Revisor’s notes. —

The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1984 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982, and in 1984, 1990, 1995, 2008, and 2016 to make other minor word changes.

Administrative Code. —

For health and social services, see 7 AAC.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57(b), ch. 16, SLA 2021, provides that the 2021 changes made by ch. 16, SLA 2021, apply to minors subject to AS 47.12.030(a) , as amended by sec. 22, ch. 16, SLA 2021, and AS 47.12.100 “who are held in a facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a facility operated by the Department of Health and Social Services on or after July 9, 2021.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 16, SLA 2021 (HB 105), the basis of a number of amendments to this title relating to juveniles and criminal justice, see 2021 House Journal 181 — 182.

Chapter 05. Administration of Welfare, Social Services, and Institutions.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

Article 1. General Administrative Provisions.

Sec. 47.05.010. Duties of department.

The Department of Health and Social Services shall

  1. administer adult public assistance, the Alaska temporary assistance program, and all other assistance programs, and receive and spend money made available to it;
  2. adopt regulations necessary for the conduct of its business and for carrying out federal and state laws granting adult public assistance, temporary cash assistance, diversion payments, or self-sufficiency services for needy families under the Alaska temporary assistance program, and other assistance;
  3. establish minimum standards for personnel employed by the department and adopt necessary regulations to maintain those standards;
  4. require those bonds and undertakings from persons employed by it that, in its judgment, are necessary, and pay the premiums on them;
  5. cooperate with the federal government in matters of mutual concern pertaining to adult public assistance, the Alaska temporary assistance program, and other forms of public assistance;
  6. make the reports, in the form and containing the information, that the federal government from time to time requires;
  7. cooperate with the federal government, its agencies, or instrumentalities in establishing, extending, and strengthening services for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and neglected children in danger of becoming delinquent, and receive and expend funds available to the department by the federal government, the state, or its political subdivisions for that purpose;
  8. cooperate with the federal government in adopting state plans to make the state eligible for federal matching in appropriate categories of assistance, and in all matters of mutual concern, including adoption of the methods of administration that are found by the federal government to be necessary for the efficient operation of welfare programs;
  9. adopt regulations, not inconsistent with law, defining need, prescribing the conditions of eligibility for assistance, and establishing standards for determining the amount of assistance that an eligible person is entitled to receive; the amount of the assistance is sufficient when, added to all other income and resources available to an individual, it provides the individual with a reasonable subsistence compatible with health and well-being; an individual who meets the requirements for eligibility for assistance shall be granted the assistance promptly upon application for it;
  10. grant to a person claiming or receiving assistance and who is aggrieved because of the department’s action or failure to act, reasonable notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ), and the department shall adopt regulations relative to this;
  11. enter into reciprocal agreements with other states relative to public assistance, welfare services, and institutional care that are considered advisable;
  12. establish the requirements of residence for public assistance, welfare services, and institutional care that are considered advisable, subject to the limitations of other laws of the state, or law or regulation imposed as conditions for federal financial participation;
  13. establish the divisions and local offices that are considered necessary or expedient to carry out a duty or authority assigned to it and appoint and employ the assistants and personnel that are necessary to carry on the work of the divisions and offices, and fix the compensation of the assistants or employees, except that a person engaged in business as a retail vendor of general merchandise, or a member of the immediate family of a person who is so engaged, may not serve as an acting, temporary, or permanent local agent of the department, unless the commissioner of health and social services certifies in writing to the governor, with relation to a particular community, that no other qualified person is available in the community to serve as local welfare agent; for the purposes of this paragraph, a “member of the immediate family” includes a spouse, child, parent, brother, sister, parent-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law;
  14. provide education and health-related services and referrals designed to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and the number of induced pregnancy terminations in the state;
  15. investigate reports of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property by certified nurse aides in facilities licensed by the department under AS 47.32;
  16. establish state policy relating to and administer federal programs subject to state control as provided under 42 U.S.C. 3001 — 3058ee (Older Americans Act of 1965), as amended, and related federal regulations;
  17. administer the older Alaskans service grants under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 and the adult day care and family respite care grants under AS 47.65.100 ;
  18. actively seek to recruit quality foster parents and adoptive parents when a shortage of quality foster parents or adoptive parents exists.

History. (§ 51-1-3(a) — (m) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 1 ch 63 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 175 SLA 1968; am § 2 ch 136 SLA 1970; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 120 — 122 ch 59 SLA 1982; am §§ 8 — 10 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 6 ch 119 SLA 1984; am §§ 29 — 32 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 8 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 17 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 1 ch 34 SLA 2008; am E.O. No. 116, § 6 (2012); am § 2 ch 7 4SSLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For special procedures, see 7 AAC 5, art. 3.

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For permanent fund dividend distribution, see 7 AAC 38.

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 5.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.

For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.

For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.

For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.

For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.

For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.

For rates for mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 16.

For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.

For substance abuse rehabilitative services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 18.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.

For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.

For chiropractic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 25.

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.

For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.

For telemedicine applications, see 7 AAC 43, art. 30.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.

For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.

For federal heating assistance program, see 7 AAC 44, art. 1.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

For chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48, art. 2.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.

For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.

For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.

For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54, art. 2.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For family and youth services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 2.

For alcohol safety action program services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 3.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

For services to the blind or visually impaired, see 7 AAC 82.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.

For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.

For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.

For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.

For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.

For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.

For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.

For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.

For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.

For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.

For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.

For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.

For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (15).

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, added paragraphs (16) and (17).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (10), substituted “office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “department” following “for a fair hearing by the”.

The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, added (18), and made a related change.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979); Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015).

Collateral references. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Health, §§ 1 et seq., 19-44

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Funds, § 53

70A Am. Jur. 2d, Social Security and Medicare, § 1 et seq.

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, § 1 et seq.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 1-51.

Sec. 47.05.012. Material incorporated by reference.

Under AS 44.62.245(a)(2) , in adopting or amending a regulation that incorporates a document or other material by reference, the department may incorporate future amended versions of the document or other material if the document or other material is one of the following:

  1. a document that is published, compiled, or prepared by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and is included in the following list:
    1. the international classification of diseases, clinical modifications;
    2. the common procedure coding system;
    3. the specifications for national uniform billing data elements;
    4. the federal poverty guidelines for the state;
    5. the Indian Health Service encounter rates; or
    6. the relative value units used in the Medicare program for determination of fee schedules;
  2. the current procedural terminology for physicians published by the American Medical Association;
  3. the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association;
  4. the length of stay in hospitals by diagnosis and operation for the western region of the United States, published by Solucient;
  5. the relative value guide published by the American Society of Anesthesiologists;
  6. the consumer price index published by the United States Department of Labor;
  7. the health plan employer data and information set published by the National Committee for Quality Assurance;
  8. practice standards adopted by the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Diabetes Association, American Cancer Society, American Academy of Family Physicians, American College of Physicians, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, or the National Asthma Education and Prevention Program;
  9. the compendium of animal rabies prevention and control published by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
  10. the control of communicable diseases manual published by the American Public Health Association;
  11. the standards manual and interpretative guidelines for behavioral health, employment and community support services, and for medical rehabilitation published by the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitative Facilities;
  12. consumer assessment of health plans published by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research;
  13. resources for optimal care of the injured patient published by the Committee on Trauma, American College of Surgeons;
  14. a document related to a resuscitation protocol that is published, compiled, or prepared based on the recommendations from the International Liaison Committee on Resuscitation;
  15. the preferred drug list adopted by the department under AS 47.07.065(b) ; or
  16. a prior authorization medications list under a state program permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (Title XIX, Social Security Act).

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1998; am § 15 ch 20 SLA 2002; am § 68 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 9 ch 59 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 2012; am § 5 ch 18 SLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Administrative Code. —

For trauma centers and trauma registry, see 7 AAC 26, art. 7.

For control of diseases of public health importance, see 7 AAC 27, art. 1.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.

For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For public health services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, inserted “prevention and” and “, 2002,” in paragraph (9).

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, deleted “2002” following “prevention and control” in paragraph (9).

The 2012 amendment, effective August 22, 2012, added (14) and made a related stylistic change.

The 2019 amendment, effective August 9, 2019, added (15) and (16) and made related stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.05.015. Contracts.

  1. The department may contract with a person or local government for the delivery of services to be provided by the department under AS 47.05.010 if the commissioner determines the service will be provided at less cost to the state or will be provided in a more effective manner.
  2. Services that may be provided by contract under this section include accepting applications for assistance, conducting interviews, making eligibility determinations, and issuing benefits, but do not include adoption of program standards or other matters involving the exercise of agency discretion.
  3. A contract authorized under this section is exempt from the competitive bid requirements of AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code). In awarding a contract under this section the department shall request proposals in accordance with regulations of the Department of Administration under AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).
  4. This section does not limit the authority provided by law for the department to contract for the delivery of services other than those provided under AS 47.05.010 .

History. (§ 11 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 57 ch 106 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Sec. 47.05.017. Home care providers.

  1. State money may not be used for a home care provider unless criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 is requested for the provider within 10 business days after the provider is hired to provide the care and is reviewed within five business days after it is received. The department shall require the grantee or contractor to do the information request and review required under this subsection for a home care provider employed by a person who has a grant or contract from the department to provide home care services.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations identifying actions that it will take, in addition to those otherwise required under AS 47.17 and AS 47.24, when a report of harm is made under AS 47.17 or AS 47.24 that might relate to harm caused by actions or inactions of a public home care provider. The regulations must
    1. address circumstances under which the department will, or will require a contractor or grantee to, reassign, suspend, or terminate a person alleged to have perpetrated harm;
    2. include appropriate procedural safeguards to protect the due process rights of public home care providers who may be reassigned, suspended, or terminated under the circumstances described in (1) of this subsection; and
    3. if the home care provider is a certified nurse aide, include procedures under which the department shall notify the Board of Nursing if the nurse aide is suspected of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property.
  3. In this section, “public home care provider” means a person who is paid by the state, or by an entity that has contracted with the state or received a grant from state funds, to provide homemaker services, chore services, personal care services, home health care services, or similar services in or around a client’s private residence or to provide respite care in either the client’s residence or the caregiver’s residence or facility.

History. (§ 2 ch 45 SLA 1994; am § 9 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 23 SLA 2004)

Cross references. —

P.L. 105-277, division A, Sec. 101(b) (title I, Sec. 124(a)), 112 Stat. 2681-50, 2681-73, provided that: “A nursing facility or home health care agency may submit a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange of [criminal history records corresponding to the fingerprints or other identification information submitted] regarding an applicant for employment if the employment position is involved in direct patient care.”

Administrative Code. —

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective April 24, 2004, in subsection (a), substituted “criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 is” for “records under AS 12.62.035(a) are” and made related changes in the first sentence, and substituted “information” for “records” in the second sentence.

Sec. 47.05.020. Regulations concerning records; disclosure of information.

  1. The power of the department to adopt regulations includes the power to adopt and enforce reasonable regulations governing the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, files, and communications of the department. The regulations must provide that financial information concerning an eligibility determination of a person applying for or receiving cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services under the Alaska temporary assistance program shall be disclosed to a legislator on request of the legislator in connection with official purposes within the scope of the legislator’s legislative functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law. When, under the law, names and addresses of recipients of public assistance are furnished to or held by another agency or department of government, the agency or department of government shall adopt regulations necessary to prevent the publication of the lists or their use for purposes not directly connected with the administration of public assistance and legislative functions. A legislator to whom information relating to the Alaska temporary assistance program is disclosed under this section may not further disclose the information except to another legislator and then only in connection with official purposes within each legislator’s legislative functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law.
  2. In addition to any access to public assistance records authorized under (a) of this section, the department shall provide a copy of a public assistance record prepared or maintained by or on behalf of the department to the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, upon the request of the respective agency. If the record is in an electronic data base, the department shall provide the requesting agency with either access to the data base, or a copy of the information in the data base and a statement certifying its contents. The agency receiving the information under this subsection may use the information only for child support purposes authorized under law.

History. (§ 51-1-3(n) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 33 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 145 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 7 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed repeal of (b) of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.

Collateral references. —

Communications to social worker as privileged. 50 ALR3d 563.

Confidentiality of records as to recipients of public welfare. 54 ALR3d 768.

Sec. 47.05.030. Misuse of public assistance lists and records.

  1. Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this section and for purposes directly connected with the administration of general assistance, adult public assistance, the day care assistance program authorized under AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 , or the Alaska temporary assistance program, and in accordance with the regulations of the department, a person may not solicit, disclose, receive, make use of, or authorize, knowingly permit, participate in, or acquiesce in the use of, a list of or names of, or information concerning, persons applying for or receiving the assistance directly or indirectly derived from the records, papers, files, or communications of the department or subdivisions or agencies of the department, or acquired in the course of the performance of official duties.
  2. It is not a violation of (a) of this section for the department or an employee of the department to disclose to a legislator, or for a legislator to solicit, receive, or make use of, financial information concerning an eligibility determination of a person applying for or receiving cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services under the Alaska temporary assistance program if the disclosure, solicitation, receipt, and use are for official purposes in connection with the legislator’s official functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law. Information provided to a legislator under this subsection shall remain confidential and may not be further disclosed except as provided in AS 47.05.020 .
  3. It is not a violation of (a) of this section for the department or an employee of the department to disclose information to the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, if the receiving agency requests the information only for purposes authorized under AS 47.05.020 .

History. (§ 51-1-3(o) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 56 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 6 ch 272 SLA 1976; am §§ 34, 35 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 146 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 74 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 8 ch 69 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 9 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.009” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.002 — 47.25.009.

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in (c) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

In 2016, in subsection (a), “and (c)” was added following ‘‘provided in (b)’’ to correct a manifest error of omission in ch. 87, SLA 1997.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed repeal of (c) of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.

Notes to Decisions

The legislature has made disclosure of welfare records unlawful. It has left no room for the exercise of agency discretion to decide whether or not records not directly connected with the administration of welfare programs should be produced in compliance with a court order. Mace v. Jung, 386 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1963), overruled, Adkins v. Lester, 530 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1974), overruled in part, Adkins v. Lester, 530 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1974).

Quoted in

Hertz v. Hertz, 847 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1993).

Sec. 47.05.032. Disclosures to legislators.

A legislator to whom confidential information is disclosed under AS 47.05.020 47.05.030 is not subject to a penalty for further disclosure of the information unless, at the time the information was provided to the legislator, the legislator was given written notification that the material was confidential.

History. (§ 36 ch 107 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

Sec. 47.05.040. Consent to conditions of federal programs.

In order to take advantage of the training grants provisions of 42 U.S.C. 301 — 1397f (Social Security Act), as amended, the state, through the department, consents and agrees to all conditions required by federal statute and regulation necessary for the state to participate fully in the training grants or other programs.

History. (§ 4 ch 133 SLA 1957)

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

Sec. 47.05.050. Cooperation with federal government.

It is the public policy of the state to cooperate and coordinate with the United States government and its agencies in providing for and administering federal and state laws for adult public assistance and the other assistance that is provided for or extended to the people of the state.

History. (§ 51-1-4 ACLA 1949; am § 12 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

For subsidized adoption and subsidized guardianship payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 2.

Sec. 47.05.055. Certified nurse aides.

  1. If the department has reason to believe that a certified nurse aide employed in a facility licensed by the department under AS 47.32 as a hospital or nursing home has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property in connection with the person’s duties as a certified nurse aide at the facility, the department shall investigate the matter. The department shall conduct proceedings to determine whether a finding of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property should be made. These proceedings shall be conducted under AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 . A finding under this subsection that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property shall be reported by the department to the Board of Nursing.
  2. If the certified nurse aide is employed in a skilled nursing facility or nursing facility, other than an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, that is participating in the Medicaid or Medicare program, only the state survey and certification agency may make, and report to the Board of Nursing, a finding that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property in connection with the nurse aide’s employment at the facility.

History. (§ 10 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 18 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 14 ch 42 SLA 2013)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, in subsection (a) substituted “under AS 47.32 as a hospital or nursing home” for “under AS 18.20” and made a stylistic change.

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.

Sec. 47.05.060. Purpose and policy relating to children.

The purpose of this title as it relates to children is to secure for each child the care and guidance, preferably in the child’s own home, that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen the child’s family ties unless efforts to preserve and strengthen the ties are likely to result in physical or emotional damage to the child, removing the child from the custody of the parents only as a last resort when the child’s welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the child is removed from the family, to secure for the child adequate custody and care and adequate planning for permanent placement of the child. It is the policy of the state to acknowledge and take into account the principles of early childhood and youth brain development and, whenever possible, consider the concepts of early adversity, toxic stress, childhood trauma, and the promotion of resilience through protective relationships, supports, self-regulation, and services.

History. (§ 2 ch 152 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 29 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 75 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added the last sentence.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under former AS 47.10.280 .

Protection of children is the paramount purpose governing enactment of laws pertaining to children’s courts and institutions. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Child in Need of Aid proceedings are designed to protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well-being. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).

No actionable duty in tort. —

In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).

Notions of benevolent protective policies cannot be used to validate departures from positive law relating to the adjudicative and dispositive phases of children’s proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Nor to justify dispensing with constitutional safeguards. —

The benevolent social theory supposedly underlying children’s court acts does not furnish justification for dispensing with constitutional safeguards. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Hearing required. —

So long as a child remains a a ward of the court the parents are entitled to review of the order terminating rights upon a showing of good cause. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

Denial of Rita T. Hearing. —

Superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying father a Rita T. hearing when he subsequently sought to withdraw his relinquishment of parental rights; the record demonstrated that the father did not have the ability to properly care for the special needs of his children. Alden H. v. Office of Children's Servs., 108 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2005).

The purpose of the supervision or treatment contemplated by the creation of the child in need of supervision [now child in need of aid] and its predecessor noncriminal delinquency was reintegration of the child into her family and resumption of parental custody including parental control. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).

Applied in

Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981); E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).

Quoted in

In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1986); In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987); In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).

Stated in

D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).

Cited in

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018); State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 47.05.065. Legislative findings related to children.

The legislature finds that

  1. parents have the following rights and responsibilities relating to the care and control of their child while the child is a minor:
    1. the responsibility to provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care;
    2. the right and responsibility to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, including the right to direct the child’s medical care and the right to exercise reasonable corporal discipline;
    3. the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live;
    4. the right and responsibility to make decisions of legal or financial significance concerning the child;
    5. the right to obtain representation for the child in legal actions; and
    6. the responsibility to provide special safeguards and care, including appropriate prenatal and postnatal protection for the child;
  2. it is the policy of the state to strengthen families and to protect children from child abuse and neglect; the state recognizes that, in some cases, protection of a child may require removal of the child from the child’s home; however,
    1. except in those cases involving serious risk to a child’s health or safety, the Department of Health and Social Services should provide time-limited family support services to the child and the child’s family in order to offer parents the opportunity to remedy parental conduct or conditions in the home that placed the child at risk of harm so that a child may return home safely and permanently; and
    2. the state also recognizes that when a child is removed from the home, visitation between the child and the child’s parents or guardian and family members reduces the trauma for the child and enhances the likelihood that the child will be able to return home; therefore, whenever a child is removed from the parental home, the Department of Health and Social Services should encourage frequent, regular, and reasonable visitation of the child with the child’s parent or guardian and family members;
  3. it is the policy of the state to recognize that, when a child is a ward of the state, the child is entitled to reasonable safety, adequate care, and adequate treatment and that the Department of Health and Social Services as legal custodian and the child’s guardian ad litem as guardian of the child’s best interests and their agents and assignees, each should make reasonable efforts to ensure that the child is provided with reasonable safety, adequate care, and adequate treatment for the duration of time that the child is a ward of the state;
  4. it is in the best interests of a child who has been removed from the child’s own home for the state to apply the following principles in resolving the situation:
    1. the child should be placed in a safe, secure, and stable environment;
    2. the child should not be moved unnecessarily;
    3. a planning process should be followed to lead to permanent placement of the child;
    4. every effort should be made to encourage psychological attachment between the adult caregiver and the child;
    5. frequent, regular, and reasonable visitation with the parent or guardian and family members should be encouraged;
    6. parents and guardians must actively participate in family support services so as to facilitate the child’s being able to remain in the home; when children are removed from the home, the parents and guardians must actively participate in family support services to make return of their children to the home possible; and
    7. to the extent practicable, the Department of Health and Social Services should enable a child’s contact with previous out-of-home caregivers when appropriate and in the best interests of the child;
  5. numerous studies establish that
    1. children undergo a critical attachment process before the time they reach six years of age;
    2. a child who has not attached with an adult caregiver during this critical stage will suffer significant emotional damage that frequently leads to chronic psychological problems and antisocial behavior when the child reaches adolescence and adulthood; and
    3. it is important to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that all children, especially those under the age of six years, who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes expeditiously.

History. (§ 14 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to this section, see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (4)(G) and made related changes.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Child’s continuous residence with foster parents. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that among several factors, many of which weighed equally between the parties, the child’s continuous residence with foster parents for 30 of his 37 months by the end of trial took on the most importance; this did not amount to a single factor outweighing all others in applying the “best interests of the child” standard and accorded with the finding in AS 47.05.065 (5)(C). In re Adoption of Bernard A., 77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003).

In father’s suit claiming that a social worker and supervisor failed to comply with CINA procedures, qualified immunity applied to bar most of father’s state law tort claims because the social worker and her supervisor acted within the scope of their authority and discretion; subsection (4)(A) of this section precluded father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008).

Reinstatement of parental rights. —

Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because it was not clearly erroneous to find that the mother and her sister were similarly situated with respect to their bonds with the child, who had lived with the sister; over two years passed between the initial reinstatement order and the superior court's supplemental findings, and the superior court most heavily weighed the child's emotional well-being, namely his ability to maintain all familial bonds. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).

Child’s need for permanency. —

Superior court may consider a child’s need for permanency at the time of a termination trial when making its best interest determination, as the legislature has recognized that children under six can suffer significant emotional damage if they do not have permanency in their lives. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).

Young children have unique needs for permanency and bonding. At the time of termination, the child was only eight months old. He had spent his entire life in his grandmother’s care and had developed a strong bond with his grandmother and his older sister. It was in his best interests to remain with the grandmother, and the best interests of the child, not the parent, are paramount. Mother had not bonded with her son and had continued her long-time abuse of cocaine both during and after the pregnancy. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father a termination trial continuance because the father showed no serious prejudice by showing the father could timely remedy conduct causing the father's child to be in need of aid, as (1) a short continuance did not provide enough time for needed services, and (2) a long continuance was not in the child's best interests. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Consideration of necessary factors. —

Remand on the mother's request for reinstatement of parental rights was necessary because, despite stating it considered the factors in this section, the court did not make any findings about the child's best interest. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Because the disputed factual findings supporting the best interests determination were not material or not clearly erroneous, the decision granting a mother reinstatement of her parental rights had to be affirmed; the superior court made findings about the child's age, his attachment to caregivers, his opportunities to maintain visitation with those to whom he was bonded, the safety, security, and stability of the mother's home, and the necessity of moving the child from his placement. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).

Stated in

Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).

Cited in

M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008); Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009); Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.05.070. Third party liability subrogation.

  1. The department may not pay medical claims that are payable by a third party payor. Medical providers shall attempt collection from the third party payor before billing Medicaid. Before payment by Medicaid, evidence of third-party denial or partial payment shall be presented with the claim.
  2. When the department provides or pays for medical assistance for injury or illness under this title, the department is subrogated to not more than the part of an insurance payment or other recovery by the recipient that is for medical expenses provided by the department. Notwithstanding the assertion of any action or claim by the recipient of medical assistance, the department may bring an action in the superior court against an alleged third-party payor to recover an amount subrogated to the department for medical assistance provided on behalf of a recipient.
  3. If a recipient of medical assistance under this title settles a claim or obtains an award or judgment arising from the injury or illness for which the medical assistance was received, the amount of the claim to which the department is entitled under (b) of this section shall be reduced by a pro rata share of the attorney fees and litigation costs. Regardless of the manner in which the amount of the attorney fees is derived in the particular case, the pro rata reduction of the subrogated claim for reimbursement of attorney fees shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable rules of court governing the award of attorney fees in civil matters.
  4. The department is authorized to enter into contracts for the collection of medical expenses already paid by Medicaid from potential third-party payors. The department may pay, from the funds recovered by the contractor, any amounts owing to the federal government as its share of the Medicaid paid claim, and the costs of collecting the funds.
  5. [Repealed, § 9 ch 96 SLA 2006.]
  6. The department may adopt regulations to interpret and implement this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 105 SLA 1986; am §§ 6 — 8 ch 85 SLA 2000; am §§ 2, 9 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Cross references. —

For applicability of the 2000 amendments of subsections (b) and (c), and the addition of subsections (e) and (f), see sec. 10(b), ch. 85, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary & Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, rewrote subsection (b) and repealed subsection (e).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional amendment of (b) of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 2, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 2, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 47.05.071. Duty of a medical assistance recipient.

  1. A medical assistance recipient shall cooperate with and assist the department in identifying and providing information concerning third parties who may be liable to pay for care and services received by the recipient under the medical assistance program.
  2. As a condition of medical assistance eligibility, a person who applies for medical assistance shall, at the time of application,
    1. assign to the department the applicant’s rights of payment for care and services from any third party to the extent the department has paid medical assistance for care and services;
    2. cooperate with and assist the department in identifying and providing information concerning third parties who may be liable to pay for care and services received by the recipient under the medical assistance program; and
    3. agree to make application for all other available third-party resources that may be used to provide or pay for the cost of care or services received by the medical assistance recipient or that may be used to finance reimbursement to the state for the cost of care or services received by the medical assistance recipient; a medical assistance recipient is under no duty to file a civil or other action for the purpose of reimbursing the state for the cost of care or services.

History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Sec. 47.05.072. Duty of attorney for medical assistance recipient.

  1. An attorney representing a medical assistance recipient shall notify the attorney general’s office.
  2. The notice to the attorney general’s office required under (a) of this section includes submission of the following:
    1. identification of the medical assistance recipient’s name, last known address, and telephone number, and the date of the injury or illness giving rise to the action or claim;
    2. copies of the pleadings and other papers related to the action or claim;
    3. the identification of each potentially liable third party, including that party’s name, last known address, and telephone number;
    4. the identification of any insurance policy potentially responsive to the action or claim; and
    5. a description of the facts and circumstances supporting the action or claim.
  3. An attorney who represents a medical assistance recipient shall give the attorney general’s office notice within 30 days of any judgment, award, or settlement in an action or claim by the medical assistance recipient to recover damages for an injury or illness that has resulted in the department’s providing or paying for medical assistance.
  4. If a medical assistance recipient is handling the action or claim on a pro se basis, the provisions of this section apply as if the medical assistance recipient were an attorney representing the medical assistance recipient.

History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Sec. 47.05.073. Judgment, award, or settlement of a medical assistance lien.

  1. A medical assistance recipient may not maintain any rights to payment for medical costs as a result of a judgment, award, or settlement of an action or claim for which another person may be legally obligated to pay without first making repayment to the department for costs of past medical assistance services provided to or paid for on behalf of the medical assistance recipient that relate to that action or claim.
  2. A medical assistance recipient may not place any payment as a result of a judgment, award, or settlement of an action or claim for which another person was legally obligated to pay because of injury or illness into any trust for the purpose of maintaining public assistance or medical assistance eligibility without first making repayment to the department for costs of past medical assistance services provided to the medical assistance recipient related to that action or claim.
  3. The attorney general may only discharge a medical assistance lien under AS 47.05.075 if the discharge complies with federal law.
  4. Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, a third-party payor shall have no further liability if it settles or compromises a dispute in good faith and without knowledge that the individual is a recipient of medical assistance.

History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Sec. 47.05.074. Conflict with federal requirements.

If any provision of this chapter related to subrogation, assignment, or lien conflicts with federal law concerning the Medicaid program or receipt of federal money to finance the medical assistance program, the provision does not apply to the extent of the conflict.

History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Sec. 47.05.075. Medical assistance lien.

  1. The department has a lien upon any sum that may be due to the recipient of medical assistance from a third-party payor. The lien is in the amount of the medical assistance paid for medical services under this title, together with reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the enforcement of the lien.
  2. A lien against a sum due from a third-party payor for medical services provided to a recipient of medical assistance under this title attaches and is effective upon filing with a recorder’s office in any recording district in the state. However, a lien filed under this subsection is not perfected and has no effect unless notice of filing of the lien is served by the department upon the third-party payor, personally or by registered, certified, or insured mail, return receipt requested.
  3. If a recipient of medical assistance under this title settles a claim or obtains an award or judgment arising from the injury or illness for which the medical assistance was received, the amount of the lien to which the department is entitled under (a) of this section shall be reduced by a pro rata share of the attorney fees and litigation costs. Regardless of the manner in which the amount of the attorney fees is derived in the particular case, the pro rata reduction of the lien shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable rules of court governing the award of attorney fees in civil matters.
  4. A perfected lien under this section has priority over all other liens except tax liens and a lien perfected for attorney fees and costs.

History. (§ 9 ch 85 SLA 2000; am § 4 ch 96 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “over all other liens except tax liens and a lien perfected for attorney fees and costs” for “immediately after a lien perfected by a hospital, nurse, or physician under AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 ” in subsection (d).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional amendment of (d) of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 4, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 4, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.

Sec. 47.05.080. Recovery of overpayments.

  1. Except for overpayments recovered under AS 47.07 that cover the value of services paid from federal sources, benefit overpayments collected by the department in administering public assistance programs under AS 47.05.010 shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue under AS 37.10.050(a) .
  2. The permanent fund dividend of a former recipient of a public assistance program listed under (a) of this section may be taken under AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.170 to satisfy the balance due on a defaulted overpayment claim.

History. (§ 91 ch 36 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 35 SLA 1995; am § 37 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 10 SLA 2016)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2018, “AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.170 ” was substituted for “AS 43.23.065(b)(6) and 43.23.068 ” to reflect the renumbering of those sections.

Cross references. — For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 10, SLA 2016, see 2016 Senate Journal 1611 — 1612.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote (a).

Editor's notes. — Under sec. 2, ch. 10, SLA 2016, the changes made to subsection (a) in sec. 1, ch. 10, SLA 2016, apply to “to the recovery of benefit overpayments for public assistance programs administered by the Department of Health and Social Services under AS 47.05.010 , regardless of whether the overpayments occurred before, on, or after July 1, 2016.”

Sec. 47.05.085. Subpoena power.

  1. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee at the director level may issue subpoenas to compel the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records considered necessary as evidence in connection with an investigation under or the administration of AS 47.07 (medical assistance), AS 47.08 (assistance for catastrophic illnesses and acute or chronic medical conditions), AS 47.25 (day care assistance, child care grants, general relief, adult public assistance, and food stamps), and AS 47.27 (Alaska temporary assistance program).
  2. In case of refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person under (a) of this section, the superior court may, upon application by the department, issue an order requiring the person to appear before the department to produce evidence if ordered. Failure to obey the order of the court is punishable as contempt.
  3. A person who, without just cause, fails or refuses to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records, if it is in the person’s power to do so, in obedience to a subpoena of the department or an authorized representative of it, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $200, or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by both. Each day the failure or refusal continues is a separate offense.

History. (§ 2 ch 97 SLA 2004)

Sec. 47.05.090. Authorization of the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance.

  1. The Department of Health and Social Services may, on behalf of the state, enter into the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance and supplementary agreements with agencies of other states for the provision of adoption and medical assistance under AS 47.07 and other provisions of this title for eligible children with special needs.
  2. In this section, “state” includes a state, territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.

History. (§ 15 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Sec. 47.05.100. Monthly reports concerning children.

By the 15th day of each month, the Department of Health and Social Services shall provide a report summarizing child protection activities carried out during the previous calendar month and the status of children committed to the department’s custody, including information on the number and type of reports of child abuse and neglect received, the outcome of investigations completed, the number of placements of children committed to the department’s custody, and the number of foster homes licensed. The report shall be made accessible to the public through the Internet.

History. (§ 15 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Sec. 47.05.105. Enhanced computerized eligibility verification system.

  1. The department shall establish an enhanced computerized income, asset, and identity eligibility verification system for the purposes of verifying eligibility, eliminating duplication of public assistance payments, and deterring waste and fraud in public assistance programs administered by the department under AS 47.05.010 . Nothing in this section prohibits the department from verifying eligibility for public assistance through additional procedures or authorizes the department or a third-party vendor to use data to verify eligibility for a federal program if the use of that data is prohibited by federal law.
  2. The department shall enter into a competitively bid contract with a third- party vendor for the purpose of developing a system under this section to prevent fraud, misrepresentation, and inadequate documentation when determining an applicant’s eligibility for public assistance before the payment of benefits and for periodically verifying eligibility between eligibility redeterminations and during eligibility redeterminations and reviews. The department may also contract with a third-party vendor to provide information to facilitate reviews of recipient eligibility and income verification.
  3. The annual savings to the state resulting from the use of the system under this section must exceed the cost of implementing the system. A contract under this section must require the third-party vendor to report annual savings to the state realized from implementing the system. Payment to the third-party vendor may be based on a fee for each applicant and may include incentives for achieving a rate of success established by the department for identifying duplication, waste, and fraud in public assistance programs.
  4. To avoid a conflict of interest, the department may not award a contract to provide services for the enrollment of public assistance providers or applicants under this title to a vendor that is awarded a contract under this section.

History. (§ 39 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 39, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect September 19, 2016.

Article 2. Oversight of Medical Care Programs.

Sec. 47.05.200. Annual audits.

  1. The department shall annually contract for independent audits of a statewide sample of all medical assistance providers in order to identify overpayments and violations of criminal statutes. The audits conducted under this section may not be conducted by the department or employees of the department. The number of audits under this section may not be less than 50 each year. The audits under this section must include both on-site audits and desk audits and must be of a variety of provider types. The department may not award a contract under this subsection to an organization that does not retain persons with a significant level of expertise and recent professional practice in the general areas of standard accounting principles and financial auditing and in the specific areas of medical records review, investigative research, and Alaska health care criminal law. The contractor, in consultation with the commissioner, shall select the providers to be audited and decide the ratio of desk audits and on-site audits to the total number selected. In identifying providers who are subject to an audit under this section, the department shall attempt to minimize concurrent state or federal audits.
  2. Within 90 days after receiving each audit report from an audit conducted under this section, the department shall begin administrative procedures to recoup overpayments identified in the audits and shall allocate the reasonable and necessary financial and human resources to ensure prompt recovery of overpayments unless the attorney general has advised the commissioner in writing that a criminal investigation of an audited provider has been or is about to be undertaken, in which case, the commissioner shall hold the administrative procedure in abeyance until a final charging decision by the attorney general has been made. The commissioner shall provide copies of all audit reports to the attorney general so that the reports can be screened for the purpose of bringing criminal charges. The department may assess interest and penalties on any identified overpayment. Interest under this subsection shall be calculated using the statutory rates for postjudgment interest accruing from the date of the issuance of the final agency decision to recoup overpayments identified in the audit. In this subsection, the date of issuance of the final agency decision is the later of the date of
    1. the department’s written notification of the decision and the provider’s appeal rights; or
    2. if timely appealed by the provider, a final agency decision under AS 44.64.060 .
  3. Each fiscal year, the state’s share of recovered overpayments obtained because of the required contract audits under this section shall be deposited with the commissioner of revenue under AS 37.10.050 and separately accounted for by the commissioner of administration under AS 37.05.142 . The legislature may appropriate a portion of the estimated balance in the account to the department to pay for the annual audits described in this section.
  4. As a condition of obtaining payment under AS 47.07 and AS 47.08 and for purposes of this section, a provider shall allow
    1. the department reasonable access to the records of medical assistance recipients and providers; and
    2. audit and inspection of the records by state and federal agencies.
  5. This section does not preclude the department from performing audits that are allowed or required under other laws.

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003; am §§ 40, 41 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, in (a), inserted “may not be less than 50” preceding “each year”, deleted “, as a total for the medical assistance programs under AS 47.07 and AS 47.08, shall be .75 percent of all enrolled providers under the programs, adjusted annually on July 1, as determined by the department, except that the number of audits under this section may not be less than 75” following “each year”, added the last sentence; in (b), added the language beginning “The department may assess interest” to the end of the subsection.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Smart v. State, 237 P.3d 1010 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 47.05.210. Medical assistance fraud.

  1. A person commits the crime of medical assistance fraud if the person
    1. knowingly submits or authorizes the submission of a claim to a medical assistance agency for property, services, or a benefit with reckless disregard that the claimant is not entitled to the property, services, or benefit;
    2. knowingly prepares or assists another person to prepare a claim for submission to a medical assistance agency for property, services, or a benefit with reckless disregard that the claimant is not entitled to the property, services, or benefit;
    3. except as otherwise authorized under the medical assistance program, confers, offers to confer, solicits, agrees to accept, or accepts property, services, or a benefit
      1. to refer a medical assistance recipient to a health care provider; or
      2. for providing health care to a medical assistance recipient if the property, services, or benefit is in addition to payment by a medical assistance agency;
    4. does not produce medical assistance records to a person authorized to request the records;
    5. knowingly makes a false entry in or falsely alters a medical assistance record;
    6. knowingly destroys, mutilates, suppresses, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a medical assistance record knowing that the person lacks the authority to do so; or
    7. violates a provision of AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 or a regulation adopted under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08.
  2. Medical assistance fraud under (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section is
    1. a class B felony if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is $25,000 or more;
    2. a class C felony if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is $500 or more but less than $25,000;
    3. a class A misdemeanor if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is less than $500.
  3. Medical assistance fraud under (a)(4), (5), or (6) of this section is a class A misdemeanor.
  4. Medical assistance fraud under (a)(7) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.

Sec. 47.05.220. Notice of charges.

Upon the filing of a complaint, information, presentment, or indictment charging a medical assistance provider with a crime under AS 47.05.210 , the attorney general shall, in writing, notify the commissioner of the filing. Upon receiving notice from the attorney general under this section, the commissioner shall immediately undertake a review of all unpaid claims or requests for reimbursements attributable to services claimed to have been provided by the person charged.

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

Sec. 47.05.230. Determination of value; aggregation of amounts.

In AS 47.05.210 , whenever it is necessary to determine the value of property, that value shall be determined in accordance with AS 11.46.980 . In determining the degree or classification of a crime described under AS 47.05.210 , amounts involved in criminal acts committed under one course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, shall be aggregated.

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Sec. 47.05.235. Duty to identify and repay self-identified overpayments.

  1. Unless a provider is being audited under AS 47.05.200(a) , an enrolled medical assistance provider shall conduct a biennial review or audit of a statistically valid sample of claims submitted to the department for reimbursement. If overpayments are identified, the medical assistance provider shall report the overpayment to the department not later than 10 business days after identification of the overpayment. The report must also identify how the medical assistance provider intends to repay the department. After the department receives the report, the medical assistance provider and the department shall enter into an agreement establishing a schedule for repayment of the identified overpayment. The agreement may authorize repayment in a lump sum, in a payment plan, or by offsetting future billings, as approved by the department.
  2. The department may not assess interest or penalties on an overpayment identified and repaid by a medical assistance provider under this section.

History. (§ 42 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 42, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.

Sec. 47.05.240. Exclusion from medical assistance programs.

  1. The commissioner may exclude an applicant to or disenroll a medical assistance provider in the medical assistance program in AS 47.07 or AS 47.08, or both, for a period of up to 10 years after unconditional discharge on a conviction
    1. for medical assistance fraud under AS 47.05.210 or misconduct involving a controlled substance under AS 11.71; or
    2. in a court of the United States or a court of another state or territory, for a crime with elements similar to the crimes included under (1) of this subsection.
  2. After a period of exclusion under (a) of this section, an applicant may not participate in a medical assistance program under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 until the applicant establishes to the commissioner by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant possesses all required licenses and certificates and is qualified to participate.

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.

Sec. 47.05.250. Civil penalties.

  1. The department may assess a civil penalty against a provider who violates this chapter, AS 47.07, or regulations adopted under this chapter or AS 47.07.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations establishing a range of civil penalties that the department may assess against a provider under this section. In establishing the range of civil penalties, the department shall take into account appropriate factors, including the seriousness of the violation, the service provided by the provider, and the severity of the penalty. The regulations may not provide for a civil penalty of less than $100 or more than $25,000 for each violation.
  3. The provisions of this section are in addition to any other remedies available under this chapter, AS 47.07, or regulations adopted under this chapter or AS 47.07.
  4. A provider against whom a civil penalty of less than $2,500 is assessed may appeal the decision assessing the penalty to the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish time limits and procedures for an appeal under this subsection. The decision of the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee may be appealed to the office of administrative hearings established under AS 44.64.
  5. A provider against whom a civil penalty of $2,500 or more is assessed may appeal the decision assessing the penalty to the office of administrative hearings established under AS 44.64.

History. (§ 43 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 43, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.

Sec. 47.05.270. Medical assistance reform program.

  1. The department shall adopt regulations to design and implement a program for reforming the state medical assistance program under AS 47.07. The reform program must include
    1. referrals to community and social support services, including career and education training services available through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development under AS 23.15, the University of Alaska, or other sources;
    2. electronic distribution of an explanation of medical assistance benefits to recipients for health care services received under the program;
    3. expanding the use of telehealth for primary care, behavioral health, and urgent care;
    4. enhancing fraud prevention, detection, and enforcement;
    5. reducing the cost of behavioral health, senior, and disabilities services provided to recipients of medical assistance under the state’s home and community-based services waiver under AS 47.07.045 ;
    6. pharmacy initiatives;
    7. enhanced care management;
    8. redesigning the payment process by implementing fee agreements that include one or more of the following:
      1. premium payments for centers of excellence;
      2. penalties for hospital-acquired infections, readmissions, and outcome failures;
      3. bundled payments for specific episodes of care; or
      4. global payments for contracted payers, primary care managers, and case managers for a recipient or for care related to a specific diagnosis;
    9. stakeholder involvement in setting annual targets for quality and cost-effectiveness;
    10. to the extent consistent with federal law, reducing travel costs by requiring a recipient to obtain medical services in the recipient’s home community, to the extent appropriate services are available in the recipient’s home community;
    11. guidelines for health care providers to develop health care delivery models supported by evidence-based practices that encourage wellness and disease prevention.
  2. The department shall, in coordination with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, efficiently manage a comprehensive and integrated behavioral health program that uses evidence-based, data-driven practices to achieve positive outcomes for people with mental health or substance abuse disorders and children with severe emotional disturbances. The goal of the program is to assist recipients of services under the program to recover by achieving the highest level of autonomy with the least dependence on state-funded services possible for each person. The program must include
    1. a plan for providing a continuum of community-based services to address housing, employment, criminal justice, and other relevant issues;
    2. services from a wide array of providers and disciplines, including licensed or certified mental health and primary care professionals; and
    3. efforts to reduce operational barriers that fragment services, minimize administrative burdens, and reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.
  3. The department shall identify the areas of the state where improvements in access to telehealth would be most effective in reducing the costs of medical assistance and improving access to health care services for medical assistance recipients. The department shall make efforts to improve access to telehealth for recipients in those locations. The department may enter into agreements with Indian Health Service providers, if necessary, to improve access by medical assistance recipients to telehealth facilities and equipment.
  4. On or before November 15 of each year, the department shall prepare a report and submit the report to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available. The report must include
    1. realized cost savings related to reform efforts under this section;
    2. realized cost savings related to medical assistance reform efforts undertaken by the department other than the reform efforts described in this section;
    3. a statement of whether the department has met annual targets for quality and cost-effectiveness;
    4. recommendations for legislative or budgetary changes related to medical assistance reforms during the next fiscal year;
    5. changes in federal laws that the department expects will result in a cost or savings to the state of more than $1,000,000;
    6. a description of any medical assistance grants, options, or waivers the department applied for in the previous fiscal year;
    7. the results of demonstration projects the department has implemented;
    8. legal and technological barriers to the expanded use of telehealth, improvements in the use of telehealth in the state, and recommendations for changes or investments that would allow cost-effective expansion of telehealth;
    9. the percentage decrease in costs of travel for medical assistance recipients compared to the previous fiscal year;
    10. the percentage decrease in the number of medical assistance recipients identified as frequent users of emergency departments compared to the previous fiscal year;
    11. the percentage increase or decrease in the number of hospital readmissions within 30 days after a hospital stay for medical assistance recipients compared to the previous fiscal year;
    12. the percentage increase or decrease in state general fund spending for the average medical assistance recipient compared to the previous fiscal year;
    13. the percentage increase or decrease in uncompensated care costs incurred by medical assistance providers compared to the percentage change in private health insurance premiums for individual and small group health insurance;
    14. the cost, in state and federal funds, for providing optional services under AS 47.07.030(b) ;
    15. the amount of state funds saved as a result of implementing changes in federal policy authorizing 100 percent federal funding for services provided to American Indian and Alaska Native individuals eligible for Medicaid, and the estimated savings in state funds that could have been achieved if the department had fully implemented the changes in policy.
  5. In this section, “telehealth” means the practice of health care delivery, evaluation, diagnosis, consultation, or treatment, using the transfer of health care data through audio, visual, or data communications, performed over two or more locations between providers who are physically separated from the recipient or from each other or between a provider and a recipient who are physically separated from each other.

History. (§ 43 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Except for paragraphs (a)(5), (8), and (10), this section took effect under sec. 43, ch. 25, SLA 2016, on September 19, 2016. Paragraphs (a)(5), (8), and (10) were subject to a condition and took effect September 15, 2017, under secs. 43, and 61 — 64, ch. 25, SLA 2016, after the condition was satisfied.

Sec. 47.05.290. Definitions.

In AS 47.05.200 47.05.290 ,

  1. “benefit” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  2. “claim” includes a request for payment for medical assistance services under applicable state or federal law or regulations, whether the request is in an electronic format or paper format or both;
  3. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  4. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  5. “falsely alters” has the meaning given in AS 11.46.580 ;
  6. “knowingly” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  7. “makes a false entry” has the meaning given in AS 11.56.820 ;
  8. “medical assistance agency” means the department, an agency of the department, and an agent, contractor, or designee of the department or of one of its agencies that performs one or more of the activities of the department or an agency of the department;
  9. “medical assistance program” means a program under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08;
  10. “medical assistance provider” or “provider” means a person or organization that provides, attempts to provide, or claims to have provided services or products to a medical assistance recipient that may qualify for reimbursement under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 or a person or organization that participates in or has applied to participate in a medical assistance program as a supplier of a service or product;
  11. “medical assistance recipient” means a person on whose behalf another claims or receives a payment from a medical assistance agency, without regard to whether the individual was eligible for benefits under a medical assistance program;
  12. “medical assistance record” means records required to be kept by state or federal law or regulation regarding claims to a medical assistance agency;
  13. “organization” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  14. “person” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  15. “property” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  16. “reckless disregard” means acting recklessly, as that term is defined in AS 11.81.900 ;
  17. “services” or “medical assistance services” means a health care benefit that may qualify for reimbursement under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08, including health care benefits provided, attempted to be provided, or claimed to have been provided to another, by a medical assistance provider, or “services” as defined in AS 11.81.900 ;
  18. “unconditional discharge” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Article 3. Criminal and Civil History.

Cross references. —

Section 53 ch. 57, SLA 2005, directs that the provisions of AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 apply to (1) applications or requests submitted within the 30 days before, or submitted on or after, the effective date of AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 for initial licensure, certification, or other approval or selection; and (2) applications or requests submitted within the 30 days before, or submitted on or after, the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 for renewal of a license, certification, or other approval or selection for an entity or individual service provider that is subject to those sections. It further provides that the Department of Health and Social Services may not make a final determination regarding an application or request described in sec. 53 (a) earlier than the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390.

For transitional provisions regarding applications for licenses or approvals under the chapter that were submitted more than 30 days before the effective date of AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 , see § 57, ch. 57, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2018 changes to AS 47.05.300 - 47.05.390 , see sec. 26, ch. 69, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.05.300. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of AS 47.05.310 47.05.390 apply to any individual or entity that is required by statute or regulation to be licensed or certified by the department or that is eligible to receive payments, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department.
  2. Those individual service providers subject to AS 47.05.310 47.05.390 under (a) of this section include
    1. public home care providers described in AS 47.05.017 ;
    2. providers of home and community-based waiver services financed under AS 47.07.030(c) ; and
    3. case managers to coordinate community mental health services under AS 47.30.530 .

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2018 changes to AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 , see sec. 26, ch. 69, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 69, SLA 2018 (SB 81), which was the basis for changes to AS 47.05.300 - 47.05.390 , see 2017 Senate Journal 452 — 454.

Sec. 47.05.310. Criminal history; criminal history check; compliance.

  1. If an individual has been charged with, convicted of, found not guilty by reason of insanity for, or adjudicated as a delinquent for, a crime that is inconsistent with the standards for licensure or certification established by the department by regulation, that individual may not own an entity, or be an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns an entity. In addition, an entity may not
    1. allow that individual to operate the entity;
    2. hire or retain that individual at the entity as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity;
    3. allow that individual to reside in the entity if not a recipient of services; or
    4. allow that individual to be present in the entity if the individual would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, unless that individual is a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
  2. The department may not issue or renew a license or a certification for an entity or an individual that is in violation of (a) of this section or that would be in violation based on the information received as part of the application process.
  3. [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
  4. An entity or an individual shall provide to the department a release of information authorization for a criminal history check under this section for each individual who is not a recipient of services from the entity, who is not  in the custody of the department, and, after the entity applies for or has been issued a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal by the department,
    1. who intends to become an owner of the entity, or an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns the entity;
    2. whom the entity intends to hire or retain as the operator of the entity’s business;
    3. whom the entity intends to hire or retain as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity; or
    4. who will be present in the entity or at the places of operation of the entity, and would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, but who is not a family member or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
  5. An individual for whom a release of information authorization has been provided to the department shall submit the individual’s fingerprints to the department, with the fee established under AS 12.62.160 , for a report of criminal justice information under AS 12.62 and for submission by the Department of Public Safety to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check. The Department of Public Safety shall provide the report of criminal justice information and the results of the national criminal history record check to the department for its use in considering an application for a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal, or in considering other approval or selection regarding an entity or individual, for compliance with the standards established in this section. The department may waive the requirement for fingerprint submission if an individual is unable to provide fingerprints due to a medical or physical condition that is documented by a licensed physician.
  6. The provisions of this section do not apply if the department grants an exception from a requirement of (a) — (e) of this section under a regulation adopted by the department or if the department  grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 .
  7. The department shall adopt regulations listing those criminal offenses that are inconsistent with the standards for licensure or certification by the department.
  8. For purposes of this section, in place of nonissuance or nonrenewal of a license or certification, an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department or a person wishing to become an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department is ineligible to receive a payment, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department if the entity or individual is in violation of this section or would be in violation of this section based on information received by the department as part of an application, approval, or selection process.
  9. [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
  10. An individual who possesses a valid teacher certificate issued under AS 14.20.015 14.20.025 and applies to work at a facility licensed or certified by the Department of Education and Early Development or who applies to work in a child care facility or residential child care facility in a position as a certificated teacher with supervised access may request that the individual’s criminal justice information and national criminal history record check on file with the Department of Education and Early Development be used to satisfy the requirements of (d) and (e) of this section.
  11. A person is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil or criminal liability if the person
    1. makes a report of medical assistance fraud, abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
    2. submits information to a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 ; or
    3. fails to hire or retain an employee or unsupervised volunteer because the employee or unsupervised volunteer is included in a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 .
  12. The department may issue or renew a foster home license under AS 47.32 or provide payments under AS 47.14.100(b) or (d) to an entity, individual service provider, or person if the applicant or a person who resides in the home is barred from licensure or payment under (c), (i)(2), or (i)(3) of this section and
    1. a person in the home is an adult family member or family friend of a child in the custody or supervision of the state under AS 47.10;
    2. the department finds that placing the child with the entity, individual service provider, or person is in the best interests of the child; and
    3. the conduct that is the basis of the finding under (c), (i)(2), or (i)(3) of this section occurred at least 10 years before the date the department receives the application for licensure or renewal or makes a payment to the entity, individual service provider, or person.
  13. In this section,
    1. “adult family member” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990 ;
    2. “child care facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.25.095 ;
    3. “foster home” has the meaning given in AS 47.32.900 ;
    4. “residential child care facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.32.900 ;
    5. “supervised access” means that a supervisor maintains a prudent level of awareness of the whereabouts of the individual for whom supervised access is required to ensure the protection of recipients of services.

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 19 ch 2 SSSLA 2015; am § 4 — 7 ch 15 SLA 2018; am §§ 4 — 9, 25 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

Subsection (k) was enacted as ( l ); relettered in 2018, at which time (k) was relettered as (m). Paragraphs (m)(1) and (3) were enacted as (4) and (5); renumbered in 2018, at which time other paragraphs were renumbered to maintain alphabetical consistency.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendments to this section, see sec. 22(b), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective October 7, 2015, added (j) and (k) [now (m)].

The first 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (k)(4) and (5) [now (m)(1) and (3)]; added ( l ).

The second 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, repealed (c); in the introductory language in (d), inserted “or an individual” following “An entity”, substituted “check under this section for each individual” for “check for an individual”, inserted “, who is not in the custody of the department” following “after the entity” and inserted “applies for or” preceding “has been issued”, made a stylistic change in (d)(4); in (e), inserted “or individual” following “regarding an entity” near the end of the second sentence, deleted the former third sentence, which read, “For purposes of obtaining access to criminal justice information maintained by the Department of Public Safety under AS 12.62, the department is a criminal justice agency conducting a criminal justice activity.”; in (f), added “or if the department grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 ” at the end; rewrote (h); repealed (i); added ( l ) [now (k)].

Editor's notes. —

Under secs. 4 and 5, ch. 15, SLA 2018, effective September 5, 2018, former subsections (c) and (i) were amended. Under sec. 25, ch. 69, SLA 2018, effective September 25, 2018, former subsections (c) and (i) were repealed. The repeals were given effect.

Sec. 47.05.320. Criminal history use standards.

The department shall by regulation establish standards for the consideration and use by the department, an entity, or an individual service provider of the criminal history of an individual obtained under AS 47.05.310 .

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.05.325. Civil history; civil history check; compliance.

  1. The department shall establish by regulation civil history standards for denial of issuance or renewal of a license or certification for an individual or for an entity if the individual who is applying for a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal is
    1. a biological or adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or Indian custodian of a child who is or was the subject of a child-in-need-of-aid petition under AS 47.10 and the individual had custody of the child at the time the child was the subject of a petition; or
    2. the subject of a finding or circumstance described in AS 47.05.330(a) .
  2. If an individual is the subject of a petition or finding or circumstance described in (a) of this section, or a substantially similar provision in another jurisdiction, the individual may not own an entity or be an officer, director, partner, member, employee, or principal of the business organization that owns an entity. In addition, an entity may not
    1. allow that individual to operate the entity;
    2. hire or retain that individual at the entity as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity;
    3. allow that individual to reside in the entity, unless that individual receives services from the entity or is in the custody of the state; or
    4. allow that individual to be present in the entity if the individual would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, unless that individual is a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
  3. An entity or an individual shall provide to the department a release of information authorization for a civil history check under this section for each individual who is not a recipient of services from the entity, who is not in the custody of the department, and, after the entity applies for or has been issued a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal by the department,
    1. who intends to become an owner of the entity, or an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns the entity;
    2. whom the entity intends to hire or retain as the operator of the entity’s business;
    3. whom the entity intends to hire or retain as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity; or
    4. who will be present in the entity or at the places of operation of the entity, and would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, but who is not a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
  4. For purposes of this section, in place of nonissuance or nonrenewal of a license or certification, an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department or a person wishing to become an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department is instead ineligible to receive a payment, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department if the entity or individual is in violation of this section or would be in violation of this section based on information received by the department as part of an application, approval, or selection process.
  5. The department shall by regulation identify other governmental agencies or political subdivisions of the state that can request information that is required under this section for a similar purpose.
  6. The provisions of this section do not apply if the department grants an exception from the requirements of (a) or (b) of this section under a regulation adopted by the department or if the department grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 .
  7. A person is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil and criminal liability if the person
    1. makes a report of medical assistance fraud, abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
    2. submits information to a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 ; or
    3. fails to hire or retain an employee or unsupervised volunteer because the employee or unsupervised volunteer is included in a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 .
  8. The department shall by regulation establish standards for the consideration and use by the department, an entity, or an individual of the civil history of an individual obtained under this section.

History. (§ 10 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 28, ch. 69, SLA 2018 makes this section effective July 25, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 47.05.330. Identification of civil history databases for a civil history check; confidentiality.

  1. The department shall by regulation identify each database the department will review when conducting a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 to identify each individual
    1. whom a court or the department has found
      1. to have committed abuse, neglect, undue influence, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult;
      2. under AS 47.32 or regulations adopted under AS 47.32, to have significantly adversely affected the health, safety, or welfare of an individual who is receiving a service from an entity licensed under AS 47.32; a finding described in this subparagraph includes a decision to revoke, suspend, or deny a license or license renewal, or the relinquishment of a license as part of a settlement agreement;
    2. who has been subject to criminal or civil penalties for a violation of AS 09.58, AS 47.05, AS 47.07, AS 47.08, or regulations adopted under AS 09.58, AS 47.05, AS 47.07, or AS 47.08;
    3. about whom the department or a court has made a substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect under AS 47.10 or AS 47.14;
    4. who was a biological or adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or Indian custodian of a child at the time the child was the subject of a child-in-need-of- aid petition under AS 47.10;
    5. who, in the course of employment with the state, has been terminated from employment or has had an allegation of assaultive, abusive, neglectful, or exploitive behavior or actions substantiated;
    6. who, in this state or another jurisdiction, for reasons related to abuse, neglect, undue influence, exploitation, or other reasons that are inconsistent with standards for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare, has had a professional license, certification, or similar professional designation revoked, suspended, or denied, or has had a request for renewal of a professional license, certification, or similar professional designation denied;
    7. whom another state or jurisdiction has identified on a civil registry or database substantially similar to the databases identified under this section for reasons substantially similar to the reasons identified in (1) — (6) of this subsection.
  2. The information gathered under this section is not a public record under AS 40.25.110 and is not subject to public inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.125 . However, information gathered under this section may be released to an entity, an individual who is included in a database, a governmental agency, and a political subdivision of the state in a manner provided under this section and regulations adopted under this chapter.

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 11 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, rewrote the section.

Sec. 47.05.340. Regulations.

The department shall adopt regulations to implement AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 .

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.

Sec. 47.05.350. Use of information; immunity.

An entity that obtains information about an employee under a criminal history check under AS 47.05.310 or a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 may use that information only as provided for in regulations adopted by the department under this chapter. However, if an entity reasonably relies on the information provided under the regulations adopted by the department to deny employment to an individual who was selected for hire as an employee, including during a period of provisional employment, the entity is not liable in an action brought by the individual based on the employment determination resulting from the information.

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 12 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in the first sentence, deleted “or individual service provider” following “An entity”, inserted “or a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 ” following “history check under AS 47.05.310 ”, and substituted “this chapter” for “AS 47.05.320 ” at the end, in the second sentence, twice deleted “or individual service provider” following “entity”.

Sec. 47.05.360. Variance request; final decision.

  1. An individual or entity subject to the provisions of AS 47.05.310 or 47.05.325 may request a variance from the provisions of AS 47.05.310 or 47.05.325 under procedures established by the department by regulation. The procedures must include the establishment of a variance committee to consider requests for variances. A request for a variance may include a request that the department issue a written explanation of incorrect information contained in the civil history databases identified under AS 47.05.330 .
  2. An individual or entity that is dissatisfied with a decision by a variance committee may, not more than 30 days after the committee issues the decision, apply to the commissioner for reconsideration of the decision. A determination by the commissioner is a final agency decision for purposes of appeal to the superior court.
  3. The department shall disclose information and records pertaining to a child subject to AS 47.10 or AS 47.17 to a variance committee as provided under AS 47.10.093(b) .

History. (§ 13 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 28, ch. 69, SLA 2018 makes this section effective July 25, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 47.05.390. Definitions.

In AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 , unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
  2. [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
  3. [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
  4. “criminal justice information” has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;
  5. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  6. “entity” means an entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) or an individual service provider as described in AS 47.05.300 and includes an owner, officer, director, member, or partner of the entity;
  7. “individual service provider” means an individual described in AS 47.05.300(a) , and includes those listed in AS 47.05.300(b) ;
  8. “license” includes a provisional license;
  9. “unsupervised” means that an individual who is licensed under AS 47.32, after submitting a criminal history background check, is not physically present to observe the volunteer at the entity.

History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 14, 25 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, repealed (1) – (3), in (6), inserted “or an individual service provider as described in AS 47.05.300 ” following “listed in AS 47.32.010(b) ”.

Chapter 07. Medical Assistance for Needy Persons.

Administrative Code. —

For Medicaid assistance eligibility, see 7 AAC 100. For Medicaid coverage and payment, see 7 AAC 105 — 7 AAC 160.

Sec. 47.07.010. Purpose.

It is declared by the legislature as a matter of public concern that the needy persons of this state who are eligible for medical care at public expense under this chapter should seek only uniform and high quality care that is appropriate to their condition and cost-effective to the state and receive that care, regardless of race, age, national origin, or economic standing. It is equally a matter of public concern that providers of services under this chapter should operate honestly, responsibly, and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations in order to maintain the integrity and fiscal viability of the state’s medical assistance program, and that those who do not operate in this manner should be held accountable for their conduct. It is vital that the department administer this chapter in a manner that promotes effective, long-term cost containment of the state’s medical assistance expenditures while providing medical care to recipients. Accordingly, this chapter authorizes the department to apply for participation in the national medical assistance program as provided for under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act).

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 4 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective September 9, 2003, rewrote the first sentence, added the second sentence, and in the last sentence substituted “department” for “Department of Health and Social Services.”

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003); Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).

Collateral references. —

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, §§ 33-38.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 231-269.

Criminal prosecution or disciplinary action against medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under Medicaid, Medicare or similar welfare program for providing medical services. 50 ALR3d 549, 70 ALR4th 132.

Imposition of civil penalties, under state statute, upon medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under medicaid, medicare, or similar welfare programs providing medical services. 32 ALR4th 671.

Criminal liability of pharmacy or pharmacist for welfare fraud in connection with supplying prescription drugs. 16 ALR5th 390.

Sec. 47.07.020. Eligible persons.

  1. All residents of the state for whom the Social Security Act requires Medicaid coverage are eligible to receive medical assistance under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act).
  2. In addition to the persons specified in (a) of this section, the following optional groups of persons for whom the state may claim federal financial participation are eligible for medical assistance:
    1. persons eligible for but not receiving assistance under any plan of the state approved under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act, Supplemental Security Income) or a federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
    2. persons in a general hospital, skilled nursing facility, or intermediate care facility, who, if they left the facility, would be eligible for assistance under one of the federal programs specified in (1) of this subsection;
    3. persons under 21 years of age who are under supervision of the department, for whom maintenance is being paid in whole or in part from public funds, and who are in foster homes or private child-care institutions;
    4. aged, blind, or disabled persons, who, because they do not meet income and resources requirements, do not receive supplemental security income under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act), and who do not receive a mandatory state supplement, but who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility to receive an optional state supplementary payment;
    5. persons under 21 years of age who are in an institution designated as an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities and who are financially eligible as determined by the standards of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
    6. persons in a medical or intermediate care facility whose income while in the facility does not exceed 300 percent of the supplemental security income benefit rate under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act) but who would not be eligible for an optional state supplementary payment if they left the hospital or other facility;
    7. persons under 21 years of age who are receiving active treatment in a psychiatric hospital and who are financially eligible as determined by the standards of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
    8. persons under 21 years of age and not covered under (a) of this section, who would be eligible for benefits under the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program, except that they have the care and support of both their natural and adoptive parents;
    9. pregnant women not covered under (a) of this section and who meet the income and resource requirements of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
    10. persons under 21 years of age not covered under (a) of this section who the department has determined cannot be placed for adoption without medical assistance because of a special need for medical or rehabilitative care and who the department has determined are hard-to-place children eligible for subsidy under AS 25.23.190 25.23.210 ;
    11. persons who can be considered under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(e)(3) (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) to be individuals with respect to whom a supplemental security income is being paid under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act) because they meet all of the following criteria:
      1. they are 18 years of age or younger and qualify as disabled individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a) (Title XVI, Social Security Act);
      2. the department has determined that
        1. they require a level of care provided in a hospital, nursing facility, or intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities;
        2. it is appropriate to provide their care outside of an institution; and
        3. the estimated amount that would be spent for medical assistance for their individual care outside an institution is not greater than the estimated amount that would otherwise be expended individually for medical assistance within an appropriate institution;
      3. if they were in a medical institution, they would be eligible for medical assistance under other provisions of this chapter; and
      4. home and community-based services under a waiver approved by the federal government are either not available to them under this chapter or would be inappropriate for them;
    12. disabled persons, as described in 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIII), who are in families whose income, as determined under applicable federal regulations or guidelines, is less than 250 percent of the official poverty line applicable to a family of that size according to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and who, but for earnings in excess of the limit established under 42 U.S.C. 1396d(q)(2)(B), would be considered to be individuals with respect to whom a supplemental security income is being paid under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c; a person eligible for assistance under this paragraph who is not eligible under another provision of this section shall pay a premium or other cost-sharing charges according to a sliding fee scale that is based on income as established by the department in regulations;
    13. persons under 19 years of age who are not covered under (a) of this section and whose household income does not exceed 175 percent of the federal poverty line as defined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);
    14. pregnant women who are not covered under (a) of this section and whose household income does not exceed 175 percent of the federal poverty line as defined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);
    15. persons who have been diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer and who are eligible for coverage under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII).
  3. Receipt of medical assistance under this chapter is considered to be an additional benefit to these individuals and does not affect other assistance payments, federal or state, for which the recipient is eligible.
  4. Additional groups may not be added unless approved by the legislature.
  5. Notwithstanding (b)(4) of this section, a person is not eligible for Medicaid benefits until a final determination is made on the eligibility of that person for benefits under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act).
  6. A person may not be denied eligibility for medical assistance under this chapter on the basis of a diversion of income or transfer of assets, whether by assignment or after receipt of the income, into a Medicaid-qualifying trust or annuity that, according to a determination made by the department,
    1. has provisions that require that the state will receive all of the trust or annuity assets remaining at the death of the individual, subject to a maximum amount that equals the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual; and
    2. otherwise meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4) for a trust and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F) and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(e)(1) for an annuity.
  7. A person’s eligibility for medical assistance under this chapter may not be denied or delayed on the basis of a transfer of assets for less than fair market value if the person establishes to the satisfaction of the department that the denial or delay would work an undue hardship on the person as determined on the basis of criteria in applicable federal regulations.
  8. A person who meets the eligibility requirements of (a) or (b) of this section, except that the person is a qualified alien as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1641, is eligible for medical assistance unless the person is not eligible under the limited eligibility provision of 8 U.S.C. 1613.
  9. The department may allow a person under 19 years of age who is determined to be eligible for benefits under this chapter to remain eligible for those benefits for up to 11 calendar months following the month that the person is determined eligible for benefits or until the person is 19 years old, whichever occurs earlier.
  10. [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]
  11. [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]
  12. Notwithstanding the eligibility provisions under (a) and (b) of this section, a person may not receive medical assistance under this section unless the person first enrolls in the Medicare program under 42 U.S.C. 1395 to the extent that the person is eligible to receive benefits and services under the program.
  13. Except as provided in (g) of this section, the department shall impose a penalty period of ineligibility for the transfer of an asset for less than fair market value by an applicant or an applicant’s spouse consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1).
  14. [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 105 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 117 SLA 1975; am § 1 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 11 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 132 SLA 1982; am § 13 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 3 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 119 SLA 1988; am § 38 ch 168 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1993; am § 17 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 38 — 42 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 130 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 2 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 9 SLA 2003; am § 2 ch 31 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 34 SLA 2003; am § 85 ch 56 SLA 2005; am §§ 6, 7 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 2007; am § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008; am § 1 ch 81 SLA 2010; am § 15 ch 42 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (j), (k), and (n) were repealed by § 1, ch. 39, SLA 2008 before they took effect.

Cross references. —

For exclusion of certain funds from income calculation of certain long-term care facility residents, see AS 47.45.400 .

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.

For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.

For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.

For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.

For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.

For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.

For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.

For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.

For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.

For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.

For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.

For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.

For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of subsection (h) by § 1, ch. 82, SLA 1997 (CSHB 153 (FIN)), see 1997 House Journal 442. For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of paragraphs (b)(13) and (14) and subsection (i) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 34, SLA 2003 (SB 105), which amended (d) and added former subsection (f), see 2003 Senate Journal 389 — 390.

Notes to Decisions

Retroactive application of eligibility rules. —

State did not err by temporarily denying a mother’s Medicaid application filed in September 2008 under AS 47.07.020(m) because she had transferred funds to her son in February 2007 based upon the then-existing Medicaid eligibility rules. The legislature’s retroactive change to the eligibility rules was valid, the State was not equitably estopped from applying those rules, and the application of the rules did not violate the mother’s constitutional rights. Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).

Cited in

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015); State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes limiting or barring public health care to indigent aliens. 113 ALR5th 95.

Sec. 47.07.025. Assignment of medical support rights.

  1. An applicant for or recipient of assistance under this chapter is considered to have assigned to the state, through the department and the child support services agency, all rights to accrued and continuing medical support that the applicant and other persons for whom assistance is sought may have from all sources. The assignment takes effect upon a determination that the applicant is eligible for assistance under this chapter. Except with respect to the amount of any unpaid medical support obligation accrued under the assignment, the assignment under this section terminates when the applicant ceases to receive assistance under this chapter.
  2. Through the child support services agency or on its own behalf, the department may garnish the wages, salary, or other employment income of a person who
    1. is required by a medical support order, cash medical support order, or both, under AS 25.27.060(c) to provide insurance or cash coverage of the costs of medical care to a child who is eligible for medical assistance under this chapter;
    2. has received payment from a third party for the costs of the services; and
    3. has not used the payments to reimburse, as appropriate, the other parent or custodian of the child, the provider of the services, or the department.
  3. Garnishment under (b) of this section is limited to the amount necessary to reimburse the department for expenditures for the child under this chapter. Claims for current support or support arrearages take priority over claims under this section.

History. (§ 18 ch 102 SLA 1994; am § 22 ch 106 SLA 2000; am § 11 ch 45 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (a) and (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Cross references. —

For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (b)(1), added “, cash medical support order, or both,” following “medical support order”, and “insurance or cash” following “under AS 25.27.060(c) to provide”.

Sec. 47.07.030. Medical services to be provided.

  1. The department shall offer all mandatory services required under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
  2. [See conditional effective date note.]  In addition to the mandatory services specified in (a) of this section and the services provided under (d) of this section, the department may offer only the following optional services: case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury; case management and nutrition services for pregnant women; personal care services in a recipient’s home; emergency hospital services; long-term care noninstitutional services; medical supplies and equipment; advanced practice registered nurse services; clinic services; rehabilitative services for children eligible for services under AS 47.07.063 , substance abusers, and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults; targeted case management services; inpatient psychiatric facility services for individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age; psychologists’ services; clinical social workers’ services; marital and family therapy services; professional counseling services; midwife services; prescribed drugs; physical therapy; occupational therapy; chiropractic services; low- dose mammography screening, as defined in AS 21.42.375(e) ; hospice care; treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders; adult dental services; prosthetic devices and eyeglasses; optometrists’ services; intermediate care facility services, including intermediate care facility services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities; skilled nursing facility services for individuals under 21 years of age; and reasonable transportation to and from the point of medical care.
  3. Notwithstanding (b) of this section, the department may offer a service for which the department has received a waiver from the federal government if the department was authorized, directed, or requested to apply for the waiver by law or by a concurrent or joint resolution of the legislature.
  4. The department shall establish as optional services a primary care case management system or a managed care organization contract in which certain eligible individuals are required to enroll and seek approval from a case manager or the managed care organization before receiving certain services. The purpose of a primary care case management system or managed care organization contract is to increase the use of appropriate primary and preventive care by medical assistance recipients while decreasing the unnecessary use of specialty care and hospital emergency department services. The department shall
    1. establish enrollment criteria and determine eligibility for services consistent with federal and state law; the department shall require recipients with multiple hospitalizations to enroll in a primary care case management system or with a managed care organization under this subsection, except that the department may exempt recipients with chronic, acute, or terminal medical conditions from the requirement under this paragraph;
    2. define the coordinated care services and the provider types eligible to participate as primary care providers;
    3. create a performance and quality reporting system; and
    4. integrate the coordinated care demonstration projects described under AS 47.07.039 and the demonstration projects described under AS 47.07.036(e) with the primary care case management system or managed care organization contract established under this subsection.
  5. The department shall provide the services set out in (a) and (b) of this section to an eligible person, notwithstanding the person’s participation in an approved clinical trial. In this subsection, “approved clinical trial” has the meaning given in AS 21.42.415 .
  6. When the department authorizes the purchase of durable medical equipment under this section, the department may require a recipient of medical assistance services to purchase used or refurbished durable medical equipment if used or refurbished durable medical equipment
    1. is available;
    2. is less expensive, including shipping, than new durable medical equipment of the same type;
    3. is able to withstand at least three years of use; and
    4. equally meets the needs of the recipient.
  7. For purposes of medical assistance coverage, the department may require behavioral health clinic services to be provided by or under the direct supervision of a physician licensed under AS 08.64. In this subsection, “direct supervision” means that a physician licensed under AS 08.64 is available, either in person or by a communication device, to
    1. provide clinical consultation or oversight to the supervisee;
    2. approve behavioral health treatment plans;
    3. review each case to determine the need for continued care;
    4. ensure that the services provided to recipients of behavioral health clinic services are medically necessary and clinically appropriate; and
    5. assume professional responsibility for the services provided.
  8. In this section,
    1. “case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury” means services furnished to assist individuals who reside in a community setting or who are transitioning to a community setting to gain access to needed medical, social, educational, and other available services;
    2. “durable medical equipment” means equipment that
      1. can withstand repeated use;
      2. is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose;
      3. generally is not useful to an individual in the absence of an illness or injury; and
      4. is appropriate for use in the home, school, or community.
    3. “traumatic or acquired brain injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.80.529 .

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 35 SLA 1973; am § 2 ch 105 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1978; am § 25 ch 40 SLA 1981; am § 2 ch 132 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 1986; am § 4 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 2 ch 119 SLA 1988; am § 3 ch 45 SLA 1989; am § 3 ch 69 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 70 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 38 SLA 1992; am § 1 ch 110 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 51 SLA 1993; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1993; am § 2 ch 76 SLA 1993; am § 19 ch 102 SLA 1994; am § 108 ch 21 SLA 1995; am §§ 3, 4 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 5 ch 130 SLA 2002; am § 2 ch 106 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 2004; am §§ 2, 3 ch 109 SLA 2010; am § 3 ch 117 SLA 2010; am § 16 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 1 ch 26 SLA 2015; am § 44 ch 25 SLA 2016; am § 48 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 7 ch 75 SLA 2018; am § 1 ch 97 SLA 2018; am § 1 ch 18 SLA 2020)

Delayed amendment. —

Under § 1, ch. 18, SLA 2020, subsection (b) is amended to read as follows: “(b) In addition to the mandatory services specified in (a) of this section and the services provided under (d) of this section, the department may offer only the following optional services: case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury; case management and nutrition services for pregnant women; personal care services in a recipient's home; emergency hospital services; long-term care noninstitutional services; medical supplies and equipment; advanced practice registered nurse services; clinic services; rehabilitative services for children eligible for services under AS 47.07.063 , substance abusers, and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults; targeted case management services; inpatient psychiatric facility services for individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age; psychologists' services; clinical social workers' services; marital and family therapy services; professional counseling services; midwife services; prescribed drugs; physical therapy; occupational therapy; chiropractic services; low-dose mammography screening, as defined in AS 21.42.375(e) ; hospice care; treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders; adult dental services; prosthetic devices and eyeglasses; optometrists' services; intermediate care facility services, including intermediate care facility services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities; skilled nursing facility services for individuals under 21 years of age; and reasonable transportation to and from the point of medical care.”.

Under § 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this amendment is conditional upon the commissioner of health and social services notifying the revisor of statutes in writing on or before October 1, 2021 “if the United States Department of Health and Human services approves the amendments to the state plan for medical assistance coverage under AS 47.07.030(b) , as amended by sec. 1 of this Act, and AS 47.07.900 (20), enacted by sec. 2 of this Act.” Under § 5, ch. 18, SLA 2020, if the condition occurs, the amendment of subsection (b) takes effect “on the day after the date the revisor of statutes receives notice from the commissioner of health and social services under sec. 4 of this Act.” As of October 2021, the notification had not occurred.

Revisor's notes. —

Reorganized in 2010, 2015, and 2018, to conform to the style of the Alaska Statutes; subsection (h) was enacted as (e) in 2010; subsection (f) was enacted as (g) in 2015; paragraph (h)(2) was enacted as AS 47.07.900 (20) in 2015; and subsection (g) was enacted as (h) in 2018.

Cross references. —

For provision requiring a report to the legislature on “the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the coverage of marital and family therapy services”, see sec. 9, ch. 75, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provisions relating to application for federal approval of an amended state plan to implement changes to the medical assistance program described in this chapter and the obligation of the commissioner of health and social services to notify the revisor of statutes of the date of that federal approval of the amended state plan, see §§ 3 and 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.

For a temporary provision relating to expending money for abortions that are not mandatory during the COVID-19 public health disaster emergency, see sec. 12, ch. 2, SLA 2021, in the 2021 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.

For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.

For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.

For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.

For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.

For rates for mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 16.

For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.

For substance abuse rehabilitative services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 18.

For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.

For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.

For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For chiropractic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 25.

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.

For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.

For telemedicine applications, see 7 AAC 43, art. 30.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.

For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective September 14, 2003, deleted the last two sentences in subsection (c), relating to the department annually making available to the legislature its recommendations.

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, deleted “for substance abusers, chronically mentally ill adults, and severely emotionally disturbed persons under the age of 21” following “targeted case management services” in subsection (b).

The first 2010 amendment, effective September 23, 2010, inserted “case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury;” in subsection (b); and added subsection (e) (now (f)).

The second 2010 amendment, effective September 29, 2010, added subsection (e).

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b), substituted “individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age” for “individuals age 65 or older and individuals under age 21”; substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”; substituted “under 21 years of age” for “age 21” near the end.

The 2015 amendment, effective May 20, 2015, added (g) [now (f)].

The first 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, rewrote (d).

The second 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (b), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner”.

The first 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, in (b), inserted “marital and family therapy services;” following “clinical social workers’ services;”.

The second 2018 amendment, effective November 27, 2018, added (h) [now (g)].

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter concerning the amendment of subsections (b) and (d) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.

Notes to Decisions

Dental care. —

Denial by the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Medical Assistance, of routine dental services to a severely retarded Medicaid recipient was reversed and the case was remanded for further findings, because the Department abused its discretion by failing to determine whether its “undue hardship” regulation, 7 AAC 43.080(a) [now repealed], applied; and, as the recipient made a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination under Title II (42 U.S.C.S. § 12132) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Department was obliged to consider reasonable accommodations for the recipient. Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003).

Cited in

State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

Transsexual surgery as covered operation under state medical assistance program. 2 ALR4th 775.

Limitation on right of chiropractors and osteopathic physicians to participate in public medical welfare programs. 8 ALR4th 1056.

Sec. 47.07.032. Inpatient psychiatric services for persons under 21 years of age.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 47.07.030 , the department may not grant assistance under this chapter for inpatient psychiatric services to a person under 21 years of age who is in an out-of-state psychiatric hospital facility or an out-of-state residential psychiatric treatment center unless the department determines that the assistance is for
    1. psychiatric hospital services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state; or
    2. residential psychiatric treatment center services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state.
  2. The department shall, on a monthly basis, evaluate what types of services are available in the state for inpatient psychiatric care for persons under 21 years of age. If inpatient psychiatric services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and that appropriately address the person’s needs become available at a location in the state for a person under 21 years of age who is receiving the services under this chapter at a location outside the state, the department shall, as a condition of continued eligibility for coverage of the services under this chapter, require the person to be transferred to the in-state facility unless the department determines that the transfer would be detrimental to the person’s health, established therapeutic relationship, or clinical need.

History. (§ 1 ch 137 SLA 2003)

Sec. 47.07.035. Priority of medical assistance. [Repealed, § 4 ch 106 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.07.036. Cost containment measures authorized.

  1. If the department finds that the costs of medical assistance for all persons eligible under this chapter will exceed the amount allocated in the state budget for a fiscal year, the department may implement cost containment measures to reduce anticipated program costs for that fiscal year as authorized under this section.
  2. The department, in implementing this section, shall take all reasonable steps to implement cost containment measures that do not eliminate program eligibility or the scope of services required or authorized under AS 47.07.020 and 47.07.030 before implementing cost containment measures under (c) of this section that directly affect program eligibility or coverage of services. The cost containment measures taken under this subsection may include new utilization review procedures, changes in provider payment rates, precertification requirements for coverage of services, and agreements with federal officials under which the federal government will assume responsibility for coverage of some individuals or some services for some individuals through such federal programs as the Indian Health Service or Medicare.
  3. If cost containment measures authorized under (b) of this section are insufficient to reduce the anticipated program costs for a fiscal year to the amount allocated in the state budget for the program for that fiscal year, the department may, to the extent authorized under federal law and the state’s constitution, deny any or all optional services listed in AS 47.07.030(b) — (d) to a person eligible for services under AS 47.07.020 or deny program eligibility to a person who is eligible for the medical assistance program under the optional coverage provisions of AS 47.07.020(b) — (i). However, the department may not eliminate program participation of a person who is eligible for coverage under AS 47.07.020 (a), nor may the department deny coverage of a service described in AS 47.07.030(a) for a person who is eligible for the medical assistance program under AS 47.07.020.
  4. Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, the department may
    1. apply for a section 1915(i) option under 42 U.S.C. 1396n to improve services and care through home and community-based services to obtain, at a minimum, a 50 percent federal match;
    2. apply for a section 1915(k) option under 42 U.S.C. 1396n to provide home and community-based services and support to increase the federal match for these programs from 50 percent to 56 percent;
    3. apply for a section 1945 option under 42 U.S.C. 1396w-4 to provide coordinated care through health homes for individuals with chronic conditions and to increase the federal match for the services to 90 percent for the first eight quarters the required state plan amendment is in effect;
    4. evaluate and seek permission from the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to participate in various demonstration projects, including payment reform, care management programs, workforce development and innovation, and innovative services delivery models; and
    5. provide incentives for telehealth, including increasing the capability for and reimbursement of telehealth for recipients.
  5. Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, and in addition to the projects and services described under (d) and (f) of this section, the department shall apply for a section 1115 waiver under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) to establish one or more demonstration projects focused on innovative payment models for one or more groups of medical assistance recipients in one or more specific geographic areas. The demonstration project or projects may include
    1. managed care organizations as described under 42 U.S.C. 1396u-2;
    2. community care organizations;
    3. patient-centered medical homes as described under 42 U.S.C. 256a-1; or
    4. other innovative payment models that ensure access to health care without reducing the quality of care.
  6. Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, and in addition to the projects and services described under (d) and (e) of this section, the department shall apply for a section 1115 waiver under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) to establish one or more demonstration projects focused on improving the state’s behavioral health system for medical assistance recipients. The department shall engage stakeholders and the community in the development of a project or projects under this subsection. The demonstration project or projects must
    1. be consistent with the comprehensive and integrated behavioral health program described under AS 47.05.270(b) ; and
    2. include continuing cooperation with the grant-funded community mental health clinics and drug and alcohol treatment centers that have historically provided care to recipients of behavioral health services.
  7. In this section, “telehealth” has the meaning given in AS 47.05.270(e) .

History. (§ 3 ch 106 SLA 2003; am § 45 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For a statement of legislative intent relating to ch. 106, SLA 2003, which added this section, see § 1, ch. 106, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, added (d) — (g).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 5, ch. 106, SLA 2003, provides that this section “applies only to eligibility determinations made and medical services performed on or after July 1, 2003.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 106, SLA 2003 (Senate Bill 109), adding this section, see 2003 Senate Journal 395.

Sec. 47.07.038. Collaborative, hospital-based project to reduce use of emergency department services.

History. [Repealed, § 61[d] ch 25 SLA 2016.]

Revisor's note.—

This section was enacted conditionally under secs. 46 and 61(d), ch. 25, SLA 2016. The condition was never satisfied and therefore the section never took effect. As this section was included in the statutes in anticipation of the conditional effect being satisfied, the revisor of statutes has chosen to treat the failure of the condition as a repeal to ensure that the statutory record is accurately reflected and preserved.

Sec. 47.07.039. Coordinated care demonstration projects.

  1. The department shall contract with one or more third parties to implement one or more coordinated care demonstration projects for recipients of medical assistance identified by the department. The purpose of a demonstration project under this section is to assess the efficacy of a proposed health care delivery model with respect to cost for, access to, and quality of care for medical assistance recipients. The department may contract for separate demonstration projects to coordinate care for different groups of medical assistance recipients to achieve more effective care for recipients at greater cost savings for the medical assistance program. The department shall request proposals for at least one project under this section on or before December 31, 2016, and may annually request proposals for additional projects under this section thereafter. The department may use an innovative procurement process as described under AS 36.30.308 to award a contract for a project under this section. A proposal for a demonstration project under this section must be submitted to the committee established under (b) of this section and must include three or more of the following elements:
    1. comprehensive primary-care-based management for medical assistance services, including behavioral health services and coordination of long-term services and support;
    2. care coordination, including the assignment of a primary care provider located in the local geographic area of the recipient, to the extent practical;
    3. health promotion;
    4. comprehensive transitional care and follow-up care after inpatient treatment;
    5. referral to community and social support services, including career and education training services available through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development under AS 23.15, the University of Alaska, or other sources;
    6. sustainability and the ability to achieve similar results in other regions of the state;
    7. integration and coordination of benefits, services, and utilization management;
    8. local accountability for health and resource allocation;
    9. an innovative payment process, including bundled payments or global payments.
  2. A project review committee is established in the department for the purpose of reviewing proposals for demonstration projects under this section. The project review committee consists of
    1. the commissioner of the department, or the commissioner’s designee;
    2. the commissioner of administration, or the commissioner’s designee;
    3. the chief executive officer of the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, or the chief executive officer’s designee, who shall serve as chair of the committee;
    4. two representatives of stakeholder groups, appointed by the governor for staggered three-year terms, as follows:
      1. one representative of a stakeholder group who has direct experience with health plan management and cost control for the medical assistance population;
      2. one representative of a stakeholder group who has direct experience with health plan management and cost control for a nongovernment employer of 500 or more employees in the state;
    5. a nonvoting member who is a member of the senate, appointed by the president of the senate; and
    6. a nonvoting member who is a member of the house of representatives, appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives.
  3. The department may contract with a managed care organization, primary care case manager, accountable care organization, prepaid ambulatory health plan, or provider-led entity to implement a demonstration project under this section. The fee structure for a contract under this subsection may include global payments, bundled payments, capitated payments, shared savings and risk, or other payment structures. The department shall work with the division of insurance, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, to streamline the application process for a company to obtain a certificate of authority required under AS 21.09.010 as necessary to participate in a demonstration project under this section.
  4. A proposal for a demonstration project under this section must include, in addition to the elements required under (a) of this section, information demonstrating how the project will implement additional cost-saving measures, including innovations to reduce the cost of care for medical assistance recipients through the expanded use of telehealth for primary care, urgent care, and behavioral health services. The department shall identify legal or cost barriers preventing the expanded use of telehealth and shall recommend remedies for identified barriers.
  5. The department shall contract with a third-party actuary to review demonstration projects established under this section. The actuary shall review each demonstration project after two years of implementation and make recommendations for the implementation of a similar project on a statewide basis. The actuary shall evaluate each project based on cost savings for the medical assistance program, health outcomes for participants in the project, and the ability to achieve similar results on a statewide basis. On or before December 31 of each year, starting in 2018, the actuary shall submit a final report to the department regarding any demonstration project that has been in operation for at least two years.
  6. The department shall prepare a plan regarding regional or statewide implementation of a coordinated care project based on the results of the demonstration projects under this section. On or before November 15, 2019, the department shall submit the plan to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the plan is available. On or before November 15 of each year thereafter, the department shall submit a report regarding any changes or recommendations regarding the plan developed under this subsection to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available.
  7. In this section, “telehealth” has the meaning given in AS 47.05.270(e) .

History. (§ 46 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 46, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.

Sec. 47.07.040. State plan for provision of medical assistance.

The department shall prepare a state plan in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) and submit it for approval to the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The plan shall designate that the Department of Health and Social Services is the single state agency to administer this plan. The department shall act for the state in any negotiations relative to the submission and approval of the plan. The department may make those arrangements or regulatory changes, not inconsistent with law, as may be required under federal law to obtain and retain approval of the United States Department of Health and Human Services to secure for the state the optimum federal payment under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance).

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 6 ch 105 SLA 1986; am E.O. No. 72 § 3 (1989); am § 32 ch 126 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.

For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.

For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.

For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.

For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.

For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.

For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.

For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.

For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.

For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.

For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.

For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.

For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.

For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.

For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.

For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.

For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.

For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.

For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.

For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.

For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.

For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003); Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 47.07.042. Recipient cost-sharing.

  1. Except as provided in (b) — (d) of this section, the state plan developed under AS 47.07.040 shall impose deductible, coinsurance, and copayment requirements on persons eligible for assistance under this chapter to the maximum extent allowed under federal law and regulations. The plan must provide that health care providers shall collect the allowable charge. The department shall reduce payments to each provider by the amount of the allowable charge. A provider may not deny services because a recipient is unable to share costs, but an inability to share costs imposed under this section does not relieve the recipient of liability for the costs.
  2. The state plan developed under AS 47.07.040 shall impose a copayment requirement for inpatient hospital services in an amount that is the lesser of
    1. $50 a day, up to a maximum of $200 per discharge; or
    2. the maximum allowed under federal law and regulations.
  3. If the department has clear and compelling reason to believe that application of the maximum allowable charges under (a) of this section to a specific service would not reduce state expenditures or would generate savings to the state that are insignificant in relation to the total cost containment possible, then the department may waive the charges otherwise required under (a) of this section as to that specific service.
  4. In addition to the requirements established under (a) and (b) of this section, the department may require premiums or cost-sharing contributions from recipients who are eligible for benefits under AS 47.07.020(b)(13) and whose household income is between 150 and 175 percent of the federal poverty line. If the department requires premiums or cost-sharing contributions under this subsection, the department
    1. shall adopt in regulation a sliding scale for those premiums or contributions based on household income;
    2. may not exceed the maximums allowed under federal law; and
    3. shall implement a system by which the department or its designee collects those premiums or contributions.
  5. Except as provided in (c) of this section and notwithstanding (b) of this section, the department may require premiums and other cost-sharing contributions from recipients who are eligible for assistance under AS 47.07.020(b)(15) to the maximum extent allowed by federal law. If the department requires premiums or other cost-sharing contributions under this subsection, the department shall
    1. adopt in regulation a sliding scale for those premiums or contributions based on household income; and
    2. implement a system by which the department or its designee collects the premiums or other cost-sharing contributions.
  6. [Repealed, § 3 ch 48 SLA 2007.]

History. (§ 20 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 5, 6 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 9 SLA 2003; am §§ 2, 3 ch 34 SLA 2003; am §§ 2, 3 ch 48 SLA 2007)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1998, in subsection (d), “AS 47.07.020(b)(13) ” was substituted for “AS 47.07.020(b)(12) ” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of AS 47.07.020(b)(12) .

Former subsection (f) was enacted as (e); relettered in 2003, at which time “(f) of this section” was substituted for “(e) of this section” in subsection (d).

Cross references. —

For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

For statement of legislative intent for subsection (e), see § 1, ch. 9, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts. For transitional provisions related to continued eligibility of current recipients, current program regulations, and continued eligibility for assistance under current state plan provisions until amended, see §§ 5 — 7, ch. 9, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.

For federal poverty guidelines, see aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2003 amendment, effective April 17, 2003, added subsection (e).

The second 2003 amendment, effective August 31, 2003, substituted “income is greater than the applicable amount set out in (e) of this section” for “income is between 150 and 200 percent of the federal poverty guideline” in the first sentence in subsection (d) and added subsection (f).

The 2007 amendment, effective July 10, 2007, substituted “between 150 and 175 percent of the federal poverty line” for “greater than the applicable amount set out in (f) of this section” in the first sentence of subsection (d), and repealed subsection (f).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 22, ch. 102, SLA 1994 provides that the charges provided for under this section “apply to services performed on or after July 1, 1994.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the amendment of subsection (a) and the addition of subsection (d) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 34, SLA 2003 (SB 105), which amended (d) and added (f) of this section, see 2003 Senate Journal 389—390.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 47.07.045. Home and community-based services.

  1. The department may provide home and community-based services under a waiver in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act), this chapter, and regulations adopted under this chapter, if the department has received approval from the federal government and the department has appropriations allocated for the purpose. To supplement the standards in (b) of this section, the department shall establish in regulation additional standards for eligibility and payment for the services.
  2. Before the department may terminate payment for services provided under (a) of this section
    1. the recipient must have had an annual assessment to determine whether the recipient continues to meet the standards under (a) of this section;
    2. the annual assessment must have been reviewed by an independent qualified health care professional under contract with the department; for purposes of this paragraph, “independent qualified health care professional” means,
      1. for a waiver based on intellectual or developmental disability, a person who is qualified under 42 C.F.R. 483.430 as a qualified intellectual disability professional;
      2. for other allowable waivers, a registered or advanced practice registered nurse licensed under AS 08.68 who is qualified to assess children with complex medical conditions, older Alaskans, and adults with physical disabilities for medical assistance waivers; and
    3. the annual assessment must find that the recipient’s condition has materially improved since the previous assessment; for purposes of this paragraph, “materially improved” means that a recipient who has previously qualified for a waiver for
      1. a child with complex medical conditions, no longer needs technical assistance for a life-threatening condition, and is expected to be placed in a skilled nursing facility for less than 30 days each year;
      2. intellectual or developmental disability, no longer needs the level of care provided by an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities either because the qualifying diagnosis has changed or the recipient is able to demonstrate the ability to function in a home setting without the need for waiver services; or
      3. an older Alaskan or adult with a physical disability, no longer has a functional limitation or cognitive impairment that would result in the need for nursing home placement, and is able to demonstrate the ability to function in a home setting without the need for waiver services.
  3. If a child who is financially dependent on a military service member is eligible for home and community-based services while physically present in the state, the department shall provide for home and community-based services when the child returns to the state as though the child had remained in the state if the military service member provides proof acceptable to the department that
    1. the member has maintained residency in the state for the period of eligibility; proof under this paragraph must include official military personnel records;
    2. the member and the dependent child are physically present in the state and intend to reside permanently in the state while receiving the home and community-based services;
    3. the member returned to the state within 18 months after separating from military service; and
    4. the member’s dependent child is not eligible for coverage of home and community-based services under another health insurance plan.
  4. In (c) of this section, “military” means the armed forces of the United States, the United States Coast Guard, or the Alaska National Guard.

History. (§ 8 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 17 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 10 ch 102 SLA 2014; am § 49 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For transitional provision extending program regulations on home and community-based services that are in effect on August 1, 2006, if the regulations are not inconsistent with the language and purposes of this section, see § 12, ch. 96, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts. For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 102, SLA 2014, adding subsections (c) and (d) to this section, see 2014 Senate Journal 1469 — 1470.

Administrative Code. —

For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.

For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b)(2)(A), rewrote the subparagraph, which read, “for a waiver based on mental retardation or developmental disability, a person who is qualified under 42 CFR 483.430 as a mental retardation professional”; in (b)(3)(B), substituted “intellectual” for “mental retardation” at the beginning, and substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.

The 2014 amendment, effective July 29, 2014, added (c) and (d).

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (b)(2)(B), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse”.

Notes to Decisions

Substantial evidence. —

Substantial evidence supported a final agency decision to terminate in-home nursing care benefits contrary to an administrative law judge's (ALJ) findings, under heightened scrutiny, because (1) an assessment found the recipient's condition improved, (2) an assessment review made that conclusion, (3) another review found the assessment consistent with narrative information and clinical diagnoses, (4) prior assessments showed improved functioning, and (5) the decision directly responded to the ALJ's opinion and noted a failure to account for eyewitness observations. Radebaugh v. State, 397 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2017).

Sec. 47.07.046. Traumatic or acquired brain injury services.

  1. The department shall provide traumatic or acquired brain injury services under a waiver in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act), this chapter, and regulations adopted under this chapter, if the department has received approval from the federal government and the department has appropriations allocated for the purpose. In addition to the annual assessment required in (b) of this section, the department shall establish in regulation additional standards for eligibility and payment for the services.
  2. Before the department may terminate payment for services provided under (a) of this section, the recipient must have had an annual assessment to determine whether the recipient continues to meet the standards established by regulation under (a) of this section.
  3. In this section, “traumatic or acquired brain injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.80.529 .

History. (§ 4 ch 109 SLA 2010)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2010, in (c) of this section, “AS 47.80.529 ” was substituted for “AS 47.80.590” to conform to the 2010 renumbering of that section.

Effective dates. —

Section 4, ch. 109, SLA 2010, which enacted this section, is effective September 23, 2010.

Sec. 47.07.050. Implementation of the medical assistance program.

The department shall take the steps necessary to adopt those regulations, prepare necessary documentation for the state and providers, and undertake the systems design that may be necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter on or before November 1, 1972. Implementation of the medical assistance program shall include appropriate controls and reporting capabilities as required by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and the department shall make those necessary reports as required by that federal agency or as requested by the legislature.

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.

For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.

For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.

For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.

For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.

For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

Sec. 47.07.055. Recovery of medical assistance from estates.

  1. The estate of an individual who received medical assistance payments is subject to a claim for recovery of the medical assistance after the individual’s death that, except as provided in (b) of this section, may be secured by a lien filed against the individual’s real property during the individual’s lifetime if the
    1. individual was an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, or other medical institution;
    2. department required the individual, as a condition of receiving medical assistance under this chapter, to spend for medical expenses all but a minimal amount of that individual’s income; and
    3. department determined during the individual’s lifetime, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the individual could not reasonably be expected to be discharged from the institution and to return home.
  2. A lien may not be filed under (a) of this section against an individual’s home if the home is lawfully occupied by the individual’s
    1. spouse;
    2. child under age 21;
    3. blind or disabled child as described in AS 47.25.615 (3) or (5) or 42 U.S.C. 1382(c); or
    4. sibling, if the sibling has an equity interest in the home and was residing in the home for at least one year before the date of the individual’s admission to the institution.
  3. The state may not recover the costs of medical assistance under a lien on a home under (a) of this section until after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when neither of the following is lawfully residing in the home:
    1. a sibling of the individual who was residing in the individual’s home for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the individual’s institutionalization and who has continuously resided in the home since the institutionalization began; or
    2. a son or daughter of the individual who
      1. resided in the home for at least two years immediately preceding the date of the individual’s institutionalization;
      2. has continuously resided in the home since the institutionalization began; and
      3. establishes to the department’s satisfaction that the son or daughter provided care to the individual that allowed the individual to reside in the home rather than in an institution.
  4. A lien and claim authorized under (a) of this section are extinguished if, during the individual’s lifetime, the individual is discharged from the institution and returns home. However, a new lien and claim are authorized for subsequent expenses if the circumstances described in (a) of this section occur after the individual returns home.
  5. In addition to recovery of medical assistance upon sale of property subject to a lien authorized under (a) — (d) of this section, after an individual’s death, the individual’s estate is subject to a claim for reimbursement for medical assistance payments made on behalf of the individual under this chapter for the following services to the extent that those services were provided when the individual was 55 years of age or older:
    1. services received while an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, or other medical institutions; and
    2. home and community-based services provided through a waiver received from the federal government that allows home and community-based services to be covered under this chapter for persons who are eligible for coverage under this chapter while in an institution but who are able to avoid institutionalization because of the provision of home and community-based services.
  6. Other than a recovery upon sale of a home, a claim under this section may be made only after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child under age 21 and no surviving child who is blind or totally and permanently disabled.
  7. For purposes of AS 13.16.470 , the claims authorized under this section are debts with preference under the laws of the state.
  8. In addition to the claims allowed under the other provisions of this section, the state may file a claim under AS 06.65.320 against the amount in an individual’s program account after the individual dies. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the claim is subject to the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 529A(f) (Internal Revenue Code). In this subsection, “program account” has the meaning given in AS 06.65.390 .

History. (§ 21 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 18, 19 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 6 ch 56 SLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (a)(1), and in (e)(1), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.

The 2016 amendment, effective November 4, 2016, added (h).

Sec. 47.07.060. Receipt of federal money.

The Department of Administration shall accept and receive all grants of money awarded to the state under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance). All money received shall be deposited by the Department of Administration in a special account of the general fund and shall be used by the state exclusively for medical assistance and the administration of medical assistance under the provisions of this chapter. This money shall be paid from the account on a certified disbursement voucher from the department.

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972)

Sec. 47.07.063. Payment for certain services furnished or paid for by a school district.

  1. The department may pay medical assistance under this chapter to a school district on behalf of an eligible child with a disability for rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services covered under this chapter that are furnished or paid for by the school district if
    1. the school district and the department have entered into an agreement requiring the school district to reimburse the department for any state financial share required by the federal government;
    2. the rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services are
      1. included in the child’s individualized education program developed under AS 14.30.278 ; and
      2. otherwise eligible for reimbursement under this chapter;
    3. the child is a child with a disability who
      1. is eligible for medical assistance under this chapter for the services; and
      2. complies with all applicable provisions of this chapter for that assistance;
    4. the school district fully complies with billing, auditing, and reporting required under the approved state plan described in AS 47.07.040 ;
    5. reimbursement of payment for the rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services under this section does not exceed reimbursement allowable for the services under this chapter; and
    6. all other requirements of federal and state law are met.
  2. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of state law, the school district shall allow the department access to medical, financial, and other records of the child that are in the possession of the school district in order to verify eligibility for services under this chapter. The department shall keep information received under this subsection confidential to the same extent as the school district is required to keep the information confidential under law.
  3. The department may adopt regulations to carry out this section.
  4. In this section, unless the context otherwise requires,
    1. “child with a disability” has the meaning given in AS 14.30.350 ;
    2. “rehabilitative services” has the meaning given in 42 C.F.R. 440.130;
    3. “school district” has the meaning given the term “district” in AS 14.17.990 , but includes a state boarding school established under AS 14.16.010 .

History. (§ 6 ch 130 SLA 2002; am §§ 2, 3 ch 93 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (d) of this section was reorganized in 2004 to maintain alphabetical order.

Administrative Code. —

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, inserted “rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional” three times in subsection (a), and added paragraph (d)(2).

Sec. 47.07.065. Payment for prescribed drugs.

  1. The department shall pay for prescribed drugs under AS 47.07.030(b) under regulations adopted by the commissioner in conformity with applicable federal regulations.
  2. The department shall adopt in regulation and regularly update a preferred drug list and a prior authorization medications list under a state program permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (Title XIX, Social Security Act). The department shall take other reasonable cost savings and cost containment measures, including pursuing and securing negotiated rates, rebates, and contracts or other agreements on covered outpatient drugs. In this subsection, “preferred drug list” means a list of prescription medications within a therapeutic class and suggested as the first choice when prescribed for individuals within the medical assistance program.

History. (§ 5 ch 45 SLA 1989; am § 6 ch 18 SLA 2019)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2019 amendment, effective August 9, 2019, added (b).

Sec. 47.07.067. Payment for adult dental services.

  1. Subject to appropriation, the department shall pay for minimum treatment and for preventative and restorative adult dental services provided under AS 47.07.030(b) and under regulations adopted by the commissioner in conformity with applicable federal requirements and this chapter. Regulations adopted under this section must include the following:
    1. except as provided in (d) of this section, a maximum amount of benefits for preventative and restorative adult dental services of $1,150 for each eligible recipient in a fiscal year; and
    2. specification of the scope of coverage for preventative and restorative adult dental services.
  2. On or before June 30 of each year, the department shall review appropriations available for the purposes of this section for the following fiscal year, and estimate the scope of services to be used and the number of eligible recipients anticipated to be served during the following fiscal year. Notwithstanding the maximum amount of benefits specified in (a)(1) of this section, the department shall reduce, by regulation, the specified maximum amount of benefits for the following fiscal year if the department’s estimates under this subsection would exceed appropriations available for that fiscal year.
  3. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of AS 44.62, the department may adopt emergency regulations to implement (b) of this section.
  4. If the department authorizes or approves payment for complete or partial dentures for an eligible recipient, the department may authorize the payment in one fiscal year of the maximum payment amount for not more than two fiscal years. A recipient is not eligible for additional benefits under this section for a two-year period.
  5. As used in this section, “minimum treatment” means the application or prescription of a medication or material deemed necessary by a licensed dentist for the immediate relief of pain or to reduce the spread of infection.

History. (§ 2 ch 52 SLA 2006; § 1 ch 35 SLA 2009; am §§ 1, 2 ch 60 SLA 2010)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 1, ch. 35, SLA 2009 repealed § 5, ch. 52, SLA 2006, which was to have repealed this section June 30, 2009.

Subsection (d) was enacted as (e); relettered in 2010, at which time subsection (d) was relettered as (e) and a conforming amendment made in the 2010 amendment of subsection (a).

Administrative Code. —

For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective September 7, 2010, in (a)(1), added “except as provided in (d) of this section,”; added (e) (now (d)).

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 52, SLA 2006 (HB 105), proposing coverage for adult dental services for eligible recipients under the Medicaid program (AS 47.07), see 2005 House Journal 151 - 153.

Sec. 47.07.068. Payment for abortions.

  1. The department may not pay for abortion services under this chapter unless the abortion services are for a medically necessary abortion or the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. Payment may not be made for an elective abortion.
  2. In this section,
    1. “abortion” has the meaning given in AS 18.16.090 ;
    2. “elective abortion” means an abortion that is not a medically necessary abortion;
    3. “medically necessary abortion” means that, in a physician’s objective and reasonable professional judgment after considering medically relevant factors, an abortion must be performed to avoid a threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of a woman from continuation of the woman’s pregnancy;
    4. “serious risk to the life or physical health” includes, but is not limited to, a serious risk to the pregnant woman of
      1. death; or
      2. impairment of a major bodily function because of
        1. diabetes with acute metabolic derangement or severe end organ damage;
        2. renal disease that requires dialysis treatment;
        3. severe pre-eclampsia;
        4. eclampsia;
        5. convulsions;
        6. status epilepticus;
        7. sickle cell anemia;
        8. severe congenital or acquired heart disease, class IV;
        9. pulmonary hypertension;
        10. malignancy if pregnancy would prevent or limit treatment;
        11. kidney infection;
        12. congestive heart failure;
        13. epilepsy;
        14. seizures;
        15. coma;
        16. severe infection exacerbated by pregnancy;
        17. rupture of amniotic membranes;
        18. advanced cervical dilation of more than six centimeters at less than 22 weeks gestation;
        19. cervical or cesarean section scar ectopic implantation;
        20. any pregnancy not implanted in the uterine cavity;
        21. amniotic fluid embolus; or
        22. another physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy that places the woman in danger of death or major bodily impairment if an abortion is not performed.

History. (§ 2 ch 8 SLA 2014)

Effective dates. —

Section 2, chapter 8, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on July 16, 2014.

Editor’s notes. —

For a statement of legislative intent relating to this section and the funding of existing women’s health programs, see sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality. —

Restrictions placed upon Alaska's Medicaid funding of abortions by a statute and a regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the restrictions were not narrowly tailored to meet the ends of preserving Medicaid funds. Moreover, the State of Alaska did not show that the differences between the affected classes—women who chose to have abortions versus women who chose to carry their pregnancies to term—justified the discriminatory treatment that was imposed. State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.07.070. Payment rates for health facilities.

  1. The department shall, by regulation, set rates of payment for health facilities under this chapter and AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) and this section. A rate established under this section takes effect under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) but not until approved in writing by the commissioner. The commissioner may delegate the performance of these functions.
  2. In determining the rates of payment for health facilities for a fiscal year, the department shall, within the limit of appropriations made by the legislature for the department’s programs under this chapter and under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 for that fiscal year, including anticipated available federal revenue for that fiscal year, set rates for facilities that are based on
    1. reasonable costs related to patient care; and
    2. audit and inspection results and reports, when the audit or inspection is conducted under AS 47.07.074 .
  3. This section does not apply to the minimum daily reimbursement rate specified by law under AS 47.24.017 or AS 47.25.195(e) for assisted living homes.

History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 3 ch 95 SLA 1983; am § 7 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 72 § 4 (1989); am §§ 1, 2 ch 153 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 95 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 83 SLA 2000; am § 1 ch 28 SLA 2003)

Cross references. —

For transitional provision relating to regulations adopted under AS 47.07.070 before its 2003 repeal and reenactment, see § 7, ch. 28, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.

For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.

For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.

For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.

For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, rewrote this section.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 28, SLA 2003 (SB 108), see 2003 Senate Journal 393—394.

Notes to Decisions

“Fair rate” of compensation. —

The state statutory standard of a “fair rate” does not require the state to compensate a provider fully for increases in workers’ compensation insurance. State and federal law mandate only that the overall rate paid to a facility be fair in relation to the costs incurred by the facility, not that each component of a facility’s costs be compensated at a fair rate. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).

Federal reimbursement requirements. —

Federal Medicaid law, specifically the Boren Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, does not require actual reimbursement of a provider’s costs. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).

Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) violated a hospital’s due process rights under Alaska Const., art. I, § 7 when it used erroneous information to calculate a Medicaid reimbursement rate under 7 AAC 43.685 because application of the regulation was not reasonable since there was no compelling reason for using inaccurate data; however, a superior court should not have ordered DHSS to use a report to calculate the correct rate because that was not the only reasonable method of doing so. State v. Valley Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 116 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2005).

Reimbursement on modified cost basis. —

Under the regulatory scheme in Alaska, a Medicaid facility is reimbursed based on a modified “cost plus” basis—actual operating costs incurred two fiscal years ago plus an inflation factor anticipating capital improvement costs. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).

Recoupment. —

Although this section authorized the commission prospectively to determine the rate of payment to be made to a health care facility, the statute was silent on the subject of prospective recoupment from a health care facility based on audit results. The section could not fairly be read as implicitly authorizing the commission to consider audit results in its determination of prospective payment rates for the current fiscal year. Cordova v. Medicaid Rate Comm'n., 789 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990) (decided prior to the second 1989 amendment, which made the department responsible for setting the rates of payment, with commission advice).

Sec. 47.07.071. Reports by health facilities.

After the end of each fiscal year of a health facility, the facility shall submit to the department a report on the facility’s financial performance during the fiscal year. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish the date by which this financial report is due.

History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 5 (1989); am § 2 ch 95 SLA 1997)

Administrative Code. —

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

Sec. 47.07.072. Report by the department. [Repealed, § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994.]

Sec. 47.07.073. Uniform accounting, budgeting, and reporting.

  1. The department by regulation shall require a uniform system of accounting, budgeting, and reporting for health facilities receiving payments under this chapter. The regulations must provide for reporting revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities, units of service, and other items considered necessary by the department to implement this chapter.
  2. [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
  3. The department may waive or modify a requirement for accounting, budgeting, or reporting for a health facility if waiver or modification is consistent with the policies of this chapter.
  4. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, the department may, by regulation, modify the system of accounting, budgeting, and reporting required under this section for a health facility having fewer than 25 acute care beds in order to reduce the operating costs of that facility.

History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 7 (1989); am §§ 2 — 4, 6 ch 28 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, in subsection (a) deleted “financial” preceding “reporting” and “prospective” preceding “payments” in the first sentence, added the language beginning “, and other items” to the end of the last sentence, and deleted the former last sentence, which read “The department shall specify the date the system becomes effective for each health facility”; repealed subsection (b); rewrote subsection (c); and in subsection (d) deleted “financial” preceding “reporting.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 28, SLA 2003 (SB 108), see 2003 Senate Journal 393—394.

Sec. 47.07.074. Audits and inspections.

  1. As a condition of obtaining payment under AS 47.07.070 , a health facility shall allow
    1. the department reasonable access to the records of medical assistance recipients and providers; and
    2. audit and inspection of the records by state and federal agencies.
  2. The department may establish the scope and timing of audits under this chapter. The department may provide that audits will be conducted less frequently than annually.

History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am §§ 3, 4 ch 95 SLA 1997; am § 5 ch 28 SLA 2003; am § 5 ch 66 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.

For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.

For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.

For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, deleted “and the commission” following “department” in paragraph (a)(1).

The second 2003 amendment, effective September 9, 2003, in subsection (a) substituted “records of medical assistance recipients and providers” for “financial records of medical assistance beneficiaries” in paragraph (1) and in paragraph (2) substituted “the records” for “financial records.”

Notes to Decisions

Entitlement to records. —

Even if the Division of Medical Assistance had not received medical and billing records as part of a settlement agreement with a physician, his participation in Medicaid entitled the department to full access to his records. McConnell v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance, 991 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1999).

Recoupment. —

This section does not provide authority for recoupment from a health care facility based on audit results. The text of the statute does not state or imply that the amount of the payment will be affected by any audit. Cordova v. Medicaid Rate Comm'n., 789 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990).

Sec. 47.07.075. Administrative procedure.

  1. Actions of the department regarding health facility payment rates under this chapter and AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 are subject to provisions of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) except as provided in (b) of this section, and the hearing for an appeal must be conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ).
  2. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish time limits applicable to the various phases of an administrative appeal process involving an appeal of the amount of a payment rate set by the department for a facility. The time limits set under the regulations supersede conflicting time limits in AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 .  The regulations must provide that
    1. a hearing for an appeal described in this subsection must be scheduled under AS 44.62.410 to occur no more than 120 days after written notice of rate appeal has been received by the department from a facility unless the facility requests a delay or good cause for the delay is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the hearing officer;
    2. the commissioner must, within 30 days after receiving the recommendation of the hearing officer, either render a decision in the case or refer the case back to a hearing officer for additional findings;
    3. if either time limit set under (1) or (2) of this subsection is not met, the department shall report the noncompliance to the legislature and the governor by the following January 20 with an explanation of the length of delay, reasons for the delay, and proposed corrective action by the department to ameliorate the causes of delay.

History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 8 (1989); am §§ 3, 4 ch 153 SLA 1990; am E.O. No. 116, § 7 (2012))

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), added “, and the hearing for an appeal must be conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” following “as provided in (b) of this section”.

Sec. 47.07.076. Reports to legislature.

  1. The department and the attorney general shall annually prepare a report relating to the medical assistance program under this chapter. The report must include the following information:
    1. the amount and source of funds used to prevent or prosecute fraud, abuse, payment errors, and errors in eligibility determinations for the previous fiscal year;
    2. actions taken to address fraud, abuse, payment errors, and errors in eligibility determinations during the previous fiscal year;
    3. specific examples of fraud or abuse that were prevented or prosecuted;
    4. identification of vulnerabilities in the medical assistance program, including any vulnerabilities identified by independent auditors with whom the department contracts under AS 47.05.200 ;
    5. initiatives the department has taken to prevent fraud or abuse;
    6. recommendations to increase effectiveness in preventing and prosecuting fraud and abuse;
    7. the return to the state for every dollar expended by the department and the attorney general to prevent and prosecute fraud and abuse;
    8. the most recent payment error rate measurement report for the medical assistance program, including fee for service programs and pilot or demonstration projects; the report must also explain the reasons for the payment errors and the total amount of state and federal funds paid in error during the reporting period and not recovered by the department at the time of the report;
    9. results from the Medicaid Eligibility Quality Control program.
  2. On or before November 15 of each year, the department shall submit the report required under (a) of this section to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available.
  3. [Repealed, §§ 53, 61(f), 66 ch 25 SLA 2016.]

History. (§ 47 ch 25 SLA 2016; am §§ 53, 61(f), 66 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 47, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect July 1, 2016.

Sec. 47.07.080. [Renumbered as AS 47.07.900.]

Sec. 47.07.085. Supplemental reimbursement for emergency medical transportation services.

  1. The department shall develop a program to provide supplemental reimbursement to eligible emergency medical transportation service providers for the cost of providing services to medical assistance recipients. Except as provided in (b) of this section, the amount of the supplemental reimbursement paid to a provider must be equal to the amount of federal financial participation that the department receives for the nonfederal matching funds paid by the provider through intergovernmental transfers or certified public expenditures, less any administrative fee described in (d) or (e) of this section. Under the program, the department shall use intergovernmental transfers, or certified public expenditures, or both, for the nonfederal share of emergency medical transportation services that are eligible for federal financial participation under the medical assistance program.
  2. The amount a provider receives in supplemental reimbursements under the program, when combined with the amount the provider receives from all other sources, including medical assistance reimbursement under the state plan, may not exceed the provider’s actual cost for providing emergency medical transportation services to medical assistance recipients.
  3. An emergency medical transportation service provider is eligible to participate in the program if the provider
    1. is enrolled with the department as a medical assistance provider;
    2. voluntarily enters into an agreement with the department to participate in the program;
    3. is owned or operated by the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a federally recognized tribe or tribal organization;
    4. charges for emergency medical transportation services on a fee-for- service or other federally permissible basis; and
    5. certifies that the provider’s expenditures for emergency medical transportation services qualify for federal financial participation.
  4. If the department authorizes the use of intergovernmental transfers under the program, the department shall charge an administrative fee to a provider to cover the department’s costs of administering the program. The administrative fee may not exceed 20 percent of the nonfederal share the provider pays to the department. A provider may include the administrative fee in the provider’s cost for providing an emergency medical transportation service to a medical assistance recipient.
  5. If the department authorizes the use of certified public expenditures under the program, the department may establish an administrative fee for a provider. If the department establishes an administrative fee under this subsection, the department may allow a provider to include the administrative fee in the provider’s cost for providing an emergency medical transportation service to a medical assistance recipient.
  6. This section authorizes the department to provide supplemental reimbursements to a ground, water, or air emergency medical transportation service provider only if the United States Department of Health and Human Services approves payments to that type of emergency medical transportation service provider.
  7. If the United States Department of Health and Human Services revokes approval of the program, the department shall provide notice to the legislature. The department shall submit written notice to the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives as early as possible after the United States Department of Health and Human Services expresses its intent to revoke approval of the program.
  8. Supplemental reimbursement payments are subject to appropriation.
  9. In this section,
    1. “program” means the supplemental reimbursement program developed by the department under this section;
    2. “provider” means an eligible emergency medical transportation service provider;
    3. “state plan” means the state plan for medical assistance coverage developed under AS 47.07.040 .

History. (§ 1 ch 34 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 2, ch. 34, SLA 2018 makes this section effective June 21, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Secs. 47.07.110 — 47.07.190. Medicaid Rate Advisory Commission. [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.07.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. [Repealed, § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006.]
  2. “advanced practice registered nurse services” means services furnished by a person who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under AS 08.68.850 that are within the scope of regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) , whether or not the person is under the supervision of, or associated with, a physician or other health care provider;
  3. “chiropractic services” includes only services that are provided by a chiropractor licensed under AS 08.20 that consist of treatment by means of manual manipulation of the spine and x-rays necessary for treatment;
  4. “clinic services” means services provided by state-approved outpatient community mental health clinics, state-operated community mental health clinics, outpatient surgical care centers, and physician clinics;
  5. “clinical social workers’ services” means clinical social work services provided by a person licensed as a clinical social worker under AS 08.95;
  6. [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
  7. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  8. “emergency hospital services” means services that
    1. are necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health of the individual; and
    2. because of the threat to the life or health of the individual, necessitate the use of the most accessible hospital available that is equipped to furnish the services, even if the hospital does not currently meet
      1. the conditions for participation under Medicare; or
      2. the definitions of inpatient or outpatient hospital services under 42 C.F.R. 440.10 and 440.20;
  9. “emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults” includes only persons who receive mental health services from an entity that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 ;
  10. “eyeglasses” are lenses, including frames when necessary, and other aids to vision prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye, or by an optometrist, whichever the patient may select, to aid or improve vision;
  11. “health facility” includes a
    1. hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, rehabilitation facility, inpatient psychiatric facility, home health agency, rural health clinic, and outpatient surgical clinic; and
    2. birthing center if birthing centers are authorized for coverage under the state plan approved under AS 47.07.040 by the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
  12. “hospice care” means services to a terminally ill individual of the type and under the circumstances described in 42 U.S.C. 1396d(o), as amended, and applicable federal regulations;
  13. “midwife services” means services within the practice of midwifery, as defined in AS 08.65.190 , that are performed by a certified direct-entry midwife, and miscellaneous fees, other than facility fees, for birth kits, oxygen, and other ancillary expenses necessary for a birth attended by a certified direct-entry midwife;
  14. [Repealed, § 60 ch 33 SLA 2016.]
  15. “personal care services in a recipient’s home” means services authorized under a service plan in accordance with applicable federal and state law;
  16. “psychologists’ services” means services within the practice of psychology provided by a person licensed as a psychologist or psychological associate under AS 08.86;
  17. “rehabilitative services” means services for substance abusers and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults provided by
    1. a drug or alcohol treatment center; or
    2. an outpatient community mental health clinic;
  18. “substance abuser” means a person who
    1. is an alcoholic, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ;
    2. participates in inhalant abuse, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ; or
    3. misuses illegal or prescription drugs;
  19. “targeted case management services” means services for populations designated by the department in regulation that will assist individuals eligible for medical assistance under this chapter in gaining access to needed medical, social, educational, or other services provided to persons through the department;
  20. [See conditional effective date note.] “professional counseling services” means services within the practice of professional counseling provided by a person licensed as a professional counselor under AS 08.29; professional counseling services may be provided at a facility that is not a provider of clinic services.

History. (am E.O. No. 72 § 12 (1989); § 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 12 SLA 1976; am § 3 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 26 ch 40 SLA 1981; am § 4 ch 132 SLA 1982; am §§ 5, 10 ch 95 SLA 1983; am § 3 ch 20 SLA 1986; am §§ 9, 10 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 3 ch 70 SLA 1991; am § 3 ch 38 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 110 SLA 1992; am § 4 ch 51 SLA 1993; am § 3 ch 75 SLA 1993; am § 3 ch 130 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003; am § 4 ch 93 SLA 2004; am § 1 ch 78 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006; am §§ 1, 2 ch 35 SLA 2009; am § 20 ch 42 SLA 2013; am §§ 48, 49 ch 25 SLA 2016; am § 50, 60 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 56 ch 3 SLA 2017; am § 2 ch 18 SLA 2020)

Delayed amendment. —

Under § 2, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this section is amended to read as follows: “In this chapter,

“(1) [Repealed, § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006.]

“(2) ‘advanced practice registered nurse services’ means services furnished by a person who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under AS 08.68.850 that are within the scope of regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) , whether or not the person is under the supervision of, or associated with, a physician or other health care provider;

“(3) ‘chiropractic services’ includes only services that are provided by a chiropractor licensed under AS 08.20 that consist of treatment by means of manual manipulation of the spine and x-rays necessary for treatment;

“(4) ‘clinic services’ means services provided by state-approved outpatient community mental health clinics, state-operated community mental health clinics, outpatient surgical care centers, and physician clinics;

“(5) ‘clinical social workers’ services’ means clinical social work services provided by a person licensed as a clinical social worker under AS 08.95;

“(6) [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]

“(7) ‘department’ means the Department of Health and Social Services;

“(8) ‘emergency hospital services’ means services that

“(A) are necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health of the individual; and

“(B) because of the threat to the life or health of the individual, necessitate the use of the most accessible hospital available that is equipped to furnish the services, even if the hospital does not currently meet

“(i) the conditions for participation under Medicare; or

“(ii) the definitions of inpatient or outpatient hospital services under 42 C.F.R. 440.10 and 440.20;

“(9) ‘emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults’ includes only persons who receive mental health services from an entity that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 ;

“(10) ‘eyeglasses’ are lenses, including frames when necessary, and other aids to vision prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye, or by an optometrist, whichever the patient may select, to aid or improve vision;

“(11) ‘health facility’ includes a

“(A) hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, rehabilitation facility, inpatient psychiatric facility, home health agency, rural health clinic, and outpatient surgical clinic; and

“(B) birthing center if birthing centers are authorized for coverage under the state plan approved under AS 47.07.040 by the United States Department of Health and Human Services;

“(12) ‘hospice care’ means services to a terminally ill individual of the type and under the circumstances described in 42 U.S.C. 1396d(o), as amended, and applicable federal regulations;

“(13) ‘midwife services’ means services within the practice of midwifery, as defined in AS 08.65.190 , that are performed by a certified direct-entry midwife, and miscellaneous fees, other than facility fees, for birth kits, oxygen, and other ancillary expenses necessary for a birth attended by a certified direct-entry midwife;

“(14) [Repealed, § 60 ch 33 SLA 2016.]

“(15) ‘personal care services in a recipient’s home’ means services authorized under a service plan in accordance with applicable federal and state law;

“(16) ‘psychologists’ services’ means services within the practice of psychology provided by a person licensed as a psychologist or psychological associate under AS 08.86;

“(17) ‘rehabilitative services’ means services for substance abusers and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults provided by

“(A) a drug or alcohol treatment center; or

“(B) an outpatient community mental health clinic;

“(18) ‘substance abuser’ means a person who

“(A) is an alcoholic, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ;

“(B) participates in inhalant abuse, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ; or

“(C) misuses illegal or prescription drugs;

“(19) ‘targeted case management services’ means services for populations designated by the department in regulation that will assist individuals eligible for medical assistance under this chapter in gaining access to needed medical, social, educational, or other services provided to persons through the department;

“(20) ‘professional counseling services’ means services within the practice of professional counseling provided by a person licensed as a professional counselor under AS 08.29; professional counseling services may be provided at a facility that is not a provider of clinic services.”

Under § 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this amendment is conditional upon the commissioner of health and social services notifying the revisor of statutes in writing on or before October 1, 2021 “if the United States Department of Health and Human services approves the amendments to the state plan for medical assistance coverage under AS 47.07.030(b) , as amended by sec. 1 of this Act, and AS 47.07.900 (20), enacted by sec. 2 of this Act.” Under § 5, ch. 18, SLA 2020, if the condition occurs, the amendment of this section takes effect “on the day after the date the revisor of statutes receives notice from the commissioner of health and social services under sec. 4 of this Act.” As of October 2021, the notification had not occurred.

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.07.080 . Renumbered in 1983, at which time it was reorganized to alphabetize the defined terms. Reorganized in 1986, 1991, 1992, and 1993 to maintain alphabetical order.

Sections 1 and 2, ch. 35, SLA 2009 repealed §§ 3 and 7, ch. 52, SLA 2006, which were to have added, effective June 30, 2009, a definition of “adult dental services.”

In 2010, in paragraphs (2) and (14), references to “AS 08.68.850 ” were substituted for references to “AS 08.68.410 ” to reflect the 2010 renumbering of AS 08.68.410 .

The definition of “durable medical device” was renumbered in 2015 and 2018 to maintain alphabetical order.

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to application for federal approval of an amended state plan to implement changes to the medical assistance program described in this chapter and the obligation of the commissioner of health and social services to notify the revisor of statutes on the date of that federal approval of the amended state plan, see §§ 3 and 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, repealed paragraph (6).

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote paragraph (19).

The 2005 amendment, effective October 12, 2005, in paragraph (11) added the subparagraph (A) designation and subparagraph (B).

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, repealed a former paragraph (1), which had defined “adult dental services”.

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (11)(A), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.

The first 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, in (4), deleted “that receive grants under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 ” following “health clinics”; in (17)(A), deleted “that is funded with a grant under AS 47.30.475 ” following “treatment center”, in (17)(B), deleted “that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 ” following “health clinic”.

The second 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (2), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner” in two places, substituted “licensed” for “certified”, substituted “regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) ” for “the person’s certified authority”; repealed (14).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (9), substituted “includes only persons who receive” for “and ‘severely emotionally disturbed persons under age 21’ include only persons who receive”.

Chapter 08. Assistance for Catastrophic Illness and Chronic or Acute Medical Conditions.

Administrative Code. —

For catastrophic illness and chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48.

Article 1. Catastrophic Illness Assistance.

Sec. 47.08.010. Reimbursement of providers.

  1. Subject to (b) of this section, under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 , the Department of Health and Social Services may reimburse providers of medical care for unpaid costs incurred in the treatment of a person suffering an illness or accident that results in financial catastrophe to the person or the person’s family.
  2. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the commissioner of health and social services shall determine whether sufficient appropriations have been made for the anticipated costs of services to needy persons under AS 47.08.150 and the anticipated costs of reimbursements under (a) of this section. The Department of Health and Social Services may not accept applications for reimbursement under (a) of this section for a fiscal year if, at the beginning of the fiscal year the department determines that
    1. there are insufficient funds appropriated for the anticipated costs of services for needy persons under AS 47.08.150 ; or
    2. after subtracting anticipated costs under AS 47.08.150, there are insufficient funds appropriated for anticipated reimbursements under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am §§ 4, 6 ch 130 SLA 1998)

Conditional amendment of section. —

Under §§ 5, 8, and 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, subsection (b) is repealed and subsection (a) is amended to read as follows: “(a) Under the provisions of this chapter, the Department of Health and Social Services shall reimburse providers of medical care for unpaid costs incurred in the treatment of a person suffering an illness or accident that results in financial catastrophe to the person or the person’s family.” Under § 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, this repeal of subsection (b) and amendment of subsection (a) take effect “on the day after the later of (1) the date on which time expires for appeal of a judgment declaring any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional, or (2) if an appeal is taken, the date of entry of the final order on appeal that any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional.” As of January 2022, the contingency had not occurred.

Collateral references. —

Criminal prosecution or disciplinary action against medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under Medicaid, Medicare or similar welfare program for providing medical services. 50 ALR3d 549, 70 ALR4th 132.

Imposition of civil penalties, under state statute, upon medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under medicaid, medicare, or similar welfare programs providing medical services. 32 ALR4th 671.

Criminal liability of pharmacy or pharmacist for welfare fraud in connection with supplying prescription drugs. 16 ALR5th 390.

Sec. 47.08.020. Catastrophic Illness Committee.

There is created the Catastrophic Illness Committee, consisting of a medical review officer from the Department of Health and Social Services, a member appointed by the governor who has suffered a catastrophic illness, and a representative of the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development appointed by the governor.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Commerce and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Community and Economic Development” in accordance with § 88, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Sec. 47.08.030. Notice.

The committee shall enlist the assistance of medical providers in making the public aware of the catastrophic illness assistance program.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.08.040. Applications for assistance.

An application for financial assistance under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 may be filed by a person who has suffered catastrophic illness or by a parent, spouse, or legal guardian of that person, or by any other interested party with the written consent of the person who has suffered the catastrophic illness.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 47.08.050. Services excluded from coverage.

Annually, the committee shall determine in light of appropriated funds and expected need the medical expenses reimbursable under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 , except that the following are not reimbursable:

  1. dentistry and optometry unless prescribed by a licensed dentist or physician as medically necessary as the result of the injury or illness;
  2. elective medical or surgical procedures;
  3. drugs and medications not prescribed by a licensed physician;
  4. services received as a result of a pregnancy or birth without unusual complications;
  5. private psychological or psychiatric treatment or private alcoholism treatment, unless not available from public agencies or programs;
  6. chiropractic services and services provided by a person who practices naturopathy;
  7. services not of a medical nature;
  8. medical services currently provided to persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections;
  9. costs incurred before July 1976.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 55, § 41 (1984); am § 7 ch 56 SLA 1986)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 47.08.060. Calculation of applicant’s share.

  1. As frequently as necessary the committee shall adopt, in light of appropriated funds and expected need, a formula to be used in determining the applicant’s share of total medical expenses incurred as a result of a catastrophic illness, based on the applicant’s annual gross income, number of dependents, amount of assets, and forthcoming third-party payments, all considered in light of the requirement that the applicant’s share will be paid to the provider on a payment schedule covering a period of at least three years.
  2. For the purposes of applying the formula to determine the applicant’s share, multiple catastrophic illness occurring within a 12-month period to the applicant or other members of the applicant’s family shall be treated as one catastrophic illness.
  3. In applying the formula to determine the applicant’s share, the total gross income and the total assets of the family of the applicant may be taken into account, with the following exceptions:
    1. the applicant’s permanent place of abode;
    2. one noncommercial vehicle;
    3. tools, equipment, vehicles and other assets required in a trade or business;
    4. ordinary household and personal effects;
    5. $1,000 of liquid assets;
    6. all nonliquid assets unless this exclusion would bring about an inequitable result; however, all income derived from this property shall be taken into consideration in determining the recipient’s gross income;
    7. inalienable shares in a Native corporation created under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), for the period of their inalienability as specified in the Act;
    8. Alaska longevity bonus payments;
    9. any other assets specifically restricted for the use of the recipient by state or federal law.
  4. Assets received by the applicant as a custodian, guardian, conservator, or trustee for another are not considered assets of the custodian, guardian, conservator, or trustee.
  5. The applicant’s share shall be reduced in the amount of any premiums paid for health insurance or a prepaid medical plan up to $500 if incurred in the 12-month period beginning with the occurrence of the injury or the onset of the illness.
  6. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the committee may waive payment of an applicant’s share when the catastrophic illness is the proximate result of an immunization required by law.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am § 108 ch 56 SLA 1996; am § 86 ch 56 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective June 25, 2005, updated a federal reference in paragraph (c)(7).

Sec. 47.08.070. Standards for reimbursement to providers.

The amount that the committee reimburses providers for medical services rendered to a person who has suffered catastrophic illness may not be greater than 100 percent of the total unpaid bills related to the catastrophic illness and shall be determined by the following standards:

  1. only unpaid medical expenses for periods not to exceed 12 months, and related to catastrophic illness, may be considered; the initial 12-month period begins with the date of the first charges incurred because of the illness;
  2. the committee may not reimburse a provider if the applicant’s total medical expenses related to the catastrophic illness are less than $1,000 in any period not exceeding 12 months described in (1) of this section after all sources of third-party payment have been exhausted by the applicant or by someone acting on behalf of the applicant;
  3. the committee may not reimburse a provider for the applicant’s share of the total medical expenses; moreover, a reimbursement to the provider shall be conditioned on the provider’s agreement that the provider enter into a payment schedule with the applicant which will result in full liquidation of the applicant’s share; payment schedules may not be for a term of less than three years.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Administrative Code. —

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

Sec. 47.08.080. Reconsideration of decision by committee.

The committee shall promptly notify an applicant of its decision with written reasons for the amount of the award or denial. An applicant who is dissatisfied with a decision of the committee may apply to the committee for reconsideration within 30 days of receipt of the decision. The request for reconsideration must include a written statement of grounds for reconsideration and any supporting documentation which was not available to the committee for its original decision. Within 30 days after receipt of a request for reconsideration, the committee shall affirm, amend, or reverse its original decision. The committee shall promptly notify the applicant of its decision upon reconsideration with written reasons for its action. Information describing hearing rights and procedures must be furnished with the written notification of denial.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.08.090. Hearing.

An applicant who is dissatisfied with the committee’s decision upon reconsideration may request a hearing in accordance with procedures established under AS 47.25.180 .

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.08.100. Finality of decisions.

Decisions as to catastrophic illness awards are final

  1. 30 days after the applicant receives the committee’s decision unless a reconsideration is requested during that time;
  2. 30 days after the applicant receives the committee’s decision upon reconsideration unless a hearing is requested during that time;
  3. 15 days after the applicant receives the hearing authority’s decision if that decision is not appealed to the director during that time;
  4. upon being notified of the decision of the director if an appeal is taken to the director under AS 47.25.180 .

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.08.110. Extension of time limits.

Time limits for reconsideration or for requesting an appeal may be extended, at the discretion of the committee, upon application or upon the committee’s own motion. A request for reconsideration or for a hearing shall be considered made on the date when the request is dispatched rather than the date when it is received by the committee.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.08.120. Recovery from a collateral source.

If the applicant or a provider receives payment from any other source for medical expenses that have been paid by the committee, the applicant or provider is liable to the committee in the amount of that payment. An application may not be considered by the committee unless the applicant agrees to this provision. A provider may not be paid by the committee under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 unless the provider agrees to this provision.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 47.08.130. Regulations.

The department may adopt regulations, under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) that establish rates of reimbursement to providers for medical expenses incurred, as well as other regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 .

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Administrative Code. —

For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.

Sec. 47.08.140. Definitions.

In AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ,

  1. “applicant” means a person who has suffered a catastrophic illness and is applying for assistance under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 or is the subject of an application for assistance under AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ;
  2. “applicant’s share” means the amount of the total medical expense related to the catastrophic illness that the committee determines the applicant can reasonably be expected to pay based on income, assets, and number of dependents under AS 47.08.060 ;
  3. “catastrophic illness” means illness or injury that results in medical expenses of over $1,000 during a period not to exceed 12 months, after all other sources of third-party payment have been exhausted;
  4. “committee” means the Catastrophic Illness Committee, created under AS 47.08.020 ;
  5. “elective medical or surgical procedures” means treatment that is not essential to the life or health of a person;
  6. “family” means two or more persons related by blood or marriage or adoption living as one economic unit;
  7. “liquid assets” means assets that can be readily converted to cash;
  8. “medical expense” means any financial obligation incurred in the course of treatment of illness as prescribed by a physician, including bills for ancillary services, patient transportation, transportation of a medical or family escort when reasonably necessary, or living expenses while receiving outpatient treatment in a community to which the applicant is not reasonably able to commute from the applicant’s permanent place of abode;
  9. “nonliquid assets” means all assets that are not liquid assets;
  10. “permanent place of abode” means a dwelling, or a dwelling unit in a multiple dwelling, including lots and outbuildings or an appropriate portion of these, that are necessary to convenient use of the dwelling unit;
  11. “provider” means a licensed physician, pharmacist, dentist, or other health service worker or a licensed hospital, clinic, skilled nursing home, intermediate care facility or health maintenance organization that has provided services not excluded by AS 47.08.050 to an applicant as a result of a catastrophic illness;
  12. “third-party payments” means payments of medical expenses related to a catastrophic illness by sources other than the applicant or the committee, including but not limited to state and federal medical assistance programs, private health insurance, employment-related health insurance, military health insurance, workers’ compensation, violent crimes compensation, Indian Health Service of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and awards in legal actions.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Article 2. Medical Assistance for Chronic or Acute Medical Conditions.

Sec. 47.08.150. Assistance for chronic or acute medical conditions.

  1. Under the provisions of this section, the Department of Health and Social Services may pay providers of medical care for services described in (c) of this section that are provided to needy persons suffering from a chronic or acute medical condition who may apply for assistance under (b) of this section.
  2. A needy person suffering from a chronic or an acute medical condition who is eligible for general relief assistance under AS 47.25.120 and is not eligible for the medical assistance program under AS 47.07 may apply for assistance under this section. The department shall make a determination of eligibility based on a general relief assistance application. The requirements of AS 47.08.020 47.08.140 do not apply to assistance sought under this section, except that, notwithstanding (c) of this section, neither reimbursement nor assistance may be paid by the department for services that are listed in AS 47.08.050 as those services are defined in AS 47.08.140 .
  3. The services eligible for payment under this section for a needy person with a chronic or acute medical condition are the following:
    1. prescription drugs and medical supplies prescribed to treat a person who has
      1. a terminal illness;
      2. cancer and requires chemotherapy; or
      3. a chronic condition that would normally, in its untreated course, result in the death or disability of the recipient, but that is amenable to outpatient medication; the chronic conditions for which the cost of prescription drugs may be paid include the following diagnoses:
        1. diabetes and diabetes insipidus;
        2. seizure disorders;
        3. chronic mental illness;
        4. hypertension;
    2. physician services
      1. related to care under (3) of this subsection;
      2. provided in a hospital emergency room the same day on which the recipient is admitted for care under (3) of this subsection;
      3. provided to a recipient residing in a nursing home; or
      4. provided in either an outpatient or an inpatient setting to a recipient with a diagnosis described in (1) of this subsection;
    3. inpatient hospital services that cannot be performed on an outpatient basis and that are certified as necessary by a professional review organization consulted by the Department of Health and Social Services but not including inpatient psychiatric hospital services;
    4. outpatient laboratory and x-ray services;
    5. medical transportation related to care under (3) of this subsection or nursing facility care;
    6. outpatient surgical services;
    7. nursing facility care.
  4. The payment rate for facilities under this section shall be the same as that established by regulation for medical services under AS 47.25.195 , and payment rates under this section for other providers may not exceed those established under AS 47.07.
  5. The Department of Health and Social Services may limit the amount, duration, and scope of services covered under this section by regulation. If the Department of Health and Social Services finds that the cost of assistance for all persons eligible under this section will exceed the amount allocated for that assistance during the fiscal year, the Department of Health and Social Services may limit coverage for certain medical services by regulation in order to provide the most critical care within the available appropriations.
  6. The Department of Health and Social Services may adopt regulations to implement this section.

History. (§ 7 ch 130 SLA 1998)

Conditional repeal. —

Under §§ 8 and 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, this section is repealed “on the day after the later of (1) the date on which time expires for appeal of a judgment declaring any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional, or (2) if an appeal is taken, the date of entry of the final order on appeal that any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional.” As of January 2022, the contingency had not occurred.

Administrative Code. —

For chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48, art. 2.

Chapter 10. Children in Need of Aid.

Opinions of attorney general. —

For analysis of the question of when tribes in Alaska may exercise jurisdiction over tribal children in child custody proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), see 2004 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (October 1, 2004).

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979); Allam v. State, 830 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

Article 1. Children’s Proceedings.

Cross references. —

For court rules governing children’s proceedings, see Alaska Rules of Court, Child in Need of Aid Rules (CINA Rules) and Delinquency Rules.

Sec. 47.10.005. Construction.

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to

  1. achieve the end that a child coming within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter may receive the care, guidance, treatment, and control that will promote the child’s welfare and the parents’ participation in the upbringing of the child to the fullest extent consistent with the child’s best interests; and
  2. follow the findings set out in AS 47.05.065 .

History. (§ 16 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of act enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the paragraph (1) designation and paragraph (2), and in paragraph (1) added “achieve” at the beginning and added the language beginning “and the parents’ participation” to the end of the paragraph.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

Father’s claims that a social worker failed to comply with Child in Need of Aid (CINA) procedures were not actionable because AS 47.10.960 precluded the father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008); Rowan B. v. State, 361 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2015).

Foster parent intervention in child in need of aid cases. —

Child in need of aid laws shall be liberally construed so that a child receives the care, guidance, treatment, and control that will promote the child's welfare and the parents' participation in the upbringing of the child to the fullest extent consistent with the child's best interests; when the cautious use of permissive intervention is necessary to promote the child's best interest, the trial court has the discretion to employ it. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Theresa L. v. State, 353 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2015); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 47.10.010. Jurisdiction; guardians and attorneys; support.

  1. Proceedings relating to a child under 18 years of age residing or found in the state are governed by this chapter when the child is alleged to be or may be determined by the court to be a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 .
  2. In a controversy concerning custody of a child under this chapter, the court may appoint a guardian of the person and property of a child, may appoint an attorney to represent the legal interests of the child, and may order support from either or both parents. Custody of a child may be given to the department and payment of support money to the department may be ordered by a court.

History. (§ 4 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1961; am §§ 1, 2 ch 110 SLA 1967; am § 1 ch 64 SLA 1969; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 7, 8 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 1 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 5 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 17 ch 50 SLA 1987; am § 6 ch 125 SLA 1988; am § 3 ch 130 SLA 1988; am § 6 ch 125 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 5 ch 81 SLA 1995; am §§ 17, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 17 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the 1998 amendment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendment to this section applies to

“(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after the effective date of this Act in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.030 . Cases decided under former provisions of this section concerning children in need of aid may also be found at AS 47.10.011 and 47.10.088 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the amendment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:

“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;

“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;

“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”

Constitutionality. —

The statutory scheme of this chapter is not so vague as to deprive parents of their procedural due process rights. R.C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1988).

Applicability of 1977 amendment. —

All cases pending at the time of the enactment of the new children’s statute by the 1977 acts are entitled to hearing under the new, rather than the old, standards. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).

In order to provide guidance to the superior court for the administration of juvenile justice, children adjudged dependent under the standards of former subsection (a)(5) of this section prior to its repeal in 1977 were entitled, on request, to a dispositional hearing under the standards of former subsection (a)(2)(C) of this section. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).

Children adjudged dependent under former (a)(5) of this section are entitled on request to an adjudicative hearing under the standards of subsection (a)(2)(C). In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

There is no statute authorizing awards of attorney’s fees in child in need of aid proceedings, nor has any rule or order authorizing such an award been promulgated. Cooper v. State, 638 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1981).

Residency retained. —

CINA statutes govern proceedings relating to minors who are residents of Alaska, regardless of whether the minor is physically present in Alaska, and the superior court’s findings that the boys retained their Alaska residency were not clearly erroneous where the mother’s only relevant evidence was her own testimony that she had gone to Edmonton, Canada with an intent to remain there. E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).

Applied in

E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).

Cited in

Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999); Damon W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 14, 2018); Shelly C. v. Jonah C., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 21, 2020).

Collateral references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.

43 C.J.S., Infants, § 12 et seq.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquents or dependents. 14 ALR2d 336.

Sec. 47.10.011. Children in need of aid.

Subject to AS 47.10.019 , the court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to any of the following:

  1. a parent or guardian has abandoned the child as described in AS 47.10.013 , and the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter;
  2. a parent, guardian, or custodian is incarcerated, the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter, and the incarcerated parent has not made adequate arrangements for the child;
  3. a custodian with whom the child has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care, supervision, or support for the child, and the whereabouts of the parent or guardian is unknown;
  4. the child is in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent substantial physical harm or is in need of treatment for mental injury and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian has knowingly failed to provide the treatment;
  5. the child is habitually absent from home or refuses to accept available care and the child’s conduct places the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury;
  6. the child has suffered substantial physical harm, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer substantial physical harm, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian to supervise the child adequately;
  7. the child has suffered sexual abuse, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer sexual abuse, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian to adequately supervise the child; if a parent, guardian, or custodian has actual notice that a person has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor within the past 15 years, is registered or required to register as a sex offender under AS 12.63, or is under investigation for a sex offense against a minor, and the parent, guardian, or custodian subsequently allows a child to be left with that person, this conduct constitutes prima facie evidence that the child is at substantial risk of being sexually abused;
  8. conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have
    1. resulted in mental injury to the child; or
    2. placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of
      1. a pattern of rejecting, terrorizing, ignoring, isolating, or corrupting behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury; or
      2. exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.100 11.41.220 , 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410 11.41.432 , an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100 11.41.220 , 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410 11.41.432 , an attempt to commit an offense that is a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432, or an attempt to commit an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432; or
      3. repeated exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250 11.41.270 or an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250 11.41.270 ;
  9. conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have subjected the child or another child in the same household to neglect;
  10. the parent, guardian, or custodian’s ability to parent has been substantially impaired by the addictive or habitual use of an intoxicant, and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child; if a court has previously found that a child is a child in need of aid under this paragraph, the resumption of use of an intoxicant by a parent, guardian, or custodian within one year after rehabilitation is prima facie evidence that the ability to parent is substantially impaired and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child as described in this paragraph;
  11. the parent, guardian, or custodian has a mental illness, serious emotional disturbance, or mental deficiency of a nature and duration that places the child at substantial risk of physical harm or mental injury;
  12. the child has committed an illegal act as a result of pressure, guidance, or approval from the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.

History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.010 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the enactment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:

“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;

“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;

“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”

Statutory interpretation. —

In interpreting child in need of aid statutes and other laws, the court applies its independent judgment, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).

The discretion allotted a parent in the administration of punishment is not unlimited. Clearly it does not extend to punishment regularly causing the “substantial physical harm” which under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] determines that a child is in need of aid. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).

Mental examination of parent. —

That Alaska CINA R. 16(b) allows a court to order mental and physical examinations of a child’s parents at the predisposition phase of a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding does not limit the court’s authority under Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a) to order a mental examination at the adjudication stage. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).

In child-in-need-of-aid proceedings, Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a) should be invoked cautiously, only after the movant has demonstrated sufficient justification for a mental or physical examination. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).

As a mother’s mental state was in controversy because her mental or emotional condition allegedly placed her child at risk within the meaning of paragraph (11) of this section, and there was sufficient evidence to establish good cause for a psychological evaluation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering her to undergo such an evaluation under Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a). Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).

Willingness of parents to provide care. —

A court was not bound to accept at face value the parents’ expression of willingness to care for their children, but could look to the objective conduct of the parents in determining whether they were willing to provide care. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Inability to care for child. —

Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The child had special needs that the father simply did not seem to understand. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Where superior court did not clearly err in finding that parent was unwilling to care for child, the termination of parental rights was affirmed. R.J.M. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).

Mother's contention that the appearance of judicial partiality violated her due process rights was rejected because, although the trial court may have exhibited partiality related to whether substance abuse continued to substantially impair the mother's ability to parent, that only impacted one of the grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother's ability to be heard and adequately represent her interests with respect to the domestic violence and mental illness findings was not prejudiced, and the child's best interests would not be served by delaying permanency and prolonging the judicial proceedings given that the mother had yet to remedy the conduct or conditions that made him a child in need of aid. Sarah A. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children Servs., 427 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2018).

Termination held inappropriate where father arranged for care of infant. —

Termination of the father’s parental rights was inappropriate under paragraph (2) where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support the conclusion that the incarcerated father failed to make arrangements for his daughter’s care upon her birth. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).

Refusal of guardianship proper. —

Trial court did not err by failing to establish a guardianship instead of terminating the father’s parental rights because the potential that the father may one day be able to change was not sufficient to suggest, much less prove, that guardianship was in the son’s best interests. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).

Finding of inability to care. —

A child may not be adjudicated “in need of aid” under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] on the grounds that his parent or caregiver is unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. A parent’s or caregiver’s ability to care may be considered only under the specific, explicit standards of [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ]. In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996) (overruling In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), and A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), to the limited extent that those cases stated that ability to care may be considered under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010].

In a case in which there are relatives willing to care for the children, children in need of aid (CINA) jurisdiction under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] does not exist. K.F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996).

Parent’s substance abuse placed her girls at substantial risk of harm and caused the parent to neglect the girls and on multiple occasions the parent was found passed out and unable to care for the girls; the record adequately supported the lower court’s finding and it did not err in terminating the parent’s parental rights. A.J. v. State, 62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003).

Where a father’s addiction to substances, including alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana, resulted in repeated incarcerations, and he had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, his frequent and prolonged absences impaired his ability to parent and were harmful to his children; thus, a trial court did not err in finding that the children were in need of aid under paragraph (10) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that a father’s youngest child was a child in need of aid because the evidence showed that the child was in substantial risk of injury if he returned home. The father’s previous lack of cooperation and the exhaustion of resources mitigated Office of Children Services’ failure to refer the father to service providers in a case plan. Burke P. v. State, 162 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2007).

While the trial court erred by finding that the son was a child in need of aid as a result of the father’s previous incarceration where the father was not incarcerated at the time of the termination trial, the trial court properly found the son to be a child in need of aid under paragraphs (6), (8), (10), and (11). The evidence showed that the father had a history of violent behavior, he did not comply with his case plan to address his anger, an alcohol assessment concluded that the father was significantly disabled by his alcohol abuse, and some of his acts of violence involved alcohol. Jeremy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).

Court termination of incarcerated parent’s rights held proper. —

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the state with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the state had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Termination of father’s right to his children was proper based on finding that the children were in need of aid under paragraph (8) of this section, where the father’s long history of domestic violence against women created a substantial risk of harm to the children if they were placed with him, and the father failed to complete parenting and anger management classes, as witnessing domestic violence is mentally harmful to children; fact that because a parent has never directed violence against his child does not show that the child has not faced “a substantial risk of mental injury” under paragraph (8)(B)(i). Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).

Order terminating parents’ rights to their child was upheld where the parents, who had a history of substance abuse, mental problems, and criminal activity, did not remedy the conditions in the home that threatened the child’s safety. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).

Where a father was incarcerated for the first 20 months of his child’s life, then was in her life for only five months before disappearing to avoid incarceration on a probation violation, and where there was no evidence that he maintained any contact with her during his flight, a finding of abandonment and termination of his parental rights was proper, especially in light of the child’s young age and the proportion of her life for which the father was absent. David S. v. State, 270 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2012).

Termination of parental rights to Indian children was appropriate because delaying the children's permanency until a parent's release from incarceration likely would have resulted in serious emotional harm given the children's emotional state, the parent's release date, and the parent's inability to care for the children immediately upon release. The testimony of the Office of Children's Services supervisor of family services was sufficient to support the finding. Thaddeus S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Noncompliance with case plan. —

The superior court did not clearly err by relying on the father’s non-compliance with his case plan when it found that a father had abandoned his child, causing the child to be a child in need of aid. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Child was in need of aid because the father’s action in waiting more than one year to arrange for the child’s care while he was incarcerated ultimately rendered the steps he did take inadequate. Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).

Superior court properly terminated a father’s parental rights after finding that the children were in need of aid due to abandonment because the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in his case plan; the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Further, the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the father’s failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations, and his failure to maintain visitation with his children caused the destruction of the parent-child relationship. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father's parental right did not violate his due process rights where the basis of termination was his abandonment of the child, which was evidenced by his failure to engage with his case plan and his plan for the child's placement with the paternal grandparents, and requiring him to prove that he could provide a safe home for the child was appropriate. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

When a father engaged in parenting, vocational, and religious instruction while incarcerated, it was on the father's own initiative rather than in response to any guidance from the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) about what the father needed to do to improve the chances of reunification. Therefore, termination of the father's parental rights was inappropriate because the OCS's minimal engagement with the father, combined with the lack of a relevant case plan, meant that the OCS did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Superior court did not err when it accepted the termination petition and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental because the trial occurred about 13 months after the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the child and it found that the mother had failed to participate in services before the adjudication hearing. It noted that, since the adjudication, the mother had been stopped in a truck littered with a “shocking” amount of drugs and related paraphernalia. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).

Requirements for adjudication of child in need of aid. —

A child may not be adjudicated a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] on the grounds that the child’s parent or caregiver is unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1996).

In termination of parental rights proceedings, trial court did not err in finding Indian child was a child in need of aid because neither 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e) nor state rules required courts to make “removal findings” before extending custody, but additional findings and determinations were needed before Office of Children’s Services’ custody could be extended. Danielle A. v. State, 215 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2009).

Children were in need of aid where the evidence showed that: (1) the mother suffered from depression and had attempted suicide on several occasions; (2) there was ongoing domestic violence between the mother and the father; and (3) the mother used drugs, including marijuana, methadone, and cocaine, and that one of the children tested positive for cocaine when he was born. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).

While the superior court properly rejected a master’s recommendation that there was no probable cause to believe that two of the children were children in need of aid because the matter was moot where the children were in the mother’s custody and the Office of Children’s Services no longer sought to be involved in the parent-child relationship, there was no error in the superior court’s decision that the master’s recommendation that the children be returned home was not effective until the court had reviewed it, however, the 23-day wait in this case between the master’s recommendation and the superior court’s order on review of it was unacceptable. Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that a daughter was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10) where the evidence established that the father had a drug use problem that he attempted to hide from the Office of Children's Services, the daughter had special needs that the father did not understand or meet unless he was sober, and the father had stipulated that the daughter was a child in need under AS 47.10.011 's substance abuse subsection. Kent P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 5, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Gross parental misconduct not required. —

Argument that a superior court must find “gross parental misconduct” in order to conclude that a child has suffered mental injury is not supported by either this section’s legislative history or Alaska caselaw. Josephine B. v. State, 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2007), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2008).

Jurisdiction retained. —

Even if Alaska did not have jurisdiction as the children’s home state, the superior court would still retain jurisdiction under former AS 25.30.020(a)(2) because the boys were present in Alaska and in need of aid on the day that the state filed its petition for temporary custody. E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).

Child properly found in need of aid. —

Evidence provided by therapists and the child’s mother was sufficient to support a finding that the child was refusing care available by her father and on that basis was a child in need of aid. F.T. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).

The court’s findings that parents’ history of substance abuse, as well as their failure to visit their hospitalized child or to otherwise fulfill their parental obligations, constituted abandonment of the child, that the mother’s harmful conduct was likely to continue, and that reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate the parents and to reunify the family had been made, and that the child was therefore a child in need of aid, were warranted by the evidence. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997).

Father’s leaving the state without leaving any forwarding address and failure to contact his daughter for over one year was evidence of a disregard for his parental obligations, and supported a finding that he destroyed any chance of having developed a parent-child relationship. D.K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998).

Probable cause existed to believe that a child faced an imminent risk of substantial harm and was a child in need of aid based on evidence that he was a passenger in his father’s car in a drunk driving accident and on the histories of substance abuse, domestic violence, and repeated drunk driving convictions of his parents. In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1998).

The termination statute requires a determination that the children were CINA based on any of the factors listed in this section, and where the court based its CINA finding on three separate bases: neglect, domestic violence, and mental illness, the court did not err in determining that the children were CINA. A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).

Trial court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights over her children was affirmed, where the record clearly supported the conclusion that the mother caused the children to suffer harm in three ways: (1) mental injury, (2) sexual abuse, and (3) substantial risk of physical harm. V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 21, 2001), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2002), sub. op., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).

Order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter was affirmed, where the record supported the trial court’s ruling under paragraph (10) that the daughter was at substantial risk of harm because of the mother’s chronic substance abuse problem. M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002).

Where the mother had a decade long history of abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, numerous arrests, and failures at treatment, and where one child’s problems included sexualized behavior, head banging, biting, fire setting, defecating in his pants, and violence towards animals, the mother’s children were properly adjudicated as children in need of aid, and when reasonable efforts at reunification had been exhausted, the mother’s parental rights were properly terminated. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).

State supreme court upheld a trial court’s judgment that a child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).

Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father’s reckless use of firearms, including shooting the child’s mother when she was pregnant with the child, created a significant risk of mental injury to the child if continued. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Court found probable cause to believe that an infant was a child in need of aid under paragraphs (1) and (11) of this section, based upon risk posed to the infant by the mother’s inability to perceive danger to the child, her inability to retain information given to her on care for the child, her refusal to follow directions given to her on care for the child, her anger management problems that posed a risk to the child, and her refusal to accept medication or counseling for her depression. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).

Evidence that supported the termination of a father’s parental rights under AS 47.10.080(o) , e.g., the significant period of the father’s incarceration, the mother’s unavailability, and the unsuitability of the father’s placement proposals, supported a determination that two children were in need of aid under paragraph (2) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).

Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Trial court did not err by finding that the sons were children in need of aid under subsection (8) where the mother had dialed 911 and said she wanted to kill them, which resulted in their removal, and where the sons exhibited strong reactions including one son’s diagnosis of acute post-traumatic stress disorder. Kim B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 28, 2009) (memorandum decision).

Children were properly found to be in need of aid where the mother admitted to drinking while she was pregnant with one of the children and to testing positive for marijuana use following the child’s birth. Lucy J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2010).

Superior court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services had provided her with remedial and rehabilitative programs, although she was bonded with the child, she was unwilling to attend treatment programs or provide a time frame for completing treatment, and the child, who was five years age at the time, was thriving in his grandparents’ home. Simone B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 30, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services, and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency. It was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

In a case in which a father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an “Indian child” under the definition set out in the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Supreme Court, which had twice remanded the matter to the superior court, considered the evidence presented at the new evidentiary proceedings - and the superior court's credibility findings - and concluded that the superior court's finding that the daughter was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10) was not clearly erroneous. Leonid K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her Indian daughter, for neglect and substance abuse, because the court did not clearly err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the child would likely have been seriously harmed if returned to her mother's care and that the mother's conduct was unlikely to change, despite the mother's recent short period of sobriety, as both expert and lay witnesses testified as to the mother's substance abuse issues. Ava T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, by declining to credit the testimony of the father's witnesses over the testimony of the witnesses for the children's services agency, in finding active but unsuccessful efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and in giving more weight to expert witness testimony than to testimony from the father's witnesses as to the likelihood of future harm to the child. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court had not violated a mother's due process rights in finding a child to be in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 (6) where the mother had means other than the child's testimony of rebutting the Office of Children's Services' allegations of the child's whereabouts on the night of a stabbing, given the child's age, her testimony would not likely have been found probative of whether she was placed at risk by intoxicated caregivers, and none of the findings relied on hearsay. Taryn M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Mother had not refuted the trial court's findings that she knowingly failed to provide the child needed medical treatment to alleviate her significant respiratory and dental problems, and thus the finding that the mother's actions placed the child in need of aid, for purposes of AS 47.10.011 , was proper, as was the termination of the mother's rights under AS 47.10.088 . Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a mother's use of intoxicants was addictive and habitual under AS 47.10.011 (10) where although she took Subutex as part of a medically assisted treatment program for addiction, she had failed to participate in required counseling, and she sought and took other prescription opioids during her pregnancy. Sally C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a child was in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (1) and had been abandoned under AS 47.10-013(a)(4) where although the father was relatively consistent in visitation, cleaned up his home, and participated in case plan meetings, he refused to take drug tests, participate in parental risk assessments and evaluations, or participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Findings that the child was in need of aid was supported by evidence that the mother suffered from mental illness that she refused to acknowledge or receive treatment for, the child had acute medical needs that the mother was unable to handle, reasonable efforts to help the mother had been made, and the mother had been given a reasonable amount of time, given the child's age, to remedy her issues. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

In a termination of parental rights action, the trial court did not err when it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was a child in need of aid, as the evidence showed that the child was exposed to marijuana and methamphetamine while in the care of the mother and her partner Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err by finding that the child was a child in need of aid based on a substantial risk of physical harm and her parents had neglected other children in the household. Alexander G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 15, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Child improperly found in need of aid. —

Superior court’s adjudication of seriously emotionally disturbed 10-year-old boy as a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] was reversed where separated father’s conduct objectively bespoke willingness to care for child and there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of father’s history of violence. F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993).

The court clearly erred where it adjudicated children “in need of aid” under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] under the following facts; (1) the mother was unable to provide her sons with enough “structure and consistency”; (2) she sometimes disciplined her sons by yelling at them; and (3) her awareness of possible dangerous places in the environment was not as great as that of the social workers observing her. N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

In the absence of evidence that, as a result of actions of a child’s mother, there was a substantial risk that the child would suffer harm or that the child suffered substantial neglect, and, since the mother was serving as the child’s de facto custodian, the court erred in finding that he was a child in need of aid. T.B. v. State, 922 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1996).

The phrase “substantial physical abuse or neglect” means “substantial physical abuse” or “substantial physical neglect,” and the court’s specific reliance on emotional neglect as the basis for finding a child in need of aid was erroneous. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Finding that the children were in need of aid was clearly erroneous, as there was no evidence that the children suffered a “mental injury” or a serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the children’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner, as the children’s behaviors may not have been ideal, but they did not demonstrate such an injury. Theresa L. v. State, 353 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2015).

Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and incarceration of the father because the father initiated efforts to visit the child, who was already in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS), as soon as the father learned of the father's possible paternity. Furthermore, the father had visitation during the subsequent incarceration as often as the OCS was able to provide it. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Order terminating the parents' rights had to be vacated because a therapist's background did not reflect the required expertise for the case since, although she held a master's degree in marriage and family therapy, there was no indication she could have been qualified as an expert for diagnosing complex mental injury to a child or opining on the cause of such an injury and without an opinion tying the parents to such an injury, the child in need of assistance finding, upon which the termination order was based, was deficient. Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).

Privilege against self-incrimination. —

See E. L. L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977)(decided prior to the 1977 amendment to AS 47.10.010 ).

Violation of former law relating to purchase of intoxicating liquors by minors. —

See Purdy v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 762, 16 Alaska 173 (D. Alaska 1956).

Termination based on abandonment proper.

Termination based on abandonment was supported by evidence that the father had not spoken to the child in over nine months, and made minimal progress toward his case plan. Victor B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Petition to terminate parental rights was affirmed because, while there was a seven month period where the Office of Children’s Service (OCS) did not make active efforts required by Indian Child Welfare Act, over the entire period where OCS was involved, their efforts were sufficiently active in this case so that any shortcomings during father’s brief and intermittent periods of incarceration did not negate those efforts. Vale T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 15, 2021).

Test for abandonment. —

The test for abandonment under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] is two-pronged: the superior court must find (1) that the parent’s conduct implied a conscious disregard for parental obligations; and (2) that the parent’s conscious disregard led to the destruction of the relationship between the parent and the parent’s children. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment under AS 47.10.013 because the record established that even though he was working, the father did not provide child support after he was released from jail, and he made only one contact with the child during a 13 month period while the child was in foster care. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

The child’s therapist testified that the father’s absence from the child’s life, and subsequent inconsistent visitation aggravated the child’s severe anxiety, interfering with his day-to-day functioning. Two one-year periods without visitation, coupled with the absence of any other forms of communication or support, constituted abandonment by the father. Dan A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 13, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper on the basis of abandonment because, after being given support and counselling, the father lost his job, was discharged from counseling for non-compliance, was arrested twice for driving while intoxicated, and failed to communicate the setbacks to the State. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Father abandoned his daughter by failing to maintain regular visitation for more than six months, supporting termination under AS 47.10.013(a)(3) ; he had last visited the child seven and a half months before trial and had visited her only three times, all in a single month, during the 15 months between December 2013 and March 2015. Based on his incarceration and failure to attend substance abuse and batterers' classes, the conduct was likely to continue. Trevor M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 368 P.3d 607 (Alaska 2016).

Record supported the superior court's finding that the father abandoned the child for purposes of AS 47.10.011 (1) by failing to comply with several important aspects of his case plan related to ceasing substance abuse and mitigating instances of domestic violence, and he offered no justification for this failure; the superior court did not err in finding that the father caused the child to be a child in need of aid by virtue of his abandonment. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Best interests of child prevail over parental rights. —

Record supported trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child where the record showed that the child suffered emotional problems as the result of the instability of his home environment; child had spent the last 19 months in foster care, he could not afford to wait any longer for his father to be a parent, and he would suffer severe psychological harm if the father was granted custody and then dropped out of his life again, which was likely. Carl N. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 102 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2004).

Where a father was incarcerated for the first 20 months of his child’s life, then was in her life for only five months before disappearing to avoid incarceration on a probation violation, and where there was no evidence that he maintained any contact with her during his flight, a finding of abandonment and termination of his parental rights was proper, especially in light of the child’s young age and the proportion of her life for which the father was absent. David S. v. State, 270 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2012).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate due to the child’s need for permanency, the strong bond which the child had formed with a foster family, and — given that the child’s older sister was part of the foster family already — the importance of keeping siblings together. The court also noted the foster family’s willingness to support a continued relationship between the child and the mother. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Criminal record and history of violence. —

Child was in need of aid where the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions; he admitted at trial that his assault and domestic violence convictions all resulted from crimes against women he knew, and one assault occurred against the child’s mother on the day before the child’s birth. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).

Breakup of Indian family. —

Court properly found the child to be a child in need of aid because the State’s efforts intended to address the mental health and substance abuse problems of the child were active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of an Indian family under 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d). Kyle S. v. State, 309 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2013) (memorandum decision).

Father's parental rights to an Indian child were properly terminated because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as (1) OCS provided frequent supervised visits recommended by two experts, (2) multiple agencies provided hands-on, one-on-one, parenting education, and (3) OCS paid for and followed up on the father's counseling with a chosen therapist to address mental health issues and was not obligated to try another course of action when the father did not improve due to a lack of commitment to therapy. Tim B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 18, 2019).

Destruction of parent-child relationship. —

Destruction of the parent-child relationship must be brought about by the acts of the parent; and in order to constitute abandonment, the acts of the parent must be willful. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Videotaped statement of child admissible against father. —

The videotaped statement of a four-year-old girl alleging sexual abuse by her father exhibited the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible under Evid. R. 804(b)(5) in a civil proceeding against the father where the statements were spontaneous and natural, the girl used child-like terminology to describe graphic sexual behavior and tied these incidents to events that would be prominent in the mind of a small child, and the interviewers conducted themselves in a neutral fashion and did not extract her statements. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).

Child at risk of harm. —

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).

Father’s history of death threats, bullying, and intimidation in front of his children, combined with his insistence on isolating the family from any social services, placed the children at risk of continued injury and warranted a finding that they were children in need of aid under this section. Martha S. v. State, 268 P.3d 1066 (Alaska 2012).

Even accepting a father’s argument that he was unable to defend himself against sexual abuse allegations due to his concurrent defense to criminal charges, the evidence of neglect, sexual abuse and domestic violence against the father was more than sufficient to justify termination of his parental rights. Edward C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Although father made some effort to maintain a relationship with his daughter, his parenting efforts were inconsistent; he failed to provide either financial or emotional support, failed to follow his case plan, and exposed the child to possible harmful situations. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).

If a trial court finds that a parent sexually abused one child in the household, it can presume that the other children in the household are at substantial risk for sexual abuse; therefore, in a child in need of aid case, the statutory presumption applied to male children in the household if the trial court found that a father had sexually abused a female child. Rowan B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2014).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Trial court, which terminated a mother’s parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the children in need of aid statutes, did not err in finding that the evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother’s children would likely be seriously harmed if returned to the mother. Because the aggregated testimony of expert and lay witnesses supported the trial court’s finding that the mother likely would continue to relapse until she resolved her underlying mental health issues, the trial court’s conduct-not-likely-to-change finding was not clearly erroneous. Diana P. v. State, 355 P.3d 541 (Alaska 2015).

Evidence presented at trial supported findings that the parents' substance use harmed the child and that the continued custody of the child by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child; the parents stipulated at an earlier adjudication hearing that the child was a child in need of aid and the parents were not engaged in treatment. The court could have inferred that returning the child to the parents while they were homeless and addicted to multiple controlled substances would result in substantial harm. Rachelle H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 22, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Record clearly supported the superior court's findings that the son was a child in need of aid as the son was at substantial risk of harm if not given appropriate care and that the father was unlikely to give it because the father was apparently indifferent to his son's special needs; and the father was emotionally volatile and short tempered. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues, coupled with the mother’s lack of accountability, would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Reasonable efforts.—

In a case in which a mother challenged the termination of her parental rights to her child, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's relevant finding was not clearly erroneous and that the trial court correctly applied relevant law. The record supported the trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her child, but that OCS's efforts were hampered by the mother's repeated incarcerations and her conduct during the times she was not incarcerated. Sloane K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 14, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother and the children because when the caseworker did not have face-to-face meetings she held them with the mother over the phone, and there was sufficient evidence in the record for the superior court to conclude that the mother was not interested in having those meetings. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.

Office of Children Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to address issues identified in a doctor's report and to help the mother gain critical parenting skills because OCS followed through on recommendations in the neuropsychological report, especially as they pertained to the mother's learning difficulty; OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the mother's lack of willingness to participate in her plan and her level of cooperation. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.

There was no error in the superior court's reasonable efforts finding with respect to the Office of Children Services' failure to seek additional providers for a bonding study because the children were in need of aid due to the mother's inability to manage her fatigue and learn the skills she needed to safely parent both children together; the extent of the mother's parental bonds with her children was secondary to those main issues. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Furthermore, that the Alaska Office of Children’s Services made reasonable reunification efforts by facilitating substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting classes, and various forms of visitation. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Child subjected to neglect. —

Finding that a child is in need of aid because she suffered physical neglect does not require the state to show both that parents physically neglected child and that child was physically harmed by their neglect; former AS 47.10.010(a)(6) (now see paragraph (9) of this section) did not require a finding of actual harm. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 968 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1998).

There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in the child’s continuing mental health issues. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.

Effect of witnessing domestic abuse. —

Witnessing domestic violence is mentally harmful to children; fact that because a parent has never directed violence against his child does not mean that the child has not faced “a substantial risk of mental injury” under paragraph (8)(B)(i). Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).

Trial court did not err in finding that children were in need of aid because the record contained clear support for the finding that their mother had a tendency to enter into and remain in abusive relationships; the mother’s own testimony indicated that the children suffered from PTSD and required intensive therapy due to the domestic violence in her home. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 264 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2011).

Father’s rights properly terminated due to domestic violence. —

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights where the father was reluctant to participate in his case plan and had failed to recognize or remedy his role in his abusive relationship with the children’s mother; a police officer’s testimony supported the finding that jealousy, control, and power, in other words, domestic violence, remained an issue for the father. Victor B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).

A child was a child in need of aid due to the father’s pattern of domestic violence against the child’s mother, including the most recent incident when he broke both of her arms, the many severe and violent incidents involving alcohol, and the father’s failure to follow through with treatment for his substance abuse. Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013).

Trial court's findings that termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the father exposed the child to domestic violence, causing her mental injury, was supported by evidence that the father had a well documented history of domestic violence, including two convictions, had made no changes in how he interacted with others, and failed to participate in any classes to help him with his violent behavior. Victor B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Substance abuser.—

Finding that the mother's habitual drug use substantially impaired her ability to parent and placed the child at substantial risk of harm, thus making the child a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10), was amply supported by the record; the mother was convicted in 2007 after she drove under the influence of methamphetamine with the child as a passenger, and evidence of the mother's 2016 relapse was separately relevant to show that her drug use was addictive and that her ability to parent had been substantially impaired. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Admission of an officer's alleged hearsay statements constituted harmless error as the evidence was sufficient, without the officer's statements, to find that the children were in need of aid, and to terminate the father's parental rights based on his ongoing substance abuse issues because there was evidence of the father's positive drug tests and no-shows for testing; testimony by the mother regarding the father's past drug usage; testimony by a sister-in-law that she found tin foil with a burnt substance on it in the room in her home where the father was staying; and testimony by two different officers who conducted two separate traffic stops where they each suspected the father was under the influence of a controlled substance. Aaron B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Sedrvs., — P.3d — (Alaska July 17, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

There was no error in the termination of the father’s parental rights because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the father’s family. For the majority of the four years during which OCS had custody of the children, he continued to use marijuana and alcohol, refused to engage consistently in therapy, failed to internalize lessons and skills taught in parenting classes, and missed many classes and urinalysis appointments. Kevin H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 29, 2021).

Father’s incarceration, ongoing drug use, and criminal activity justify termination. —

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights and found his children were in need of aid where the father used cocaine and marijuana, and was arrested repeatedly on drug-related offenses. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Substance abuse. —

In a case in which a father challenged a trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights to four children, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence supported the trial court's findings and the trial court correctly applied relevant law. There was substantial support in the record reflecting the father's ongoing substance use and failed treatment programs, which the trial court reasoned indicated a habitual or addictive use of intoxicants, placing the children at a substantial risk of harm. Glenn L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 20, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Substance abuse and exposure to domestic violence. —

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights by determining that his daughter was a child in need of aid. There was sufficient evidence in the record to find that the father had an addiction to prescription and illegal intoxicants; it appeared that many of the father’s legal problems and incarcerations related to his addiction, which resulted in substantial harm to his daughter. Seth D. v. State, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008).

In terminating a mother’s parental rights, a trial court did not err in concluding that the children were in need of aid because the mother had a long history of alcohol abuse and all three children suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and other serious mental health issues as a result of witnessing domestic violence. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2013) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the child had been exposed to conduct or conditions specified in this section because the mother did not dispute that she exposed the child to drug addicts, drug dealers, and domestic violence. As the mother refused to fulfill her case plan requirements, which included substance abuse treatment, the trial court did not err by finding she did not remedy her conduct in time for her son to be safely returned to her custody. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Trial court’s finding that the child was a child in need of aid was supported by evidence that the mother’s substance abuse prevented her from caring for the child. Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).

Child born with addiction. —

There was clear and convincing evidence that a child was in need of aid and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper; the child suffered substantial physical harm while withdrawing from the methadone addiction with which the child was born. Darcy F. v. State, 252 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2010).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother's conduct resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the son under AS 47.10.011 (10) where the in utero exposure to Subutex resulted in the son's withdrawal symptoms at birth that persisted for weeks. Sally C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Parent with mental illness. —

Parent’s failure to seek treatment for her mental illness constituted unwillingness to provide care, and supported the termination of her parental rights. R.J.M. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).

It was not error for the superior court to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on her personality disorder rather than her physical ailment, because termination was required under paragraph (11). R.G. v. State, 43 P.3d 145 (Alaska 2002)..

Son was a child in need of aid based on mental injury due to his exposure to domestic violence; the child’s problems were related to neglect, exposure to domestic violence, and pathogenic parenting, and he was diagonsed with Reactive Attachment Disorder, which the responsible social worker noted usually began with pathogenic parenting. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights due to abandonment was proper because the mother failed to exercise visitation, she had multiple mental health diagnoses, she had very limited insight and judgment, and her impairments were so severe that she was unlikely to be able to function independently, requiring lifelong wrap-around services in order to meet her own needs. Miranda R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 17, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Failure of parents to remedy conduct. —

Order terminating parents’ rights to their three children was proper because the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions that put their children at substantial risk of harm within a reasonable time; the parents began to participate in residential substance abuse treatment just three weeks before the trial to terminate their rights. Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009).

Trial court did not err when it found that the children were children in need of aid, because the children suffered mental injury due to the parents’ lack of supervision and failure to meet the children’s mental health and counseling needs, including inappropriate and intimidating corporal punishment. William S. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 15, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, an Indian child who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).

Father's failure-to-remedy challenge failed where he conceded that he had yet to complete substantial portions of his case plan, even though at the time of the termination hearing more than two years had passed since the child's removal. Moreover, he provided no excuse for having failed to complete such tasks in the two years provided, and his argument that he had substantially remedied any alleged harm to the child because he no longer associated with a drug user at the time of trial did nothing to dispel the legitimate concerns that the father had not changed his behaviors so as to place the child's interests first. Dillon K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 27, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Failure to remedy conditions. —

Superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in her home that placed her children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; the mother’s sobriety was new in her life, she continued to be romantically involved with a man who had been convicted of child sexual assault, and the mother failed to recognize her children’s special needs. Sherry R. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).

Superior court properly found that a father’s history of incarceration and substance abuse, as well as his pending incarceration, put his children in need of aid under subsections (2) and (10), and that the father had failed within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed his children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury under AS 47.10.088 . Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).

Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to remedy conduct that put their children at substantial risk under AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(B) because the father failed to achieve the goals of his case plan and stated that he did not intend to seek further alcohol abuse treatment because it was not important. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because sufficient evidence showed that his drinking impaired his ability to parent and caused a substantial risk of harm to the children; his continuing alcohol problems supported the finding that he failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk. Stephen H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the mother failed to remedy the conduct and conditions that caused the children to be children in need of aid because the parents' history showed a repeated pattern of substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence; the mother did not understand the extent of the children's needs or have the skills necessary to protect them from future harm; the mother never internalized or understood the ways in which her behavior adversely affected the children; and, by the time of trial, the mother still had not completed substance abuse treatment or a long period of sobriety. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Order terminating the mother's parental rights to her two children was affirmed as she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children in need of aid because she was unable to cease her use of marijuana for well over a year after the first child's removal; she continued to regularly smoke marijuana when she was pregnant with the second child, even though she was informed of the risks posed by prenatal marijuana exposure; although the mother eventually became clean, she began smoking marijuana again several months after the children were returned to her care; and, after her relapse, the condition of the family's home and the hygiene of the children deteriorated. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).

It was not clear error to find a father did not remedy conduct making his children in need of aid because (1) the father did not engage in treatment recommended by his assessment, (2) he used drugs in the month preceding the termination of parental rights trial, and (3) her did not timely obtain a psychological assessment. Justin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 15, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid because the father's release from prison remedied the condition that placed the children in need of aid; because the father 's “unavailability” was not relevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, it was error to consider it. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Failure to maintain contact or comply with other requirements. —

Child was in need of aid where the father failed to maintain any sort of contact or visitation with the child for eight months, failed to comply with the urinalysis testing program, and did not complete a state-approved domestic violence intervention program. Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010).

Son was a child in need of aid based on abandonment where the parents failed to correspond with the child and visited only sporadically; argument by father that they were too poor to be able to visit more often was unconvincing where the father and mother moved away from the child with no clear benefit to the child or the parents, and the Alaska Office of Children’s Services offered to assist the parents with travel expenses. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Child was in need of aid where the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Evidence supported superior court’s finding that children were in need of aid due to abandonment, domestic violence, and substance abuse because the parent failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the children in need of aid and the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the family. The evidence showed that despite OCS’s efforts, the parent visited the children only three times during the 30 months they were in OCS custody preceding the trial. Albert S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 12, 2014) (memorandum decision).

No due process violations. —

Order adjudicating a father’s children in need of aid was proper because the father was not denied due process; he had notice that the State was seeking adjudication findings, he had an opportunity to be heard on adjudication, and he was not denied the opportunity to deliver a closing argument. Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 264 P.3d 842 (Alaska 2011).

Superior court properly adjudicated a mother's child as in need of aid because, even assuming that the court violated the mother's due process rights, the error was harmless where she raised only a theoretical possibility of prejudice inasmuch as she cited, but did not apply, the relevant due process test, did not explain what "inferences" the court allegedly drew against her or how those inferences affected the court's adjudication or removal decision, or what information in the court's summary of findings led the court to discount her expert's testimony or make any alleged inferences against her, and the court's general comments did not implicate the mother's rights to notice and an opportunity to respond to specific evidence. Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).

No right to jury trial. —

Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 7, 11, and 16 do not provide a right to a jury trial in child-in-need-of-aid proceedings. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).

Appellate review of child in need of aid determination. —

Supreme court will only overturn a trial court’s finding that a child is in need of aid if it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. L.P. v. State, 838 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1992).

Because either the finding that a child was in need of aid due to the father's incarceration or the father's mental illness adequately supported the termination decision, and the father did not challenge the trial court's child in need of aid finding under subsection (11), the court of appeals did not reach his point on appeal concerning the court's use of the mother's adjudication stipulation under subsection (2). Jasper R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 24, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Because a mother in a termination of parental rights case did not contest the superior court's finding that the mother's children were in need of aid based on the mother's substance abuse, the appellate court declined to consider the alternative findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and risk of exposure to domestic violence by the mother's paramour, as those issues were rendered moot. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Parent’s appeal of adjudication deemed moot after state’s dismissal. —

In arguing that the adjudication of a father’s children to be in need of aid was not moot, the father’s argument that, even if the adjudication no longer affected him, its potential for collateral consequences was sufficient, did not prevent a finding that the appeal was moot after the state voluntarily moved to dismiss the case at disposition. Peter A. v. State, 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006).

Applied in

A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska 2000); A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000); C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015); Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).

Quoted in

M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001); Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006); Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015); Jenny S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 4, 2015); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017).

Stated in

Wilson W. v. State, 185 P.3d 94 (Alaska 2008); Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014); In re Adoption of E.H., 431 P.3d 1190 (Alaska 2018); Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002); S.B. v. State, 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002); State v. M.L.L., 61 P.3d 43 (Alaska 2002); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003); Pravat P. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 249 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2011); Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011); Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013); Sherry R. v. State, 332 P.3d 1268 (Alaska 2014); Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015); Ray R. v. State, 386 P.3d 1225 (Alaska 2016); Caitlyn E. v. State, 399 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2017); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018); Mariah B. v. Dep't to Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 499 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.

Sec. 47.10.013. Abandonment.

  1. For purposes of this chapter, the court may find abandonment of a child if a parent or guardian has shown a conscious disregard of parental responsibilities toward the child by failing to provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact, or provide normal supervision, considering the child’s age and need for care by an adult. Abandonment of a child also includes instances when the parent or guardian, without justifiable cause,
    1. left the child with another person without provision for the child’s support and without meaningful communication with the child for a period of three months;
    2. has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child;
    3. failed for a period of at least six months to maintain regular visitation with the child;
    4. failed to participate in a suitable plan or program designed to reunite the parent or guardian with the child;
    5. left the child without affording means of identifying the child and the child’s parent or guardian;
    6. was absent from the home for a period of time that created a substantial risk of serious harm to a child left in the home;
    7. failed to respond to notice of child protective proceedings; or
    8. was unwilling to provide care, support, or supervision for the child.
  2. For purposes of (a) of this section, a parent or guardian who is a victim of domestic violence, or who has a child in the parent’s or guardian’s care who is the victim of domestic violence, is considered to have justifiable cause to take an action or to fail to take an action that would otherwise be considered to be abandonment of a child under (a) of this section if the action or failure to act is necessary to protect the parent or guardian, or a child in the care of the parent or guardian, from further acts of domestic violence. However, a parent or guardian who initially had justifiable cause to act or fail to act as described in this subsection may be considered to have abandoned the child without justifiable cause for purposes of (a) of this section if the parent or guardian does not take reasonable steps to reunify with or provide care for the abandoned child after becoming secure from further acts of domestic violence or after providing that another child in the care of the parent or guardian is secure from further acts of domestic violence.
  3. A parent who is immune from prosecution under AS 11.81.500 and chooses to surrender an infant shall surrender the infant in the manner described in this subsection. Surrendering the infant in the manner described in this subsection constitutes abandonment for purposes of this chapter. An infant’s parent is considered to have abandoned the infant safely, and, notwithstanding AS 25.20.030 and AS 47.10.120 , the parent’s legal duty to support the infant is extinguished if
    1. the parent, without expressing an intent to return for the infant, leaves the infant in the physical custody of a person who is a
      1. person the parent reasonably believes would provide for the health and safety of the infant and who would act appropriately to care for the infant;
      2. peace officer, community health aide, physician, or hospital employee; or
      3. person who is employed by or is a volunteer for a fire department or emergency medical service, if the person is acting within the scope of the person’s fire department or emergency medical service duties; and
    2. there is no evidence the infant has been physically injured before abandonment.
  4. A person to whom an infant is surrendered in the manner described in (c)(1)(B) or (C) of this section shall
    1. act appropriately to care for the infant;
    2. inform the parent that the parent may, but is not required to, answer any questions regarding the name, identity, and medical history of the infant and parents of the infant unless the parent chooses to contact the department under (3) of this subsection;
    3. ask the parent if the parent wishes to relinquish the parent’s parental rights and release the infant for adoption; if the answer is affirmative, the person shall contact the department so that the parent can discuss that option with the department;
    4. immediately notify the nearest office of the department that the infant has been surrendered in the manner described in (c) of this section.
  5. An individual, agency, facility, or entity that receives an infant abandoned safely under (c) of this section is not liable for civil damages for failure to discharge the duties listed in (d) of this section.
  6. A record regarding the surrender of an infant under (c) of this section is confidential and not subject to public inspection or copying under AS 40.25.100 40.25.220 .

History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 1 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, added subsections (c) through (f).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Little contact with child over prolonged period. —

State supreme court upheld a trial court’s judgment that a child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate when evidence showed that a great part of the son’s emotional disturbance was attributable to neglect, the instability of caregivers, and violence in the father’s shifting households, as well as poor role modeling in the home; father also failed to maintain contact with his daughter, although he had sought custody of her in the past during periods when he was out of prison. Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005).

Two one-year-long periods without visitation, coupled with the absence of any other forms of communication or support, constituted abandonment by the father. The child’s therapist testified that the father’s absence from the child’s life and subsequent inconsistent visitation aggravated the child’s severe anxiety, interfering with his day-to-day functioning. Dan A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 13, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err by finding the child in need of aid due to abandonment because the father had failed to participate in a case plan as he was out of contact with the Office of Children's Services from February to September 2016 and again from September 2016 to May 2017; and, between the end of the trial home visit in October 2015 and May 2017, the only arguable progress that the father made on his case plan was his self-reported lack of contact with the mother and his family contact with the child. Alvin R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 24, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Finding of abandonment. —

Child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment because the record established that even though he was working, the father did not provide child support after he was released from jail, and he made only one contact with the child during a 13 month period while the child was in foster care. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

Father’s inconsistent behavior, sudden lengthy absences, and failure to follow his case plan constituted abandonment. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).

A father’s parental rights were terminated because he abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the requirement of the Office of Children’s Services that the father visit with the children individually was reasonable, and his failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations. Further, the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in his case plan; the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father's parental right did not violate his due process rights where the basis of termination was his abandonment of the child, which was evidenced by his failure to engage with his case plan and his plan for the child's placement with the paternal grandparents, and requiring him to prove that he could provide a safe home for the child was appropriate. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

It was not clear error to find a father abandoned his Indian child because (1) the father did not regularly visit or meaningfully participate in a case plan requiring drug tests and visits, (2) the drug testing was reasonable due to his substance abuse history, presence of other children in the home who tested positive for illegal substances, and failure to show the father's religion or work schedule prevented participating in testing, and (3) the father did not show his work schedule prevented attending visits. Steve H. v. State, 444 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2019).

Although the superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid, since its findings concerning “unavailability” were irrelevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, because “unavailability” could be relevant to abandonment, the matter was remanded to the superior court to reconsider its findings in relation to Office of Children's Services' abandonment argument and petition. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Failure to participate in a suitable plan. —

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a child was in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (1) and had been abandoned under AS 47.10-013(a)(4) where although the father was relatively consistent in visitation, cleaned up his home, and participated in case plan meetings, he refused to take drug tests, participate in parental risk assessments and evaluations, or participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Failure to take steps to obtain visitation. —

Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment because the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).

No effort to see child for over one year after birth. —

Where the father made no efforts to establish a relationship with his baby daughter for over a year after her birth, one year was not a reasonable time to remedy the effects of his abandonment under former AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B)(ii) [now AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(B) ]. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).

“Failed to participate in a suitable plan.” —

In determining what “failed to participate” means within the context of paragraph (a)(4), while this statutory provision does not necessarily require a parent to follow his or her reunification plan to the letter, it does require more than minimal participation. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).

By failing to even minimally participate in her case plan for over six months, the mother’s conduct fell within the definition of “abandonment” stated in paragraph (a)(4). A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).

Court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment where he failed to comply with his case plan and refused to provide basic contact information so that he could be notified about events in the case and services that might be available; he had not had contact with the children for six years. Wilson W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his child. The father failed to cooperate with the reasonable services that the OCS provided. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Father’s failure to comply with a case plan designed to assist him in becoming able to take care of his child was properly held to be abandonment. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, but was merely giving lip-service to the providers and was going through the motions. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination proper. —

Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper on the basis of abandonment because, after he had an opportunity to receive counselling and support from the state, the father lost his job, was discharged from counseling for non-compliance, was arrested twice for driving while intoxicated, and failed to communicate these setbacks to the State. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).

Father abandoned his daughter by failing to maintain regular visitation for more than six months, supporting termination under AS 47.10.013(a)(3) ; he had last visited the child seven and a half months before trial and had visited her only three times, all in a single month, during the 15 months between December 2013 and March 2015. Based on his incarceration and failure to attend substance abuse and batterers' classes, the conduct was likely to continue. Trevor M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 368 P.3d 607 (Alaska 2016).

Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Termination held improper. —

Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and incarceration of the father because the father initiated efforts to visit the child, who was already in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS), as soon as he learned of his possible paternity. Furthermore, the father had visitation during the subsequent incarceration as often as the OCS was able to provide it. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Quoted in

A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska 2000); C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Cited in

M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002); Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010); Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.10.014. Neglect.

For purposes of this chapter, the court may find neglect of a child if the parent, guardian, or custodian fails to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attention, or other care and control necessary for the child’s physical and mental health and development, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so.

History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Neglect not found.

Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of neglect because there was no basis in the record for a finding that the father, who was incarcerated, failed to provide support that the father was financially able to provide. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Neglect found. —

Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).

Trial court did not err by finding the child to be a child in need of aid based on neglect because for some time after the father was incarcerated he refused to provide names of relatives who might be placements, he unlawfully left the halfway house and kidnapped the child from her foster parents, and placed her in a dangerous situation during a police confrontation. Darryl W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 14, 2019) (memorandum decision).

There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in her continuing mental health issues. Kendra H. v. State (Alaska 2000) (memorandum decision).

Quoted in

Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010); Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015).

Sec. 47.10.015. Physical harm.

For the purposes of this chapter, the court may find physical harm to a child or substantial risk of physical harm to a child if

  1. the child was the victim of an act described in AS 11.41.100 11.41.250 , 11.41.300 , 11.41.410 11.41.455 , or AS 11.51.100 and the physical harm occurred as a result of conduct by or conditions created by a parent, guardian, or custodian; or
  2. a negligent act or omission by a parent, guardian, or custodian creates a substantial risk of injury to the child.

History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Rowan B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 47.10.019. Limitations on determinations.

Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, the court may not find a minor to be a child in need of aid under this chapter solely on the basis that the child’s family is poor, lacks adequate housing, or exhibits a lifestyle that is different from the generally accepted lifestyle standard of the community where the family lives. However, this section may not be construed to prevent a court from finding that a child is in need of aid if the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011 47.10.015 .

History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Housing. —

Abandonment finding was supported in part by evidence that the parent refused to reveal his address; the superior court focused not on the quality of the housing but on the parent’s secretiveness about it. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).

Applied in

Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).

Cited in

C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 47.10.020. Investigation and petition.

  1. Whenever circumstances subject a child to the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.005 47.10.142 , the court shall appoint a competent person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and report for the information of the court to determine whether the best interests of the child require that further action be taken. The court shall make the appointment on its own motion or at the request of a person or agency having knowledge of the child’s circumstances. If, under this subsection, the court appoints a person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and to report to it, or if the department is conducting an investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect, the court may issue any orders necessary to aid the person, the agency, or the department in its investigation or in making the preliminary inquiry and report. Upon receipt of the report under this subsection, the court may
    1. close the matter without a court hearing;
    2. determine whether the best interests of the child require that further action be taken; or
    3. authorize the person or agency having knowledge of the facts of the case to file with the court a petition setting out the facts.
  2. The petition and all subsequent pleadings shall be styled as follows: “In the matter of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., a child under 18 years of age.” The petition may be executed upon the petitioner’s information and belief and must be verified. It must include the following information:
    1. the name, address, and occupation of the petitioner, together with the petitioner’s relationship to the child, and the petitioner’s interest in the matter;
    2. the name, age, and address of the child;
    3. a brief statement of the facts that bring the child within this chapter;
    4. the names and addresses of the child’s parents;
    5. the tribal affiliation, if known, of the child;
    6. the name and address of the child’s guardian or of the person having control or custody of the child.
  3. If the petitioner does not know a fact required in this section, the petitioner shall so state in the petition.
  4. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  5. Nothing in this section requires the department to obtain authorization from the court before
    1. conducting an investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect; or
    2. filing a petition.

History. (§ 5 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am §§ 7, 8 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 98 SLA 1995; am §§ 18, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 19, 20 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 7, 8 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) added the second sentence, in the third sentence added the language beginning “or if the department” to the end of the sentence, and inserted “under this subsection” in the last sentence; and added subsection (e).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

No actionable duty in tort. —

In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).

Stated in

Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Superior Court, 462 P.3d 1000 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 16-25

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 49 et seq.

43 C.J.S., Infants, § 12 et seq.

Sec. 47.10.030. Summons and custody of minor.

  1. After a petition is filed and after further investigation that the court directs, if the person having custody or control of the minor has not appeared voluntarily, the court shall issue a summons that
    1. recites briefly the substance of the petition;
    2. clearly states that at the hearing it is possible that parental rights and responsibilities may be terminated forever and that the minor may at the hearing be committed to the department for possible adoption; and
    3. directs the person having custody or control of the minor to appear personally in court with the minor at the place and at the time set forth in the summons.
  2. In all cases under this chapter, the child, each parent, the tribe, foster parent or other out-of-home care provider, guardian, and guardian ad litem of the child and, subject to (d) and (e) of this section, each grandparent of the child shall be given notice adequate to give actual notice of the proceedings and the possibility of termination of parental rights and responsibilities, taking into account education and language differences that are known or reasonably ascertainable by the petitioner or the department. The notice of the hearing must contain all names by which the child has been identified. Notice shall be given in the manner appropriate under rules of civil procedure for the service of process in a civil action under Alaska law or in any manner the court by order directs. Proof of the giving of the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard. The court may also subpoena the parent of the child, or any other person whose testimony may be necessary at the hearing. A subpoena or other process may be served by a person authorized by law to make the service, and, where personal service cannot be made, the court may direct that service of process be in a manner appropriate under rules of civil procedure for the service of process in a civil action under Alaska law or in any manner the court directs.
  3. If the minor is in such condition or surroundings that the minor’s welfare requires the immediate assumption of custody by the court, the court may order, by endorsement upon the summons, that the officer serving the summons shall at once take the minor into custody and make the temporary placement of the minor that the court directs.
  4. Except as provided in (e) of this section, the department shall give advance written notice of all court hearings in a child’s case to a grandparent of the child if
    1. the grandparent has contacted the department, provided evidence acceptable to the department of being the child’s grandparent, requested notice about the hearings in the child’s case, and provided the department with a current mailing address; or
    2. the department is aware that the child has a grandparent and the grandparent’s mailing address is on file with the department.
  5. Notwithstanding (d) of this section, the department is not required to give advance notice to a grandparent about hearings in a child’s case if the grandparent
    1. has been convicted of a crime in which the child was the victim; or
    2. is prohibited by a court order from having contact with the child.

History. (§ 6 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 110 SLA 1960; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 9 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 21 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 2 ch 43 SLA 2001)

Cross references. —

For effect of the 1998 amendments to subsection (b) on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 70, ch. 99, SLA 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) and Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971), cited below, were decided prior to the 1977 amendment to this section, which rewrote subsection (b).

The child and his parents must receive notice which would be deemed adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. These requirements suggest that Alaska civil and criminal rules should be looked to for techniques of service on children. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

Personal service upon the child is required. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).

Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).

And it must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

One day’s notice was insufficient to afford a reasonable time to prepare. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).

Grandparents had right to notice of CINA proceedings. —

Grandparents were entitled to judicial declaration that they had a right to notice of any child in need of aid (CINA) proceedings involving their grandchildren; grandparents were also entitled to a declaration that their right to notice was violated when they did not receive notice after amendments to CINA statutes requiring grandparent notice took effect. Jacob v. State, 177 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2008).

Failure to provide notice held harmless. —

Failure to provide a grandmother notice of permanency hearings was harmless error. It was unlikely that her presence would have changed the results of the hearings, and she was able to fully address the evidence later in her own proceedings. Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012).

Waiving defects in process. —

While some authorities hold that infants, even when represented by counsel, cannot waive defects in process and consent to jurisdiction over the person, such a rule unreasonably restricts the strategic choices open to a child represented by counsel. A no-waiver rule could be used as a delaying tactic by an unprepared prosecutor when process was not entirely correct. A child represented by competent counsel is about as fit as an adult to waive this sort of objection, which is usually beyond the ken of adult laymen as well as children. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

Defect in process was waived by child’s failure to raise it below. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

Order terminating parental rights vacated because of inadequate notice. —

Order terminating parental rights was vacated where the state, by merely publishing notice of the parental rights termination proceeding, failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1912(a), and subsections (a) and (b) of this section and the record did not establish actual notice so as to render that error harmless. In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1986).

Stated in

State v. Jacob, 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Sec. 47.10.040. Release of minor. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law as to a child in need of aid, see AS 47.10.080(c)(2); as to an alleged delinquent minor, see AS 47.12.080.]

Sec. 47.10.050. Appointment of guardian ad litem or attorney.

  1. Whenever in the course of proceedings instituted under this chapter it appears to the court that the welfare of a child will be promoted by the appointment of an attorney to represent the child, the court may make the appointment. If it appears to the court that the welfare of a child in the proceeding will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the court shall make the appointment. Appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney shall be made under the terms of AS 25.24.310 .
  2. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]

History. (§ 8 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 167 SLA 1975; am §§ 11, 12 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 22 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For appointment of counsel, see CINA Rule 12; for guardians ad litem, see CINA Rule 11.

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Under Rule of Children’s Procedure 12(c)(3), the presence of the guardian ad litem is required at a child hearing. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979) (See current Child in Need of Aid Rule 11(f)(3)(A).).

Failure to conduct hearing in presence of child’s counsel and guardian ad litem held harmless error. —

See In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Collateral references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 74.

43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 44, 45.

Recognition of foreign guardian as next friend or guardian ad litem. 94 ALR2d 211.

Who is minor’s next of kin for guardianship purposes. 63 ALR3d 813.

Validity and efficacy of minor’s waiver of right to counsel — modern cases. 25 ALR4th 1072.

Sec. 47.10.060. Waiver of jurisdiction. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law as to an alleged delinquent minor, see AS 47.12.100.]

Sec. 47.10.070. Hearings.

  1. The court may conduct the hearing on the petition in an informal manner. The court shall give notice of the hearing to the department, and it may send a representative to the hearing. The court shall also transmit a copy of the petition to the department. The department shall send notice of the hearing to the persons for whom notice is required under AS 47.10.030(b) and to each grandparent of the child entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(d) . The department and the persons to whom the department must send notice of the hearing are entitled to be heard at the hearing. Except as provided in (c) of this section, and unless prohibited by federal or state law, court order, or court rule, a hearing is open to the public.
  2. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  3. Except as provided in (e) of this section, the following hearings in child-in-need-of-aid cases are closed to the public:
    1. the initial court hearing after the filing of a petition to commence the child-in-need-of-aid case;
    2. a hearing following the initial hearing in which a parent, child, or other party to the case is present but has not had an opportunity to obtain legal representation;
    3. a hearing, or a part of a hearing, for which the court issues a written order finding that allowing the hearing, or part of the hearing, to be open to the public would reasonably be expected to
      1. stigmatize or be emotionally damaging to a child;
      2. inhibit a child’s testimony in that hearing;
      3. disclose matters otherwise required to be kept confidential by state or federal statute or regulation, court order, or court rule; or
      4. interfere with a criminal investigation or proceeding or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding; before ruling on a request under this subparagraph, the court shall give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the state or a municipal agency that is assigned to the criminal investigation or to the prosecuting attorney.
  4. If a hearing, or part of a hearing, in a child-in-need-of-aid case is not closed under (c) of this section, the court shall hear in camera any information offered regarding the location, or readily leading to the location, of a parent, child, or other party to the case who is a victim of domestic violence or whose safety or welfare may be endangered by public release of the information. Access to testimony heard in camera under this subsection is limited to the court and authorized court personnel.
  5. The grandparents of the child and an out-of-home care provider may attend hearings that are otherwise closed to the public under (c) of this section. However, the court shall limit the presence of these persons in a hearing closed to the public to the time during which the person’s testimony is being given if the court determines that the limitation is necessary under (c)(3) of this section.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a person attending a hearing open to the public may not disclose a name, picture, or other information that would readily lead to the identification of a child who is the subject of the child-in-need-of-aid case. At the beginning of the hearing, the court shall issue an order specifying the restrictions necessary to comply with this subsection. If a person violates the order, the court may impose any appropriate sanction, including contempt and closure of any further hearings to the person.

History. (§ 10(1) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 49 SLA 1966; am § 53 ch 71 SLA 1972; am § 16 ch 57 SLA 1991; am §§ 19, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 23 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 43 SLA 2001; am §§ 9, 10 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For effect of the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 70, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of Rule 3(c), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, permitting attendance of a grandparent or out-of-home care provider at a hearing, as authorized by the 2005 enactment of (e) of this section, see § 51, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of Rule 3(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, allowing general public attendance at a hearing, as authorized by the 2005 amendment of (a) of this section, see § 52, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) deleted the former last two sentences and added the present last sentence; and added subsections (c)-(f).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Section 61(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of (a) and addition of (c) — (f) of this section “have the effect of changing Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, by allowing members of the public to attend court hearings except in certain circumstances.”

Under § 62(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the amendments to Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, that relate to the 2005 amendments of this section, apply “to hearings that are conducted on or after July 1, 2005.” Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments of and additions to this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”

Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendment of and addition to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.110 .

Cited in

In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975); M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Barry H. v. State, 404 P.3d 1231 (Alaska 2017).

Sec. 47.10.072. Access to hearing by victim. [Repealed, § 23 ch 57 SLA 1991.]

Sec. 47.10.075. Young adult advisory panels. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]

Sec. 47.10.080. Judgments and orders.

  1. An adjudication hearing shall be completed within 120 days after a finding of probable cause is entered unless the court finds good cause to continue the hearing. When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. The court, at the conclusion of the hearing, as the circumstances of the case may require, shall find and enter a judgment that the child is or is not a child in need of aid.
  2. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  3. If the court finds that the child is a child in need of aid, the court shall
    1. order the child committed to the department for placement in an appropriate setting for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event not to extend past the date the child becomes 19 years of age, except that the department, the child, or the child’s guardian ad litem may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
      1. one-year extensions of commitment that do not extend beyond the child’s 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the child; and
      2. additional one-year extensions of commitment past 19 years of age that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if the continued state custody is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it;
    2. order the child released to a parent, adult family member, or guardian of the child or to another suitable person, and, in appropriate cases, order the parent, adult family member, guardian, or other person to provide medical or other care and treatment; if the court releases the child, it shall direct the department to supervise the care and treatment given to the child, but the court may dispense with the department’s supervision if the court finds that the adult to whom the child is released will adequately care for the child without supervision; the department’s supervision may not exceed two years or in any event extend past the date the child reaches 19 years of age, except that the department or the child’s guardian ad litem may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
      1. one-year extensions of supervision that do not extend beyond the child’s 19th birthday if the extensions are in the best interests of the child; and
      2. an additional one-year period of supervision past 19 years of age if the continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it; or
    3. order, under the grounds specified in (o) of this section or AS 47.10.088 , the termination of parental rights and responsibilities of one or both parents and commit the child to the custody of the department; the department shall report quarterly to the court and shall demonstrate in its report that the department is making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child.
  4. An order issued under (c)(3) of this section authorizes the commissioner of health and social services or a designee or the guardian of the person of the child to consent to the adoption of the child.
  5. If the court finds that the minor is not a child in need of aid, it shall immediately order the minor released from the department’s custody and returned to the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian, and dismiss the case.
  6. A child found to be a child in need of aid is a ward of the state while committed to the department or the department has the power to supervise the child’s actions. For an order made under (c)(1) of this section, the court shall hold a permanency hearing as required by (l) of this section and at least annually thereafter during the continuation of foster care to determine if continued placement, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the child. The department, the child, and the child’s parents, guardian, and guardian ad litem are entitled, when good cause is shown, to a permanency hearing on application. If the application is granted, the court shall afford these persons and their counsel reasonable advance notice and hold a permanency hearing where these persons and their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard. The persons entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(b) and the grandparents entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(d) are entitled to notice of a permanency hearing under this subsection and are also entitled to be heard at the hearing. The child shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and to be heard at the permanency hearing. After the permanency hearing, the court shall make the written findings that are required under (l) of this section. The court shall review an order made under (c)(2) of this section at least annually to determine if continued supervision, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the child; this review is not considered to be a permanency hearing and is not governed by the provisions of this subsection that relate to permanency hearings.
  7. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  8. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  9. A child or the child’s parents, guardian, or guardian ad litem, or attorney, acting on the child’s behalf, or the department may appeal a judgment or order, or the stay, modification, setting aside, revocation, or enlargement of a judgment or order issued by the court under this chapter. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a decision on the appeal shall be issued no later than 90 days after the latest of the following:
    1. the date oral argument, if any, is heard on the appeal; or
    2. 45 days after the last date oral argument could have been timely requested if oral argument was not requested.
  10. [Repealed, § 29 ch 63 SLA 1977.]
  11. [Repealed, § 69 ch 99 SLA 1998.]
  12. Within 12 months after the date a child enters foster care as calculated under AS 47.10.088(f) , the court shall hold a permanency hearing. The hearing and permanent plan developed in the hearing are governed by the following provisions:
    1. the persons entitled to be heard under AS 47.10.070 or under (f) of this section are also entitled to be heard at the hearing held under this subsection;
    2. when establishing the permanent plan for the child, the court shall make appropriate written findings, including findings related to whether
      1. and when the child should be returned to the parent or guardian;
      2. the child should be placed for adoption or legal guardianship and whether a petition for termination of parental rights should be filed by the department; and
      3. there is a compelling reason that the most appropriate placement for the child is in another planned, permanent living arrangement and the department has recommended the arrangement under AS 47.14.100(o) ; the findings under this paragraph must include the steps that are necessary to achieve the new arrangement;
    3. if the court is unable to make a finding required under (2) of this subsection, the court shall hold another hearing within a reasonable period of time;
    4. in addition to the findings required by (2) of this subsection, the court shall also make appropriate written findings related to
      1. whether the department has made the reasonable efforts required under AS 47.10.086 to offer appropriate family support services to remedy the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid under this chapter;
      2. whether the parent or guardian has made substantial progress to remedy the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid under this chapter;
      3. if the permanent plan is for the child to remain in out-of- home care, whether
        1. the child’s out-of-home placement continues to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child; and
        2. the department is making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child; and
      4. whether the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanent plan for the child;
    5. the court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan at least annually until successful implementation of the plan; if the plan approved by the court changes after the hearing, the department shall promptly apply to the court for another permanency hearing, and the court shall conduct the hearing within 30 days after application by the department;
    6. if the court finds, under (4)(C)(ii) of this subsection, that the department is not making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child, the court shall order the department to make reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child unless the current placement is in the best interests of the child.
    7. in a hearing to review the permanent plan under AS 47.10.111(c) or 47.10.112(c) , the court shall make written findings related to whether
      1. the person who filed the petition or proxy is entitled to placement preference under AS 47.14.100(e) or 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), whichever is applicable; and
      2. if 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) applies, the current placement is in compliance with or whether there is good cause to deviate from the placement preferences.
  13. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
  14. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
  15. For purposes of terminating a parent’s parental rights under the standards in (c)(3) of this section, the court may determine that incarceration of the parent is sufficient grounds for determining that a child is a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 as a result of parental conduct and that the parental rights of the incarcerated parent should be terminated if the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
    1. the period of incarceration that the parent is scheduled to serve during the child’s minority is significant considering the child’s age and the child’s need for an adult’s care and supervision;
    2. there is not another parent willing and able to care for the child; and
    3. the incarcerated parent has failed to make adequate provisions for care of the child during the period of incarceration that will be during the child’s minority.
  16. If a child is removed from the parental home, the department shall provide reasonable visitation between the child and the child’s parents, guardian, and family. When determining what constitutes reasonable visitation with a family member, the department shall consider the nature and quality of the relationship that existed between the child and the family member before the child was committed to the custody of the department. The court may require the department to file a visitation plan with the court. The department may deny visitation to the parents, guardian, or family members if there is clear and convincing evidence that visits are not in the child’s best interests. If the department denies visitation to a parent or family member of a child, the department shall inform the parent or family member of a reason for the denial and of the parent’s or adult family member’s right to request a review hearing as an interested person. A parent, adult family member, or guardian who is denied visitation may request a review hearing. A non-party adult family member requesting a review hearing under this subsection is not eligible for publicly appointed legal counsel.
  17. If the court orders a child committed to the department under (c) of this section and the department places the child in licensed foster care, the department shall
    1. provide the foster parent with a copy of
      1. appropriate information held by the department regarding the child to the extent required by AS 47.12.310(b)(2)(H) ;
      2. all initial, updated, and revised case service plans for the child, court orders relating to the child, and the child’s medical, mental, and education reports prepared by or for the department, including reports compiled before the child was placed with the foster parent; and
      3. supplements to the plans, orders, and reports described in (B) of this paragraph;
    2. require the foster parent to
      1. maintain and update records regarding medical, mental, educational, and behavioral services provided to the child;
      2. provide all records described in (A) of this paragraph to the department when the child leaves the foster home placement; and
      3. maintain the confidentiality of records regarding a child placed in the foster home except when disclosure of the records is allowed under regulations of the department or when disclosure is reasonably necessary to ensure continuation of care for the child through appropriate medical, mental, educational, and behavioral services.
  18. If the court orders a child committed to the department under (c) of this section, the court shall order the child’s parent or guardian to provide the department with
    1. the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all of the child’s medical providers;
    2. the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of mental health providers that have provided services to the child;
    3. the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of schools, preschools, or day care facilities that the child was attending before the child was committed to the department;
    4. a description of special needs of the child, if any; and
    5. the names and locations of relatives who may be willing to have the child placed in their home.
  19. The department may transfer a child, in the child’s best interests, from one placement setting to another, and the child, the child’s parents or guardian, the child’s foster parents or out-of-home caregiver, the child’s guardian ad litem, the child’s attorney, and the child’s tribe are entitled to advance notice of a nonemergency transfer. A party opposed to the proposed transfer may request a hearing and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer would be contrary to the best interests of the child for the court to deny the transfer. A foster parent or out-of-home caregiver who requests a nonemergency change in placement of the child shall provide the department with reasonable advance notice of the requested change. When the department transfers a child from one out-of-home placement to another, the department shall search for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or a family friend who meets the foster care licensing requirements established by the department. A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible.
  20. For a child who is placed in foster care, when the department finds that it is in the best interest of a child and that the foster family will not be placed in undue risk of harm, the department shall require foster parents to provide regular opportunities for visitation with the child by the parents of the child and encourage foster parents to serve as mentors for facilitating family reunification.
  21. A hearing conducted under this section is open to the public unless an exception provided in AS 47.10.070(c) applies to make the hearing closed to the public or unless prohibited by federal or state statute or regulation.
  22. In addition to the extensions of state custody ordered by a court under (c)(1)(A) or (B) of this section, a court may grant in a hearing a resumption of state custody that does not extend beyond a person’s 21st birthday if the person
    1. consents to it;
    2. was placed in out-of-home care by the department immediately before being released from state custody and the person was
      1. at least 18 years of age and released to the person’s own custody; or
      2. at least 16 years of age and released to the
        1. person’s own custody after the disabilities of minority were removed under AS 09.55.590 ; or
        2. custody of a parent or guardian because the person refused out-of-home care;
    3. is in need of out-of-home care
      1. to avoid personal harm;
      2. because of the person’s severe emotional disturbance, mental disability, physical disability, homelessness, or a combination of those conditions;
      3. because the person is completing an educational or vocational program; or
      4. to otherwise improve the person’s successful transition to independent living; and
    4. if requested by the department, agrees to reasonable terms for resuming state custody that may include matters relating to the person’s education, attainment of a job or life skills, or other terms found by the court to be reasonable and in the person’s best interest.
  23. The court shall recognize a presumption that maintenance of a sibling relationship, including with a sibling who is related by blood, marriage, or adoption through one parent, is in a child’s best interest.
  24. In any team-decision meeting the department holds to address the potential or actual transfer of a child from one placement setting to another, the department shall ask the participants for input regarding whether it is in the child’s best interest for the child to remain in the child’s current school for the remainder of the school term.
  25. If the department transfers a child from one placement setting to another and it is reasonable and in the child’s best educational interests, the department shall immediately, and in advance of the transfer if possible, coordinate with the school the child is attending to ensure the child is permitted to attend that school through the end of the school term if the child’s new placement is in the same municipality and connected by road to the school. If federal funds and school district transportation funds are not available to pay for the cost of transportation for the child, the department shall pay the costs of transporting the child to school. The department shall work with the family or agency where the child is placed to arrange for transportation. The department shall consult with the school district regarding the child’s best interests, but the school district may not override the department’s decision to allow a child to remain in the current school through the end of the school term.

History. (§ 10(2) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 2 ch 110 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 118 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 1967; am §§ 1 — 4 ch 27 SLA 1970; am §§ 12 — 15 ch 245 SLA 1970; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 6, 7 ch 1 SLA 1972; am §§ 1, 2 ch 125 SLA 1974; am §§ 14 — 18, 29 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 6 ch 86 SLA 1979; am §§ 4, 5 ch 117 SLA 1990; am § 8 ch 63 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 72 SLA 1993; am § 11 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 30 ch 23 SLA 1995; am §§ 20 — 26, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 89 SLA 1996; am §§ 2, 3 ch 94 SLA 1997; am §§ 24 — 30, 69 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 20 ch 33 SLA 1999; am § 4 ch 43 SLA 2001; am § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 11 — 14 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 1, 2 ch 80 SLA 2010; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 59 SLA 2012; am § 8 ch 6 4SSLA 2016; am § 3 — 6 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am § 8 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Effective August 11, 1996, former subsection (b) was amended by § 3, ch. 144, SLA 1996. See AS 47.12.120 for provisions that replaced former subsection (b) when that subsection was repealed by § 55, ch. 59, SLA 1996, effective September 10, 1996. Also, section 4, ch. 144, SLA 1996, effective August 11, 1996, added a section governing enforcement of restitution orders under former (b)(4) of this section. Under § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996, that section was renumbered as AS 47.12.170 , effective September 10, 1996. In 1998, in subparagraph (q)(1)(A), “AS 47.12.310(b)(2)(H) ” was substituted for “AS 47.12.310(b)(8)” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of AS 47.12.310(b)(8).

In 2016, in subparagraph AS 47.10.080 ( l )(2)(C), a reference to “AS 47.14.100 (o)” was substituted for “AS 47.14.100(p) ” to reconcile the changes made to AS 47.14.100 in 2012.

Cross references. —

For purpose of enactment of subsection (o) as a response to judicial decisions, see § 1, ch. 89, SLA 1996 in the Temporary and Special Acts. For purpose and intent of 1998 amendments to this section, including the purpose of overriding certain court decisions, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of the 1998 amendments to this section on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see §§ 71-75, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of Rule 17.2(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, adding to the required findings a determination as to whether the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the child’s permanent placement, as required by the 2005 amendment of ( l ) of this section, see § 53, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the effect of the 2016 amendments to subsection ( l ) on Rule 17.2, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see sec. 15, ch. 7, SLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (s), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, repealed subsections (m) and (n).

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (c) inserted “not to extend” in the introductory language of paragraph (1) and substituted “adult family member” for “relative” in paragraph (2); added subparagraph ( l )(4)(D) and made related stylistic changes; in subsection (p) added the fifth sentence, inserted “, adult family member,” in the next-to-last sentence, and added the last sentence; and added subsections (t) and (u).

The 2010 amendment, effective January 1, 2011, in (c)(1), added “, the child,” following “except that the department”; in (c)(1)(B), substituted “additional one-year extensions of commitment” for “an additional one-year period of state custody”, added “that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday” following “past 19 years of age”; added (v).

The 2012 amendment, effective September 9, 2012, in ( l )(2)(C), added “there is a compelling reason that the most appropriate placement for” preceding “the child”, and substituted “is in another planned” for “should be placed in another planned”, and “and the department has recommended the arrangement under AS 47.14.100(p) ; the findings under this paragraph must include the steps that” for “and what steps”; in (v)(2), added the (v)(2)(A) and (v)(2)(B) designations, in (v)(2)(A), added “at least 18 years of age”, added (v)(2)(B); in (v)(3), added the (v)(3)(A) — (D) designations, added (v)(3)(B) and (v)(3)(C), in (v)(3)(D), deleted “enhance the person’s ability to continue the person’s education or training or” preceding “otherwise improve the person’s successful”; added (w).

The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added ( l )(6) [now ( l )(7)], and made a related change.

The second 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, in (c)(3), substituted “; the department shall report quarterly to the court and shall demonstrate in its report that the department is making reasonable efforts” for “, and the department shall report quarterly to the court on efforts being made”; added ( l )(4)(C)(ii), and made a stylistic and a related change, added ( l )(6); added the last sentence in (s); added (x) and (y).

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (s), added the last two sentences.

Editor’s notes. —

Chapter 89, SLA 1996, which added subsection (o), provides at § 1 that “the purpose of this Act is to respond to the Alaska Supreme Court’s invitation in A.M. v. State of Alaska, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995) and Nada A. V. State of Alaska, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983) to create a statutory basis for making incarceration a factor that can be considered in termination proceedings concerning children in need of aid.”

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Section 60(d), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of ( l ) of this section has the effect of amending Rule 17.2(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by modifying the grounds for review of a permanent plan.

Section 61(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 addition of (u) of this section “has the effect of changing Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by allowing members of the public to attend court hearings except in certain circumstances.”

Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendment of subsection (c) and addition of subsections (t) and (u) apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”

Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, subsections (t) and (u) of this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”

Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, paragraph (l)(7) applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017."

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the 1998 amendments to this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Annotator’s notes. —

For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.120 .

Each category of children mandates differences regarding content of dispositional orders. —

Alaska’s pertinent statutory provisions and procedural rules distinguish between categories of children for purposes of administering Alaska children’s laws. Of controlling significance is that each class or category mandates distinct differences regarding the permissible content of any dispositional order the trial court can enter. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Notice of transfer. —

Maternal grandmother had the required notice of her grandchildren’s transfer of placement from her care because she had initiated the transfer. Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012).

Review of placement decision. —

The superior court has the authority to review the decision of the department to determine if the placement is in the best interest of the minor, but in reviewing a decision of the department, the superior court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the department; since the legislature has committed the decision of placement to the department’s discretion, the question for the court is whether the agency abused its discretion. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); State v. E.E., 912 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Extension of state’s pretrial custody of children. —

Extension of the state’s pretrial custody of children beyond the initial two-year period allowed by this section was not error given the father’s delay in objecting, the nearness of the trial date at the time of his objection, and his failure to show potential prejudice arising from continued state custody. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Effect of denying petition for extension of custody. —

Where defendant proposed to return child in state custody to her natural mother and sought extension of state custody to accomplish this gradually, a native village council argued that denial of department’s petition for an extension of custody would not require the superior court then to return the child to her mother, but rather that under subsection (e) the court could release the child to the child’s parents under the tribal court adoption order; however, it was held that the superior court correctly concurred in the state’s position that, absent an extension, the child must be returned to her natural mother. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).

Extension of department custody held in best interest of child. —

Superior court did not abuse its discretion finding that an extension of custody of a child in need of aid by the department for an additional year, during which time the girl would be transitioned back into her mother’s custody, was in the child’s best interest. Work needed to be done for reunification efforts to succeed, and the superior court’s finding that it was not in the child’s best interests to be immediately returned to her mother was adequately supported by the record. Danielle A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2009) (memorandum decision).

Parental right to custody and control is not absolute. —

While a parent has a right to the care, custody and control of his or her children, this right is not absolute, and “courts have become increasingly aware of the rights of children.” The Alaska legislature has struck a balance between these potentially competing rights by requiring the state to prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence in parental rights termination cases. Once this burden of proof has been met, however, the statute mandates a termination. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).

Effect of visitation restriction. —

In a proceeding on child visitation, the trial court’s restriction on visitation by a father was not, in effect, a termination of his parental rights. Nelson v. Jones, 944 P.2d 476 (Alaska 1997), overruled in part, Angelica C. v. Jonathan C., 459 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2020).

Section not in conflict with Indian Child Welfare Act. —

The application of the clear and convincing standard to the findings that a child is in need of aid as a result of parental conduct and that the paternal conduct is likely to continue does not conflict with section 1912(f) (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Section 1912(f) looks to likely future harm to the child, requiring only a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of likely harm to the child with continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian. In contrast, this section is concerned with the present condition of the child and the likely future conduct of the parent and requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child is in need of aid as a result of parental conduct and that the parental conduct that placed the child in need of aid is likely to continue. The Alaska statute requires findings additional to that required by the ICWA, thus providing a level of protection to the parental rights beyond that provided by the ICWA, and is not preempted by the ICWA. In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1986).

Peremptory challenge procedure inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. —

While juvenile proceedings have some of the characteristics of both civil and criminal actions, they are basically different from both, and the words “civil or criminal” as used in AS 22.20.022 must be strictly construed. The trial judge was correct in holding that peremptory challenge procedure applied only to civil and criminal actions and not to juvenile proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Consolidation of proceedings. —

Delaying an adjudication hearing for two children and combining it with the termination trial was appropriate where the same evidence was to be presented at both proceedings, thereby justifying the finding of good cause to delay the adjudication and consolidate it with the termination trial. The mother failed to show that the continuance and consolidation deprived her of a substantial right or caused her serious prejudice. Denise L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Notions of benevolent protective policies cannot be used to validate departures from positive law relating to the adjudicative and dispositive phases of children’s proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Duty of incarcerated parent. —

Father’s burden under paragraph (o)(3) of this section was not relieved by the fact that his children were in the custody of the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services when he returned to jail; because none of the father’s proposed placements was facially “adequate,” the Division made more than reasonable efforts for family services, and the conditions for terminating his rights were met. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Review of custody orders. —

The new children’s law, as a result of the 1977 acts, provides for review of custody orders annually or more often if good cause is shown. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).

Evidentiary hearing on adoption plan. —

Superior court did not err in approving an adoption plan without holding an evidentiary hearing because neither subsection ( l ) of this section nor Alaska CINA R. 17.2 explicitly required such a hearing. Owen M. v. State, 120 P.3d 201 (Alaska 2005).

Standard of review. —

The factual findings supporting the trial court’s determination that a minor is a child in need of aid will not be overturned on review unless clearly erroneous. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).

Superior court did not exceed its jurisdiction in requiring the Department of Health and Social Services to designate a parenting class and urinalysis center for the child’s father, and in ordering the department to encourage contacts between the child and her mother, where the department was merely ordered to implement its chosen programs and was not required to make any particular placement or post-disposition treatment decision. In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990).

No actionable duty in tort. —

In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).

Appellate jurisdiction. —

AS 22.05.010 places final appellate jurisdiction in all cases in the supreme court. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Applied in

In re Adoption of J.B.K., 865 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1993); In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012); Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).

Quoted in

In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992); N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996); Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003); In re Mark V., 324 P.3d 840 (Alaska 2014); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Stated in

In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1972); State v. Jacob, 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009); Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012); Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017); In re Adoption of E.H., 431 P.3d 1190 (Alaska 2018); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1981); S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1982); In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987); In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994); Perry v. Newkirk, 871 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1994); D.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1997); D.K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998); C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998); S.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003); Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005); Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005); Danielle A. v. State, 215 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2009); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).

II.Child in Need of Aid

A minor who has been adjudged a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid] cannot be institutionalized under the Children’s Code. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Where a runaway child is found to be a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], not a delinquent minor, no legal basis exists for his incarceration. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Power of court under subsection (c). —

Under subsection (c) of this section, the court is empowered to order the minor committed to the Department of Health and Social Services or order the minor released to his parents, guardian, or some other suitable person. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

The Department of Health and Social Services does not possess the authority to institutionalize any minor, including one who has been declared a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], who has been committed to its custody. It is unreasonable to construe Alaska children’s statutes in a manner which would result in the grant to the Department of Health and Social Services of broader powers of commitment than possessed by the trial court. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

A child “in need of aid” appears to be the functional equivalent of a “dependent” child under AS 47.10.010 as it existed prior to its 1977 amendment. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Establishing CINA status. —

Abandonment is but one way of establishing CINA status for purposes of terminating parental rights because former AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) also applies when no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative is willing and able to provide care and inability to provide care does not require a showing that the parent-child relationship has been destroyed. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

“Best interests” standard. —

Given that both subparagraph (c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) and subsection (f) contain the “best interests” standard, it’s reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the standard to have the same meaning with respect to each type of continuation of custody, namely an extension under subparagraph (c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) beyond the term of the original order and an “extension” under subsection (f) beyond the first year of the order until its expiration. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).

The “continuing conditions of need” requirement for continued custody found in AS 47.10.083 should be viewed as an additional requirement beyond “best interests,” not as the equivalent thereof. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).

“Best interests” as used in AS 47.10.080(c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) does not constitute a requirement that the state demonstrate the continuing existence of former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) conditions of need in order to obtain an extension of custody. Thus, the state may require an extension of custody in order to implement a plan for reuniting the family without causing emotional trauma to the child by virtue of a sudden change of circumstances. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).

One episode of neglect on the part of a parent does not signify a continuing pattern of gross disregard for the welfare of his children. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).

The discretion allotted a parent in the administration of punishment is not unlimited. Clearly it does not extend to punishment regularly causing the “substantial physical harm” which under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(C) determines that a child is in need of aid. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).

Statutory provisions governing judgments and orders terminating parental rights have been changed. In order to terminate parental rights, the court must now find that the child is in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as the result of parental conduct proved by clear and convincing evidence and that the parental conduct is likely to continue to exist if there is no termination of parental rights, proved again by clear and convincing evidence, AS 47.10.080(c)(3) . In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Under former AS 47.10.010(a)(5) and subsection (a) and former subsection (c)(3)(D) of this section, in order to terminate parental rights, the superior court was required to find (1) that the child was a “dependent minor” and (2) that the parent had demonstrated by her conduct, proved by clear and convincing proof, that she was unfit to continue to exercise her parental rights and responsibilities. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

In order to terminate parental rights under this section, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) that there is a child in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as a result of parental conduct, and (2) that the parental conduct is likely to continue. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Authority to direct placement of minor. —

Once a court declares a minor a child in need of aid and commits the minor to the Department of Health and Social Services under subsection (c)(1), the department has the authority to direct the placement of the minor. The court can review the department’s decision to see if it constitutes an abuse of discretion, but it cannot make a specific placement order once legal custody has been granted to the department. In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986).

The Department of Health and Social Services is not required to file an additional petition for adjudication in order to change the physical placement of minors in its legal custody. In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986).

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the State with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the State had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Parent’s impulsive personality disorder not ground for termination of rights. —

Where after finding that child was in need of aid, trial judge found that the parent “is likely to continue to demonstrate a conscious disregard of the obligation owed by a parent to a child even after her release from incarceration because she suffers from an impulsive personality disorder,” such finding was insufficient to satisfy requirement of clear and convincing evidence that conduct leading to determination that child is in need of aid is likely since an impulsive personality disorder itself is not conduct and thus, not a ground for termination. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).

The absence of a “psychological parent” bond cannot, standing alone, be equated to the destruction of a parent-child relationship and cannot be the sole legal determinant of a viable parent-child relationship in termination of parental rights cases. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Findings. —

A finding that the parental conduct is likely to continue must be made expressly on the record prior to ordering the termination of parental rights. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).

Findings sufficient. —

The record, which included evidence that children had serious social, physical and cognitive problems, were filthy, and lacked necessary medical care, and that the mother’s neglect was likely to continue, furnished sufficient evidence of neglect such that the supreme court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court erred in any of its findings of fact or in its ultimate conclusion that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

The court’s findings that parents’ history of substance abuse, as well as their failure to visit their hospitalized child or to otherwise fulfill their parental obligations, constituted abandonment of the child, that the mother’s harmful conduct was likely to continue, and that reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate the parents and to reunify the family had been made, and that the child was therefore a child in need of aid, were warranted by the evidence. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997).

In a case involving an Indian child, findings that, despite assiduous remedial efforts by the Division of Family and Youth Services over a two-year period, the father’s continuing failure to stabilize his own life would almost certainly render him incapable of providing the child a safe and stable home were sufficient to justify termination of his parental rights. E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).

Evidence that supported the termination of a father’s parental rights under subsection (o) of this section, e.g., the significant period of the father’s incarceration, the mother’s unavailability, and the unsuitability of the father’s placement proposals, supported a determination that two children were in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (2). Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to show that removal of her three children from foster care with their paternal grandparents was contrary to the children's best interests where the father had moved in with the grandparents, his continued drinking endangered the children, and there was no evidence that the cultural or social differences between the children's home village and the new foster home with their maternal grandmother and aunt would have harmed the children. Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly recognized that to overrule the child services office's placement decision would be extraordinary and the superior court did not clearly err by finding that the office abused its discretion in its placement decision; the child had significant needs requiring full-time care, professional caregivers' perspectives were highly relevant, and the office failed to give them due weight in its placement decision. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Requirements of a permanency hearing fulfilled. —

Where the court held a hearing within twelve months of the girls’ entry into foster care and, as required by Alaska CINA R. 17.2(c) and (e), where the division filed a report including a proposed permanent plan of terminating parental rights and supporting facts, and the court made appropriate findings, the superior court fulfilled the requirements of a permanency hearing. N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).

Failure to hold annual review before termination trial not error. —

Where the mother’s counsel requested a continuance that resulted in delaying the termination hearing to a date more than twelve months from the permanency hearing, by delaying the termination trial, the mother in effect artificially manufactured the need for an annual review, and under these circumstances, the superior court did not err in failing to hold an annual review before the termination trial. N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).

Termination where developmentally disabled adult could not consent to continued custody. —

The mother of a developmentally disabled 20-year-old sought to have her daughter continue in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services after the office had arranged for a guardian and a place in an adult assisted living facility for the daughter. Because of the age of the daughter and her stipulated inability to give valid consent, the office could not continue to have custody of her and the mother’s claim was moot. Mia A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 25, 2012) (memorandum decision).

A rehabilitation program is not a common practice in the trial courts absent approval by a representative of the state. In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).

Family reunification efforts. —

Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services was not required to provide family reunification efforts where the conditions set forth in subsection (o) of this section were met; further, while a father was incarcerated, the Alaska Department of Corrections had primary responsibility for providing services to the father. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

In a termination of parental rights case, while superior court should have made its findings that the state could discontinue reasonable efforts to reunite the family at a permanency hearing, the error appeared harmless because the mother did not establish that she suffered any prejudice from superior court’s decision to make the findings in a written order prior to holding a permanency hearing. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Abandonment. —

For cases construing former language in subsection (c) providing for termination of parental rights and responsibilities when the child had been abandoned, see D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1973); In re B.J., 530 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1975); In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).

Termination of father’s parental rights was affirmed, where he had not made reasonable efforts to locate and communicate with his daughter and, at the time of the termination hearing, was incarcerated for assaulting his girlfriend. E.J.S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 754 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988).

Superior court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights on the basis of her abandonment of her child was supported by substantial evidence. —

See D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985).

Parental rights cannot be terminated for another’s misconduct. —

Trial court’s termination of father’s parental rights was erroneous where father could not have visited his children until he had established that he was their father and a period of approximately eighteen months elapsed before paternity of both children was established which resulted from the mother’s refusal, even under court order, to provide blood for testing purposes. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).

Incarceration of parent. —

While long-term incarceration of a parent can result in a child becoming a child in need of aid under an inability to provide care theory, such incarceration is not a sufficient basis to justify termination of parental rights under paragraph (c)(3) of this section. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).

Termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights pursuant to AS 47.10.088 and this section was inappropriate where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support termination. The father’s testimony indicated that he took steps to assure that the child had a safe home, away from the baby’s drug-addicted mother. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).

Foster parent intervention.

Foster parent intervention should be the rare exception rather than the rule but it is not precluded as a matter of law; the statute allows any party to request a hearing to prove that the Office of Children's Services' placement decision is not in the child's best interests. In applying the definition of “party” under the child in need of aid (CINA) rules, the phrase “any other person” includes foster parents when the court properly exercises its discretion to allow them to intervene. Foster parent intervention does not violate CINA statutes. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing foster parents to intervene for the limited purpose of challenging the decision to place the child with his paternal grandmother, as the foster parents said they had specific evidence about the placement that the court was not going to receive from any existing party; because the foster parents were identified as a pre-adoptive foster placement and attested to their desire to adopt the child, their claim did share a question of law or fact with the placement review, the child's best interests. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Court authority to set conditions on parent for placement of child in parental home. —

Court possessed authority to require parent to complete alcohol abuse program and maintain sobriety as a precondition to placement of the child in the parental home by the department under (c)(1) of this section. D.A.W. v. State, 699 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1985).

Trial court did not abuse discretion in failing to consider possibility of setting up plan for reestablishing family relationship between father and son. —

See In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).

Role of trial court in proceeding involving termination of parental rights. —

See In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).

Applicability of burden of proof. —

A burden of proof is not applicable to a dispositive hearing other than when termination of parental rights is involved. In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976). See also In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Determination of the standard to be applied by the court at the dispositive phase of a child hearing was not tantamount to establishing a burden of proof requirement. Such a requirement had been set forth in former subsection (c)(3)(D) [see now subsection (c)(3)]. No such requirement had been set forth in situations such as where termination of parental rights was not involved. In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976).

Standard of proof held constitutional. —

Allowing parental rights to be terminated based on a standard of proof less stringent than “beyond a reasonable doubt” does not violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Alaska Constitution. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Since in proceedings brought to terminate parental rights, the parent is neither charged with criminal behavior nor subject to incarceration as a direct consequence of the proceeding, there is nothing in the federal constitution that compels adoption of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in termination proceedings. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent’s substantial interest in his or her child custody rights. This evidentiary standard balances the competing interests involved in a proceeding brought to terminate parental rights, one of which is the right of a child to an adequate home. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

The due process clause did not require a standard of proof greater than clear and convincing evidence when the state sought to terminate parental rights because of unfitness under former subsection (c)(3)(D). In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Standard of proof under former subsection (c)(3)(D) calling for “clear and convincing” evidence of the natural mother’s unfitness for the care and custody of the child was held proper. In re Adoption of S., 543 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1975).

Protection provided by Indian Child Welfare Act. —

The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 — 1963, enacted in 1978, provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of parents in termination proceedings involving Indians and Native Alaskans than that provided in this section. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).

Orders terminating parental rights met statutory and rule of court requirements regarding findings of fact. —

See In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).

Review of orders terminating parental rights. —

Orders made under subsection (c)(3) of this section are not entitled to automatic review, inasmuch as subsection (f) of this section specifies which orders are entitled to this review and orders under subsection (c)(3) of this section are not included within the list. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

All orders made pursuant to this section, including orders under subsection (c)(3) of this section, are to be reviewed upon application of an interested party if the party establishes good cause for the review, and if the child is still a ward of the court. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

As long as a child remains the ward of the court, under subsection (f) of this section his or her natural parents are entitled to a review of the order terminating their parental rights upon a showing of good cause for the hearing. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

Good cause could be established if the parents showed that it would be in the best interests of the child to resume living with them because they have sufficiently rehabilitated themselves so that they can provide proper guidance and care for the child. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

Where, when a mother applied for a hearing before the superior court, she indicated that as a result of a 14-month rehabilitation program she had overcome the problems that had led to the termination of her parental rights and also indicated that professional counselors, social workers and others would be able to establish that she was now capable of providing a warm and loving home for the child, this was a sufficient showing of good cause to entitle her to a review of the order terminating her parental rights if the child had not yet been adopted. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).

Office of Children's Services is afforded an extremely high degree of discretion, and whether the office abused its discretion is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Burden of proof under subsection (c)(3). —

Although subsection (c)(3) does not place the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there is a child in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as a result of parental conduct and that the parental conduct is likely to continue on either party, the Supreme Court of Alaska has assigned the burden of proof to the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).

For reference to apparent conflict between subsection (c)(1) as it read prior to 1977 amendment and Children’s Rule 22(f), see footnote 30 in In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976).

Collateral references. —

Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights. 80 ALR3d 1141.

Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody. 38 ALR4th 756.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.

Sec. 47.10.081. Predisposition hearing reports.

  1. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  2. Before the disposition hearing of a child in need of aid, the department shall submit a predisposition report to aid the court in its selection of a disposition.  This report must include, but is not limited to, the following:
    1. a statement of changes in the child’s or parent’s behavior, which will aid the court in determining that supervision of the family or placement is no longer necessary;
    2. if removal from the home is recommended, a description of the reasons the child cannot be protected or rehabilitated adequately in the home, including a description of any previous efforts to work with the parents and the child in the home and the parents’ attitude toward placement of the child;
    3. a description of the potential harm to the child that may result from removal from the home and any efforts that can be made to minimize such harm; and
    4. any further information that the court may request.
  3. The court shall inform the child, the child’s parents and the attorneys representing the parties and the guardian ad litem that the predisposition report will be available to them not less than 10 days before the disposition hearing.
  4. For purposes of this section, “parents” means the natural or adoptive parents, and any legal guardian, relative, or other adult person with whom the child has resided and who has acted as a parent in providing for the child for a continuous period of time before this action.

History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 17 ch 57 SLA 1991; am § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.10.082. Health and safety of child and other considerations.

In making its dispositional order under AS 47.10.080(c) , the court shall keep the health and safety of the child as the court’s paramount concern and consider

  1. the best interests of the child;
  2. the ability of the state to take custody and to care for the child to protect the child’s best interests under AS 47.10.005 47.10.142 ; and
  3. the potential harm to the child caused by removal of the child from the home and family environment.

History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 27 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 31 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Showing required to justify termination of parental rights. —

While best interests of the child become relevant at some point, there first must be a showing of parental conduct sufficient to justify termination. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).

Applied in

E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).

Quoted in

Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).

Cited in

Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 47.10.083. Review of orders, requests for extensions.

In a review under AS 47.10.080(f) and in a hearing related to a request for extended commitment or extended supervision under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (2), the court shall, in addition to the requirements of those provisions and the requirements of court rules, determine whether a child continues to be a child in need of aid at the time of the review or hearing. The court may not continue or extend state custody or supervision of the child unless the court finds that the child continues to be a child in need of aid except that, if the child is no longer a child in need of aid, the court may establish a specific timetable for gradual reunification of the family and termination of state custody or supervision if the court makes a finding that immediate reunification would be detrimental to the child.

History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 3 ch 29 SLA 1990)

Legislative history reports. —

For legislative letter of intent in connection with the enactment of this section by § 3, ch. 29, SLA 1990 (SCS CSHB 175(Jud)), see 1990 Senate Journal 3431.

Notes to Decisions

The “continuing conditions of need” requirement for continued custody found in this section should be viewed as an additional requirement beyond “best interests” for extension of custody under AS 47.10.080(c)(1)(A) , not as the equivalent thereof. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).

Dismissal. —

Superior court erred in dismissing a child in need of aid case based upon a perceived lack of jurisdiction. AS 47.10.083 required the superior court to act in the child's best interests and to consider whether immediately returning the child to her parents' custody would have been detrimental, which its comments made clear it believed was the case. State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018).

Applied in

A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990); F.T. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).

Sec. 47.10.084. Legal custody, guardianship, and residual parental rights and responsibilities.

  1. When a child is committed under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) to the department, released under AS 47.10.080(c)(2) to the child’s parents, guardian, or other suitable person, or committed to the department or to a legally appointed guardian of the person of the child under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) , a relationship of legal custody exists. This relationship imposes on the department and its authorized agents or the parents, guardian, or other suitable person the responsibility of physical care and control of the child, the determination of where and with whom the child shall live, the right and duty to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, the duty of providing the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, and the right and responsibility to make decisions of financial significance concerning the child. These obligations are subject to any residual parental rights and responsibilities and rights and responsibilities of a guardian if one has been appointed. When a child is committed to the department and the department places the child with the child’s parent, the parent has the responsibility to provide and pay for food, shelter, education, and medical care for the child. When parental rights have been terminated, or there are no living parents and no guardian has been appointed, the responsibilities of legal custody include those in (b) and (c) of this section. The department or person having legal custody of the child may delegate any of the responsibilities under this section, except authority to consent to marriage, adoption, and military enlistment may not be delegated. For purposes of this chapter, a person in charge of a placement setting is an agent of the department.
  2. When a guardian is appointed for the child, the court shall specify in its order the rights and responsibilities of the guardian.  The guardian may be removed only by court order. The rights and responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, having the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consenting to marriage, consenting to military enlistment, consenting to major medical treatment, obtaining representation for the child in legal actions, and making decisions of legal or financial significance concerning the child.
  3. When there has been transfer of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities. These residual rights and responsibilities of the parent include, but are not limited to, the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consent to adoption, consent to marriage, consent to military enlistment, consent to major medical treatment except in cases of emergency or cases falling under AS 25.20.025 , and the responsibility for support, except if by court order any residual right and responsibility has been delegated to a guardian under (b) of this section. In this subsection, “major medical treatment” includes the administration of medication used to treat a mental health disorder.
  4. When the child is placed in foster care, the foster parent has the right and responsibility to use a reasonable and prudent parent standard to make decisions relating to the child. The foster parent may make decisions under (a) or (b) of this section that include decisions relating to the child’s participation in age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities, including travel, sports, field trips, overnight activities, and extracurricular, enrichment, cultural, and social activities. The department shall provide foster parents with training regarding the reasonable and prudent parent standard. In this subsection, “reasonable and prudent parent standard” means a standard characterized by careful and sensible decisions to maintain the health, safety, and best interests of the child while encouraging the emotional and developmental growth of the child.

History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 1 ch 73 SLA 1993; am § 28 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 32 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 15 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 9 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (d), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For program administration: children with disabilities, see 4 AAC 52, art. 2.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the last sentence in subsection (c).

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (d).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Department’s responsibility for medical costs. —

The department is responsible for the medical costs of children in its custody, whether the children are placed at home or in a foster home. In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

The phrase “reasonable visitation” in subsection (c) does not imply an absolute right to visitation; this section should be read in conjunction with the rest of the chapter to allow parental visits to be barred when the visits are not in the best interests of the child. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).

Right to medicate child over the mother's objection. —

Standard in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst. applied to the Office of Children's Services' (OCS) request to medicate the child over the mother's objection, and OCS had a compelling interest to provide adequate medical care to the child in its custody. Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).

Construction of subsection (c) where parental rights no longer exist. —

Subsection (c) only allows parents who retain parental rights to veto adoption; it does not confer any new rights on parents. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).

Definition of Indian custodian not met. —

Termination of the father’s designation as an Indian custodian was appropriate because the father’s status as Indian custodian was based solely on the mother’s temporary transfer of physical care and custody to the father after termination of his parental rights. Because the mother possessed the authority to revoke the transfer at any time before the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody, and because the mother and OCS acted jointly to rescind the earlier transfer, the condition under which the father met the definition of Indian custodian no longer existed. Ted W. v. State, 204 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009).

The following procedures should be followed when visitation rights are denied prior to the termination of parental rights: first, the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services should have primary authority to set visitation based on the best interests of the child, since the division is in the best position to make this decision in the first instance; and secondly, either the guardian ad litem or the parents should be entitled to request an expedited evidentiary hearing of a denial of visitation, which would consist of an independent determination by the superior court that clear and convincing evidence showed that the child’s best interests were served by disallowing parental visitations. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).

Effect of being foster parents on husband-wife evidentiary privilege. —

A foster child is a child of the foster parents for purposes of applying the exception to the husband-wife privilege set forth in Alaska Evidence Rule 505(a)(2)(D)(i); one foster parent cannot rely on the husband-wife privilege to refuse to testify against the other concerning evidence relating to an assault on the foster child. Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

De facto termination of natural parent’s visitation rights. —

Where the Department of Health and Social Services decided to allow minor children, who had been adjudicated as children in need of aid, to move from Alaska to Alabama with their foster care family, the state’s action constituted a de facto termination of a natural parent’s visitation rights; the natural father was unemployed and virtually penniless, the state would not provide airfare so that the father could visit his children on a regular basis, and the father would be limited to phone “visits” because of his lack of funds. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).

Department’s decision to place children in a foster home in Anchorage did not constitute a de facto termination of their mother’s parental rights of visitation, notwithstanding the mother’s contention that she did not have the financial means to travel from her home in Juneau to Anchorage. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).

Limitation on visitation unjustified. —

Before a limitation on reasonable parental limitation is justified, the Department of Health and Social Services must present proof that the limitation is in the child’s best interests, and where no such evidence was presented, the case for restricting visitation with the incarcerated father was not made. In re D.P., 861 P.2d 1166 (Alaska 1993).

Father properly denied visitation after parental rights terminated. —

After terminating a father’s parental rights, a trial court did not err in refusing to reserve post-termination visitation because the father’s criminal record showed a pattern of violent behavior, especially toward women; the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions, including assaulting the child’s mother the night before the child was born. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, an Indian child who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).

Parental failure to maintain contact. —

Record did not show that a father’s visitation rights were de facto terminated under this section because the child was placed in a foster home. The father was out of contact with the state and his parole office even when he was out of jail, and the state made efforts to reunify the child with her parent for several years. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

Standard of review of state action constituting de facto termination of natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation. —

The appropriate standard of review for state decisions which essentially terminate a natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation under subsection (c) is an independent determination of whether the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental visitation is in the child’s best interest. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).

Applied in

In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986); In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012); Dapo v. State, 454 P.3d 171 (Alaska 2019).

Stated in

C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018); Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Siyuq K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 9, 2020).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990); B.S. v. State (In re C.A.S.), 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409 (Alaska 1996); Yelena R. v. George R., 326 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2014).

Collateral references. —

Governmental tort liability for social service agency’s negligence in placement, or supervision after placement, of children. 90 ALR3d 1214.

Sec. 47.10.085. Medical treatment by religious means.

In a case in which the minor’s status as a child in need of aid is sought to be based on the need for medical care, the court may, upon consideration of the health of the minor and the fact, if it is a fact, that the minor is being provided treatment by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by an accredited practitioner of the church or denomination, dismiss the proceedings and thereby close the matter. This may be done, in the interests of justice and religious freedom, on the court’s own motion or upon the application of a party to the proceedings, at any stage of the proceedings after information is given to the court under AS 47.10.020(a) .

History. (§ 8 ch 1 SLA 1972; am § 19 ch 63 SLA 1977)

Cross references. —

For a related provision, see AS 47.17.020(d) .

Administrative Code. —

For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Collateral references. —

Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered. 21 ALR5th 248.

Sec. 47.10.086. Reasonable efforts.

  1. Except as provided in (b), (c), and (g) of this section, the department shall make timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the child and to the parents or guardian of the child that are designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to enable the safe return of the child to the family home, when appropriate, if the child is in an out-of-home placement. The department’s duty to make reasonable efforts under this subsection includes the duty to
    1. identify family support services that will assist the parent or guardian in remedying the conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid;
    2. actively offer the parent or guardian, and refer the parent or guardian to, the services identified under (1) of this subsection; the department shall refer the parent or guardian to, and distribute to the parent or guardian information on, community-based family support services whenever community- based services are available and desired by the parent or guardian; the information may include the use of a power of attorney under AS 13.26.066 to select an individual to care for the child temporarily; and
    3. document the department’s actions that are taken under (1) and (2) of this subsection.
  2. If the court makes a finding at a hearing conducted under AS 47.10.080(l) that a parent or guardian has not sufficiently remedied the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or the conditions in the home despite reasonable efforts made by the department in accordance with this section, the court may conclude that continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not in the best interests of the child. The department shall then make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanent plan and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
  3. The court may determine that reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not required if the court has found by clear and convincing evidence that
    1. the parent or guardian has subjected the child to circumstances that pose a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety; these circumstances include abandonment, sexual abuse, torture, chronic mental injury, or chronic physical harm;
    2. the parent or guardian has
      1. committed homicide under AS 11.41.100 11.41.130 of a parent of the child or of a child;
      2. aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited under AS 11.16 or AS 11.31 to commit a homicide described in (A) of this paragraph;
      3. committed an assault that is a felony under AS 11.41.200 11.41.220 and results in serious physical injury to a child; or
      4. committed the conduct described in (A) — (C) of this paragraph that violated a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to an offense described in (A) — (C) of this paragraph;
    3. the parent or guardian has, during the 12 months preceding the permanency hearing, failed to comply with a court order to participate in family support services;
    4. the department has conducted a reasonably diligent search over a time period of at least three months for an unidentified or absent parent and has failed to identify and locate the parent;
    5. the parent or guardian is the sole caregiver of the child and the parent or guardian has a mental illness or mental deficiency of such nature and duration that, according to the statement of a psychologist or physician, the parent or guardian will be incapable of caring for the child without placing the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury even if the department were to provide family support services to the parent or guardian for 12 months;
    6. the parent or guardian has previously been convicted of a crime involving a child in this state or in another jurisdiction and, after the conviction, the child was returned to the custody of the parent or guardian and later removed because of an additional substantiated report of physical or sexual abuse by the parent or guardian;
    7. a child has suffered substantial physical harm as the result of abusive or neglectful conduct by the parent or guardian or by a person known by the parent or guardian and the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the person was abusing the child;
    8. the parental rights of the parent have been terminated with respect to another child because of child abuse or neglect, the parent has not remedied the conditions or conduct that led to the termination of parental rights, and the parent has demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm;
    9. the child has been removed from the child’s home on at least two previous occasions, family support services were offered or provided to the parent or guardian at those times, and the parent or guardian has demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm;
    10. the parent or guardian is incarcerated and is unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, considering the child’s age and need for care by an adult; or
    11. the parent or guardian
      1. has sexually abused the child or another child of the parent or guardian; or
      2. is registered or required to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper under AS 12.63.
  4. If the court determines under (b) or (c) of this section that reasonable efforts under (a) of this section are not required to be provided,
    1. the court shall hold a permanency hearing for the child within 30 days after the determination; and
    2. the department shall make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
  5. The department may develop and implement an alternative permanency plan for the child while the department is also making reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s family under (a) of this section.
  6. In making determinations and reasonable efforts under this section, the primary consideration is the child’s best interests.
  7. The department is not required to make reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section if the department took emergency custody of an infant under AS 47.10.142 after the infant was abandoned safely within the meaning of AS 47.10.013(c) .
  8. The department shall engage a child who is 14 years of age or older in the development or revision of a case plan, permanency goal, or alternative permanency plan for the child. The department shall also allow the child to select not more than two adults to participate in the development or revision of the plan in addition to the child’s foster parents or department employees who are supervising the care of the child. The department may reject an adult selected by the child if the department has good cause to believe that the adult will not act in the best interests of the child. If the department rejects an adult, the child may select another adult. The child may designate one of the adults to be the child’s advisor, and the advisor may advocate for the child.

History. (§ 33 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 2006; am §§ 4, 5 ch 1 SLA 2008; am § 38 ch 43 SLA 2013; am § 5 ch 28 SLA 2016; am § 10 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, in paragraph (a)(2) "AS 13.26.066 " was substituted for "AS 13.26.023" in two places to reflect the renumbering of that section.

Cross references. —

For purpose and intent in enacting this section, including the purpose of overriding certain court decisions, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 76, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

For effect of the 2006 amendment of (c) of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 11, ch. 20, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 43, SLA 2013 (SB 22), see 2013 Senate Journal 38 — 39.

For provision relating to applicability of subsection (h), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, substituted “clear and convincing evidence” for “a preponderance of the evidence” in the introductory language of subsection (c).

The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, substituted “(b), (c), and (g)” for “(b) and (c)” in the first sentence of subsection (a), and added subsection (g).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (c)(11), and made a related change.

The 2016 amendment, effective September 20, 2016, in (a)(2), inserted “, and distribute to the parent or guardian information on,” preceding “community-based family” and inserted “the information may include the use of a power of attorney under AS 13.26.023 to select an individual to care for the child temporarily;” at the end of the paragraph.

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (h).

Editor's notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Under sec. 12, ch. 20, SLA 2006, the 2006 amendment of (c) of this section applies “to a child in need of aid proceeding that is pending before the court, that is on appeal to the court, or for which the time for appeal to the court has not yet passed on or after May 4, 2006.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Terminating parental rights. —

In order to terminate parental rights, in addition to finding that the child is a child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 and that the parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that place the child at risk, AS 47.10.088 requires the department to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the department has complied with the provisions of this section concerning reasonable efforts to provide family support services designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to return the child to the family home. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska), op. withdrawn, — P.2d — (Alaska 2000), sub. op., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000) (Decided before 2006 amendment of subsection (a).)

Where the state presented overwhelming evidence of the mother’s repeated failure to care appropriately for her children, and her decade long lack of success in substance abuse treatment for abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, and where a psychologist testified it was unlikely the mother would ever be capable of parenting, reasonable efforts at family reunification were exhausted, and termination of the mother’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).

The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).

A child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid. The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).

Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse, and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services, and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency. It was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because, although the children went through nine different foster placements in the three months after OCS assumed custody, the changes in placement resulted not from OCS ineptitude but from the children's acute behavioral issues; OCS repeatedly referred both parents to rehabilitative services, including counseling, shelters, mental health and substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes; and much of the parents' difficulty in making progress in their rehabilitative efforts was due to their missed calls, meetings, assessments, and drug tests. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; the record indicated that it was not OCS’s failure but the father’s refusal to acknowledge his mental health issues that ultimately prevented the success of OCS’s reunification efforts because OCS referred the father for a psychological assessment in every case plan it developed. Darwin B. v. State (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; in light of the father’s history of non-cooperation, OCS’s consistent reunification efforts for approximately 25 months were more than sufficient to remedy its early failure to make reasonable efforts. Darwin B. v. State (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) on the whole made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children because the OCS referred the mother to and paid for her participation in psychological evaluations, domestic violence evaluations, domestic violence classes, substance abuse evaluations, therapy, and the Resource Center for Parents and Children reunification program; the OCS offered visitation to the parents after the trial home visit ended; the OCS provided the mother with food, clothing, transportation, and some assistance obtaining public housing; and the OCS continued to provide services until the end of the case. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because she had a more than 15-year history of opioid addiction, and she admitted that she was an addict; the Office of Children's Services had been involved with her older children; and she was unable to provide a stable home within a reasonable time. Alison L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts toward reunification because OCS's immediate focus on the father's substance abuse issues was understandable as parental substance abuse was one of the reasons the child was adjudged to be a child in need of aid when taken from the father's home; and the case worker did not err in failing to refer the father for some kind of mental health evaluation as his cognitive issues appeared to be consistent with what was known about his drug use, and he never told OCS that his cognitive issues were mental-health-related. Warren S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 25, 2021) (memorandum decision).

“Reasonable efforts.” —

The department made reasonable efforts under subsection (a) where the department had no contact information for the father’s family or friends, making it difficult to locate him, and the case worker completed an affidavit of diligent inquiry, noting that her efforts to locate the father included checking phone books, utility applications, permanent fund dividend applications, and criminal records. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).

Father’s sentence to six years of incarceration qualified as a significant period of his children’s minority within the meaning of paragraph (c)(10) of this section; thus, a court was authorized to dispense with the requirement that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services provide family support services under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) . Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

In a parental rights termination case, the state made reasonable efforts to reunite the father and the child where the state notified him in writing of the permanency hearing, the social worker returned his calls, gave him information regarding the child and the foster parents, mailed him documents relating to the child, offered him the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in an administrative review hearing (which he declined), and set up a case plan.Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).

When a father engaged in parenting, vocational, and religious instruction while incarcerated, it was on the father's own initiative rather than in response to any guidance from the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) about what the father needed to do to improve the chances of reunification. Therefore, termination of the father's parental rights was inappropriate because the OCS's minimal engagement with the father, combined with the lack of a relevant case plan, meant that the OCS did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).

Termination of father’s parental right to twins under AS 47.10.088 was proper where the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to ensure that children could be returned to the father as required by CINA R. 18(c)(2)(A) and this section; efforts by the OCS to reunite the children with the father were held reasonable in light of the lack of interest the father showed when he was first released from jail and moved to another state, and when he failed to visit the children or to complete parenting and anger management classes provided to him. Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).

While failure of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to provide mental health referral to a father throughout the history of his case fell short of exemplary, OCS nonetheless satisfied the “active efforts” requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq., based upon its overall handling of the case, because the father’s own actions would have frustrated the success of any OCS services, and the father received a number of referrals for services, including multiple substance abuse treatment programs and parenting classes. Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).

In a termination of parental rights case, while superior court should have made its findings that the state could discontinue reasonable efforts to reunite the family at a permanency hearing, the error appeared harmless because the mother did not establish that she suffered any prejudice from superior court’s decision to make the findings in a written order prior to holding a permanency hearing. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

In a termination of parental rights case, further efforts to provide family support to the mother would no longer be in the best interests of the children because the office of children’s services had made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, there was clear and convincing evidence that they were children in need of aid, and the mother was unable to accept the state’s offers of assistance and was incapable of caring for the children. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

In a termination of parental right case, the State made reasonable efforts at reunification because, although reasonable efforts might not have been made up through the date of the commencement of the termination trial, the court continued the trial for several months and required the State to make reasonable efforts and give the father an opportunity to successfully work on his case plan. The court ordered the State to refer the father to domestic violence intervention programs and alcohol treatment, which the State immediately did. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the mother and the children was supported by evidence that the office of children’s services arranged transportation and visitation, helped the mother relocate, made referrals for the mother to attend therapy, and provided parenting classes. Jordan J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family by referring the mother to substance abuse assessments, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and domestic violence counseling, and providing transportation assistance, arranging family visits, and attempting to locate the mother when OCS lost contact with her. Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015).

In a parental rights termination case, the superior court's finding that the Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify a mother with her son was not clearly erroneous. The record supported a conclusion that the greatest obstacle to the mother's success was her failure to take advantage of what services she was offered. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).

In a parental rights termination case, the superior court did not clearly err in its finding that the Office of Children's Services' efforts, though ultimately unsuccessful, were designed to facilitate the child's return to his mother's care. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, a superior court did not improperly lower the burden on the Office of Children's Services to make reasonable efforts because such efforts did not have to be deemed reasonable before a termination trial; moreover, waiting to review the reasonableness of OCS efforts until the termination trial did not allow OCS to evade its responsibility to provide objectively reasonable efforts. Moreover, OCS did not err in determining that a decreased level of communication was reasonable given the circumstances of a mother's move to Oregon. Moira M. v. State, 370 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2016).

Office of Children's Services (OCS) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the father and child where, in addition to the mother's conduct, the father's abandonment had caused the child to be a child in need of aid, given the father's resistance to any involvement with OCS, the plan to engage the father with simple tasks and activities first and then increase involvement was reasonable, and the father refused to participate in the case plan in any way other than visitation. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).

It was no error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's father because (1) the father was incarcerated and nothing showed the father tried to contact OCS or OCS did not respond to the father's efforts, (2) infrequent contacts by OCS did not make OCS's efforts unreasonable, (3) it was not plain error to hold OCS did what OCS could to recommend services, (4) it was reasonable to first focus such efforts on the child's non-incarcerated mother, and (5) the efforts included Department of Corrections services. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family where it offered several services, and family therapy and trial home visits were inappropriate given the credible testimony that the risk of exposure to the domestic partner remained too high for the child's well being. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter because it improperly excused the failure of the Office of Children's Services to demonstrate reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family; the trial court relied exclusively on its conviction that further efforts would be pointless, and it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that a basis under subsection (c) applied. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).

If the trial court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the enumerated bases in subsection (c) applies, there is no room in the statutory framework to excuse reasonable efforts on alternative bases; nor would a decision to forego required reasonable efforts in expectation of their futility comport with the parallel Indian Child Welfare Act holdings. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).

Subsection (c) does not exist to absolve the failure of the Office of Children's Services to execute its responsibilities in routine interventions; it is intended to operate as a safety valve, permitting courts to excuse, in the best interests of the child, remedial efforts if extraordinary circumstances or the parent's egregious conduct would render those efforts pro forma or, more importantly, endanger the child's welfare. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).

Superior court did not err in finding that the services provided by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) amounted to reasonable efforts for purposes of AS 47.10.086(a) , despite the fact that there might have been a lapse in efforts; the evidence showed the mother did not truly desire to commence treatment, OCS did not fail its reasonable efforts obligation by failing to provide her documentation for admission to her preferred treatment program, plus OCS otherwise provided many services over approximately 20 months. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her daughter because, although visitation fell short of what was required, the evidence did show that the mother had consistent in-person visitation with the child for the first seven months' of OCS custody, twice-weekly phone calls after the child's move to South Carolina, and some in-person visits during that time; visitation was only part of the reasonable efforts analysis; and the mother did not challenge the superior court's findings about OCS's considerable and persistent efforts over the course of three years to address her substance abuse and mental health problems. Chloe T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 23, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts by providing a mother transportation, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral funding for case management services, a peer navigator, referrals to parenting classes and substance abuse assessments, weekly supervised visits, and referrals for housing at a local shelter and residential treatment center. The mother failed to tell the OCS about transportation difficulties, did not use cab vouchers, and was able, at times, to use other sources for help. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts given a father's incarceration. OCS repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the father through the telephone number the father provided, through the father's attorney, and through the Texas Department of Corrections; secured some services for the father when the father was not incarcerated; and attempted to arrange telephonic visitation with the children and to provide case management services. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Evidence supported the superior court's findings that Alaska Office of Children's Services offered the parents and the children a number of services designed to reunite them as a family, but the father was ultimately unable or unwilling to significantly shift the beliefs that stood in the way of his effective parenting. While the office’s efforts were not perfect, the efforts were nonetheless timely and reasonable, and quite extensive as to both the parents and the children. Clarice M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 29, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err when it determined that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, as its findings that OCS had gone over and above to try to get the mother in treatment but the mother failed to engage and complete either a substance abuse or a mental health assessment supported the trial court's findings. Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court erred in terminating parents’ parental rights to their two Native American children because there was insufficient evidence to sustain an active efforts finding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act under a clear and convincing evidence standard; the Office of Children’s Services failed to create documentation and provide the witness testimony necessary to support what efforts it and the Tribe did make to reunify the parents and their children. Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).

In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father because, in addition to incorporating his probation requirements in the case plan, the OCS maintained contact with him and his probation officer and encouraged him to initiate and maintain contact with his children by writing letters until he could progress to more contact with them; he wrote to the children only once in 15 months; and it was his responsibility to demonstrate true interest in reunification. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its active efforts obligation under the Child in Need of Aid statute where the father did not point to any evidence that a psychological evaluation would have enabled him to resolve the substance abuse and parenting problems that led OCS to take custody of the children. Rather, the record suggested what prevented the father from moving forward was his unwillingness to engage with the services provided. The OCS made repeated attempts to engage the father in his case, providing transportation assistance, family visitation, and referrals for substance abuse treatment and domestic violence counseling. The father demonstrated a consistent unwillingness to participate in these services. Bradley S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 2, 2020) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because the mother abandoned the twins by failing to keep in touch, disappearing, and visiting only erratically; the mother did not challenge the child in need of aid abandonment finding, the substance of which diminished OCS's ability to engage her; and the mother was aware of her case plans, but she took no steps to meet the goals they established. Alison L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his son as the caseworker testified that she contacted the father a number of times from April 2019 to June 2020 in an attempt to get him to engage with the case plan, but he rejected every overture; and the father refused to get in contact with members of the team of doctors and therapists that cared for his son so that he could learn how to care for his son. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).

There was no error in the termination of the father’s parental rights because the superior court did not err when it determined that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) provided appropriate services to the father. The services OCS provided were aimed at promoting bonding and attachment between the father and his daughters to allow him to be safely reunited with them. Kevin H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 29, 2021).

Superior court did not err in finding the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite a mother with her sons because the mother was not given a formal diagnosis of a specific mental health disability; OCS referred the mother to substance abuse treatment programs and a domestic violence assessment after determining her substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect of the sons, not her anxiety or impulsiveness, were the conditions that put the sons in need of aid. Angie W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 16, 2022).

Child at risk of harm. —

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Efforts by the state to preserve the family relationships. —

Where a child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment, and where the record established that the father had failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, the record also established that the government had made the required active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, because for four years, the state offered the father substance abuse evaluation and treatment and made numerous attempts to place the child with her mother’s tribe and the father and his family, but were unable to do so, particularly due to the father’s repeated drug problems and incarceration. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided: (1) in-person reviews of the requirements of the case plan; (2) referrals for substance abuse assessments and substance abuse treatment; (3) drug testing; (4) parenting classes; (5) domestic violence education; and (6) consistent visitation, beginning immediately after the first child was taken into emergency custody. As to the father, given his incarceration, the OCS’s efforts to provide the father with family support services when he was not in prison, and the father’s failure to make any changes necessary to achieve reunification, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the OCS’s reunification efforts in their entirety were reasonable despite its failure to provide visitation in prison. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the father where the OCS had provided referrals for the father to multiple agencies and services, arranged for housing and travel assistance, food donations and laundry cards, conducted home visits, and tried to help the father get a job; the OCS also developed case plans that detailed child-protection issues and services to remedy those issues; the OCS referred the children to a variety of mental health services and educational services; however, the OCS’s decision not to offer family therapy with the father and mother was appropriate since the child was not at a point where family therapy with the parents was appropriate. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Based on a father’s lack of effort to comply with the terms of his case plan and his refusal to provide basic contact information so that he could be notified about events in the case and services that might be available to the family, a trial court did not err in finding that active, but unsuccessful, efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Wilson W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, made reasonable efforts to reunify a family by: developing case plans addressing the mother’s substance abuse, parenting capacity, and mental health issues; referring the mother for substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and urinalyses; and providing the mother with visitation with her son and a trial home visit. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children’s Services had a duty to provide services to help the mother remedy the conduct or conditions that endangered the children, which involved her substance abuse and domestic violence. Professionals did not identify the mother’s physical condition as factor in helping alleviate the endangering conduct or conditions, nor was she diagnosed as bipolar, although she told people she had been. Nora M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 5, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Efforts of the office of children’s services were timely and reasonable, as OCS arranged for drug testing, referred the mother for psychological evaluation and counseling, provided a bus pass, attempted a home visit, and visited the mother in jail to continue services and general case evaluations. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).

In a termination of parental rights case, the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active, but unsuccessful efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family; even if the OCS had begun the education component of the case plan earlier, there was no evidence that these efforts would have been productive. The OCS initially referred the father for substance abuse assessments and treatment and tried to work with the father during his incarceration; the OCS later offered the father the opportunity to take classes to help educate him about the child’s special needs, as well as chances to demonstrate that the father’s conduct was improving. Dirk H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 25, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services had provided her with remedial and rehabilitative programs, although she was bonded with the child, she was unwilling to attend treatment programs or provide a time frame for completing treatment, and the child, who was five years age at the time, was thriving in his grandparents’ home. Simone B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 30, 2015) (memorandum decision).

In a parental rights termination case, the superior court’s finding that the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunify a mother with her son was not clearly erroneous. The record supported a conclusion that the greatest obstacle to the mother’s success was her failure to take advantage of the services she was offered. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs. (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her child because OCS provided family support services to the parent and child designed to promote reunification, including substance abuse assessments, parenting classes, and offers of help with housing and employment before the mother dropped out of contact; and it was well within OCS's discretion to prioritize the mother's substance abuse problems over her homelessness. Abigail C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 13, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court erred in terminating parents' parental rights to their two Native American children because there was insufficient evidence to sustain an active efforts finding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act under a clear and convincing evidence standard; the Office of Children's Services failed to create documentation and provide the witness testimony necessary to support what efforts it and the Tribe did make to reunify the parents and their children. Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).

Lack of parental cooperation. —

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper where the record showed that it was not the OCS’s failures that caused the mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems to remain untreated but rather the mother’s lack of willingness to maintain contact with her caseworkers, to candidly report her health status to service providers, and to engage in services when they were offered. Amanda K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 2, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Office of Child Services caseworkers made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with the father, connect him with services, and facilitate the establishment of a relationship between him and his daughter. Given his exposure of the child to harm during unsupervised visits at the father’s home, requiring OCS supervised visits, and then terminating those visits due to the father’s behavior, was proper. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).

Although OCS petitioned to terminate a parent’s rights soon after a child was born, there was substantial information to support a determination that reasonable efforts to facilitate the relationship were made, including supervised visitation, attempts to hold planning meetings with the father and to obtain a psychological evaluation to help determine what approaches would be helpful to improve the father’s parenting skills. The father was inconsistent regarding visitation, and failed to attend the meetings or undergo the evaluation. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).

Mother suggested that the Office of Children’s Service’s duty to refer a client to services required the office to make an appointment with the provider, but the reunification services requirement is met by providing information and referrals regarding the services; the office referred the mother to numerous providers, and she failed to meaningfully participate with the office’s efforts to engage her in services. Nora M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 5, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Mother had abused cocaine and other substances since the age of seventeen, and had access to multiple treatment programs over the course of her life, most of which she did not complete. In several instances she did not stay in touch with her caseworker so as to be able to learn what remedial opportunities were available. There was no reason to believe this long-time pattern of behavior by the mother would change, despite the efforts of the department. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to enable the child to return home to the mother but that she refused to engage consistently with the recommended mental health services; she failed to attend the sessions required in order to make comprehensive treatment recommendations; regardless of the quality of her assessments, she never entered the recommended outpatient program, and by the time of the termination trial she had not entered any inpatient program; and, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, she testified that she did not have a substance abuse problem. Sandy M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 16, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children; the mother did not engage with the case plan and did not receive the benefit of the therapies OCS made available to her, plus OCS obtained a court order compelling her to complete a psychological examination, which OCS was not compelled to do, and given that the mother repeatedly refused to allow OCS to assess her needs, her claim that OCS should have provided specific services to suit those needs was without merit. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

It was not clear error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made timel and, reasonable reunification efforts because (1) OCS provided case plans, supervised visitation, and referrals for treatment and financial assistance, (2) the father's whereabouts were unknown for much of the case, (3) the father would not get a psychological assessment or communicate an inability to obtain a later evaluation, (4) OCS's failure to provide an evaluation and visitation lapses while the father was in prison was not fatal to finding reasonable efforts, and (5) the father's disappearance and unwillingness to participate in services where he relocated made OCS's efforts reasonable under the circumstances. Justin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 15, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Failure to remedy parental issues after reasonable effort. —

The state provided services to address a father’s personality disorder and substance abuse, which constituted “reasonable efforts” under this section. Jake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 31, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Efforts by state declined by parent. —

State made multiple offers of assistance to father to facilitate contact with his child, which he declined. The state’s efforts were reasonably calibrated to the interest in parenting shown by the father. Jeff A.C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 27, 2005), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005), sub. op., 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005) (memorandum decision).

Applied in

A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000); A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Kyle S. v. State, 309 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2013).

Stated in

Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001); S.H. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002); Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004); Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011); Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.10.087. Placement in secure residential psychiatric treatment centers.

  1. The court may authorize the department to place a child who is in the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (3) or 47.10.142 in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that
    1. the child is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and, as a result, is likely to cause serious harm to the child or to another person;
    2. there is no reasonably available, appropriate, and less restrictive alternative for the child’s treatment or that less restrictive alternatives have been tried and have failed; and
    3. there is reason to believe that the child’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
  2. A court shall review a placement made under this section at least once every 90 days. The court may authorize the department to continue the placement of the child in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that the conditions or symptoms that resulted in the initial order have not ameliorated to such an extent that the child’s needs can be met in a less restrictive setting and that the child’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
  3. The department shall transfer a child from a secure residential psychiatric treatment center to another appropriate placement if the mental health professional responsible for the child’s treatment determines that the child would no longer benefit from the course of treatment or that the child’s treatment needs could be met in a less restrictive setting. The department shall notify the child, the child’s parents or guardian, and the child’s guardian ad litem of a determination and transfer made under this subsection.
  4. In this section, “likely to cause serious harm” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 .

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Administrative Code. —

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

In re April S., 467 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2020).

Stated in

Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 47.10.088. Involuntary termination of parental rights and responsibilities.

  1. Except as provided in AS 47.10.080(o) , the rights and responsibilities of the parent regarding the child may be terminated for purposes of freeing a child for adoption or other permanent placement if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
    1. the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011 ;
    2. the parent
      1. has not remedied the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child at substantial risk of harm; or
      2. has failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child in substantial risk so that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; and
    3. the department has complied with the provisions of AS 47.10.086 concerning reasonable efforts.
  2. In making a determination under (a)(2) of this section, the court may consider any fact relating to the best interests of the child, including
    1. the likelihood of returning the child to the parent within a reasonable time based on the child’s age or needs;
    2. the amount of effort by the parent to remedy the conduct or the conditions in the home;
    3. the harm caused to the child;
    4. the likelihood that the harmful conduct will continue; and
    5. the history of conduct by or conditions created by the parent.
  3. In a proceeding under this chapter involving termination of the parental right of a parent, the court shall consider the best interests of the child.
  4. Except as provided in (e) of this section, the department shall petition for termination of a parent’s rights to a child, without making further reasonable efforts, when a child is under the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 and 47.10.011 , and
    1. the child has been in foster care for at least 15 of the most recent 22 months;
    2. the court has determined that the child is abandoned under AS 47.10.013 and the child is younger than six years of age;
    3. the court has made a finding under AS 47.10.086(b) or a determination under AS 47.10.086(c) that the best interests of the child do not require further reasonable efforts by the department;
    4. a parent has made three or more attempts within a 15-month period to remedy the parent’s conduct or conditions in the home without lasting change; or
    5. a parent has made no effort to remedy the parent’s conduct or the conditions in the home by the time of the permanency hearing under AS 47.10.080(l) .
  5. If one or more of the conditions listed in (d) of this section are present, the department shall petition for termination of the parental rights to a child unless the department
    1. has documented a compelling reason for determining that filing the petition would not be in the best interests of the child; a compelling reason under this paragraph may include care by a relative for the child; or
    2. is required to make reasonable efforts under AS 47.10.086 and the department has not provided to the parent, consistent with the time period in the department’s case plan, the family support services that the department has determined are necessary for the safe return of the child to the home.
  6. A child is considered to have entered foster care under this chapter on the earlier of
    1. the date of the first judicial finding of child abuse or neglect; or
    2. 60 days after the date of removal of the child from the child’s home under this chapter.
  7. This section does not preclude the department from filing a petition to terminate the parental rights and responsibilities to a child for other reasons, or at an earlier time than those specified in (d) of this section, if the department determines that filing a petition is in the best interests of the child.
  8. The court may order the termination of parental rights and responsibilities of one or both parents under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) and commit the child to the custody of the department. The rights of one parent may be terminated without affecting the rights of the other parent.
  9. The department shall concurrently identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified person or family for an adoption whenever a petition to terminate a parent’s rights to a child is filed. Before identifying a placement of the child in an adoptive home, the department shall attempt to locate all living adult family members of the child and, if an adult family member expresses an interest in adopting the child, investigate the adult family member’s ability to care for the child. The department shall provide to all adult family members of the child located by the department written notice of the adult family members’ rights under this chapter and of the procedures necessary to gain custody of the child, but the department’s obligation to provide written notice under this subsection does not apply to a parent of the child whose parental rights are being or have been terminated or to an adult family member who is known by the department to be ineligible for a foster care license under AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32. If an adult family member of the child requests that the department approve the adult family member for an adoption, the department shall approve the request unless there is good cause not to approve the adoption. If the court issues an order to terminate under (j) of this section, the department shall report within 30 days on the efforts being made to recruit a permanent placement for the child if a permanent placement was not approved at the time of the trial under (j) of this section. The report must document recruitment efforts made for the child.
  10. No later than six months after the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights is filed, the court before which the petition is pending shall hold a trial on the petition unless the court finds that good cause is shown for a continuance. When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. The court shall make written findings when granting a continuance.
  11. The court shall issue an order on the petition to terminate within 90 days after the last day of the trial on the petition to terminate parental rights.

History. (§ 33 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 16 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 2, 3 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 52 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

For effect of subsections (j) and (k) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 77, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, including overriding certain cases concerning termination of parental rights, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

For effect of the 2006 amendment of (a) and (b) of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 11, ch. 20, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the second through fourth sentences in subsection (i).

The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, made designation changes within subsection (a), deleted “by a preponderance of the evidence that” at the beginning of present paragraph (a)(3), and made related changes.

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32” for “AS 47.35.019 or 47.35.021” in the third sentence of subsection (i).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Under sec. 12, ch. 20, SLA 2006, the 2006 amendments of (a) and (b) of this section apply “to a child in need of aid proceeding that is pending before the court, that is on appeal to the court, or for which the time for appeal to the court has not yet passed on or after May 4, 2006.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.010 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the enactment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:

“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;

“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;

“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”

Procedure. —

In order to terminate parental rights, in addition to finding that the child is a child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 and that the parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that place the child at risk, this section requires the department to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the department has complied with the provisions of AS 47.10.086 concerning reasonable efforts to provide family support services designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to return the child to the family home. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska), op. withdrawn, — P.2d — (Alaska 2000), sub. op., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).

In reaching its termination decision, the superior court was not required to revisit its earlier placement decision and its termination order superseded all earlier placement orders. The mother could have challenged those placement decisions by requesting superior court review, and could then have petitioned the appellate court for review of the superior court’s ruling, however, because the mother failed to seek timely review, the superior court’s termination order rendered earlier issues of placement moot. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).

Failure to remedy conditions which place the child in need of aid. —

Order terminating the mother's parental rights to her two children was affirmed as she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children in need of aid because she was unable to cease her use of marijuana for well over a year after the first child's removal; she continued to regularly smoke marijuana when she was pregnant with the second child, even though she was informed of the risks posed by prenatal marijuana exposure; although the mother eventually became clean, she began smoking marijuana again several months after the children were returned to her care; and, after her relapse, the condition of the family's home and the hygiene of the children deteriorated. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children because she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children at substantial risk of harm, her continued custody of the children would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to them, and termination was in the best interests of the children, where, while the mother had completed one treatment program, she had been unsuccessful in six prior attempts at other programs, and admitted that she was not ready to take the children, the foster parents were willing to adopt the children, the children's tribe had approved the foster parents as the adoptive placement, and the current placement would enhance the children's lives. Cyra J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 8, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not clearly err by finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time because it was not clear that she had exhibited an ability to implement the necessary skills to safely care for her children. There was considerable evidence that the mother "shuts down" after extended periods of parenting, and her inattentiveness could result in physical injury to the children. Charles S. v. State, 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time where consideration of the children's status as an Indian child was not required when making a failure-to-remedy finding, the mother admitted that she was not yet ready for the children to be returned to her care, she had continued to engage in significant domestic violence and substance abuse, and the children needed permanence and stability. Jean B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 7, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights was proper as the mother had not remedied the conduct or conditions that caused her children to be in need of aid because her admitted substance abuse had left her unable to raise her children and led to her failure to protect them from her husband’s abuse; and she had done virtually nothing to address her substance abuse and mental health trauma. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid because the father's release from prison remedied the condition that placed the children in need of aid; because the father 's “unavailability” was not relevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, it was error to consider it. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Subsection (a)(2) does use the specific article “the” when referring to “the conduct or conditions” that were not remedied, and that subsection's conduct and conditions language must be understood to refer back to the conduct and conditions in AS subsection (a)(1); therefore, the conditions to be remedied must be those the court found the children were subjected to and that rendered them in need of aid. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Because the mother's substance abuse and abusive relationships continued to pose a danger to her children, the superior court did not err by finding that she failed to remedy her conduct. Vera S. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 9, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err by terminating the mother's parental rights based on failure to remedy the conduct or conditions under AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(A) because she did not seek treatment for her addiction, she did not stop using illegal substances, she did not secure a safe home, and there was ongoing domestic violence in her home. Violet W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 18, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had not recognized the impact of substance abuse on her parenting and on her children and, correspondingly, that the safety risk persisted and had not been remedied; testimony at the first trial revealed that the mother minimized her substance abuse and denied that it affected the children. Pamiuqtuuq C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 2, 2022).

Superior court did not err when it accepted the termination petition and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental because the trial occurred about 13 months after the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the child and it found that the mother had failed to participate in services before the adjudication hearing. It noted that, since the adjudication, the mother had been stopped in a truck littered with a “shocking” amount of drugs and related paraphernalia. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).

Counsel not ineffective for failing to request continuance. —

In a termination of parental rights case, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a continuance because there were several tactical reasons why counsel might have decided not to ask for a continuance, including the mother's recent drug relapse and her risk of relapsing again due to her refusal to enter residential treatment; a delay could have produced additional evidence that the children were improving in their foster placement; and a continuance of four months, even assuming the superior court granted it, would have been of little tactical use because the testimony at trial indicated that the mother needed nine months to a year before the children could safely be placed with her. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Jury trial not required. —

In state’s petition to terminate mother’s parental rights, because the Alaska Constitution only preserves a jury trial for legal causes of action, not those that are equitable in nature, and child protection cases are historically treated as matters of equity in Alaska, there was no due process right to a jury trial in children in need of aid proceedings. Alyssa B. v. State, 165 P.3d 605 (Alaska 2007).

Standard for CINA placement. —

In this case no adoption proceeding had been initiated, and on remand the superior court was to consider the grandmother to have asked the Office of Children’s Services to place the children with her for child in need of assistance purposes, not as having asked for approval of her adoption of the children. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Termination hearing in parent’s absence. —

Mother’s due process rights were not violated when termination hearing was conducted in her absence and over her objection where the delay was caused by the mother’s numerous motions to dismiss the case and disqualify the judge and the trial court found that the mother was deliberately avoiding trial, constituting extraordinary circumstances such that it was not improper for the trial court to proceed without her participation. Alyssa B. v. State, 165 P.3d 605 (Alaska 2007).

Continuance properly denied. —

Court’s refusal to continue a termination of parental rights case pending an appeal of a father’s criminal convictions for physical and sexual abuse of the children was proper; there was a statutory time limit, and the children’s interest in permanency weighed heavily against delaying the proceeding for years while the father pursued an appeal. Although the father should not have been penalized for asserting his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at the adjudication or termination proceeding, the superior court had to balance this privilege against the children’s interest in a timely resolution of the proceedings when considering the continuation request. Rowan B. v. State, 361 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2015).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father's motion to continue a termination of parental rights trial until the father's release from custody to demonstrate sobriety because (1) it did not appear even a short delay would let the father allay concerns that he would again relapse or other concerns, so denying a continuance did not seriously prejudice the father, and (2) the children's interest in permanency had to be considered. Remy K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2017) (memorandum decision).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father a termination trial continuance because the father showed no serious prejudice by showing the father could timely remedy conduct causing the father's child to be in need of aid, as (1) a short continuance did not provide enough time for needed services, and (2) a long continuance was not in the child's best interests. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Compliance with Indian Child Welfare Act. —

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights to his child where children’s services proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made the active efforts required to prevent the breakup of the family; social workers met with the father to discuss his case plan, offered him a mental health evaluation at the jail, and brought the child to the jail for visits. Roland L. v. State, 206 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2009).

Freeing the child for adoption or other permanent placement. —

It was unclear whether the superior court terminated the mother’s parental rights for the purposes of freeing the child for adoption or other permanent placement, as required under subsection (a), and while the superior court noted that the child had an interest in having a stable, permanent family arrangement, at the time of the termination proceedings DFYS was attempting to unite the child and her biological father. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).

Where a mother regained custody of her child, an order terminating the father’s parental rights freed the child for “other permanent placement” with a non-terminated parent. Victor B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Best interests of the child. —

Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where termination was in the child’s best interests because the child did not know the father, and at nearly two years old, she was of an age at which it was important not to disrupt the bonding that had occurred between her and her foster parents. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Father’s inability to maintain sobriety outside jail and his repeated incarcerations indicated that he was not a reliable parent, and a temporary placement would not satisfy the children’s immediate need for permanency and stability; given the ages of the children and their need for a stable home, a permanent placement was in their best interests, pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was in his children’s best interests where the father’s inability to demonstrate that he could maintain sobriety outside jail and his repeated incarcerations indicated that he was not a reliable parent. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Superior court did not err in considering the lack of adoptive placement options as part of its best interests analysis where it followed from the case law allowing consideration of favorable present placements. Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court did not err in considering the mother’s determination to change as part of the best interests analysis where the mother’s ability to stay sober and her determination to remain so were relevant factors to consider under AS 47.10.088(c) . Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court did not err in considering the mother-child bond as part of its best interests analysis where consideration of that bond was relevant, and the possible open adoption options made the likelihood of continued involvement after termination slim at best. Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).

Termination of mother’s rights was in daughter’s best interests based on testimony that if she were returned to her mother, she would not develop in a healthy way because of stress and she would be at risk for additional physical and emotional abuse. Tessa M. v. State, 182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008).

Trial court did not err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests because the parents could not provide a more stable home than the home the children already had or that would be provided in the system. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).

Terminating parental rights was in the child’s best interests because termination would prevent the child from suffering the harm inflicted upon her siblings, the girl’s primary bond was with her foster parents, the girl had been in foster care for more than 80 percent of her life, and there was no evidence that further delay would result in significant changes. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).

Given the court’s findings regarding permanency, the child’s special needs, and the mother’s history of substance abuse relapse, her argument that she should have more time to attempt reunification efforts was counter to the child’s best interests, and termination of her parental rights was proper. Adina B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 15, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests because the evidence showed her drug and alcohol abuse was likely to continue and therefore likely to endanger the children if they were in her custody. The children were living in a safe and loving preadoptive home and had been in the Office of Children’s Services’ custody for 29 months, a significant portion of their lives. Thea G. v. State, 291 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2013).

Trial court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because termination was in the child’s best interests; the trial court properly took into account factors such as the child’s need for permanency, his bond with the the family he had lived with since his birth, and the likelihood that the mother would not be ready to provide full-time care for the child within a reasonable period of time. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).

Superior court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest because it gave the possibility of a guardianship appropriate consideration; the mother’s substance abuse history and the children’s needs for permanence and stability outweighed the possibility that the mother might one day resolve her substance abuse issues, such that termination was better for the children than a guardianship. Jenny S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 4, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that termination of the mother’s rights was in the children's best interests; although the mother claimed that separating her from the children was harmful to all of them, the mother’s best interests were not aligned with those of the children, the fact that one child was not yet in a definitive adoptive home did not preclude a finding that termination was in her best interest, and the children were making significant progress in foster care and the mother had a lack of progress. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

Statute only provides that the court may consider any of the enumerated best interest factors, it does not create a duty for the court to do so; the fact that the court did not expressly cite these factors was not grounds for reversing the superior court's finding, plus although the superior court did not expressly mention the factors listed in the statute, it did make factual findings relevant to several of these factors, which were supported by the record. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as there was not a reasonable likelihood of returning the child to a parent within a reasonable time based on the child's age. Tyler K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (memorandum decision).

It was in the best interest of the children to terminate their mother's parental rights because the trial court was not required to first decide whether a guardianship or adopting was in the children's best interest instead; it was important for the children to be legally free from the mother, which could have only been achieved through termination. Fiona P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2017) (memorandum decision).

There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to make its best interests determination in a termination of parental rights case because the record reflected that the mother had struggled with narcotics abuse since 2009, that she acted erratically while caring for her children, she failed to take advantage of services provided, and she had neglected her children. Fiona P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2017) (memorandum decision.

It was not clear error to conclude termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because (1) a finding that it was likely the father's problematic conduct would continue and very unlikely the children could be reunited with the father within a reasonable time was supported and not clearly erroneous, and (2) the record supported findings that the children were doing well in current placements and continuing to attempt reunification would seriously delay permanency. Remy K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err when it found that terminating a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the mother's children because the court found that the mother was unable to provide for the children's basic needs and that the children had special needs requiring special attention. The children were young and needed stability and a parent who was present for them as opposed to dealing with their own issues, while the children's foster home was a potentially permanent home. Bonnie M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the evidence showed that the parents had neglected and traumatized the children; that neither parent had yet demonstrated the necessary skills to care for the children; and that the children were improving in foster care after having suffered, both physically and emotionally, in the care of their parents. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Mother could not meet her child's extensive needs, had not demonstrated any change in behavior since the case began, and she failed to act on recommendations that the child receive dental and medical surgery, exacerbating an already medically fragile condition; the finding that termination was in the child's best interests under AS 47.10.088(b) was proper. Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Finding that termination was in the child's best interests was not clear error where despite her genuine love for the child, the mother was unable to separate from the domestic partner or recognize the extent of the child's problems, and the maternal grandmother provided the child with safety and stability. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the children had improved in foster care; the caseworker testified that termination would be in the children's best interests; the mother's severe and untreated substance abuse continued to pose a risk of harm to her children; and, in contrast to the mother's situation, the foster parent had the ability to provide a stable, loving home with family support. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests as the child needed permanency; it was unlikely that the mother would remedy the conduct that made him a child in need of aid; and the Office of Children's Services had identified a possible adoptive placement. Abigail C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 13, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err by finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests as its decision to focus on the child's need for stability and the evidence that the father would not be able to provide that stability for a significant amount of time was not clearly erroneous. Alvin R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 24, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err by terminating a father's parental rights before ensuring that the child would have a permanent home because it was the termination of the father's parental rights that transformed the obligation of the Office of Children's Services to care for the child into a legal duty to find adoptive placements for her; the requirement that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests is a state law requirement, not an Indian Child Welfare Act requirement. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Sufficient evidence supported termination of a father's parental rights to the father's Indian child because (1) the father's abandonment of the child and failure to remedy the father's conduct created a risk of harm to the child, (2) the father left the child in the child's mother's custody knowing the mother abused substances, and (3) termination was in the child's best interests based on the father's conduct, especially when the child was in foster care three times in the first four years of life. Steve H. v. State, 444 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests or otherwise err in its consideration of a possible guardianship because it considered the evidence and the children's specific needs and implicitly considered guardianship as an option in its termination order; the superior court wrote detailed factual findings regarding the Office of Children's Services' long history with the children. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests because it made clear that terminating parental rights was for the purpose of establishing a permanent placement. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).

It was not clear error to find terminating a father's parental rights was in his Indian children's best interests because his history of crime and incarceration, his time left to serve, the time required after release to show parental fitness, and his lack of a strong bond with the children showed the children could not return to him within a reasonable time; he had over three years left to serve, he needed at least a year after release to show sobriety, stability, and parenting skills, and he was unlikely to change his behavior, as he did not accept responsibility for his conduct Donald L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 30, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in citing the “the totality of the circumstances” in its determination that terminating a father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because it did consider specific, statutorily enumerated factors; it explained that, given the multiple prior family interventions by state agencies and the father's minimal engagement with his case plan, there was a high likelihood his harmful conduct would continue if the children were returned to him. Walker E. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 480 P.3d 598 (Alaska 2021).

Superior court did not err in finding that it was in the son's best interests that the father's parental rights be terminated because, emphasizing the enormous amount of energy and attentiveness it took to care for the child due to his special needs, the superior court predicted that the child would likely sustain serious emotional or physical damage if placed in the father's care. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).

The superior did not clearly err in finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where it gave great weight to two factors: the amount of effort the father had expended to remedy the conduct that brought the child into the custody of the Office of Children's Services and the history of his similar conduct. Alexander G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 15, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate due to the child’s need for permanency, the strong bond which the child had formed with a foster family, and — given that the child’s older sister was part of the foster family already — the importance of keeping siblings together. The court also noted the foster family’s willingness to support a continued relationship between the child and the mother. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Best interests of child prevail over parental rights. —

Record supported trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child where the record showed that the child suffered emotional problems as the result of the instability of his home environment; child had spent the last 19 months in foster care, he could not afford to wait any longer for his father to be a parent, and he would suffer severe psychological harm if the father was granted custody and then dropped out of his life again, which was likely. Carl N. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 102 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2004).

Father had ongoing problems with addiction to prescription and illicit drugs, and while he may have been devoted to his daughter and may have believed he had a bond with her, ample evidence supported the trial court’s best-interest determination to terminate father’s parental rights. Seth D. v. State, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008).

The court is not specifically obligated to enter findings articulating its consideration of a parent’s desire to continue parenting his children as a component of its best interests analysis. The factors outlined in this section are nonexclusive, and there is no requirement that superior courts “accord a particular weight to any given factor.” All of the statutory factors indicated that the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of his children. Doe v. State, 272 P.3d 1014 (Alaska 2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, because a continuance of a few months would not have addressed the court’s concerns regarding the likelihood that the mother would relapse, the denial of the continuance did not seriously prejudice the mother’s ability to make her case at trial. In light of the mother’s pattern of relapse following treatment, the superior court had a strong basis to conclude that a few months of additional time would not have been sufficient for the mother to show that she had truly remedied her conduct. Hannah B. v. State, 289 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating parents’ rights to their four children because termination was in the children’s best interest under AS 47.10.088(c) ; the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical harm if returned to the parents’ custody as there was no progress on the part of either parent in obtaining parenting skills, and their past history of substance abuse and domestic violence was likely to recur. Christopher C. v. State, 303 P.3d 465 (Alaska 2013).

Young children have unique needs for permanency and bonding. At the time of termination, the child was only eight months old. He had spent his entire life in his grandmother’s care and had developed a strong bond with his grandmother and his older sister. It was in his best interests to remain with the grandmother, and the best interests of the child, not the parent, are paramount. Mother had not bonded with her son and had continued her long-time abuse of cocaine both during and after the pregnancy. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).

Termination of parental rights due to abandonment. —

In proceeding to terminate parental rights, although trial judge orally stated that he considered involuntary incarceration to constitute abandonment, where written findings of fact, submitted by state and signed by court, referred to parent’s voluntary absence from October of 1980 to June of 1981 as the relevant conscious disregard of parental obligations, there was no reversible error. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).

Where the father abandoned his son for three years and lost contact with all those involved in his son’s Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding, this abandonment finding justified termination without visitation notwithstanding any of the father’s arguments regarding the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), because his alleged learning disability had no bearing on the abandonment issue and he did not argue that the state’s efforts in contacting him were unreasonable under the ADA. C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).

A child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid. The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).

Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).

Father failed to meet his affirmative duty to show a genuine interest in the child and his minimal efforts to communicate were merely token efforts. He did not request any visitation with the child until roughly eight months after learning of her existence; while complying generally with his case plan, he failed to complete any of the requirements specific to the child, such as learning about her medical needs or spending time with her to form a bond; and his visits with the child were erratic and short. Jeff A.C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 27, 2005), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005), sub. op., 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005) (memorandum decision).

Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not clearly err when it determined that the child was a child in need of aid by relying on the father’s non-compliance with his case plan to find that he had abandoned his child. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the requirement of the Office of Children’s Services that the father visit with the children individually was reasonable, and his failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations. Further, the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father’s parental rights to a child on the ground of abandonment was appropriate because the father, who was incarcerated, had not remedied the abandonment within a reasonable time. The limitations imposed by the father’s incarceration were largely due to the father’s own conduct, the father’s recent change in attitude toward parenting the child did not outweigh a history of disinterest, and the child’s best interests were served by termination. Dane T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Although the superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid, since its findings concerning “unavailability” were irrelevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, because “unavailability” could be relevant to abandonment, the matter was remanded to the superior court to reconsider its findings in relation to Office of Children's Services' abandonment argument and petition. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Failure to remedy conditions which place the child in need of aid. —

Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not clearly err when it concluded that the father failed to remedy the conditions that placed his child in need of aid. The Office of Children’s Services tried to convince him to participate in a parenting assessment and a psychological evaluation to help him begin to address his child’s needs, but the father refused to participate in any psychological evaluation. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly found that a mother did not timely remedy the conduct or conditions that made her son a child in need of aid because the mother failed to timely remedy her persistent and active interference with the son’s treatment as a child with special needs; the mother’s active undermining of the professionals who aimed to provide much-needed therapeutic care to the son demonstrated a significant lack of insight into what was required to parent a special needs child; the mother further failed to take appropriate action to treat her substance abuse issues. Sherry R. v. State, 332 P.3d 1268 (Alaska 2014).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because substantial evidence supported its finding that the mother failed to remedy the conditions that put the child at risk; the evidence showed that the mother had history of misusing medication, relapsed, continuing mental conditions, and resistance to treatment and other help. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, as the mother did not recognize the existence or extent of the child’s special needs, while the foster family demonstrated the ability to provide the support, love, and care the child needed. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).

Finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at substantial risk of harm was supported by evidence that the mother left the children with a sex offender who showed the children pornography and she failed to intervent when the children fought, indicating a lack of understanding about her parental role in supervising the children. Jordan J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2015).

Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse, and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services; and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency, and it was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Mother made sincere and significant attempts to remedy her conduct, and this factor weighed in her favor, but the evidence of her substance abuse history, relapses, and failure to maintain sobriety was undisputed; when determining whether the mother remedied her conduct, the superior court was not required to give more weight to any particular factor, many of the factors did not support her position, and the superior court did not clearly err in relying on her substantial history of severe addiction and finding that she had not remedied her conduct. Nola L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 3, 2016) (memorandum decision).

It was not clear error to find a mother did not remedy untreated mental illness, placing the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm, because (1) the mother was inconsistent in engaging with a case plan’s recommended services, including medication management, parenting classes, and individual ther- apy, as the mother did not attend therapy, did not complete a parenting course, and stopped taking med- ication, (2) the mother’s financial and transportation limits did not excuse noncompliance, and, (3) when the mother engaged with the case plan, the child had been in the Office of Children’s Services custody for over a year. Emma D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 15, 2016) (memorandum decision) .

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).

Finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time was not error where the evidence showed that bipolar disorder was the mother's most serious obstacle to parenting, it remained largely unaddressed, and because of it she continued to pose a risk of injury to her children. Joy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 14, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the father's parental rights based the father's failure to remedy the conditions that placed the child at substantial risk of harm in a reasonable amount of time was supported by evidence the child had been in the custody of the Office of Children's Services for 18 months at the time of trial, and the father failed to abide by the recommendations of his substance abuse assessor, failed to complete parenting classes, and dropped out of contact with the child for months at a time. Tyler K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the mother failed to remedy the conduct and conditions that caused the children to be children in need of aid because the parents' history showed a repeated pattern of substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence; the mother did not understand the extent of the children's needs or have the skills necessary to protect them from future harm; the mother never internalized or understood the ways in which her behavior adversely affected the children; and, by the time of trial, the mother still had not completed substance abuse treatment or a long period of sobriety. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights to a child was appropriate because, although the father argued that he cleaned up the family home, obtained a commercial driver's license and a job, and passed drug tests during the pendency of the case, the superior court did not clearly err in finding that he did not remedy his mental health issues that were the root cause of his inability to safely parent the child and placed the child in substantial risk of continued physical harm and continuing mental injury. Matthew H. v. State, 397 P.3d 279 (Alaska 2017).

Finding that a mother had not remedied the conduct or conditions that endangered her son was not clear error where her behavior showed that she did not recognize the risk of harm that her domestic partner posed to the child's mental and physical well-being. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on her failure to remedy her substance abuse within a reasonable time because the mother frequently submitted positive urinalyses (UA) samples or failed to report for UAs at all; her substance abuse continued throughout the case; and the children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother's or the grandmother's care. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not violate the parents' due process rights by relying on prior conduct, as such was clearly connected to the current issues with the parents' conduct and its effect on the child, plus given their stipulation that the child was in need of aid, nothing prevented the superior court from considering the parents' entire history of conduct in determining whether to terminate their rights under AS 47.10.088 . Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that terminating the parents' rights was in the child's best interests under AS 47.10.088 , given that parental efforts at rehabilitation were low, harmful conduct was likely to continue, and the likelihood of reunification in a reasonable time, based on the child approaching her teenage years, was slim. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Terminating parental rights was in the child's best interests given the father's failures to take measures necessary to protect the child from the mother, and the child had thrived in foster care. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in finding that the father failed to remedy the conditions that placed the child at a substantial risk of harm where he failed to take any steps to keep the child safe from the abusive mother. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights due to risk of harm to child. —

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).

Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had a history of relationships involving repeated incidents of domestic violence, and the mother’s intellectual functioning was likely to contribute to her difficulty in avoiding unsafe partners, thereby putting her children at risk. Cara G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 29, 2012) (memorandum decision).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the child had been exposed to conduct or conditions specified in AS 47.10.011 because the mother did not dispute that she exposed the child to drug addicts, drug dealers, and domestic violence. As the mother refused to fulfill her case plan requirements, which included substance abuse treatment, the trial court did not err by finding she did not remedy her conduct that endangered her son. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Trial court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because, based on the mother’s untreated substance abuse and underlying emotional issues, as well as the child’s option for permanency with the family he had lived with since birth, the trial court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that allowing the mother’s custody of the child likely would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Trial court, which terminated a mother’s parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the children in need of aid statutes, did not err in finding that the evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother’s children would likely be seriously harmed if returned to the mother. Because the aggregated testimony of expert and lay witnesses supported the trial court’s finding that the mother likely would continue to relapse until she resolved her underlying mental health issues, the trial court’s conduct-not-likely-to-change finding was not clearly erroneous. Diana P. v. State, 355 P.3d 541 (Alaska 2015).

In terminating a father's parental rights, the superior court properly considered both the father's history of substance abuse and his current conduct in determining that the father had failed to remedy the conduct placing his daughter at risk of harm. Ray R. v. State, 386 P.3d 1225 (Alaska 2016).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues, coupled with the mother’s lack of accountability, would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Economic condition of parents. —

Record did not support claim that the decision to terminate parental rights was based on or caused by economic hardship. The trial court considered a number of appropriate factors in the face of overwhelming evidence that it would be best for the children if the parental rights were terminated. Dustin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 1, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Reasonable efforts. —

Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the State made reasonable efforts to assist the father where it drew up a suitable case plan, including parenting classes and drug monitoring. The State also made reasonable efforts to provide the father with visitation until it became clear that the visitation was harmful to the child. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where the State arranged visitation between the father and his children during the new incarceration until the superior court ordered otherwise; although father received substance abuse treatment and parenting classes from the department of corrections, the court determined he was unlikely to recover sufficiently to successfully care for his children. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

In a parental rights termination case, the state made reasonable efforts to reunite the father and the child where the state notified him in writing of the permanency hearing, the social worker returned his calls, gave him information regarding the child and the foster parents, mailed him documents relating to the child, offered him the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in an administrative review hearing (which he declined), and set up a case plan.Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).

Trial court did not err by finding that mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time because even though she had been in compliance with case plan since November 2007, at the time of trial she still faced significant obstacles to successful reunification such as the sons’ lack of attachment to their mother, her inability to show empathy for what her sons had experienced, and the likelihood that she would act aggressively when under stress and abuse or neglect her sons. Kim B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 28, 2009) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided: (1) in-person reviews of the requirements of the case plan; (2) referrals for substance abuse assessments and substance abuse treatment; (3) drug testing; (4) parenting classes; (5) domestic violence education; and (6) consistent visitation, beginning immediately after the first child was taken into emergency custody. As to the father, the court held that given his incarceration, the OCS’s efforts to provide the father with family support services when he was not in prison, and the father’s failure to make any changes necessary to achieve reunification, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the OCS’s reunification efforts in their entirety were reasonable despite its failure to provide visitation in prison. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper where the record showed that it was not the OCS’s failures that caused the mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems to remain untreated but rather the mother’s lack of willingness to maintain contact with her caseworkers, to candidly report her health status to service providers, and to engage in services when they were offered. Amanda K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 2, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper, even though there were some deficiencies in the State’s reunification efforts, because the mother did not follow her case plan, often missed scheduled appointments, and showed up to visitations with a hangover and smelling “like booze.” Janelle A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 25, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights was proper where the Office of Children’s Services made active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d), AS 47.10.088(a)(3) , and return of the children to the mother’s care would likely result in serious damage to the children, AS 47.10.088(a)(2) . Iris R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 5, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had made active efforts to help him progress with his case plan in the face of his reluctance to communicate with OCS; although the trial court continued the termination trial for 10 months to give him another chance to make necessary changes, in the intervening period he stopped taking drug tests and did not inform OCS of his living arrangements. Roy S. v. State, 278 P.3d 886 (Alaska 2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, social services was not required to actively pursue placement with the father’s relatives as part of its active efforts to prevent the termination of the father’s parental rights because the social worker had looked into placement with the father’s parents but there were concerns about their ability to meet the child’s special needs. Finally, the father did nothing more than suggest placement with his “sisters,” but they were unsuitable as placements because they were “known to have sex offenders in the home.” Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS), made undeniably excellent efforts to prevent the break of the family; OCS participated in monthly status hearings, there were weekly case-planning meetings and mediation, and OCS social workers met regularly to brainstorm different approaches that could work with the mother. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).

Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family by referring the mother to substance abuse assessments, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and domestic violence counseling, and providing transportation assistance, arranging family visits, and attempting to locate the mother when OCS lost contact with her. Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015).

A father's parental rights to his son were properly terminated because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; the record indicated that it was not OCS's failure but the father's refusal to acknowledge his mental health issues that ultimately prevented the success of OCS's reunification efforts because OCS referred the father for a psychological assessment in every case plan it developed. Darwin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).

It was no error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's father because (1) the father was incarcerated and nothing showed the father tried to contact OCS or OCS did not respond to the father's efforts, (2) infrequent contacts by OCS did not make OCS's efforts unreasonable, (3) it was not plain error to hold OCS did what OCS could to recommend services, (4) it was reasonable to first focus such efforts on the child's non-incarcerated mother, and (5) the efforts included Department of Corrections services. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because, although the children went through nine different foster placements in the three months after OCS assumed custody, the changes in placement resulted not from OCS ineptitude but from the children's acute behavioral issues; OCS repeatedly referred both parents to rehabilitative services, including counseling, shelters, mental health and substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes; and much of the parents' difficulty in making progress in their rehabilitative efforts was due to their missed calls, meetings, assessments, and drug tests. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided the father with referrals to therapists, a psychiatrist and others, the social worker continued communicating with the father even though she feared for her safety, and the father substantially refused to work with the OCS or see a psychiatrist. Linus L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 9, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter because it improperly excused the failure of the Office of Children's Services to demonstrate reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family; the trial court relied exclusively on its conviction that further efforts would be pointless, and it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that a basis under subsection (c) applied. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).

Trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) failed to carry its burden of demonstrating it had provided reasonable efforts was not clearly erroneous because the trial court had clear support from OCS's own witnesses and internal review, as well as credible expert testimony, for its finding. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) on the whole made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children because the OCS referred the mother to and paid for her participation in psychological evaluations, domestic violence evaluations, domestic violence classes, substance abuse evaluations, therapy, and the Resource Center for Parents and Children reunification program; the OCS offered visitation to the parents after the trial home visit ended; the OCS provided the mother with food, clothing, transportation, and some assistance obtaining public housing; and the OCS continued to provide services until the end of the case. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts by providing a mother transportation, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral funding for case management services, a peer navigator, referrals to parenting classes and substance abuse assessments, weekly supervised visits, and referrals for housing at a local shelter and residential treatment center. The mother failed to tell the OCS about transportation difficulties, did not use cab vouchers, and was able, at times, to use other sources for help. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts given a father's incarceration. OCS repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the father through the telephone number the father provided, through the father's attorney, and through the Texas Department of Corrections; secured some services for the father when the father was not incarcerated; and attempted to arrange telephonic visitation with the children and to provide case management services. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother and the children because when the caseworker did not have face-to-face meetings she held them with the mother over the phone, and there was sufficient evidence in the record for the superior court to conclude that the mother was not interested in having those meetings. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to address issues identified in a doctor's report and to help the mother gain critical parenting skills because OCS followed through on recommendations in the neuropsychological report, especially as they pertained to the mother's learning difficulty; OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the mother's lack of willingness to participate in her plan and her level of cooperation. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).

There was no error in the superior court's reasonable efforts finding with respect to the Office of Children Services' failure to seek additional providers for a bonding study because the children were in need of aid due to the mother's inability to manage her fatigue and learn the skills she needed to safely parent both children together; the extent of the mother's parental bonds with her children was secondary to those main issues. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) satisfied the requirement that it make reasonable efforts to reunify the family as the initial communication failure in 2012 and the alleged lack of encouragement during the trial home visit involved, at most, discrete and limited failures in OCS's very long-running involvement with the family; and there was conflicting evidence regarding OCS's reasonable efforts as, from the trial court's perspective, the father's willingness to engage with his younger children's OCS case showed not that OCS failed to work as hard in the current case, but rather that the father did not care enough about his older children to make the same effort. Ronan F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 10, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his son as the caseworker testified that she contacted the father a number of times from April 2019 to June 2020 in an attempt to get him to engage with the case plan, but he rejected every overture; and the father refused to get in contact with members of the team of doctors and therapists that cared for his son so that he could learn how to care for his son. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts toward reunification because OCS's immediate focus on the father's substance abuse issues was understandable as parental substance abuse was one of the reasons the child was adjudged to be a child in need of aid when taken from the father's home; and the case worker did not err in failing to refer the father for some kind of mental health evaluation as his cognitive issues appeared to be consistent with what was known about his drug use, and he never told OCS that his cognitive issues were mental-health-related. Warren S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 25, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in finding the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite a mother with her sons because the mother was not given a formal diagnosis of a specific mental health disability; OCS referred the mother to substance abuse treatment programs and a domestic violence assessment after determining her substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect of the sons, not her anxiety or impulsiveness, were the conditions that put the sons in need of aid. Angie W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 16, 2022).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Furthermore, that the Alaska Office of Children’s Services made reasonable reunification efforts by facilitating substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting classes, and various forms of visitation. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Superior court did not err when it terminated the mother’s parental rights after finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the family because OCS actively helped the mother to apply for housing and had no reason to prioritize her “possible” mental health issues when there was no evidence that such issues led to the child’s removal. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).

Reasonable time. —

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights because reasonable and active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; those efforts were unsuccessful because of the mother’s substance abuse, and return of the child was likely to result in serious emotional and/or physical damage to the child. Darcy F. v. State, 252 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2010).

Termination of parental rights was proper where, although the superior court found that the parents had made some positive changes, due to the overwhelmingly lengthy history of dysfunction, the changes did not rise to the level of remedying the conduct and conditions within a reasonable time. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).

Termination of parental rights of mother to her tenth child was proper where she had lost rights to her nine other children due to her ongoing addiction to crack cocaine, and her related conduct which put the children at risk, and which continued after the birth of this child despite repeated offers to the mother of help and treatment. Under the circumstances termination in little over a year after the child was put into foster care did not violate the mother’s right to reasonable efforts supporting the family. Patience P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 11, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because (1) the time was viewed from the child's perspective, (2) the termination trial occurred 22 months after the son's placement, and (3) the son's need for permanency was shown. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because the father's claims that the father should have had more time since termination would not cause the son's placement with the father's sister any sooner, and not terminating parental rights would give the father an incentive to follow a case plan failed as nothing showed more time was reasonable from the son's perspective. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because the father's claims that the father should have had more time after the father's release since the father had no access to requisite programs in prison failed as the father did not follow the father's case plan after the father's release. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Mother was given a reasonable amount of time, about a year and a half, given the child's young age, to remedy her issues. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

In a case terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights in the Families with Infants and Toddlers Court (FIT Court), the supreme court concluded that it was error to adhere to the FIT Court's preset timeline rather than making an individualized assessment of whether the parents had a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that placed the children in substantial risk based on the facts of their children's cases because the court acknowledged that a few more months might have made a difference for the mother. To the extent the 12-months-to-permanency timeline was interpreted as lacking the flexibility to account for individual circumstances, it contravened the statutory command of this statute. Edna L. v. State, 477 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2020).

In a case terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights in the Families with Infants and Toddlers Court (FIT Court), in light of the ambiguities and potential for serious misunderstanding in the way the 12-months-to-permanency goal in the FIT Court was presented to the parents, the record did not support their knowing and voluntary waiver of a child in need of aid process that adequately took into account their individual circumstances. Edna L. v. State, 477 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2020).

One year not reasonable time to remedy conduct. —

Where the father made no efforts to establish a relationship with his baby daughter for over a year after her birth, one year was not a reasonable time to remedy the effects of his abandonment under item (a)(1)(B)(ii) [now (a)(2)(B)]. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).

Passage of time as factor to consider. —

Office of Children’s Services’ second petition to terminate the father’s parental rights was not barred by res judicata because it raised new material facts; the passage of time alone could have significant consequences if a young child’s developmental needs were not being met, and the superior court properly considered new evidence regarding the mother’s circumstances. Kent V. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 233 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2010).

Child adjusted to foster home. —

It was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights where the child was thriving, happy, and well-adjusted at her foster parents’ home and had bonded with her foster family, so that removing her from the only family she has ever known would likely cause her irreparable harm. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).

Where two of mother’s children had been sexually abused, all of the children had aggression behaviors, and mother had a flat relationship with children, court properly terminated the mother’s rights as taking the children out of their more stable foster homes would likely cause them additional setbacks and emotional trauma. V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).

Special needs child. —

Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The child had special needs that the father simply did not seem to understand. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).

Indian Child Welfare Act —

Father’s parental rights were properly terminated because a doctor qualified as an expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act; courts had not required that the expert exhibit familiarity with the Alaska Native culture when the basis for termination did not implicate cultural bias, there was no contrary evidence in the record that the doctor disregarded, and the doctor’s testimony was not vague and generalized. The doctor’s testimony directly supported the conclusion that unless the father made progress in recommended services, his conduct was unlikely to change; also, the report at a minimum supported an inference that the childrenwould have suffered harm if returned to his care. Kent K. v. Dep't of Health Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs. (Alaska Feb. 3, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Lack of parental bond. —

Termination of father’s parental rights was in child’s best interests where the child’s bond with his foster parents, with whom he had been placed almost his entire life, and his bond with his half-brother, weighed against reunification with his father. The father’s failure to contact the Office of Children’s Services for six months after moving to Anchorage and his failure to drive to Fairbanks to take advantage of additional visitation was further evidence that the father did not have a strong parent-child bond with his child. Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010).

Incarceration of parent. —

Father’s incarceration could not serve as the proper basis for a finding of destruction of the parent-child relationship without substantial evidence that father’s disregard of his parental responsibilities led to the destruction of his parent-child relationship. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

While long-term incarceration of a parent can result in a child becoming a child in need of aid under an inability to provide care theory, such incarceration is not a sufficient basis to justify termination of parental rights under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) . A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Where a Native American mother of twins suffered from a serious and long-term addiction to cocaine and the father of the twins was incarcerated at time of their birth and then absconded from custody, based on the totality of the circumstances, the parental rights of both parents were properly terminated. T.F. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).

The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).

Father’s sentence to six years of incarceration qualified as a significant period of his children’s minority within the meaning of AS 47.10.086(c)(10) ; thus, a court was authorized to dispense with the requirement that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services provide family support services under paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the State with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the State had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights pursuant to AS 47.10.080 and this section was inappropriate where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support termination. The father’s testimony indicated that he took steps to assure that the child had a safe home, away from the baby’s drug-addicted mother. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).

In a termination of parental rights case, social services satisfied its duty to make active efforts. Because the father was incarcerated, a social worker communicated with him and facilitated the exchange of letters and pictures between him and the child, and they developed a case plan for the father and kept him informed. Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012).

Termination of a father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest because, due the father’s incarceration, he would not be able to parent the child until she was well into her teen years; the child needed stability and permanence. Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).

Termination of parental rights due to multiple deficiencies in parent’s parenting ability. —

Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).

Termination of only the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) presented evidence of the father’s personality disorders, substance abuse, and criminal history; the OCS presented testimony that the child’s behavior and trauma were attributed to the father; and the OCS presented substantial undisputed evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was needed to protect the child from his father, that the father was an unfit parent and caused serious harm to the child, and that termination of the mother’s rights could be psychologically harmful to the child, but her continued involvement could benefit the child’s therapeutic plan. Jamie H. v. State, 336 P.3d 1253 (Alaska 2014).

Termination of the parents’ rights was upheld as the parents failed to address their substance abuse issue, conduct that placed the children at substantial risk harm, and termination was in the best interest of the children, one of whom needed constant, stable care and access to medical treatment to recover from a serious illness. Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015).

Terminating the mother’s parental rights to one child was in that child's best interests where the mother’s continuing mental illness and failure to supervise and protect the child subjected her to substantial harm, and she repeatedly failed to correct her behavior despite multiple chances and assistance. Denise L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights due to parental conduct. —

Parent’s constitutional right to due process was not violated by allowing, in a civil proceeding that could have resulted in the termination of parental rights, the admission of his daughter’s videotaped statement alleging sexual abuse without affording the parent an opportunity to cross-examine his daughter, given that uncorroborated hearsay evidence will not satisfy the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for the termination of parental rights. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).

Trial court’s termination of father’s parental rights was erroneous where father could not have visited his children until he had established that he was their father and a period of approximately eighteen months elapsed before paternity of both children was established which resulted from the mother’s refusal, even under court order, to provide blood for testing purposes. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).

In order to terminate parental rights under AS 47.10.080 , a court must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) that there is a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] as a result of parental conduct, and (2) that the parental conduct causing the child to be in need of aid is likely to continue. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

The record, which included evidence that children had serious social, physical and cognitive problems, were filthy, and lacked necessary medical care, and that the mother’s neglect was likely to continue, furnished sufficient evidence of neglect such that the supreme court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court erred in any of its findings of fact or in its ultimate conclusion that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s rights where evidence showed that on two occasions the children were found in downtown Juneau exposed to dangerous and unsanitary conditions while with him and that his neglect was due to his alcoholism which was likely to continue and further that the state had taken active remedial measures to rehabilitate the father. J.P.W. v. State (In re J.W.), 921 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1996).

Where the evidence before the superior court demonstrated the mother’s failure to provide her daughter with daily care and this neglect stemmed in part from the mother’s continued substance abuse, there was an ample evidentiary basis for adjudicating the daughter as a child in need of aid. D.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996).

Parental rights were properly terminated where evidence supported that mother continued to abuse drugs, had neglected her other children, and was at risk for neglecting the child who was the subject of the proceeding. J.H. v. State, 30 P.3d 79 (Alaska 2001).

Where the father failed to complete the individualized anger management, parenting, or substance abuse treatment programs his case plan required, and did not follow through with any of the program’s individual recommendations for treatment, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children in substantial risk of harm, or that returning them to his custody would place them at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights. Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).

Where the father was an untreated sex offender who was assessed as having a “high” risk of recidivism, the father posed a significant and particularized threat of further sexual abuse; further, his children had already been severely traumatized by his conduct; therefore, the trial court properly found that returning the father’s children to his custody would place them at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights. Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).

Where the state presented overwhelming evidence of the mother’s repeated failure to care appropriately for her children, and her decade long lack of success in substance abuse treatment for abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, and where a psychologist testified it was unlikely the mother would ever be capable of parenting, reasonable efforts at family reunification were exhausted, and termination of the mother’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).

Superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in her home that placed her children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; the mother’s sobriety was new in her life, she continued to be romantically involved with a man who had been convicted of child sexual assault, and the mother failed to recognize her children’s special needs. Sherry R. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).

Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father’s reckless use of firearms, including shooting the child’s mother when she was pregnant with the child, created a significant risk of future physical harm to the child. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father admitted to disciplinary problems and confrontations while in prison. When that testimony was taken together with the testimony of the child’s mother and the social worker that the father threatened them while he was in custody, the evidence was clear and convincing that the father did not remedy his behavior and did not make sufficient progress. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Where a father’s addiction to substances, including alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana, resulted in repeated incarcerations, and he had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, his frequent and prolonged absences impaired his ability to parent and were harmful to his children; thus, a trial court did not err in finding that the children remained in substantial risk of harm pursuant to item (a)(1)(B)(i) [now (a)(2)(A)] of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights because he failed to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that placed the child at substantial risk of harm where his repeated incarcerations and substance abuse placed his children at substantial risk of harm, the father had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, and he was not likely to recover without serious treatment. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).

Trial court properly terminated father’s parental rights to his son and daughter pursuant to this section because there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that the children were children in need of aid based on the conditions enumerated in AS 47.10.011 , that the father was responsible for a “mental injury” to the son and that he failed to maintain contact with his daughter for several years. Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005).

Order terminating parents’ rights to their child was upheld where the parents, who had a history of substance abuse, mental problems, and criminal activity, did not remedy the conditions in the home that threatened the child’s safety, as required by subsection (a)(1)(B) [now (a)(2)]. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).

Termination of father’s right to twins was proper under this section where the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to ensure that the children could be returned to the father as required by CINA R. 18(c)(2)(A) and AS 47.10.086 , the children were in need of aid as provided in AS 47.10.011 (8), and father failed to remedy the conditions that caused them to be in need of aid. Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).

Findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that a father’s youngest child was a child in need of aid where the evidence showed that there was a substantial risk of injury if the child returned home; the father’s previous lack of cooperation and the exhaustion of resources mitigated the failure of Office of Children Services to refer the father to service providers in a case plan. Burke P. v. State, 162 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2007).

Mother failed to sufficiently remedy conduct or conditions that placed her children at risk, under this section and Alaska CINA R. 18(c)(1), where the mother failed to comply with her case plan, including cooperating with drug testing. Reports of harm continued after a trial home visit began, and, after the trial home visit ended, the mother visited with her children only sporadically and moved without informing the department. Maisy W. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 175 P.3d 1263 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court properly found that a father’s history of incarceration and substance abuse, as well as his pending incarceration, put his children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (2) and (10), and that the father had failed within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed his children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury under this section. Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).

Mother’s parental rights were properly terminated under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) because mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time and returning daughter to her mother would place her at substantial risk of further emotional and physical harm; trial court found that daughter was severly emotionally damaged, she endured emotional and physical abuse, and that mother had either failed to protect her daughter or contributed to the daughter’s harm, or both. Tessa M. v. State, 182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court’s conclusion that best interests of the children would be served by terminating father’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous and was warranted by this section because the children continued to be in need of aid, father failed to complete anger management and parenting classes, and father had not remedied conditions that placed his children at risk of substantial harm, including sudden and long absences between visits and unrealistic beliefs of his children’s behavioral and emotional problems. Paul G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 6, 2008) (memorandum decision).

Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).

Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to remedy conduct that put their children at substantial risk under subsection (a)(2)(B) because the father failed to achieve the goals of his case plan and stated that he did not intend to seek further alcohol abuse treatment because it was not important. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).

Father had not remedied his conduct and termination of his parental rights was proper where he did not start to participate fully in counseling until after his son had been in foster care for over seven months, he never completed any of the substance abuse or anger management programs despite being required to do so by court orders and his case plan, and at a counseling appointment the father threatened the life of a social worker who was the bearer of unwelcome news and then stopped attending treatment. Jeremy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err by finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that led to removal of her children where she (1) did not adequately address her mental health problems and failed to engage in consistent treatment; (2) failed to fully integrate what she learned about domestic violence and the trial court questioned whether she had permanently ended her relationship with the father; and (3) failed to address her substance abuse, as she failed to regularly attend 12-step meetings, maintain regular conduct with a sponsor, or surround herself with individuals leading a lifestyle conductive to sobriety. She continued to minimize and even deny her drug use and abuse in her testimony. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).

Sufficient evidence supported termination of father’s parental rights where, although he attended a program on family violence intervention, he otherwise failed to comply with requirements set by the court, and continued to exhibit behavior which was potentially harmful to the child or others, including threatening a social worker, and failure to accept responsibility for his own actions. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Termination of mother’s parental rights was proper where she did not remedy the drug and alcohol abuse that placed the children at substantial risk of harm; she admitted to drinking while she was pregnant with one of the children and to testing positive for marijuana use following the child’s birth. Lucy J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2010).

Father’s rights were properly terminated where he failed to remedy the conditions that placed the child in need of aid; although there were periods of time when his contacts with the child improved, the periods did not overcome the evidence that he was unable to maintain regular contact, provide reasonable support, or normal supervision for the child. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).

Trial court did not err in finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in her child’s best interest because it considered the mother’s long and cyclical history of engaging in treatment and then relapsing, her failure to follow through with mental health treatment and medication compliance, her failure to comply with her case plan, and her failure to separate herself from her abusive boyfriend. Judith R. v. State, 289 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2012).

Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment because the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Mother had not refuted the trial court's findings that she knowingly failed to provide the child needed medical treatment to alleviate her significant respiratory and dental problems, and thus the finding that the mother's actions placed the child in need of aid, for purposes of AS 47.10.011 , was proper, as was the termination of the mother's rights under AS 47.10.088 . Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).

There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in her continuing mental health issues. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights not clearly erroneous.—

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, by declining to credit the testimony of the father's witnesses over the testimony of the witnesses for the children's services agency, in finding active but unsuccessful efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and in giving more weight to expert witness testimony than to testimony from the father's witnesses as to the likelihood of future harm to the child. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Substance abuse. —

Termination of mother’s parental rights was supported by evidence that the child was a child in need of aid due to mother’s substance abuse. The mother did not remedy her substance abuse issues in a reasonable time, and there was no evidence the mother would change her behavior upon release from incarceration; once released it would take two years for her prove sobriety and stability. Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).

Because a mother in a termination of parental rights case did not contest the superior court's finding that the mother's children were in need of aid based on the mother's substance abuse, the appellate court declined to consider the alternative findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and risk of exposure to domestic violence by the mother's paramour, as those issues were rendered moot. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that the child was at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse because he admitted to smoking drugs while the child was in the house, he testified that others he associated with had used drugs in his home and he blamed the child's positive drug test on them, and the child's hair follicle tested positive for amphetamine, cocaine, and methamphetamine while she was in the father's care and control. Steve K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 18, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Because this statute did not require the Office of Children's Services to wait 15 months before filing a petition, the court did not err by holding a termination trial based on a petition filed less than 15 months after the children were removed from their home as the mother had made no progress in addressing her substance abuse and was not willing to accept accountability; and the father refused to take any accountability for his behaviors and had not been open to working on the conditions causing his children to be in need of aid. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a mother had failed to remedy the conduct that caused her child to be in need of aid, having balanced the mother’s efforts to address her substance abuse with her unsuccessful attempts to maintain sobriety. In finding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the superior court took into account factors including the child’s need for permanency and the low likelihood of return to the mother’s care within the foreseeable future. Karine W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2022).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).

Criminal record and history of violence. —

Termination of parental rights was proper where the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions; he admitted at trial that his assault and domestic violence convictions all resulted from crimes against women he knew, and one assault occurred against the child’s mother on the day before the child’s birth. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) in determining that a mother failed to remedy the conditions that placed her children at risk of harm; her four months of outpatient treatment were insufficient to remedy her long history of alcohol abuse. After participating in Alcoholics Anonymous for over four months, she could not recite a single one of the program’s 12 steps. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Failure of parents to remedy conduct. —

Order terminating parents’ rights to their three children was proper where the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions that put their children at substantial risk of harm within a reasonable time; the parents began to participate in residential substance abuse treatment just three weeks before the trial to terminate their rights. Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009).

Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).

Where a child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment, the record also established that the father had failed to remedy harmful conduct or conditions where he had failed to undergo required substance abuse assessment and treatment, which was needed before he could resume visitation with the child, and there was a strong bond between the child and her foster family. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

Because the children required permanence and stability that the father could not offer, and because the evidence suggested that he would not be able to provide permanence and stability within any reasonable time period, terminating the father’s parental rights was proper. The father repeatedly showed a poor attitude and failed to cooperate in efforts to assist him. Pravat P. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 249 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2011).

Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because sufficient evidence showed that his drinking impaired his ability to parent and caused a substantial risk of harm to the children; his continuing alcohol problems supported the finding that he failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk. Stephen H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).

Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had a history of relationships involving repeated incidents of domestic violence, and the mother’s intellectual functioning was likely to contribute to her difficulty in avoiding unsafe partners, thereby putting her children at risk. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a father’s parental rights to his child was proper where father failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time; there was substantial evidence that the father could not fulfill the child’s urgent needs resulting from reactive attachment disorder and PTSD, which were a direct result of the father’s behaviors. Jake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 31, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights was proper because the children were children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (8) and (11); they suffered mental injury due to parents’ lack of supervision and failure to meet children’s mental health and counseling needs, including inappropriate and intimidating corporal punishment. Termination was in the children’s best interest. William S. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 15, 2014) (memorandum decision).

In light of the father’s history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence, despite completing multiple treatment programs, the superior court did not clearly err in its finding that the father had not learned from his treatment. Sid G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 6, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk as the Alaska Office of Children's Services worked with the mother over the course of nearly two years, the mother tried to engage in treatment and address substance abuse and mental health issues but was unsuccessful and repeatedly relapsed, and the mother was repeatedly incarcerated and struggled with homelessness. Bonnie M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on her failure to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time and was in the children's best interests because the mother had barely begun to work on her case plan by the trial date despite months of efforts by the Office of Children's Services to engage her; she was released from jail in July 2016, but she had not yet scheduled a substance abuse assessment by the time of trial in early November 2016; and the superior court did not err in finding that the mother's long history of substance abuse was inhibiting her ability to parent, and in not believing her claims that she would do whatever it took to remedy her conduct. Jane A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 25, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Timely compliance with case plan. —

Mother failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the child at risk in a timely manner, as she failed to start working her case plan until months after the child was taken from her when she was arrested. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).

Designating relative as primary caretaker not a remedy for unacceptable parenting. —

If parents have not remedied the conduct that poses an active threat to a child’s safety, merely designating a relative as primary caretaker does not “remedy” the conduct and therefore does not satisfy subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) [now (a)(2)(B)]. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).

Termination of parental rights reversed. —

Termination of father’s parental rights was reversed where the state did not produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that placement of the children with the father was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children and did not make active efforts to reunify the father with his children. C.J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001).

Trial court clearly erred by finding that the father failed to remedy his conduct in a reasonable time, and therefore the termination of his parental rights was reversed, because he remedied his substance abuse issues, as he had successfully completed inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment programs, the Office of Children's Services no longer required him to complete urinalysis testing, and he had remained sober for two years. The father was also actively engaged in therapy, parenting classes, and visitation with his children. Charles S. v. State, 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).

Consideration of alternative grounds. —

Where a case was remanded to determine whether children should be adjudicated children in need of aid (CINA) due to the father’s inability to provide for them, once it complied with that direction, the trial court’s additional consideration of other grounds for CINA jurisdiction was not inconsistent with the mandate. A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1997).

Absence of meaningful alternative placement. —

Presence or absence of meaningful alternative placements could be considered by court in deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, but it was not a decisive factor where there was evidence at termination hearing that the children would need more time in therapeutic foster homes before they were ready for adoption and that the children would benefit from such an environment. Paul G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 6, 2008) (memorandum decision).

Applied in

A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000); A.J. v. State, 62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002); Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Mariah B. v. Dep't to Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 499 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2021).

Stated in

N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001); S.H. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002); In re Adoption of Bernard A., 77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 21, 2001); Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004); Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006); In re Adoption of Xavier K., 268 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2012); Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013); Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); Louisa M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 12, 2020).

Collateral references. —

Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights. 92 ALR5th 379.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Constitutional issues. 110 ALR5th 579.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel. 118 ALR5th 561.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 ALR5th 351.

Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 ALR5th 385.

Sec. 47.10.089. Voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities.

  1. When a child is committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (3) or released under AS 47.10.080(c)(2) , the rights of a parent with respect to the child, including parental rights to control the child, to withhold consent to an adoption, or to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption, may be voluntarily relinquished to the department and the relationship of parent and child terminated in a proceeding as provided under this section.
  2. A voluntary relinquishment must be in writing and signed by a parent, regardless of the age of the parent, in the presence of a representative of the department or in the presence of a court of competent jurisdiction with the knowledge and approval of the department. A copy of the signed relinquishment shall be given to the parent.
  3. A voluntary relinquishment may be withdrawn within 10 days after it is signed. The relinquishment is invalid unless the relinquishment contains the right of withdrawal as specified under this subsection.
  4. A parent may retain privileges with respect to the child, including the ability to have future contact, communication, and visitation with the child in a voluntary relinquishment executed under this section. A retained privilege must be in writing and stated with specificity.
  5. Not less than 10 days after a voluntary relinquishment is signed, the court shall enter an order terminating parental rights if the court determines that termination of parental rights under the terms of the relinquishment is in the child’s best interest. If a parent has retained one or more privileges under (d) of this section, the court shall incorporate the retained privileges in the termination order with a recommendation that the retained privileges be incorporated in an adoption or legal guardianship decree.
  6. A voluntary relinquishment may not be withdrawn and a termination order may not be vacated on the ground that a retained privilege has been withheld from the relinquishing parent or that the relinquishing parent has been unable, for any reason, to act on a retained privilege, except as provided in Rule 60(b), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.
  7. After a termination order is entered, a person who has voluntarily relinquished parental rights under this section may request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to seek enforcement or modification of or to vacate a privilege retained in the termination order. The court may modify, enforce, or vacate the retained privilege if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.
  8. After a termination order is entered and before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree, a person who voluntarily relinquished parental rights to a child under this section may request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to vacate the termination order and reinstate parental rights relating to that child. A court shall vacate a termination order if the person shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that reinstatement of parental rights is in the best interest of the child and that the person is rehabilitated and capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child.
  9. A person who relinquished parental rights is entitled to the appointment of an attorney if a hearing is requested under (g), (h), or (j) of this section to the same extent as if the parent’s rights had not been terminated in a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding.
  10. After a termination order is entered and before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree, a prospective adoptive parent or a guardian of a child who is the subject of the adoption or guardianship decree may request, after providing notice as specified under this subsection, that the court decline to incorporate a privilege retained in a termination order and recommended for incorporation in an adoption or guardianship decree under (e) of this section. The request made under this subsection may only be considered by the court after providing at least 20 days’ notice by certified mail to the last known address of the person who has voluntarily relinquished parental rights to the child. The notice under this subsection must describe the request and explain that the recipient of the notice may submit a written statement under penalty of perjury to the court that the recipient either agrees with or opposes the request. The notice must also include the deadline for submitting the statement and the mailing address of the court. The court may decline to incorporate a retained privilege if the person who retained the privilege agrees with the request or if the court finds that it is in the child’s best interest.

History. (§ 17 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For the text of the amendment of Rule 18(d)(1), Child in Need of Aid Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with this section, see § 54, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of the amendment of Rule 9(g), Alaska Adoption Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with (h) of this section relating to voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see § 57, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of the amendment of Rule 13(a), Alaska Adoption Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with (e) of this section relating to the content of the court decree and findings supporting a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see § 58, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 60(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rules 9 and 13, Alaska Adoption Rules, by requiring retained privileges to be set out in the relinquishment form and order and by providing additional procedures related to the relinquishment. Section 60(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rule 13, Alaska Adoption Rules, by authorizing review hearings for voluntary relinquishments. Section 60(e), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rule 18, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by providing that a relinquishment be in writing, allowing for the withdrawal of the relinquishment, allowing for the retention of certain privileges, and authorizing a review hearing before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree.

Notes to Decisions

Denial of review hearing on termination of parental rights held proper. —

Denial of a mother’s request for a review hearing to rescind the termination of her parental rights was appropriate under subsection (h) because the mother repeatedly tested positive for cocaine and opiates, failed to complete rehabilitation programs, and failed to overcome her substance abuse problem despite a few recent short-term positive steps. Lara S. v. State, 209 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2009).

Application to reinstatement hearing. —

Standards in this section were applicable to hearings on the reinstatement of parental rights. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Withdrawal of relinquishment. —

It was reasonable for the superior court to conclude that the failure of the adoptive placement did not entitle a mother to be permitted to withdraw her relinquishment based solely on a best interests determination because the relinquishment expressly acknowledged that the adoption could fail as a result of a negative home study or the grandmother's inability to care for the child; the relinquishment was unconditional, and only retained a privilege to be notified if the adoption fell through. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).

Late notice of withdrawal. —

Even assuming the superior court had the discretion to accept a mother's late notice to withdraw a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, its refusal to do so was not an abuse of discretion because its findings comported with the statute and the relinquishment's language. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).

Reinstatement of parental rights. — Because the disputed factual findings supporting the best interests determination were not material or not clearly erroneous, the decision granting a mother reinstatement of her parental rights had to be affirmed; the superior court made findings about the child's age, his attachment to caregivers, his opportunities to maintain visitation with those to whom he was bonded, the safety, security, and stability of the mother's home, and the necessity of moving the child from his placement. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because it was not clearly erroneous to find that the mother and her sister were similarly situated with respect to their bonds with the child, who had lived with the sister; over two years passed between the initial reinstatement order and the superior court's supplemental findings, and the superior court most heavily weighed the child's emotional well-being, namely his ability to maintain all familial bonds. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because there was some support in the record for its finding that the child wanted to live with the mother; the superior court was entitled to, and did, discount the credibility of both a clinical psychologist and the caseworker. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).

Standing. —

Supreme court did not consider a mother's argument that termination of her parental rights was not in the child's best interests because by filing the relinquishment the mother voluntarily removed herself from child in need of aid proceedings relating to the child; unless and until the mother was able to resume participation in the proceedings by withdrawing or voiding her relinquishment, she had no standing to bring such a challenge. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 47.10.090. Court records.

  1. The court shall make and keep records of all cases brought before it.
  2. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  3. Within 30 days after the date of a child’s 18th birthday or, if the court retains jurisdiction of a child past the child’s 18th birthday, within 30 days after the date on which the court releases jurisdiction over the child, the court shall order all the court’s official records pertaining to that child in a proceeding under this chapter sealed. A person may not use these sealed records unless authorized by order of the court upon a finding of good cause.
  4. The name or picture of a child under the jurisdiction of the court may not be made public in connection with the child’s status as a child in need of aid unless authorized by order of the court or unless to implement the permanency plan for a child after all parental rights of custody have been terminated. This subsection does not prohibit the release of aggregate information for statistical or other informational purposes if the identity of any particular person is not revealed by the release.
  5. The court’s official records under this chapter may be inspected only with the court’s permission and only by persons having a legitimate interest in them. A foster parent is considered to have a legitimate interest in those portions of the court’s records relating to a child who is placed by the department with the foster parent or who the department proposes for placement with the foster parent.

History. (§ 10(3)(4) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 124 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 90 SLA 1975; am § 20 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 4 ch 130 SLA 1988; am § 56 ch 50 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 98 SLA 1994; am § 12 ch 113 SLA 1994; am §§ 29 — 31, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 34 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 18, 19 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For similar provisions related to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.300 .

For effect of the 1998 amendment to subsection (e) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 78, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the text of the amendment of Rule 22(c), Child in Need of Aid Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with the 2005 amendment of (d) of this section, see § 55, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted reference to “child” for reference to “minor” throughout subsections (c) and (d); in subsection (c) substituted “unless authorized by order of the court upon a finding of good cause” for “for any purpose except that the court may order their use for good cause shown” at the end of the subsection; and in subsection (d) added the language beginning “or unless” to the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 61(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of (d) of this section has “the effect of changing Rule 22, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by allowing the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to a child, including a child’s name or picture to be made public in certain circumstances.”

Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments of (c) and (d) of this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”

Notes to Decisions

Purpose for enacting subsection (a). —

Reading this section together with other sections of the laws relating to children’s proceedings leads one to believe that subsection (a) was enacted principally for the purpose of protecting the child against the possible adverse effects an unauthorized revelation of his social record would have. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).

There is no indication that subsection (a) was intended to authorize the granting of testimonial use immunity to parents. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).

The supreme court could not say with certainty that this section would be construed to forbid the use, in a subsequent criminal action against a parent, of testimony that the parent gave at a children’s proceeding. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).

Confidentiality policy. —

The policy of confidentiality in Child in Need of Aid proceedings is not absolute. The court has discretion to disclose records in CINA proceedings under subsection (a) [as that subsection read before its amendment by § 12, ch. 113 SLA 1994]. Clifton v. State, 758 P.2d 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).

Cited in

C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).

Sec. 47.10.092. Disclosure to certain public officials and employees.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 47.10.090 and 47.10.093 , a parent or legal guardian of a child subject to a proceeding under AS 47.10.005 47.10.142 may disclose confidential or privileged information about the child or the child’s family, including information that has been lawfully obtained from agency or court files, to the governor, the lieutenant governor, a legislator, the ombudsman appointed under AS 24.55, the attorney general, and the commissioner of health and social services, administration, or public safety, or an employee of these persons, for review or use in their official capacities. The Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration shall disclose additional confidential or privileged information, excluding privileged attorney-client information, and make copies of documents available for inspection about the child or the child’s family to these state officials or employees for review or use in their official capacities upon request of the official or employee and submission of satisfactory evidence that a parent or legal guardian of the child has requested the state official’s assistance in the case as part of the official’s duties. A person to whom disclosure is made under this section may not disclose confidential or privileged information about the child or the child’s family to a person not authorized to receive it.
  2. The disclosure right under (a) of this section is in addition to, and not in derogation of, the rights of a parent or legal guardian of a minor.
  3. The obligations under (a) of this section remain in effect throughout the period that the child is in the custody of the department, including after the parent’s parental rights have been terminated with respect to the child, unless the child’s parent or legal guardian who made the disclosure under (a) of this section subsequently files a notice with the Department of Health and Social Services that the assistance of the state official or employee is no longer requested.
  4. The Department of Health and Social Services shall notify an official identified under (a) of this section of the opportunity for a parent to file a grievance under AS 47.10.098 when the official is denied access to all or part of a requested record.
  5. Each department shall respond to a request made by an official identified under (a) of this section within five working days after receiving the request, or by a later date specified in the request, by providing access to all or part of the information requested or by providing the specific citation to a federal or state law that prohibits disclosure of all or part of the information requested.
  6. A person who discloses confidential or privileged information in violation of (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.

History. (§ 2 ch 98 SLA 1994; am § 50 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 64 SLA 1997; am § 35 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 20, 21 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 4 ch 38 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (c) and (d) were enacted as (d) and (e) and relettered in 2005, at which time former subsection (c) was relettered as subsection (e). Subsection (e) was enacted as (f) and relettered in 2006, at which time former (e) was relettered as (f).

Cross references. —

For effect of the 1998 amendment to subsection (a) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 78, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For similar provisions related to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.320 .

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) made a stylistic change in the first sentence and, in the second sentence, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration” for “department” and inserted “, excluding privileged attorney-client information,”; and added subsections (d) and (e) [now (c) and (d)].

The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, added subsection (f) [now (e)].

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “discloses confidential or privileged information in violation of (a)” for “violates a provision” in subsection (f).

Editor’s notes. —

In connection with the 1998 amendment to subsection (a), § 81, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “TRANSITIONAL PROVISION; DISCLOSURE OF AGENCY RECORDS. (a) The Department of Health and Social Services may disclose information and make copies of documents available to state officials or employees as authorized under AS 47.10.092(a) , as amended by sec. 35 of this Act, based on an appropriate request that was received before, on, or after September 14, 1998.

“(b) The Department of Health and Social Services, a parent, or a legal guardian may disclose information as authorized under AS 47.10.092(a) , as amended by sec. 35 of this Act, regardless of when the information came into the possession or knowledge of the department, parent, or legal guardian and regardless of when the conduct or situation described in the information occurred.”

Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

B.S. v. State (In re C.A.S.), 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994).

Sec. 47.10.093. Disclosure of agency records.

  1. Except as permitted in AS 47.10.092 , (b) — (g) and (i) — (l) of this section, and AS 47.17.030(g) , all information and social records pertaining to a child who is subject to this chapter or AS 47.17 prepared by or in the possession of a federal, state, or municipal agency or employee in the discharge of the agency’s or employee’s official duty are privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone without a court order.
  2. A state or municipal agency or employee shall disclose appropriate confidential information regarding a case to
    1. a guardian ad litem appointed by the court;
    2. a person or an agency requested by the department or the child’s legal custodian to provide consultation or services for a child who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 as necessary to enable the provision of the consultation or services;
    3. an out-of-home care provider as necessary to enable the out-of-home care provider to provide appropriate care to the child, to protect the safety of the child, and to protect the safety and property of family members and visitors of the out-of-home care provider;
    4. a school official as necessary to enable the school to provide appropriate counseling and support services to a child who is the subject of the case, to protect the safety of the child, and to protect the safety of school students and staff;
    5. a governmental agency as necessary to obtain that agency’s assistance for the department in its investigation or to obtain physical custody of a child;
    6. a law enforcement agency of this state or another jurisdiction as necessary for the protection of any child or for actions by that agency to protect the public safety;
    7. a member of a multidisciplinary child protection team created under AS 47.14.300 as necessary for the performance of the member’s duties;
    8. the state medical examiner under AS 12.65 as necessary for the performance of the duties of the state medical examiner;
    9. a person who has made a report of harm as required by AS 47.17.020 to inform the person that the investigation was completed and of action taken to protect the child who was the subject of the report;
    10. the child support services agency established in AS 25.27.010 as necessary to establish and collect child support for a child who is a child in need of aid under this chapter;
    11. a parent, guardian, or caregiver of a child or an entity responsible for ensuring the safety of children as necessary to protect the safety of a child;
    12. a review panel, including a variance committee established under AS 47.05.360 , established by the department for the purpose of reviewing the actions taken by the department in a specific case;
    13. the University of Alaska under the Alaska higher education savings program for children established under AS 47.14.400 , but only to the extent that the information is necessary to support the program and only if the information released is maintained as a confidential record by the University of Alaska;
    14. a child placement agency licensed under AS 47.32 as necessary to provide services for a child who is the subject of the case;
    15. a state or municipal agency of this state or another jurisdiction that is responsible for delinquent minors, as may be necessary for the administration of services, protection, rehabilitation, or supervision of a child or for actions by the agency to protect the public safety; however, a court may review an objection made to a disclosure under this paragraph; the person objecting to the disclosure bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure is not in the child’s best interest; and
    16. a sibling of a child who is the subject of the case to allow the siblings to contact each other if it is in the best interests of the child to maintain contact; in this paragraph, “sibling” means an adult or minor who is related to the child who is the subject of the case by blood, adoption, or marriage as a child of one or both of the parents of the child who is the subject of the case; a sibling who is adopted by a person other than the parent of the child who is the subject of the case remains a sibling of the child.
  3. A state or municipal law enforcement agency shall disclose information regarding a case that is needed by the person or agency charged with making a preliminary investigation for the information of the court under AS 47.10.020 .
  4. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  5. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  6. The department may release to a person with a legitimate interest confidential information relating to children not subject to the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 .
  7. The department and affected law enforcement agencies shall work with school districts and private schools to develop procedures for the disclosure of confidential information to a school official under (b)(4) of this section. The procedures must provide a method for informing the principal or the principal’s designee of the school that the student attends as soon as it is reasonably practicable.
  8. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
  9. The commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee or the commissioner of administration or the commissioner’s designee, as appropriate, may disclose to the public, upon request, confidential information, as set out in (j) of this section, when
    1. the parent or guardian of a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17 has made a public disclosure concerning the department’s involvement with the family;
    2. the alleged perpetrator named in one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17 has been charged with a crime concerning the alleged abuse or neglect; or
    3. abuse or neglect has resulted in the fatality or near fatality of a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17.
  10. The department may publicly disclose information pertaining to a child or an alleged perpetrator named in a report of harm described under (i) of this section, or pertaining to a household member of the child or the alleged perpetrator, if the information relates to a determination, if any, made by the department regarding the nature and validity of a report of harm under AS 47.17 or to the department’s activities arising from the department’s investigation of the report. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee
    1. shall withhold disclosure of the child’s name, picture, or other information that would readily lead to the identification of the child if the department determines that the disclosure would be contrary to the best interests of the child, the child’s siblings, or other children in the child’s household; or
    2. after consultation with a prosecuting attorney, shall withhold disclosure of information that would reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal investigation or proceeding or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding.
  11. Except for a disclosure made under (i) of this section, a person to whom disclosure is made under this section may not disclose confidential information about the child or the child’s family to a person not authorized to receive it.
  12. The Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration shall adopt regulations to implement and interpret the duties of the respective department under this section, including regulations governing the release of confidential information and identifying a sufficient legitimate interest under (f) of this section.
  13. A person may not bring an action for damages against the state, the commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee based on the disclosure or nondisclosure of information under (i) of this section except for civil damages resulting from gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct.
  14. A person who discloses confidential information in violation of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
  15. In this section, “school” means a public or private elementary or secondary school.

History. (§ 13 ch 113 SLA 1994; am §§ 1, 2 ch 32 SLA 1995; am §§ 32 — 34, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 4 ch 94 SLA 1997; am § 36 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 69 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 31 ch 99 SLA 2004; am §§ 22 — 27 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 5, 6 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 2 ch 58 SLA 2007; am § 1 ch 38 SLA 2012; am § 15 ch 69 SLA 2018; am §§ 11, 12 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

A reference to “AS 47.10.092 ” was inserted in (a) of this section in 1994 to harmonize the amendments to AS 47.10 made by ch. 98, SLA 1994, and ch. 113, SLA 1994.

Subsections (g) and former (h) were enacted as (h) and (i), respectively. Relettered in 1995, at which time former subsection (g) was relettered as (i) and the internal reference in (a) was conformed.

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Subsections (i) — (m) were enacted as (k) — (o) and relettered in 2005, at which time former subsections (i) and (j) were relettered as subsections (n) and (o) and internal references in subsections (a), (i), (j), (k), and (m) were conformed.

In 2007, in (b)(13) of this section, “AS 47.14.400 ” was substituted for “AS 47.05.400” to reflect the 2007 renumbering on enactment of AS 47.05.400.

Cross references. —

For similar provisions relating to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.310 .

For provision relating to applicability of paragraph (b)(16), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, deleted “or to a citizen review board or local review panel for permanency planning authorized by AS 47.14.200 or 47.14.220 ” from the end of paragraph (b)(1).

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, substituted “(b)(4)” for “(b)(3)” in the first sentence of subsection (g).

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) substituted “permitted” for “specified,” updated subsection references, and substituted “child” for “minor”; in subsection (b) added paragraphs (11) and (12) and otherwise rewrote the subsection; rewrote subsection (c); in subsection (f) inserted “confidential”, substituted “children” for “minors”, and deleted the last sentence; in subsection (g) inserted “confidential” and made stylistic changes; and added subsections (k) — (o) [now (i) — (m)].

The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, substituted “one or more reports” for “a report” in paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2), substituted “abuse or neglect” for “a report of harm under AS 47.17” and “a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17” for “that child” in paragraph (i)(3), and rewrote subsection (j).

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraph (b)(13), and made related changes.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, added (b)(14) and (b)(15).

The first 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (a), substituted “in AS 47.10.092 , (b) — (g) and (i) — ( l ) of this section, and AS 47.17.030(g) ,” for “in AS 47.10.092 and in (b) — (g) and (i) — ( l ) of this section,”; added (b)(16), and made related changes.

The second 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in (b)(12), inserted “including a variance committee established under AS 47.05.360 ,” following “a review panel”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 61(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendments of this section have “the effect of changing Rule 22, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, by allowing the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to a child, including a child’s name or picture to be made public in certain circumstances.”

Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”

Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”

Opinions of attorney general. —

For discussion of the question of the public release of law enforcement records related to juveniles as affected by this section, see 1994 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (November 25, 1994).

Sec. 47.10.095. Arrest of a minor. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.200.]

Sec. 47.10.097. Fingerprinting of minors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.210.]

Sec. 47.10.098. Grievance procedure.

  1. The department shall develop, in regulation, a grievance procedure for a parent to file a complaint based on
    1. the application of a department policy or procedure under this chapter;
    2. compliance with this chapter or a regulation adopted under this chapter; or
    3. an act or failure to act by the department under this chapter.
  2. The department shall prepare and distribute to each parent of a child who is under the jurisdiction of the department a written copy of the grievance procedure developed under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 28 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54.245 — 7 AAC 54.260.

For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54, art. 2.

Sec. 47.10.100. Retention of jurisdiction over child.

  1. The court retains jurisdiction over the case and may at any time stay execution, modify, set aside, revoke, or enlarge a judgment or order, or grant a new hearing, in the exercise of its power of protection over the child and for the child’s best interest, for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event extend past the day the child reaches 19 years of age, unless sooner discharged by the court, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. An application for any of these purposes may be made by the parent, guardian, or custodian acting in behalf of the child, or the court may, on its own motion, and after reasonable notice to interested parties and the appropriate department, take action that it considers appropriate.
  2. If the court determines at a hearing authorized by (a) of this section that the department has complied with the requirements for release of a child under AS 47.14.100(q) and that it is in the best interests of the child to be released to the child’s own custody, or to the care or custody of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, it shall enter an order to that effect and the child is discharged from the control of the department.
  3. If a child is adjudicated a child in need of aid before the child’s 18th birthday, the court may retain jurisdiction over the child after the child’s 18th birthday for the purpose of supervising the child, but the court’s jurisdiction over the minor under this chapter never extends beyond the child’s 19th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. The department may retain jurisdiction over a child if the child has been placed in the custody or under the supervision of the department before the child’s 18th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it.

History. (§ 11 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am §§ 16, 17 ch 245 SLA 1970; am § 21 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 35, 36 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 59 SLA 2012)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective September 9, 2012, substituted “child” for “minor”, or similar, throughout; in (a), substituted “child reaches 19 years of age” for “minor becomes 19”, inserted “custody or” preceding “supervision” in two places, added “years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday” following “supervision past 19”; in (b), inserted “the department has complied with the requirements for release of a child under AS 47.14.100(q) and that” following “(a) of this section that”; in (c), twice substituted “period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision” for “period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision”, deleted “between the child’s 18th and 19th birthdays for the purpose of supervising the child,” following “The department may retain jurisdiction over a child”.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.160 .

Family placement disallowed. —

Trial court did not err in upholding the office of children’s services’ decision not to place the child with her great-grandmother, as the great-grandmother’s home was unsafe and she was unable to provide the necessary care for the child’s special needs. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).

Quoted in

In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).

Stated in

Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018).

Collateral references. —

Right of parent to regain custody of child after temporary conditional relinquishment of custody. 35 ALR4th 61.

Sec. 47.10.110. Appointment of guardian or custodian.

When, in the course of a proceeding under this chapter, it appears to the court that the welfare of a minor will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian or custodian of the minor’s person, the court may make the appointment. The court shall have a summons issued and served upon the parents of the minor, if they can be found, in a manner and within a time before the hearing that the court considers reasonable. The court may determine whether the father, mother, another suitable person, or the department shall have the custody and control of the minor. If the minor is of sufficient age and intelligence to state desires, the court shall consider them.

History. (§ 12 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 22 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 37 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

Relation to pre-existing CINA action. —

When there exists an ongoing child in need of aid (CINA) proceeding, any attempts to appoint a guardian, whether filed pursuant to this section or AS 13.26.101 et seq., must be considered and treated, in all respects, as part of the original CINA case. Father’s right to disqualify a judge was not reinvigorated by the act of raising a guardianship issue in a CINA case, and his participation in the original case without objection to the trial judge waived his right to make a subsequent challenge. Terry S. v. State, 168 P.3d 489 (Alaska 2007).

Termination of parental rights. —

Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests or otherwise err in its consideration of a possible guardianship because it considered the evidence and the children's specific needs and implicitly considered guardianship as an option in its termination order; the superior court wrote detailed factual findings regarding the Office of Children's Services' long history with the children. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).

Stated in

C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).

Collateral references. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 19 et seq.

39 C.J.S., Guardian and Ward, §§ 28-35.

Right of infant to select his own guardian. 85 ALR2d 921.

Sec. 47.10.111. Petition for adoption or guardianship of a child in state custody.

  1. Except as provided under AS 13.26.137(b)(2) and AS 25.23.030(d)(2) , if a person seeks adoption or appointment as legal guardian of a child in state custody under this chapter, the court shall hear the adoption or guardianship proceedings as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child. A person may initiate proceedings for the adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under this chapter by filing with the court a petition
    1. for adoption that meets the requirements of AS 25.23.080 ; or
    2. to be appointed legal guardian that meets the requirements of AS 13.26.147 .
  2. If a person files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under (a) of this section before the court approves adoption or legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l)(2) , the court shall hold the petition in abeyance until after the court has approved adoption or legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) .
  3. If a person files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the child is not placed with the person who files the petition at the time the person files the petition, the department shall, not more than 60 days after the petition is filed, submit a permanent plan to the court. The court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) not more than 90 days after the petition is filed.
  4. A person who files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section does not become a party to the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings. A person who files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section may only participate in proceedings under this chapter that concern the person’s petition.
  5. A parent who has consented to adoption under AS 25.23.060 , who has relinquished parental rights under AS 47.10.089 , or whose parental rights have been terminated under AS 47.10.080(o) or 47.10.088 , is not a party to the adoption or guardianship proceedings under this section.
  6. Except as provided in this section, the requirements of AS 25.23 apply to a petition for adoption filed under this section, and the requirements of AS 13.26.101 13.26.186 apply to a petition for legal guardianship filed under this section.

History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, cross references to renumbered sections in subsections (a) and (f) were conformed.

Cross references. —

For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.

Effective dates. —

Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on January 1, 2017.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''

Sec. 47.10.112. Proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship.

  1. A person seeking the immediate permanent placement of a child in state custody under this chapter may file a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of the child. The court shall hear proceedings related to the proxy as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child. In the case of an Indian child, a proxy for a formal petition for
    1. adoption preserves the placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) with respect to the person who files the proxy; and
    2. legal guardianship preserves the placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. 1915(b) with respect to the person who files the proxy.
  2. A proxy filed under this section does not initiate proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship. A person seeking to adopt a child in state custody must file a petition for adoption as required under AS 25.23. A person seeking to be appointed legal guardian of a child in state custody must file a petition for appointment as required under AS 13.26.101 13.26.186 .
  3. If a person files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the child is not placed with the person who files the proxy at the time the person files the proxy, the department shall, not more than 60 days after the proxy is filed, submit a permanent plan to the court. The court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) not more than 90 days after the proxy is filed.
  4. A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section does not become a party to the child-in- need-of-aid proceedings. A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship may only participate in proceedings under this chapter that concern the person’s proxy.
  5. A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child is not entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at public expense.
  6. A person who receives a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship shall file the proxy with the court.
  7. The department may adopt regulations to implement this section.
  8. In this section,
    1. “extended family member”
      1. means a person who is at least 18 years of age and who is the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, sibling, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, niece, nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent; or
      2. in the case of an Indian child, has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
    2. “proxy for a formal petition” or “proxy” means
      1. a request by a person who is interested in immediate permanent placement and adoption or legal guardianship of a child, and is an extended family member, member of an Indian child’s tribe, or other Indian family member, made at any court hearing or conveyed to the department by telephone, mail, facsimile, electronic mail, or in person;
      2. in the case of an Indian child, a request made to the department on behalf of a person described in (A) of this paragraph by
      3. a proxy for a formal petition, as established by the department by regulation.
  9. the Indian child’s biological parent, individually or through counsel; or

(ii) the Indian child’s tribe, a tribe in which the Indian child is eligible for enrollment, or a tribe in which the Indian child’s biological parent is a member; or

History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, in subsection (b) "AS 13.26.101 13.26.186 '' was substituted for "AS 13.26.030 — 13.26.085'' to reflect the renumbering of those sections.

Cross references. —

For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.

Effective dates. —

Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect January 1, 2017.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''

Sec. 47.10.113. Civil custody proceedings.

  1. Except as provided in AS 25.24.150(a) , a court shall hear a request to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child.
  2. A person who files a request for an order to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter is not entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at public expense under this section.
  3. Except as provided in this section, the requirements of AS 25.24.010 25.24.180 apply to a request under this section to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter.

History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.

Effective dates. —

Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect January 1, 2017.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.10.115. Permanent fund dividend.

  1. The department shall annually apply for a permanent fund dividend and retain in trust under AS 43.23.015(e) for the benefit of the child the dividend and accrued interest on the dividend if the child is in the custody of the department when the application is due.
  2. The department shall distribute the proceeds of a trust under this section
    1. to the child when the child
      1. has reached 21 years of age; or
      2. is no longer in the custody of the department and has reached at least 18 years of age or is emancipated; or
    2. when
  3. [Repealed, § 14 ch 7 4SSLA 2016.]

ordered to do so by the court in the best interest of the child.

History. (§ 7 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 30 ch 53 SLA 2008; am §§ 7, 14 ch 7 4SSLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, rewrote (b); repealed (c).

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012).

Sec. 47.10.120. Support of child.

  1. When a child in need of aid is committed under this chapter, the court or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 shall, after giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, require that the parent pay to the department in a manner that the court or the child support services agency directs a sum to cover in full or in part the maintenance and care of the child. The support obligation shall be calculated under Rule 90.3(i) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. If a parent wilfully fails or refuses to pay the sum fixed, the parent may be proceeded against as provided by law in cases of family desertion and nonsupport.
  3. The sum collected from a parent under this section shall be directly credited to the general fund of the state.
  4. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]

History. (§ 13 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 31 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 141 SLA 1959; am § 23 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 88, 89 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am § 38 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 38 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, inserted “or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” and “or the child support services agency” in the first sentence of subsection (a), and substituted “require” for “adjudge” in that sentence.

Notes to Decisions

Support of minor until 19 years old. —

This section imposes a duty of support on the parents of an institutionalized “delinquent minor” and under AS 47.10.080 (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1), and (c)(2) and AS 47.10.100(a) and (c) an institutionalized delinquent is a “minor” until the delinquent becomes 19. In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.080 and 47.10.100 ).

Cited in

In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991).

Sec. 47.10.130. Detention. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.240.]

Sec. 47.10.140. Temporary detention and detention hearing. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.250.]

Sec. 47.10.141. Runaway and missing minors.

  1. Upon receiving a written, telephonic, or other request to locate a minor evading the minor’s legal custodian or to locate a minor otherwise missing, a law enforcement agency shall make reasonable efforts to locate the minor and shall immediately complete a missing person’s report containing information necessary for the identification of the minor.  As soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after completing the report, the agency shall transmit the report for entry into the Alaska Public Safety Information Network and the National Crime Information Center computer system. The report shall also be submitted to the missing persons information clearinghouse under AS 18.65.620 . As soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after the agency learns that the minor has been located, it shall request that the Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation remove the information from the computer systems.
  2. A peace officer shall take into protective custody a minor described in (a) of this section if the minor is not otherwise subject to arrest or detention. Unless (c) of this section applies, when a peace officer takes a minor into protective custody under this subsection,
    1. the peace officer shall
      1. return the minor to the minor’s parent or guardian at the parent’s or guardian’s residence if the residence is in the same community where the minor was found and if the minor’s parent or guardian consents to the return, except that the officer may not use this option if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has experienced physical or sexual abuse in the parent’s or guardian’s household;
      2. take the minor to a nearby location agreed to by the minor’s parent or guardian if the parent or guardian does not consent to return of the minor under (A) of this paragraph and the officer does not have reasonable cause to believe that the minor has experienced physical or sexual abuse in the parent’s or guardian’s household; or
      3. if disposition of the minor is not made under (A) or (B) of this paragraph, take the minor to
        1. an office specified by the Department of Health and Social Services;
        2. a program for runaway minors licensed by the department under AS 47.10.310 ;
        3. a shelter for runaways that has a permit from the department under AS 47.32 that agrees to shelter the minor;
        4. a facility or contract agency of the department; or
        5. another suitable location and promptly notify the department if an office specified by the department, a licensed program for runaway minors, a shelter for runaways that will accept the minor, or a facility or contract agency of the department does not exist in the community;
    2. if the peace officer plans to take the minor to an office, program, shelter, or facility under (1)(C) of this subsection, the peace officer shall give the highest priority to taking the minor to an office, program, shelter, or facility that is semi-secure;
    3. a minor under protective custody may not be housed in a jail or other detention facility but may be housed in a semi-secure portion of an office, program, shelter, or other facility under (1)(C) of this subsection;
    4. the peace officer, immediately upon taking a minor into protective custody, shall
      1. advise the minor of available mediation services and of the right to social services under AS 47.10.142(b) ; and
      2. if the identity of the minor’s parent or guardian is known, advise the minor’s parent or guardian that the minor has been taken into protective custody and that counseling services for the minor’s parent or guardian and the minor’s household may be available under AS 47.10.142(b) .
  3. A minor may be taken into emergency protective custody by a peace officer and placed into temporary detention in a juvenile detention facility in the local community if there has been an order issued by a court under (j) of this section. A minor detained under this subsection shall be brought before a court on the day the minor is detained, or if that is not possible, within 24 hours after the detention for a hearing to determine the most appropriate placement in the best interests of the minor. A minor taken into emergency protective custody under this subsection may not be detained for more than 24 hours, except as provided under (j) of this section. Emergency protective custody may not include placement of a minor in an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area, nor may an order for protective custody be enforced against a minor who is residing in a licensed program for runaway minors, as defined in AS 47.10.390 .
  4. If, after investigation of a report of a missing minor, a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that the minor is involuntarily absent from the custody of a custodial parent or guardian, the department shall notify the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the disappearance and shall provide the bureau with a description of the minor. The description of the minor must include, if known, the minor’s full name, date and place of birth, parent’s names, and mother’s maiden name. If the Department of Public Safety has reason to believe that the minor, whether born in this state or not, has been enrolled in a specific school or school district in the state, the department shall also notify the last known school or school district attended in the state by the missing minor of the disappearance. When a person who was listed as a missing minor is found, the Department of Public Safety shall notify the Bureau of Vital Statistics and any school or school district previously informed of the person’s disappearance.
  5. In the absence of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, an office, program, shelter, or facility, or an employee of an office, program, shelter, or facility, to which a minor is taken by a peace officer for semi-secure custody is not subject to civil or criminal liability based on the minor’s leaving the office, program, shelter, or facility without permission unless the office, program, shelter, or facility is not in compliance with the department’s regulations that set standards for semi-security and the lack of compliance was a material factor in the minor’s being able to leave without permission.
  6. If a child, without permission, leaves the semi-secure portion of an office, program, shelter, or facility to which the child was taken by a peace officer under (b)(1)(C) of this section, the office, program, shelter, or facility shall immediately notify the department and the nearest law enforcement agency of the identity of the child and the child’s absence. If the same child is again taken into protective custody under (b) of this section and the peace officer knows that the child has previously been reported under this subsection as missing from a semi-secure placement, the peace officer, in addition to taking the appropriate action under (b) of this section, shall report the circumstances and the identity of the child to the department. Within 48 hours after receiving this report, the department shall determine whether to file a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 . If the department decides not to file a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid, the department shall, within seven state working days after receiving the report from the peace officer under this subsection, send to the child’s parents or guardian, as applicable, written notice of its determination not to proceed with the petition, including the reasons on which the determination was based. If the department is unable to obtain a reasonably reliable address for a parent or guardian, the department shall keep a copy of the notice on file and, notwithstanding AS 47.10.093 , release the notice to the child’s parent or guardian on request of the parent or guardian. If the department files a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid, the court shall proceed under AS 47.10.142(d) .
  7. If the department files a petition alleging the child is a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (5) because the child is habitually absent from home or refuses available care, the child’s parent or guardian shall attend each hearing held during the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings unless the court excuses the parent or guardian from attendance for good cause. If the child is found to be a child in need of aid, the court may order that the
    1. child participate in treatment;
    2. parent or guardian personally participate in treatment reasonably available in the parent or guardian’s community as specified in a plan set out in the court order; and
    3. child and the parent or guardian comply with other conditions set out in the court order.
  8. If the court orders a minor’s parent or guardian to participate in the treatment under (g) of this section, the court may also order the parent or guardian to use available insurance or another resource to cover the treatment, or to pay for the treatment if other coverage is unavailable.
  9. If the parent or guardian fails to attend a hearing as required by the court under (g) of this section, the hearing shall proceed without the presence of the parent.
  10. The court shall issue a written order if the court determines that a minor shall be placed in a juvenile detention facility as a result of violating a court order issued under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or 47.10.142(f) . An order issued under this subsection
    1. must include a finding of probable cause that the minor is a runaway in wilful violation of a court order and identify the court order the minor has violated;
    2. must specify the factual basis for determining that there is reasonable cause to believe that the minor has violated a court order;
    3. must describe how the minor’s current situation poses a severe and imminent risk to the minor’s life or safety;
    4. must include findings of fact to support a determination that there is not an appropriate, less restrictive alternative to placing the minor in a juvenile detention facility available, with due consideration to the best interests of the minor;
    5. must include a plan for the minor’s release from the juvenile detention facility in the least amount of time necessary, not to exceed seven days unless otherwise specified by the court; and
    6. may not be renewed or extended.
  11. In this section,
    1. “law enforcement agency” has the meaning given in AS 12.36.090 ;
    2. “semi-secure” means operated according to standards that may be established by the department in regulations that are designed to require a level of security that will reasonably ensure that, if a minor leaves without permission, the minor’s act of leaving will be immediately noticed;
    3. “temporary secure juvenile holding area” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 .

History. (§ 2 ch 42 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 72 SLA 1988; am §§ 1, 2 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 4 ch 202 SLA 1990; am § 13 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 39, 40 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 3 — 6 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 8 SLA 1997; am §§ 37, 38 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 20 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 15 — 17 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, subsection (b) was rewritten to reconcile amendments made by § 39, ch. 59, SLA 1996 and § 3, ch. 120, SLA 1996. Subsections (e)-(i) were enacted as (f)-(j), respectively, and relettered in 1996, at which time former (e) was relettered as (j) and internal references in subsections (f), (h), and (i) were conformed.

Subsection (j) was enacted as (k). Relettered in 2021, at which time former subsection (j) was relettered as subsection (k).

Cross references. —

For records of missing children, see AS 18.50.315 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in item (b)(1)(C)(iii).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (c), in the first sentence substituted “juvenile detention facility” for “juvenile detention home” and “(k) [now (j)] of this section” for “a finding of probable cause that (1) the minor is a runaway in willful violation of a valid court order issued under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) , 47.10.142(f) , AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3), or 47.12.250 (d), (2) the minor’s current situation poses a severe and imminent risk to the minor’s life or safety, and (3) no reasonable placement alternative exists within the community”, in the third sentence substituted “(k) [now (j)] of this section” for “AS 47.12.250 ” at the end, in the fourth sentence, substituted “an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area” for “a jail or a secure facility other than a juvenile detention home”; added (j)(3); added (k) [now (j)].

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999); Estate of Logusak v. City of Togiak, 185 P.3d 103 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 47.10.142. Emergency custody and temporary placement hearing.

  1. The Department of Health and Social Services may take emergency custody of a child upon discovering any of the following circumstances:
    1. the child has been abandoned as abandonment is described in AS 47.10.013 ;
    2. the child has been neglected by the child’s parents or guardian, as “neglect” is described in AS 47.10.014 , and the department determines that immediate removal from the child’s surroundings is necessary to protect the child’s life or provide immediate necessary medical attention;
    3. the child has been subjected to physical harm by a person responsible for the child’s welfare, and the department determines that immediate removal from the child’s surroundings is necessary to protect the child’s life or that immediate medical attention is necessary; or
    4. the child or a sibling has been sexually abused under circumstances listed in AS 47.10.011 (7).
  2. The department shall offer available counseling services to the person having legal custody of a minor described in AS 47.10.141 and to the members of the minor’s household if it determines that counseling services would be appropriate in the situation. If, after assessing the situation, offering available counseling services to the legal custodian and the minor’s household, and furnishing appropriate social services to the minor, the department considers it necessary, the department may take emergency custody of the minor.
  3. When a child is taken into custody under (a) or (b) of this section or when the department is notified of a child’s presence in either a program for runaway children under AS 47.10.300 47.10.390 or a shelter for runaway children under AS 47.10.392 47.10.399 , the department shall immediately, and in no event more than 24 hours later unless prevented by lack of communication facilities, notify the parents or the person or persons having custody of the child. If the department determines that continued custody is necessary to protect the child, the department shall notify the court of the emergency custody by filing, within 24 hours after custody was assumed, a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid. If the department releases the child within 24 hours after taking the child into custody and does not file a child in need of aid petition, the department shall, within 24 hours after releasing the child, file with the court a report explaining why the child was taken into custody, why the child was released, and to whom the child was released.
  4. The court shall immediately, and in no event more than 48 hours after being notified unless prevented by lack of transportation, hold a temporary custody hearing at which the child, if the child’s health permits, and the child’s parents or guardian, if they can be found, shall be permitted to be present. If present at the hearing, a parent or guardian of the child may request a continuance of the hearing for the purpose of preparing a response to the allegation that the child is a child in need of aid. The court may grant the request on a showing of good cause for why the parent or guardian is not prepared to respond to the allegation. During a continuance, the child remains in the temporary legal custody of the department, except as otherwise provided in this subsection. At the first hearing under this subsection, regardless of whether a continuance is granted, the court shall make a preliminary determination of whether continued placement in the home of the child’s parent or guardian would be contrary to the welfare of the child. If a court determines that continued placement in the home of the child’s parent or guardian would not be contrary to the welfare of the child, the court shall return the authority to place the child to the child’s parent or guardian pending a temporary custody hearing under (e) of this section.
  5. When the temporary custody hearing is held, the court shall determine whether probable cause exists for believing the child to be a child in need of aid, as defined in AS 47.10.990 . If the court finds that probable cause exists, it shall order the child committed to the department for temporary placement, or order the child returned to the custody of the child’s parents or guardian, subject to the department’s supervision of the child’s care and treatment. The court shall inform the child, and the child’s parents or guardian if they can be found, of the reasons for finding probable cause, authorizing the child’s temporary placement, and, if applicable, finding that continued placement in the home of the child’s parents or guardian would be contrary to the welfare of the child. If the court finds no probable cause, it shall order the child returned to the custody of the child’s parents or guardian.
  6. When a minor is committed to the department for temporary placement under (e) of this section, the court order shall specify the terms, conditions, and duration of placement. If the court orders the minor returned to the custody of the minor’s parents or guardian under (e) of this section after a hearing held on a petition filed under AS 47.10.141(f) , the court shall specify the terms and conditions that must be followed by the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian. The court shall require the minor to remain in the placement provided by the department and shall clearly state in the order the consequences of violating the order, including detention under AS 47.10.141(c) .
  7. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
  8. Within 12 months after a child is committed to the department under this section, the court shall review the placement plan and actual placement of the child under AS 47.10.080(l) .
  9. When the department takes emergency custody of a child under this section or a court orders a child committed to the department for temporary placement under this section, the department shall, to the extent feasible and consistent with the best interests of the child, place the child according to the criteria specified under AS 47.14.100(e) . A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible if it is consistent with the best interests of the child.

History. (§ 3 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 24 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 2 ch 104 SLA 1982; am §§ 6, 7 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 6 ch 117 SLA 1990; am §§ 14, 15 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 41, 42 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 7 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 94 SLA 1997; am §§ 39 — 41 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 45 SLA 2000; am § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 1, 2 ch 117 SLA 2004; am § 8 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am § 13 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 1996, in subsection (f), “AS 47.10.141(f) ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.141(g) ” to reflect the 1996 relettering of AS 47.10.141(g) .

Cross references. —

For court rules governing emergency custody and temporary custody hearings, see CINA Rules 6 and 10.

For the effect of the 2000 amendment of (d) of this section on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see sec. 4, ch. 45, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (i), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For administration, see 7 AAC 50, art. 2.

For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, repealed subsection (g).

The 2004 amendment, effective June 30, 2004, rewrote subsections (d) and (e), relating to temporary custody and placement hearings.

The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, added (i).

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (i) added the last two sentences.

Editor's notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsections (a), (c), and (h) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Section 5, ch. 45, SLA 2000 provides that the 2000 amendment to subsection (d) applies to “circumstances in which emergency custody of a child is taken by the state on or after August 9, 2000.”

Section 3, ch. 117, SLA 2004, provides that the 2004 amendment of (d) and (e) of this section applies “to emergency custody and temporary placement hearings under [this chapter] conducted on or after June 30, 2004.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Probable cause. —

In children in need of aid proceedings, probable cause is established where reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person’s belief that the child is in need of aid. In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1998).

No actionable duty in tort. —

In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section was the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).

Dismissal of case. —

In a case in which the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of a mother’s child after receiving reports that the mother’s conduct had placed the child at risk of harm, the superior court did not err by releasing the child from OCS custody and dismissing the case when OCS declined to pursue it. Clementine F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 375 P.3d 39 (Alaska 2016)

Quoted in

D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985); In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991); 909 P.2d 360; Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).

Stated in

Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Superior Court, 462 P.3d 1000 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); R.C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1988); Pam R. v. State, 185 P.3d 67 (Alaska 2008); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Schwier v. Schwier, 446 P.3d 354 (Alaska 2019); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody. 38 ALR4th 756.

Secs. 47.10.150 — 47.10.180. General power, duty, and authority of the department. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.010 — 47.14.050.]

Sec. 47.10.190. Detention of minors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.240(a).]

Sec. 47.10.200. Releasing juveniles after commitment. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.260.]

Sec. 47.10.210. Youth counsellors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.270.]

Sec. 47.10.220. Grants-in-aid. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.10.980 and 47.12.980.]

Secs. 47.10.230 — 47.10.260. Care of children. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.100 — 47.14.130.]

Sec. 47.10.265. Youth courts. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.400.]

Sec. 47.10.270. [Renumbered as AS 47.10.970.]

Sec. 47.10.280. Purpose of chapter. [Repealed, § 1 ch 152 SLA 1976. For current similar provisions, see AS 47.05.060.]

Sec. 47.10.290. [Renumbered as AS 47.10.990.]

Article 2. Programs for Runaway Minors.

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

Sec. 47.10.300. Powers and duties of the department.

The department shall

  1. review, inspect, and approve or disapprove for licensing proposed or established programs for runaway minors to ensure the health and safety of minors in the program;
  2. maintain a register of licensed programs for runaway minors;
  3. award nonprofit corporations or municipalities grants for the establishment or operation of licensed programs for runaway minors;
  4. adopt regulations for the administration of AS 47.10.300 47.10.390 , including regulations providing for the coordination of services to be provided by licensed programs for runaway minors and by the department.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.

For services related to the decision to place a child, see 7 AAC 56, art. 4.

Collateral references. —

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 36.

Sec. 47.10.310. Licensing of programs for runaway minors.

  1. A person may not operate a program for runaway minors in the state without a license issued under this section. A person who violates this subsection is guilty of a violation.
  2. The department may license a program for runaway minors under AS 47.10.300 47.10.390 only if the program
    1. is operated by a corporation or a municipality; and
    2. meets the requirements of (c) of this section.
  3. A program for runaway minors shall
    1. explain to a minor who seeks assistance from the program the legal rights and responsibilities of runaway minors and the services and assistance provided for runaway minors by the program and by the state or local municipality;
    2. upon admission of a minor to the program, attempt to determine why the minor is a runaway and what services may be necessary or appropriate for reuniting the minor with the minor’s family;
    3. provide or help arrange for the provision of services necessary to promote the health and welfare of a minor in the program and, if appropriate, members of the minor’s family; services may include, but are not limited to, the provision of food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and individual, group, or family counseling;
    4. within one state working day after admission of a minor to the program inform the department of a minor in the program
      1. who claims to be the victim of child abuse or neglect, as defined in AS 47.17.290 ;
      2. whom an employee of the program has cause to believe has been a victim of child abuse or neglect; or
      3. whom an employee of the program has reason to believe is evading the supervision of the department, the person to whom the department has entrusted supervision, or the minor’s legal guardian;
    5. be operated with the goal of reuniting runaway minors with their families, except in cases in which reunification is clearly contrary to the best interest of the minor; and
    6. maintain adequate staffing and accommodations to ensure physical security and to provide crisis services to minors residing in a facility operated by the program; a program that, as determined by the department, regularly receives state money in an amount that exceeds one-fourth of the program’s costs shall maintain semi-secure portions of its facilities in a proportion that meets regulations established by the department; residents under 18 years of age shall be segregated from residents who are 18 years of age or older.
  4. A program for runaway minors may provide services for the protection of the health and welfare of a person under 21 years of age who is in need of the services and who is without a place of shelter in which supervision and care of the person are available.
  5. A program for runaway minors that operates a licensed residential shelter in the state shall provide a shelter with a capacity designated in the license issued under AS 47.10.300 47.10.390 .

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 17 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 9 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 2010)

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective August 2, 2010, added (e).

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 47.10.320. Residence in runaway minor program facilities.

A runaway minor may maintain residency for a period not exceeding 45 days at a facility operated as part of a licensed program for runaway minors. The minor may maintain residency without the consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor, except that if the court has ordered the minor committed to the custody of the department, written consent of the department is required. The residency may be extended for an additional period of 45 days with the written consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor. A minor may not maintain residency beyond the 90th day following admission to a licensed program for runaway minors without the written consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor and the written consent of the department.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

Sec. 47.10.330. Notice to minor’s legal custodian.

  1. [Repealed, § 24 ch 33 SLA 1994.]
  2. The director of a program for runaway minors shall promptly notify a minor’s legal custodian if the minor is released from the program into the custody of a person other than the legal custodian or a person representing the legal custodian.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 24 ch 33 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.10.340. Confidentiality of records.

Records of a licensed program for runaway minors that identify a minor who has been admitted to or has sought assistance from the program are confidential and are not subject to inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 , unless

  1. after being informed of the minor’s right to privacy, the minor consents in writing to the disclosure of the records;
  2. the records are relevant to an investigation or proceeding involving child abuse or neglect or a child in need of aid petition; or
  3. disclosure of the records is necessary to protect the life or health of the minor.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 47.10.350. Immunity from liability.

  1. The officers, directors, and employees of a licensed program for runaway minors are not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in admitting a minor to the program.
  2. This section does not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of recklessness or intentional misconduct.
  3. The officers, directors, and employees of a licensed program for runaway minors are not criminally liable under AS 11.51.130(a)(4) for assisting a minor in the program.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 18 ch 33 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.10.360. Municipal powers.

Authority to establish and operate a licensed program for runaway minors is granted to municipalities that do not otherwise have that authority.

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)

Sec. 47.10.390. Definitions.

In AS 47.10.300 47.10.390 ,

  1. “licensed program for runaway minors” means a residential or nonresidential program licensed by the department under AS 47.10.310 ;
  2. “runaway minor” means a person under 18 years of age who
    1. is habitually absent from home; or
    2. refuses to accept available care;
  3. “semi-secure” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.141(k) .

History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 43 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 9 ch 120 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (3), “AS 47.10.141(j) ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.141(e) ” to reflect the 1996 relettering of AS 47.10.141(e) .

In 2021, in paragraph (3), “ AS 47.10.141(k) ” was substituted for “ AS 47.10.141(j) ” to reflect the 2021 relettering of AS 47.10.141(j) .

Article 3. Shelters for Runaway Minors.

Cross references. —

For statement of legislative intent in connection with the enactment of this article, see § 1(a), ch. 33, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

Sec. 47.10.392. Certificate required.

A private residence may not be held out publicly as a shelter for runaway minors unless the residence

  1. is designated a shelter for runaways by a corporation that is licensed to make the designation under AS 47.32; and
  2. has a valid permit from the department signifying that designation.

History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 10 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 21 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.

For services related to the decision to place a child, see 7 AAC 56, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (1).

Sec. 47.10.394. Operation of shelters.

  1. A shelter for runaways may not shelter a runaway minor for more than seven days unless the department determines that
    1. the minor is the subject of exceptional circumstances; or
    2. another appropriate setting is not available for the minor.
  2. The provider of a shelter for runaways shall promptly, but within one state working day, inform the department of a runaway minor in the shelter
    1. who claims to be the victim of child abuse or neglect;
    2. whom the provider has reasonable cause to suspect has been a victim of child abuse or neglect; or
    3. whom the provider has reason to believe is evading the supervision of the department, the person to whom the department has entrusted supervision, or the minor’s legal guardian.
  3. In this section, “child abuse or neglect” has the meaning given in AS 47.17.290 .

History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 10 ch 120 SLA 1996; am §§ 57, 58 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted “, as defined in AS 47.17.290 ” at the end of (b)(1); added (c).

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 47.10.396. Confidentiality of records.

If the department requires record keeping by a shelter for runaways or by a corporation that is licensed to designate shelters for runaways, records of the shelter and the corporation that identify a runaway minor who has been sheltered in a shelter for runaways or has sought assistance from a shelter for runaways are confidential and are not subject to inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 unless

  1. after being informed of the minor’s right to privacy, the minor consents in writing to the disclosure of the records;
  2. the records are relevant to an investigation or proceeding involving child abuse or neglect or a child in need of aid petition; or
  3. disclosure of the records is necessary to protect the life or health of the minor.

History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 71 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in the introductory language twice deleted “nonprofit” preceding “corporation”.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 47.10.398. Immunity from liability.

  1. A person in a shelter for runaways, or in a home for which an application to be designated a shelter for runaways is being considered by a corporation licensed for that purpose by the department, that is operated in a manner that is consistent with AS 47.10.392 47.10.399 and regulations adopted under those sections is not criminally liable under AS 11.51.130(a)(4) .
  2. Except as provided in (c) of this section, the provider of a shelter for runaways, or of a home for which an application to be designated a shelter for runaways is being considered by a corporation approved for that purpose by the department, that is operated in a manner that is consistent with AS 47.10.392 47.10.399 and regulations adopted under those sections and the members of the provider’s household, other than a runaway minor, are not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission
    1. in admitting or refusing to admit a runaway minor to the shelter or home; or
    2. by a runaway minor who is sheltered in the shelter or home.
  3. The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of recklessness or intentional misconduct.

History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 11, 12 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Sec. 47.10.399. Definitions.

In AS 47.10.392 47.10.399 ,

  1. “runaway minor” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.390 ;
  2. “shelter for runaways” or “shelter for runaway minors” means a private residence whose legal occupant agrees to shelter, with or without compensation, a runaway minor accepted into the residence by the legal occupant and that
    1. is not simultaneously licensed under AS 47.10.310 as a program for runaway minors;
    2. has been designated a shelter for runaways by a corporation licensed for that purpose under AS 47.32; and
    3. has a permit issued by the department under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 13 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 22 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in subparagraphs (2)(B) and (2)(C).

Secs. 47.10.400 — 47.10.490. Citizens’ review panel for permanency planning. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.200 — 47.14.299.]

Article 4. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.10.960. Civil liability.

  1. Failure to comply with a provision of this title does not constitute a basis for civil liability for damages.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a civil action for common law negligence or an action under AS 09.55.580 on behalf of a child who is injured or dies while in the custody of the state.

History. (§ 42 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 29 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 6 ch 38 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote this section.

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, added subsection (b).

Notes to Decisions

Action against state not available. —

In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to grandparents under this section; the grandchild was a child being served, and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that former AS 47.14.240 was the basis of such a duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).

No special duty of care created. —

Father’s claims that a social worker failed to comply with Child in Need of Aid (CINA) procedures were not actionable because AS 47.10.960 precluded the father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 47.10.970. Appropriations.

Funds to carry out this chapter shall be provided for in the general appropriation Act of the legislature.

History. (§ 1 art IV ch 145 SLA 1957)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.10.270 . Renumbered in 1990.

Administrative Code. —

For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.

Sec. 47.10.980. Grants-in-aid.

The department may accept grants-in-aid from the federal government or private foundations and may accept other gifts consistent with the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 44 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.10.990. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “adult family member” means a person who is 18 years of age or older and who is
    1. related to the child as the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling;
    2. the child’s sibling’s legal guardian or parent; or
    3. in the case of an Indian child, an extended family member as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
  2. “care” means to provide for the physical, mental, and social needs of the child;
  3. “child” means a person who is
    1. under 18 years of age;
    2. 19 years of age if that person was under 18 years of age at the time that a proceeding under this chapter was commenced; and
    3. under 21 years of age if that person is committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (v);
  4. “child in need of aid” means a child found to be within the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 and 47.10.011 ;
  5. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  6. “court” means the superior court of the state;
  7. “custodian” means a natural person 18 years of age or older to whom a parent or guardian has transferred temporary physical care, custody, and control of the child for a period of time;
  8. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  9. “domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990 ;
  10. “family member” means a person of any age who is
    1. related to the child as the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling;
    2. the child’s sibling’s legal guardian or parent; or
    3. in the case of an Indian child, an extended family member as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
  11. “family support services” means the services and activities provided to children and their families, including those provided by the community, a church, or other service organization, both to prevent removal of a child from the parental home and to facilitate the child’s safe return to the family; “family support services” may include counseling, substance abuse treatment, mental health services, assistance to address domestic violence, visitation with family members, parenting classes, in-home services, temporary child care services, and transportation;
  12. “foster care” means care provided by a person or household under a foster home license required under AS 47.32;
  13. “gravely disabled” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
  14. “guardian” means a natural person who is legally appointed guardian of the child by the court;
  15. “hazardous volatile material or substance” has the meaning given in AS 47.37.270 ;
  16. “Indian child” has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
  17. “Indian child’s tribe” has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
  18. “infant” means a child who is less than 21 days of age;
  19. “intoxicant” means a substance that temporarily diminishes a person’s control over mental or physical powers, including alcohol, controlled substances under AS 11.71, and a hazardous volatile material or substance misused by inhaling its vapors;
  20. “juvenile detention facility ” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  21. “mental health professional” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 , except that, if the child is placed in another state by the department, “mental health professional” also includes a professional listed in the definition of “mental health professional” in AS 47.30.915 who is not licensed to practice by a board of this state but is licensed by a corresponding licensing authority to practice in the state in which the child is placed;
  22. “mental illness” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
  23. “mental injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.17.290 ;
  24. “near fatality” means physical injury or other harm, as certified by a physician, caused by an act or omission that created a substantial risk of death;
  25. “out-of-home care provider” means a foster parent or relative other than a parent with whom the child is placed;
  26. “parent” means the biological or adoptive parent of the child;
  27. “permanency hearing” means a hearing
    1. designed to reach a decision in a case concerning the permanent placement of a child under AS 47.10; and
    2. at which the direction of the case involving the child is determined;
  28. “physical injury” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
  29. “reasonable efforts” means, with respect to family support services required under AS 47.10.086 , consistent attempts made during a reasonable time period and time-limited services;
  30. “reasonable time” means a period of time that serves the best interests of the child, taking in account the affected child’s age, emotional and developmental needs, and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments;
  31. “secure residential psychiatric treatment center” has the meaning given “residential psychiatric treatment center” in AS 47.32.900 ;
  32. “serious physical injury” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
  33. “sexual abuse” means the conduct described in AS 11.41.410 11.41.460 ; conduct constituting “sexual exploitation” as defined in AS 47.17.290 , and conduct prohibited by AS 11.66.100 11.66.150 ;
  34. “support” has the meaning given in AS 11.51.120(b) .

History. (§ 1 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 110 SLA 1967; am §§ 5, 6 ch 27 SLA 1970; am §§ 27 — 28 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 91, 92 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 18 ch 57 SLA 1991; am § 7 ch 72 SLA 1993; am § 15 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 52 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 45 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 43 — 45, 69 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 14 ch 107 SLA 1998; am §§ 23, 24 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 30, 31 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 6 ch 1 SLA 2008; am § 3 ch 80 SLA 2010; am §§ 10 — 12 ch 6 4SSLA 2016 ch 6 4SSLA 2016; am § 18 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.20.290 . Renumbered in 1990. Reorganized in 1984 to alphabetize the terms defined and again in 1986, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2005, 2008, and 2016 to maintain alphabetical order. Section 15, ch. 113, SLA 1994 added a new paragraph (13) that was not set out because it duplicated a definition of “victim” enacted in 1991 and repealed in 1996.

Cross references. —

For provision providing legislative findings and intent for the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added the 2016 amendments to this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in paragraph (16) [now (19)] added the language beginning “, except that” to the end of the paragraph and added paragraphs (28) — (31) [now (1), (10), (22), and (23) respectively].

The second 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraphs (10) [now (12)] and (24) [now (29)] and inserted “ ‘residential psychiatric treatment center’ ” in paragraph (24) [now (29)].

The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, added paragraph (32) [now (16)].

The 2010 amendment, effective January 1, 2011, rewrote (3).

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (1)(C), (10)(C), (33) and (34) [now (16) and (17)] and made related changes.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (20) substituted “facility has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ” for “home is a separate establishment, exclusively devoted to the detention of minors on a short-term basis and not a part of an adult jail”.

Editor's notes.—

Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, the 2016 amendments to this section "apply to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017."

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.990 .

Constitutionality. —

The statutory scheme of this chapter is not so vague as to deprive parents of their procedural due process rights. R.C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1988).

“Care.” —

The definition of “care” set out in paragraph (1) [now paragraph (2)] applies, in relevant part, only to paragraph (a)(1) of the “child in need of aid” statute, AS 47.10.010 , and has no application to paragraph (a)(6) of that section. [Decided before the 1998 amendment of AS 47.10.010 .] R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

“Guardian.” —

Trial court properly applied the statutory definition of “guardian” in this section, correctly recognizing that it precluded a mother’s friend from being considered a guardian because he had not been legally appointed as the child’s guardian. M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002).

“Reasonable efforts.” —

Evidence supported the superior court's findings that Alaska Office of Children's Services offered the parents and the children a number of services designed to reunite them as a family, but the father was ultimately unable or unwilling to significantly shift the beliefs that stood in the way of the father's effective parenting. While the office’s efforts were not perfect, the efforts were nonetheless timely and reasonable, and quite extensive as to both the parents and the children. Clarice M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 29, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Reasonable time. —

Mother did not remedy her personality disorder or drug problem within a reasonable time as provided in AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B) and this section; the record contained ample evidence that the mother had a mental health disorder that impaired her judgment and capacity to parent her children adequately, particularly where two of the three children had challenging physical and developmental problems, and the third had not bonded with her. Natalie D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2006) (memorandum decision).

Termination of parental rights of mother to her tenth child was proper where she had lost rights to her nine other children due to her ongoing addiction to crack cocaine, and her related conduct which put the children at risk, and which continued after the birth of this child despite repeated offers to the mother of help and treatment. Under the circumstances termination in little over a year after the child was put into foster care did not violate the mother’s right to reasonable efforts supporting the family. Patience P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 11, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Mother had abused cocaine and other substances since the age of seventeen, and had access to multiple treatment programs over the course of her life, most of which she did not complete. In several instances she did not stay in touch with her caseworker so as to be able to learn what remedial opportunities were available. There was no reason to believe this long-time pattern of behavior by the mother would change, despite the efforts of the department. The child that was the subject of this case had tested positive for cocaine at birth and had lived with his grandmother all eight months of his life. Given the past behavior of the mother, and the child’s lack of bonding with his mother, eight months did constitute a reasonable time to provide support survices, and a reasonable age at which to terminate the mother’s rights. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).

Mother was given a reasonable amount of time in which to remedy the mother's conduct leading to the mother's child's removal because the mother (1) said the mother had not engaged in therapy required to regain custody and did not desire to, and (2) the mother showed the same pattern of starting and stopping treatment in a prior case. Emma D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 15, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the substance abuse and mental health issues that placed the children at risk. The Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) worked with the mother for nearly two years, and by the time of the termination trial one child was 27 months old and had been in the custody of the OCS for 23 months, while the other child was three years old and had been in the custody of the OCS for nearly a year. Bonnie M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Given the strong evidence of the son's extraordinary special needs, in particular his need for stable and consistent attention, the superior court could reasonably conclude that seven months was enough time for the father to demonstrate a sincere commitment to learning how to care for his child, and it did not err in finding that the father failed within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions that made his son a child in need of aid. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).

The legislature has authorized institutionalization only where the child is found to be a delinquent minor. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Hence, a minor who has been adjudged a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid] cannot be institutionalized under the Children’s Code. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

The Department of Health and Social Services does not possess the authority to institutionalize any minor, including one who has been declared a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], who has been committed to its custody. It is unreasonable to construe Alaska children’s statutes in a manner which would result in the grant to the Department of Health and Social Services of broader powers of commitment than possessed by the trial court. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Quoted in

Josephine B. v. State, 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2007); Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013); Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015); Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Superior Court, 462 P.3d 1000 (Alaska 2020).

Stated in

Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

In re White, 445 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1968); N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001); Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006); Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011); Rowan B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2014); Theresa L. v. State, 353 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2015).

Chapter 12. Delinquent Minors.

Editor’s notes. —

Many of the provisions of this chapter were derived from former provisions of AS 47.10.

Article 1. Juvenile Delinquency.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that the enactment of AS 47.12.020(b) , 47.12.022 , and 47.12.025 and the 2005 amendments of AS 47.12.065 and 47.12.160 have the effect of amending specific Alaska Delinquency Rules to conform those court rules to the statutory changes to acknowledge the inclusion of certain persons 18 years of age or older as minors under this chapter and to acknowledge the special statutory provisions contained in the enacted and amended sections to those persons. For a list of the specific court rules affected, see § 10, ch. 70, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.12.010. Goal and purposes of chapter.

  1. The goal of this chapter is to promote a balanced juvenile justice system in the state to protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law, and equip juvenile offenders with the skills needed to live responsibly and productively.
  2. The purposes of this chapter are to
    1. respond to a juvenile offender’s needs in a manner that is consistent with
      1. prevention of repeated criminal behavior;
      2. restoration of the community and victim;
      3. protection of the public; and
      4. development of the juvenile into a productive citizen;
    2. protect citizens from juvenile crime;
    3. hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for the offender’s conduct;
    4. provide swift and consistent consequences for crimes committed by juveniles;
    5. make the juvenile justice system more open, accessible, and accountable to the public;
    6. require parental or guardian participation in the juvenile justice process;
    7. create an expectation that parents will be held responsible for the conduct and needs of their children;
    8. ensure that victims, witnesses, parents, foster parents, guardians, juvenile offenders, and all other interested parties are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity throughout all legal proceedings;
    9. provide due process through which juvenile offenders, victims, parents, and guardians are assured fair legal proceedings during which constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced;
    10. divert juveniles from the formal juvenile justice process through early intervention as warranted when consistent with the protection of the public;
    11. provide an early, individualized assessment and action plan for each juvenile offender in order to prevent further criminal behavior through the development of appropriate skills in the juvenile offender so that the juvenile is more capable of living productively and responsibly in the community;
    12. ensure that victims and witnesses of crimes committed by juveniles are afforded the same rights as victims and witnesses of crimes committed by adults;
    13. encourage and provide opportunities for local communities and groups to play an active role in the juvenile justice process in ways that are culturally relevant; and
    14. review and evaluate regularly and independently the effectiveness of programs and services under this chapter.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 15 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 1999)

Notes to Decisions

Commitment periods. —

In the provisions of AS 47.12.120(b)(1) and 47.12.260 , the legislature allocated the risk of repeat offenders to the public in exchange presumably for offsetting gains realized by rehabilitating juveniles to make them productive citizens, and imposing state tort liability for harm caused by released juveniles would have distorted this balance; likewise the policy of preventing future harm was not obviously going to be served by imposing a duty, given that AS 47.12.010(b) limited commitment and re-commitment periods of time, and there was no clear correlation between the length of commitment and the rate of recidivism. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).

While the defendant's right to appear at a criminal proceeding is partially grounded in due process, the statute does not create an obligation on the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in particular to pay whatever is necessary to guarantee that right; the purposes of the statute are broad aspirations for the juvenile justice system as a whole, which includes not only DJJ but also the Department of Public Safety, the Court System, and the Public Defender Agency. Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019).

Court of appeals erred in upholding a decision requiring the Public Defender Agency to pay the travel expenses for a juvenile to the site of his juvenile delinquency proceeding because neither the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) nor the Agency was legally obligated to pay such costs; neither the DJJ's nor the Agency's authorizing statutes required them to pay the travel expenses for out-of-custody indigent juvenile defendants to attend their delinquency proceedings. Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019).

Delay due to pandemic. —

Although multiple factors weighed in favor of granting the joint motion for an in-person trial in this juvenile delinquency case, the judge's denial was not an abuse of discretion; he had to balance the public health concerns created by the COVID-19 pandemic against the rights of the parties. When the initial request was made, the municipality still had a 15-person limit to in-person gatherings, and even after that limit was extended to 35 people, the case numbers in Anchorage continued to be high. L.B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2021).

Quoted in

W.S. v. State, 174 P.3d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Sec. 47.12.020. Jurisdiction.

  1. Proceedings relating to a minor under 18 years of age residing or found in the state are governed by this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, when the minor is alleged to be or may be determined by a court to be a delinquent minor as a result of violating a criminal law of the state or a municipality of the state.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, proceedings relating to a person who is 18 years of age or over are governed by this chapter if the person is alleged to have committed a violation of the criminal law of the state or a municipality of the state, the violation occurred when the person was under 18 years of age, and the period of limitation under AS 12.10 has not expired.
  3. The provisions of this chapter apply to the detention and care of a person who is alleged to have committed a violation of a criminal law of the state or local government, subject to the provisions of AS 47.12.030(a) , 47.12.100 , and 47.12.105 .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 70 SLA 2005; am § 19 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 14, 2005, added subsection (b).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, added (c).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that (b) of this section “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Notes to Decisions

Due process right to protect juvenile offender status. — Superior court erred in granting the State's waiver petition because defendant juvenile had a due process right to present evidence at the waiver hearing to protect his juvenile offender status and avoid being waived to adult court; minors alleged to have violated Alaska's criminal laws, including those for whom the State is seeking to waive juvenile jurisdiction, have a liberty interest in juvenile status. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Collateral references. —

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of juvenile court. 48 ALR2d 662.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court. 89 ALR2d 506.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile. 5 ALR4th 1211, § 7.

Sec. 47.12.022. Applicability; inclusion of certain persons as minors.

Except as provided in AS 47.12.025 , the provisions of this chapter apply to a person who is 18 years of age or older and who is subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter due to AS 47.12.020(b) or (c). To implement AS 47.12.020(b) and (c) and this section, the term “minor” as used in this chapter includes a person described in this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 70 SLA 2005; am § 20 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that this section “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, deleted “solely” following “chapter due”, and twice inserted “or (c)” following “AS 47.12.020(b) .”

Sec. 47.12.025. Special provisions for certain persons considered to be minors.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the following special provisions apply to a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter due solely to AS 47.12.020(b) :
    1. a petition filed under AS 47.12.040(b) must be styled as follows: “In the matter of  . . . . . . . . , a person under the jurisdiction of this chapter under AS 47.12.020(b) ”; the petition may not state the name of a parent, guardian, or other person;
    2. notice of an investigation, adjustment, hearing, or other procedure under this chapter to a parent, guardian, or foster parent is not required;
    3. participation by a parent, guardian, or foster parent in any part of the investigation, adjustment, hearing, or other procedure under this chapter is not required;
    4. agreement or consent by a parent or guardian to the terms and conditions of an informal adjustment under AS 47.12.060 is not required;
    5. an opportunity for a foster parent to be heard before informal adjustment under AS 47.12.060 is not required;
    6. the presence of a parent or guardian is not required, and the person does not have a right to have a parent or guardian present, at an interview conducted during an investigation under this chapter;
    7. after a petition is filed and after further investigation that the court directs, if the person has not appeared voluntarily for proceedings under this chapter, the court may issue a summons or an arrest warrant for the person;
    8. a person who is taken into custody under this chapter may, in the discretion of the court and upon written promise to appear in court at the time specified by the court, be released; if not released, the person shall be detained under the provisions of (b) of this section;
    9. consent of a parent or guardian to waiver of the right to appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem under AS 47.12.090 is not required;
    10. the appointment of a guardian ad litem under AS 47.12.090 is not required; the court may appoint a guardian ad litem under AS 47.12.090 only if special circumstances exist concerning the mental or physical capacity of the person who is named in the petition under (1) of this subsection;
    11. an order under AS 47.12.120(b) to release the person to a parent, guardian, or other person must be with the consent of the parent, guardian, or other person; a parent, guardian, or other person who consents does not assume any of the responsibilities described in AS 47.12.150 or retain any residual rights or responsibilities described in AS 47.12.150 ;
    12. a person released under AS 47.12.120(c) shall be released without conditions;
    13. a parent, guardian, or custodian may not apply for a review under AS 47.12.120(d) ; notice to a parent, guardian, custodian, or foster parent of a review under AS 47.12.120(a) is not required; a parent, guardian, custodian, or foster parent does not have a right to be heard at the review under AS 47.12.120(d) ;
    14. the person’s parent or guardian may not file an appeal under AS 47.12.120(f) ;
    15. notice of the predisposition report under AS 47.12.130(b) to the person’s parent or guardian is not required;
    16. unless part of a conditional release plan agreed to by a parent or guardian, a parent or guardian of the person may not be ordered to participate in or pay for treatment under AS 47.12.155(b)(1) , (c), or (d) or to notify the department if the person violates a term or condition of a court order under AS 47.12.155(b)(2) ;
    17. an application to extend jurisdiction under AS 47.12.160(a) may not be made by a parent or guardian;
    18. the court may not order the parent of the person to pay for maintenance or care of the person under AS 47.12.230 ;
    19. the name of a parent or guardian of the person is not required to be disclosed in connection with the filing of a petition or informal adjustment under AS 47.12.315 .
  2. At a hearing under AS 47.12.250(c) regarding a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter due solely to AS 47.12.020(b) , if the court finds that probable cause exists, the court shall determine whether the person should be detained pending the hearing on the petition or released. The court may either order the person detained as provided in (c) of this section or released under the provisions of AS 12.30 as if the provisions of AS 12.30 were to apply to proceedings under this chapter. If the court finds no probable cause, the court shall order the person released and close the proceeding.
  3. If a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter due solely to AS 47.12.020(b) has been arrested by a peace officer or a juvenile probation officer under AS 47.12.245 , detained under AS 47.12.250 , or committed to the custody or supervision of the department under AS 47.12.120(b) or 47.12.240 , the department, after consulting the peace officer or juvenile probation officer if appropriate, shall make arrangements for the detention, placement, or supervision of the person. In the discretion of the department, the person may be detained or placed in a juvenile detention facility, juvenile treatment facility, temporary secure juvenile holding area, or adult correctional facility.

History. (§ 2 ch 70 SLA 2005; am § 21 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (c), in the first sentence, twice inserted “juvenile” preceding “probation officer”, in the second sentence, substituted “juvenile detention facility, juvenile treatment facility, temporary secure juvenile holding area, or adult correctional facility” for “juvenile facility or in an adult correctional facility.”

Editor’s notes. —

Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that this section “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Sec. 47.12.030. Provisions inapplicable.

  1. When a minor who was at least 16 years of age at the time of the offense is charged by complaint, information, or indictment with an offense specified in this subsection, this chapter and the Alaska Delinquency Rules do not apply to the offense for which the minor is charged or to any additional offenses joinable to it under the applicable rules of court governing criminal procedure. Subject to the provisions of AS 47.12.105 , the minor shall be charged, held, transported, released on bail, prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated in the same manner as an adult. If the minor is convicted of an offense other than an offense specified in this subsection, the minor may attempt to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the minor is amenable to treatment under this chapter. If the court finds that the minor is amenable to treatment under this chapter, the minor shall be treated as though the charges had been heard under this chapter, and the court shall order disposition of the charges of which the minor is convicted under AS 47.12.120(b) . The provisions of this subsection apply when the minor is charged by complaint, information, or indictment with an offense
    1. that is an unclassified felony or a class A felony and the felony is a crime against a person;
    2. of arson in the first degree;
    3. that is a class B felony and the felony is a crime against a person in which the minor is alleged to have used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense and the minor was previously adjudicated as a delinquent or convicted as an adult, in this or another jurisdiction, as a result of an offense that involved use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime against a person or an offense in another jurisdiction having elements substantially identical to those of a crime against a person, and the previous offense was punishable as a felony; in this paragraph, “deadly weapon” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ; or
    4. that is misconduct involving weapons in the first degree under
      1. AS 11.61.190(a)(1) ; or
      2. AS 11.61.190(a)(2) when the firearm was discharged under circumstances manifesting substantial and unjustifiable risk of physical injury to a person.
  2. When a minor is accused of violating a statute specified in this subsection, other than a statute the violation of which is a felony, this chapter and the Alaska Delinquency Rules do not apply and the minor accused of the offense shall be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult; if a minor is charged, prosecuted, and sentenced for an offense under this subsection, the minor’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall be present at all proceedings; the provisions of this subsection apply when a minor is accused of violating
    1. a traffic statute or regulation, or a traffic ordinance or regulation of a municipality;
    2. AS 11.76.105 , relating to the possession of tobacco by a person under 19 years of age;
    3. a fish and game statute or regulation under AS 16;
    4. a parks and recreational facilities statute or regulation under AS 41.21;
    5. [Repealed, § 23 ch 16 SLA 2021.]
    6. a municipal curfew ordinance, whether adopted under AS 29.35.085 or otherwise, unless the municipality provides for enforcement of its ordinance under AS 29.25.070(b) by the municipality; in place of any fine imposed for the violation of a municipal curfew ordinance, the court shall allow a defendant the option of performing community work; the value of the community work, which may not be lower than the amount of the fine, shall be determined under AS 12.55.055(c) ; in this paragraph, “community work” includes the work described in AS 12.55.055(b) or work that, on the recommendation of the municipal or borough assembly, city council, or traditional village council of the defendant’s place of residence, would benefit persons within the municipality or village who are elderly or disabled;
    7. AS 04.16.050 , relating to consumption, possession, or control of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age.
  3. The provisions of AS 47.12.010 47.12.260 and the Alaska Delinquency Rules do not apply to driver’s license proceedings under AS 28.15.185 ; the court shall impose a driver’s license revocation under AS 28.15.185 in the same manner as adult driver’s license revocations, except that a parent or legal guardian shall be present at all proceedings.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 72 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1998; am § 16 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 15 ch 65 SLA 2001; am § 4 ch 66 SLA 2005; am § 22 ch 32 SLA 2016; am §§ 22, 23 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 14, 2005, added paragraph (a)(4) and made related stylistic changes.

The 2016 amendment, effective October 4, 2016, repealed (b)(5).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a), in the second sentence, substituted “Subject to the provisions of AS 47.12.105 , the minor shall be charged, held, transported” for “The minor shall be charged, held,”; added (b)(7), and made a related change.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (a), made in § 16, ch. 107, SLA 1998, apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998. Also, § 2, ch. 9, 1998 provides that paragraph (a)(3), added by § 1, ch. 9, SLA 1998, applies to offenses committed on or after July 7, 1998, but that references in (a)(3) to previous adjudications or convictions include offenses committed on, before, or after July 7, 1998.

Section 5, ch. 66, SLA 2005, provides that (a)(4) of this section “applies to acts committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Section 57(a), ch. 16, SLA 2021, provides that the 2021 amendment of (b) of this section applies to “to offenses committed on or after July 9, 2021.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 66, SLA 2005 (HB 88), relating to weapons offenses involving minors, see 2005 House Journal 104 — 106.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

Subsection (a), placing the burden on defendant to prove his amenability to juvenile treatment, does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Alaska Constitution. Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

AS 47.12.030(b) , requiring a juvenile's adult prosecution for a misdemeanor traffic offense, did not violate equal protection because (1) the juvenile had a limited interest in juvenile prosecution, (2) driving was a heavily regulated dangerous adult activity, (3) the legislature had a legitimate interest in assuring minors who drove were held to an adult standard of care and could rationally conclude minors posed a particularly significant threat to minors' own and the public's safety, and (4) there was no particular anomaly in treating juvenile felony traffic offenders as juveniles. Watson v. State, 400 P.3d 121 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017), aff'd, 487 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2021).

Statute requiring a minor who was accused of a non-felony traffic offense to be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the district court in the same manner as an adult, but not applying that provision when the minor was accused of committing a felony violation, did not violate the equal protection provision because classifying minor offenders according to whether they were charged with a felony or misdemeanor violation was closely related to the State's competing interests of deterrence and rehabilitation as it promoted the State's interest in a uniform system of penalties to deter bad driving and protect the public, but the legislature could have concluded that the legal consequences of a felony conviction were too severe for a minor. Watson v. State, 487 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2021).

Constitutionality of criminal penalties faced by 16- and 17-year-olds. —

Enactment of the provision changing criminal penalties faced by 16- and 17-year-olds for certain criminal acts did not violate Alaska Const., art. IV, § 15 since it did not alter the Delinquency Rules but, rather, it redefined the coverage of the delinquency law. Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Combination of the automatic waiver statute and the adult sentencing statute was consistent with evolving standards of decency and this scheme bore a fair and substantial relationship to the legitimate purposes of punishment; the sentencing judge gave the minor defendant’s rehabilitative prospects careful scrutiny and appropriate weight and the resulting sentence for first-degree murder was not clearly mistaken. Gray v. State, 267 P.3d 667 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is the express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction. Mere confinement without treatment does not contribute to the goal of rehabilitation; such confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Principal precept behind children’s court concept is that a person under 18 years of age does not have mature judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of his acts, and that therefore he should not generally have to bear the stigma of a criminal conviction for the rest of his life. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

The phrase “under 18 years of age” refers to the age of the accused person at the time of the alleged offense. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Jurisdiction dependent upon age of offender at time of act. —

Juvenile jurisdiction of the superior court in delinquency proceedings is dependent upon the age of the offender at the time of the delinquent acts. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Child is exempt from criminal prosecution until children’s court waives jurisdiction. —

From the moment a child commits an offense he is exempt from criminal prosecution until the children’s court properly waives its jurisdiction. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Deferring action against child until 18th birthday would frustrate purpose of juvenile courts. —

To allow officials charged with the execution of the law to prosecute a child offender as a criminal merely by deferring action until the child’s 18th birthday would frustrate the purpose of juvenile courts. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Serious constitutional issues would arise if the nature of the proceedings against a child offender were to depend on the arbitrary decision of law-enforcement officials. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

When person over or under certain age. —

With respect to penal statutes, whether a person is over or under a certain age depends upon whether he has reached that particular anniversary of his birthday or not. State v. Linn, 363 P.2d 361 (Alaska 1961) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Criminal negligence of 16-year-old. —

Criminal justice standard for negligence is an objective one, based on the perceptions and conduct one would expect of a reasonable person; all people older than 18 had to live up to the standard of care that one would expect a reasonable person to observe, and this principle remains unchanged, even though the age of adult criminal responsibility is now 16 years for the serious felonies specified in the statute. Waterman v. State, 342 P.3d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).

“Delinquent” status depends not upon a criminal conviction but upon proof that the juvenile committed acts which would have been criminal if committed by an adult. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

One who committed a crime when 18 years of age could be criminally prosecuted, as an adult, when he had been previously adjudged a delinquent minor and the court had retained supervisory jurisdiction over him until age 19. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Due process right to protect juvenile offender status. — Superior court erred in granting the State's waiver petition because defendant juvenile had a due process right to present evidence at the waiver hearing to protect his juvenile offender status and avoid being waived to adult court; minors alleged to have violated Alaska's criminal laws, including those for whom the State is seeking to waive juvenile jurisdiction, have a liberty interest in juvenile status. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Former AS 17.12.110(d)(4) not in conflict. —

Former AS 17.12.110(d)(4), which provided that a person who, while under the age of 18, possesses, controls or uses any amount of marijuana was, upon conviction, guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1000, was not in conflict with 47.10.010 (a)(1) and AS 47.10.080(b)(1). M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

State may interfere with certain conduct of children in need of aid. —

Conduct of children alleged to be in need of supervision [see now children alleged to be in need of aid], such as running away from home and foster home placement, may constitutionally be interfered with by the state. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Interests to be protected by legislation regarding children in need of aid. —

See L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Means chosen by the state to protect children are closely and substantially related to an appropriate government interest. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

The purpose of the supervision or treatment contemplated by the creation of the child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], and its predecessor noncriminal delinquency was reintegration of the child into her family and resumption of parental custody including parental control. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Burden of proving amenability to treatment as juvenile. —

Where a minor is prosecuted as an adult for one of the felonies listed in subsection (a) but is ultimately found guilty of a lesser offense, the provision imposing on the minor the burden of proving that he or she is amenable to treatment as a juvenile does not violate the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Requisites to determination of delinquency. —

Before a juvenile can be determined delinquent in a proceeding which could result in commitment to an institution, thus curtailing his freedom, certain requisites must be met. First, written notice of the charges must be given to the juvenile and his parents sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to allow preparation to meet the charges. Second, the child and his parents must be apprised of the right to counsel, including appointed counsel in case of indigency. Third, the child may exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Lastly, absent a valid confession, the determination of delinquency cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony, which is subject to cross-examination. E. J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alaska 1970) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Minor properly declared delinquent. —

Where the lower court determined that a minor would not abide by any orders it entered regarding her supervision under former subsection (j) of AS 47.10.080 , this behavior constituted willful criminal contempt of the court’s authority; were she an adult, her actions would be characterized as a “crime” under Alaska statutes. She was, therefore, properly declared a delinquent and subject to those sanctions available for the correction of a delinquent minor’s behavior. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Where the parents’ interests are hostile to the child’s, the parents may not select the child’s attorney. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Court Div., 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Then the child may retain the attorney of his choice or, in the alternative, ask the court to appoint an attorney for him. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Court Div., 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

And court must respect choice. —

If the child has retained counsel, the court must respect the child’s choice. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Court Div., 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Prosecution for joyriding. —

AS 47.10.010 (b) and former AS 28.35.010(d) demonstrated a clear legislative intent to exclude from the coverage and requirements of the juvenile code those cases involving alleged misdemeanor violations of Alaska’s “joyriding” statute by persons under 18 years of age. State v. G.L.P., 590 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1979) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

One under 18 years of age could be charged, prosecuted and sentenced in the district court, as an adult, for a misdemenaor violations of Alaska’s “joyriding” statute, former AS 28.35.010(a), before there had been an order by the superior court waiving the latter court’s juvenile jurisdiction. State v. G.L.P., 590 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1979) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Parental presence at all court proceedings is a prerequisite to conviction of a minor for a traffic offense, including driving while intoxicated. Aiken v. State, 730 P.2d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Appeal after serving sentence. —

If there remain collateral legal disabilities apart from the sentence, an appeal is not mooted even though the sentence has been served. E. J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alaska 1970) (decided under AS 47.10.010 ).

Cited in

Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); Sergie v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. July 30, 2021); Grubb v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2022).

Sec. 47.12.040. Investigation and petition.

  1. Whenever circumstances subject a minor to the jurisdiction of this chapter, the court shall
    1. require in conformance with this section, that, for a minor who is alleged to be a delinquent minor under AS 47.12.020 , the department or an entity selected by it shall make a preliminary inquiry to determine if any action is appropriate and may take appropriate action to adjust the matter without a court hearing; the department or an entity selected by it may arrange to interview the minor, the minor’s parents or guardian, and any other person having relevant information; at or before the interview, the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian, if present, must be advised that any statement may be used against the minor and of the following rights of the minor: to have a parent or guardian present at the interview; to remain silent; to have retained or appointed counsel at all stages of the proceedings, including the initial interview; if a petition is filed, to have an adjudication hearing before a judge or jury with compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses; and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses; if, under this paragraph,
      1. the department or an entity selected by it makes a preliminary inquiry and takes appropriate action to adjust the matter without a court hearing, the minor may not be detained or taken into custody as a condition of the adjustment and, subject to AS 47.12.060 , the matter shall be closed by the department or an entity selected by it if the minor successfully completes all that is required of the minor by the department or an entity selected by it in the adjustment; in a municipality or municipalities in which a youth court has been established under AS 47.12.400 , adjustment of the matter under this paragraph may include referral to the youth court; if a community dispute resolution center has been established under AS 47.12.450(a) and has obtained recognition under AS 47.12.450(b) , adjustment of the matter under this paragraph may include use of the services of the community dispute resolution center;
      2. the department or an entity selected by it concludes that the matter may not be adjusted without a court hearing, the department may file a petition, amended petition, or supplemental petition under (2) of this subsection setting out the facts; or
    2. appoint a competent person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and report for the information of the court to determine whether the interests of the public or of the minor require that further action be taken; if, under this paragraph, the court appoints a person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and to report to it, then upon the receipt of the report, the court may informally adjust the matter without a hearing, or it may authorize the person having knowledge of the facts of the case to file with the court a petition setting out the facts; if, following the filing of a petition, additional facts are determined, the court may authorize a person having knowledge of the facts to file an amended petition or supplemental petition; if the court informally adjusts the matter, the minor may not be detained or taken into the custody of the court as a condition of the adjustment, and the matter shall be closed by the court upon adjustment.
  2. The petition and all subsequent pleadings shall be styled as follows: “In the matter of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., a minor under 18 years of age.” The petition may be executed upon the petitioner’s information and belief, and must be verified. It must include the following information:
    1. the name, address, and occupation of the petitioner, together with the petitioner’s relationship to the minor, and the petitioner’s interest in the matter;
    2. the name, age, and address of the minor;
    3. a brief statement of the facts that bring the minor within this chapter;
    4. the names and addresses of the minor’s parents;
    5. the name and address of the minor’s guardian, or of the person having control or custody of the minor.
  3. If the petitioner does not know a fact required in this section, the petitioner shall so state in the petition.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 17 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 108 SLA 1998; am § 24 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Cross references. —

For authority of court to order a minor to submit to a blood test when a petition has been filed alleging a violation of AS 11.41.410 11.41.450 that includes sexual penetration as an element of the offense, see AS 18.15.300 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a)(1)(B), inserted “, amended petition, or supplemental petition” following “file a petition”, and in (a)(2), inserted “if, following the filing of a petition, additional facts are determined, the court may authorize a person having knowledge of the facts to file an amended petition or supplemental petition;” following “petition setting out the facts;”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments made to subsection (a) by ch. 107, SLA 1998 apply “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Notes to Decisions

Distinctions between this section and AS 25.24.310 . —

See Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.020 ).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.020 ); Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Sec. 47.12.050. Notice to and involvement of parent or guardian.

  1. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided, in all cases under this chapter, the minor, each parent of the minor, the foster parent of the minor, and the guardian of the minor are entitled to notice adequate to give actual notice of the proceedings, taking into account education and language differences that are known or reasonably ascertainable by the party giving the notice. The notice must contain all names by which the minor has been identified.
  2. Notice shall be given in the manner appropriate under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of process in a civil action under state law or in any manner the court by order directs. Proof of giving of the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard or other proceeding commenced.
  3. The court may subpoena the parent or guardian of the minor, or any other person whose testimony may be necessary at the hearing. A subpoena or other process may be served by a person authorized by law to make the service. If personal service cannot be made, the court may direct that service of process be in the manner appropriate under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of process in a civil action under state law or in any manner the court directs.
  4. In any proceeding under this chapter, the presence of the minor’s parent or guardian is preferred.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 40 SLA 1999)

Cross references. —

For effect of the amendment made by § 2, ch. 40, SLA 1999 on the Alaska Delinquency Rules, see § 10, ch. 40, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts.

Sec. 47.12.060. Informal action to adjust matter.

  1. The provisions of this section apply to a minor who is alleged to be a delinquent minor under AS 47.12.020 and for whom the department or an entity selected by it has made a preliminary inquiry as required by AS 47.12.040(a)(1) . Following the preliminary inquiry,
    1. the department or the entity selected by it may dismiss the matter with or without prejudice; or
    2. the department or the entity selected by it may take informal action to adjust the matter.
  2. When the department or the entity selected by it decides to make an informal adjustment of a matter under (a)(2) of this section, that informal adjustment
    1. must be made with the agreement or consent of the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian to the terms and conditions of the adjustment;
    2. must give the minor’s foster parent an opportunity to be heard before the informal adjustment is made;
    3. must include notice that informal action to adjust a matter is not successfully completed unless, among other factors that the department or the entity selected by it considers, as to the victim of the act of the minor that is the basis of the delinquency allegation, the minor pays restitution in the amount set by the department or the entity selected by it or agrees as a term or condition set by the department or the entity selected by it to pay the restitution;
    4. [Repealed, § 22 ch 32 SLA 2016.]
    5. [Repealed, § 56 ch 16 SLA 2021.]

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 18 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 40 SLA 1999; am § 16 ch 65 SLA 2001; am § 22 ch 32 SLA 2016; am § 56 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Cross references. —

For effect of the amendment made by § 3, ch. 40, SLA 1999 on the Alaska Delinquency Rules, see § 10, ch. 40, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective October 4, 2016, repealed (b)(4).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, repealed (b)(5).

Notes to Decisions

Juvenile matter’s disposition included in presentence report. —

Superior court erred in granting defendant’s motion to delete material from his presentence report regarding an informal disposition of a juvenile case. State v. Short, 96 P.3d 526 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).

Superior court did not err when it refused to delete the references to "adjusted" juvenile cases from defendant's presentence report because the Department of Juvenile Justice was authorized to take informal action to adjust any juvenile delinquency matter; and, although defendant broadly challenged the propriety of including any "adjusted" juvenile cases in his presentence report, he raised no specific challenges to the accuracy of the information. Pitka v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2019).

Cited in

Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Sec. 47.12.065. Dual sentencing provisions.

  1. The department or the entity selected by it may refer to the appropriate district attorney the circumstances involving a minor who is subject to the provisions of this section because the minor is alleged to have violated a criminal law of the state. Except as provided in (d) of this section, the department or the entity selected by it may make the referral if the minor was 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense, and the offense is
    1. a felony that is a crime against a person and the minor has previously been adjudicated a delinquent under the laws of this state or substantially similar laws of another jurisdiction for a felony offense that is a crime against a person; or
    2. sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree.
  2. If a referral is made under (a) of this section, the district attorney may elect to seek imposition of a dual sentence in the case to further the goal and purposes of this chapter as set out in AS 47.12.010 . If the district attorney seeks imposition of a dual sentence, the district attorney shall present the case to the grand jury for indictment. If the grand jury returns an indictment, the district attorney shall file with the court under AS 47.12.040(a) a petition seeking the minor’s adjudication as a delinquent.
  3. If the district attorney decides not to seek imposition of a dual sentence under (b) of this section or if the grand jury does not return an indictment, the case shall proceed under the remaining provisions of this chapter.
  4. The department or the entity selected by it may refer to the appropriate district attorney a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter under AS 47.12.020(b) and who is alleged to have committed a felony or other offense. If the district attorney elects to seek imposition of a dual sentence in the matter, the district attorney shall file notice of that election. If the alleged crime is a misdemeanor, the district attorney shall file a delinquency petition. If the alleged crime is a felony, the district attorney shall follow the procedure set out in (b) of this section.

History. (§ 19 ch 107 SLA 1998; am §§ 3, 4 ch 70 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 14, 2005, added “Except as provided in (d) of this section” at the beginning of the second sentence in subsection (a) and added subsection (d).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that (d) of this section “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Sec. 47.12.070. Summons and custody of minor.

After a petition is filed and after further investigation that the court directs, if the minor has not appeared voluntarily, the court shall issue a summons that

  1. recites briefly the substance of the petition;
  2. directs the person having custody or control of the minor to appear personally in court with the minor at the place and at the time set forth in the summons.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.12.080. Release of minor.

A minor who is taken into custody may, in the discretion of the court and upon the written promise of the parent, guardian, or custodian to bring the minor before the court at a time specified by the court, be released to the care and custody of the parent, guardian, or custodian. The minor, if not released, shall be detained as provided by AS 47.12.240 . The court may determine whether the father or mother or another person shall have the custody and control of the minor for the duration of the proceedings. If the minor is of sufficient age and intelligence to state desires, the court shall give consideration to the minor’s desires.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

A child has the right to remain free pending an adjudication that the child is delinquent, dependent, or in need of supervision [now delinquent or in need of aid], where the facts supporting the petition involve an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, and where the court has been given reasonable assurance that the child will appear at future court proceedings. If the facts produced at the inquiry show that the child cannot return or remain at home, every effort must be made to place the child in a situation where his freedom will not be curtailed. Only if there is clearly no alternative available may the child be committed to a detention facility and deprived of his freedom. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided under former AS 47.10.040 ).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (decided under former AS 47.10.040 ).

Sec. 47.12.090. Appointment of attorney or guardian ad litem.

  1. In all proceedings initiated under a petition for delinquency, a minor shall have the right to be represented by counsel and, if indigent, have counsel appointed by the court. The court shall appoint counsel in such cases unless it makes a finding on the record that the minor has made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and a parent or guardian with whom the minor resides or resided before the filing of the petition concurs with the waiver. In cases in which it has been alleged that the minor has committed an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, waiver of counsel may not be accepted unless the court is satisfied that the minor has consulted with an attorney before the waiver of counsel.
  2. Whenever in the course of proceedings instituted under this chapter it appears to the court that the welfare of a minor will be promoted by the appointment of an attorney to represent the minor or an attorney or other person to serve as guardian ad litem, the court may make the appointment. Appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney shall be made under the terms of AS 25.24.310 .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Cross references. —

For appointment of counsel, see Delinquency Rule 16; for guardians ad litem, see Delinquency Rule 15.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971); Cooper v. State, 638 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1981); M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.050 ).

Collateral references. —

Right to and appointment of counsel in juvenile court proceedings. 60 ALR2d 691, 25 ALR4th 1072.

Right of juvenile court defendant to be represented during court proceedings by parent. 11 ALR4th 719.

Sec. 47.12.100. Waiver of jurisdiction.

  1. If the court finds at a hearing on a petition that there is probable cause for believing that a minor is delinquent and finds that the minor is not amenable to treatment under this chapter, it shall order the case closed. Subject to the provisions of AS 47.12.105 , after a case is closed under this subsection, the minor may be charged, held, transported, released on bail, prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated in the same manner as an adult.
  2. A minor is unamenable to treatment under this chapter if the minor probably cannot be rehabilitated by treatment under this chapter before reaching 20 years of age. In determining whether a minor is unamenable to treatment, the court may consider the seriousness of the offense the minor is alleged to have committed, the minor’s history of delinquency, the probable cause of the minor’s delinquent behavior, and the facilities available to the department for treating the minor.
  3. For purposes of making a determination under this section,
    1. the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence; and
    2. the burden of proof that a minor is not amenable to treatment under this chapter is on the state; however, if the petition filed under AS 47.12.040 seeking to have the court declare a minor a delinquent is based on the minor’s alleged commission of an offense that is an unclassified felony or class A felony and that is a crime against a person, the minor
      1. is rebuttably presumed not to be amenable to treatment under this chapter; and
      2. has the burden of proof of showing that the minor is amenable to treatment under this chapter.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 25 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Cross references. —

For court rule covering waiver proceedings, see Delinquency Rule 20.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, rewrote the second sentence of (a), which read, “After a case is closed under this subsection, the minor may be prosecuted as an adult.”

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases set out below were decided under former AS 47.10.060 .

Non-criminal treatment of child offenders is to be rule. —

The statutory framework for dealing with child offenders contemplates that non-criminal treatment is to be the rule and adult criminal disposition the exception. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Self-incrimination. —

Statute creates a danger of self-incrimination in a juvenile waiver hearing because the burden is on the minor to establish amenability to treatment; at a waiver hearing a minor choosing to present the best amenability to treatment evidence to protect the interest in remaining in juvenile court may self-incriminate and hand the State evidence it can use to convict the minor in subsequent adjudications or criminal proceedings, and requiring an election is inconsistent with constitutional values. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Section provides means to determine amenability to treatment available for child offenders. —

The waiver procedure set out in former AS 47.10.060 and in former Rule of Children’s Procedure 3 provides the means by which the children’s court judge determines, prior to adjudicating the delinquency petition, that an accused child is not a suitable subject for the treatment available for child offenders. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

The court’s authority to impose a penal sentence on a juvenile was limited under the strict procedures of former AS 47.12.060(a) and (d) and former Rule of Children’s Procedure 3. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Findings necessary to justify waiver. —

To justify waiver, the children’s court judge must find, on sufficient evidence, that probable cause is established at the hearing for believing that the child committed the act with which he was charged in the petition and which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime and the child is not amenable to the treatment provided under this article. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

As a prerequisite to criminal prosecution, the children’s court must find not only that the child is properly accused but also that he would not be receptive to the rehabilitative programs available to the court. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

The inability to predicate a plan for a defendant during the short time remaining before his 19th birthday coupled with the obvious need of treatment as disclosed by the record may be sufficient to justify a waiver to adult jurisdiction. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

The court may close out the case as a juvenile matter only upon finding cause to believe that the minor is delinquent and that the minor is not amenable to treatment. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

A court must find that there is probable cause to believe that the minor is delinquent and that the minor is not amenable to treatment before jurisdiction may be waived. In re J. H. B., 578 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1978).

There is no conflict between former AS 47.10.060(d) and AS 47.10.080(b)(1). In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The inconsistency between former AS 47.10.060(d) and AS 47.10.080(b)(1) that existed prior to the 1977 amendments to these sections has been eliminated in that former AS 47.10.060(d) provided that the determinative age is 20 and AS 47.10.080(b)(1) provides that the maximum limitation of confinement of minors is to the age of 20. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Prosecution for joyriding. —

One under 18 years of age could be charged, prosecuted and sentenced in the district court, as an adult, for a misdemeanor violation of Alaska’s “joyriding” statute, former AS 28.35.010(a), before there had been an order by the superior court waiving the latter court’s juvenile jurisdiction. State v. G.L.P., 590 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1979).

In proceedings under this section, even if a child’s best chance for rehabilitation would be in a juvenile institution, waiver must be ordered when the evidence shows a likelihood that the child cannot be rehabilitated before reaching 20 years of age. D.E.P. v. State, 727 P.2d 800 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

Basis for finding amenability to treatment. —

This section does not authorize a finding of amenability to treatment on the basis that rehabilitation will probably not occur if the minor is prosecuted as an adult. State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278 (Alaska 1986).

Applied in

State v. Jensen, 650 P.2d 422 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Quoted in

Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978); W.M.F. v. Johnstone, 711 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

Cited in

E. L. L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977); State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Brower v. State, 683 P.2d 290 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Shewey v. State, 739 P.2d 196 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Holden v. State, 190 P.3d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

II.Amenability to Treatment

Factors to be considered in judging seriousness of alleged offense. —

In judging the seriousness of the alleged offense, the children’s court judge may consider not only the type of crime charged but also the circumstances surrounding its commission, the factors leading to delinquency, history of delinquency, and facilities available for rehabilitation. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Former AS 47.10.060(d) is clear on its face that age 20 is the proper age for determining whether a minor is amenable to treatment. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The 1977 amendments of former AS 47.10.060 and 47.10.080 show that it is the legislature’s intent that age 20 is the age to be used in determining the amenability issue. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Binding advance consent to treatment. —

In order to give effect of the legislature’s intent that a court may consider treatment until age 20 in determining waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, it is necessary that the judge be able to evaluate at the time of the waiver hearing whether the juvenile will in fact be available for treatment. It is not possible for the judge to know this unless the child can give binding consent at the time of the hearing. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The portion of the opinion in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), that held that a minor in a waiver hearing could not give a binding advance consent to treatment beyond age 19 was mistaken. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The amenability decision rests in the sound discretion of the children’s court judge. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

But the latitude afforded him is not unbounded. The proper exercise of that discretion must be predicated not only upon procedural regularity sufficient to satisfy the basic requirements of due process but also on a full inquiry into the amenability issue. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

The trial court was required to make an evidentiary record and make written findings of fact, as required by former Children’s Rule 3(h), as to each of these four factors enunciated in former AS 47.10.060(d). In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

These findings must be supported by substantial evidence. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Substantial evidence must be presented before jurisdiction may be waived. In re D. H. v. State, 561 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1977).

Based on these findings, the trial court, within its sound discretion, must make a decision as to the minor’s amenability to treatment. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Factors to be considered in determining amenability. —

Former AS 47.10.060(d) of this section suggests four factors which may be considered by the court when inquiring into the amenability issue: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) the delinquency of the minor; (3) the probable cause of the delinquent behavior; and (4) the facilities available for the treating of the minor. J. W. H. v. State, 583 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).

All four factors listed in former AS 47.10.060(d) need not be resolved against the child to justify waiver. Nor is there value in requiring the children’s court to make an arithmetic calculation as to the weight to be given each factor. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

But there must be a thorough examination of the child, his background and alternative strategies of rehabilitation short of adult criminal treatment. Lacking such an examination, the children’s court has no evidentiary basis for the decision. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); In re D. H. v. State, 561 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1977).

Though the standards for determining amenability to treatment through the children’s court lack explicit definition, it is clear from the statute that the court in most cases must go beyond the circumstances surrounding the alleged delinquent acts and the age of the child. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Even though the children’s court may have independent knowledge concerning children’s treatment programs and facilities, it is necessary to make the existence and evaluation of such programs a part of the waiver proceedings to enable proper review by the supreme court. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

At a waiver hearing there must be a thorough examination of (1) the probable cause for believing that the child committed the act with which he was charged and (2) the amenability of the child to juvenile treatment. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974).

In the absence of such an examination there is no evidentiary basis for a waiver decision. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974); J. W. H. v. State, 583 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).

III.Procedural Matters

The record must disclose the existence and evaluation of the available children’s treatment programs in all future cases in order to establish the validity of the hearing. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974).

Due process right to protect juvenile offender status. — Superior court erred in granting the State's waiver petition because defendant juvenile had a due process right to present evidence at the waiver hearing to protect his juvenile offender status and avoid being waived to adult court; minors alleged to have violated Alaska's criminal laws, including those for whom the State is seeking to waive juvenile jurisdiction, have a liberty interest in juvenile status. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Waiver decision without testimony of psychologist or psychiatrist. —

A waiver of juvenile jurisdiction decision can be made without the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist, since such testimony is germane to at most two of the four factors set out in former AS 47.10.060(d), and not all four of those facts need be determined adversely to the youth to warrant waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. J.R. v. State, 616 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1980).

Compulsory psychiatric evaluation constituting error. —

Compelling a juvenile to submit to a psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of determining his amenability to treatment as a child was reversible error, where admission of the psychiatric evidence against him at the waiver hearing helped to pave the way for the state to prosecute him for murder as an adult, thereby exposing him to potential punishment far more severe than could otherwise have been visited upon him. R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

The constitutional prerequisites for a valid waiver of juvenile court treatment are reflected in former Rule of Children’s Procedure 3 which guarantees the child a hearing before the children’s court judge after adequate notice thereof, counsel at the hearing who has had access to records and reports relevant to issues before the court, and a statement of reasons accompanying the waiver order. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Compliance with former Rule of Children’s Procedure 3(h) was essential to insure that the waiver hearing was not a “mere ritual” and to provide a meaningful basis for review. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974).

The waiver hearing is a critically important stage in criminal proceedings against a child. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

At stake at a child’s waiver hearing is the statutory promise of special rehabilitative treatment in lieu of the harsher sanction of criminal conviction. Because the consequences of waiver are great, the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

The investigation at a waiver hearing cannot be a mere ritual. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

There must be a hearing which measures up to the essential of due process and fair treatment. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974); J. W. H. v. State, 583 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).

The right of confrontation applies to children’s proceedings in which the child is charged with misconduct for which he may be incarcerated. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Waiver without hearing is denial of due process. —

To waive children’s court jurisdiction without a hearing or opportunity for adversary presentation is a denial of fair process. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

As is waiver without substantial evidence of unamenability to treatment. —

To waive children’s court jurisdiction without substantial evidence having been presented that the child is unamenable to juvenile rehabilitation programs is denial of fair process. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Amenability determination need not be made by jury beyond reasonable doubt. —

There must be a thorough examination made in determining probable cause and amenability to treatment. Without such an examination, there is no evidentiary basis for a waiver decision. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), did not apply to a juvenile waiver proceeding because it was not a sentencing proceeding, but rather a determination of the court’s jurisdiction; therefore, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), the decision about whether defendant was amenable to treatment as a juvenile under this section did not have to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 963, 127 S. Ct. 404, 166 L. Ed. 2d 287 (U.S. 2006).

A minor may move to waive children’s court jurisdiction pursuant to former AS 47.10.060(a). M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

A minor under the age of 18 cannot “elect” to be tried as an adult. M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Where no waiver hearing has been conducted, the court has no authority to sentence a delinquent child as an adult. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Before treating a juvenile as an adult, the court must first conduct a waiver hearing. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Option available to prosecution absent waiver. —

A proceeding in children’s court, which is limited to the dispositions set forth in former AS 47.10.080(b) , is the only option available to the prosecution absent waiver under former AS 47.10.060(a), and the standards established in former AS 47.10.060(a) are sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary enforcement. M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

But hearing is not criminal in nature. —

A waiver hearing is not criminal in nature and is dispositional, rather than adjudicatory. N.P.A. v. State, 604 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1979).

And right to attend may be waived. —

Although a minor had a constitutional right to attend her waiver hearing, she waived that right when she voluntarily failed to appear at the hearing by refusing to waive extradition from another state. N.P.A. v. State, 604 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1979).

The proper standard of proof as to the amenability of a minor to treatment is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980); M.K. v. State, 744 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Use of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as the standard of proof in a waiver hearing to show nonamenability of a juvenile to treatment is not violative of due process. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

The state bears the burden of establishing unamenability by a preponderance of the evidence. P.K.M. v. State, 780 P.2d 395 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Probable cause determination cannot be based on hearsay testimony. —

The probable cause determination of a court at a waiver hearing concerning juveniles cannot be based upon hearsay testimony. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Exclusionary rule. —

Fundamental fairness requires adopting an exclusionary rule when a minor bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of not being amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system: the minor's testimonial evidence at the waiver hearing cannot be used as substantive evidence over the minor's objection at any subsequent juvenile adjudication or adult criminal proceedings. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Exclusionary rule is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness to balance a minor's right to present a defense at a waiver proceeding against the privilege against self-incrimination; by requiring a minor to choose between presenting relevant, testimonial, amenability-to-treatment evidence or preserving the privilege against self-incrimination, subsection (c)(2) forces a minor into an unfair dilemma. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

For cases in which subsection (c)(2) applies, it is necessary to exercise the exclusionary rule to prevent the State, from using a minor's juvenile waiver hearing testimony, and the fruits of that testimony, over the juvenile’s objection, at a subsequent criminal trial or adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court; juveniles in such hearings must be advised in advance that testimony may not be admitted against them at a subsequent trial on the underlying offense. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Exclusionary rule will mitigate much of a minor's risk in exercising the due process right to present a defense at a waiver hearing, and it is consistent with the policy underlying juvenile waiver hearings; by increasing the likelihood that a minor will be able to offer relevant evidence of amenability to treatment, this exclusionary rule will enable superior courts to make better decisions in waiver proceedings. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Exclusion of testimony held proper. —

Although proffered testimony was relevant to the amenability issue, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it because its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Insufficient evidence. —

Where the court had little information concerning the probable cause of the minor’s delinquent behavior, it was aware only of the nature of the offenses, of the fact that the minor was apparently not in need of funds, and of his statement that he regarded the commission of the crimes as a game, this information was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of this subsection. In re D. H. v. State, 561 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1977).

Juvenile waiver hearing. —

Alaska Statutes 47.12.100 creates a danger of self-incrimination in a juvenile waiver hearing because the burden is on the minor to establish amenability to treatment; at a waiver hearing a minor choosing to present the best amenability to treatment evidence to protect the interest in remaining in juvenile court may self-incriminate and hand the State evidence it can use to convict the minor in subsequent adjudications or criminal proceedings, and requiring an election is inconsistent with constitutional values. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Findings necessary to justify waiver. —

Statements defendant juvenile claimed demonstrated bias did not indicate the superior court judge would be unwilling to consider an explanation for his conduct, should he offer one at a subsequent hearing, because the statements were part of the court's required findings regarding the "seriousness" of defendant's crimes; the waiver order makes clear that the most important factor relied on in granting the State's petition was that defendant offered no explanation for his conduct. C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Waiver hearing did not comply with the standards set forth in former AS 47.10.060 and former Rule of Children’s Procedure 3. R.J.C. v. State, 520 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1974).

Trial court’s conclusion that minor was amenable to treatment was abuse of discretion. —

See In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Minor unamenable to treatment. —

The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a juvenile offender who had committed three murders while stealing money from her victims was not amenable to treatment by age 20. W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

After taking into account the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s current age, and the inconclusive psychiatric and psychological testimony, the trial court’s decision that defendant was unamenable to treatment was sustained. M.K. v. State, 744 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over an 18 1/2 year old individual was not an abuse of discretion, where he had committed several property offenses which would be felonies if committed by an adult, and the evidence supported the conclusion that he was not amenable to treatment. D.R.D. v. State, 767 P.2d 207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Finding of unamenability to treatment not error. —

Superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant was not amenable to treatment as a minor. C.G.C. v. State, 702 P.2d 648 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).

Continuance denied. —

The trial court did not err in failing to grant defendant a nine- to 12-month continuance to permit further psychiatric and psychological treatment in order to test his amenability to juvenile treatment. M.K. v. State, 744 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Sec. 47.12.105. Detention of minors waived into adult court.

  1. Except as provided in AS 47.12.240 , the department, by agreement with the Department of Corrections, shall detain and care for waived minors. The department shall transfer a waived minor to a facility operated by the Department of Corrections when the waived minor reaches 18 years of age.
  2. Except as provided in (c) of this section, a waived minor held in an adult correctional facility for more than four hours to attend court proceedings must be separated by sight and sound from adult offenders.
  3. If there is not an available juvenile detention facility in a community where a trial is being held or if a juvenile facility is inappropriate for a waived minor, the department may request that the court order, in the interest of justice, that a waived minor be held in an adult correctional facility with or without sight and sound separation from adult offenders. In making this decision, the court shall consider
    1. the age of the waived minor;
    2. the physical and mental maturity of the waived minor;
    3. the present mental state of the waived minor, including whether the waived minor presents an imminent risk of harm to self;
    4. the nature and circumstances of the alleged offense;
    5. the waived minor’s history of prior delinquent acts;
    6. the relative ability of an available adult or juvenile detention facility to meet the specific needs of the waived minor and protect the safety of the public and other detained minors; and
    7. other relevant factors.
  4. If a court determines under (c) of this section that it is in the interest of justice to permit a waived minor to be held in an adult correctional facility,
    1. the department shall request a hearing not less than once every 30 days to review the determination that the waived minor may be held under the ordered circumstances;
    2. the waived minor may not be held in an adult correctional facility, or permitted to have sight or sound contact with adult offenders, for more than 180 days, unless the court determines in writing that there is good cause for an extension or the waived minor expressly waives this limitation.
  5. A waived minor detained under (a) of this section shall be detained in a secure juvenile facility and receive credit, including a good time deduction under AS 33.20.010 , for time spent in a department facility pending trial, sentencing, or appeal, if the detention is in connection with an offense for which a sentence is imposed.
  6. A waived minor who is detained in an adult correctional facility under (c) of this section is entitled to counsel at a review hearing held under (d) of this section.
  7. In this section, “waived minor” means an individual who commits an offense while under the age of 18 and is waived into adult court under AS 47.12.030 or 47.12.100 .

History. (§ 26 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effective dates. —

Section 60, ch. 16, SLA 2021, makes this section effective July 9, 2021, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 47.12.110. Hearings.

  1. The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition. The court shall give notice of the hearing to the department, and the department shall send a representative to the hearing. The representative of the department may also be heard at the hearing. The department shall give notice of the hearing and a copy of the petition to the minor’s foster parent, and the court shall give the foster parent an opportunity to be heard at the hearing. The public shall be excluded from the hearing, but the court, in its discretion, may permit individuals to attend a hearing if their attendance is compatible with the best interests of the minor. Nothing in this section may be applied in such a way as to deny a minor’s rights to confront adverse witnesses, to a public trial, and to a trial by jury.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section or an order prohibiting or limiting the public made under (e) of this section, the victim of an offense that a minor is alleged to have committed, or the designee of the victim, has a right to be present at all hearings or proceedings held under this section at which the minor has a right to be present. If the minor is found to have committed the offense, the victim may at the disposition hearing give sworn testimony or make an unsworn oral presentation concerning the offense and its effect on the victim. If there are numerous victims of a minor’s offense, the court may limit the number of victims who may give sworn testimony or make an unsworn oral presentation, but the court may not limit the right of a victim to attend a hearing even if the victim is likely to be a witness in a hearing concerning the minor’s alleged offense.
  3. [Repealed, § 54 ch 107 SLA 1998.]
  4. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a court hearing on a petition seeking the adjudication of a minor as a delinquent shall be open to the public, except as prohibited or limited by order of the court, if
    1. the department files with the court a motion asking the court to open the hearing to the public, and the petition seeking adjudication of the minor as a delinquent is based on
      1. the minor’s alleged commission of an offense, and the minor has knowingly failed to comply with all the terms and conditions required of the minor by the department or imposed on the minor in a court order entered under AS 47.12.040(a)(2) or 47.12.120 ;
      2. the minor’s alleged commission of
        1. a crime against a person that is punishable as a felony;
        2. a crime in which the minor employed a deadly weapon, as that term is defined in AS 11.81.900(b) , in committing the crime;
        3. arson under AS 11.46.400 11.46.410 ;
        4. burglary under AS 11.46.300 ;
        5. distribution of child pornography under AS 11.61.125 ;
        6. sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110 ; or
        7. misconduct involving a controlled substance under AS 11.71 involving the delivery of a controlled substance or the possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, other than an offense under AS 11.71.040 or 11.71.050 ; or
      3. the minor’s alleged commission of a felony and the minor was 16 years of age or older at the time of commission of the offense when the minor has previously been convicted or adjudicated a delinquent minor based on the minor’s commission of an offense that is a felony; or
    2. the minor agrees to a public hearing on the petition seeking adjudication of the minor as a delinquent.
  5. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a court proceeding shall be open to the public, except as prohibited or limited by order of the court, when the district attorney has elected to seek imposition of a dual sentence and a petition has been filed under AS 47.12.065 , or when a minor agrees as part of a plea agreement to be subject to dual sentencing.
  6. During jury selection or as part of an opening statement at the hearing, the attorney representing the department may introduce the victim to the jury, and the attorney for the minor may introduce the minor to the jury.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 19 ch 63 SLA 1997; am § 2 ch 64 SLA 1997; am §§ 20 — 22, 54 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 4 ch 40 SLA 1999; am § 6 ch 65 SLA 2005; am § 24 ch 1 TSSLA 2012)

Cross references. —

For legislative purpose concerning the amendments to this section made by § 19, ch. 63, SLA 1997 see § 1, ch. 63, SLA 1997 in the 1997 Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of subsection (e) on Alaska Delinquency Rules 3 and 21, see § 55, ch. 107, SLA 1998 in the Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of the amendment made by § 4, ch. 40, SLA 1999 on the Alaska Delinquency Rules, see § 10, ch. 40, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts. For use of photographic evidence of property taken or damaged, see AS 12.45.086 .

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 14, 2005, added subsection (f).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “sex trafficking” for “promoting prostitution” in sub-subparagraph (d)(1)(B)(vi).

Editor’s notes. —

For text of the 2005 amendment to Alaska Delinquency Rule 3(e) relating to a minor’s presence and participation in hearings described in this section, see § 9, ch. 70, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts. Under sec. 11(b), ch. 70, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendment to Alaska Delinquency Rule 3(e) by § 9, ch. 70, SLA 2005, “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Section 8, ch. 65, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of (f) of this section has the effect of amending Rule 21, Alaska Delinquency Rules, by allowing introduction of the minor and the victim at an adjudication hearing.

Section 27(a), ch. 1, TSSLA 2012, provides that the 2012 amendment to (d)(1)(B)(vi) of this section applies to offenses committed before, on, or after July 1, 2012.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.070 .

Constitutionality. —

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), discussing due process requirements in juvenile delinquency proceedings .

Constitutional requirements apply to children. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Hence, states must afford juveniles due process of law in delinquency proceedings that might result in the child’s incarceration, and accordingly juveniles must be afforded the right to be represented by counsel, must be given proper and timely notice, must be given the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and afforded the privilege against self-incrimination. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

While the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that children must be afforded due process rights in the pre-adjudication stages of the juvenile process, the Alaska supreme court believes that due process safeguards are necessary not only at the adjudicative hearing, but at any stage which may result in deprivation of the child’s liberty. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The extension to children of fundamental constitutional rights does not mean a total substitution of the adult criminal model for the present children’s court system. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).

The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles are unique to the juvenile process; hence, what is held with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Due process standards must be observed at a detention inquiry since it may result in the deprivation of the child’s liberty. Due process requires at the very least that detention orders be based on competent, sworn testimony, that the child have the right to be represented by counsel at the detention inquiry, and that the detention order state with particularity the facts supporting it. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Incarceration, when applied to children, is a taking of liberty under the 14th amendment, regardless of benevolent-sounding labels. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The due process clause of the 14th amendment applies when a child is charged with misconduct for which he may be incarcerated in an institution, regardless of the labels of the adjudication and institution, so the child is entitled to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The right to grand jury indictment is not so fundamental that due process is offended by alternate methods for instituting children’s proceedings where the child is charged with having violated a criminal statute. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Children who are charged with acts which would be chargeable only by grand jury indictment, if committed by an adult, need not be indicted by a grand jury. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Children are constitutionally entitled to jury trial in the adjudicative stage of a delinquency proceeding. However, due to the uniqueness of some facets of the procedures governing children’s court proceedings and the potential damage which may accrue to the child by a public trial, the child should first consult with his counsel and his parents or guardian when appropriate, and then affirmatively assert the right to a trial by jury before it is finally granted. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1971), in which it was held that trial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Whenever a child in a delinquency proceeding is charged with acts which would be a crime, subject to incarceration if committed by an adult, Alaska Const., art. I, § 11, guarantees him the right to jury trial. To the extent In re White, 445 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1968) [subsequently overruled, In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1972)] is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The purposes of the right to jury trial, such as protection against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge, apply as much in children’s cases as in adults’ cases. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

If the child waives jury trial, the state may not require it, but jury trial shall be provided only on demand. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The Hammonds test of waiver [Hammonds v. State, 442 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968)], applies to infants as well as adults. The consequences of application will differ for infants, because some decisions can be “knowingly and intelligently” made only by persons of fuller knowledge and maturity. An infant not advised by an attorney could make few knowledgeable and intelligent decisions about whether to waive rights in judicial proceedings. On the other hand, in areas where an adult ordinarily delegates to his attorney decision-making authority, as in deciding whether to object to introduction of evidence, the competence of the attorney rather than of the client generally determines whether waivers satisfy the Hammonds criteria. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The right to counsel extends to children charged with delinquency. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

A juvenile must be afforded the right to be represented by counsel at the delinquency proceeding, and a denial of that right violates due process. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Right to reasonable time to prepare for trial. —

It is unquestionable that the right to the assistance of counsel of necessity includes the concomitant right to have a reasonable time in which to prepare for trial. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

While an adult defendant in a criminal case must be brought to trial within a reasonable time, due process requires that he may not be brought to trial too soon. He must be given a reasonable time to consult with his counsel and to prepare his defense. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Attendance by outside individuals. —

Although an individual does not qualify for attendance under former AS 47.10.070(b) , this does not necessarily establish the impropriety of their presence at a minor’s disposition hearing. Instead, the court on a case-by-case basis needs to balance and make written findings of fact on the respective interests of the minor and the person who seeks admission to a juvenile proceeding. The interest of the individual must be substantial while the possibility of significant harm to the minor must be negligible. J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

This section provides for the exclusion of the public from children’s hearings. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

But such provision involves only persons whose presence is not desired by child. —

The area of discretion in the rule, where the court may refuse to open the hearing, involves persons whose presence is not desired by the child. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

It is an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse admittance to individuals whose presence is favored by the child, except in special circumstances such as the unavailability of a courtroom sufficiently large to hold all the individuals whose presence is sought. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

If the child or his guardian ad litem wants the press, friends, or others to be free to attend, then the hearing must be open to them. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

As children are guaranteed the right to a public trial by the Alaska Constitution. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Due process requires that children have the right to a public trial by jury where they are charged with acts which would be a crime if committed by an adult. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The fundamental constitutional right of public trial by jury must be afforded children in delinquency adjudication proceedings, in spite of the possible interference with the benevolent motives of the children’s court system which have, in the past, justified denial of those rights. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The reasons for the constitutional guarantees of public trial apply as much to juvenile delinquency proceedings as to adult criminal proceedings. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

Delinquency must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under the due process clause of the 14th amendment. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (decided prior to 1972 amendment).

The required standard of proof has been increased from “a preponderance of the evidence” to “beyond a reasonable doubt” in the adjudicatory stages of at least those delinquency proceedings in which a child is charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. E. J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alaska 1970).

“Compatible”. —

In the absence of contrary authority, it is appropriate to accord the word “compatible” its usual meaning. W.M.F. v. Johnstone, 711 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

Cited in

Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Collateral references. —

Applicability of rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 43 ALR2d 1128.

Degree of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 43 ALR2d 1138.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 83 ALR4th 1135.

Sec. 47.12.120. Judgments and orders.

  1. The court, at the conclusion of the hearing, or thereafter as the circumstances of the case may require, shall find and enter a judgment that the minor is or is not delinquent.
  2. If the minor is not subject to (j) of this section and the court finds that the minor is delinquent, it shall
    1. order the minor committed to the department for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event extend past the day the minor becomes 19 years of age, except that the department may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing (A) two-year extensions of commitment that do not extend beyond the minor’s 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the minor and the public; and (B) an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it; the department shall place the minor in the juvenile facility that the department considers appropriate and that may include a juvenile treatment facility, juvenile detention facility, or secure residential psychiatric treatment center; the minor may be released from placement or detention and placed on probation on order of the court and may also be released by the department, in its discretion, under AS 47.12.260 ;
    2. order the minor placed on probation, to be supervised by the department, and released to the minor’s parents, guardian, or a suitable person; if the court orders the minor placed on probation, it may specify the terms and conditions of probation; the probation may be for a period of time not to exceed two years and in no event to extend past the day the minor becomes 19 years of age, except that the department may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
      1. two-year extensions of supervision that do not extend beyond the minor’s 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the minor and the public; and
      2. an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if the continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it;
    3. order the minor committed to the custody of the department and placed on probation, to be supervised by the department and released to the minor’s parents, guardian, other suitable person, or suitable nondetention setting such as with a relative or in a foster home or residential child care facility, whichever the department considers appropriate to implement the treatment plan of the predisposition report; if the court orders the minor placed on probation, it may specify the terms and conditions of probation; the department may transfer the minor, in the minor’s best interests, from one of the probationary placement settings listed in this paragraph to another, and the minor, the minor’s parents or guardian, the minor’s foster parent, and the minor’s attorney are entitled to reasonable notice of the transfer; the probation may be for a period of time not to exceed two years and in no event to extend past the day the minor becomes 19 years of age, except that the department may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
      1. two-year extensions of commitment that do not extend beyond the minor’s 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the minor and the public; and
      2. an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if the continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it;
    4. order the minor and the minor’s parent to make suitable restitution in lieu of or in addition to the court’s order under (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection; under this paragraph,
      1. except as provided in (B) of this paragraph, the court may not refuse to make an order of restitution to benefit the victim of the act of the minor that is the basis of the delinquency adjudication; under this subparagraph, the court may require the minor to use the services of a community dispute resolution center that has been recognized by the commissioner under AS 47.12.450(b) to resolve any dispute between the minor and the victim of the minor’s offense as to the amount of or manner of payment of the restitution;
      2. the court may not order payment of restitution by the parent of a minor who is a runaway or missing minor for an act of the minor that was committed by the minor after the parent has made a report to a law enforcement agency, as authorized by AS 47.10.141(a) , that the minor has run away or is missing; for purposes of this subparagraph, “runaway or missing minor” means a minor who a parent reasonably believes is absent from the minor’s residence for the purpose of evading the parent or who is otherwise missing from the minor’s usual place of abode without the consent of the parent; and
      3. at the request of the department, the Department of Law, the victims’ advocate, or on its own motion, the court shall, at any time, order the minor and the minor’s parent, if applicable, to submit financial information on a form approved by the Alaska Court System to the court, the department, and the Department of Law for the purpose of establishing the amount of restitution or enforcing an order of restitution under AS 47.12.170 ; the form must include a warning that submission of incomplete or inaccurate information is punishable as unsworn falsification in the second degree under AS 11.56.210 ;
    5. order the minor committed to the department for placement in an adventure-based education program established under AS 47.21.020 with conditions the court considers appropriate concerning release upon satisfactory completion of the program or commitment under (1) of this subsection if the program is not satisfactorily completed;
    6. in addition to an order under (1) — (5) of this subsection, order the minor to perform community service; for purposes of this paragraph, “community service” includes work
      1. on a project identified in AS 33.30.901 ; or
      2. that, on the recommendation of the city council or traditional village council, would benefit persons within the city or village who are elderly or disabled; or
    7. in addition to an order under (1) — (6) of this subsection, order the minor’s parent or guardian to comply with orders made under AS 47.12.155 , including participation in treatment under AS 47.12.155 (b)(1).
  3. If the court finds that the minor is not delinquent, it shall immediately order the minor released from the department’s custody and returned to the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian, and dismiss the case.
  4. A minor found to be delinquent is a ward of the state while committed to the department or while the department has the power to supervise the minor’s actions. The court shall review an order made under (b) of this section annually and may review the order more frequently to determine if continued placement, probation, or supervision, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the minor and the public. The department, the minor, and the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian are entitled, when good cause is shown, to a review on application. If the application is granted, the court shall afford these parties and their counsel and the minor’s foster parent reasonable notice in advance of the review and hold a hearing where these parties and their counsel and the minor’s foster parent shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard. The minor shall be afforded the opportunity to be present at the review.
  5. The department shall pay all court costs incurred in all proceedings in connection with the adjudication of delinquency under this chapter, including hearings that result in the release of the minor.
  6. A minor, the minor’s parents or guardian acting on the minor’s behalf, or the department may appeal a judgment or order, or the stay, modification, setting aside, revocation, or enlargement of a judgment or order issued by the court under this chapter.
  7. [Repealed, § 54 ch 107 SLA 1998.]
  8. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
  9. When, under (a) of this section, the court enters judgment finding that a minor is delinquent, the court may order the minor temporarily detained pending entry of its dispositional order if the court finds that detention is necessary
    1. to protect the minor or the community; or
    2. to ensure the minor’s appearance at a subsequent court hearing.
  10. If, in a case in which a district attorney has elected to seek imposition of a dual sentence under AS 47.12.065 , the court finds that the minor is delinquent for committing an offense in the circumstances set out in AS 47.12.065 , or if the minor agrees as part of a plea agreement to be subject to dual sentencing, the court shall
    1. enter one or more orders under (b) of this section; and
    2. pronounce a sentence for the offense in accordance with the provisions of AS 12.55; however, the sentence pronounced under this paragraph must include some period of imprisonment that is not suspended by the court.
  11. [Repealed, § 22 ch 32 SLA 2016.]

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 144 SLA 1996; am § 6 ch 94 SLA 1997; am §§ 23 — 25, 54 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 108 SLA 1998; am §§ 5, 6 ch 40 SLA 1999; am § 17 ch 65 SLA 2001; am § 3 ch 23 SLA 2002; am § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 33 ch 42 SLA 2006; am § 22 ch 32 SLA 2016; am § 27 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996, the amendments made by § 3, ch. 144, SLA 1996 to AS 47.10.080 were made to this section instead. Also, in 1996, in (b)(7) of this section “AS 47.12.155 ” was substituted for “AS 47.12.079” in two places to reflect the 1996 renumbering of AS 47.12.079.

Administrative Code. —

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, repealed subsection (h).

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, inserted “in the second degree” in subparagraph (b)(4)(C).

The 2016 amendment, effective October 4, 2016, repealed (k).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (b)(1), near the end, substituted “juvenile treatment facility, juvenile detention facility, or secure residential psychiatric treatment center” for “juvenile correctional school, juvenile work camp, treatment facility, detention home, or detention facility”.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the annotations set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.080 .

Each category of children mandates differences regarding content of dispositional orders. —

Alaska’s pertinent statutory provisions and procedural rules distinguish between categories of children for purposes of administering Alaska children’s laws. Of controlling significance is that each class or cate- gory mandates distinct differences regarding the permissible content of any dispositional order the trial court can enter. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Institutionalization of a minor. —

A minor’s history of failed placements and continued violations of law can provide an adequate basis for the superior court’s decision to institutionalize the minor. However, this decision must still be made after careful consideration of the alternatives. J.T.S. v. State, 825 P.2d 461 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

It was not error to institutionalize a minor where the minor had a long history of unsuccessful less restrictive placements and had a continuing need for treatment. The record also supported the court’s findings that the minor needed education and substance abuse treatment and would not receive them in a less restrictive environment. A.I. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Findings insufficient to sustain order institutionalizing juvenile. —

See R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), overruled in part, B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Jurisdiction dependent upon age of offender at time of act. —

Juvenile jurisdiction of the superior court in delinquency proceedings is dependent upon the age of the offender at the time of the delinquent acts. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978).

Nor to justify dispensing with constitutional safeguards. —

The benevolent social theory supposedly underlying children’s court acts does not furnish justification for dispensing with constitutional safe- guards. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Option available to prosecution absent waiver under former AS 47.10.060(a). —

A proceeding in children’s court, which is limited to the dispositions set forth in former AS 47.10.080(b) , is the only option available to the prosecution absent waiver under former AS 47.10.060(a), and the standards established in that section are sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary enforcement. M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Least restrictive alternative approach. —

Under the ‘‘least restrictive alternative’’ approach, the court must consider and reject less restrictive alter- natives prior to the imposition of more restrictive alternatives. The state has the burden of proving that less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

To determine the least restrictive alternative in a given case, the court must consider, among other things, the seriousness of the offense, the degree of the child’s culpability, the totality of the underlying circumstances in the case, and the child’s prior record. In re J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Superior court erred in concluding that institutionalization was the ‘‘least restrictive alternative,’’ where there was no substantial evidence to warrant a conclusion that the child’s treatment needs could not be successfully addressed by residential treatment. In re J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Restitution order held appropriate. —

Under paragraph (b)(4), a superior court had authority, and was obligated, to order restitution for the time the victim’s aunt missed work because, as the victim’s effective guardian, she was a victim under AS 47.12.990 (16) and AS 12.55.185 (19)(B). W.S. v. State, 174 P.3d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

One who committed a crime when 18 years of age could be criminally prosecuted, as an adult, when he had been previously adjudged a delinquent minor and the court had retained supervisory jurisdiction over him until age 19. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978).

Section is maximum sentencing statute. —

Statutes requiring release upon a specified birthday are, in effect, maximum sentencing statutes. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

Sentence reduction to 19 years of age not retroactive. —

There was nothing in the amendatory legislation to this section that indicated an intention that the sentence reduction should operate retrospectively. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

Commitment periods. —

In the provisions of AS 47.12.120(b)(1) and 47.12.260 , the legislature allocated the risk of repeat offenders to the public in exchange presumably for offsetting gains realized by rehabilitating juveniles to make them productive citizens, and imposing state tort liability for harm caused by released juveniles would have distorted this balance; likewise the policy of preventing future harm was not obviously going to be served by imposing a duty, given that AS 47.12.010(b) limited commitment and re-commitment periods of time, and there was no clear correlation between the length of commitment and the rate of recidivism. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).

The only instance under Alaska children’s laws authorizing institutionalization or incarceration is when the child has violated the laws of the state, or any of its political subdivisions, and in turn has been adjudged a delinquent minor. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

The legislature has authorized institutionalization only where the child is found to be a delinquent minor. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).

Extension of commitment. —

While a juvenile killed a victim after being released early from commitment and there was no question that the victim’s family suffered injury, the connection between the juvenile’s crime and the state’s failure to ask for the juvenile to remain committed for the requisite or an extended time was attenuated; the juvenile’s commitment could not have been unilaterally extended under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) , and because it was not obvious in any event that extending the juvenile’s commitment would have made the the juvenile less likely to commit violent acts, the state owed no duty and the state was entitled to summary judgment in the victim’s family’s negligence action against it. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).

There is no conflict between former AS 47.10.080(b)(1) and former AS 47.10.060(d). In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The right of confrontation is paramount to the state’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (U.S. 1974), limited, Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1989).

But state’s interest in secrecy of juvenile adjudications need not always fall before confrontation right. —

See Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

Prosecution witness impeachable by cross-examination for bias from probationary status as juvenile delinquent. —

The confrontation clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness’s probationary status as juvenile delinquent although such an impeachment would conflict with a state’s asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (U.S. 1974), limited, Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1989).

Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to a prosecution witness or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record — if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case — is outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias on the testimony of a crucial identification witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (U.S. 1974), limited, Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1989).

The state cannot, consistent with right of confrontation, require the defendant to bear the full burden of vindicating the state’s interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal records. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (U.S. 1974), limited, Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1989).

The United States supreme court has held that the constitutional right of confrontation required that defense counsel be allowed to investigate the potential bias of a crucial prosecution witness, even where that potential bias arose out of a juvenile adjudication and its resultant probationary status. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

The United States supreme court concluded that Alaska’s interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender was outweighed by the more critical need to afford a criminal defendant reasonable inquiry into the motives of prosecution witnesses. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

Conflict between section and decision in Davis v. Alaska is superficial. —

The conflict between this section and the supreme court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), is only superficial. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

Since disclosure required because of probationary status, not juvenile adjudication. —

The constitutional requirement of disclosure in the facts in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), is created not by the juvenile adjudication itself but by the probationary status of the juvenile at the time of Davis’ trial, with its potential for motivating false testimony. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

Where the witness was not on juvenile probation, it cannot be seriously argued that the fact of previous juvenile convictions, standing alone, provided any inference of potential bias. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

State adjudications directed solely at credibility do not conflict with confrontation right. —

Juvenile adjudications which are stale by Alaska’s standards and directed solely at general credibility rather than bias are generally not sufficiently probative to create a genuine conflict with the defendant’s right of confrontation. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

Where the attempted impeachment was of general credibility by proof of prior “convictions,” the probative value of this type of evidence is considerably less than that which suggests false or distorted testimony because of bias, and the need to confront a witness with such evidence is correspondingly less. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

As a general rule, the trial courts could properly refuse evidence of stale convictions or juvenile adjudications where these were offered for the purpose of discrediting the witness generally rather than to show some specific potential for bias or prejudice toward the defendant. Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1974).

Privilege against self-incrimination. —

When a person under the age of 18 years violated former AS 47.10.010(a)(1), he could be adjudged a “delinquent minor,” one possible consequence of which adjudication was commitment to a juvenile facility until the age of 19 [now 20]. Moreover, if there was probable cause to believe the minor was delinquent and the court found that he was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile, he could be prosecuted as if he were an adult. Thus, there was always some danger of incarceration, or other criminal sanctions, when a child committed an act which would have been a crime if committed by an adult. Under such circumstances a child had a privilege against self-incrimination. E. L. L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977).

Former subsection (g) provides in part that a juvenile offender may not be considered a criminal by reason of the adjudication, nor may the adjudication be afterward deemed a conviction. Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S. Ct. 125, 42 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 1974).

A judge cannot consider a juvenile offense as a criminal conviction for the purpose of prescribing a mandatory sentence. Berfield v. State, 458 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1969).

The judge’s consideration of factors relating to accused’s life, characteristics, background and behavior prior to reaching the age of 18 years did not mean that he considered accused a criminal or that he was using the juvenile offenses as criminal convictions in determining the sentence to impose. Berfield v. State, 458 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1969).

Consideration of the juvenile record is proper by the court imposing a sentence upon an adult offender. Penn v. State, 588 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1978).

Use of the juvenile history of the offender in sentencing proceedings does not amount to the use of those proceedings as evidence against the offender within the proscription of such a statute as this section. Penn v. State, 588 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1978).

When sentence determined. —

The sentence which may be imposed upon a convicted adult is determined as of the time of the final judgment of conviction, or as of the time of commission of the offense. These rules have been applied to juvenile sentencing. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

Restitution. —

Superior court could properly require minor to pay restitution for jewelry which was taken during a burglary which he admitted and for which the court adjudicated him a delinquent, where he did not contest the fact that his participation in the burglary made him legally accountable as an accomplice of the theft of the jewelry. J.M. v. State, 786 P.2d 923 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Conversion of juvenile restitution order. —

Superior courts do not have the authority to convert unpaid restitution of a juvenile offender into a civil judgment. R.I. v. State, 894 P.2d 683 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

Appeal of detention order. —

Under this section and Children’s Rule 29(a), a minor who is detained may appeal his detention order. A.M. v. State, 653 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Appellants are authorized to bring juvenile bail appeals under App. R. 207 to ensure that juvenile detention hearings are not insulated from review. A.M. v. State, 653 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Appeal from detention order dismissed as untimely. —

See A.M. v. State, 653 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Standards for use in choosing alternatives under former AS 47.10.080(b) . —

See R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), overruled in part, B.F.L. v. State, 233 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Where a delinquent child was sentenced for a fixed time period and ordered to an adult institution, this amounted to a penal sentence as opposed to the juvenile disposition required under former AS 47.10.080(b)(1). B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Court cannot place child in particular institution. —

Under this section as amended, the court no longer has discretion to order the delinquent child placed in a particular institution. The court only has authority to commit the child to the department, which then places the child. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974); A.A. v. State, 538 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1975).

Authority to order placement of delinquent child. —

In enacting former AS 47.10.080(b)(3), the legislature intended for the department, not the court, to make the decisions concerning placement of the minor. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); State v. E.E., 912 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Following a court’s determination that placement outside the home is appropriate, the decision of a minor’s exact placement is entrusted to the discretion of the Department of Health and Social Services. The court may not usurp the department’s decision-making function or substitute its own view of the minor’s best interests. E.T. v. State, 879 P.2d 363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Former AS 47.10.080(b)(3) of this section provides the court authority to order the delinquent minor placed on probation to the Department of Health and Social Services; it is then up to the department to determine whether the minor should be placed with his parents or in another setting. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); State v. E.E., 912 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Where a delinquent child was under the age of 18 at the time the acts of delinquency were committed, he is considered a minor for the purposes of adjudication and disposition. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Age 20 is the proper age for determining whether a minor is amenable to treatment. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The inconsistency between former AS 47.10.060(d) and former AS 47.10.080(b)(1) that existed prior to the 1977 amendments to these sections was eliminated in that AS 47.10.060(d) provided that the determinative age was 20 and subsection (b)(1) provided that the maximum limitation of confinement of minors was 20. In re F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), overruled, State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Binding advance consent to treatment. —

In order to give effect to the legislature’s intent that a court may consider treatment until age 20 in determining waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, it is necessary that the judge be able to evaluate at the time of the waiver hearing whether the juvenile will in fact be available for treatment. It is not possible for the judge to know this unless the child can give binding consent at the time of the hearing. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

A minor may bindingly consent to an additional period of supervision as provided by former AS 47.10.080(b)(1) of this section. In determining the effect to be given to such consent, the court should consider the age and maturity of the juvenile and whether he has the advice of counsel. To protect a minor from making a decision adverse to his own interests, a guardian ad litem may be appointed. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

The portion of the opinion in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), that held that a minor in a waiver hearing could not give a binding advance consent to treatment beyond age 19 was mistaken. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

While it is true, as indicated in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1978), that the statute contemplates that the determination of the additional period of treatment be made after the initial hearing, such an intent does not mandate that an advance consent to treatment given by the minor may not be regarded as binding. State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

Restitution properly includes mental health counseling for victims. —

Superior court had authority to order restitution in favor of a mental health counselor because, given the broad authorization for counseling restitution in AS 12.55.045(a) , suitable restitution in delinquency cases includes mental health counseling for victims. W.S. v. State, 174 P.3d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

The court must choose between commitment to the Department of Health and Social Services and probation, and may not delegate the choice to the Department of Health and Social Services. This is a correct textual analysis, especially in light of the provision in former AS 47.10.080(b)(1) for subsequent court order for probation following placement or detention. The legislature has clearly indicated its intent to place this choice in the hands of the court. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

Court-ordered probation. —

Probation cannot be deemed court-ordered under subsection (b) of this section unless it is directly ordered. It cannot be “triggered” by a decision of the department that the juvenile has successfully completed a rehabilitation program, even if the court judgment states that institutionalization will end upon such successful completion. L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1981).

Former AS 47.10.080 is comparable to AS 12.55.100(a)(2) and requires consideration of a minor’s earning capacity. J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

The hearing judge erred by placing a delinquent child on probation until his 20th birthday. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Petition necessary to extend probation beyond 19th birthday. —

The superior court was without authority to extend probation beyond the delinquent child’s 19th birthday without a petition from the department to extend the probationary period for an additional year. B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974).

Travel expenses not included in court costs. —

Legislature's choice of language, “court costs”, does not require Division of Juvenile Justice to pay for an out-of-custody juvenile defendant's travel expenses; “court costs” may reasonably be interpreted to include such things as filing fees, court reporter fees, and other costs of the sort that are sometimes taxed by the court against a party. Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019).

Only juvenile delinquency statute addressing the Division of Juvenile Justice's payment obligations, does not require that it pay the travel expenses of an out-of-custody juvenile defendant to attend trial. Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019).

Court of appeals erred in upholding a decision requiring the Public Defender Agency to pay the travel expenses for a juvenile to the site of his juvenile delinquency proceeding because neither the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) nor the Agency was legally obligated to pay such costs; neither the DJJ's nor the Agency's authorizing statutes required them to pay the travel expenses for out-of-custody indigent juvenile defendants to attend their delinquency proceedings. Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019).

Applied in

L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); Adams v. Ross, 551 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1976); In re D. H. v. State, 561 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1977); R.N. v. State, 770 P.2d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); P.R.J. v. State, 787 P.2d 123 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Quoted in

Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1972); LeFever v. State, 877 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Cited in

Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1973); Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991); State v. Ladd, 951 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Andrews v. State, 967 P.2d 1016 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Collateral references. —

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile’s offense. 66 ALR4th 985.

Sec. 47.12.130. Predisposition hearing reports.

  1. Before the disposition hearing of a delinquent minor, the department shall submit a predisposition report with a recommended plan of treatment to aid the court in its selection of a disposition, a victim impact statement reporting the information set out in AS 12.55.022 , and any further information that the court may request. In preparing the predisposition report, the department shall contact the victim of the minor’s offense.
  2. The court shall inform the minor, the minor’s parents, and the attorneys representing the parties and the guardian ad litem that the predisposition report will be available to them not less than 10 days before the disposition hearing.
  3. [Repealed, § 6 ch 23 SLA 2002.]
  4. In this section, “parents” means the natural or adoptive parents, and any legal guardian, relative, or other adult person with whom the minor has resided and who has acted as a parent in providing for the minor for a continuous period of time before this action.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 35 ch 92 SLA 2001; am § 6 ch 23 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (d) was formerly (c); relettered in 2001.

Notes to Decisions

Consideration of outside materials. —

Although this statute and the Delinquency Rules list the information that must be made available to aid the court in a minor’s disposition hearing, neither purports to limit the materials a court may consider as a discretionary matter. In the absence of an express restriction governing the consideration of unsolicited letters, the superior court was authorized to proceed in any lawful manner, provided the court’s actions were not inconsistent with the Delinquency Rules and did not unduly delay or otherwise interfere with the unique purpose and character of delinquency proceedings. Thus, the court’s consideration of unsolicited, unobjectionable letters from the family of the victims was appropriate. J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.081 ).

Applied in

Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.081 ).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.081 ).

Sec. 47.12.140. Court dispositional order.

In making its dispositional order under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) — (3) and (5) and (j), the court shall

  1. consider both the best interests of the minor and the interests of the public, and, in doing so, the court shall take into account
    1. the seriousness of the minor’s delinquent act and the attitude of the minor and the minor’s parents toward that act;
    2. the minor’s culpability as indicated by the circumstances of the particular case;
    3. the age of the minor;
    4. the minor’s prior criminal or juvenile record and the success or failure of any previous orders, dispositions, or placements imposed on the minor;
    5. the effect of the dispositional order to be imposed in deterring the minor from committing other delinquent acts;
    6. the need to commit the minor to the department’s custody or to detain the minor in a juvenile treatment facility, juvenile detention facility, secure residential psychiatric treatment center, or other suitable place in order to prevent further harm to the public;
    7. the interest of the public in securing the minor’s rehabilitation; and
    8. the ability of the state to take custody of and to care for the minor; and
  2. order the least restrictive alternative disposition for the minor; for purposes of this paragraph, the “least restrictive alternative disposition” means that disposition that is no more restrictive than is, in the judgment of the court, most conducive to the minor’s rehabilitation taking into consideration the interests of the public.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 26 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 28 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (1)(F), substituted “in a juvenile treatment facility, juvenile detention facility, secure residential psychiatric treatment center,” for “in an institution.”

Notes to Decisions

Institutionalization of a minor. —

It was not error to institutionalize a minor where the minor had a long history of unsuccessful less restrictive placements and had a continuing need for treatment. The record also supported the court’s findings that the minor needed education and substance abuse treatment and would not receive them in a less restrictive environment. A.I. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015) (memorandum decision).

Cited in

Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Sec. 47.12.150. Legal custody, guardianship, and residual parental rights and responsibilities.

  1. When a minor is committed to the department under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3) or 47.12.240 , detained by the department on behalf of the Department of Corrections under AS 33.30.011 and AS 47.12.105 , or released under AS 47.12.120(b)(2) to the minor’s parents, guardian, or other suitable person, a relationship of legal custody exists. This relationship imposes on the state and its authorized agents or the parents, guardian, or other suitable person the responsibility of physical care and control of the minor, the determination of where and with whom the minor shall live, the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the minor, and the duty of providing the minor with food, shelter, education, and medical care. These obligations are subject to any residual parental rights and responsibilities and rights and responsibilities of a guardian if one has been appointed. When a minor is committed to the department and the department places the minor with the minor’s parent, the parent has the responsibility to provide and pay for food, shelter, education, and medical care for the minor. When parental rights have been terminated, or there are no living parents and a guardian has not been appointed, the responsibilities of legal custody include those in (b) and (c) of this section. The department or person having legal custody of the minor may delegate any of the responsibilities under this section, except authority to consent to marriage, adoption, and military enlistment may not be delegated. For purposes of this chapter, a person in charge of a placement setting is an agent of the department.
  2. When a guardian is appointed for the minor, the court shall specify in its order the rights and responsibilities of the guardian. The guardian may be removed only by court order. The rights and responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, having the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consenting to marriage, consenting to military enlistment, consenting to major medical treatment, obtaining representation for the minor in legal actions, and making decisions of legal or financial significance concerning the minor.
  3. When there has been transfer of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities. These residual rights and responsibilities of the parent include the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consent to adoption, consent to marriage, consent to military enlistment, consent to major medical treatment except in cases of emergency or cases falling under AS 25.20.025 , and the responsibility for support, except if by court order any residual right and responsibility has been delegated to a guardian under (b) of this section.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 29 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For program administration: children with disabilities, see 4 AAC 52, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a), rewrote the first sentence, which read, “When a minor is committed under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3) to the department or released under AS 47.12.120(b)(2) to the minor’s parents, guardian, or other suitable person, a relationship of legal custody exists.”, in the second sentence, substituted “imposes on the state” for “imposes on the department”.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the annotations set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.084 .

Department’s responsibility for medical costs. —

The department is responsible for the medical costs of children in its custody, whether the children are placed at home or in a foster home. In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991).

The phrase “reasonable visitation” in subsection (c) does not imply an absolute right to visitation; this section should be read in conjunction with the rest of the chapter to allow parental visits to be barred when the visits are not in the best interests of the child. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).

The following procedures should be followed when visitation rights are denied prior to the termination of parental rights: first, the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services should have primary authority to set visitation based on the best interests of the child, since the division is in the best position to make this decision in the first instance; and secondly, either the guardian ad litem or the parents should be entitled to request an expedited evidentiary hearing of a denial of visitation, which would consist of an independent determination by the superior court that clear and convincing evidence showed that the child’s best interests were served by disallowing parental visitations. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).

Effect of being foster parents on husband-wife evidentiary privilege. —

A foster child is a child of the foster parents for purposes of applying the exception to the husband-wife privilege set forth in Alaska Evidence Rule 505(a)(2)(D)(i); one foster parent cannot rely on the husband-wife privilege to refuse to testify against the other concerning evidence relating to an assault on the foster child. Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

De facto termination of natural parent’s visitation rights. —

Where the Department of Health and Social Services decided to allow minor children, who had been adjudicated as children in need of aid, to move from Alaska to Alabama with their foster care family, the state’s action constituted a de facto termination of a natural parent’s visitation rights; the natural father was unemployed and virtually penniless, the state would not provide airfare so that the father could visit his children on a regular basis, and the father would be limited to phone “visits” because of his lack of funds. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).

Department’s decision to place children in a foster home in Anchorage did not constitute a de facto termination of their mother’s parental rights of visitation, notwithstanding the mother’s contention that she did not have the financial means to travel from her home in Juneau to Anchorage. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).

Limitation on visitation unjustified. —

Before a limitation on reasonable parental limitation is justified, the Department of Health and Social Services must present proof that the limitation is in the child’s best interests, and where no such evidence was presented, the case for restricting visitation with the incarcerated father was not made. In re D.P., 861 P.2d 1166 (Alaska 1993).

Standard of review of state action constituting de facto termination of natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation. —

The appropriate standard of review for state decisions which essentially terminate a natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation under subsection (c) is an independent determination of whether the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental visitation is in the child’s best interest. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).

Applied in

In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990); B.S. v. State (In re C.A.S.), 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994).

Sec. 47.12.155. Parental or guardian accountability and participation.

  1. The parent or guardian of a minor who is alleged to be a delinquent under AS 47.12.020 or found to be a delinquent under AS 47.12.120 shall attend each hearing held during the delinquency proceedings unless the court excuses the parent or guardian from attendance for good cause.
  2. If a minor is found to be a delinquent under AS 47.12.120 , the court may order that the minor’s parent or guardian
    1. personally participate in treatment reasonably available in the parent’s or guardian’s location as specified in a plan set out in the court order;
    2. notify the department if the minor violates a term or condition of the court order; and
    3. comply with any other conditions set out in the court order, including a condition in an order requiring a parent to pay restitution ordered on behalf of a victim of a delinquent act.
  3. If a court orders a minor’s parent or guardian to participate in treatment under (b) of this section, the court also shall order the parent or guardian to use any available insurance or another resource to cover the treatment, or to pay for the treatment if other coverage is unavailable. If the court determines that the parent or guardian is unable to pay for the treatment due to indigence and the department pays for the treatment, the department may seek reimbursement only from the indigent parent’s or guardian’s permanent fund dividend.
  4. The permanent fund dividend of an indigent parent or guardian participating in treatment ordered under (b) of this section may be taken under AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.150 to satisfy the balance due on a reimbursement claim by the department under (c) of this section.
  5. If a parent or guardian fails to attend a hearing as required in (a) of this section, the court shall hold the hearing without the attendance of the parent or guardian.

History. (§ 2 ch 144 SLA 1996; am § 36 ch 92 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.10.079; renumbered in 1996. In 1996, in subsection (a), “AS 47.12.020 ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.010(a)(1)” and in subsections (a) and (b), “AS 47.12.120 ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.080(b) ” under § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996.

In 2018, “AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.150 ” was substituted for “AS 43.23.065(b)(6) and 43.23.066 ” to reflect the renumbering of those sections.

Cross references. —

For applicability of the 2001 amendment of subsection (b) by § 36, ch. 92, SLA 2001, see § 45, ch. 92, SLA 2001, in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.12.160. Retention of jurisdiction over minor.

  1. Except as provided in (g) of this section, the court retains jurisdiction over the case and may at any time stay execution, modify, set aside, revoke, or enlarge a judgment or order, or grant a new hearing, in the exercise of its power of protection over the minor and for the minor’s best interest, for a period of time not to exceed the maximum period otherwise permitted by law or in any event extend past the day the minor becomes 19, unless sooner discharged by the court, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. An application for any of these purposes may be made by the parent, guardian, or custodian acting in behalf of the minor, or the court may, on its own motion, and after reasonable notice to interested parties and the appropriate department, take action that it considers appropriate.
  2. If the court determines at a hearing authorized by (a) of this section that it is in the best interests of the minor to be released to the care or custody of the minor’s parent, guardian, or custodian, it may enter an order to that effect and the minor is discharged from the control of the department.
  3. If a minor is adjudicated a delinquent before the minor’s 18th birthday, the court may retain jurisdiction over the minor after the minor’s 18th birthday for the purpose of supervising the minor’s rehabilitation, but the court’s jurisdiction over the minor under this chapter never extends beyond the minor’s 19th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. The department may retain jurisdiction over the person between the person’s 18th and 19th birthdays for the purpose of supervising the person’s rehabilitation, if the person has been placed under the supervision of the department before the person’s 18th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it.
  4. The department, or the district attorney in a matter subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter under AS 47.12.020(b) , may petition the court for imposition of sentence pronounced under AS 47.12.120(j)(2) if the offender is still subject to the jurisdiction of the court and if the offender, after pronouncement of sentence under AS 47.12.120(j)(2) ,
    1. commits a subsequent felony offense;
    2. commits a subsequent offense against a person that is a misdemeanor and involves injury to a person or the use of a deadly weapon;
    3. fails to comply with the terms of a restitution order;
    4. fails to engage in or satisfactorily complete a rehabilitation program ordered by a court or required by a facility or juvenile probation officer; or
    5. escapes from a juvenile or other correctional facility.
  5. If a petition is filed under (d) of this section and if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor has committed a subsequent felony offense that is a crime against a person or is the crime of arson, the court shall impose the adult sentence previously pronounced under AS 47.12.120(j) and, subject to AS 47.12.105 , transfer custody of the minor to the Department of Corrections. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the other circumstances set out in (d)(1) — (5) of this section exist, the court shall impose the adult sentence previously pronounced and, subject to AS 47.12.105 , transfer custody of the minor to the Department of Corrections unless the minor proves by preponderance of the evidence that mitigating circumstances exist that justify a continuance in the stay of the adult sentence and the minor is amenable to further treatment under this chapter. The court shall make written findings to support its order.
  6. Notwithstanding another provision of law, the court shall accept
    1. payments of restitution from a minor and the minor’s parent at any time;and
    2. prepayments of restitution or payments in anticipation of an order of restitution.
  7. If the department has filed a delinquency petition under AS 47.12.020 and 47.12.040 regarding a minor who is 18 years of age or older, the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate and dispose of the matter as provided in this chapter.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 27 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 17 SLA 2004; am §§ 5 — 7 ch 70 SLA 2005; am § 11 ch 21 SLA 2018; am § 30 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective April 22, 2004, added subsection (f).

The 2005 amendment, effective July 14, 2005, added “Except as provided in (g) of this section” at the beginning of subsection (a); in subsection (d) inserted “, or the district attorney in a matter subject to the jurisdiction of this chapter under AS 47.12.020(b) ,” in the introductory language and inserted “or other” in paragraph (5); and added subsection (g).

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, in (f)(2), deleted the second sentence, which read, “If the recipient has elected to have the Department of Law collect the judgment of restitution under AS 12.55.051(g) , the court shall forward all payments of restitution to the Department of Law within five days after the court’s acceptance.”

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (e), twice inserted “, subject to AS 47.12.105 ,”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of (d) of this section and the provisions of (g) of this section “apply to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Notes to Decisions

Time limit of jurisdiction over juvenile. —

Under subsection (a), the superior court’s jurisdiction over the minors’ cases ends when the minors were discharged from the court’s supervision. Because of this, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to set aside an adjudication of delinquency when the petition was filed three years after the juvenile’s probation expired. State v. T.M., 860 P.2d 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

No inherent power to vacate order. —

The superior court does not possess inherent authority to vacate any delinquency adjudication it had previously entered. State v. T.M., 860 P.2d 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

When one commits a criminal offense after reaching the age of 18 years, he is no longer entitled to claim the benefits of the Children’s Code. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

Offenses to which court’s jurisdiction not extended. —

Neither subsection (a) nor subsection (c) purports to extend the court’s juvenile jurisdiction to newly committed offenses occurring between the offender’s 18th and 19th birthdays. Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

Jurisdiction defeated only by expressly retroactive statute. —

Once the sentencing court acquires jurisdiction over the individual, only an expressly retroactive statute could defeat its continuing jurisdiction for the duration of the sentence originally imposed. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

Restitution. —

Trial court continued to have jurisdiction to enter a restitution order against the juvenile’s mother, even though his probation had ended, because AS 47.12.160 and 47.12.170 conferred extended subject-matter jurisdiction on the question of restitution. Because the trial court had issued a disposition order directing the juvenile and his mother to make restitution in an amount to be determined later, the trial court retained continuing subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dollar amount of restitution and to issue a final restitution order. State v. W.P., 349 P.3d 181 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).

Applied in

P.R.J. v. State, 787 P.2d 123 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.100 ).

Cited in

Andrews v. State, 967 P.2d 1016 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

Sec. 47.12.170. Enforcement of restitution.

  1. An order by the court under AS 47.12.120 that a minor or the minor’s parent pay restitution is a civil judgment that remains enforceable after the expiration of the court’s jurisdiction over the minor under AS 47.12.160 . A recipient of a restitution order, or the state on behalf of the restitution recipient, may enforce a restitution order against the minor and the minor’s parent by any procedure authorized by law for enforcement of a civil judgment. If the restitution recipient enforces or collects restitution through civil process, collection costs and full reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded. If the state on the restitution recipient’s behalf enforces or collects restitution through civil process, collection costs and full reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded, up to a maximum of twice the amount of restitution owing at the time the civil process was initiated. This section does not limit the authority of the court to otherwise enforce orders of payment for restitution. An order of restitution enforced under this section does not limit under other law the civil liability of the minor or the minor’s parent as a result of the delinquent conduct.
  2. The Department of Law is authorized to collect restitution on behalf of the recipient unless
    1. the recipient elects as provided in (c) of this section to enforce the order of restitution without the assistance of the Department of Law; or
    2. the order requires restitution to be made in a form other than payment of a specific dollar amount.
  3. The court shall forward a copy of the restitution order to the department and the office of victims’ rights when the order is entered. Upon receipt of the order, the department shall send a notice to the recipient regarding the recipient’s rights under this section, including the right to elect to enforce the order of restitution without the assistance of the Department of Law and of the possibility of, and procedure for, receiving payment from the restorative justice account. When 90 days have passed since the recipient received the notice, or when the department receives the recipient’s response to the notice, whichever is earlier, the department shall send to the Department of Law a copy of the order of restitution; the name, date of birth, social security number, and current address of the recipient, the minor, and the minor’s parent; the notice sent to the recipient under this subsection; and the recipient’s response, if any. If a response from the recipient reaches the department after the department has sent the order of restitution and other information to the Department of Law under this subsection, the department shall immediately send the response to the Department of Law. The information provided to the Department of Law and the office of victims’ rights under this subsection is confidential and is not open to inspection as a public record under AS 40.25.110 . The Department of Law, the office of victims’ rights, or agents for the Department of Law or office of victims’ rights may not disclose the information except as necessary to collect on the restitution.
  4. The Department of Law may not begin collection procedures on the order of restitution until the recipient has been given notice under (c) of this section and has been given 90 days after receipt of notice to elect to collect the restitution without the assistance of the Department of Law. If the Department of Law receives a response to the notice before the 90-day period, the Department of Law may begin collection on the restitution. A recipient may inform the Department of Law at a later time of the recipient’s election to collect the restitution without the assistance of the Department of Law; upon receipt of the information, the Department of Law may no longer proceed with collection efforts on behalf of the recipient. A recipient who has elected under this section to collect restitution without the assistance of the Department of Law may not later request the services of that department to collect the restitution.
  5. If the Department of Law or its agents proceed to collect restitution on behalf of a recipient under (c) of this section, the actions of the Department of Law or an agent of the Department of Law on behalf of the recipient do not create an attorney-client relationship between the Department of Law and the recipient. The Department of Law or its agent may not settle a judgment for restitution without the consent of the recipient of the restitution.
  6. An action for damages may not be brought against the state or any of its agents, officers, or employees based on an action or omission under this section.
  7. The Department of Law may enter into contracts on behalf of the state to carry out the collection procedures of this section. The Department of Law may adopt regulations necessary to carry out the collection procedures of this section, including the reimbursement of attorney fees and costs in appropriate cases.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; § 4 ch 144 SLA 1996; am §§ 37, 38 ch 92 SLA 2001; am §§ 4, 5 ch 23 SLA 2002; am §§ 12, 13 ch 21 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was enacted as AS 47.10.086 by § 4, ch. 144, SLA 1996, with instructions in § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996 to place it in AS 47.12 if the bill that later became ch. 59, SLA 1996 were enacted. Accordingly, the section was renumbered in 1996, at which time “AS 47.12.120 ” was substituted in two places for “AS 47.10.080 ,” pursuant to § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996. Section 46, ch. 59, SLA 1996 also enacted a similar version of this section, but the § 4, ch. 144, SLA 1996 version is set out instead because its provisions subsumed the § 46, ch. 59, SLA 1996 provisions.

Cross references. —

For the effect of the 2001 amendment of subsection (a) of this section on Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, see § 42(a), ch. 92, SLA 2001, in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, in (c), inserted “and the office of victims’ rights” following “the Department of Law” or similar, three times, added “and of the possibility of, and procedure for, receiving payment from the restorative justice account” at the end of the second sentence, substituted “When 90 days” for “When 30 days” at the beginning of the third sentence, inserted “for the Department of Law or office of victims’ rights” following “or agents” in the last sentence; in (d), in the first sentence, substituted “given 90 days” for “given 30 days” following “and has been”, added the second sentence.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 45, ch. 92, SLA 2001, provides that the amendment to subsection (a) and the addition of subsections (b) — (g), made by ch. 92, SLA 2001, apply “to judgments or orders of restitution entered in adjudications of delinquency of minors or in criminal cases before, on, or after January 1, 2002.”

Notes to Decisions

Restitution order enforceable after juvenile jurisdiction expires. —

Juvenile’s argument that his restitution obligation should have terminated when the term of probation ended was rejected; this section expressly provides that a restitution order remains enforceable after the superior court’s juvenile jurisdiction expires. W.S. v. State, 174 P.3d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Trial court continued to have jurisdiction to enter a restitution order against the juvenile’s mother, even though his probation had ended, because AS 47.12.160 and 47.12.170 conferred extended subject-matter jurisdiction on the question of restitution. Because the trial court had issued a disposition order directing the juvenile and his mother to make restitution in an amount to be determined later, the trial court retained continuing subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dollar amount of restitution and to issue a final restitution order. State v. W.P., 349 P.3d 181 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015).

Sec. 47.12.180. Effect of adjudication.

  1. Except as provided by AS 47.12.160(d) and (e) and AS 47.12.170 , an adjudication under this chapter upon the status of a minor
    1. may not operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction upon a criminal charge;
    2. does not operate to permit a minor afterward to be considered a criminal by the adjudication; and
    3. does not operate to permit the adjudication to be afterward considered a conviction, nor may a minor be charged with or convicted of a crime in a court except as provided in this chapter.
  2. The commitment and placement of a minor and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court, nor does the commitment and placement or evidence operate to disqualify a minor in a future civil service examination or appointment in the state.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 28 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Notes to Decisions

Juvenile adjudication as aggravating factor. —

Aggravator in AS 12.55.155(c)(8) was applied properly. Although AS 47.12.180(a) bars the use of a juvenile adjudication as a prior criminal conviction, defendant’s juvenile assault convictions were used to establish behavior, not convictions, and evidence of his uncharged instances of assaultive behavior could have been used. Moore v. State, 174 P.3d 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Cited in

Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Sec. 47.12.200. Arrest of a minor.

The arrest of a minor other than for a traffic offense is not considered an arrest for any purpose except for the purpose of the disposition of a proceeding arising out of that arrest.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.12.210. Fingerprinting of minors.

  1. A peace officer may fingerprint a minor under the same circumstances as an adult may be fingerprinted.
  2. Except as provided by AS 47.12.310 (b)(1), fingerprint records taken under this section are not subject to AS 47.12.310 .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 29 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Sec. 47.12.220. Appointment of guardian or custodian.

When, in the course of a proceeding under this chapter, it appears to the court that the welfare of a minor will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian or custodian of the minor’s person or property, the court may make the appointment. The court shall have a summons issued and served upon the parents of the minor, if they can be found, in a manner and within a time before the hearing that the court considers reasonable. The court may determine whether the father, mother, or the department shall have the custody and control of the minor. If the minor is of sufficient age and intelligence to state desires, the court shall consider them. The court may order either or both parents to pay support for the minor’s care to the guardian, custodian, or department.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.12.230. Support of minor.

  1. When a delinquent minor is committed under this chapter, the court or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 shall, after giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, require that the parent pay to the department in a manner that the court or the child support services agency directs a sum to cover in full or in part the maintenance and care of the minor. The support obligation shall be calculated under Rule 90.3(i) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. If a parent wilfully fails or refuses to pay the sum fixed, the parent may be proceeded against as provided by law in cases of family desertion and nonsupport.
  3. The sum collected from a parent under this section shall be directly credited to the general fund of the state.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 7 ch 38 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, inserted “or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” and “or the child support services agency” in the first sentence of subsection (a), and substituted “require” for “adjudge” in that sentence.

Notes to Decisions

Support of minor until 19 years old. —

This section imposes a duty of support on the parents of an institutionalized “delinquent minor” and under AS 47.10.080 (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1), and (c)(2) and AS 47.10.100(a) and (c) an institutionalized delinquent is a “minor” until the delinquent becomes 19. In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.080 and 47.10.100 ).

Sec. 47.12.240. Detention of minors.

  1. When the court commits a minor to the custody of the department, the department shall arrange to place the minor in a juvenile detention facility or another suitable place that the department designates for that purpose. Except under the conditions described in AS 47.12.105 or (c) of this section, the minor may not be incarcerated in a correctional facility that houses adult prisoners.
  2. When a minor is detained under this chapter, the person having responsibility for the facility in which the minor is detained shall immediately make reasonable attempts to notify the minor’s parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor’s detention.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a minor may be detained in an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area if the minor is arrested for criminal charges under AS 47.12.030(a) , if the minor is the subject of a petition filed with the court under this chapter seeking adjudication of the minor as a delinquent minor, or if the minor is in official detention pending the filing of that petition; however, detention in an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area under this subsection may not exceed the lesser of
    1. six hours, except under the criteria listed in (e) of this section; or
    2. the time necessary to arrange the minor’s transportation to a juvenile detention facility or comparable facility for the detention of minors.
  4. When a minor is detained under (c) of this section, the minor shall be
    1. assigned to quarters in a correctional facility or an adult jail that are separate from quarters used to house adult prisoners so that the minor cannot communicate with or view adults who are in official detention;
    2. provided admission, health care, hygiene, and food services and recreation and visitation opportunities separate from services and opportunities provided to adults who are in official detention.
  5. Notwithstanding the limitation on detention set out in (c) of this section, a minor whose detention is authorized by (c) of this section may be detained in a correctional facility for up to 24 hours when the authority having jurisdiction over the minor under this chapter is outside a metropolitan statistical area under the current designation of the United States Bureau of the Census and the authority has no existing acceptable alternative placement available for the minor. The minor may be held in secure custody beyond the 24-hour period if the criteria set out in this subsection are met and if the correctional facility is located where conditions of
    1. distance to be traveled or the lack of highway, road, or other ground transportation do not allow for court appearances within 24 hours, in which case the minor may be held for up to an additional 48 hours at the correctional facility; or
    2. lack of safety exist, such as severely adverse, life-threatening weather conditions that do not allow for reasonably safe travel, in which case the time for an appearance may be delayed until 24 hours after the time that the conditions become safe.
  6. A detention authorized by (e) of this section may not exceed the time necessary to satisfy the requirement of (c)(2) of this section.
  7. [Repealed, § 42 ch 12 SLA 2006.]
  8. In this section,
    1. “correctional facility” has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901 whether the facility is operated by the state, a municipality, a village, or another entity;
    2. “official detention” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 30 ch 107 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 2 ch 79 SLA 2001; am §§ 1, 2 ch 95 SLA 2004; am § 42 ch 12 SLA 2006; am §§ 31 — 35 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, deleted former paragraph (c)(3), relating to protective custody detention of a minor, and made related changes.

The 2006 amendment, effective April 4, 2006, repealed subsection (g).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a), in the first sentence, substituted “juvenile detention facility” for “detention home, work camp,” following “place the minor in a”, in the second sentence, substituted “under the conditions described in AS 47.12.105 or” for “when detention in a correctional facility is authorized by” near the beginning; rewrote (c); in (d), rewrote the introductory language, which read, “When a minor is detained under (c)(1) of this section and incarcerated in a correctional facility, the minor shall be”, in (d)(1), inserted “or an adult jail” following “correctional facility”, and made a stylistic change; in (e), in the introductory language, twice substituted “(c)” for (c)(1)”; in (f), substituted (c)(2) for (c)(1)(B) near the end.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 95, SLA 2004 (SB 340), proposing legislation conforming the state’s juvenile detention laws with federal requirements set out in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2003, see 2004 Senate Journal 2185.

Notes to Decisions

This section prescribes conditions of confinement after the court has lawfully determined that a child should be confined in an institution. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

A detention which was twice continued by the master of the children’s court for a total period of six days exemplifies a usurpation of judicial power. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972) (decided under former AS 47.10.130 ).

“Juvenile” used interchangeably with “minor”. —

The term “juvenile” is not defined, but throughout this section is used interchangeably with “minor.” Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

The apparent intent of the legislature was the two terms “minor” and “juvenile” and to be construed identically. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

Thus, instruction that “juvenile” defined identically to minor is correct. —

Since, for the purposes of this section, a minor is a person under 18 years of age, an instruction that “juvenile” is identically defined is correct. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

Department need not incarcerate over-18-year olds apart from adults. —

The department is not limited in its options pertaining to the selection of a suitable facility for those over 18 years of age by the requirement of incarceration apart from adult offenders. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

Problems when juvenile reaches 18 years before incarceration. —

Difficult problems are presented when one who has committed an offense while under 18 years of age is ordered incarcerated at a later age. Great care must be exercised by the Department of Health and Social Services to provide for custody in an appropriate institution geared to the dual constitutional dictates of reformation of the juvenile and protection of the public. Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

Quoted in

B.A.M. v. State, 528 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1974) (decided under former AS 47.10.190 ).

Sec. 47.12.245. Arrest.

  1. A peace officer may
    1. arrest a minor
      1. for the commission of an act that subjects the minor to the provisions of this chapter under the same circumstances and in the same manner as would apply to the arrest of an adult for violation of a criminal law of the state or a municipality of the state;
      2. if the peace officer reasonably believes the minor is a fugitive from justice;
      3. if the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the minor has violated a condition of the minor’s release or probation; or
      4. if the peace officer reasonably believes that the minor has been adjudicated a delinquent and has escaped from an institution or absconded from probation, parole, or the jurisdiction of a court;
    2. continue the lawful arrest of a minor that is made by a citizen.
  2. A juvenile probation officer may arrest a minor if the juvenile probation officer has probable cause to believe that the minor has violated the minor’s conditions of conduct or probation.

History. (§ 31 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 36 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (b), twice inserted “juvenile” preceding “probation officer” and substituted “violated the minor’s conditions of conduct or probation” for “violated conditions of the minor’s release or probation”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Sec. 47.12.250. Temporary detention and detention hearing.

  1. A peace officer or a juvenile probation officer who has arrested, or a peace officer who has continued the arrest of, a minor under AS 47.12.245 or a minor for criminal charges under AS 47.12.030 may
    1. have the minor detained in a juvenile detention facility or temporary secure juvenile holding area if, in the opinion of the officer making or continuing the arrest, it is necessary to do so to protect the minor or the community; however, the department may direct that a minor subject to delinquency proceedings who was arrested or whose arrest was continued be released from detention before the hearing required by (c) of this section;
    2. before taking the minor to a juvenile detention facility or temporary secure juvenile holding area, release the minor to the minor’s parents or guardian if detention is not necessary to
      1. protect the minor or the community; or
      2. ensure the minor’s attendance at subsequent court hearings.
  2. A peace officer who has a minor detained under (a) of this section shall immediately, and in no event more than 12 hours later, notify the court and make reasonable efforts to notify the minor’s parents or guardian, the minor’s foster parent, and the department of the officer’s action. The department may file with the court a petition alleging delinquency before the detention hearing.
  3. The court shall immediately, and in no event more than 48 hours later, hold a hearing at which the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian if they can be found shall be present. For those minors held securely in correctional facilities that house adult prisoners, the court shall immediately, and in no event more than 24 hours after the custody begins, hold a hearing at which the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian if they can be found shall be present. The court shall determine whether probable cause exists for believing the minor to be delinquent. The court shall inform the minor of the reasons alleged to constitute probable cause and the reasons alleged to authorize the minor’s detention. The minor is entitled to counsel. The court shall give the minor’s foster parent the opportunity to be heard at the hearing.
  4. If the court finds that probable cause exists, it shall determine whether the minor should be detained pending the hearing on the petition or released. It may either order the minor held in detention or released to the custody of a suitable person pending the hearing on the petition. If the court finds no probable cause, it shall order the minor released and close the case.
  5. Except for temporary detention pending a detention hearing, a minor may be detained only by court order.
  6. A minor arrested for criminal charges under AS 47.12.030 is subject to adult court proceedings and shall be held in a juvenile detention facility under AS 47.12.105 . A minor arrested under this section may be temporarily held in an adult correctional facility or temporary secure juvenile holding area under the conditions set out in AS 47.12.240(c) .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 32, 33 ch 107 SLA 1998; am §§ 7, 8 ch 40 SLA 1999; am § 3 ch 79 SLA 2001; am §§ 37, 38 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Cross references. —

For effect of the amendments made by §§ 7 and 8, ch. 40, SLA 1999 on the Alaska Delinquency Rules, see § 10, ch. 40, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts.

For effect of the amendment to (c) of this section by § 3, ch. 79, SLA 2001 on Rule 12, Alaska Delinquency Rules, see § 4, ch. 79, SLA 2001 the 2001 Temporary & Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a), in the introductory language, inserted “juvenile” preceding “probation officer”, and “or a minor for criminal charges under AS 47.12.030 ” following “AS 47.12.245 ”, and made a stylistic change, in (a)(1), inserted “or temporary secure juvenile holding area” following “juvenile detention facility”, deleted “peace” preceding “officer”, inserted “subject to delinquency proceedings” following “direct that a minor” and made a stylistic change, in (a)(2), inserted “or temporary secure juvenile holding area” following “juvenile detention facility”; added (f).

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases below were decided under former AS 47.10.140 .

Meaning of “immediately”. —

Former Delinquency Rule 7(b) and this section are not inconsistent. The term “immediately” means the same thing in both the rule and the statute. The language “in no event more than 12 hours later” in the statute is not a modification of “immediately,” but merely sets an outside time limit for parental notification. State v. J.R.N., 861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993).

Waiver of parental notification by juvenile. —

A juvenile may waive his or her right to parental notification. The waiver must be a knowing and voluntary one. Whether the juvenile’s waiver of his right was knowing and voluntary must be assessed by the totality of the circumstances as they existed when he stated that he did not want his parents notified. State v. J.R.N., 861 P.2d 578 (Alaska 1993).

Former AS 47.10.140(c) seems to require detention orders to be based upon first-hand testimony in which the adverse witness is subject to cross-examination. D.G. v. State, 754 P.2d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).

Detention orders neither based on competent testimony nor accompanied by the required statement of facts are invalid. P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972).

Cited in

State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Native Village of Nenana v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986); Estate of Logusak v. City of Togiak, 185 P.3d 103 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 47.12.255. Placement in secure residential psychiatric treatment centers.

  1. The court may authorize the department to place a minor who is in the custody of the department under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3) or 47.12.140 in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that
    1. the minor is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and, as a result, is likely to cause serious harm to the minor or to another person;
    2. there is no reasonably available, appropriate, and less restrictive alternative for the minor’s treatment or that less restrictive alternatives have been tried and have failed; and
    3. there is reason to believe that the minor’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
  2. A court shall review a placement made under this section at least once every 90 days. The court may authorize the department to continue the placement of the minor in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that the conditions or symptoms that resulted in the initial order have not ameliorated to such an extent that the minor’s needs can be met in a less restrictive setting and that the minor’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
  3. The department shall transfer a minor from a secure residential psychiatric treatment center to another appropriate placement if the mental health professional responsible for the minor’s treatment determines that the minor would no longer benefit from the course of treatment or that the minor’s treatment needs could be met in a less restrictive setting. The department shall notify the minor, the minor’s parents or guardian, and the minor’s guardian ad litem of a determination and transfer made under this subsection.
  4. In this section, “likely to cause serious harm” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 .

History. (§ 34 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Sec. 47.12.260. Releasing minors after commitment.

A minor found to be a juvenile delinquent who by conduct gives sufficient evidence of having reformed may be released at any time under the conditions and regulations that the department considers proper, if it appears to the satisfaction of the department that there is a reasonable probability that the minor will remain at liberty without violating the law.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

Notes to Decisions

Purpose. —

In the provisions of AS 47.12.120(b)(1) and 47.12.260 , the legislature allocated the risk of repeat offenders to the public in exchange presumably for offsetting gains realized by rehabilitating juveniles to make them productive citizens, and imposing state tort liability for harm caused by released juveniles would have distorted this balance; likewise the policy of preventing future harm was not obviously going to be served by imposing a duty, given that AS 47.12.010(b) limited commitment and recommitment periods of time, and there was no clear correlation between the length of commitment and the rate of recidivism. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).

Jurisdiction over probation revocation proceedings. —

The Department of Health and Social Services has the authority to conduct revocation proceedings when it has granted the probation allegedly violated, as a corollary to its power under this section to grant probation. However, until such time as the department chooses to establish procedures regarding probation revocation, jurisdiction over such cases will remain in the superior court. L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1981) (decided under former AS 47.10.200 ).

Hearing. —

The requirement in Children’s Rule 12(a) of a disposition hearing applies to a court-ordered revocation of a juvenile delinquent’s administratively granted probation. L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1981) (decided under former AS 47.10.200 ).

The hearing in connection with a juvenile delinquent’s probation revocation must be broader than merely determining probable cause that probation conditions are violated. L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1981) (decided under former AS 47.10.200 ).

Sec. 47.12.270. Juvenile probation officers.

  1. The department shall employ juvenile probation officers. A juvenile probation officer shall exercise the duties of a probation officer and shall prepare preliminary investigations and assist and advise the court in the furtherance of the welfare and control of a minor under the court’s jurisdiction. A juvenile probation officer shall also carry out other duties in the care and treatment of minors that are consistent with the intent of this chapter.
  2. A juvenile probation officer has the powers of a peace officer with respect to the service of process and arresting a minor when
    1. a court has issued an arrest warrant;
    2. there is probable cause to believe the minor has violated conditions of conduct or probation; or
    3. probable cause exists for believing that the minor has escaped from or unlawfully evaded a placement made under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 39 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, rewrote the section.

Notes to Decisions

Youth counselors as “correctional officers.” —

Youth counselors at McLaughlin Youth center are not “correctional officers” within the meaning of AS 18.65.290 (2) [now AS 18.65.290 (3)], but the term “correctional officer” used in AS 12.55.125(c)(2) encompasses the youth counselors at McLaughlin. Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Article 2. Information And Records.

Sec. 47.12.300. Court records.

  1. The court shall make and keep records of all cases brought before it.
  2. The court shall forward a record of adjudication of a violation of an offense listed in AS 28.15.185(a) to the Department of Administration if the court imposes a license revocation under AS 28.15.185 .
  3. Except when disclosure of the name of a minor is authorized or required by this chapter and except as provided in (g) of this section, the name or picture of a minor under the jurisdiction of the court may not be made public in connection with the minor’s status as a delinquent unless authorized by order of the court.
  4. Except as provided in (f) of this section, within 30 days of the date of a minor’s 18th birthday or, if the court retains jurisdiction of a minor past the minor’s 18th birthday, within 30 days of the date on which the court releases jurisdiction over the minor, the court shall order all the court’s official records pertaining to that minor in a proceeding under this chapter sealed, as well as records of all driver’s license proceedings under AS 28.15.185 , criminal proceedings against the minor, and punishments assessed against the minor. A person may not use these sealed records for any purpose except that the court may order their use for good cause shown or may order their use by an officer of the court in making a presentencing report for the court. The provisions of this subsection relating to the sealing of records do not apply to records of traffic offenses.
  5. The court’s official records prepared under this chapter and not made public under this section are confidential and may be inspected only with the court’s permission and only by persons having a legitimate interest in them. A foster parent is considered to have a legitimate interest in those portions of the court’s official records relating to a child who is already placed with the foster parent or who is recommended for placement with the foster parent. A person with a legitimate interest in the inspection of a confidential record maintained by the court also includes a victim who suffered physical injury or whose real or personal property was damaged as a result of an offense that was the basis of an adjudication or modification of disposition. If the victim knows the identity of the minor, identifies the minor or the offense to the court, and certifies that the information is being sought to consider or support a civil action against the minor or against the minor’s parents or guardian under AS 09.65.255 , the court shall, subject to AS 12.61.110 and 12.61.140 , allow the victim to inspect and use the following records and information in connection with the civil action:
    1. a petition filed under AS 47.12.040(a) seeking to have the court declare the minor a delinquent;
    2. a petition filed under AS 47.12.120 seeking to have the court modify or revoke the minor’s probation;
    3. a petition filed under AS 47.12.100 requesting the court to find that a minor is not amenable to treatment under this chapter and that results in closure of a case under AS 47.12.100(a) ; and
    4. a court judgment or order entered under this chapter that disposes of a petition identified in (1) — (3) of this subsection.
  6. A person who has been tried as an adult under AS 47.12.100(a) or a person whose records have been made public under (g) of this section, or the department on the person’s behalf, may petition the superior court to seal the records of all criminal proceedings, except traffic offenses, initiated against the person, and all punishments assessed against the person, while the person was a minor. A petition under this subsection may not be filed until five years after the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense for which the person was tried as an adult or five years after a disposition was entered for an offense for which the records were made public under (g) of this section. If the superior court finds that its order has had its intended rehabilitative effect and further finds that the person has fulfilled all orders of the court entered under AS 47.12.120 , the superior court shall order the record of proceedings and the record of punishments sealed. Sealing the records restores civil rights removed because of a conviction. A person may not use these sealed records for any purpose except that the court may order their use for good cause shown or may order their use by an officer of the court in making a presentencing report for the court. The court may not, under this subsection, seal records of a criminal proceeding
    1. initiated against a person if the court finds that the person has not complied with a court order made under AS 47.12.120 ; or
    2. commenced under AS 47.12.030(a) unless the minor has been acquitted of all offenses with which the minor was charged or unless the most serious offense of which the minor was convicted was not an offense specified in AS 47.12.030(a) .
  7. When a district attorney has elected to seek imposition of a dual sentence and a petition has been filed under AS 47.12.065 , or when a minor agrees as part of a plea agreement to be subject to dual sentencing, all court records shall be open to the public except for predisposition reports, psychiatric and psychological reports, and other documents that the court orders to be kept confidential because the release of the documents could be harmful to the minor or could violate the constitutional rights of the victim or other persons.
  8. Except as provided in (f) of this section, this section does not apply to the records of a minor who is waived into adult court under AS 47.12.030 or 47.12.100 and is subject to this chapter only to the extent that AS 47.12.105 applies to the minor.
  9. A person who discloses confidential information in violation of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 64 SLA 1997; am E.O. No. 99 § 76 (1997); am §§ 35 — 39 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 9 ch 40 SLA 1999; am § 40 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, in subsection (e), “AS 09.65.255 ” was substituted for “AS 34.50.020 ” to reflect the 2006 renumbering of AS 34.50.020 .

Subsection (h) was enacted as (i). Relettered in 2021, at which time former subsection (h) was relettered as subsection (i).

Cross references. —

For similar provisions related to children in need of aid, see AS 47.10.090 . For effect of subsection (g) on Alaska Delinquency Rule 27, see § 56, ch. 107, SLA 1998.

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, added (i) [now (h)].

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Notes to Decisions

Court’s consideration of information submitted by public. —

The confidentiality of juvenile records is aimed at protecting the privacy of minors by preventing the dissemination of information concerning juvenile delinquency proceedings to the public. However, there is no reason why the guarantee of confidentiality should insulate the court from relevant information submitted by members of the public. J.C.W. v. State, 880 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.090 ).

Superior court’s records release order did not violate state or federal rights of privacy, where the order was intended to facilitate an expeditious and comprehensively monitored reunion of the child and her father, and the order’s scope was limited to agencies directly involved in providing resources to the parties in the case. In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.090 ).

Applied in

McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Quoted in

Sledge v. State, 763 P.2d 1364 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.090 ).

Stated in

RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

Cited in

M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Nao v. State, 953 P.2d 522 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.090 ); C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 47.12.310. Agency records.

  1. Except as specified in AS 47.12.315 , 47.12.320 , and (b) — (g) and (i) of this section, all information and social records pertaining to a minor who is subject to this chapter or AS 47.17 prepared by or in the possession of a federal, state, or municipal agency or employee in the discharge of the agency’s or employee’s official duty, including driver’s license actions under AS 28.15.185 , are privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone without a court order.
  2. A state or municipal agency or employee shall disclose
    1. information regarding a case to a federal, state, or municipal law enforcement agency for a specific investigation being conducted by that agency;
    2. appropriate information regarding a case to
      1. a guardian ad litem appointed by the court;
      2. a person or an agency requested by the department or the minor’s legal custodian to provide consultation or services for a minor who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter as necessary to enable the provision of the consultation or services;
      3. school officials as may be necessary to protect the safety of the minor who is the subject of the case and the safety of school students and staff or to enable the school to provide appropriate counseling and supportive services to meet the needs of a minor about whom information is disclosed;
      4. a governmental agency as may be necessary to obtain that agency’s assistance for the department in its investigation or to obtain physical custody of a minor;
      5. a law enforcement or corrections agency of this state or another jurisdiction as may be necessary for the protection, rehabilitation, care, or supervision of any minor or for actions by that agency to protect the public safety;
      6. a victim or to the victim’s insurance company as may be necessary to inform the victim or the insurance company about the arrest of the minor, including the minor’s name and the names of the minor’s parents, copies of reports, or the disposition or resolution of a case involving a minor;
      7. the state medical examiner under AS 12.65 as may be necessary to perform the duties of the state medical examiner;
      8. foster parents or relatives with whom the child is placed by the department as may be necessary to enable the foster parents or relatives to provide appropriate care for the child who is the subject of the case, to protect the safety of the child who is the subject of the case, and to protect the safety and property of family members and visitors of the foster parents or relatives;
      9. the Department of Law or its agent for use and subsequent release if necessary for collection of an order of restitution on behalf of the recipient;
      10. the Violent Crimes Compensation Board established in AS 18.67.020 for use in awarding compensation under AS 18.67.080 ;
      11. a state, municipal, or federal agency of this state or another jurisdiction that has the authority to license adult or children’s facilities and services;
      12. a child placement agency licensed under AS 47.32 as necessary to provide services for a minor who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter;
      13. a state or municipal agency of this state or another jurisdiction that is responsible for child protection services, as may be necessary for the administration of services, protection, rehabilitation, or supervision of a minor or for actions by the agency to protect the public safety;
      14. the Department of Corrections as necessary for the administration of services, protection, rehabilitation, or supervision of any minor for release to the public as authorized by law, or as necessary to transfer detention of a minor who is waived into adult court under AS 47.12.030 or 47.12.100 and held under AS 47.12.105 ; and
      15. a corrections agency of this state or another jurisdiction as may be necessary for the protection, rehabilitation, care, or supervision of a former juvenile offender; and
    3. to the University of Alaska under the Alaska higher education savings program for children established under AS 47.14.400 information that is necessary to support the program, but only if the information released is maintained as a confidential record by the University of Alaska.
  3. A state or municipal law enforcement agency
    1. shall disclose information regarding a case that is needed by the person or agency charged with making a preliminary investigation for the information of the court under this chapter;
    2. may disclose to the public information regarding a criminal offense in which a minor is a suspect, victim, or witness if the minor is not identified by the disclosure;
    3. may disclose to school officials information regarding a case as may be necessary to protect the safety of school students and staff or to enable the school to provide appropriate counseling and supportive services to meet the needs of a minor about whom information is disclosed;
    4. may disclose to the public information regarding a case as may be necessary to protect the safety of the public; and
    5. may disclose to a victim or to the victim’s insurance company information, including copies of reports, as necessary for civil litigation or insurance claims pursued by or against the victim.
  4. Upon request of a victim, the department shall make every reasonable effort to notify the victim as soon as practicable, by telephone or in writing, when a delinquent minor is to be released from placement under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) . The notice under this subsection must include the expected date of the delinquent minor’s release, the geographic area in which the delinquent minor is required to reside, and other pertinent information concerning the delinquent minor’s conditions of conduct or probation that may affect the victim.
  5. A person may authorize the department to release information to the military or to a prospective employer about the existence of a delinquency adjudication against that person under this chapter and the offense on which it was based.
  6. The department may release to a person with a legitimate interest information relating to a minor subject to the jurisdiction of the department under this chapter. The department shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 to implement this subsection, including regulations governing the release of information and standards for identifying a legitimate interest in the information.
  7. The department and affected law enforcement agencies shall work with school districts and private schools to develop procedures for the disclosure of information to school officials under (b)(2)(C) and (c)(3) of this section. The procedures must provide a method for informing the principal or the principal’s designee of the school the student attends as soon as it is reasonably practicable.
  8. Notwithstanding (c)(3) of this section, a state or municipal law enforcement agency is not required to notify the appropriate school official of a school district or school under (c) of this section if the agency determines that notice would jeopardize an ongoing investigation.
  9. A state or municipal agency, other than a state or municipal law enforcement agency, or authorized employee may disclose to the public information regarding a case as may be necessary to protect the safety of the public provided the disclosure is authorized by regulations adopted by the department.
  10. In this section, “school” means a public or private elementary or secondary school.
  11. A person who discloses confidential information in violation of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 4 — 7 ch 64 SLA 1997; am § 7 ch 94 SLA 1997; am § 46 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 40, 41 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 39 ch 92 SLA 2001; am § 1 ch 47 SLA 2002; am § 30 ch 124 SLA 2004; am § 3 ch 58 SLA 2007; am §§ 2, 3 ch 38 SLA 2012; am § 30 ch 9 SLA 2013; am §§ 41, 42 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 46, ch. 99, SLA 1998 and § 40, ch. 107, SLA 1998 both amended subsection (b). To reconcile chs. 99 and 107, SLA 1998, (b)(7) and (8), as enacted by § 46, ch. 99, SLA 1998, were renumbered as (b)(2)(G) and (H). The amendments to (b)(2)(E) made by § 46, ch. 99, SLA 1998 were used instead of those made by § 40, ch. 107, SLA 1998 because, if the amendments are not interpreted as conflicting, the ch. 99 amendments included the ch. 107 amendments and, if the amendments are interpreted as conflicting, the ch. 99 amendments had a later effective date than the ch. 107 amendments.

Subsection (i) was enacted as subsection (k). Relettered in 2004, at which time former subsections (i) and (j) were relettered as subsections (j) and (k).

In 2007, in (b)(3) of this section, “AS 47.14.400 ” was substituted for “AS 47.05.400” to reflect the 2007 renumbering on enactment of AS 47.05.400.

Cross references. —

For similar provisions related to children in need of aid, see AS 47.10.093 .

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, added subsection (k) [now (i)].

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraph (b)(3) and made related changes.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, added (b)(2)(L) and (b)(2)(M); rewrote (f).

The 2013 amendment, effective May 10, 2013, in (a), inserted “and (i)” following “and (b) — (g)”.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (b), in (b)(2)(E), inserted “or corrections” following “law enforcement” and “, care” following “rehabilitation, added (b)(2)(N), (O); in (d), deleted “in a juvenile facility” following “released from placement” near the end of the first sentence, substituted “conduct or probation” for “release” following “conditions of” near the end of the second sentence.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (b) made by ch. 99, SLA 1998 apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that the amendments to this section made by ch. 107, SLA 1998 apply “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Section 45, ch. 92, SLA 2001, provides that the amendment to subsection (b) made by ch. 92, SLA 2001 applies “to judgments or orders of restitution entered in adjudications of delinquency of minors or in criminal cases before, on, or after January 1, 2002.”

Section 32(e), ch. 124, SLA 2004, provides that subsection (i) of this section [enacted as subsection (k)] applies “to an offense occurring before, on, or after July 1, 2004.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

Examination of records. —

Statute does not clearly and unambiguously state that a pre-sentence investigator is barred from examining or relying on Alaska Department of Health and Social Services records pertaining to a defendant’s prior acts of delinquency when those acts were informally adjusted. McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Defendant’s petition for rehearing was denied where a pre-sentence investigator properly referred to defendant’s non-adjudicated acts of delinquency in a pre-sentence report. McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Sec. 47.12.315. Public disclosure of information in department records relating to certain minors.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 47.12.310 and except as otherwise provided in this section, the department shall disclose information to the public, on request, concerning a minor subject to this chapter who was at least 13 years of age at the time of commission of
    1. a felony offense against a person under AS 11.41;
    2. arson in the first or second degree;
    3. burglary in the first degree;
    4. distribution of child pornography;
    5. sex trafficking in the first degree;
    6. misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first, second, or third degrees involving distribution or possession with intent to deliver; or
    7. misconduct involving weapons in the first through fourth degrees.
  2. The department may disclose the information authorized in (a) of this section only if a court has adjudicated the minor as delinquent.
  3. When required by this section to disclose information, the department may disclose only the name of the minor, the name of each legal parent or guardian, the specific offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent, and the final outcome of the court proceedings relating to the offense. Before the disclosure, the department shall delete the information that identifies the victim of the offense.
  4. The department may not disclose the name of an out-of-home care provider with whom the minor was living at the time the minor was alleged to have committed the offense.
  5. If the department or other state or municipal agency maintains the information to be disclosed by electronic means that can be recovered from a computer database, the department or agency may disclose the information in that medium.
  6. The department may not release information under this section after five years from the date the department or other agency is first required or authorized to make the disclosure under this section.
  7. When disclosure is required under this section, the department may petition the court for an order prohibiting the disclosure. The court may grant the petition if, based on information presented in the petition or at an in camera hearing held on the petition, the court finds that
    1. the crime was an isolated incident and the minor does not present any further danger to the public; or
    2. the victim agrees that disclosure is inappropriate.
  8. In this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “out-of-home care provider” means a person, other than the child’s legal parents, with whom a child who is in the custody of the state under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, or AS 47.14 is currently placed, including a foster parent, a relative other than a parent, and a person who has petitioned for adoption or guardianship of the child.

History. (§§ 8, 10 ch 64 SLA 1997; am § 70 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 25 ch 1 TSSLA 2012; am § 4 ch 38 SLA 2012; am § 168 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 130 ch 4 FSSLA 2019; am § 43 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2012, in (a)(5) of this section, “sex trafficking” was substituted for “promoting prostitution” to reconcile § 4, ch. 38, SLA 2012 and § 25, ch. 1, TSSLA 2012.

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, in paragraph (d)(1) deleted “, as that term is defined in AS 47.14.299 ,” following the first instance of “out-of-home care provider” near the beginning and added the definitions of “out-of-home care provider” and “agency or person.”

The first 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, rewrote the section.

The second 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in former (a)(1)(F), now (a)(5), substituted “sex trafficking” for “promoting prostitution”.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 12, 2016, in (a)(6), deleted “, or third” preceding “degrees involving distribution”; and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, substituted “first, second, or third degrees” for “first or second degrees” in (a)(6).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (c), substituted “for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent” for “alleged to have been committed in the petition” following “specific offense” in the first sentence.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 27(a), ch. 1, TSSLA 2012, provides that the 2012 amendment to (a)(5) made in § 25, ch. 1, TSSLA 2012, changing the phrase “promoting prostitution” to “sex trafficking”, applies to offenses committed before, on, or after July 1, 2012.

Legislative history reports. —

For the governor's transmittal letter concerning ch. 1, TSSLA 2012 (HB 359), see 2012 House Journal 1665 — 1669.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Sec. 47.12.320. Disclosure of information to public officials.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 47.12.300 and 47.12.310 ,
    1. a parent or legal guardian of a minor subject to a proceeding under this chapter may disclose confidential or privileged information about the minor, including information that has been lawfully obtained from agency or court files, to the governor, the lieutenant governor, a legislator, the ombudsman appointed under AS 24.55, the attorney general, and the commissioners of health and social services, administration, or public safety, or an employee of these persons, for review or use in their official capacities;
    2. the department may disclose confidential or privileged information about the minor and make available for inspection documents about the minor to the state officials or employees identified in (1) of this subsection for review or use in their official capacities; and
    3. a person to whom disclosure is made under (1) or (2) of this subsection may not disclose confidential or privileged information about the minor to a person not authorized to receive it.
  2. The disclosure right under (a)(1) of this section is in addition to, and not in derogation of, the rights of a parent or legal guardian of a minor.
  3. A person who violates a provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable for the violation in the manner authorized under AS 12.55 for a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 42, 43 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For similar provisions related to children-in-need-of-aid, see AS 47.10.092 .

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 57, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply “to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1998.”

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Article 3. Youth Courts.

Sec. 47.12.400. Youth courts.

  1. The department may use youth courts to hear, determine, and dispose of cases involving a minor whose alleged act that brings the minor within the jurisdiction of AS 47.12.010 47.12.260 constitutes a violation of a state law that is a misdemeanor or a violation or constitutes a violation of a municipal ordinance that prescribes a penalty not exceeding the penalties for a class A misdemeanor under state law.
  2. Unless otherwise directed by the commissioner, the jurisdiction of a youth court is coextensive with the boundaries of the municipality in which the youth court is located. Only one youth court may be established within the boundaries of a municipality. Nothing in this subsection prohibits two or more municipalities from operating a single youth court for the municipalities by agreement between them.
  3. A nonprofit corporation may obtain recognition from the commissioner to serve as a youth court. The corporation may exercise only the powers that are delegated to a youth court by the commissioner, and shall exercise those powers as authorized by the corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws. The bylaws of the corporation must set out standards and procedures by which the corporation, in its capacity as a youth court,
    1. establishes a system by which the minor may be held accountable for the conduct that brings the minor within the jurisdiction of the youth court by being tried, represented, and adjudicated by the minor’s peers;
    2. guarantees the constitutional rights of the minor that are guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions;
    3. may secure jurisdiction over a minor; the youth court may secure jurisdiction over the minor only with the consent of the minor and the agreement of the minor’s legal custodian;
    4. sets out the process for disposing of matters referred to it for resolution;
    5. provides a process for appeal of a verdict or sentence, and defines the basis for appeals;
    6. reserves the right to refer to the department, under AS 47.12.060(a) , a matter transmitted to the youth court for disposition in which the minor fails, without good cause, to comply with all requirements ordered by the youth court as a part of sentence imposed on the minor; and
    7. prepares and delivers a report of the disposition of the matter referred to it for resolution to the commissioner.
  4. Subject to the privileges that witnesses have in the courts of this state, the commissioner may compel by subpoena, at a specified time and place, the
    1. appearance and sworn testimony of a person who the commissioner reasonably believes may be able to give information relating to a matter before a youth court; and
    2. production by a person of a record or object that the commissioner reasonably believes may relate to a matter before a youth court.
  5. If a person refuses to comply with a subpoena issued under (d) of this section, the superior court may, upon application of the commissioner, compel obedience by proceedings for contempt in the same manner as in the case of disobedience to the requirements of a subpoena issued by the court or refusal to testify in the court.
  6. The commissioner shall make and keep records of all cases referred to a youth court. The records of a youth court proceeding
    1. relating to a minor who complies with all requirements ordered by the youth court as a part of sentence imposed on the minor shall be sealed by the commissioner and may not be used for any purpose; and
    2. except as to a record described in (1) of this subsection, shall be afforded at least the same protection and are subject to at least the same procedural safeguards in matters relating to access, use, and security as they would be under AS 47.12.310 .
  7. An individual who is a member or an agent of the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation that has obtained recognition from the commissioner to serve as a youth court under this section is immune from suit in a civil action based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or a discretionary duty as a member of the board of directors or that has been properly delegated by the board of directors. An individual who tries, represents, or adjudicates a minor in a youth court is immune from suit in a civil action based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or a discretionary duty within the individual’s quasi-judicial capacity with the youth court. A nonprofit corporation that has obtained recognition from the commissioner to serve as a youth court is immune from suit in a civil action based upon an act or failure to act for which an individual is granted immunity under this subsection.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 108 SLA 1998; am § 100 ch 21 SLA 2000)

Sec. 47.12.410. Funding for youth courts.

The legislature may appropriate 25 percent of the fines imposed under AS 12.55.035 and collected and separately accounted for by the state under AS 37.05.142 to the department for distribution to youth courts established and operating under AS 47.12.400 . Nothing in this section creates a dedicated fund.

History. (§ 3 ch 110 SLA 2010)

Effective dates. —

Section 3, ch. 110, SLA 2010, which enacted this section, is effective September 26, 2010.

Article 4. Community Dispute Resolution Centers.

Sec. 47.12.450. Community dispute resolution centers for matters involving minors.

  1. An entity organized for the purpose of providing community mediation services may establish and operate a community dispute resolution center to resolve disputes between minors who are alleged to have committed offenses and the victims of those offenses.
  2. The commissioner may recognize an entity organized for the purpose of providing community mediation services as a community dispute resolution center to serve as a center to resolve disputes between minors and victims. Before extending recognition under this subsection, the commissioner shall determine that the bylaws of the entity set out standards and procedures
    1. for filing requests for dispute resolution services with the center and for scheduling mediation sessions participated in by the parties to the dispute;
    2. to ensure that each dispute mediated meets the criteria for appropriateness for mediation and for rejecting disputes that do not meet the criteria;
    3. for giving notice of time, place, and nature of the mediation session to the parties, and for conducting mediation sessions that comply with the provisions of this section;
    4. to ensure that participation by all parties is voluntary;
    5. for obtaining referrals from public and private bodies;
    6. for providing mediators who, during the dispute resolution process, may not make decisions or determinations of the issues involved, but who shall facilitate negotiations by the participants themselves to achieve a voluntary resolution of the issues;
    7. for communicating to the agency making a referral under AS 47.12.040(a)(1)(A) or the court making a referral under AS 47.12.120(b)(4)(A) , as appropriate, the following:
      1. notice that the minor and victim have been unable to enter into a written agreement under (d)(2) of this section or that the minor or victim has withdrawn from mediation as authorized by (f) of this section;
      2. notice that the minor and victim have entered into a written agreement under (d)(2) of this section; the center shall transmit a copy of the agreement to the agency or the court, as appropriate;
      3. notice that the minor has failed to perform fully the minor’s obligations under the written agreement under (d)(2) of this section;
      4. notice that the minor has successfully completed all that is required of the minor under the provisions of the written agreement under (d)(2) of this section; and
    8. for informing and educating the community about the community dispute resolution center and encouraging the use of the center’s services in appropriate cases.
  3. A center established under this section shall provide dispute resolution services between a minor who has committed an offense and who, because of the commission of the offense, may be alleged to be a delinquent minor under AS 47.12.020 , and a person who was a victim of that offense. The center shall provide dispute resolution services either without charge to a participant or for a fee that is based on the participant’s ability to pay.
  4. In conducting a dispute resolution process under this section, a center shall require that
    1. the minor and the victim enter into a written agreement that expresses the method by which they shall attempt to resolve the issues in dispute; and
    2. at the conclusion of the dispute resolution process, the minor and the victim enter into a written agreement that sets out the settlement of the issues and the future responsibilities, if any, of each party.
  5. Except for a notice or a communication described in (b)(7) of this section, all memoranda, work notes or products, or case files of centers established under this section are confidential and privileged and are not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding unless the court or administrative tribunal determines that the materials were submitted by a participant to the center for the purpose of avoiding discovery of the material in a subsequent proceeding. Any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution made during the resolution process by a participant, mediator, or another person is a privileged communication and is not subject to disclosure in a judicial or administrative proceeding unless all parties to the communication waive the privilege. However, privilege and limitation on evidentiary use set out in this subsection do not apply to a communication of a threat that injury or damage may be inflicted on a person or on the property of a party to the dispute to the extent the communication may be relevant evidence in a criminal matter.
  6. A minor or a victim who enters a dispute resolution process at a center established under this section may revoke consent, withdraw from dispute resolution, and seek judicial or administrative redress before reaching a written resolution agreement. The withdrawal must be in writing. If a minor or a victim withdraws from dispute resolution, a legal penalty, sanction, or restraint may not be imposed upon the person for that withdrawal.
  7. A center established under this section may seek and accept contributions and any other available money and may expend the money to carry out the purposes of this section.
  8. An individual who is a member or an agent of the board of directors of or a mediator at a community dispute resolution center is immune from suit in a civil action based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or a discretionary duty within the official capacity of the individual. A community dispute resolution center is immune from suit in a civil action based upon an act or failure to act for which an individual is granted immunity under this subsection.
  9. In this section, “center” means a community dispute resolution center.

History. (§ 4 ch 108 SLA 1998)

Article 5. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.12.980. Grants-in-aid.

The department may accept grants-in-aid from the federal government or private foundations and may accept other gifts consistent with the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.12.988. Implementation of provisions by an entity selected by department.

In this chapter, when authority exercised by the department may also be exercised by an entity selected by the department, the entity that the department may select in order to exercise authority is limited to

  1. a municipality;
  2. a corporation; or
  3. two or more persons recognized by the community and operating under contract or license from the department.

History. (§ 44 ch 107 SLA 1998)

Sec. 47.12.990. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  2. “court” means the superior court of the state;
  3. “crime against a person” means an offense set out in AS 11.41;
  4. “delinquent minor” means a minor found to be within the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.12.020 ;
  5. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  6. “gravely disabled” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
  7. “juvenile detention facility” means a secure facility for the detention of delinquent minors in the custody of the department under AS 47.12.240 or 47.12.250 ;
  8. “juvenile probation officer” means an officer described in AS 47.12.270 ;
  9. “juvenile treatment facility” means a secure facility for treatment of minors adjudicated delinquent and committed by a court to the care and custody of the department under AS 47.12.120(b)(1) ;
  10. “mental health professional” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 , except that, if the minor is placed in another state by the department, “mental health professional” also includes a professional listed in the definition of “mental health professional” in AS 47.30.915 who is not licensed to practice by a board of this state but is licensed by a corresponding licensing authority to practice in the state in which the minor is placed;
  11. “mental illness” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
  12. “minor” means a person who is
    1. under 18 years of age at the time the person commits an offense; and
    2. subject to the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter;
  13. “peace officer” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  14. “residential child care facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.32.900 ;
  15. “secure residential psychiatric treatment center” has the meaning given “residential psychiatric treatment center” in AS 47.32.900 ;
  16. “temporary secure juvenile holding area” means separate quarters that are used for the temporary detention of delinquent minors pending a court order or transportation to a juvenile detention facility and that are not within sight or sound of any adult prisoners;
  17. “victim” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 46 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 45 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 25 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 32 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 44 — 46, 56 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1998 and 2021, the paragraphs in this section were renumbered to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in paragraph (10) added the language beginning “, except that” to the end of the paragraph.

The second 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference and inserted “’residential psychiatric treatment center”’ in paragraph (14).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (7), substituted “a secure facility” for “separate quarters within a city jail used” following “means”, added “in the custody of the department under AS 47.12.240 or 47.12.250 ” at the end; repealed former (8) and (9); in (12), in the introductory language, added “who is” at the end, in (12)(A), added “at the time the person commits an offense; and” at the end, added (12)(B), and made related changes; repealed (15); added (17) – (20) [now (8), (9), (14), (16)].

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.990 .

A child who sells LSD is a “delinquent minor” under former provisions of AS 47.10.990 of this section because the sale of LSD is a crime under former AS 17.12.010 [now see AS 11.71]. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).

“Delinquent” status depends not upon a criminal conviction but upon proof that the juvenile committed acts which would have been criminal if committed by an adult. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

“Juvenile” and “minor” as used in former AS 47.10.190 construed identically. —

See Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

The term “juvenile” is not defined, but throughout former AS 47.10.190 is used interchangeably with “minor.” Davenport v. McGinnis, 522 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1974).

Self-incrimination. —

The possible consequences of proceedings brought under former AS 47.10.010(a)(3) or (a)(6) and former provisions of AS 47.10.990 do not give rise to a right against self-incrimination. E. L. L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977).

“Minor” and “delinquent minor”. —

The general definition of “minor” in former provisions of AS 47.10.990 was inapplicable to the detention of a delinquent minor until the minor’s nineteenth birthday under AS 47.10.080 , 47.10.100 , and likewise, it is inapplicable to the responsibility to pay support for a delinquent minor committed under those sections. In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987).

“Victim.” —

Under AS 47.12.120(b)(4) , superior court had authority, and was obligated, to order restitution for the time the victim’s aunt missed work because, as the victim’s effective guardian, she was a victim under this section and AS 12.55.185 (19)(B). W.S. v. State, 174 P.3d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Applied in

L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); R. D. S. M. v. Intake Officer, 565 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1977); Henson v. State, 576 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1978); C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

White v. State, 457 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1969); N.P.A. v. State, 604 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1979); Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Court, 450 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2019); C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81 (Alaska 2020).

Chapter 14. Juvenile Programs and Institutions.

Administrative Code. —

For juvenile correctional facilities and juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52.

Editor’s notes. —

Many of the provisions of this chapter were derived from former provisions of AS 47.10.

Article 1. Juvenile Institutions.

Administrative Code. —

For juvenile correctional facilities and juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52.

Sec. 47.14.010. General powers of department over juvenile facilities and institutions.

The department may

  1. purchase, lease, or construct buildings or other facilities for the care, detention, rehabilitation, and education of children in need of aid or delinquent minors;
  2. adopt plans for construction of juvenile detention facilities, juvenile treatment facilities, and other juvenile institutions;
  3. adopt standards and regulations for the design, construction, repair, maintenance, and operation of all juvenile detention facilities, juvenile treatment facilities, and institutions;
  4. inspect periodically each juvenile detention facility, juvenile treatment facility, or other institution to ensure that the standards and regulations adopted are being maintained;
  5. reimburse municipalities maintaining and operating juvenile detention facilities;
  6. enter into contracts and arrangements with cities and state and federal agencies to carry out the purposes of AS 47.10, AS 47.12, and this chapter;
  7. do all acts necessary to carry out the purposes of AS 47.10, AS 47.12, and this chapter;
  8. adopt the regulations necessary to carry out AS 47.10, AS 47.12, and this chapter;
  9. accept donations, gifts, or bequests of money or other property for use in construction of juvenile institutions, detention facilities, or juvenile treatment facilities;
  10. operate juvenile detention facilities when municipalities are unable to do so;
  11. receive, care for, and place in a juvenile detention facility, the minor’s own home, a foster home, a juvenile treatment facility, or treatment institution all minors committed to its custody under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, and this chapter.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 47 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.

For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.

For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.

For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54, art. 2.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (2), substituted “juvenile detention facilities, juvenile treatment facilities” for “juvenile homes, juvenile work camps, juvenile detention facilities”; in (3), substituted “facilities, juvenile treatment facilities” for “home, work camp, facilities”; in (4), substituted “facility, juvenile treatment facility” for “home, work camp facility”; in (5), substituted “municipalities” for “cities” and deleted “homes, work camps, and” following “juvenile detention”; in (9), deleted “homes, work camps,” following “construction of juvenile”, added “, or juvenile treatment facilities” at the end, and made a related change; in (10), substituted “juvenile detention facilities” for “juvenile homes”; in (11), substituted “juvenile detention facility” for “juvenile detention home”, substituted “juvenile treatment facility” for “correctional school, work camp” and made a related change.

Collateral references. —

60 Am Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 1 et seq.

Sec. 47.14.020. Duties of department.

The department shall

  1. accept all minors committed to the custody of the department and all minors who are involved in a written agreement under AS 47.14.100(c) , and provide for the welfare, control, care, custody, and placement of these minors in accordance with this chapter;
  2. require and collect statistics on juvenile offenses and offenders in the state;
  3. conduct studies and prepare findings and recommendations on the need, number, type, construction, maintenance, and operating costs of juvenile detention facilities, juvenile treatment facilities, and other institutions, and adopt and submit a plan for construction of the facilities and institutions when needed, together with a plan for financing the construction programs;
  4. examine, where possible, all facilities, institutions, and places of juvenile detention and treatment in the state and inquire into their methods and the management of juveniles in them.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 48 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.

For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.

For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (3), substituted “juvenile detention facilities, juvenile treatment facilities” for “homes, work camps, facilities” following “operating costs of”, deleted “homes, work camps,” following “construction of the” and made related and stylistic changes; in (4), deleted “work camps,” following “institutions,”, inserted “and treatment” following “juvenile detention”.

Sec. 47.14.025. Applicability; inclusions of certain persons as minors.

The provisions of AS 47.14.010 47.14.050 apply to a person who is 18 years of age or older and who is subject to the jurisdiction of AS 47.12 due solely to AS 47.12.020(b) . To implement this section, the term “minor” as used in AS 47.14.010 47.14.050 includes a person described in this section.

History. (§ 8 ch 70 SLA 2005)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 10, ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that the enactment of AS 47.14.025 has the effect of amending specific Alaska Delinquency Rules to conform those court rules to the statutory change to acknowledge the inclusion of certain persons 18 years of age or older as minors under this chapter and to acknowledge the special statutory provisions contained in this section to those persons. For a list of the specific court rules affected, see § 10, ch. 70, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts. Section 11(a), ch. 70, SLA 2005, provides that this section “[applies] to offenses committed on or after July 14, 2005.”

Sec. 47.14.030. Use of standardized form by facilities.

For the purpose of collecting statistics, the department shall establish and require state and local agencies that operate a jail or other detention facility to use a standardized form to keep a record and report the admission of a minor. The record shall be limited to the name of the minor admitted, the minor’s date of birth, the specific offense for which the minor was admitted, the date and time admitted, the date and time released, the sex of the minor, the ethnic origin of the minor, and other information required by federal law. Except for the notation of the date and time of the minor’s release, the record shall be prepared at the time of the minor’s admission. Unless otherwise provided by law, information and records obtained under this section are confidential and are not public records. They may be disclosed only for the purpose of compiling statistics and in a manner that does not reveal the identity of the minor.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.14.040. Authority to maintain and operate temporary secure juvenile holding area, juvenile detention facility, or juvenile treatment facility.

  1. A municipality or entity may maintain and operate a temporary secure juvenile holding area, and a municipality or a nonprofit corporation may maintain and operate a juvenile detention facility or juvenile treatment facility.
  2. The municipality or nonprofit corporation may receive grants-in-aid from the state for costs of operation of the temporary secure juvenile holding area or facility maintained and operated under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 49 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (a), substituted “municipality or entity” for “city” near the beginning, substituted “temporary secure juvenile holding area” for “juvenile detention facility” following “operate a”, substituted “municipality” for “city” preceding “or a nonprofit corporation”, substituted “facility or juvenile treatment facility” for “home or a juvenile work camp” at the end; in (b), substituted “municipality” for “city” near the beginning, substituted “temporary secure juvenile holding area or facility” for “homes, work camps, or facilities” following “operation of the”.

Sec. 47.14.050. Operation of homes and facilities.

  1. The department shall adopt standards and regulations for the operation of juvenile detention facilities and juvenile treatment facilities in the state.
  2. The department may enter into contracts with municipalities and other governmental agencies for the detention of juveniles before and after commitment by juvenile authorities. A contract may not be made for longer than one year.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 50, 51 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Administrative Code. —

For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.

For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.

For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, rewrote (a); in (b), substituted “municipalities” for “cities” following “into contracts with” in the first sentence.

Article 2. Care of Children.

Administrative Code. —

For social services, see 7 AAC 53.

Sec. 47.14.100. Powers and duties of department over care of child.

  1. Subject to (e), (f), and (i) — (m) of this section, the department shall arrange for the care of every child committed to its custody by placing the child in a foster home or in the care of an agency or institution providing care for children inside or outside the state. The department may place a child in a suitable family home, with or without compensation, and may place a child released to it, in writing verified by the parent, or guardian or other person having legal custody, for adoptive purposes, in a home for adoption in accordance with existing law. For a child 16 years of age or older, the department may authorize another transitional living arrangement, including student dormitory residence at a postsecondary educational institution, that adequately meets the child’s needs and is designed to assist the child’s transition to independent living.
  2. The department may pay the costs of maintenance that are necessary to assure adequate care of the child, and may accept funds from the federal government that are granted to assist in carrying out the purposes of this chapter, or that are paid under contract entered into with a federal department or agency. A child under the care of the department may not be placed in a family home or institution that does not maintain adequate standards of care.
  3. The department may receive, care for, and make appropriate placement of minors accepted for care for a period of up to six months on the basis of an individual voluntary written agreement between the minor’s parent, legal guardian, or other person having legal custody and the department. The agreement must include provisions for payment of fees under AS 44.29.022 to the department for the minor’s care and treatment. The agreement entered into may not prohibit a minor’s parent, legal guardian, or other person who had legal custody from regaining care of the minor at any time.
  4. In addition to money paid for the maintenance of foster children under (b) of this section, the department
    1. shall pay the costs of caring for foster children with physical or mental disabilities, including the additional costs of medical care, habilitative and rehabilitative treatment, services and equipment, and special clothing, and the indirect costs of medical care, including child care and transportation expenses;
    2. may pay for respite care; in this paragraph, “respite care” means child care for the purpose of providing temporary relief from the stresses of caring for a foster child; and
    3. may pay a subsidized guardianship payment under AS 25.23.210 when a foster child’s foster parents or other persons approved by the department become court-appointed legal guardians of the child.
  5. When a child is removed from a parent’s home, the department shall search for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible. The department shall place the child, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of good cause to the contrary,
    1. in the least restrictive setting that most closely approximates a family and that meets the child’s special needs, if any;
    2. within reasonable proximity to the child’s home, taking into account any special needs of the child and the preferences of the child or parent;
    3. with, in the following order of preference,
      1. an adult family member;
      2. a family friend who meets the foster care licensing requirements established by the department;
      3. a licensed foster home that is not an adult family member or family friend;
      4. an institution for children that has a program suitable to meet the child’s needs.
  6. If an adult family member of the child specified under (e) of this section exists and agrees that the child should be placed elsewhere, before placement elsewhere, the department shall fully communicate the nature of the placement proceedings to the adult family member. Communication under this subsection shall be made in the adult family member’s native language, if necessary.
  7. The department may enter into agreements with Alaska Native villages or Native organizations under 25 U.S.C. 1919 (Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978) respecting the care and custody of Native children and jurisdiction of Native child custody proceedings.
  8. The department may not pay for respite care, as defined in (d) of this section, unless the department or the entity that has contracted with the department to provide the respite care requests criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 for the individual who provides the respite care within 10 business days after the individual is hired to provide respite care and reviews the information within five business days after receiving it.
  9. A child may not be placed with an out-of-home care provider if the department determines that the child can remain safely at home with an adult family member or guardian who lives with the child. In this subsection, “out-of-home care provider” means an agency or person, other than the child’s legal parents, with whom a child who is in the custody of the state under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (3), 47.10.142 , or (c) of this section is currently placed; “agency or person” includes a foster parent, a relative other than a parent, a person who has petitioned for adoption of the child, and a residential child care facility.
  10. For the purpose of determining whether the home of a relative meets the requirements for placement of a child under (e) of this section or under AS 47.10.088(i) , the department shall conduct a criminal background check from state and national criminal justice information available under AS 12.62. The department may conduct a fingerprint background check on any member of the relative’s household who is 16 years of age or older when the relative requests placement of the child. For the purposes of obtaining criminal justice information under this subsection, the department is a criminal justice agency conducting a criminal justice activity under AS 12.62.
  11. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, the department may not pay for inpatient psychiatric services provided to a person under 21 years of age and who is in the custody of the department if the services are provided in an out-of-state psychiatric hospital facility or an out-of-state residential psychiatric treatment center unless the department determines that the assistance is for
    1. psychiatric hospital services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state; or
    2. residential psychiatric treatment center services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state.
  12. The department shall, on a monthly basis, evaluate what types of services are available in the state for inpatient psychiatric care for persons under 21 years of age. If inpatient psychiatric services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and that appropriately address the person’s needs become available at a location in the state for a person under 21 years of age who is receiving the services under this section at a location outside the state, the department shall, as a condition of continued payment by the state for the services, require the person to be transferred to the in-state facility unless the department determines that the transfer would be detrimental to the person’s health, established therapeutic relationship, or clinical need.
  13. Prima facie evidence of good cause not to place a child with an adult family member or family friend under AS 47.10.088(i) or under (e) of this section includes the failure to meet the requirements for a foster care license under AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32, taking into account a waiver, variance, or exemption allowed under AS 47.32.030(a)(3) and 47.32.032 . Prima facie evidence of good cause not to place a child with an adult family member or adult family friend does not include poverty or inadequate or crowded housing. If the department denies a request for placement with an adult family member or a family friend, the department shall inform the adult family member or family friend of the basis for the denial and the right to request a hearing to review the decision. A non-party adult family member or family friend requesting a review hearing under AS 47.10.088(i) or under (e) of this section is not eligible for publicly appointed legal counsel.
  14. Except as provided in (o) and (p) of this section, the department shall continue to search for a suitable adoptive or permanent legal guardianship for a child or person who is in the custody of the state and who is under 21 years of age.
  15. The department may recommend to the court another planned permanent living arrangement for a child who is in state custody only if
    1. the child is 16 years of age or older;
    2. the department has unsuccessfully made intensive efforts to find a permanent placement for the child; and
    3. the department, after considering reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, or permanent placement with a fit and willing relative, determines that there is a compelling reason that the most appropriate permanency plan for the child is placement in another planned permanent living arrangement, and the department documents for the court the compelling reason for the alternate plan.
  16. The department may release from state custody a child or person who has been committed to the custody of the department, before the custody is ordered to end, only if the person, if the person is 19 years of age or older, consents, or
    1. the child or person, if the child or person is over 16 years of age and available, and the guardian ad litem are notified not less than 30 days before a motion for release is filed unless the parties agree to a shorter notice period;
    2. the department files a motion with the court for release of state custody that describes the reasons the release is in the best interest of the child or person; and
    3. a court makes a written finding that release from state custody is in the best interest of the child or person.
  17. When custody of a child who has been committed to the custody of the department is due to expire, the department shall file a notice of release with the court 30 days before the date of release unless the parties agree to a shorter notice period and distribute the notice to the parties, including the child if the child is 16 years of age or older and available.
  18. The department shall make reasonable efforts to place siblings in the same placement if the siblings are residing in the same home when taken into the custody of the department. If siblings are not placed together after reasonable efforts have been made, the case supervisor for the division with responsibility over the custody of children shall document in the file the efforts that were made and the reason separating the siblings for placement purposes is in the best interest of the children. If it is in the best interests of the children to maintain contact, the department shall provide each sibling with contact information for the other sibling and encourage the children’s caregivers to provide opportunities for contact between the siblings. In this subsection, “sibling” means two or more persons who are related by blood, adoption, or marriage as a child of one or both parents.
  19. As used in (o) of this section, “compelling reason” may include circumstances in which
    1. the child has specifically requested that emancipation be established;
    2. a parent and child have a significant bond, but the parent is unable to care for the child because of an emotional or physical disability, and the child’s foster parents have committed to raising the child to the age of majority and to facilitating visitation with the disabled parent.
  20. In this section,
    1. “adult family member” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990 ;
    2. “another planned permanent living arrangement” means a permanent living arrangement for a child who is committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) that is an alternative to permanent placement with an adult family member, and to reunification, adoption, and legal guardianship.
    3. “family friend,” as used in (e) of this section, includes, in the case of an Indian child, a member of the Indian child’s tribe, a member of the tribe in which the child’s biological parent is a member, and another Indian family member.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 47 — 50 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 71 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 2, 3 ch 137 SLA 2003; am § 2 ch 23 SLA 2004; am §§ 33 — 37 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 8 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 22 ch 25 SLA 2006; am § 53 ch 40 SLA 2008; am § 72 ch 41 SLA 2009; am §§ 6, 7 ch 59 SLA 2012; am § 13 ch 6 4SSLA 2016; am §§ 9 — 11 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am §§ 14 — 16 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2012, subsections (n) — (s) were enacted as (o) — (t) and relettered, former subsection (n) was relettered as (t), and the definition of “adult family member” designated as (t)(1). The definition of “another planned permanent living arrangement” was enacted as (u) and redesignated as (t)(2). Internal references in subsections (n) and (s) were conformed.

Cross references. —

P.L. 105-277, division A, Sec. 101(b) (title I, Sec. 124(a)), 112 Stat. 2681-50, 2681-73, provided that: “A nursing facility or home health care agency may submit a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange of [criminal history records corresponding to the fingerprints or other identification information submitted] regarding an applicant for employment if the employment position is involved in direct patient care.”

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to this section, see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.

For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.

For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.

For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.

For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.

For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.

For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.

For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.

For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.

For subsidized adoption and subsidized guardianship payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 2.

For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.

For foster and residential care placement and foster home evaluation, see 7 AAC 56, art. 6.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, in subsection (i) deleted “, as that term is defined in AS 47.14.299 ,” following the first instance of “out-of-home care provider” near the beginning and added the definitions of “out-of-home care provider” and “agency or person.”

The second 2003 amendment, effective October 8, 2003, updated subsection references in subsection (a) and added subsections (k) and ( l ).

The 2004 amendment, effective April 24, 2004, in subsection (h), substituted “criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62” for “records under AS 12.62.035(a) are” and made related changes.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, updated subsection references in subsection (a); rewrote subsection (e); in subsection (f) substituted reference to “family members” for reference to “relatives” and deleted the last sentence; in subsection (j) inserted “under (e) of this section or under AS 47.10.088(i) ” in the first sentence and substituted “16 years of age” for “12 years of age” in the second sentence; and added subsection (m).

The first 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, substituted “clear and convincing evidence” for “a showing” in the introductory language of subsection (e).

The second 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “foster children with physical or mental disabilities” for “physically or mentally handicapped foster children” in paragraph (d)(1), and inserted “and” preceding “special clothing” in that paragraph.

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “the failure to meet the requirements for a foster care license under AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32” for “grounds for denial of a foster care license under AS 47.35.019 or 47.35.021” in the first sentence of subsection (m).

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, added (n) [now (t)(1)].

The 2012 amendment, effective September 9, 2012, in (m), inserted “, taking into account a waiver, variance, or exemption allowed under AS 47.32.030(a)(3) and 47.32.032 ” following “regulations adopted under AS 47.32”; added (o) through (u) (now (n) through (s) and (t)(2)).

The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (t)(3).

The second 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, added the last sentence of (a); in (n), inserted “or person” following “permanent legal guardianship for a child” and substituted “21 years of age” for “18 years of age”; in (p), inserted “or person” following “a child” four times, and added “the person, if the person is 19 years of age or older, consents, or” at the end of the introductory language.

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in the introductory language in (e), inserted “search for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible. The department shall” following the first occurrence of “the department shall”; in the first sentence in (i), substituted “an adult family member or guardian who lives with the child” for “one parent or guardian” following “remain safely at home with”; in (r), added the third sentence.

Notes to Decisions

Statutory construction. —

Court construes a foster placement statute in the best interests of the foster child, not the potential foster parent. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).

Purpose of AS 47.10.230 . —

It seems likely that former AS 47.10.230 was enacted to fulfill the legal commitments the state is required to make in order to receive federal funds under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

Due process. —

Under the due process clause, a foster parent has a property interest in state foster care reimbursement payments that may not be deprived without due process protections; the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, had to provide notice to foster parents of an intended recoupment of payments. Heitz v. State, 215 P.3d 302 (Alaska 2009).

Res judicata. —

Because the grandmother did not receive a review hearing on any of her requests, res judicata did not bar her most recent request for a hearing. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Hearing required. —

To the extent the superior court denied a grandmother’s request for a placement review hearing because she failed to show good cause for a hearing, the ruling was in error, and on remand the superior court had to provide her with the hearing to which she was entitled. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Burdens of proof. —

Legislature placed the burden on the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to justify its denial of an adult family member’s request for placement, and if a judicial review hearing is requested, OCS must demonstrate that its decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence; the legislature gave a family member the right to request such a hearing, but did not impose a burden on the family member to show good cause. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Notice of transfer. —

Maternal grandmother had the required notice of her grandchildren’s transfer of placement from her care because she had initiated the transfer. Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012).

Medical expenses. —

The department is responsible for the medical costs of children in its custody, whether the children are placed at home or in a foster home. In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

Social security benefits. —

State could properly apply to become the payee for social security benefits for a minor who had been placed in foster care and later committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services. C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1992) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

State had no right to order a mother to remit to the state social security benefits which she had lawfully received as representative payee for her minor son who had been placed in foster care and later committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services. C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1992) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

Whether the state could apply a minor’s social security benefits towards the cost of his care at a state youth center was a question which was required to be submitted to the Social Security Agency for initial determination. C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364 (Alaska 1992) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

Future harm to child. —

Unwillingness to cooperate with the Division of Family and Youth Services or to abide by its case plans is generally a strong indicator of future harm to a child. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).

Placement request. —

In this case, because no adoption proceeding had been initiated, on remand the superior court was to consider the grandmother to have asked the Office of Children’s Services to place the children with her for child in need of assistance purposes, not as having asked for approval of her adoption of the children. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).

Preferences in adoptive placement. —

Subsection (e) does not entitle natural relatives to a preference in the adoptive placement of children. In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985) (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

If the child’s placement with his foster family is not actually for “adoptive purposes,” subsection (f) does not disqualify his 20-year-old natural sister from seeking preferential placement under subsection (e). S.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000).

Supreme Court of Alaska has repeatedly found that there is no blood-relative preference in adoption cases. AS 47.14.100(e) is limited by former provisions of subsection (f), which stated in part, “nothing in this subsection or in (e) of this section applies to child placement for adoptive purposes.” Subsection (e) allows blood relatives to petition for initial placement of a child in need of aid, and grandparents wishing to exercise this preference should petition the Department of Family and Youth services (DFYS) for custody or ask for de novo review of DFYS’s decision if their request is denied. Adoption of L.E.K.M., 70 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2003).

Trial court did not err when it dismissed paternal grandparents’ adoption petition and granted primary custody of an orphaned child to her day care providers who were also friends of the child’s murdered mother, because there was not a blood-relative preference in adoption cases in Alaska. Adoption of L.E.K.M., 70 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2003).

Preferences in custodial placement. —

Minor great-grandchildren were not placed with their great-grandparents after removal from their parents’ home for neglect. The great-grandparents’ home was found to be in poor repair and unsafe, and the great-grandparents each had significant health problems. Taken together, the evidence supported the decision not to apply the adult family member preference in determining custody. Dylan J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 10, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Tribe’s placement preference. —

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to follow the tribe's placement preference; the trial court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to place the child with her paternal grandparents and that the placement was compliant with the Indian Child Welfare Act; the court gave great deference to the tribe's placement resolution identifying the paternal grandparents as the most culturally and socially appropriate placement. Rachelle H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 22, 2020).

Placement with grandmother properly denied. —

Conclusion that the Office of Children's Services presented clear and convincing evidence that its denial of placement with the grandmother was justified was not clearly erroneous and the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding good cause to deviate from the statutory requirement that the child be placed with an adult family member. The superior court's factual findings that the grandmother had not permanently ended her relationship with a person convicted for a crime of domestic violence created a barrier to the placement of a child in the grandmother's home were not clearly erroneous. Rose D. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska July 8, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in prioritizing the child's adoption by her long-term foster parents over continued pursuit of a potential relative placement with the grandmother, whose background check revealed evidence of past child abuse and neglect. Shelly C. v. Jonah C., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 21, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Good cause for non-relative placement. —

Contrary to the grandparents' claim, the Office of Children's Services presented clear and convincing evidence of good cause to deviate from the requirement in this section to place the child with an adult relative, including evidence that the child had a strong bond with his brother, who had been placed with a family friend, and that the child did not have a significant bond with the grandparents. Celia W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 15, 2021) (memorandum decision).

“Placement for adoptive purposes”. —

This section does not cut off any possible subsequent requests by a blood relative for placement of a child in need of aid after the superior court commits the child to the state’s custody with the goal of adoption, because the “placement for adoptive purposes” language in former provisions of subsection (f) refers to DFYS’s specific decisions concerning “placement” of a child in its custody, not to the court’s threshold decision to give DFYS “custody” over the child. S.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000).

Reasonable placement efforts by department. —

Where a child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment, and where the record also established that the father had failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, the record established that the state had made sufficient efforts to place the child with family members as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1915(a), and the Child in Need of Aid law, AS 47.14.100(e)(3) , because the state made numerous efforts to place the child with the parents’ family members, but those placements proved inadequate, particularly as the mother’s tribe advised that it did not have any placement possibilities for the child, and the child’s current foster family belonged to an Indian tribe. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).

Foster care. —

Foster care arrangements are created by the Department of Family and Youth services (DFYS) pursuant to AS 47.14.100 , not by judges in adoption cases pursuant to AS 25.23.120(d) . Adoption of L.E.K.M., 70 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2003).

Custodian's compliance with court's instructions. —

Department of Health and Social Services properly denied an aunt’s request for foster custody of her niece, a child in need of aid who had been removed from the custody of her mother, where court found that the aunt would have likely ignored instructions not to place the niece with her mother, resulting in injury to the child. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).

Applied in

Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).

Quoted in

E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981); In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985); Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003). (decided under former AS 47.10.230 ).

Stated in

State v. Jacob, 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416 (Alaska 2003); Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013).

State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 47.14.110. Department inspections; reports by foster homes and institutions.

  1. A representative of the department shall visit, as often as is considered necessary, every foster home or institution in which a child is placed, and, if not satisfied as to the care given, may remove the child from the foster home or institution and place the child elsewhere.
  2. The person or institution receiving a child shall submit the reports the department requires as to the education, health, and welfare of the child and the conditions under which the child is living.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.14.112. Training and workload standards; reports to legislature.

  1. The department shall implement workload standards and a training program for employees who supervise the care of children committed to the supervision or custody of the department under AS 47.10, work with families to prevent the removal of a child from the child’s home under AS 47.10, or investigate reports of harm under AS 47.17. The department shall prepare a staffing report under (b) of this section if the department is unable
    1. to employ the number of qualified employees necessary to ensure that
      1. the department reasonably and safely minimizes the time a child is not in a permanent living arrangement or under a permanent guardianship;
      2. a child is not removed from the child’s home when it is possible and in the child’s best interest for the department to work with the child’s family to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home;
      3. each child is placed in a permanent home not more than 24 months after the date the child is first removed from the child’s home;
    2. to meet best practices standards set by the department requiring the employment of mentors for employees who supervise the care of children committed to the supervision or custody of the department under AS 47.10, work with families to prevent the removal of a child from the child’s home under AS 47.10, or investigate reports of harm under AS 47.17;
    3. for a new employee who supervises the care of a child committed to the supervision or custody of the department under AS 47.10, works with families to prevent the removal of a child from the child’s home under AS 47.10, or investigates reports of harm under AS 47.17, to
      1. provide a minimum of six weeks of training unless the department finds that the new employee has sufficient experience to justify a shorter training period;
      2. limit the employee’s workload as follows:
        1. before the beginning of an employee’s fourth month of work with the department, the employee may supervise not more than six families;
        2. after the beginning of the employee’s fourth month of work but before the end of the employee’s sixth month of work with the department, the employee may supervise not more than 12 families;
        3. when an employee supervises families in a region where travel distances negatively affect the employee’s ability to supervise families and the employee has worked for the department for less than 12 months, the employee may not supervise the maximum number of families provided under (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph; and
    4. for an employee, other than a new employee, who supervises the care of children committed to the supervision or custody of the department under AS 47.10, works with families to prevent the removal of a child from the child’s home under AS 47.10, or investigates reports of harm under AS 47.17, to ensure that the average statewide caseload is not more than 13 families for each worker.
  2. A staffing report prepared as a result of the department’s inability to meet the training and workload standards in (a) of this section must be included in the department’s annual report to the legislature required under AS 18.05.020 . The department shall explain in the staffing report the reasons the department has not been able to meet the standards and provide the following information:
    1. the number of employees who vacated positions during the reporting period;
    2. the number of funded positions that are vacant;
    3. a description of efforts made to recruit and retain employees;
    4. if the department determines additional employee positions are necessary to meet the standards, the number and cost of the additional positions;
    5. if the department determines additional funding is necessary to meet the standards, the amount and purpose of the additional funding; and
    6. the effects on a child and the child’s family of the department’s inability to meet the standards.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department is immune from suit under this section if the department was unable to meet the workload standards and adjusted workload standards because of a lack of sufficient appropriations or because the department’s efforts to recruit or retain employees did not result in an adequate number of qualified applicants to meet the workload standards, as outlined in the staffing report.
  4. The division of the department with responsibility over the custody of children shall prepare and make available to the legislature an annual report on employee recruitment and retention, including a five-year plan, for the division. Not later than November 15 of each year, the department shall deliver the report to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available. The report prepared under this subsection is separate from the annual report to the legislature required under AS 18.05.020 and must include, for the previous 12 months,
    1. the number of frontline social workers employed by the division, the annual average turnover rate of the workers, and the average caseload of the workers on January 1 and July 1 of that year;
    2. the number of children removed from their homes;
    3. the achievement of success measured by the following:
      1. rate of family reunification;
      2. average length of time children spent in custody of the department;
      3. rate of placement with an adult family member or family friend;
      4. number of children placed in a permanent living arrangement with a guardian or biological or adoptive parent;
      5. number of children released from the custody of the department;
    4. if the department has met or exceeded the caseload standards under this chapter and, if the standards were exceeded, the number of caseworker positions in the division that could be eliminated and the amount of funding that could be reduced while continuing to meet but not routinely exceed the caseload standards;
    5. the performance of the department on federal benchmarks focused on the safety, well-being, and permanent placements of foster children compared with the previous five years.

History. (§ 17 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 17, ch. 15, SLA 2018, which enacted this section, took effect on September 5, 2018.

Sec. 47.14.115. Training of foster parents.

  1. If the department has placed a child in a foster home, the department shall, no less often than once quarterly, make available training that will assist the foster parent or parents in providing care that will meet the needs of the child placed in the home and the requirements established by the department in regulation.
  2. If the department determines that it is in the best interests of a child in the custody of the department to place the child with an adult family member who does not have a foster care home license under AS 47.32, the department shall assist the adult family member in obtaining a license, including assisting the adult family member with obtaining any variances necessary to obtain the license, so that the family member is eligible for payments under AS 47.14.100(b) and (d).

History. (§ 51 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 18 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to this section, see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (b).

Sec. 47.14.120. Standards of care.

The department shall establish standards of care and adopt regulations desirable for the welfare of every child under its care.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For subsidized adoption and subsidized guardianship payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 2.

For foster and residential care placement and foster home evaluation, see 7 AAC 56, art. 6.

Sec. 47.14.130. Payment of costs.

The department shall pay the proper and necessary costs of the court and witnesses and other expenses necessarily incurred in the enforcement of AS 47.14.100 47.14.130 .

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Article 3. Citizen Review Panel.

Sec. 47.14.200. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.205. State Citizen Review Panel.

  1. There is established within the department a Citizen Review Panel. The panel shall be composed of volunteer members who are broadly representative of the state, including members who have expertise in the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect.
  2. The panel shall meet not less than once every three months. Meetings may take place telephonically.

History. (§ 38 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.210. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.215. Duties of the state panel.

  1. The state panel shall evaluate the extent to which the department is effectively discharging its child protection responsibilities under
    1. the state plan submitted to the United States Department of Health and Human Services under 42 U.S.C. 5106a(b);
    2. child protection standards under federal and state laws; and
    3. any other criteria that the panel considers important to ensuring the protection of children, including the level and efficiency of coordination of foster care and adoption programs in the state and a review of child fatalities and near fatalities.
  2. In carrying out the responsibilities under (a) of this section, the state panel shall examine the policies, procedures, and practices of the department, and, where appropriate, evaluate specific cases of child abuse or neglect.
  3. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish policies and procedures necessary to carrying out the duties of the state panel under this section.

History. (§ 39 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.220. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.225. Cooperation with state panel.

  1. The department shall provide the panel access to information on child abuse or neglect cases that is necessary for the panel to carry out its duties under AS 47.14.215 .
  2. The department shall serve as staff to the state panel as requested by the panel members.

History. (§ 40 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.230. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.235. Confidentiality.

  1. A person attending a meeting of the state panel or a member or staff of the state panel may not make any disclosure related to information obtained during a review by the state panel unless authorized under AS 47.10.092 or 47.10.093 .
  2. Meetings of the state panel are subject to AS 44.62.310 44.62.319 (Open Meetings Act).

History. (§ 41 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2010, “AS 44.62.310 44.62.319 (Open Meetings Act)” was substituted for “AS 44.62.310 and 44.62.312 ” in accordance with § 29(1), ch. 58, SLA 2010.

Sec. 47.14.240. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.245. Public outreach.

The state panel shall conduct public outreach and gather public comment on current department procedures and practices involving children and family services.

History. (§ 42 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.250. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.255. Report.

  1. The state panel shall prepare and make available to the governor, the legislature, and the public an annual report containing a summary of the activities of the panel conducted under AS 47.14.205 47.14.295 and recommendations for the improvement of child protection services in the state.
  2. Not later than six months after the date on which the report is released under (a) of this section, the department shall submit a written response to the report. The department’s response must include a description of whether and how the department will incorporate the recommendations of the panel, where appropriate.

History. (§ 43 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.260. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.265. Civil penalty for violation of AS 47.14.235.

A violation under AS 47.14.235 is subject to a civil penalty of up to $2,500 for each violation.

History. (§ 44 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.270. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.275. Immunity.

A member of the state panel and a person who furnishes services to or advises the state panel is not liable for damages or other relief in an action involving the performance or failure to perform a duty or other activity of the state panel.

History. (§ 45 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.14.280. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Sec. 47.14.295. Definitions.

In AS 47.14.205 47.14.295 ,

  1. “near fatality” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990 ;
  2. “state panel” means the Citizen Review Panel established under AS 47.14.205 .

History. (§ 46 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 82 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor's notes.—

In 2016, paragraphs (2) and (3) were renumbered as paragraphs (1) and (2) to maintain sequential order following the repeal of former paragraph (1) in 2009.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, repealed former (1), which read, “‘adult family member’ has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990 ;”.

Sec. 47.14.299. Citizens’ Foster Care Review Board. [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]

Article 4. Multidisciplinary Child Protection Teams.

Sec. 47.14.300. Multidisciplinary child protection teams.

  1. The department, a state or municipal agency with expertise in child abuse or neglect, or a tribe recognized by the United States Secretary of the Interior to exist as an Indian tribe under 25 U.S.C. 479a (Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994) with expertise in child abuse or neglect, in partnership with the department, may facilitate the initial establishment of a multidisciplinary child protection team. The purpose of a team is to assist in the evaluation and investigation of reports of child abuse or neglect, as defined in AS 47.17.290 , made under AS 47.17 or initiated by the department or a law enforcement agency and to provide consultation and coordination for agencies involved in child-in-need-of-aid cases under AS 47.10. The multidisciplinary child protection teams shall
    1. ensure that investigations involving child abuse or neglect are coordinated and conducted by trained investigators;
    2. take and recommend steps to avoid duplicative interviews of children;
    3. assist in the reduction of trauma to a child and family involved in an investigation of child abuse or neglect; and
    4. review records, provide consultation, and make recommendations to the department pertaining to a child-in-need-of-aid case under AS 47.10 referred to the team by a team member.
  2. A team shall be made up of
    1. an employee of the child protection office in the department who has expertise in child abuse and neglect;
    2. a peace officer, as defined in AS 11.81.900 ;
    3. one or more staff members of a local child advocacy center, if a center is located in the relevant area;
    4. a medical care provider licensed under AS 08 who has received training in child abuse assessment;
    5. a counselor, social worker, psychologist, or physician who specializes in mental health care, is licensed under AS 08, and has knowledge of child abuse dynamics;
    6. a prosecutor of child abuse cases or a designee of a prosecutor of child abuse cases;
    7. a victim advocate with knowledge of child abuse dynamics;
    8. other persons with expertise in child abuse and neglect invited to serve as needed by consensus of the team as follows:
      1. child development specialists;
      2. educators;
      3. victim counselors as defined in AS 18.66.250 ;
      4. experts in the assessment and treatment of substance abuse;
      5. an attorney who specializes in child protection in the attorney general’s office;
      6. a representative of an Indian tribe, as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903(8) (Indian Child Welfare Act), as designated by the tribe;
      7. guardians ad litem; and
      8. a representative of the division in the department with jurisdiction over juvenile justice.
  3. A team may meet, review records, and conduct business in the absence of one or more members of the team. When a case is referred to the team, the department shall make available to the team records pertaining to the case prepared by or in the possession of the department, including appropriate confidential records under AS 47.10.093(b) . A member of the team may use or disclose records made available by the department under this subsection only as necessary for the performance of the member’s duties. The team may make recommendations to the department on appropriate planning for the case.
  4. Except for a public report issued by a team that does not contain confidential information, records or other information collected by the team or a member of the team related to duties under this section are confidential and not subject to public disclosure under AS 40.25.100 and 40.25.110 .
  5. A team shall meet at least monthly and may meet more often as needed. Meetings of a team are closed to the public and are not subject to the provisions of AS 44.62.310 44.62.319 (Open Meetings Act).
  6. The determinations, conclusions, and recommendations of a team or its members are not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding. A member may not be compelled to disclose a determination, conclusion, recommendation, discussion, or thought process through discovery or testimony in a civil or criminal proceeding. Records and information collected by the team are not subject to discovery or subpoena in connection with a civil or criminal proceeding.
  7. Notwithstanding (f) of this section, an employee of the department may testify in a civil or criminal proceeding concerning cases reviewed by a team even though the department’s records were reviewed by a team and formed the basis of that employee’s testimony and the team’s report.
  8. A person who serves on a multidisciplinary child protection team is not liable for damage or other relief in an action brought by the reason of the performance of a duty, a function, or an activity of the team.
  9. In this section, “team” means a multidisciplinary child protection team created under (a) and (b) of this section.

History. (§ 54 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 1 — 4 ch 59 SLA 2014)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.100 and 40.25.110 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.100 and 09.25.110” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 and 09.25.110.

In 2010, “AS 44.62.310 44.62.319 (Open Meetings Act)” was substituted for “AS 44.62.310 and 44.62.312 ” in accordance with § 29(1), ch. 58, SLA 2010.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective October 5, 2014, rewrote (a), (b), and (c), which read, “(a) The department shall create multidisciplinary child protection teams to assist in the evaluation and investigation of reports made under AS 47.17 and to provide consultation and coordination for agencies involved in child protection cases under AS 47.10. (b) A team created under (a) of this section may invite other persons to serve on the team who have knowledge of and experience in child abuse and neglect matters. These persons may include (1) mental and physical health practitioners licensed under AS 08; (2) child development specialists; (3) educators; (4) peace officers as defined in AS 11.81.900 ; (5) victim counselors as defined in AS 18.66.250 ; (6) experts in the assessment and treatment of substance abuse; (7) representatives of the district attorney’s office and the attorney general’s office; (8) persons familiar with 25 U.S.C. 1901 — 1963 (Indian Child Welfare Act); (9) guardians ad litem; and (10) staff members of a child advocacy center if a center is located in the relevant area. (c) A team created under (a) and (b) of this section shall review records on a case referred to the team by the department. The department shall make available to the team its records on the case and other records compiled for planning on the case by other agencies at the request of the department. The team may make recommendations to the department on appropriate planning for the case.”; in (e), added the first sentence.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2200 — 2202.

Article 5. Alaska Higher Education Savings Program for Children.

Sec. 47.14.400. Higher education savings program.

  1. The department shall administer a program to encourage investment by a person or entity in the higher education of eligible children in the state. The program must include
    1. a central office, dedicated to faith-based and community services, for development and marketing of the program;
    2. a mechanism for the department to establish and maintain a University of Alaska college savings plan under AS 14.40.802 14.40.817 for an eligible child who is a beneficiary of the program;
    3. a process for identifying donors and eligible beneficiaries;
    4. a process for distributing nonidentifying information about an eligible beneficiary to a potential donor, including the age, sex, and general location of the beneficiary, unless the information readily leads to the identification of the eligible beneficiary;
    5. terms and conditions for participation in the program that are consistent with the University of Alaska college savings plan restrictions and with federal law pertaining to higher education savings accounts; and
    6. a procedure for monitoring success of the program, for record keeping, and for maintaining confidentiality of records as required by federal and state law.
  2. A person is eligible for participation in the higher education savings program for children as a beneficiary if the person was ordered committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c) or AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3), was placed in out-of-home care for not less than two years, and is a resident of the state.
  3. The commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee may name a new beneficiary to an existing college savings plan established under (a) of this section if the new designation is not prohibited under federal law or under the University of Alaska college savings plan and if the named beneficiary dies, fails to enroll in an eligible program before the beneficiary becomes 30 years of age, or fails to meet conditions established in regulations adopted by the commissioner of health and social services.
  4. Identifying information of a beneficiary contained in records related to the program is confidential.
  5. In this section,
    1. “beneficiary” has the meaning given in AS 14.40.802 ;
    2. “college savings plan” means a postsecondary education savings program or advance college tuition savings contract established under AS 14.40.802 14.40.817 ;
    3. “donor” means the person or entity who contributes to the higher education savings program for children for the purpose of establishing or contributing to a college savings account established for a child under this section;
    4. “out-of-home care” means care at the residence or facility at which a child is placed by the state, and does not include care at the residence from which the child was removed.

History. (§ 1 ch 58 SLA 2007)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was enacted as AS 47.05.400 and renumbered in 2007. In 2007, under AS 01.05.031 , “of health and social services” was added after “commissioner” in subsection (c) to correct a manifest error in ch. 58, SLA 2007.

Article 6. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.14.980. Grants-in-aid.

The department may accept grants-in-aid from the federal government or private foundations and may accept other gifts consistent with the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.14.990. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “care” or “caring” under AS 47.14.100(c) means to provide for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child;
  2. “child in need of aid” means a child found to be within the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 and 47.10.011 ;
  3. “court” means the superior court of the state;
  4. “criminal justice information” has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;
  5. “delinquent minor” means a minor found to be within the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.12.020 ;
  6. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  7. “juvenile detention facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  8. “juvenile probation officer” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  9. “juvenile treatment facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  10. “minor” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  11. “temporary secure juvenile holding area” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
  12. “treatment institution” means a hospital, clinic, institution, center, or other health care facility that has been designated by the department for the treatment of juveniles.

History. (§ 47 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 55, 56 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 73, 82 ch 41 SLA 2009; am §§ 52 — 54, 56 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1998, 2016, and 2021, the paragraphs in this section were renumbered to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, repealed (11), which read, “ ‘serious offense’ has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;”; and in (12), deleted “ ‘Treatment facility’ or” preceding “ ‘treatment institution’ ”.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (7), substituted “has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ” for “means separate quarters within a city jail used for the detention of delinquent minors”; repealed former (8) and (9); in (10), substituted “has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ” for “means a person under 18 years of age”; added (12) – (14) [now (8), (9), and (11)].

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013).

Chapter 15. Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles.

Revisor’s notes. —

By letter of June 23, 2009, the commissioner of health and social services notified the revisor of statutes that at least 37 states have signed this compact. Therefore, under §§ 14 and 15, ch. 37, SLA 2009, the 2009 amendments of this chapter took effect July 1, 2009.

Sec. 47.15.010. Execution of interstate compact.

The governor shall execute a compact on the behalf of the state with any other state or states legally joining in it in substantially the following form:

History. (§ 1 ch 88 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 67 SLA 1966; am § 46 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 4 ch 37 SLA 2009)

INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR JUVENILES

ARTICLE I PURPOSE

The compacting states to this Interstate Compact recognize that each state is responsible for the proper supervision or return of juveniles, delinquents, and status offenders who are on probation or parole and who have absconded, escaped, or run away from supervision and control and in so doing have endangered their own safety and the safety of others. The compacting states also recognize that each state is responsible for the safe return of juveniles who have run away from home and in doing so have left their state of residence. The compacting states also recognize that Congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 U.S.C. 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime. It is the purpose of this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to

  1. ensure that the adjudicated juveniles and status offenders subject to this compact are provided adequate supervision and services in the receiving state as ordered by the adjudicating judge or parole authority in the sending state;
  2. ensure that the public safety interests of the citizens, including the victims of juvenile offenders, in both the sending and receiving states are adequately protected;
  3. return juveniles who have run away, absconded, or escaped from supervision or control or have been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return;
  4. make contracts for the cooperative institutionalization in public facilities in member states for delinquent youth needing special services;
  5. provide for the effective tracking and supervision of juveniles;
  6. equitably allocate the costs, benefits, and obligations of the compacting states;
  7. establish procedures to manage the movement between states of juvenile offenders released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, juvenile departments, or any other criminal or juvenile justice agency that has jurisdiction over juvenile offenders;
  8. ensure immediate notice to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines;
  9. establish procedures to resolve pending charges, including detainers, against juvenile offenders before transfer or release to the community under the terms of this compact;
  10. establish a system of uniform data collection on information pertaining to juveniles subject to this compact that allows access by authorized juvenile justice and criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of compact activities to heads of state executive, judicial, and legislative branches and juvenile and criminal justice administrators;
  11. monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of juveniles and initiate interventions to address and correct noncompliance;
  12. coordinate training and education regarding the regulation of interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity; and
  13. coordinate the implementation and operation of the compact with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, and other compacts affecting juveniles particularly in those cases where concurrent or overlapping supervision issues arise; it is the policy of the compacting states that the activities conducted by the Interstate Commission created in this section are the formation of public policies and therefore are public business; furthermore, the compacting states shall cooperate and observe their individual and collective duties and responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the purposes and policies of the compact.

ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

  1. “by-laws” means those by-laws established by the Interstate Commission for its governance, or for directing or controlling its actions or conduct;
  2. “commissioner” means the voting representative of each compacting state appointed under art. III of this compact;
  3. “compact administrator” means the individual in each compacting state appointed under the terms of this compact, responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission, and policies adopted by the state council under this compact;
  4. “compacting state” means any state that has enacted the enabling legislation for this compact;
  5. “court” means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected, or dependent children;
  6. “deputy compact administrator” means the individual, if any, in each compacting state appointed to act on behalf of a compact administrator under the terms of this compact responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission, and policies adopted by the state council under this compact;
  7. “Interstate Commission” means the Interstate Commission for Juveniles created by art. III of this compact;
  8. “juvenile” means any person defined as a juvenile in any member state or by the rules of the Interstate Commission, including
    1. accused delinquent, a person charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
    2. adjudicated delinquent, a person found to have committed an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
    3. accused status offender, a person charged with an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult;
    4. adjudicated status offender, a person found to have committed an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult; and
    5. non-offender, a person in need of supervision who has not been accused or adjudicated a status offender or delinquent.
  9. “non-compacting state” means any state that has not enacted the enabling legislation for this compact;
  10. “probation or parole” means any kind of supervision or conditional release of juveniles authorized under the laws of the compacting states;
  11. “rule”
    1. means a written statement by the Interstate Commission promulgated under art. VI of this compact that is of general applicability, implements, interprets, or prescribes a policy or provision of the compact, or an organizational, procedural, or practice requirement of the commission, and has the force and effect of statutory law in a compacting state;
    2. includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule;
  12. “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia or its designee, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands.

ARTICLE III INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR JUVENILES

  1. The compacting states hereby create the “Interstate Commission for Juveniles.” The commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the compacting states. The commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers, and duties set out in this section, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the compacting states in accordance with the terms of this compact.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall consist of commissioners appointed by the appropriate appointing authority in each state under the rules and requirements of each compacting state and in consultation with the State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision created under this section. The commissioner shall be the compact administrator, deputy compact administrator, or designee from that state who shall serve on the Interstate Commission in such capacity under the applicable law of the compacting state.
  3. In addition to the commissioners who are the voting representatives of each state, the Interstate Commission shall include individuals who are not commissioners, but who are members of interested organizations. Such non-commissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general, Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, juvenile justice and juvenile corrections officials, and crime victims. All non-commissioner members of the Interstate Commission shall be ex-officio, non-voting, members. The Interstate Commission may provide in its by-laws for such additional ex-officio, non-voting, members, including members of other national organizations, in such numbers as shall be determined by the commission.
  4. Each compacting state represented at any meeting of the commission is entitled to one vote. A majority of the compacting states constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the by-laws of the Interstate Commission.
  5. The commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of a simple majority of the compacting states, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and meetings shall be open to the public.
  6. The Interstate Commission shall establish an executive committee, which shall include commission officers, members, and others as determined by the by-laws. The executive committee shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission during periods when the Interstate Commission is not in session, with the exception of rulemaking, amendment to the compact, or both. The executive committee shall oversee the day-to-day activities of the administration of the compact managed by an executive director and Interstate Commission staff; administer enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the compact and its by-laws and rules; and perform such other duties as directed by the Interstate Commission or set out in the by-laws.
  7. Each member of the Interstate Commission shall have the right and power to cast a vote to which that compacting state is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission. A member shall vote in person and may not delegate a vote to another compacting state. However, a commissioner, in consultation with the state council, shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the commissioner from that state, to cast a vote on behalf of the compacting state at a specified meeting. The by-laws may provide for members’ participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication.
  8. The Interstate Commission’s by-laws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the Interstate Commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The Interstate Commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests.
  9. Public notice shall be given of all meetings. All meetings shall be open to the public, except as set out in the rules or as otherwise provided in the compact. The Interstate Commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public if it determines by two-thirds vote that an open meeting would be likely to
    1. relate solely to the Interstate Commission’s internal personnel practices and procedures;
    2. disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by law;
    3. disclose trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential;
    4. involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any person;
    5. disclose information of a personal nature if the disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
    6. disclose investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes;
    7. disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the Interstate Commission with respect to a regulated person or entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of such person or entity;
    8. disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the stability of a regulated person or entity; or
    9. specifically relate to the Interstate Commission’s issuance of a subpoena, or its participation in a civil action or other legal proceeding.
  10. For every meeting closed under (i) of this section, the Interstate Commission’s legal counsel shall publicly certify that, in the legal counsel’s opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public, and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The Interstate Commission shall keep minutes that shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons therefore, including a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote, as reflected in the vote of each member on the question. All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.
  11. The Interstate Commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of juveniles as directed through its rules, which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange, and reporting requirements. Such methods of data collection, exchange, and reporting shall insofar as is reasonably possible conform to up-to-date technology and coordinate its information functions with the appropriate repository of records.

ARTICLE IV POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. to provide for dispute resolution among compacting states;
  2. to promulgate rules to effect the purposes and obligations as enumerated in this compact, which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact;
  3. to oversee, supervise, and coordinate the interstate movement of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact and any by-laws adopted and rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission;
  4. to enforce compliance with the compact provisions, the rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission, and the by-laws, using all necessary and proper means, including but not limited to the use of judicial process;
  5. to establish and maintain offices that shall be located within one or more of the compacting states;
  6. to purchase and maintain insurance and bonds;
  7. to borrow, accept, hire, or contract for services of personnel;
  8. to establish and appoint committees and hire staff that it considers necessary for the carrying out of its functions including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by art. III of the compact which shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission in carrying out its powers and duties;
  9. to elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties and determine their qualifications; and to establish the Interstate Commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, inter alia, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel;
  10. to accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of it;
  11. to lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal, or mixed;
  12. to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, whether real, personal, or mixed;
  13. to establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in art. VIII of this compact;
  14. to sue and be sued;
  15. to adopt a seal and by-laws governing the management and operation of the Interstate Commission;
  16. to perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact;
  17. to report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the Interstate Commission during the preceding year; such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the Interstate Commission;
  18. to coordinate education, training, and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity;
  19. to establish uniform standards of the reporting, collecting, and exchanging of data;
  20. the Interstate Commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the by-laws.

ARTICLE V ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. By-laws
    1. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members present and voting, within 12 months after the first Interstate Commission meeting, adopt by-laws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the compact, including, but not limited to
      1. establishing the fiscal year of the Interstate Commission;
      2. establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
      3. provide for the establishment of committees governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the Interstate Commission;
      4. providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the Interstate Commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each such meeting;
      5. establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the Interstate Commission;
      6. providing a mechanism for concluding the operations of the Interstate Commission and the return of any surplus funds that may exist upon the termination of the compact after the payment, reserving, or both, of all of its debts and obligations;
      7. providing start-up rules for initial administration of the compact; and
      8. establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out the compact.
  2. Officers and Staff
    1. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members, elect annually from among its members a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have such authority and duties as may be specified in the by-laws; the chairperson or, in the chairperson’s absence or disability, the vice-chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Interstate Commission; the officers elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the Interstate Commission, provided that, subject to the availability of budgeted funds, the officers shall be reimbursed for any ordinary and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the Interstate Commission;
    2. The Interstate Commission shall, through its executive committee, appoint or retain an executive director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the Interstate Commission may consider appropriate; the executive director shall serve as secretary to the Interstate Commission, but may not be a member and shall hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the Interstate Commission.
  3. Qualified Immunity, Defense, and Indemnification
    1. The commission’s executive director and employees shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of or relating to any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred, or that such person had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of commission employment, duties, or responsibilities provided, that any such person may not be protected from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person;
    2. The liability of any commissioner, or the employee or agent of a commissioner, acting within the scope of such person’s employment or duties for acts, errors, or omissions occurring within such person’s state may not exceed the limits of liability set out under the constitution and laws of that state for state officials, employees, and agents; nothing in this subsection shall be construed to protect any such person from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person;
    3. The Interstate Commission shall defend the executive director or the employees or representatives of the Interstate Commission and, subject to the approval of the attorney general of the state represented by any commissioner of a compacting state, shall defend such commissioner or the commissioner’s representatives or employees in any civil action seeking to impose liability arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such person;
    4. The Interstate Commission shall indemnify and hold the commissioner of a compacting state, or the commissioner’s representatives or employees, or the Interstate Commission’s representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against such persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such persons.

ARTICLE VI RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. The Interstate Commission shall promulgate and publish rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the compact.
  2. Rulemaking shall occur under the criteria set out in this article and the by-laws and rules adopted under this article. Such rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the Model State Administrative Procedures Act, 1981 Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 15, p. 1 (2000), or such other administrative procedures act, as the Interstate Commission considers appropriate consistent with due process requirements under the United States Constitution as now or hereafter interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified, as published with the final version of the rule as approved by the Commission.
  3. When promulgating a rule, the Interstate Commission shall, at a minimum:
    1. Publish the proposed rule’s entire text stating the reason or reasons for that proposed rule;
    2. Allow and invite any and all persons to submit written data, facts, opinions, and arguments, which information shall be added to the record, and be made publicly available;
    3. Provide an opportunity for an informal hearing if petitioned by 10 or more persons; and
    4. Promulgate a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on input from state or local officials, or interested parties.
  4. Allow, not later than 60 days after a rule is promulgated, any interested person to file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Federal District Court where the Interstate Commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of such rule. If the court finds that the Interstate Commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside. For purposes of this subsection, evidence is substantial if it would be considered substantial evidence under the Model State Administrative Procedures Act.
  5. If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, those states may, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the compact, cause that such rule shall have no further force and effect in any compacting state.
  6. The existing rules governing the operation of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles superseded by this Act shall be null and void 12 months after the first meeting of the Interstate Commission created under this compact.
  7. Upon determination by the Interstate Commission that a state-of-emergency exists, it may promulgate an emergency rule that shall become effective immediately upon adoption, provided that the usual rulemaking procedures provided under the compact shall be retroactively applied to the rule as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 90 days after the effective date of the emergency rule.

ARTICLE VII OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. Oversight
    1. The Interstate Commission shall oversee the administration and operations of the interstate movement of juveniles subject to this compact in the compacting states and shall monitor such activities being administered in non-compacting states that may significantly affect compacting states;
    2. The courts and executive agencies in each compacting state shall enforce this compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the compact’s purposes and intent; the provisions of this compact and the rules promulgated under this compact shall be received by all the judges, public officers, commissions, and departments of the state government as evidence of the authorized statute and administrative rules; all courts shall take judicial notice of the compact and the rules; in any judicial or administrative proceeding in a compacting state pertaining to the subject matter of this compact that may affect the powers, responsibilities, or actions of the Interstate Commission, it shall be entitled to receive all service of process in any such proceeding, and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes;
  2. Dispute Resolution
    1. The compacting states shall report to the Interstate Commission on all issues and activities necessary for the administration of the compact as well as issues and activities pertaining to compliance with the provisions of the compact and its by-laws and rules;
    2. The Interstate Commission shall attempt, upon the request of a compacting state, to resolve any disputes or other issues which are subject to the compact and which may arise among compacting states and between compacting and non-compacting states; the commission shall promulgate a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the compacting states;
    3. The Interstate Commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions and rules of this compact using any or all means set out in art. XI of this compact.

ARTICLE VIII FINANCE

  1. The Interstate Commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization, and ongoing activities.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each compacting state to cover the cost of the internal operations and activities of the Interstate Commission and its staff which must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the Interstate Commission’s annual budget as approved each year; the aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the Interstate Commission, taking into consideration the population of each compacting state and the volume of interstate movement of juveniles in each compacting state and shall promulgate a rule binding upon all compacting states which governs said assessment.
  3. The Interstate Commission may not incur any obligations of any kind before securing the funds adequate to meet the same, nor shall the Interstate Commission pledge the credit of any of the compacting states, except by and with the authority of the compacting state.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its by-laws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the Interstate Commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate Commission.

ARTICLE IX THE STATE COUNCIL

Each member state shall create a State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision. While each state may determine the membership of its own state council, its membership must include at least one representative from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, victims groups, and the compact administrator, deputy compact administrator or designee. Each compacting state retains the right to determine the qualifications of the compact administrator or deputy compact administrator. Each state council will advise and may exercise oversight and advocacy concerning that state’s participation in Interstate Commission activities and other duties as may be determined by that state, including but not limited to, development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the compact within that state.

ARTICLE X COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE, AND AMENDMENT

  1. Any state, the District of Columbia, or its designee, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands as defined in art. II of this compact is eligible to become a compacting state.
  2. The compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than 35 of the states. The initial effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2004 or upon enactment into law by the 35th jurisdiction. Thereafter it shall become effective and binding as to any other compacting state upon enactment of the compact into law by that state. The governors of non-member states or their designees shall be invited to participate in the activities of the Interstate Commission on a nonvoting basis before adoption of the compact by all states and territories of the United States.
  3. The Interstate Commission may propose amendments to the compact for enactment by the compacting states. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the Interstate Commission and the compacting states unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the compacting states.

ARTICLE XI WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

  1. Withdrawal
    1. Once effective, the compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every compacting state, provided that a compacting state may withdraw from the compact by specifically repealing the statute that enacted the compact into law;
    2. The effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal;
    3. The withdrawing state shall immediately notify the chairperson of the Interstate Commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state; the Interstate Commission shall notify the other compacting states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw within 60 days of its receipt;
    4. The withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations, the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal;
    5. Reinstatement following withdrawal of any compacting state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting the compact or upon such later date as determined by the Interstate Commission,
  2. Technical Assistance, Fines, Suspension, Termination, and Default
    1. If the Interstate Commission determines that any compacting state has at any time defaulted in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, or the by-laws or duly promulgated rules, the Interstate Commission may impose any or all of the following penalties;
      1. remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the Interstate Commission;
      2. alternative dispute resolution;
      3. fines, fees, and costs in amounts as are considered to be reasonable as fixed by the Interstate Commission; and
      4. suspension or termination of membership in the compact, which shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the by-laws and rules have been exhausted and the Interstate Commission has therefore determined that the offending state is in default; immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the Interstate Commission to the governor, the chief justice or the chief judicial officer of the state, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council; the grounds for default include, but are not limited to, failure of a compacting state to perform such obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, the by-laws, or duly promulgated rules and any other grounds designated in commission bylaws and rules; the Interstate Commission shall immediately notify the defaulting state in writing of the penalty imposed by the Interstate Commission and of the default pending a cure of the default; the commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the defaulting state must cure its default; if the defaulting state fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the commission, the defaulting state shall be terminated from the compact upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states and all rights, privileges, and benefits conferred by this compact shall be terminated from the effective date of termination;
    2. Within sixty days of the effective date of termination of a defaulting state, the commission shall notify the governor, the chief justice or chief judicial officer, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council of the termination;
    3. The defaulting state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination including any obligations, the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination;
    4. The Interstate Commission may not bear any costs relating to the defaulting state unless otherwise mutually agreed upon in writing between the Interstate Commission and the defaulting state;
    5. Reinstatement following termination of any compacting state requires both a reenactment of the compact by the defaulting state and the approval of the Interstate Commission under the rules.
  3. Judicial Enforcement: the Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the federal district where the Interstate Commission has its offices, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the compact, its duly promulgated rules and by-laws, against any compacting state in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys fees.
  4. Dissolution of Compact
    1. The compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the compacting state, which reduces membership in the compact to one compacting state;
    2. Upon the dissolution of this compact, the compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission shall be concluded and any surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the by-laws.

ARTICLE XII SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION

  1. The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be enforceable.
  2. The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

ARTICLE XIII BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS

  1. Other Laws
    1. Nothing in this compact prevents the enforcement of any other law of a compacting state that is not inconsistent with this compact;
    2. All compacting states’ laws other than state constitutions and other interstate compacts conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.
  2. Binding Effect of the Compact
    1. All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all rules and by-laws promulgated by the Interstate Commission, are binding upon the compacting states;
    2. All agreements between the Interstate Commission and the compacting states are binding in accordance with their terms;
    3. Upon the request of a party to a conflict over meaning or interpretation of Interstate Commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, the Interstate Commission may issue advisory opinions regarding such meaning or interpretation;
    4. In the event any provision of this compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any compacting state, the obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and such obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction shall remain in the compacting state and shall be exercised by the agency to which such obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this compact becomes effective.

Cross references. —

For provision authorizing implementation of the former provisions of this section, as they read before their amendment by § 4, ch. 37, SLA 2009, to compacting states to the former Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles, but that have not yet enacted the Interstate Compact for Juveniles set out in this section, see § 12, ch. 37, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

For effect of the 2009 amendment of this section on Rule 4, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, entitling the Interstate Commission for Juveniles to receive service of process of a judicial proceeding in this state that pertains to the Interstate Compact for Juveniles in which the validity of a compact provision or rule is an issue for which a judicial determination has been sought, and on Rule 24, entitling that commission to have standing to intervene in that judicial proceeding, see § 11, ch. 37, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, rewrote the section.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 1, ch. 67, SLA 1966, provides: “The Out-of-State Confinement Amendment to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other states legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows in this Act.”

Section 58, ch. 107, SLA 1998 provides: “SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 46. The juvenile rendition amendment to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles is hereby enacted into law by sec. 46 of this Act and entered into by this state with all other states legally joining therein in the form substantially as set out in sec. 46 of this Act. Section 46 of this Act applies to offenses committed before, on, or after July 1, 1998.”

Notes to Decisions

Best interests. —

Trial court properly ordered a runaway juvenile's return to the juvenile's home state because (1) a home state court found it was in the juvenile's best interests to return to that state, and (2) the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) gave the trial court no authority to make that decision, as the ICJ accounted for the juvenile's best interests by mandating the reporting of any abuse or neglect concerns to the home state, which was charged with conducting an investigation, but which did not alleviate the trial court's duty to return the juvenile. Jessica J. v. State, 442 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.15.020. Juvenile compact administrator.

Under the compact established under AS 47.15.010 , the commissioner of health and social services may designate an officer as the compact administrator. The compact administrator shall cooperate with all departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of this state and its subdivisions in facilitating the proper administration of the compact or of a supplementary agreement entered into by this state.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1960; am § 5 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, rewrote the first sentence, which read, “Under the compact, the governor may designate an officer as the compact administrator.”; and deleted the second and third sentences, which read, “The administrator, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall adopt regulations to carry out more effectively the terms of the compact. The compact administrator serves subject to the pleasure of the governor.”

Sec. 47.15.025. State council.

The State Council for Interstate Adult and Juvenile Offender Supervision created in AS 33.36.140 shall serve as the state council under AS 47.15.010 .

History. (§ 6 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 37, SLA 2009, makes this section effective July 1, 2009.

Sec. 47.15.030. Supplementary agreements.

The compact administrator may make supplementary agreements with appropriate officials of other states pursuant to the compact. If a supplementary agreement requires or contemplates the use of an institution or facility of this state or requires or contemplates the provision of a service of this state, the supplementary agreement has no force or effect until approved by the head of the department or agency under whose jurisdiction the institution is operated, or whose department or agency is charged with performing the service.

History. (§ 3 ch 88 SLA 1960)

Sec. 47.15.035. Regulations.

The Department of Health and Social Services may adopt regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 7 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 37, SLA 2009, makes this section effective July 1, 2009.

Sec. 47.15.040. Financial arrangements.

The compact administrator, subject to the approval of the commissioner of administration, may make or arrange for the payments necessary to discharge the financial obligations imposed upon this state by the compact or by a supplementary agreement made under the compact.

History. (§ 4 ch 88 SLA 1960)

Sec. 47.15.050. Appointment of attorney or guardian. [Repealed, § 10 ch 37 SLA 2009.]

Sec. 47.15.060. Enforcement.

The courts, departments, agencies and officers of this state and its subdivisions shall enforce this compact and shall do all things appropriate to the effectuation of its purposes and intent which are within their respective jurisdiction.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1960)

Sec. 47.15.070. Additional procedures not precluded.

In addition to the procedures provided under AS 47.15.010 for the return of a runaway juvenile, the states that are participants to the compact, the juvenile, the juvenile’s parents or other legal custodian, or the courts of the participating states may agree upon and adopt any plan or procedure legally authorized under the laws of this state and the other respective party states for the return of the runaway juvenile.

History. (§ 7 ch 88 SLA 1960; am § 8 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, substituted “under AS 47.15.010 ” for “in articles IV and VI of the compact”, and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.15.080. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Interstate Compact for Juveniles.

History. (§ 8 ch 88 SLA 1960; am § 9 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, substituted “Interstate Compact for Juveniles” for “Uniform Interstate Compact on Juveniles”.

Chapter 17. Child Protection.

Sec. 47.17.010. Purpose.

To protect children whose health and well-being may be adversely affected through the infliction, by other than accidental means, of harm through physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment, the legislature requires the reporting of these cases by practitioners of the healing arts and others to the department. It is not the intent of the legislature that persons required to report suspected child abuse or neglect under this chapter investigate the suspected child abuse or neglect before they make the required report to the department. Reports must be made when there is a reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect in order to make state investigative and social services available in a wider range of cases at an earlier point in time, to make sure that investigations regarding child abuse and neglect are conducted by trained investigators, and to avoid subjecting a child to duplicative interviews about the abuse or neglect. It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of these reports, protective services will be made available in an effort to

  1. prevent further harm to the child;
  2. safeguard and enhance the general well-being of children in this state; and
  3. preserve family life unless that effort is likely to result in physical or emotional damage to the child.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 3 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 4 ch 29 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 5 ch 59 SLA 2014)

Administrative Code. —

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective October 5, 2014, in the first sentence of the introductory language, at the beginning, substituted “In order to” for “To”, and in the third sentence, substituted “duplicative interviews” for “multiple interviews”.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994).

Collateral references. —

42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 16-18.

43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 116, 117.

Medical attention, criminal neglect by failure to provide. 12 ALR2d 1047.

Validity and construction of penal statute prohibiting child abuse. 1 ALR4th 38.

Liability of parent for injury to unemancipated child caused by parent’s negligence — modern cases. 6 ALR4th 1066.

Validity, construction, and application of statute requiring doctor or other person to report child abuse. 73 ALR4th 782.

Sec. 47.17.020. Persons required to report.

  1. The following persons who, in the performance of their occupational duties, their appointed duties under (8) of this subsection, or their volunteer duties under (9) of this subsection, have reasonable cause to suspect that a child has suffered harm as a result of child abuse or neglect shall immediately report the harm to the nearest office of the department and, if the harm appears to be a result of a suspected sex offense, shall immediately report the harm to the nearest law enforcement agency:
    1. practitioners of the healing arts;
    2. school teachers and school administrative staff members, including athletic coaches, of public and private schools;
    3. peace officers and officers of the Department of Corrections;
    4. administrative officers of institutions;
    5. child care providers;
    6. paid employees of domestic violence and sexual assault programs, and crisis intervention and prevention programs as defined in AS 18.66.990 ;
    7. paid employees of an organization that provides counseling or treatment to individuals seeking to control their use of drugs or alcohol;
    8. members of a child fatality review team established under AS 12.65.015(e) or 12.65.120 or the multidisciplinary child protection team created under AS 47.14.300 ;
    9. volunteers who interact with children in a public or private school for more than four hours a week;
    10. juvenile probation officers, juvenile probation office staff, and staff of juvenile detention facilities and juvenile treatment facilities, as those terms are defined in AS 47.12.990 .
  2. This section does not prohibit the named persons from reporting cases that have come to their attention in their nonoccupational capacities, nor does it prohibit any other person from reporting a child’s harm that the person has reasonable cause to suspect is a result of child abuse or neglect. These reports shall be made to the nearest office of the department.
  3. If the person making a report of harm under this section cannot reasonably contact the nearest office of the department and immediate action is necessary for the well-being of the child, the person shall make the report to a peace officer. The peace officer shall immediately take action to protect the child and shall, at the earliest opportunity, notify the nearest office of the department.
  4. This section does not require a religious healing practitioner to report as neglect of a child the failure to provide medical attention to the child if the child is provided treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by an accredited practitioner of the church or denomination.
  5. The department shall immediately notify the nearest law enforcement agency if the department
    1. concludes that the harm was caused by a person who is not responsible for the child’s welfare;
    2. is unable to determine
      1. who caused the harm to the child; or
      2. whether the person who is believed to have caused the harm has responsibility for the child’s welfare; or
    3. concludes that the report involves
      1. possible criminal sex abuse or sex offenses under AS 11.41.410 11.41.458 , AS 11.61.116 , 11.61.118(a)(2) , 11.61.120(a)(6) , 11.61.123 , or 11.61.128 , including sex offenses committed by a minor against a minor; or
      2. abuse or neglect that results in the need for medical treatment of the child.
  6. If a law enforcement agency determines that a child has been abused or neglected and that (1) the harm was caused by a teacher or other person employed by the school or school district in which the child is enrolled as a student, (2) the harm occurred during an activity sponsored by the school or school district in which the child is enrolled as a student, or (3) the harm occurred on the premises of the school in which the child is enrolled as a student or on the premises of a school within the district in which the child is enrolled as a student, the law enforcement agency shall notify the chief administrative officer of the school or district in which the child is enrolled immediately after the agency determines that a child has been abused or neglected under the circumstances set out in this section, except that if the person about whom the report has been made is the chief administrative officer or a member of the chief administrative officer’s immediate family, the law enforcement agency shall notify the commissioner of education and early development that the child has been abused or neglected under the circumstances set out in this section. The notification must set out the factual basis for the law enforcement agency’s determination. If the notification involves a person in the teaching profession, as defined in AS 14.20.370 , the law enforcement agency shall send a copy of the notification to the Professional Teaching Practices Commission.
  7. A person required to report child abuse or neglect under (a) of this section who makes the report to the person’s job supervisor or to another individual working for the entity that employs the person is not relieved of the obligation to make a report required under (a) of this section.
  8. This section does not require a person required to report child abuse or neglect under (a)(6) of this section to report mental injury to a child as a result of exposure to domestic violence so long as the person has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in safe and appropriate care and not presently in danger of mental injury as a result of exposure to domestic violence.
  9. This section does not require a person required to report child abuse or neglect under (a)(7) of this section to report the resumption of use of an intoxicant as described in AS 47.10.011 (10) so long as the person does not have reasonable cause to suspect that a child has suffered harm as a result of the resumption.
  10. This section does not require an athletic coach who is an unpaid volunteer to report child abuse or neglect under (a)(2) of this section unless the coach
    1. volunteers for more than
      1. four hours a week for four consecutive weeks; or
      2. 20 hours a week in a one-month period;
    2. has received the training required under AS 47.17.022 ; and
    3. has signed a form acknowledging that the coach is required to report child abuse or neglect under this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am §§ 4, 5 ch 104 SLA 1982; am E.O. No. 55 § 42 (1984); am §§ 8 — 10 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 2 ch 114 SLA 1986; am §§ 2 — 6 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 66 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 20 ch 81 SLA 1998; am §§ 57, 58 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 24 ch 118 SLA 1998; am § 39 ch 43 SLA 2013; §§ 20, 21 ch 2 SSSLA 2015; am §§ 131, 132, 133 ch 4 FSSLA 2019; am § 55 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1998, paragraph (a)(4)-(9) were renumbered as (a)(3)-(8), and internal references in subsections (a), (h), and (i) were conformed to reflect the 1998 deletion of former (a)(3).

In 1999, in (f) of this section, “commissioner of education” was changed to “commissioner of education and early development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For dismissal of CINA proceedings involving a minor receiving medical care by religious means, see AS 47.10.085 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (a)(2), inserted “, including athletic coaches,” following “school administrative staff members”.

The 2015 amendment, effective June 30, 2017, in the introductory language in (a), deleted “or with respect to (8) of this subsection, in the performance of” following “their occupational duties,” and inserted “under (8) of this subsection, or their volunteer duties under (9) of this subsection” following “appointed duties”, added (a)(9) and made related changes; added (j).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, rewrote (e)(3)(A), which read, “possible criminal conduct under AS 11.41.410 11.41.458 ; or”, and in (g), substituted “make a report required” for “make the report to the department as required.”

The 2019 amendment, effective September 1, 2020, in the introductory language in (a), added “and, if the harm appears to be a result of a suspected sex offense, shall immediately report the harm to the nearest law enforcement agency”.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, added (a)(10), and made a related change.

Notes to Decisions

Use of reports. —

The reports of child abuse and neglect required by this section are intended for use in child protection proceedings and are not intended for use in criminal proceedings. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (See also notes to AS 47.17.060 , under catchline “Judicial proceeding”)

“Judicial proceeding”. —

This section only applies to child protective proceedings instituted under AS 47.10 and not to criminal proceedings for sexual abuse. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

The phrase “judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter” in this section only refers to child protection proceedings under AS 47.10.010 . State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Giving the Department of Health and Social Services primary control of the abused child again indicates a legislative intent that the “judicial proceedings” referred to in this section occur through the department in relation to protective services, and are civil rather than criminal. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (Alaska Ct. App. 1984

Since AS 47.17.025 refers to the Department of Law, without reference to the criminal division, AS 47.17.025 does not, standing alone, necessarily resurrect the requirement of former AS 11.67.040 that the district attorney receive child abuse reports; nor does it establish an intent that child abuse reports result in criminal prosecutions; and consequently, the Court of Appeals could not find that a criminal prosecution for child sexual abuse is necessarily “a judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter” pursuant to this section. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Minister-certified counselor’s report not violating privilege. —

Nontestimonial report of sexual abuse given to authorities by a minister-certified counselor did not amount to a violation of the psychotherapist-patient or communications-with-clergy privileges. Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Cited in

State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Christoffersen v. State, 242 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2010).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statute requiring doctor or other person to report child abuse. 73 ALR4th 782.

Sec. 47.17.022. Training.

  1. A person employed by the state or by a school district who is required under this chapter to report abuse or neglect of children shall receive training on the recognition and reporting of child abuse and neglect.
  2. Each department of the state and school district that employs persons required to report abuse or neglect of children shall provide
    1. initial training required by this section to each new employee within 45 days after the first day of employment, and to any existing employee who has not received equivalent training; and
    2. appropriate in-service training required by this section as determined by the department or school district.
  3. Each department and school district that must comply with (b) of this section shall develop a training curriculum that acquaints its employees with
    1. laws relating to child abuse and neglect;
    2. techniques for recognition and detection of child abuse and neglect;
    3. agencies and organizations within the state that offer aid or shelter to victims and the families of victims of child abuse or neglect;
    4. procedures for required notification of suspected abuse or neglect;
    5. the role of a person required to report child abuse or neglect and the employing agency after the report has been made; and
    6. a brief description of the manner in which cases of child abuse or neglect are investigated by the department and law enforcement agencies after a report of suspected abuse or neglect.
  4. Each department and school district that must comply with (b) of this section shall file a current copy of its training curriculum and materials with the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault. A department or school district may seek the technical assistance of the council or the Department of Health and Social Services in the development of its training program.
  5. Each school district that provides training under this section shall provide notice to public and private schools located in the school district of the availability of the training and invite volunteers who are required to report abuse or neglect of children under  AS 47.17.020 to participate in the training at no cost to the volunteer.

History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1986; am § 7 ch 205 SLA 1990; am §§ 22, 23 ch 2 SSSLA 2015)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective June 30, 2017, substituted “within 45 days after the first day” for “during the employee's first six months” in (b)(1), deleted “at least once every five years,” at the beginning of (b)(2), and added (e).

Sec. 47.17.023. Reports from certain persons regarding child pornography.

A person providing, either privately or commercially, film, photo, or visual or printed matter processing, production, or finishing services or computer installation, repair, or other services, or Internet or cellular telephone services who, in the process of providing those services, observes a film, photo, picture, computer file, image, or other matter and has reasonable cause to suspect that the film, photo, picture, computer file, image, or other matter visually depicts a child engaged in conduct described in AS 11.41.455(a) shall immediately report the observation to the nearest law enforcement agency and provide the law enforcement agency with all information known about the nature and origin of the film, photo, picture, computer file, image, or other matter.

History. (§ 11 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 8 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 35 ch 75 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, rewrote this section, regarding reports regarding child pornography.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 44, ch. 75, SLA 2008 explicitly declares that sec. 35, ch. 75, SLA 2008, repealing and reenacting this section, is subject to severability as authorized by AS 01.10.030 .

Sec. 47.17.024. Duties of practitioners of the healing arts.

  1. A practitioner of the healing arts involved in the delivery or care of an infant who the practitioner determines has been adversely affected by, or is withdrawing from exposure to, a controlled substance or alcohol shall immediately notify the nearest office of the department of the infant’s condition.
  2. In this section,
    1. “controlled substance” has the meaning given in AS 11.71.900 , but does not include a substance lawfully taken under a prescription from a health care provider who is authorized to prescribe the substance;
    2. “infant” means a child who is less than 12 months of age.

History. (§ 9 ch 20 SLA 2006)

Sec. 47.17.025. Duties of public authorities.

  1. A law enforcement agency shall immediately notify the department of the receipt of a report of harm to a child from abuse.  Upon receipt from any source of a report of harm to a child from abuse, the department shall notify the Department of Law and investigate the report and, within 72 hours of the receipt of the report, shall provide a written report of its investigation of the harm to a child from abuse to the Department of Law for review.
  2. The report of harm to a child from abuse required from the department by this section must include:
    1. the names and addresses of the child and the child’s parent or other persons responsible for the child’s care, if known;
    2. the age and sex of the child;
    3. the nature and extent of the harm to the child from abuse;
    4. the name and age and address of the person known or believed to be responsible for the harm to the child from abuse, if known;
    5. information that the department believes may be helpful in establishing the identity of the person believed to have caused the harm to the child from abuse.
  3. Within 20 days after receiving a report of harm, whether or not the matter is referred to a local government agency, the department shall notify the person who made the report and who made a request to be notified about the status of the investigation, without disclosing any confidential information.

History. (§ 6 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 47 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added subsection (c).

Notes to Decisions

Reliance on sexual abuse report for purposes of initiating prosecution is not prohibited by this section. Strehl v. State, 722 P.2d 226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).

Summary judgment for failure to state a claim was properly granted where the only allegation that was directed at the intake officers of the Division of Family and Youth Services was that they participated in reporting an anonymous “hot line” tip of sexual abuse, as such reporting of all tips is mandated by this section. Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989).

Applied in

State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Collateral references. —

Tort liability of public authority for failure to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parent. 60 ALR4th 942.

Sec. 47.17.027. Duties of school officials.

  1. If the department or a law enforcement agency provides written certification to the child’s school officials that (1) there is reasonable cause to suspect that the child has been abused or neglected by a person responsible for the child’s welfare or as a result of conditions created by a person responsible for the child’s welfare; (2) an interview at school is a necessary part of an investigation to determine whether the child has been abused or neglected; and (3) the interview at school is in the best interests of the child, school officials shall permit the child to be interviewed at school by the department or a law enforcement agency before notification of, or receiving permission from, the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. A school official shall be present during an interview at the school unless the child objects or the department or law enforcement agency determines that the presence of the school official will interfere with the investigation. The interview shall be conducted as required under AS 47.17.033 . Immediately after conducting an interview authorized under this section, and after informing the child of the intention to notify the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, the department or agency shall make every reasonable effort to notify the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian that the interview occurred unless it appears to the department or agency that notifying the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian would endanger the child.
  2. A school official who, with criminal negligence, discloses information learned during an interview conducted under (a) of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 9 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 48 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the next-to-last sentence in subsection (a).

Sec. 47.17.030. Action on reports; termination of parental rights.

  1. If a child, concerning whom a report of harm is made, is believed to reside within the boundaries of a local government exercising health functions for the area in which the child is believed to reside, the department may, upon receipt of the report, refer the matter to the appropriate health or social services agency of that local government.  For cases not referred to an agency of a local government, the department shall, for each report received, investigate and take action, in accordance with law, that may be necessary to prevent further harm to the child or to ensure the proper care and protection of the child.
  2. A local government health or social services agency receiving a report of harm shall, for each report received, investigate and take action, in accordance with law, that may be necessary to prevent further harm to the child or to ensure the proper care and protection of the child.  In addition, the agency receiving a report of harm shall forward a copy of its report of the investigation, including information the department requires by regulation, to the department.
  3. Action shall be taken regardless of whether the identity of the person making the report of harm is known.
  4. Before the department or a local government health or social services agency may seek the termination of parental rights under AS 47.10, it shall offer protective social services and pursue all other reasonable means of protecting the child.
  5. In all actions taken by the department or a health and social services agency of a local government under this chapter that result in a judicial proceeding, the child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem in that proceeding. Appointment of a guardian ad litem shall be made in accordance with AS 25.24.310 .
  6. If an investigation under this section shows reasonable cause to believe that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property, the department shall report the matter to the Board of Nursing.
  7. When the department or a local government health or social services agency (1) completes an investigation of a report of harm concerning a child, (2) determines, based on the investigation findings, that department or local agency services to protect the child are not required, and (3) identifies an appropriate community organization that will actively reach out to families to provide needed support services, the department or local government health or social services agency shall seek the written consent of the child’s parent or guardian to refer the family to the community organization. If the parent or guardian consents to the referral, the department or local government health or social services agency shall refer the parent or guardian to the community organization identified by the department. If the child has more than one parent or guardian and only one parent or guardian consents to the referral, the department or local government health or social services agency shall refer the parent or guardian who consents to the community organization but may not provide information to the community organization concerning the parent or guardian who does not consent to the referral. A community organization that receives information from the department or a local government health or social services agency under this subsection may not disclose the information to a person who is not authorized by law to receive it.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 222 SLA 1976; am § 17 ch 55 SLA 1984; am § 11 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 59 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 19 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (g).

Notes to Decisions

Effect of subsection (d). —

Subsection (d) of this section is clearly intended to prevent further abuse by providing protective services to the child, and it does not place a mandatory duty on the state to provide counseling and other support services to the family prior to seeking termination of parental rights. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).

Applied in

State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Quoted in

Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979).

Cited in

Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).

Collateral references. —

43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 115-117.

Physical abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 53 ALR3d 605.

Sexual abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent’s right to child. 58 ALR3d 1074.

Validity of state statute providing for termination of parental rights. 22 ALR4th 774.

Sec. 47.17.033. Investigations and interviews.

  1. In investigating child abuse and neglect reports under this chapter, the department may make necessary inquiries about the criminal records of the parents or of the alleged abusive or neglectful person, including inquiries about the existence of a criminal history record involving a serious offense as defined in AS 12.62.900 .
  2. For purposes of obtaining access to information needed to conduct the inquiries required by (a) of this section, the department is a criminal justice agency conducting a criminal justice activity.
  3. An investigation by the department or another investigating agency of child abuse or neglect reported under this chapter shall be conducted by a person trained to conduct a child abuse and neglect investigation and without subjecting a child to duplicative interviews about the abuse or neglect except when new information is obtained that requires further information from the child.
  4. An interview of a child conducted as a result of a report of harm may be audiotaped or videotaped. If an interview of a child concerns a report of sexual abuse of the child by a parent or caretaker of the child, the interview shall be videotaped, unless videotaping the interview is not feasible or will, in the opinion of the investigating agency, result in trauma to the child.
  5. An interview of a child that is audiotaped or videotaped under (d) of this section shall be conducted
    1. by a person trained and competent to conduct the interview;
    2. if available, at a child advocacy center; and
    3. by a person who is a party to a memorandum of understanding with the department to conduct the interview or who is employed by an agency that is authorized to conduct investigations.
  6. An interview of a child may not be videotaped more than one time unless the interviewer or the investigating agency determines that one or more additional interviews are necessary to complete an investigation. If additional interviews are necessary, the additional interviews shall be conducted, to the extent possible, by the same interviewer who conducted the initial interview of the child.
  7. A recorded interview of a child shall be preserved in the manner and for a period provided by law for maintaining evidence and records of a public agency.
  8. A recorded interview of a child is subject to disclosure under the applicable court rules for discovery in a civil or criminal case.
  9. The training required under (c) of this section must address the constitutional and statutory rights of children and families that apply throughout the investigation and department intervention. The training must inform department representatives of the applicable legal duties to protect the rights and safety of a child and the child’s family.
  10. During a joint investigation by the department and a law enforcement agency, the department shall coordinate an investigation of child abuse or neglect with the law enforcement agency to ensure that the possibility of a criminal charge is not compromised.
  11. Unless a law enforcement official prohibits or restricts notification under (j) of this section, at the time of initial contact with a person alleged to have committed child abuse or neglect, the department shall notify the person of the specific complaint or allegation made against the person, except that the identity of the complainant may not be revealed.
  12. In this section, “child advocacy center” means a facility operated with a child-focused, community partnership committed to a multidisciplinary team approach that includes representatives from law enforcement, child protection, criminal prosecution, victim advocacy, and the medical and mental health fields who collaborate and assist in investigating allegations of sexual or other abuse and neglect of children.

History. (§ 60 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 49 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 10 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 6 ch 59 SLA 2014)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (i)-(k) were enacted as (j)-( l ). Relettered in 2006, at which time former subsection (i) was relettered as subsection ( l ) and an internal reference in subsection (k) was conformed.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added subsections (c)-(h) and ( l ).

The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, added subsections (j) [now (i)], (k) [now (j)], and ( l ) [now (k)].

The 2014 amendment, effective October 5, 2014, in (c), inserted “or another investigating agency” following “investigation by the department”, and substituted “duplicative interviews” for “more than one interview”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Sec. 47.17.035. Duties of department in domestic violence cases.

  1. In consultation with the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, the department shall develop written procedures for screening reports of harm for abuse and neglect of a child to assess whether there is domestic violence occurring within the family. The procedures must include the following factors:
    1. inquiry concerning the criminal records of the parents or of the alleged abusive or neglectful person or the alleged perpetrator if not the parent of the child; and
    2. inquiry concerning the existence of protective orders issued or filed under AS 18.66.100 18.66.180 involving either parent as a petitioner or respondent.
  2. If the department determines in an investigation of abuse or neglect of a child that
    1. the child is in danger because of domestic violence or that the child needs protection as a result of the presence of domestic violence in the family, the department shall take appropriate steps for the protection of the child; in this paragraph, “appropriate steps” includes
      1. reasonable efforts to protect the child and prevent the removal of the child from the parent or guardian who is not a domestic violence offender;
      2. reasonable efforts to remove the alleged domestic violence offender from the child’s residence if it is determined that the child or another family or household member is in danger of domestic violence; and
      3. services to help protect the child from being placed or having unsupervised visitation with the domestic violence offender until the department determines that the offender has met conditions considered necessary by the department to protect the safety of the domestic violence victim and household members;
    2. a person is the victim of domestic violence, the department shall provide the victim with a written notice of the rights of and services available to victims of domestic violence that is substantially similar to the notice provided to victims of domestic violence under AS 18.65.520 .
  3. For purposes of obtaining access to information needed to conduct the inquiries required by (a)(1) and (2) of this section, the department is a criminal justice agency conducting a criminal justice activity.
  4. A person may not bring a civil action for damages for a failure to comply with the provisions of this section.
  5. In this section,
    1. “criminal justice activity” has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;
    2. “criminal justice agency” has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;
    3. “domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990 .

History. (§ 67 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 61 ch 99 SLA 1998)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (b) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Sec. 47.17.040. Child protection registry; confidentiality.

  1. The department shall maintain a child protection registry of all investigation reports, including substantiated findings under AS 47.10 or AS 47.17.
  2. Investigation reports and reports of harm filed under this chapter are considered confidential and are not subject to public inspection and copying under AS 40.25.110 and 40.25.120 . However, in accordance with department regulations, investigation reports, including substantiated findings under AS 47.10 or AS 47.17, may be used by appropriate governmental agencies with child-protection functions, inside and outside the state, in connection with investigations or judicial proceedings involving child abuse, neglect, or custody and in conjunction with licensing action under AS 47.32 or a similar statute in another state. A person not acting in accordance with department regulations who, with criminal negligence, makes public information contained in confidential reports is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
  3. Before a substantiated finding may be placed on the child protection registry and provided as part of a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 , the department shall provide the applicant notice of the finding and an opportunity to appeal the finding. The department shall adopt regulations to implement this section.
  4. In this section, “governmental agency” includes a tribe or tribal organization conducting child protection functions and a school district.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 2 ch 222 SLA 1976; am § 10 ch 205 SLA 1990; am §§ 16, 17 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 and 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 and 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 and 09.25.120.

Cross references. —

For penalties for Class A misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035(b)(6) and 12.55.135(b) .

Administrative Code. —

For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.

For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in (a), substituted “a child protection registry” for “a central registry” following “shall maintain” and substituted “, including substantiated findings under AS 47.10 or AS 47.17” for “but not of the reports of harm” following “investigation reports” at the end; in (b), inserted “, including substantiated findings under AS 47.10 or AS 47.17,” following “investigation reports” and added “and in conjunction with licensing action under AS 47.32 or a similar statute in another state” at the end of the first sentence, made stylistic changes in the second sentence; added (c) and (d).

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 69, SLA 2018 (SB 81), which amended this section, see 2017 Senate Journal 452 — 454.

Notes to Decisions

Psychotherapist/patient privilege. —

Child abuse reports are not open to the public, and are therefore not within Rule 504(d)(5) of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, which provides that there is no physician or psychotherapist/patient privilege “as to information that the physician or psychotherapist is required to report to a public employee or as to information required to be recorded in a public office, if such report or record is open to public inspection.” State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Cited in

Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).

Sec. 47.17.050. Immunity.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person who, in good faith, makes a report under this chapter, permits an interview under AS 47.17.027 , or participates in judicial proceedings related to the submission of reports under this chapter, is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for making the report or permitting the interview, except that a person who knowingly makes an untimely report is not immune from civil or criminal liability based on the delay in making the report.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a person accused of committing the child abuse or neglect is not immune from civil or criminal liability for the child abuse or neglect as a result of reporting the child abuse or neglect.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am §§ 11, 12 ch 205 SLA 1990)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Christoffersen v. State, 242 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 47.17.060. Evidence not privileged.

Neither the physician-patient nor the husband-wife privilege is a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child’s harm, or its cause, in a judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971)

Notes to Decisions

For discussion of constitutional problems in interpreting this section to abrogate psychotherapist privilege in criminal proceedings, see State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Applicability to psychologists. —

The court assumed but did not decided that this section applies to psychologists, who are not physicians. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

“Judicial proceeding”. —

This section only applies to child protective proceedings instituted under AS 47.10 and not to criminal proceeding for sexual abuse. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

The phrase “judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter” in this section only refers to child protection proceedings under AS 47.10.010 . State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Giving the Department of Health and Social Services primary control of the abused child again indicates a legislative intent that the “judicial proceedings” referred to in this section occur through the department in relation to protective services, and are civil rather than criminal. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Since AS 47.17.025 refers to the Department of Law, without reference to the criminal division, AS 47.17.025 does not, standing alone, necessarily resurrect the requirement of former AS 11.67.040 that the district attorney receive child abuse reports; nor does it establish an intent that child abuse reports result in criminal prosecutions; and consequently, the Court of Appeals could not find that a criminal prosecution for child sexual abuse is necessarily “a judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter” pursuant to this section. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).

Cited in

In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994).

Sec. 47.17.064. Photographs and x-rays.

  1. The department or a practitioner of the healing arts may, without the permission of the parents, guardian, or custodian, take the following actions with regard to a child who the department or practitioner has reasonable cause to suspect has suffered physical harm as a result of child abuse or neglect:
    1. take or have taken photographs of the areas of trauma visible on the child; and
    2. if medically indicated, have a medical or radiological examination of the child performed by a person who is licensed to administer the examination.
  2. The department or a practitioner of the healing arts shall notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of a child as soon as possible after taking action under (a) of this section with regard to the child.

History. (§ 7 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 12 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 13 ch 205 SLA 1990)

Sec. 47.17.068. Penalty for failure to report.

A person who fails to comply with the provisions of AS 47.17.020 or 47.17.023 and who knew or should have known that the circumstances gave rise to the need for a report, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

History. (§ 7 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 13 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 14 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 11 ch 14 SLA 2006)

Cross references. —

For penalties for Class A misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035(b)(6) and 12.55.135(b) .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective April 28, 2006, substituted “class A” for “class B” near the end of the section.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 13, ch. 14, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 amendment of this section applies “to offenses committed on or after April 28, 2006.”

Sec. 47.17.069. Protective injunctions.

  1. A court may enjoin or limit a person from contact with a child if the attorney general establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person
    1. has sexually abused a child;
    2. has physically abused a child; or
    3. has engaged in conduct that constitutes a clear and present danger to the mental, emotional, or physical welfare of a child.
  2. This section does not limit the authority of the attorney general or the court to act to protect a child.

History. (§ 14 ch 39 SLA 1985)

Sec. 47.17.070. [Renumbered as AS 47.17.290.]

Sec. 47.17.290. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “athletic coach” means
    1. a paid leader or assistant of a sports team; or
    2. a volunteer leader or assistant of a sports team who volunteers as a leader or assistant of a sports team for more than four hours a week;
  2. “child” means a person under 18 years of age;
  3. “child abuse or neglect” means the physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 by a person under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby; in this paragraph, “mental injury” means an injury to the emotional well-being, or intellectual or psychological capacity of a child, as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function;
  4. “child care provider” means an adult individual, including a foster parent or an employee of an organization, who provides care and supervision to a child for compensation or reimbursement;
  5. “criminal negligence” has the meaning given in  AS 11.81.900 ;
  6. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  7. “immediately” means as soon as is reasonably possible, and no later than 24 hours;
  8. “institution” means a private or public hospital or other facility providing medical diagnosis, treatment, or care;
  9. “maltreatment” means an act or omission that results in circumstances in which there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child may be a child in need of aid, as described in  AS 47.10.011 , except that, for purposes of this chapter, the act or omission need not have been committed by the child’s parent, custodian, or guardian;
  10. “mental injury” means a serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner and the existence of that impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified expert witness;
  11. “neglect” means the failure by a person responsible for the child’s welfare to provide necessary food, care, clothing, shelter, or medical attention for a child;
  12. “organization” means a group or entity that provides care and supervision for compensation to a child not related to the caregiver, and includes a child care facility, pre-elementary school, head start center, child foster home, residential child care facility, recreation program, children’s camp, and children’s club;
  13. “person responsible for the child’s welfare” means the child’s parent, guardian, foster parent, a person responsible for the child’s care at the time of the alleged child abuse or neglect, or a person responsible for the child’s welfare in a public or private residential agency or institution;
  14. “practitioner of the healing arts” includes athletic trainers, chiropractors, mental health counselors, social workers, dental hygienists, dentists, health aides, nurses, nurse practitioners, certified nurse aides, occupational therapists, occupational therapy assistants, optometrists, osteopaths, naturopaths, physical therapists, physical therapy assistants, physicians, physician’s assistants, psychiatrists, psychologists, psychological associates, audiologists and speech-language pathologists licensed under  AS 08.11, hearing aid dealers licensed under  AS 08.55, marital and family therapists licensed under  AS 08.63, behavior analysts, assistant behavior analysts, religious healing practitioners, acupuncturists, and surgeons;
  15. “reasonable cause to suspect” means cause, based on all the facts and circumstances known to the person, that would lead a reasonable person to believe that something might be the case;
  16. “school district” means a city or borough school district or regional educational attendance area;
  17. “sex offense” has the meaning given in AS 12.63.100 ;
  18. “sexual exploitation” includes
    1. allowing, permitting, or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution prohibited by  AS 11.66.100 11.66.150 , by a person responsible for the child’s welfare;
    2. allowing, permitting, encouraging, or engaging in activity prohibited by  AS 11.41.455(a) , by a person responsible for the child’s welfare.

History. (§ 1 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 3 ch 222 SLA 1976; am §§ 56, 57 ch 94 SLA 1980; am §§ 8, 9 ch 104 SLA 1982; am §§ 15, 16 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 8 ch 56 SLA 1986; am § 3 ch 114 SLA 1986; am § 14 ch 131 SLA 1986; am § 31 ch 2 FSSLA 1987; am § 14 ch 6 SLA 1990; am § 5 ch 29 SLA 1990; am §§ 15 — 19 ch 205 SLA 1990; am § 9 ch 129 SLA 1992; am § 48 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 12 ch 2 SLA 1998; am §§ 62, 63 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 25 ch 118 SLA 1998; am § 22 ch 42 SLA 2000; am § 40 ch 43 SLA 2013; am § 4 ch 36 SLA 2014; am § 5 ch 41 SLA 2014; am § 24 ch 2 SSSLA 2015; am § 134 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Revisor's notes. —

Formerly AS 47.17.070 . Renumbered in 1990. Reorganized in 1985, 1990, 2013, and 2019 to alphabetize the terms defined.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added the definition of “athletic coach”.

The first 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in (14), inserted “athletic trainers,” following “includes”.

The second 2014 amendment, effective September 16, 2014, in (14), inserted “behavior analysts, assistant behavior analysts,” following “marital and family therapists licensed under AS 08.63”.

The 2015 amendment, effective June 30, 2017, rewrote (1), which read, “ ‘athletic coach’ includes a paid leader or assistant of a sports team;”.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (18) [now (17).

Editor's notes. —

Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to paragraphs (8) and (9) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;

“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and

“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”

Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”

AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.

Notes to Decisions

“Neglect.” —

The definition of “neglect” in this section is limited to provisions contained in AS 47.17 and is inapplicable to any provision in AS 47.10. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

“Mental injury.” —

Superior court used the correct standard when it found that a daughter was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (8). Gross parental misconduct did not have to be found to conclude that a child had suffered a mental injury, and the factual findings were supported by an expert. Josephine B. v. State, 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2007), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

Wells v. State, 102 P.3d 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004); Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010); Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).

Chapter 18. Programs and Services Related to Adolescents.

Article 1. Comprehensive Planning.

Sec. 47.18.010. Development of statewide plan.

  1. With the advice of the Alaska Human Relations Commission, the department shall develop a comprehensive statewide plan to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of state programs that relate to the prevention of adolescent pregnancy and the provision of services to adolescent parents and their children under AS 47.18.100 47.18.140 , and to peer counseling under AS 47.18.200 .
  2. The plan developed under (a) of this section must
    1. review and include existing programs and services of state government;
    2. examine and consider the achievements and experiences of projects that are similar to those authorized under AS 47.18.100 47.18.140 and 47.18.200 ;
    3. give priority to the consolidation and improvement of existing programs;
    4. make recommendations with regard to the need for new or expanded programs and services within the existing level of funding;
    5. consider the findings and recommendations of the Alaska’s Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenthood Task Force; and
    6. make recommendations concerning the incremental implementation of the plan.
  3. The Department of Education and Early Development, the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, and the Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall assist the department in developing the plan required under (a) of this section. In addition, through appropriate means, the department shall solicit advice from teens, parents, educators, school administrators, taxpayers, civic groups, community organizations, Native organizations, officials of local governments, religious institutions, and other concerned persons about how state programs can be coordinated and operated in a manner that will enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in addressing the many needs associated with adolescent parenting, the prevention of adolescent pregnancies, and the provision of adolescent peer counseling.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991; am E.O. No. 84 § 8 (1993))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (c) of this section, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” and “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with §§ 89 - 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999, and “Community and Regional Affairs” was changed to “Community and Economic Development” in accordance with § 91(a)(14), ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in (c) of this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Article 2. Public Information About Programs.

Sec. 47.18.050. Public awareness campaign.

  1. The department shall develop and implement statewide a continuing public awareness campaign, including appropriate public forums and workshops, radio and television public service announcements, and press releases designed to
    1. communicate to the public the scope and magnitude of the adolescent pregnancy and parenthood problem in the state;
    2. encourage community activities that will educate adults and adolescents about the importance of reducing adolescent pregnancy;
    3. enlist the active support and involvement of members of the public and community organizations in the development and implementation of community-based programs and activities to reduce adolescent pregnancy and assist adolescent parents in obtaining needed educational, vocational, and parenting skills.
  2. A primary policy and objective of the public awareness campaign required under (a) of this section shall be to encourage adolescents to abstain from premarital sexual intimacy.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Article 3. Adolescent Pregnancy Projects.

Sec. 47.18.100. State funding authorized.

In order to encourage and support community-based initiatives to combat the many problems associated with adolescent pregnancy and parenthood, the department shall, from appropriations for that purpose, give grants or award contracts to fund a percentage of the cost of local projects designed to prevent adolescent pregnancy and assist adolescent parents in obtaining needed educational, vocational, and parenting skills.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.18.110. Eligible projects.

  1. Projects funded under AS 47.18.100 shall be designed with a holistic approach that recognizes the interconnectedness of adolescent parenthood and a broad array of related circumstances, such as low self-esteem, domestic violence, substance abuse, economic security, financial responsibilities of having a child, cultural integrity, sources of adolescent stress, parenting skills, educational and vocational opportunities, and access to reproductive health services.
  2. Projects funded under AS 47.18.100 may include one or more of the following types of activities:
    1. family life education;
    2. counseling services for adolescents who are, or who may think they are, pregnant or who want to avoid pregnancy;
    3. prenatal care for pregnant adolescents;
    4. job training and placement for adolescent parents;
    5. educational and support services for adolescent parents;
    6. other activities that, in the judgment of the department, are likely to have a tangible effect on combating a problem associated with adolescent pregnancy or parenthood.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.18.120. Applications for project funding.

  1. A person or group seeking funding under AS 47.18.100 shall apply to the department on a form provided by the department.
  2. When applying under (a) of this section, the applicant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the department that the proposed project
    1. has been designed with extensive assistance from local community members who represent a variety of interests, cultures, and perspectives on adolescent pregnancy and parenthood;
    2. is based on sound research, to the maximum extent possible;
    3. will maximize collaboration among all relevant agencies involved in the needs being addressed by the project;
    4. includes an evaluation component to measure project effectiveness;
    5. includes a public awareness campaign component.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.18.140. Promotion of program and projects.

  1. The department shall take appropriate actions to publicize the availability of funds under AS 47.18.100 47.18.140 .
  2. The department shall annually conduct regional conferences or workshops across the state to
    1. showcase the activities and achievements of projects funded under AS 47.18.100 47.18.140 for which the evaluation components have shown a high level of success;
    2. encourage and support the replication of these successful projects; and
    3. increase public awareness of the availability of state administered services and programs to address the many problems associated with adolescent pregnancy and parenthood.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Article 4. Adolescent Peer Counseling.

Sec. 47.18.200. Peer counselor program.

  1. The department shall develop and implement a continuing statewide program of technical support and assistance to encourage school districts, municipalities, and nonprofit corporations incorporated under AS 10.20 that initiate implementation, or that are considering implementation, of adolescent peer counseling groups under adult supervision for
    1. prevention of adolescent behavioral patterns that jeopardize physical and mental health and that hamper social, educational, and personal development; and
    2. spreading information about services that are available to adolescents to help them with their health needs.
  2. The program of technical support required under (a) of this section must include
    1. suggested methods for maintaining a high level of adolescent, parental, and community support for peer counseling groups;
    2. workshops, seminars, or other training opportunities for adolescent peer counselors and their adult leaders; this training must include sessions to
      1. develop interpersonal communications skills;
      2. teach accurate health information, emphasizing sexual development;
      3. provide information about services that are available in the peer counselors’ areas and how those services can be obtained for pregnancy prevention, and prenatal care; and
      4. encourage adolescents to avoid major risk-taking behavior and to reinforce responsible behavior and self control;
    3. assistance in selecting appropriate resource materials for the groups;
    4. recommended mechanisms for effectively monitoring and evaluating the activities and accomplishments of the groups; and
    5. other similar services to assist and encourage school districts and municipalities in establishing and administering adolescent peer counseling groups.
  3. In developing the program of technical support and assistance required under (a) of this section, the department shall review and consider the activities and accomplishments in other states that have developed peer counseling networks. The department shall solicit contributions of money and expertise from the private sector that may be available for this type of program.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Article 5. Foster Care Transition Program.

Sec. 47.18.300. Program authorized.

  1. The department, in coordination with local public and private agencies, shall design, develop, and implement a foster care transition program to provide support and services to individuals who
    1. reach or have reached the age of 16 or older while in state foster care and have not yet reached 23 years of age; and
    2. meet other eligibility criteria established by the department under (b) of this section.
  2. The department may adopt regulations to carry out the purposes of AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 , including regulations establishing eligibility thresholds, standards, and limits for the program. The department shall develop the regulations in consultation with those public and private organizations considered necessary by the department.

History. (§ 2 ch 82 SLA 2002; am § 50 ch 64 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “23 years of age” for “the age of 21” in paragraph (a)(1).

Sec. 47.18.310. Program design.

The department, in coordination with local public and private agencies, shall design the program as a continuation of the training efforts related to independent living skills that were initiated when the state foster care recipients were identified as being likely to remain in state foster care until reaching the age of 18. The program design must require that program participants are directly involved in identifying the program activities that will prepare them for independent living.

History. (§ 2 ch 82 SLA 2002)

Sec. 47.18.320. Program development.

  1. Subject to the availability of an appropriation made for the purposes of AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 , the program may provide
    1. education and vocational training;
    2. assistance in obtaining educational and vocational training;
    3. career and employment services;
    4. training in basic life skills;
    5. housing and utility assistance;
    6. mentoring and counseling; and
    7. other appropriate services to complement the efforts of former state foster care recipients to achieve self-sufficiency.
  2. In developing the program, the department shall cooperate with and coordinate the use of the resources available from other state and federal agencies designed to provide support and services consistent with the purposes of the program.
  3. If appropriations to meet the purposes of this section are insufficient, the department shall submit a written report to the legislature advising the legislature of
    1. the department’s efforts to use existing funds efficiently; and
    2. the opportunities and services the department cannot provide under the existing appropriation level.
  4. When an individual 16 years of age or older who has been in state custody under AS 47.10 for at least six months is released from state custody, the department shall, in addition to any training, services, and assistance provided under (a) — (c) of this section, provide the individual with or assist the individual with obtaining the individual’s
    1. birth certificate; the birth certificate may be an official or certified copy;
    2. social security card;
    3. health insurance information;
    4. medical records;
    5. driver’s license or identification card; and
    6. certificate of degree of Indian or Alaska Native blood, if applicable.

History. (§ 2 ch 82 SLA 2002; am §§ 12, 13 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am § 20 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of subsection (d), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, in (a)(2), substituted “educational and vocational training” for “basic education and training”; added (c).

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (d).

Sec. 47.18.330. Program implementation.

  1. The department may implement the program through the award of contracts or grants to qualified entities to provide services under the program. The department may award contracts and grants if the contracts and grants further the purposes of and meet the requirements of AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 and applicable regulations adopted under those sections.
  2. Contracts awarded under this section shall be administered in accordance with AS 47.05.015 and regulations adopted under that section. Grants awarded under this section shall be awarded using requirements established in regulations adopted under AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 that are substantially similar to those set out in AS 47.05.015 for contracts.

History. (§ 2 ch 82 SLA 2002)

Sec. 47.18.390. Definitions.

In AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 ,

  1. “program” means the foster care transition program authorized under AS 47.18.300 47.18.390 ;
  2. “qualified entities” means municipalities, other political subdivisions of the state, nonprofit corporations formed under AS 10.20, churches and religious organizations, and incorporated and unincorporated entities operating within the state that meet the requirements established by the department in regulation;
  3. “state foster care” means foster care, as defined in AS 47.10.990 , that is provided to a person who is in the custody of the department under AS 47.10 and AS 47.12.

History. (§ 2 ch 82 SLA 2002)

Article 6. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.18.900. Definition.

In this chapter, “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1991)

Chapter 20. Special Services for Certain Children.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings in connection with the 1992 amendments to this chapter, see § 1, ch. 77, SLA 1992 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For programs for children with disabilities, see 7 AAC 23.

Article 1. Services for Developmentally Delayed or Disabled Children.

Secs. 47.20.005 — 47.20.020. Purpose; assistance. [Repealed, § 4 ch 77 SLA 1992.]

Secs. 47.20.030 — 47.20.040. Appropriations; purpose. [Repealed, § 6 ch 77 SLA 1978.]

Sec. 47.20.050. Definitions. [Repealed, § 4 ch 77 SLA 1992.]

Sec. 47.20.060. Purpose.

It is the purpose of AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 to

  1. subject to the availability of funding, provide quality learning and related early intervention family support services to eligible children under the age of three who have developmental delays or disabilities and, on a discretionary basis, to those children under the age of three who are at risk of developmental delays or disabilities;
  2. bring together and make optimal use of all available federal, state, local, and private resources for the benefit of children under the age of three with developmental delays or disabilities and their families;
  3. expand and improve existing learning and early intervention services and to provide and arrange for comprehensive services through local agencies and statewide support programs.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For infant learning program, see 7 AAC 23, art. 1.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Collateral references. —

What constitutes reasonable accommodation under federal statutes protecting rights of disabled individual, as regards educational program or school rules as applied to learning disabled student. 166 ALR Fed. 503.

Sec. 47.20.070. Establishment of early intervention services system program.

  1. The department, with the assistance of the Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education, shall establish a coordinated, comprehensive, statewide system of multidisciplinary interagency programs that provide appropriate early intervention services to eligible persons under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 .
  2. The department is the lead agency for purposes of federal law with respect to the administration of the early intervention services system required under (a) of this section. The department shall establish and administer the system required under (a) of this section so that the state is eligible for the maximum available funding from public and private sources.
  3. In connection with the system established under (a) of this section, the department shall
    1. develop a state plan that identifies the best methods of providing services to children under the age of three with developmental delays or disabilities and their families and report to the governor on the extent to which that plan is being implemented in the state;
    2. develop and implement an educational program concerning the nature and effects of developmental delays and disabilities;
    3. serve as a clearinghouse for educational materials and information about developmental delays and disabilities;
    4. organize and encourage training programs for persons who provide services to children under the age of three with developmental delays and disabilities and their families;
    5. establish a training program for paraprofessionals who provide services to children under the age of three with developmental delays and disabilities and their families;
    6. cooperate with other public and private agencies and individuals to facilitate the transition of children served in the early intervention system to the formal education system;
    7. identify and use all public and private resources available to the state; and
    8. monitor and evaluate the services provided to ensure the demonstrable effectiveness of the services and compliance with state and federal law and department policy regarding the provision of early intervention services.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2005, under AS 01.05.031 and § 6, ch. 13, SLA 1992, “Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education” was substituted for “Governor’s Council for the Handicapped and Gifted” in subsection (a).

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For infant learning program, see 7 AAC 23, art. 1.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Collateral references. —

Availability of damages in action to remedy violations of individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.). 165 ALR Fed. 463.

Sec. 47.20.075. Grant authority.

The department may award grants for covered services to children and their families who are eligible under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 .

History. (§ 1 ch 85 SLA 1997)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Sec. 47.20.080. Program eligibility.

  1. A child and the child’s family are eligible for core early intervention services and additional early intervention services under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 if the child is under the age of three and
    1. experiencing developmental delay or disability; or
    2. at risk of experiencing developmental delay or disability if early intervention services are not provided.
  2. If the department estimates that funding available for services under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 will be insufficient to provide services to all persons who are eligible under (a) of this section, the department shall eliminate coverage for services in the following order:
    1. additional early intervention services for persons eligible under (a)(2) of this section;
    2. additional early intervention services for persons eligible under (a)(1) of this section;
    3. core early intervention services for persons eligible under (a)(2) of this section; and
    4. core early intervention services for persons eligible under (a)(1) of this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Sec. 47.20.090. Finding and evaluating eligible participants.

  1. The department shall establish a comprehensive system for finding children and their families who are eligible for services under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 . This child find system must
    1. include a public awareness program focusing on early identification of developmentally delayed and disabled children under three years of age;
    2. provide for participation by primary referral sources; and
    3. include procedures with timelines for referral of eligible participants to service providers.
  2. The department shall, within 45 days after a child’s referral for services under (a) of this section, ensure that all affected public agencies and service providers
    1. provide for a comprehensive multidisciplinary evaluation of the functioning of the child and the needs of the child’s family so that the family can appropriately assist in the development of the child;
    2. in consultation with the child’s parents, develop a written individualized service plan that identifies how the needs of the child and the family could be met.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Sec. 47.20.100. Individualized family service plan.

The individualized family service plan developed under AS 47.20.090(b)(2) shall be based on the evaluation conducted under AS 47.20.090(b)(1) and must include, subject to AS 47.20.080(b) ,

  1. provisions for case management services to implement the plan, including the name of the case manager from the profession most immediately relevant to the child’s or family’s needs who will be responsible for the implementation of the plan and coordination with other agencies and persons;
  2. a statement of the child’s present levels of physical development, cognitive development, language and speech development, psychosocial development, and self-help skills, based on appropriate objective criteria;
  3. a description of the family’s concerns, priorities, and resources as they relate to the future enhancement of the child’s development;
  4. a description of the specific early intervention services that will help meet the unique needs of the child and the family, including the frequency, intensity, and method with which the services should be delivered;
  5. the projected dates for initiation of services and the anticipated duration of the services;
  6. an outline of the major outcomes expected to be achieved for the child and the family along with the criteria, procedures, and timelines that will be used to determine the degree to which progress toward achieving the outcomes are being made and whether modifications or revisions of the outcomes or services are necessary; and
  7. a statement of the steps that will be taken to support the transition of the child and the family to the use of services available under other appropriate programs, including programs for children who are three years of age or older.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Administrative Code. —

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

Sec. 47.20.110. Other duties of the department.

  1. The department shall adopt regulations necessary to implement AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 , including regulations
    1. for personnel development, including preservice and in-service training programs for providers of early intervention services;
    2. to govern resolution of intra-agency and interagency disputes about the provision of services under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 and the financial responsibility of the respective parties for those services;
    3. that ensure that services are provided to children and their families in a timely manner pending the resolution of disputes among public agencies or service providers;
    4. providing for due process with respect to the rights of children and parents who are eligible for services under AS 47.20.060 — 47.20.290; the regulations must provide that during the pendency of a complaint about a change in services, the child and family shall continue to receive the prior services unless the state and the family otherwise agree, or, if the complaint relates to an application for initial services, the child and family shall receive the services that are not in dispute; and
    5. for the award of grants under AS 47.20.060 — 47.20.290.
  2. The department shall establish a system for compiling data on the numbers of children and their families in the state who need early intervention services, the numbers being served, the types of services provided, and other information as required under federal law. Personally identifiable information obtained under AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 is confidential for purposes of AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 .

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 85 SLA 1997)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120.

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Administrative Code. —

For infant learning program, see 7 AAC 23, art. 1.

For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Sec. 47.20.290. Definitions.

In AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ,

  1. “additional early intervention services” means
    1. family training and counseling;
    2. speech pathology and audiology;
    3. occupational therapy;
    4. physical therapy;
    5. psychological services;
    6. medical services only for diagnostic or evaluation purposes; and
    7. health services for the child that are necessary to enable the child to benefit from the other early intervention services;
  2. “core early intervention services” means
    1. case management services;
    2. special instruction; and
    3. early identification, screening, and assessment;
  3. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  4. “developmentally delayed” means functioning at least 15 percent below a chronological or corrected age or 1.5 standard deviations below age appropriate norms in one or more of the following areas: cognitive development, gross motor development, sensory development, speech or language development, or psychosocial development, including self-help skills and behavior, as measured and verified by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures or through systematic observation of functional abilities in a daily routine by two professionals and a parent, developmental history, and appropriate assessment procedures;
  5. “disability” means having an identifiable physical, mental, sensory, or psychosocial condition that has a probability of resulting in developmental delay even though a developmental delay may not be exhibited at the time the condition is identified, including
    1. chromosomal abnormalities associated with delays in development, such as Down’s syndrome, Turner’s syndrome, Cornelia de Lange syndrome, or fragile X syndrome;
    2. other syndromes and conditions associated with delays in development, such as fetal alcohol syndrome, cocaine and other drug-related syndromes, metabolic disorders, cleft lip, or cleft palate;
    3. neurological disorders associated with delays in development, such as cerebral palsy, microcephaly, hydrocephaly, spina bifida, or periventricular leukomalacia;
    4. sensory impairment, such as hearing loss or deafness, visual loss or blindness, or a combination of hearing and visual loss, that interferes with the child’s ability to respond effectively to environmental stimulus;
    5. congenital infections, such as rubella, cytomegalovirus, toxoplasmosis, or acquired immune deficiency syndrome;
    6. chronic illness or conditions that may limit learning or development, such as cystic fibrosis, bronchopulmonary dysplasia, tracheostomies, amputations, arthritis, or muscular dystrophy;
    7. psychosocial disorders, such as reactive attachment disorder, infant autism, or childhood schizophrenia; or
    8. atypical growth patterns consistent with a prognosis of developmental delay based upon parental and professional judgment, such as failure to thrive;
  6. “early intervention services” or “services” means services that are designed to help meet the developmental needs of a child under the age of three who is developmentally delayed or disabled or at risk of developmental delay or disability or the needs of the child’s family so that the family can support the child’s development.

History. (§ 2 ch 77 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, under § 8, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in this section “AS 47.20.060 47.20.290 ” was substituted for “this chapter.”

Collateral references. —

What constitutes reasonable accommodation under federal statutes protecting rights of disabled individual, as regards educational program or school rules as applied to learning disabled student. 166 ALR Fed. 503.

Article 2. Newborn and Infant Hearing Screening, Tracking, and Intervention Program.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent relating to the 2006 enactment of this article, see §§ 1 and 2, ch. 43, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts. Under § 7, ch. 43, SLA 2006, the regulations that may be adopted by the Department of Health and Social Services to implement AS 47.20.300 47.20.390 may not take effect before the effective date of the relevant sections.

Sec. 47.20.300. Department to implement program.

The department shall plan, develop, and implement a hearing screening, tracking, and intervention program to facilitate compliance with the requirements of AS 47.20.310 47.20.390 .

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For newborn hearing screening, see 7 AAC 27, art. 11.

Sec. 47.20.310. Screening requirements.

  1. Subject to (b) of this section, the physician in attendance at or immediately after the birth of a child in a hospital in this state, or, if a physician is not in attendance at or immediately after the birth, the person attending the newborn child in a hospital in this state, shall, unless medically contraindicated, cause the child to be screened to determine whether the child has a potential hearing impairment using the methods determined by the department under (e) of this section. Unless medically contraindicated, the screening shall occur before the newborn is released from the hospital or before the infant is 30 days old, whichever is earlier. Each birthing center that provides maternity and newborn care services shall provide that each newborn in the center’s care is referred for an appointment to a licensed audiologist or to a hospital or other newborn hearing screening provider before discharge. Unless medically contraindicated, the screening shall occur before the infant is 30 days old.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the physician or other person at or immediately after the birth of a child in a hospital or birthing center that averages less than 20 births a year is not required to screen the child as described in (a) of this section but shall, before the newborn is released from the hospital or birthing center, refer the child for screening at another facility or with another provider. Unless medically contraindicated, the screening shall occur before the child is 30 days old.
  3. If it is determined by screening that a newborn child may have a hearing impairment, the physician or other person who is required under (a) of this section to cause the child to be screened shall
    1. refer the child for confirmatory diagnostic evaluation;
    2. make reasonable efforts to promptly notify the child’s parent that the child may have a hearing impairment and explain to the parent the potential effect of the impairment on the development of the child’s speech and language skills and psychosocial and cognitive development; and
    3. notify the department of the hearing screening results on a form approved by the department.
  4. When the Bureau of Vital Statistics receives a certificate of live birth under AS 18.50.160 for a newborn who was delivered at a place other than a hospital, the bureau shall notify the department employees who administer AS 47.20.310 47.20.390 . The department employees shall notify the child’s parents of the merits of having a hearing screening performed, and the department shall provide information to the parents to assist the parents in accomplishing the hearing screening within 30 days after the child’s birth.
  5. The hearing screening required under this section shall use protocols established by the department. At a minimum, the protocols must include the use of at least one of the following physiologic technologies: automated or diagnostic auditory brainstem response (ABR) or otoacoustic emissions (OAE). The department shall consider updating the protocols as information is provided to the department that new physiologic technologies or improvements to existing physiologic technologies will substantially enhance newborn and infant hearing assessment.
  6. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a physician or other person required to cause a newborn hearing screening under this section is exempt from this requirement if the parent of the newborn child objects to the screening procedure on the grounds that the procedure conflicts with the religious or other tenets and practices of the parent. The parent shall sign a statement that the parent knowingly refuses the services, and the physician or other person shall have a copy of the signed statement retained in the hospital records of the birth and sent to the department for tracking under AS 47.20.320 .
  7. The physician or other person required to cause a newborn hearing screening under this section shall report the results of newborn hearing screening as required by the department under AS 47.20.320 .

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For newborn hearing screening, see 7 AAC 27, art. 11.

Sec. 47.20.320. Reporting and tracking program.

  1. The department shall develop and implement a reporting and tracking system for newborns and infants screened for hearing loss in order to provide the department with information and data to effectively plan, establish, monitor, and evaluate the newborn and infant hearing screening, tracking, and intervention program. Evaluation of the program must include evaluation of the initial hearing screening, follow-up components, and the use and availability of the system of services for newborns and infants who are deaf or hard of hearing and their families.
  2. A physician or other person attending the birth in the state, or a hospital on behalf of a physician or other person attending the birth, shall report information related to hearing screening required under (a) of this section as specified by the department. A person who provides audiological confirmatory evaluation and diagnostic services for newborns and infants whose hearing was screened under AS 47.20.310 shall report information as specified by the department in regulation.
  3. The information received under (b) of this section shall be compiled and maintained by the department in the tracking system. The information shall be kept confidential in accordance with the applicable provisions of 20 U.S.C. 1439 (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), as amended by P.L. 105-17. Data collected by the department that was obtained from the medical records of the newborn or infant shall be for the confidential use of the department and are not public records subject to disclosure under AS 40.25.110 . Aggregate statistical data without identifying information compiled from the information received is public information.
  4. A hospital or other health facility, clinical laboratory, audiologist, physician, registered or advanced practice registered nurse, certified direct-entry midwife, officer or employee of a health facility or clinical laboratory, or an employee of an audiologist, physician, or registered or advanced practice registered nurse is not criminally or civilly liable for furnishing information in good faith to the department or its designee under this section. The furnishing of information in accordance with this section is not a violation of AS 08 or AS 18 or regulations adopted under AS 08 or AS 18 for licensees under those statutes.

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006; am § 51 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For newborn hearing screening, see 7 AAC 27, art. 11.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (d), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse” in two places and deleted “nurse midwife,” preceding “direct-entry”.

Sec. 47.20.330. Intervention program.

  1. The department shall establish guidelines for the provision of follow-up care for newborn and infant children in the state who have been identified as having or being at risk of developing a hearing loss. The services recommended must include appropriate follow-up care for newborns and infants with abnormal or inconclusive screening results, such as diagnostic evaluation, referral, and coordination of early intervention service programs if the newborn or infant is found to have a hearing loss.
  2. The parents of all newborns and infants diagnosed with a hearing loss, as reported to the department, shall be provided by the department with written information on the availability of follow-up care through community resources and government agencies, including those provided in accordance with 20 U.S.C. 1400 — 1482 (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), as amended. Information provided by the department must include listings of local and statewide nonprofit deaf and hard of hearing consumer-based organizations, parent support organizations affiliated with deafness, counseling and educational services, and programs offered through the department and the Department of Education and Early Development.

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006; am § 54 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “20 U.S.C. 1400 — 1482” for “20 U.S.C. 1400 — 1491” in subsection (b).

Sec. 47.20.340. Outreach campaign.

The department shall conduct a community outreach and awareness campaign to inform medical providers, pregnant women, and families of newborns and infants of the newborn and infant hearing screening, tracking, and intervention program and the value of early hearing screening, tracking, and intervention.

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006)

Sec. 47.20.350. Report.

The department shall prepare an annual report for the governor about the newborn and infant hearing screening, tracking, and intervention program administered under AS 47.20.310 47.20.390 . The report must include recommendations on improving the early screening, tracking, and intervention program, including strategies to increase the rate of early screening and the use of appropriate early intervention techniques. The department shall notify the legislature that the report is available.

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006)

Sec. 47.20.360. Performance evaluation.

  1. The department shall collect and compile performance data on the early hearing screening, tracking, and intervention program established under AS 47.20.300 47.20.390 to ensure that the program is in compliance with AS 47.20.300 47.20.390 and the regulations adopted under AS 47.20.300 — 47.20.390. The performance evaluation must include
    1. a comparison of the number of infants born in the state to the number of infants screened;
    2. the referral rate for confirmatory diagnostic evaluation;
    3. the follow-up rate for intervention; and
    4. the number of false screening results.
  2. In conducting a performance evaluation, the department shall establish hearing screening performance standards that must include a false positive rate and a false negative rate for screening results of less than or equal to three percent.

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006)

Sec. 47.20.390. Definitions.

In AS 47.20.300 47.20.390 ,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “follow-up care” means all of the following:
    1. services necessary to diagnose and confirm a hearing loss;
    2. ongoing audiological services to monitor hearing;
    3. communication services, including aural rehabilitation, speech, language, social, and psychological services;
    4. support services for the infant and family; and
    5. early intervention services described in 20 U.S.C. 1431 — 1445 (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), as amended;
  4. “hearing loss” means a hearing loss of 40 decibels or greater in the frequency region important for speech recognition and comprehension in one or both ears, approximately 500 through 4000 Hz;
  5. “hearing screening” means automated auditory brain stem response, otoacoustic emissions, or other appropriate screening procedure approved by the department;
  6. “infant” means a child 30 days to 24 months old;
  7. “newborn” means a child less than 30 days old;
  8. “parent” means a natural parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, legal guardian, or other legal custodian of the child;
  9. “program” means the newborn and infant hearing, tracking, and intervention screening program established under AS 47.20.310 47.20.390 .

History. (§ 6 ch 43 SLA 2006; am § 82 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, former paragraphs (4) —- (10) were renumbered as (5) — (9), respectively, to maintain sequential order following the repeal of former paragraph (4) in 2009.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, repealed former (4), which read, “ ‘health care insurer’ means an entity regulated by the director of insurance, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, and includes a health, hospital, or medical service plan corporation, and a health maintenance organization;”.

Chapter 21. Adventure-Based Education.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings in connection with the enactment of this chapter, see § 3, ch. 86, SLA 1979, in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.21.010. Establishment.

  1. The Department of Health and Social Services shall establish an adventure-based education program designed to bring adventure-based education to appropriate juvenile offenders and others selected by referral agencies.
  2. Adventure-based education is a short-term, intensive training program designed to remedy failure patterns and encourage development of self-esteem, self-confidence, and social awareness in
    1. certain delinquent juveniles in the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services;
    2. certain juveniles identified by the schools, division of social services, the courts, youth workers, or other community referral systems, as being able to benefit from adventure-based education.

History. (§ 4 ch 86 SLA 1979; am E.O. No. 55 § 43 (1984); am E.O. No. 88 § 2 (1994))

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions relating to the 1994 transfer of responsibility, see § 4, E.O. 88, in the Executive Orders pamphlet in binder 14.

Sec. 47.21.020. Program.

  1. An adventure-based education program must include provisions for the following phases:
    1. Phase I: Basic Skills Learning
      1. physical conditioning: running, hiking, swimming, and other related activities;
      2. technical training: the use of specialized tools and equipment, camping, cooking, map reading, navigation, life saving, drown proofing, and solo survival;
      3. safety training: first aid skills, emergency care, preventative medicine, nutrition, health, and personal hygiene care;
      4. team training: rescue techniques, evacuation exercises, and fire fighting;
      5. solo: solitary living for a short period with minimal equipment;
      6. interpersonal skills training: coping skills, individual and group problem solving, and societal communication skills;
      7. culturally relevant activities: traditional modes of subsistence living, traveling and surviving in wilderness areas and communities in the state, and cross-cultural experiences;
    2. Phase II: Skills Generalization
      1. vocational counseling and placement;
      2. family and interpersonal counseling;
      3. community systems utilization: transportation, community services systems, and community problem solving.
  2. Criteria for adventure-based education programs shall be established by the Department of Health and Social Services and must include provisions for
    1. staff members with background experience in Outward Bound, NOLS, Alaska Wilderness Experience, Inc., or other similar wilderness skills programs or indigenous cultural experience;
    2. minimum program standards.

History. (§ 4 ch 86 SLA 1979; am E.O. No. 88 § 3 (1994))

Cross references. —

For similar program description, see AS 14.30.500 .

Chapter 23. Child Support Enforcement Agency.

[Renumbered as AS 25.27.010 25.27.900 .]

Chapter 24. Protection of Vulnerable Adults.

Legislative history reports. —

For legislative purpose in original enactment of this chapter, see § 1, ch. 36, SLA 1983 in the Temporary and Special Acts; for governor’s transmittal letter on SB 248, from which ch. 129, SLA 1994, which substantially amended this chapter, derived, see 1994 Senate Journal 2503 — 2505; for governor's transmittal letter for ch. 19, SLA 2017 (SB 83), which amended AS 47.24.010 47.24.015 , see 2017 Senate Journal 456 — 457.

Collateral references. —

70A Am. Jur. 2d, Social Security and Medicare, § 1 et seq.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 1 et seq.

Licensing and regulation of nursing or rest homes. 53 ALR4th 689.

Sec. 47.24.010. Persons required to report; reports of harm.

  1. Except as provided in (e) of this section, the following persons who, in the performance of their professional duties, have reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult suffers from undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect shall, not later than 24 hours after first having cause for the belief, report the belief to the department’s vulnerable adult centralized intake office:
    1. a physician or other licensed health care provider;
    2. a mental health professional as defined in AS 47.30.915 and including a marital and family therapist licensed under AS 08.63;
    3. a pharmacist;
    4. an administrator or employee of a nursing home, residential care, or health care facility;
    5. a guardian or conservator;
    6. a police officer;
    7. a village public safety officer;
    8. a village health aide;
    9. a social worker;
    10. a member of the clergy;
    11. a staff employee of a project funded by the Department of Administration for the provision of services to older Alaskans, the Department of Health and Social Services, or the Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault;
    12. an employee of a personal care or home health aide program;
    13. an emergency medical technician or a mobile intensive care paramedic;
    14. a caregiver of the vulnerable adult;
    15. a certified nurse aide;
    16. an educator or administrative staff member of a public or private educational institution.
  2. A report made under this section may include the name and address of the reporting person and must include
    1. the name and contact information of the vulnerable adult;
    2. information relating to the nature and extent of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect;
    3. other information that the reporting person believes might be helpful in an investigation of the case or in providing protection for the vulnerable adult.
  3. The department or its designees shall report to the Department of Law any person required by (a) of this section to report who fails to comply with this section. A person listed in (a) of this section who, because of the circumstances, should have had reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult suffers from undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect but who knowingly fails to comply with this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. If a person convicted under this section is a member of a profession or occupation that is licensed, certified, or regulated by the state, the court shall notify the appropriate licensing, certifying, or regulating entity of the conviction.
  4. This section does not prohibit a person listed in (a) of this section, or any other person, from reporting cases of undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult that have come to the person’s attention in the person’s nonoccupational capacity. This section does not prohibit any other person from reporting a harm under this section.
  5. If a person making a report under this section believes that immediate action is necessary to protect the vulnerable adult from imminent risk of serious physical harm due to undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect and the reporting person cannot immediately contact the department’s vulnerable adult centralized intake office, the reporting person shall make the report to a police officer or a village public safety officer. The police officer or village public safety officer shall take immediate action to protect the vulnerable adult and shall, within 24 hours after receiving the report of harm, notify the department. A person may not bring an action for damages against a police officer, a village public safety officer, the state, or a political subdivision of the state based on a decision under this subsection to take or not to take immediate action to protect a vulnerable adult. If a decision is made under this subsection to take immediate action to protect a vulnerable adult, a person may not bring an action for damages based on the protective actions taken unless the protective actions were performed with gross negligence or intentional misconduct; damages awarded in the action may include only direct economic compensatory damages for personal injury.
  6. [Repealed, § 15, ch. 19, SLA 2017]
  7. [Repealed, § 14 ch 129 SLA 1994.]
  8. [Repealed, § 14 ch 129 SLA 1994.]
  9. A person required to report under this section who makes the report to the person’s job supervisor or to another individual working for the entity that employs the person is not relieved of the obligation to make the report to the department as required under (a) of this section.
  10. A person who recklessly makes a false report under this section is civilly liable for actual damages suffered by the person who is the subject of the report.

History. (§ 2 ch 36 SLA 1983; am § 4 ch 108 SLA 1988; am § 10 ch 129 SLA 1992; am § 24 ch 36 SLA 1993; am § 2 ch 103 SLA 1994; am §§ 2 — 7, 14 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 11 ch 131 SLA 1994; am § 13 ch 2 SLA 1998; am E.O. No. 102 § 3 (2001); am §§ 16 — 22 ch 71 SLA 2012; am §§ 1, 2, 15 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

The amendment made to (a) of this section by § 11, ch. 131, SLA 1994 is not set out above because it was made obsolete by the amendment made by § 2, ch. 129, SLA 1994.

Administrative Code. —

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective September 1, 2012, in the introductory language of (a), inserted “undue influence” following “suffers from” and added “in the office of the department that handles adult protective services” at the end; inserted “or employee” following “an administrator” in (a)(4); added (a)(16); in (b)(1), substituted “contact information” for “address”; in (b)(2), (c), (d), and (e), inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment”; in (d), at the end of the first sentence, added “in the person’s nonoccupational capacity” and added the second sentence; in (e), substituted “within 24 hours after receiving the report of harm” for “at the earliest opportunity” preceding “, notify the department.”, and made stylistic changes; in (f), inserted “unduly influenced, abandoned,” following “a vulnerable adult has been”; added (i) and (j).

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, in the introductory language in (a), deleted “and (f)” following “Except as provided in (e)”, and substituted “vulnerable adult centralized intake office” for “central information and referral service for vulnerable adults in the office of the department that handles adult protective services” at the end; in (e), near the end of the first sentence, substituted “vulnerable adult centralized intake office” for “central information and referral service for vulnerable adults”; repealed (f).

Notes to Decisions

Whistleblower provisions do not extend to volunteers. —

Protected relationships under the “whistleblower” provisions of this section does not protect the intangible benefits of volunteering. McAdoo v. Diaz, 884 P.2d 1385 (Alaska 1994).

Qualified immunity. —

Summary judgment based on qualified immunity should not have been granted to the care coordinator for a vulnerable adult residing in a facility. The evidence supported the conclusion that the coordinator did not subjectively believe her statements were true, given that the information in her report of harm was at odds with a plan of care she had put forward only a few months earlier. Also, there was deposition testimony that the coordinator threatened to “make things ugly” for the owner if the owner did not give up objections to the removal of the adult from the facility. Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state civil and criminal elder abuse laws. 113 ALR5th 431.

Sec. 47.24.011. Duties of the department regarding services and protection for vulnerable adults.

In order to facilitate the provision of supportive and protective services for vulnerable adults, the department shall

  1. compile information on available supportive and protective services for vulnerable adults in the state;
  2. establish, publicize, and maintain a vulnerable adult centralized intake office;
  3. develop and coordinate a statewide system to serve vulnerable adults who are in need of protective services;
  4. establish criteria and procedures for the authorization and supervision of other state agencies or community-based service providers to serve as designees of the department under this chapter;
  5. in accordance with this chapter, designate other state agencies or community-based service providers to deliver supportive and protective services to vulnerable adults who are in need of protective services;
  6. develop within the vulnerable adult centralized intake office a central registry for reports of vulnerable adults in need of protective services;
  7. maintain confidentiality of records as provided for in AS 47.24.050 ; and
  8. adopt regulations to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 3 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, in paragraphs (2) and (6), substituted “vulnerable adult centralized intake office” for “central information and referral service for vulnerable adults”.

Sec. 47.24.013. Reports of undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of vulnerable adults in out-of-home care facilities.

  1. If a report received under AS 47.24.010 pertains to the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult that is alleged to have been committed by or to have resulted from the negligence of the staff or a volunteer of an out-of-home care facility, including a facility licensed under AS 47.32, in which the vulnerable adult resides, the department may forward the report to the long term care ombudsman for investigation under AS 47.62.015 .
  2. The department shall investigate a report received under AS 47.24.010 regarding the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self- neglect of a vulnerable adult that is alleged to have been committed by or to have resulted from the negligence of the staff or a volunteer of an out-of-home care facility in which the vulnerable adult resides.
  3. Upon receipt of a report under (a) or (b) of this section, the long term care ombudsman and the department shall
    1. conduct an investigation as appropriate under AS 47.62.015 or this title, respectively;
    2. coordinate and cooperate in their responses to and investigations of the report if their jurisdictions overlap;
    3. [Repealed, § 15, ch. 19 SLA 2017.]
  4. If the long term care ombudsman directly receives a report regarding the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self- neglect of a vulnerable adult in an out-of-home care facility, the ombudsman may provide the report, and the results of the ombudsman’s actions or investigations regarding the report, to the department’s vulnerable adult centralized intake office. The ombudsman shall obtain the informed consent of the vulnerable adult or the vulnerable adult’s resident representative before providing the report to the department. The department may investigate the report as described in AS 47.24.015 if the department determines that action is appropriate. In this subsection, “resident representative” has the meaning given in AS 47.62.090 .
  5. [Repealed, § 15 ch 19 SLA 2017.]
  6. If an investigation conducted by an agency under this section shows reasonable cause to believe that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property, the agency shall report the matter to the Board of Nursing.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 14 ch 2 SLA 1998; am E.O. No. 102 §§ 4, 5 (2001); am E.O. No. 108 §§ 10 — 14 (2003); am § 26 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 23 — 26 ch 71 SLA 2012; am §§ 4 — 6, 15 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, rewrote subsections (a)-(e) to reflect the transfer of functions to the Department of Health and Social Services.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in subsection (a).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), (b), and (d), inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment”; made stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, in (a), deleted “who is 60 years of age or older” following “of a vulnerable adult”, substituted “may forward” for “shall transfer” following “the department”, and made a stylistic change; in (b), deleted “who is less than 60 years of age” following “neglect of a vulnerable adult”; repealed (c)(3); in (d), in the first sentence, substituted “directly receives” for “receives directly”, substituted “may provide” for “shall provide” following “the ombudsman” and substituted “department's vulnerable adult centralized intake office. The ombudsman shall obtain the informed consent of the vulnerable adult or the vulnerable adult's resident representative before providing the report for the department” for “central information and referral service of the office of the department that handles adult protective services”, added the last sentence; repealed (e).

Notes to Decisions

No private right of action. —

Nothing in this section or in AS 47.24.015(a) creates a private right of action for elder abuse. Superior court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to the prisoner’s claim for failure to report elder abuse. Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 47.24.015. Action on reports.

  1. Upon the department’s receipt of a report under AS 47.24.010 , the department, or its designee, shall promptly initiate an investigation to determine whether the vulnerable adult who is the subject of the report suffers from undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect. The department, or its designee, shall conduct a face-to-face interview with the vulnerable adult unless that person is unconscious or the department, or its designee, has determined that a face-to- face interview could further endanger the vulnerable adult. In this subsection, “face-to-face interview” means an in-person interview or an interview conducted through the use of technology that allows participants who are physically separated from each other to interact visually and orally.
  2. After the department conducts an investigation under (a) of this section, the department shall prepare a written report of the investigation, including findings, recommendations, and a determination of whether and what kind of supportive or protective services are needed by and are to be offered to the vulnerable adult. After the department’s designee conducts an investigation under (a) of this section, the designee shall prepare a written report of the investigation, including findings, recommendations, and a proposed determination of whether and what kind of supportive or protective services are to be offered to the vulnerable adult. The department shall prepare, and attach to the designee’s report, a final determination regarding services to be offered to the vulnerable adult.
  3. The department or its designee shall immediately terminate an investigation under this section upon the request of the vulnerable adult who is the subject of the report made under AS 47.24.010 . However, the department or its designee may not terminate the investigation if the investigation to that point has resulted in probable cause to believe that the vulnerable adult is in need of protective services and the request is made personally by the vulnerable adult and the vulnerable adult is not competent to make the request on the adult’s own behalf, or the request is made by the vulnerable adult’s guardian, attorney-in-fact, or surrogate decision maker and that person is the alleged perpetrator of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, or neglect of the vulnerable adult and is being investigated under this chapter. If the department has probable cause to believe that the vulnerable adult is in need of protective services,
    1. the department may petition the court as set out in AS 47.24.019 ;
    2. the department or its designee may refer the report made to the department under AS 47.24.010 to a police officer for criminal investigation; or
    3. in cases involving fraud, the department or its designee may refer the report made to the department under AS 47.24.010 to the office of public advocacy for investigation; in this paragraph, “fraud” has the meaning given in AS 13.26.595 .
  4. Upon request, a person who made a report to the department under AS 47.24.010 regarding a vulnerable adult shall be notified of the status of the investigation conducted under (a) of this section regarding that vulnerable adult.
  5. A person may not bring an action for damages based on a decision under this section to offer or not to offer protective services to a vulnerable adult.
  6. A person may not bring an action for damages based on the provision of protective services under this section unless the action is based on gross negligence or intentional misconduct. The damages awarded in an action under this section may include only direct economic compensatory damages for personal injury.
  7. If an investigation under this section shows reasonable cause to believe that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property, the department shall report the matter to the Board of Nursing.
  8. In conducting an investigation under this section, the department may issue subpoenas, conduct interviews, and examine any health care or financial records related to a vulnerable adult. The department may seek a court order to enforce a subpoena.
  9. A person may not interfere with the department in the performance of its investigation under this section, including interfering with the department’s access to the vulnerable adult.
  10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the office of the department that handles adult protective services shall have access to any information compiled or retained by other divisions in the department, regardless of the nature of the information or whether the information is considered confidential, to assist in administering the provisions of this chapter.
  11. The department may audiotape or videotape an interview of a vulnerable adult if the adult has the capacity to consent and gives that consent. The department shall document the consent in its investigative file. The department may not audiotape or videotape an interview of a vulnerable adult who lacks the capacity to consent.
  12. The department shall provide for the training of investigators who investigate reports of harm under this section. Training must include instruction in federal, state, and local laws and policies of the department related to vulnerable adults, and in investigative techniques. The department may require other appropriate training.
  13. In this section, “financial records” includes financial records related to the vulnerable adult that are maintained by any person.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 15 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 21 SLA 1999; am § 3 ch 64 SLA 2006; am §§ 27 — 29 ch 71 SLA 2012; am § 7 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, "AS 13.26.595 " was substituted for "AS 13.26.324" to reflect the renumbering of that section.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective September 13, 2006, added paragraph (c)(3), and made related changes.

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a) and (c), inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment”; in (c)(3), substituted “AS 13.26.324” for “AS 44.21.415 ” at the end; added (h) through (m).

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, in (a), deleted “that is not transferred under AS 47.24.013 ” following “report under AS 47.24.010 ” in the first sentence, substituted “vulnerable adult” for “subject of report” following “interview with the” in the second sentence, added the third sentence.

Notes to Decisions

No private right of action. —

Nothing in AS 47.24.013(a) or this section creates a private right of action for elder abuse. Superior court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to the prisoner’s claim for failure to report elder abuse. Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010).

Quoted in

Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.24.016. Surrogate decision makers for vulnerable adults.

  1. If the department determines under AS 47.24.015 that a vulnerable adult is in need of protective services, but the department cannot obtain the vulnerable adult’s consent to receive the services because the vulnerable adult is unable to consent or lacks decision making capacity, and has no guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, or surrogate for health care decisions under AS 13.52.030 to serve as the vulnerable adult’s surrogate decision maker, the department may select from the following list, in the order of priority listed, an individual who is willing to be the vulnerable adult’s surrogate decision maker for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to the vulnerable adult’s receipt of protective services:
    1. the vulnerable adult’s spouse, unless the vulnerable adult or the spouse have initiated divorce, dissolution, or legal separation proceedings;
    2. an individual who lives with the vulnerable adult in a spousal relationship or as a domestic partner and who is 18 years of age or older;
    3. a son or daughter of the vulnerable adult who is 18 years of age or older;
    4. a parent of the vulnerable adult;
    5. a brother or sister of the vulnerable adult who is 18 years of age or older; or
    6. a close friend or relative of the vulnerable adult who is 18 years of age or older.
  2. An individual from the list in (a) of this section may not be selected as a surrogate decision maker if
    1. the department determines that individual does not possess decision making capacity; or
    2. there are allegations that individual is a perpetrator of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, or neglect of the vulnerable adult.
  3. If the department intends to select a surrogate decision maker from a priority level in the list in (a) of this section and there is more than one individual at that priority level who is willing to be the surrogate decision maker, those individuals
    1. may select from amongst themselves, by majority vote, an individual to serve as the surrogate decision maker; or
    2. as a group may serve as the surrogate decision maker and reach decisions by consensus.
  4. The department may not continue to provide protective services to a vulnerable adult based on the consent of a surrogate decision maker serving under this section or AS 13.52.030 if the department determines that the vulnerable adult has become able to consent or has regained decision making capacity since the surrogate’s consent was given. The department may continue protective services to a vulnerable adult who has become able to consent or has regained decision making capacity only if the vulnerable adult consents.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am §§ 30 — 32 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, or surrogate for health care decisions under AS 13.52.030 ” for “guardian or attorney-in-fact”; deleted the (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) designations, and combined the content as (a)(1); in (b)(2), inserted “undue influence,” following “is a perpetrator of the”; in (d), inserted “or AS 13.52.030 ” following “serving under this section”.

Notes to Decisions

Husband not entitled to automatically assume the role of his wife’s surrogate decision maker. —

Dismissal of the husband’s action alleging that he suffered emotional distress caused by the medical center’s release of his wife to her daughter was appropriate, in part because a spouse was not entitled to automatically assume the role of a surrogate decision maker when the health department had not sought the spouse’s consent for services. Even if the husband had been acting as his wife’s agent, he would have formed a contract between the wife and the medical center that the wife could have enforced, not the husband. Clemensen v. Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 203 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 47.24.017. Delivery of protective services for vulnerable adults.

  1. If the department determines under AS 47.24.015 that a vulnerable adult is in need of protective services and the vulnerable adult, the vulnerable adult’s guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, a surrogate decision maker selected under AS 47.24.016 , or a surrogate for health care decisions under AS 13.52.030 consents to receipt of the protective services, and to the extent that resources are available, the department shall ensure that the protective services for the vulnerable adult are provided by the department or its designee within 10 working days after the department received the report under AS 47.24.010 regarding the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of the vulnerable adult. However, if circumstances beyond the control of the department or the department’s designee make it impossible to provide the protective services within the 10 working days, the department shall ensure that the services are provided as soon as possible after that time.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, if the department determines that an emergency situation exists that necessitates provision of protective services to a vulnerable adult, the department may provide the necessary protective services in a manner determined by the department to be the most appropriate in light of the emergency situation, regardless of whether the vulnerable adult or any other person has consented to receipt of the services.
  3. To the extent practicable, protective services provided under this section shall be delivered in a culturally relevant manner that protects the vulnerable adult’s right to the least restrictive environment and maximizes that person’s own decision making capabilities.
  4. If the protective services under this section include the placement of a vulnerable adult in an assisted living home at the state’s expense, the minimum daily reimbursement rate to the assisted living home for the vulnerable adult is $70. The department may, under its regulations, provide for a daily rate higher than $70 if the additional care provided to the vulnerable adult in the assisted living home justifies the additional reimbursement. In this subsection, “assisted living home” means an assisted living home licensed under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 83 SLA 2000; am § 27 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 33 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Cross references. —

For applicability provisions relating to the 2000 addition of subsection (d) by sec. 2, ch. 83, SLA 2000, and the 2001 and 2002 amendments of that subsection by secs. 3 and 4, ch. 83, SLA 2000, see sec. 14, ch. 83, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary & Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in subsection (d).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), substituted “guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, a surrogate decision maker selected under AS 47.24.016 , or a surrogate for health care decisions under AS 13.52.030 ” for “guardian or attorney-in-fact or a surrogate decision maker selected under AS 47.24.016 ”, and inserted “undue influence” preceding “abandonment”.

Sec. 47.24.019. Petitioning court for certain protective services.

  1. If, after investigation under AS 47.24.015 , the department has reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult is in need of protective services and is an incapacitated person, the department may petition the court under AS 13.26 for appointment of a guardian or temporary guardian, or for a change of guardian, for the vulnerable adult for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to the receipt of protective services for the vulnerable adult.
  2. If, after an investigation under AS 47.24.015 , the department has reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult is mentally ill and as a result either is likely to cause serious harm to self or others or is gravely disabled, the department may petition the court under AS 47.30.700 to initiate an involuntary commitment proceeding.
  3. If a vulnerable adult who has consented to receive protective services, or on whose behalf consent to receive protective services has been given, is prevented by any person from receiving those services, the department may petition the superior court for an injunction restraining the person from interfering with the provision of protective services to the vulnerable adult.

History. (§ 8 ch 129 SLA 1994; am §§ 2, 3 ch 21 SLA 1999; am § 34 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (c), substituted “any person” for “a caregiver, guardian, attorney-in-fact, or surrogate decision maker”, or similar, twice.

Secs. 47.24.020, 47.24.030 Action; protective services. [Repealed, § 14 ch 129 SLA 1994.]

Sec. 47.24.040. Monitoring.

If ongoing protective services are provided to a vulnerable adult under AS 47.24.017 , the department shall monitor the adult’s situation, as the department considers appropriate, until the department determines that the protective services are no longer needed.

History. (§ 2 ch 36 SLA 1983; am § 9 ch 129 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.24.050. Confidentiality of reports.

  1. Investigation reports and reports of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult filed under this chapter are confidential and are not subject to public inspection and copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.125 . However, under this chapter and regulations adopted under this chapter, investigation reports may be used by appropriate agencies or individuals inside and outside the state, in connection with investigations or judicial proceedings involving the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult.
  2. The department shall disclose a report of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult if the vulnerable adult who is the subject of the report or the vulnerable adult’s guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, or surrogate decision maker consents in writing. The department may not disclose a report of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult to the vulnerable adult’s guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee, or surrogate decision maker if that person is an alleged perpetrator of the undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, or neglect of the vulnerable adult and is being investigated under this chapter. The department shall, upon request, disclose the number of verified reports of undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult that occurred at an institution that provides care for vulnerable adults or that were the result of actions or inactions of a public home care provider.

History. (§ 2 ch 36 SLA 1983; am § 4 ch 45 SLA 1994; am § 10 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 4 ch 21 SLA 1999; am § 35 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.125 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.125” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.125.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, throughout the section, inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment”; in (b), twice substituted “guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, trustee” for “guardian, attorney-in-fact”; made stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.24.060. Authority of the department. [Repealed, § 14 ch 129 SLA 1994.]

Sec. 47.24.070. Required review of proposed regulations.

Before adoption by the department, regulations to implement this chapter shall be provided to the Alaska Commission on Aging established under AS 47.45.200 for review.

History. (§ 2 ch 36 SLA 1983; am § 11 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 12 ch 131 SLA 1994; am § 2 ch 24 SLA 2004; am § 32 ch 99 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2004 amendment, effective July 24, 2004, substituted “AS 47.45.200 ” for “AS 44.21.200 .”

The second 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, substituted “AS 47.44.200” for “AS 44.21.200 .”

Secs. 47.24.075 — 47.24.110. Reports; definitions. [Repealed, § 14 ch 129 SLA 1994.]

Sec. 47.24.120. Immunity from liability; retaliation prohibited.

  1. A person who in good faith makes a report under AS 47.24.010 , regardless of whether the person is required to do so, is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for making the report.
  2. An employer or supervisor of a person who in good faith makes a report under AS 47.24.010 may not discharge, demote, transfer, reduce pay or benefits or work privileges of, prepare a negative work performance evaluation of, or take other detrimental action against the person because the person made the report. The person making the report may bring a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages against an employer or supervisor who violates this subsection. In the civil action there is a rebuttable presumption that the detrimental action by the employer or supervisor was retaliatory if it was taken within 90 days after the report was made.

History. (§ 3 ch 42 SLA 1988; am § 12 ch 129 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Qualified immunity. —

Summary judgment based on qualified immunity should not have been granted to the care coordinator for a vulnerable adult residing in a facility. The evidence supported the conclusion that the coordinator did not subjectively believe her statements were true, given that the information in her report of harm was at odds with a plan of care she had put forward only a few months earlier. Also, there was deposition testimony that the coordinator threatened to “make things ugly” for the owner if the owner did not give up objections to the removal of the adult from the facility. Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.24.130. Treatment through spiritual means.

This chapter may not be construed to mean that a person is unduly influenced, abused, neglected, self-neglected, vulnerable, unable to consent, abandoned, exploited, or in need of emergency or protective services for the sole reason that the person relies on or is being furnished treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone under the tenets and practices of a church or religious denomination of which the person is a member or adherent, if the person consents to the treatment through spiritual means only and the treatment is administered by an accredited practitioner of the church or religious denomination. In this section, “church or religious denomination” has the meaning given to “religious organization” in AS 05.15.690 .

History. (§ 13 ch 129 SLA 1994; am § 36 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, “AS 05.15.690 ” was substituted for “AS 05.15.210” to reflect the 1994 renumbering of AS 05.15.210.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, inserted “unduly influenced,” preceding “abused, neglected” and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.24.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “abandonment” means desertion of a vulnerable adult by a caregiver;
  2. “abuse” means
    1. the intentional, knowing, or reckless nonaccidental and nontherapeutic infliction of physical pain, injury, mental or emotional distress, or fear, including coercion and intimidation; or
    2. sexual assault under AS 11.41.410 or 11.41.420 ;
  3. “caregiver” means
    1. a person who is providing care to a vulnerable adult as a result of a family relationship, or who has assumed some or all responsibility for the care of a vulnerable adult voluntarily, by contract, as an employee of a business that provides care in an adult’s home, or by court order; or
    2. an employee of an out-of-home care facility who provides care to one or more vulnerable adults;
  4. “deception” means creating, reinforcing, or failing to correct a false impression or preventing another person from acquiring information that would affect the person’s judgment regarding a transaction;
  5. “decision making capacity” means the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision and the ability to reach and communicate an informed decision; in this paragraph, “informed decision” includes a decision made by the vulnerable adult that is free from undue influence;
  6. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  7. “designee” means another state agency or a community-based program, individual, or provider of supportive services that has been licensed, or authorized by agreement with the department, to provide one or more services to vulnerable adults;
  8. “exploitation”
    1. means unjust or improper use of another person or another person’s resources for one’s own profit or advantage, with or without the person’s consent; and
    2. includes acts by a person who stands in a position of trust or confidence with a vulnerable adult or who knows or should know that the vulnerable adult lacks the capacity to consent that involve obtaining profit or advantage through undue influence, deception, fraud, intimidation, or breach of fiduciary duty; in this subparagraph, “fraud” has the meaning given in AS 13.26.595 (1) and (2);
  9. “fiduciary duty” means the duty of a third party who stands in a position of trust or confidence with another person, including a vulnerable adult, to act with due regard for the benefit and interest of that person;
  10. “financial institution” means an institution subject to state or federal banking or financial regulations, including
    1. a broker-dealer;
    2. a commercial bank;
    3. a savings bank;
    4. a credit union;
    5. a premium finance company;
    6. a small loan company;
    7. a bank holding company;
    8. a financial holding company;
    9. a trust company;
    10. a savings and loan association;
    11. a deferred deposit advance licensee;
    12. an investment bank;
    13. an insurance company subject to regulation by AS 21;
    14. a licensee subject to regulation by AS 21; and
    15. an investment adviser;
  11. “incapacitated person” means a person whose ability to receive and evaluate information or to communicate decisions is impaired to the extent that the person lacks the ability to provide or arrange for the essential requirements for the person’s physical health or safety without court-ordered assistance;
  12. “neglect” means the intentional, knowing, or reckless failure by a caregiver to provide essential care or services or access to essential care or services or to carry out a prescribed treatment plan necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of the vulnerable adult when the vulnerable adult is unable to provide or obtain the essential care or services or to carry out the prescribed treatment plan on the vulnerable adult’s own behalf; in this paragraph, “essential care or services” includes food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and supervision;
  13. “person who stands in a position of trust or confidence” means a person who
    1. is a relative by blood or marriage;
    2. is a joint tenant or tenant in common;
    3. has a legal or fiduciary relationship; or
    4. is a person who has been entrusted with or has assumed responsibility for the use or management of the vulnerable adult’s assets or income;
  14. “police officer” has the meaning given in AS 18.65.290 ;
  15. “protective services” means services that are intended to prevent or alleviate harm resulting from undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect and that are provided to a vulnerable adult in need of protection; in this paragraph, “services” includes
    1. protective placement;
    2. applying for or obtaining public benefits;
    3. obtaining health care services and supplies;
    4. staying financial transactions;
    5. petitioning for a protective order under AS 13.26.401 13.26.460 ;
    6. assisting with personal hygiene;
    7. obtaining food and clothing;
    8. protection from physical and emotional abuse;
    9. obtaining representative payee services; and
    10. coordinating protective services;
  16. “public home care provider” has the meaning given in AS 47.05.017(c) ;
  17. “self-neglect” means an act or omission by a vulnerable adult that results, or could result in the deprivation of essential services necessary to maintain minimal mental, emotional, or physical health and safety;
  18. “supportive services” means the range of services delivered by public and private organizations and individuals that assist the elderly and vulnerable adults with their social, health, educational, recreational, transportation, housing, nutritional, financial, legal, or other needs;
  19. “unable to consent” means refusal to, or inability to, accept services because
    1. the person is an incapacitated person or apparently is an incapacitated person;
    2. of coercion by or fear of reprisal from the perpetrator of undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, or neglect;
    3. of dependency on the perpetrator of undue influence, abandonment, exploitation, abuse, or neglect for services, care, or support; or
    4. of an inability to perceive that refusal to consent results in an imminent and substantial danger of loss, waste, or dissipation of income or assets, eviction, physical or mental harm to self or others, or death;
  20. “undue influence” means the use by a person who stands in a position of trust or confidence of the person’s role, relationship, or authority to wrongfully exploit the trust, dependency, or fear of a vulnerable adult to gain control over the decision making of the vulnerable adult, including decision making related to finances, property, residence, and health care;
  21. “vulnerable adult” means a person 18 years of age or older who, because of incapacity, mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, fraud, confinement, or disappearance, is unable to meet the person’s own needs or to seek help without assistance.

History. (§ 13 ch 129 SLA 1994; am E.O. No. 108 § 15 (2003); am §§ 37 — 45 ch 71 SLA 2012)

Revisor’s notes. —

The paragraphs in this section were renumbered in 1994 and 2012 to maintain the alphabetical order of the terms.

In 2016, "AS 13.26.595 (1) and (2)" was substituted for "AS 13.26.324(1) and (2)" and AS 13.26.401 13.26.460 " was substituted for "AS 13.26.165 — 13.26.209" to reflect the renumbering of those sections.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” in the definition of “department.”

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, rewrote (2)(A), which read, “the willful, intentional, or reckless nonaccidental and nontherapeutic infliction of physical pain, injury or mental distress”; in (3)(A), inserted “some or all” following “who has assumed”, and “as an employee of a business that provides care in an adult’s home,” following “voluntarily, by contract,”; in (4) (now (5)), added “in this paragraph, ‘informed decision’ includes a decision made by the vulnerable adult that is free from undue influence”; in (7) (now (8)), added the (8)(A) and (8)(B) designations, added “, with or without the person’s consent; and” at the end of (8)(A), added (8)(B); rewrote (9) (now 12)), which read, “ ‘neglect’ means the intentional failure by a caregiver to provide essential care or services necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of the vulnerable adult”; in the introductory language of (11) (now 15)), inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment” and substituted “in this paragraph, ‘services’ includes” for “ ‘protective services’ includes”, added the (15)(A) — (15)(J) designations, and added (15)(B) — (15)(J); in (15) (now (19)), in (19)(B) and (19)(C), inserted “undue influence,” preceding “abandonment” and in (19)(D), substituted “danger of loss, waste, or dissipation of income or assets, eviction, physical or mental harm to self or others, or death” for “danger of death or irreparable harm to self or others”; in (16) (now (21)), substituted “incapacity, mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, fraud, confinement, or disappearance” for “physical or mental impairment”; added (17) — (21) (now (4), (9), (10), (13), (20)).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Dapo v. State, 454 P.3d 171 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).

Chapter 25. Public Assistance.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance and medical assistance, see 7 AAC, part 3.

Article 1. Day Care Assistance and Child Care Grants.

Administrative Code. —

For child care assistance program, see 7 AAC 41.

For child care grant program, see 7 AAC 39.

Sec. 47.25.001. Powers and duties.

  1. The department shall
    1. implement and administer a program to assist in providing day care for the children of low and moderate income families according to the requirements of AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ;
    2. establish standards of eligibility for day care benefits;
    3. contract for the care of children of eligible families;
    4. establish procedures to periodically review the needs of families receiving day care benefits;
    5. provide notification to the local government body of the request for a contract with a day care facility.
  2. The department may
    1. adopt regulations necessary for the performance of its duties under AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ;
    2. contract with other entities to perform duties of the department under AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 within an area specified by the department; within an area, the department shall give higher priority to contracting with municipalities than with other organizations.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, in this section “AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.009” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.002 — 47.25.009.

Administrative Code. —

For program provisions, see 7 AAC 39, art. 1.

For administrative review, see 7 AAC 39, art. 2.

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 5.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Sec. 47.25.010. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.010.]

Sec. 47.25.011. Administrative costs of program contractors.

To defray administrative expenses, a contractor under AS 47.25.001(b) may only retain $1,000 or 12 percent, whichever is greater, of the day care assistance program funds it receives from the department under the contract.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.002. Renumbered in 2003.

Sec. 47.25.020. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.020.]

Sec. 47.25.021. Conditions of receipt of benefits.

Benefits may be paid for the care of children of a low or moderate income family only if a parent or guardian, because of the day care, is freed to work or to seek work or to attend school. Benefits may not be paid for the care of children of a family where one parent or guardian is not working, actively seeking work, or attending school and is physically and mentally capable of caring for the children.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.003. Renumbered in 2003.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

Sec. 47.25.030. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.030.]

Sec. 47.25.031. Eligibility of families for benefits.

The department shall determine the eligibility of families for day care benefits on the basis of the following factors:

  1. income of the family including salary, alimony, child support, retirement benefits, social security, and any other source of income;
  2. number of children in the family;
  3. whether there is one parent or guardian solely responsible for the care of the family.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.004. Renumbered in 2003.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

Sec. 47.25.035. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.035.]

Sec. 47.25.040. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.040.]

Sec. 47.25.041. Contributions by parent or guardian.

The department shall develop a sliding fee scale based on the factors listed in AS 47.25.031 for purposes of determining the amount to be contributed by the parent or guardian for child care. The contribution of the parent or guardian shall be paid to the day care facility.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.005. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.25.031 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.004” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.004.

Administrative Code. —

For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

Sec. 47.25.050. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.050.]

Sec. 47.25.051. Placement; payment by state.

  1. Parents or guardians shall select the day care facility for the care of their children.
  2. Benefits shall be paid by the department directly to the municipality or organization contracting with the day care facility.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.006. Renumbered in 2003.

Administrative Code. —

For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Provision under federal law and state administration under which a parent who qualifies for a day care subsidy may direct that the state subsidy payment be made directly to a child care facility operated by religious organizations is presumed constitutional and not violative of the “Establishment” clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions, until found otherwise by a court. June 4, 1999, Op. Att’y Gen. (This opinion was provided under former AS 44.47.300.)

Sec. 47.25.060. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.060.]

Sec. 47.25.070. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.070.]

Sec. 47.25.071. Child care grant program.

  1. A child care grant program is established in the department to provide state assistance in the operation of child care facilities. The department shall provide grants for the operation of child care facilities, including private nonprofit child care facilities. Participation in the program is optional.
  2. To qualify for a grant under (a) or (d) of this section, the child care facility must
    1. be currently licensed under AS 47.32 and applicable municipal licensing requirements;
    2. participate in the day care assistance program under AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ; and
    3. provide care under a payment system as provided in (g) of this section.
  3. A grant under (a) of this section may not exceed $50 per month for each child the child care facility cares for, or for each full-time equivalent, as determined by the department. The grant shall be adjusted on a geographic basis by the same factor as funding for a school district is adjusted in AS 14.17.460 .
  4. In addition to the grants provided in (a) of this section, the department may, subject to appropriations for that purpose, provide by grant or contract for the education and training of child care employees or administrators. To receive a grant or contract under this subsection or to participate in a training program under this subsection, the child care facility must meet all the requirements of (b) of this section.
  5. An application for a grant under this section shall be made in the form established by the department.
  6. A grant under (a) of this section shall be made monthly or quarterly and shall be based on the monthly average daily full-time equivalent enrollment in the child care facility. If the method of payment for the grant is other than monthly, it shall be at the request of the child care facility with the approval of the department. Based on criteria established by the department, the department may make quarterly advance payments.
  7. Each child care facility receiving a grant under (a) or (d) of this section shall assure that at least 15 percent or one of its child care spaces receiving subsidy under this section, whichever is greater, will be made available, if requested, to children eligible for day care assistance under AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 , whose parents or guardians wish to pay for care based on attendance only.
  8. The department shall, in consultation with interested child care providers and parents, adopt regulations to carry out the purposes of this section.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003); am § 28 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.007. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.009” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.002 — 47.25.009.

Administrative Code. —

For program provisions, see 7 AAC 39, art. 1.

For administrative review, see 7 AAC 39, art. 2.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (b)(1).

Sec. 47.25.080. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.080.]

Sec. 47.25.090. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.090.]

Sec. 47.25.095. Definitions for day care assistance and child care grant programs.

In AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ,

  1. “child” means a person below 13 years of age, or a minor who has a developmental disability;
  2. “child care facility” means an establishment licensed as a child care facility under AS 47.32, including day care centers, family day care homes, and schools for preschool age children, that provides care for children not related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption to the owner, operator, or manager of the facility;
  3. “day care” means the care, supervision, and guidance of a child or children unaccompanied by a parent or legal guardian on a regular basis for periods of less than 24 hours a day;
  4. “day care facility” means a center or home licensed in accordance with the provisions of AS 47.32 as a child care facility or recognized by the federal government for the care of children;
  5. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  6. “developmental disability” means a disability under which a person is incapable of self-care, as verified by a physician or licensed or certified psychologist who has examined the person.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 16 (2003); am §§ 29, 30 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.009. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.25.001 47.25.095 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.009” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.002 — 47.25.009.

Administrative Code. —

For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.

For definitions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, inserted “as a child care facility” and updated a section reference in paragraphs (2) and (4).

Sec. 47.25.100. [Renumbered as AS 47.55.100.]

Sec. 47.25.110. [Repealed, § 1 ch 118 SLA 1968.]

Article 2. General Relief Assistance.

Administrative Code. —

For general relief, see 7 AAC 47.

Sec. 47.25.120. Eligibility for assistance.

Financial assistance may be given under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 , so far as practicable under the conditions in this state, to a needy person who is eligible under the regulations of the department.

History. (§ 2 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 38 SLA 1957)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

A statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying such residents equal protection of the laws. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (U.S. 1969), overruled in part, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (U.S. 1974).

Collateral references. —

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, § 1 et seq.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 183 et seq.

Admissibility of records or report of welfare department or agency relating to payment to or financial condition of particular person. 42 ALR2d 752.

Residence for purpose of old age assistance. 43 ALR2d 1427.

Alcoholic as entitled to public assistance under poor laws. 43 ALR3d 554.

Constitutionality of statutory provision requiring reimbursement of public by child for financial assistance to aged parents. 75 ALR3d 1159.

Personal injury recovery as affecting eligibility for, or duty to reimburse, public welfare assistance. 80 ALR3d 772.

Eligibility for welfare benefits, under maximum-asset limitations, as affected by expenditures or disposal of assets. 19 ALR4th 146.

Eligibility for welfare benefits as affected by claimant’s status as trust beneficiary. 21 ALR4th 729.

Validity of statutes or regulations denying welfare benefits to claimants who transfer property for less than its full value. 24 ALR4th 215.

Sec. 47.25.130. Amount and type of assistance.

  1. The amount of assistance for a needy person shall be determined by the department with regard to the resources and needs of the person and the conditions existing in each case. Where possible, assistance shall be sufficient to provide the applicant with reasonable subsistence according to standards of assistance established by the department. However, the amount of assistance for subsistence needs may not exceed $120 a person a calendar month.
  2. The department may enter into competitively awarded group service agreements with providers, and may require needy persons under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 to obtain services from these designated providers.

History. (§ 3 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 2 ch 38 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 62 SLA 1985; am § 11 ch 105 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Sec. 47.25.140. Residents of public institutions.

  1. Payment under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 may not be made to or on behalf of an individual who is a resident of a public institution, except as a patient in a public medical institution, or an individual who is a patient in a public or private institution for tuberculosis or mental disease. A resident of a public institution who is otherwise eligible to receive an allowance under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 may apply for the allowance instead of the support and maintenance provided in the public institution.
  2. In this section, “public institution” does not include the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home.

History. (§ 4 ch 110 SLA 1953; am §§ 12, 13 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted “a public institution” for “the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or other public institution” in each sentence of subsection (a), added subsection (b), and made related and stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.25.150. Application for assistance.

A person requesting assistance shall apply for it, either personally or through another person, upon forms furnished and under regulations adopted by the department.

History. (§ 5 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

Sec. 47.25.160. Investigation of applicant.

The department shall promptly investigate each applicant to determine the applicant’s eligibility.

History. (§ 6 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

Sec. 47.25.170. Granting of assistance.

Upon the completion of its investigation, the department shall decide whether the applicant is eligible for and should receive assistance promptly under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 , the amount of assistance, the manner of paying or providing it, and the date on which the assistance shall begin. The department shall notify the applicant of its decision.

History. (§ 7 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Sec. 47.25.180. Appeal.

An applicant whose application is not acted upon or is denied, discontinued, or modified by the department shall be granted an opportunity for fair hearing before the office of the administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ). The hearing shall be held within a reasonable time after demand for it. The conduct of the hearing shall be governed by the regulations adopted for that purpose by the department.

History. (§ 8 ch 110 SLA 1953; am E.O. No. 116, § 8 (2012))

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in the first sentence, substituted “the office of the administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “a representative of the department appointed for that purpose”; in the second sentence, substituted “The conduct of” for “A representative designated to conduct”.

Collateral references. —

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in public welfare proceedings. 88 ALR4th 1094.

Sec. 47.25.190. Payment to guardians.

When a guardian is appointed by the court for a person receiving assistance, the department may pay the assistance to the guardian.

History. (§ 9 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Sec. 47.25.195. Payment to facilities for treatment of needy persons.

  1. The department may make payments to a health facility for the treatment of a needy person.
  2. Except as provided in (e) of this section, a health facility receiving a payment under this chapter is subject to the requirements of AS 47.07.070 47.07.075 .
  3. Except as provided in (e) of this section, if insufficient money is appropriated to fund medical assistance under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 when taking into consideration projected use and the health facility payment rates established in accordance with (b) of this section, the department may, by regulation, establish at any time in the fiscal year a prospective pro rata reduction of the facilities’ established payment rates that will be paid by the department for services provided by facilities under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 .
  4. Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, the department may enter into agreements with a facility to provide services at a payment rate lower than the rate established in accordance with (b) of this section, except that the department may not enter into an agreement with an assisted living home to provide services at a daily reimbursement rate lower than $70.
  5. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section and the provisions of AS 47.07, if the assistance provided to a needy person under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 includes the initiation or continuation of placement of the person in an assisted living home at the state’s expense, the department’s minimum daily reimbursement rate to the assisted living home for the person is $70. This minimum rate is not subject to reduction under (c) of this section. The department may, under its regulations and under the procedures of AS 47.07.070 47.07.075 , provide for a daily rate higher than $70 if the care provided to the needy person in the assisted living home justifies the higher reimbursement. A daily rate higher than $70 for assisted living homes may be reduced under (c) of this section, but not below $70.
  6. For purposes of this section,
    1. “assisted living home” means an assisted living home licensed under AS 47.32;
    2. “health facility” includes a hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, rehabilitation facility, inpatient psychiatric facility, home health agency, rural health clinic, and outpatient surgical clinic.

History. (§ 7 ch 95 SLA 1983; am § 12 ch 105 SLA 1986; am §§ 7 — 13 ch 83 SLA 2000; am § 31 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 21 ch 42 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

The subsections of this section were relettered in 1990; in 2000 subsection (f) was relettered as (e) and former subsection (e) was relettered as (f) and internal references in (b) and (c) were conformed to the relettering.

Cross references. —

For applicability provisions relating to the 2000 addition of subsection (e) (enacted as (f)) by sec. 11, ch. 83, SLA 2000, and the 2001 and 2002 amendments of that subsection by secs. 12 and 13, ch. 83, SLA 2000, see sec. 14, ch. 83, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary & Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (f)(1).

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (f)(2), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.

Sec. 47.25.200. Review of eligibility.

Assistance grants under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 shall be reviewed by the department as frequently as it considers necessary, and the amount of assistance may be changed or entirely withdrawn if the review of the circumstances warrants this action.

History. (§ 10 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.

Sec. 47.25.205. Priority of general relief medical assistance.

If the department finds that the cost of medical assistance for all persons eligible under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 will exceed the amount allocated in the state budget for that assistance for the fiscal year, the department shall eliminate coverage for medical services in the following order:

  1. treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders;
  2. optometrists’ services and eyeglasses;
  3. occupational therapy;
  4. emergency dental services for adults;
  5. prosthetic devices not including dentures;
  6. medical supplies and equipment;
  7. physical therapy;
  8. outpatient laboratory and outpatient x-ray services;
  9. ambulatory surgical center services;
  10. nonemergency medical transportation;
  11. outpatient physician services;
  12. outpatient hospital services;
  13. intermediate care facility services;
  14. skilled nursing facility services;
  15. emergency medical transportation;
  16. pharmaceuticals;
  17. inpatient physician services;
  18. inpatient hospital services.

History. (§ 13 ch 105 SLA 1986)

Sec. 47.25.210. Alienation and attachment.

Assistance granted under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 is inalienable by assignment or transfer and is exempt from garnishment, levy, or execution as provided in AS 09.38 (exemptions).

History. (§ 11 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 8 ch 62 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.25.220. State’s claim for assistance.

The total amount paid in assistance to a recipient constitutes a claim against the recipient and the recipient’s estate. On the death of a person receiving assistance, the total amount paid as assistance shall be allowed by the court having jurisdiction over the estate.

History. (§ 12 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Sec. 47.25.230. Persons liable for support and burial.

Every needy person shall be supported while living and upon dying, shall be given a decent burial by the spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings of the needy person, if they, or any of them, have the ability to do so, in the order named. Every designated person who fails to support the needy person when directed by the department to do so, or fails to give the needy person a decent burial shall reimburse the state or a municipality for the funds expended by either the state or a municipality for the relief or burial of the needy person, and these sums with interest and costs may be recovered by the state or a municipality of the state in a civil action.

History. (§ 13 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 68 ch 37 SLA 1986)

Cross references. —

For duty of parent and child to maintain each other, see AS 25.20.030 .

Notes to Decisions

Applicability of criminal nonsupport statute. —

The criminal nonsupport statute, AS 11.51.120 , does not extend beyond those individuals expressly made legally responsible for the support of a child by AS 25.20.030 and this section. Olp v. State, 738 P.2d 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Collateral references. —

Nature of care contemplated by statute imposing general duty to care for indigent relatives. 92 ALR2d 348.

Sec. 47.25.240. Action against person liable for care of recipient.

If, during the continuance of an allowance, the department ascertains that a person liable for the support of the recipient of assistance is able to provide the necessary care and support of the recipient, and the person liable for the care and support of the recipient fails or refuses to support and care for the recipient, the state has a claim for the assistance against the person liable for it. This claim may be enforced by civil action brought in the name of the state by the attorney general against the person liable for the recovery of the amount of money, with interest, paid to the recipient, together with the costs and disbursements of the action.

History. (§ 14 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 47.25.250. Temporary relief.

When a needy person is not entitled to assistance under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 and has no relatives in the state liable for support under AS 47.25.230 and 47.25.240 , the needy person may receive temporary assistance in the form and amount which the department considers necessary. Temporary assistance for needs other than transportation and medical care may not exceed $120 per person per month.

History. (§ 15 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 4 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 62 SLA 1985)

Sec. 47.25.252. Discretionary assistance.

When a needy person is not entitled to assistance under AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 , the needy person may receive assistance in the form and amount that the department considers necessary.

History. (§ 14 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.25.255. Catastrophic illness. [Repealed, § 2 ch 107 SLA 1978. For current law, see AS 47.08.]

Sec. 47.25.260. Recovery and disposition of allowances improperly granted.

If the department finds that a general relief allowance has been improperly granted, it shall investigate, and if it appears from the investigation that the assistance was improperly granted, the department may cancel the allowance and notify the recipient of the cancellation. The state then has a claim against the person who received the improper allowance. The claim may be enforced by civil action in the name of the state by the attorney general to recover the amount paid to the person, with interest, together with the necessary costs of the action.

History. (§ 16 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Sec. 47.25.265. Cancellation of disbursements.

  1. Disbursements issued to a general relief assistance recipient after the date of death of the recipient shall be canceled.
  2. General relief assistance disbursements made before the death of the recipient but not collected by the recipient before death shall be canceled, unless claimed by the authorized representative of the estate of the recipient within 90 days after the date of death.
  3. The state is not liable to the estate, heirs, or creditors of the deceased general relief assistance recipient for payment on disbursements canceled under (a) and (b) of this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 52 SLA 1964; am § 28 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2006, rewrote this section.

Sec. 47.25.270. Agreements with federal government.

The department may enter into agreements, arrangements, or contracts with any federal agency, department, or official under which funds made available to the federal agency, department, or official may be transferred to the department and spent in accordance with AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 for assistance to needy persons.

History. (§ 18 ch 110 SLA 1953)

Sec. 47.25.280. Obtaining assistance by fraud. [Repealed, § 42 ch 143 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 47.25.290. Penalty for violation.

A person who violates a provision of AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.

History. (§ 19 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 2 ch 116 SLA 1975)

Sec. 47.25.300. Definitions.

In AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 ,

  1. “assistance” means financial assistance to or on behalf of a needy person, including subsistence (food, shelter, fuel, clothing, and utilities) and transportation, medical needs (including, but not limited to, hospitalization, nursing, and convalescent care), burial, and other determined needs;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “needy person” means a needy resident of the state who is not eligible for aid from another public agency or department providing similar services in the state;
  4. “public medical institution” means a public hospital or medical institution, except an institution for the treatment of tuberculosis or mental disease.

History. (§ 1 ch 110 SLA 1953; am § 2 ch 32 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971)

Notes to Decisions

A statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than a year created a classification which constituted an invidious discrimination denying such residents equal protection of the laws. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (U.S. 1969), overruled in part, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (U.S. 1974) (decided prior to 1971 amendment which deleted durational residency requirement).

Secs. 47.25.301 — 47.25.420. Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act. [Repealed, §§ 48, 49, 59 ch 107 SLA 1996.]

Revisor’s notes. —

Under §§ 48, 49, and 59, ch. 107, SLA 1996, AS 47.25.301 — 47.25.420 were repealed effective July 1, 1997. Under §§ 47 and 60, ch. 107, SLA 1996, AS 47.25.310(c) was repealed effective February 1, 1997. Under §§ 2-4 and 60, ch. 107, SLA 1996, effective February 1, 1997, AS 47.25.311, 47.25.315, and 47.25.320(h) and (i) were added and AS 47.25.360 was amended; these sections and subsections were then repealed effective July 1, 1997.

Secs. 47.25.421 — 47.25.429. Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Program. [Repealed, § 49 ch 107 SLA 1996.]

Article 3. Adult Public Assistance.

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.430. Adult public assistance.

  1. Financial assistance shall be given under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 , so far as practicable under appropriations made by law, to every aged, blind, or disabled needy resident who has not made a voluntary assignment or transfer of property to qualify for assistance.  In this subsection, “resident” means a person who is living in the state voluntarily with the intention of making the state the person’s home and who is not living in the state for a temporary purpose.
  2. The department shall determine the amount of assistance with regard to the resources and needs of the person and the conditions existing in each case. Assistance shall be in an amount that will provide the applicant with reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health in accordance with standards established by the department and with the standards established under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 (Title XVI, Social Security Act Supplemental Security Income Program). Direct payments for medical services and remedial care may not be considered in determining the maximum amount payable. When benefit amounts under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 are increased as a result of an increase in the cost of living, the state shall pass along the increase to recipients and shall increase the amount of the state contribution to recipients, other than those receiving a personal needs allowance, by a percentage of the state contribution equal to the percentage increase in the benefit amounts under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 if the legislature has appropriated money specifically for the purpose of increasing the state contribution because of an increase in federal benefit amounts under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383; this increase in the state contribution takes effect on the same day that the corresponding federal increase in benefits under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 takes effect.
  3. Payment under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 may not be made to a person who is a resident of a public institution, except as a patient in a public medical institution, or a person who is a patient in a public or private institution for treatment of a mental disease. For purposes of this subsection, “resident” and “patient” do not include a person who is institutionalized for medical services for a period of less than three months if the person needs to continue to maintain and provide for the expenses of a home or living arrangement to which that person may return upon discharge from the institution.
  4. A resident of an institution may, upon or in anticipation of leaving the institution, apply for assistance under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 instead of the support and maintenance provided in the institution.
  5. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, the department shall, in a manner that complies with federal requirements, reduce the maximum state contribution to recipients otherwise payable on August 24, 1993 to the maximum state contribution to recipients that was in effect on January 1, 1992. On and after August 24, 1993, the department shall, in a manner that complies with federal requirements, calculate the amount of monthly assistance for a recipient based on the maximum state contribution to recipients in effect on January 1, 1992, as modified by any increase under (b) of this section.
  6. Unless the person is not eligible under the limited eligibility provision of 8 U.S.C. 1613, a state payment under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 shall be made to a person who
    1. meets the requirements of state law;
    2. is a qualified alien as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1641; and
    3. otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383.

History. (§ 51-2-51 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 33 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 49 SLA 1951; am § 1 ch 101 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 110 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 154 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 11 FSSLA 1967; am § 2 ch 105 SLA 1967; am § 1 ch 234 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1975; am § 15 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 44 SLA 1989; am §§ 4, 5 ch 29 SLA 1993; am § 2 ch 82 SLA 1997)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of subsection (f) by § 2, ch. 82, SLA 1997 (CSHB 153 (FIN)), see 1997 House Journal 442.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986).

Collateral references. —

70A Am. Jur. 2d, Social Security and Medicare, § 1 et seq.

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, § 1 et seq.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 183 et seq.

Requisite residence for purpose of old age assistance. 43 ALR2d 1427.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 ALR4th 534.

Sec. 47.25.435. Exclusion of income.

Notwithstanding the provisions of AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 , if the applicable provisions of 42 U.S.C. 301 — 1397f (Social Security Act), as amended, permit, in determining the need of an applicant for, or a recipient of, an assistance grant under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 , the department shall exclude from the computation of the applicant’s or recipient’s income the amounts specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b), as amended, amounts specified in regulations adopted to implement the supplemental security income provisions of federal law, and any amounts specified by the department by regulation so long as exclusion of those amounts is not in conflict with federal law.

History. (§ 1 ch 64 SLA 1973; am § 3 ch 149 SLA 1975; am § 16 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.885. Renumbered in 1973.

Cross references. —

For exclusion of permanent fund dividend from income or resources, see AS 43.23.085 .

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.440. Application for assistance.

A person requesting assistance shall apply for it, either personally or through another, upon forms furnished and under regulations adopted by the department.

History. (§ 51-2-52 ACLA 1949)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.450. Investigation of applicant.

Upon application, the department shall investigate promptly and record the circumstances of each applicant to determine the facts supporting the application and other information required by the department.

History. (§ 51-2-53 ACLA 1949; am § 17 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.455. Interim assistance.

  1. The department shall pay at least $280 a month to a person eligible for assistance under this chapter while the eligibility of the person for benefits under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1385 (Title XVI, Social Security Act, Supplemental Security Income Program) is being determined.  Payments in excess of $280 a month may be made under this section if the department determines that money is available for excess payments.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department may not make monthly payments in excess of the total amount of state and federal monthly payments to which the person would be entitled if the person is determined to be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1385.
  3. A person applying for assistance under this section shall, as a condition of eligibility for assistance, agree to repay the state for assistance granted upon the person’s receipt of a benefit under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 for a month in which the person received interim assistance under this section. The monthly repayment required by this subsection may not exceed the amount of assistance that the person received under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383 for that month.
  4. Beginning the first full month after a person is determined to be eligible for assistance under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383, the department shall terminate interim assistance to that person under this section and begin payments to the person under AS 47.25.430 .

History. (§ 18 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 6 ch 29 SLA 1993)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Notes to Decisions

Period for payments. —

This statute requires state payment of interim assistance through the SSI appeals process until a final SSI eligibility determination is made administratively. Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986).

Construction of related regulations. —

7 AAC 40.370, which specifies that “the amount of interim assistance provided in any month is $280 per eligible individual,” does not violate this section. While it might be a bit cumbersome for the state to amend its regulation should it opt to make payments in excess of $280, the regulation is within the discretion accorded by the section. Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986).

Compliance with federal analysis. —

Fuller consideration of an applicant’s case was required because, while the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services was not required to exactly replicate all procedural aspects of the federal five-step analysis when it assessed eligibility for state interim Supplemental Security Income benefits, to the extent that the Department’s interpretation excluded from interim assistance an entire category of disabled applicants, specifically, those who were entitled to federal benefits only because of step five, it was inconsistent with the statute. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015).

Cited in

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Okuley, 214 P.3d 247 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 47.25.460. Award, reduction, termination, and appeal.

  1. Upon completion of the investigation, the department shall promptly decide whether the applicant is eligible for and should receive adult public assistance, the amount of it, the manner of paying it, and the date on which it starts.  The department may make additional investigation that it considers necessary and shall make its decision as to the granting of assistance and the amount and nature of assistance as is justified and in conformity with AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 . The department shall notify the applicant of its decision in writing.
  2. Assistance under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 is subject to review.  If a recipient of adult public assistance or the spouse of a recipient with whom the recipient is living acquires nonexempt property exceeding resource limitations, or income sufficient to maintain the recipient properly, then the assistance granted to the recipient shall either be terminated or reduced to an amount reflecting the reduced need as determined by the department in accordance with applicable regulations.  Upon review, the department may, after having provided opportunity for a hearing under (c) of this section, change the assistance granted or terminate it entirely if it finds that the circumstances are changed sufficiently to warrant this action.
  3. A recipient whose award is proposed to be modified or terminated, or an applicant whose application is denied by the department, shall be granted an opportunity for a hearing before the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ). The hearing shall be held promptly after a request for hearing is made. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.
  4. Each award shall be paid on a monthly basis. In case it is impracticable by reason of slow or interrupted means of communication for a disbursement covering a month’s assistance to reach the recipient in due course, the department may transmit disbursements covering assistance for future months and may deliver all of them to the recipient at one time.

History. (§ 51-2-54 ACLA 1949; am § 19 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 29 ch 175 SLA 2004; am E.O. No. 116, § 9 (2012))

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2006, substituted “disbursement” for “warrant” twice in subsection (d).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in the first sentence of (c), substituted “the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “a representative of the department appointed for that purpose”.

Sec. 47.25.470. Payment when recipient incapacitated.

If a person receiving assistance is incapable of self-care or care of the funds granted under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 , the department may direct the payment of the funds to the recipient’s legally appointed guardian or to another person as designated by the department for the recipient’s benefit.

History. (§ 51-2-55 ACLA 1949; am § 20 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.480. Cancellation or reduction of assistance. [Repealed, § 30 ch 138 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 47.25.490. Imprisoned recipients.

If a recipient is convicted of a crime or offense, and punished by imprisonment, payment may not be made during the period of imprisonment, and the department may, in its discretion, declare the assistance forfeited.

History. (§ 51-2-57 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.25.500. Recovery of assistance improperly granted.

  1. If the department has reasonable grounds for believing that assistance was improperly granted, it shall investigate and document the grounds in the case file, and, if it appears as a result of the investigation that assistance was improperly granted, it may, after providing an opportunity for a hearing, terminate or reduce assistance and notify the recipient to that effect.  The department shall continue the payment of benefits pending the hearing. The state has a claim against a person who received an improper amount of assistance.  The claim may be enforced by an action instituted in the name of the state by the attorney general to recover the amount paid to the person, with interest, together with the necessary costs of the action.
  2. If the department finds that recovery would work a financial hardship on the recipient to the extent that the health and well-being of the recipient would be threatened or that the costs of recovery would exceed the amount of assistance improperly granted, it shall waive recovery or reduce the amount to be recovered.

History. (§ 51-2-58 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 33 SLA 1949; am § 21 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.510. Modification of assistance. [Repealed, § 30 ch 138 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 47.25.515. Cancellation of disbursements.

  1. Disbursements issued to a recipient of assistance under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 after the date of death of the recipient shall be canceled.
  2. Assistance disbursements issued before the death of the recipient but not collected before death shall be canceled, unless claimed by the authorized representative of the estate of the recipient within 90 days after the date of death.
  3. The state is not liable to the estate, heirs, or creditors of the deceased assistance recipient for payment on disbursements canceled under (a) or (b) of this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 52 SLA 1964; am § 22 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 30 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2006, rewrote this section.

Sec. 47.25.520. Leaving the state.

  1. A person receiving assistance who leaves the state may not receive assistance during the absence.
  2. This section does not apply to a recipient who temporarily leaves the state for
    1. medical treatment;
    2. a vacation, business trip, or other absence of less than 30 days unless the time is extended in specific cases by the department;
    3. vocational, professional, or other special education of more than 90 days if a comparable program is not reasonably available in the state; or
    4. postsecondary education.

History. (§ 51-2-60 ACLA 1949; am § 23 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.25.530. Reports by department.

The department shall make reports in detail that are required of it by the governor or by the federal government or a federal agency.

History. (§ 51-2-61 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.25.540. Annual reports. [Repealed, § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994.]

Sec. 47.25.550. Alienation and attachment.

Assistance granted under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 is inalienable by an assignment or transfer and is exempt from garnishment, levy, or execution as provided in AS 09.38 (exemptions).

History. (§ 51-2-63 ACLA 1949; am § 10 ch 62 SLA 1982; am § 24 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Gutterman v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979).

Secs. 47.25.560, 47.25.570. Government’s claim; security and lien. [Repealed, § 7 ch 234 SLA 1970.]

Sec. 47.25.575. Property taken under eminent domain powers.

If a recipient’s property is taken for urban renewal or other public purposes and the recipient expresses an intent to purchase a personal dwelling, the proceeds that are paid the recipient as a result of the taking shall be paid by the taking authority into an escrow account under escrow instructions approved by the department. If the proceeds are paid into such an account and are applied by the recipient within one year to the purchase of a personal dwelling, the proceeds may not cause a reduction of the amount of assistance to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled. The department shall inform the recipient of the provisions of this section at the time of the taking.

History. (§ 1 ch 60 SLA 1968; am § 2 ch 234 SLA 1970)

Sec. 47.25.580. Action against person liable for care of recipient.

If during the continuance of assistance the department finds that a person liable for the support of the recipient of assistance is able to provide the necessary care and support of the recipient and the person liable for the care and support of the recipient fails or refuses to support and care for the recipient, then the state has a cause of action for the assistance against the person liable for it. The action may be brought in the name of the state by the attorney general against the person liable for the recovery of the amount of money, with interest, paid to the recipient, together with the costs and disbursements of the action. The amount collected shall be paid to the Department of Revenue.

History. (§ 51-2-66 ACLA 1949; am § 5 ch 33 SLA 1949; am § 25 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.25.590. Policy and purpose of AS 47.25.430 — 47.25.615.

  1. It is the policy of the state and the purpose of AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 to cooperate and coordinate with the United States government and its agencies in providing for and administering the laws of the federal and state governments having for their purpose adult public assistance for residents of this state.
  2. The purpose of AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 is to furnish financial assistance as far as practicable to needy aged, blind, and disabled persons, and to help them attain self-support or self-care.

History. (§ 51-2-69, ACLA 1949; § 51-2-50 ACLA 1949; added by § 2 ch 133 SLA 1957; am § 26 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

As amended by § 26, ch. 138, SLA 1982, this section contained a subsection (c) which was renumbered as AS 47.25.595 .

Administrative Code. —

For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986).

Cited in

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015).

Sec. 47.25.595. Transfer of funds.

The department may enter into contracts or arrangements with any federal agency, department, or official under which funds made available to the federal agency, department, or official may be transferred to the department and spent in accordance with AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 .

History. (§ 26 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.25.590(c). Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 47.25.600. Obtaining assistance by fraud. [Repealed, § 42 ch 143 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 47.25.610. Penalty for violations.

A person who violates a provision of AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 51-2-68 ACLA 1949; am § 28 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Cross references. —

For penalties for class B misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035(b) and 12.55.135(b) .

Sec. 47.25.615. Definitions.

In AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 ,

  1. “aged” means 65 or more years of age;
  2. “assistance” means money payments to or medical care on behalf of, or any type of remedial care recognized by the department on behalf of, needy aged, blind, or disabled persons who are 18 or more years of age and residents of the state;
  3. “blind” means having no vision or having vision that is so defective as to prevent the performance of ordinary activities for which eyesight is essential;
  4. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  5. “disabled” means being unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months;
  6. “public institution” means a governmentally owned establishment that furnishes food, shelter, and some additional treatment or services to 16 or more persons;
  7. “public medical institution” means a public hospital or a public institution providing medical care, except an institution for the treatment of mental disease.

History. (§ 29 ch 138 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015).

Cited in

Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986).

Secs. 47.25.620 — 47.25.970. Aid to the blind and permanently and totally disabled. [Repealed, § 30 ch 138 SLA 1982.]

Article 4. Alaska Affordable Heating Program.

Cross references. —

For Alaska Renewable Energy Task Force, in existence through April 15, 2010, see § 7, ch. 31, SLA 2008.

Effective dates. —

Section 12, ch. 31, SLA 2008, makes this article effective May 23, 2008, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Editor’s notes. —

Concerning the amendments to AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 by ch. 83, SLA 2010, § 44(a), ch. 83, SLA 2010, provides — To the extent consistent with [the 2010 amendments of these sections,] regulations of the Department of Health and Social Services adopted under the authority of AS 47.25.622 that are in effect on September 14, 2010, remain in effect until the department adopts regulations consistent with [the 2010 amendments of these sections].”

Sec. 47.25.621. Alaska affordable heating program.

  1. The Alaska affordable heating program is established in the Department of Health and Social Services to provide expanded eligibility for Alaska residents for home heating assistance, to the extent funds are available in the Alaska affordable heating fund.
  2. The Alaska affordable heating program established under this section is in addition to the federal low-income heating and energy assistance provided under 42 U.S.C. 8621 — 8629 (Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981), as amended, and implementing regulations.
  3. The Alaska affordable heating fund is established as a separate fund to be managed by the Department of Revenue. The fund consists of appropriations made to it. Interest earned by the fund may be appropriated to it. The Department of Health and Social Services shall use money in the fund for Alaska affordable heating payments.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008; am §§ 29, 30 ch 83 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective September 14, 2010, in the section heading and in the section, substituted “Alaska affordable heating program” for “Alaska heating assistance program”; in (a), substituted “available in the Alaska affordable heating fund” for “appropriated by the legislature for that purpose”; added (c).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 11, ch. 31, SLA 2008, made this section retroactive to November 1, 2007, but §§ 9 and 12, ch. 2, 4SSLA 2008 repeal § 11, ch. 31, SLA 2008, effective August 26, 2008.

Sec. 47.25.622. Duties.

The Department of Health and Social Services shall

  1. administer the Alaska affordable heating program provided under AS 47.25.621 ;
  2. adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out the purpose of the program;
  3. coordinate payments among other heating assistance programs to avoid duplication of payments.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008; am § 31 ch 83 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective September 14, 2010, in the introductory language, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “department”; in (1), substituted “Alaska affordable heating program” for “Alaska heating assistance program”.

Sec. 47.25.623. Eligibility; payment amount.

  1. An individual is eligible for home heating assistance payments under the Alaska affordable heating program if the individual
    1. is a resident of the state;
    2. is physically present and resides in a home in the state when the home heating costs are incurred;
    3. for assistance calculated under (b) and (c) of this section, has gross household income not to exceed, as a percentage of the federal poverty guideline for Alaska set by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2),
      1. 225 percent for a determination to be made under (c)(1) — (3) of this section; and
      2. 250 percent for a determination to be made under (c)(4) of this section; and
    4. meets other eligibility requirements specified in regulations adopted under AS 47.25.622 .
  2. The Department of Health and Social Services shall determine the number of points for each eligible individual based on the point formula used under 42 U.S.C. 8621 — 8629 (Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981), as amended, and implementing regulations. Except as provided in (d) of this section, the amount of the Alaska affordable heating payment for an individual equals the base amount calculated under (c) of this section minus the amount the individual is eligible to receive under the federal low-income home energy assistance program under 42 U.S.C. 8621 — 8629, as amended, and implementing regulations.
  3. The Department of Health and Social Services shall calculate the base amount of the Alaska affordable heating payment for the individual based on points determined under (b) of this section and on the average price a barrel of Alaska North Slope crude oil for sale on the United States West Coast during September through February of the preceding fiscal year as follows:
    1. $130 a point when the average price is not more than $75 a barrel;
    2. $140 a point when the average price is more than $75 and not more than $100 a barrel;
    3. $150 a point when the average price is more than $100 and not more than $150 a barrel;
    4. $165 a point when the average price is more than $150 a barrel.
  4. Under the program authorized by AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 , taking into consideration the gross household income rates established in (a) of this section and the base amounts to be calculated under (b) and (c) of this section,
    1. if insufficient money is appropriated to fully fund the Alaska affordable heating payments during the fiscal year, the department
      1. shall, for the duration of that fiscal year, suspend calculation and payment under (a)(3)(B) of this section and calculate and pay all eligible individuals under (a)(3)(A) of this section; and
      2. may, to the extent there is or may be an appropriation balance surplus to the amount required to make all payments under (A) of this paragraph, by regulation, establish at any time during the fiscal year a prospective pro rata reduction of the payment rates that the department will pay to eligible individuals under the program during that fiscal year qualifying under (a)(3)(B) of this section and, thereafter, may provide for prorated payments; and
    2. if the commissioner reasonably determines that the total of appropriations from all sources during the fiscal year may exceed the amount required to fully fund all applications for assistance for Alaska affordable heating payments, the commissioner may expend the amount of excess money, not to exceed the total amount of the appropriations, to carry out the purpose of AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 ; under the authority of this paragraph, the commissioner shall distribute the estimated excess money pro rata among individuals receiving assistance under this section without regard to the limitations set out in the dollar value of the point formula expressed in (c)(1) — (4) of this section.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008; am §§ 32, 33 ch 83 SLA 2010)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, “home” was deleted from the phrase “Alaska home heating assistance program” to correct a manifest error in ch. 31, SLA 2008.

Cross references. —

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective September 14, 2010, in the section heading, added “; payment amount”; in the introductory language, substituted “Alaska affordable heating program” for “Alaska heating assistance program”; substituted (a)(3), (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(B) for “has gross household income above 150 percent but that does not exceed 225 percent of the federal poverty guideline for Alaska set by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);”; added (b), (c), and (d).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 11, ch. 31, SLA 2008, made this section retroactive to November 1, 2007, but §§ 9 and 12, ch. 2, 4SSLA 2008 repeal § 11, ch. 31, SLA 2008, effective August 26, 2008.

Sec. 47.25.624. Appeal rights.

Except as provided in AS 47.25.626(e) , an individual who receives a determination from the department that denies, limits, or modifies home heating payments under AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 , other than a determination based on insufficient funding of the program, may request a hearing before the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) under regulations adopted by the department.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008; am E.O. No. 116, § 10 (2012))

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “department” following “may request a hearing before the”.

Sec. 47.25.625. Ability to recover or recoup improper home heating assistance payments.

An individual is liable to the department for the value of assistance improperly paid under AS 47.25.623 if the improper payment was based on inaccurate or incomplete information provided by the individual. In a civil action brought by the state to recover from the individual the value of the assistance improperly paid, the state may recover from the individual the costs of investigation and prosecution of the civil action, including attorney fees as determined under court rules.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008)

Sec. 47.25.626. Regional heating assistance program.

  1. The Department of Health and Social Services may develop a regional Alaska heating program for the administration of AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 to provide home heating assistance in a uniform and cost-effective manner in a region of this state if an Alaska Native organization is authorized to implement a federally approved tribal family assistance plan that includes that region and has been awarded a tribal energy assistance grant for a program that includes that region under 42 U.S.C. 8623(d).
  2. The department may award contracts to implement a program developed under (a) of this section. A contract authorized for delivery of home heating assistance under a regional Alaska heating program under this section is exempt from the competitive bid requirements of AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code). Subject to appropriation, a contract under this section must be in an amount that represents a fair and equitable share of the money appropriated for the Alaska affordable heating program under AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 to serve the state residents specified in (a) of this section. The authority provided under this section to contract is in addition to the authority to contract in AS 47.05.015 or other law.
  3. The department may award a contract under this section only to an organization that
    1. has been awarded a tribal energy assistance grant under 42 U.S.C. 8623(d) for a program that includes that region;
    2. agrees to administer home heating assistance under AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 to state residents in the region; and
    3. agrees to implement an appeals process as described in (e) of this section.
  4. Records pertaining to recipients of home heating assistance under a contract awarded under this section are confidential and not subject to disclosure under AS 40.25.100 40.25.220 .
  5. An organization that receives a contract under this section shall provide an appeals process to applicants for or recipients of home heating assistance covered by the contract awarded under this section. The appeals process must be the same as the method available under AS 47.25.624 , except that the decision reached shall be considered a recommended decision to the department. Within 30 days after receiving a recommended decision, the department shall review the recommended decision and issue a decision accepting or rejecting the recommended decision. If the department rejects the recommended decision, the department shall independently review the record and issue its final decision. The final decision of the department on the matter is appealable to the courts of this state.
  6. If the department establishes a regional Alaska heating program and awards a contract to provide home heating assistance under this section,
    1. a person applying for home heating assistance under AS 47.25.621 47.25.626 in the region of the state covered by the regional Alaska heating program may obtain home heating assistance from the department only through the organization designated by the department to serve the region;
    2. the department may require the contractor
      1. to operate and administer the contract in a manner consistent with the organization’s federally approved energy assistance grant and plan; or
      2. to apply the provisions of AS 47.25.623 to determine eligibility for home heating assistance to a person for whom assistance may be paid under the contract or may allow the contractor to use other criteria to determine that eligibility.

History. (§ 4 ch 31 SLA 2008; am §§ 34 — 36 ch 83 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective September 14, 2010, in (a), substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “department”, deleted “assistance” following “Alaska heating”; in (b), deleted “assistance” following “regional Alaska heating” and substituted “Alaska affordable heating program” for “Alaska heating assistance program”; in (f), in the introductory language and in (1), deleted “assistance” following “regional Alaska heating”, added the (1) and (2) designations, added (2).

Article 5. Food Stamp Program.

Administrative Code. —

For food stamp program, see 7 AAC 46.

Sec. 47.25.975. Food stamp program.

  1. The department is authorized to implement the food stamp program.
  2. Householders determined by the department to be eligible for assistance under the food stamp program may obtain food stamp allotments; however, under regulations adopted by the department, a householder may receive all or part of the value of the food stamp allotment in the form of a wage subsidy under AS 47.27.025(e) if
    1. the householder is a member of a family eligible for the Alaska temporary assistance program under AS 47.27; and
    2. the department determines that the wage subsidy authorized under this subsection would aid the householder in the successful completion of the family self-sufficiency plan under AS 47.27.030 .
  3. Food stamp allotments, other than a wage subsidy authorized under (b) of this section, shall be used to purchase food from retail food stores that have been approved for participation in the food stamp program. Eligible households living in certain remote areas shall be permitted to purchase certain items of hunting and fishing equipment for the purpose of procuring food for the household, except firearms, ammunition, and other explosives, in accordance with regulations that the Secretary of Agriculture adopts.

History. (§ 1 ch 113 SLA 1965; am § 151 ch 127 SLA 1974; am §§ 9, 10 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For food stamp program, see 7 AAC 46.

Collateral references. —

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, §§ 27-32.

Sec. 47.25.980. Duties of department.

  1. The department shall
    1. adopt regulations necessary to carry out the food stamp program;
    2. cooperate with the federal government and do all things necessary to continue state eligibility under the food stamp program;
    3. comply with the requirements of 7 U.S.C. 2011 — 2036 (Food Stamp Program).
  2. The department may designate and change areas in the state in which the food stamp program shall be carried out.

History. (§ 1 ch 113 SLA 1965; am § 11 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For food stamp program, see 7 AAC 46.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Sec. 47.25.983. Reporting change of status. [Repealed, § 42 ch 143 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 47.25.985. Violations; penalty.

  1. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person
    1. knowingly acquires, possesses, uses, alters, or transfers food stamp allotments in violation of AS 47.25.975 47.25.980 or the regulations adopted under AS 47.25.980 ;
    2. presents food stamp allotments or causes them to be presented for payment or redemption knowing them to have been transferred, received, altered, or used in a manner violating AS 47.25.975 — 47.25.980 or the regulations adopted under AS 47.25.980;
    3. knowingly acquires, uses, alters, or transfers a wage subsidy authorized under AS 47.25.975(b) in violation of AS 47.25.975 — 47.25.980, AS 47.27.025(e) , or the regulations adopted under AS 47.25.980 or AS 47.27.025(e) .
  2. Upon conviction a person shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History. (§ 1 ch 113 SLA 1965; am § 6 ch 116 SLA 1975; am § 42 ch 143 SLA 1982; am § 12 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Sec. 47.25.990. Definitions.

In AS 47.25.975 47.25.985 ,

  1. “department” means Department of Health and Social Services;
  2. “food” means any food or food product for human consumption except alcoholic beverages and tobacco and includes seeds and plants for use in gardens to produce food for the personal consumption of the eligible household;
  3. “food stamp allotments ” means any coupon, stamp, electronic benefit, or type of allotment issued under 7 U.S.C. 2011 — 2036 (Food Stamp Program);
  4. “food stamp program” means the federal food stamp program authorized by 7 U.S.C. 2011 — 2036.

History. (§ 1 ch 113 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 91 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 52 ch 127 SLA 1974; am §§ 13, 14 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Chapter 27. Alaska Temporary Assistance Program.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Article 1. Administrative Provisions.

Sec. 47.27.005. Duties of the department.

The department shall

  1. administer the Alaska temporary assistance program by providing cash assistance, diversion payments, and self-sufficiency services to needy children and their families under this chapter and, if appropriate, by establishing regional public assistance programs to provide effectively for varying conditions in regions of the state designated by the department;
  2. establish, by regulation, program standards for incentives to work, incentives for financial planning, cash assistance, diversion payments, self-sufficiency services, and other opportunities to develop self-sufficiency;
  3. prepare, submit to the federal government, and amend, if necessary, a state plan designed to ensure that federal money is available to the state for the operation of the program set out in this chapter to provide cash assistance, diversion payments, and self-sufficiency services to needy children and their families consistent with the state objectives identified in (2) of this section;
  4. adopt methods of program administration to ensure consistency with the federal requirements under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program;
  5. make reports regarding the program to the federal government as required under federal law, in the form and containing the information required, and comply with the provisions that the federal government determines are necessary to ensure correct and verifiable information on the program;
  6. provide to the legislature an annual executive summary of the information required to be reported to the federal government under (5) of this section;
  7. conduct studies and research in order to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of the state program; and
  8. adopt regulations and take action to implement, interpret, and administer the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 96 SLA 2000; am § 15 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 72 ch 35 SLA 2003)

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent concerning the 2000 amendment to this section, see sec. 1, ch. 96, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, rewrote paragraph (4).

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Lauth v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 12 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2000).

Article 2. Alaska Temporary Assistance Program.

Sec. 47.27.010. Eligible families.

The following families may apply under the Alaska temporary assistance program:

  1. a single parent who has the physical custody of one or more related dependent children;
  2. a caretaker of one or more dependent children who is a relative to at least the fifth degree;
  3. a woman in the last trimester of pregnancy;
  4. a two-parent family with physical custody of one or more related dependent children.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 16 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Eligibility. —

Because the mother shared physical custody of the children with the father and did not have the children for more than fifty percent of the month, she was not entitled to ATAP benefits. Lauth v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 12 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 47.27.015. Disqualifying conditions.

  1. A family is not eligible for cash assistance under the Alaska temporary assistance program if the family includes an adult who
    1. has received cash assistance under the Alaska temporary assistance program, or a program of another state operated under a federal assistance grant program for needy families, for a total of 60 months as the caretaker or spouse of a caretaker of a dependent child or as a pregnant woman, unless the caretaker or pregnant woman is
      1. a person who the department has reasonable cause to believe is or recently has been the victim of domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , and the physical, mental, or emotional well-being of the victim would be endangered by a strict application of the time limit otherwise applicable under this subsection;
      2. determined, under regulations of the department to be physically or mentally unable to perform gainful activity;
      3. a parent who is providing care for a child who is experiencing a disability; or
      4. a family determined by the department to be exempt from this paragraph by reason of hardship; or
    2. is determined to be fleeing to avoid prosecution, custody, or confinement after conviction, in this or another jurisdiction, for a crime that is classified as a felony or a class A misdemeanor under AS 11 or the criminal laws of the jurisdiction where the criminal activity was committed.
  2. A family is not eligible for cash assistance or self-sufficiency services under this chapter for a period of 120 months beginning on the date the adult applicant for the family is convicted of having fraudulently misrepresented the applicant’s residence in order to receive cash assistance or self-sufficiency services in more than one state under a program financed with federal money under any successor federal program that replaces the aid to families with dependent children program.
  3. A family is not eligible for cash assistance for the following time periods if the family’s demonstrated need for cash assistance is due to a refusal of or voluntary separation from suitable employment by the adult applicant, or a custodial parent or caretaker, without good cause:
    1. one month for the first refusal or separation without good cause;
    2. six months for the second refusal or separation without good cause; and
    3. 12 months for the third and subsequent refusal or separation without good cause.
  4. A family is not eligible for cash assistance or self-sufficiency services for up to 12 months if the family’s demonstrated need is due to an intentional transfer of an asset or assets at less than fair market value for the purpose of establishing eligibility for cash assistance or self-sufficiency services. A period of ineligibility shall begin on the first day of the month following the transfer of the asset or assets and shall remain in effect for a number of months equal to the fair market value of the transferred asset or assets divided by the maximum payment amount for the family as established under AS 47.27.025 , or for 12 months, whichever is less.
  5. An Alaska temporary assistance program applicant or participant who is administratively disqualified for making a false statement or misrepresentation knowing it was false, or for knowingly failing to disclose a material fact, in order to obtain or increase cash assistance or self-sufficiency services under this chapter is not eligible to receive cash assistance or self-sufficiency services under this chapter for a period of
    1. six months following the first disqualification;
    2. 12 months following the second disqualification; and
    3. permanently following the third disqualification.
  6. The number of families for which an exemption is in effect under (a)(1) of this section may not exceed 25 percent of the number of families receiving cash assistance under this chapter.
  7. A person who is an alien is not eligible for cash assistance under this chapter unless the person is a qualified alien under 8 U.S.C. 1641 or an alien excepted under 8 U.S.C. 1612(b). However, a qualified alien may only be eligible for cash assistance under this chapter if the person is not precluded by the limited eligibility provision of 8 U.S.C. 1613.
  8. When determining under (a)(1) of this section whether an adult has received cash assistance for a total of 60 months, the department shall disregard the months that are required to be disregarded under 42 U.S.C. 608(a)(7)(D).
  9. A person convicted after August 22, 1996, of an offense that is classified as a felony under AS 11.71.010 - 11.71.040 or by the law of another jurisdiction that has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance, as defined in AS 11.71.900 , is disqualified from receiving temporary assistance under this chapter or food stamps under AS 47.25 unless the person demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the department, that the person
    1. is satisfactorily serving, or has successfully completed, a period of probation or parole;
    2. is in the process of serving, or has successfully completed, mandatory participation in a drug or alcohol treatment program;
    3. has taken action toward rehabilitation, including participation in a drug or alcohol treatment program; or
    4. is successfully complying with the requirements of the person’s reentry plan.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am §§ 39, 40 ch 32 SLA 1997; am § 3 ch 82 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 2001; am § 17 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 169 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (g) was enacted as (f). Relettered in 1997. In 1997, in subparagraph (a)(1)(A), “AS 18.66.990 ” was substituted for “AS 18.66.900 ” to reconcile chs. 64 and 107, SLA 1996.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 12, 2016, added (i).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 56(a), ch. 107, SLA 1996 provides that subsection (e) applies “to disqualifications imposed on or after the effective” date of this section. Section 56(b), ch. 107, SLA 1996 provides that subsection (c) applies “to refusals to accept, and separations from, suitable employment without good cause that occur on or after the effective” date of this section.

Legislative history reports. —

For purposes of amendments to this section made by §§ 39 and 40, ch. 32, SLA 1997, see 1997 House Journal Supp. No. 9.

For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of subsection (g) by § 3, ch. 82, SLA 1997 (CSHB 153(FIN)), see 1997 House Journal 442.

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes limiting or barring public health care to indigent aliens. 113 ALR5th 95.

Sec. 47.27.020. Application requirements.

  1. An applicant under the Alaska temporary assistance program shall complete an application in writing, or by electronic means, and in a form specified by the department. The applicant must be a pregnant woman or an individual who has physical custody of the dependent child or children. The application must be complete and must provide all of the information about the family and the child or children that is requested by the department. The applicant shall provide all supporting documentation for verification that the department determines to be necessary to establish eligibility.
  2. On the application, each applicant shall attest to whether the family, at any time, has received cash assistance or self-sufficiency services from another state program that was established with federal money under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program and whether the family has ever been disqualified from receiving cash assistance or self-sufficiency services under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program for the period for which the application has been submitted.
  3. An applicant shall agree to cooperate with the department to establish a family self-sufficiency plan and to participate in work activities when assigned by the department.
  4. An applicant shall acknowledge the assignment of support rights as required by AS 47.27.040(a) and shall agree to cooperate with the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue to the extent required under AS 47.27.040(b) . The applicant shall agree to report all child support payments received directly by the family, during or for a period for which the family is receiving cash assistance under this chapter, to the department within 15 days after receipt of those payments.
  5. An applicant shall update the information requested in the application at regular intervals as established by the department in regulation. The department may conduct reviews of an application and audit the information provided as necessary to determine eligibility.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am §§ 18 — 20 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 73 ch 35 SLA 2003)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (d) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, rewrote subsection (b).

Notes to Decisions

Requirements. —

Because the mother shared physical custody of the children with the father and did not have the children for more than fifty percent of the month, she was not entitled to ATAP benefits. Lauth v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 12 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 47.27.025. Cash assistance.

  1. The department shall provide cash assistance to families that establish eligibility based on a determination of need that considers the family’s available income, assets, and other resources, as established by the department in regulation. Each dependent child in the family is eligible for cash assistance except as otherwise provided in AS 47.27.015 or 47.27.027(b) , and cash assistance received as a dependent child does not count against eligibility for cash assistance under this chapter as a caretaker or spouse of a caretaker of a dependent child or as a pregnant woman.
  2. The amounts of cash assistance may not exceed the following:
    1. for a dependent child living with a nonneedy relative caretaker, $452 per month, plus $102 for each additional child;
    2. for a dependent child living with at least one needy parent or relative caretaker, $821 per month, plus $102 for each additional child and $102 for a second needy parent if the second parent is physically or mentally unable to perform gainful activity as defined by department regulation; or
    3. for a family consisting solely of an eligible pregnant woman, $514 per month.
  3. The department shall, for the months of July, August, and September, reduce by 50 percent the maximum cash assistance for which the family is otherwise eligible if the family’s eligibility for cash assistance is based on AS 47.27.010 (4), unless the second needy parent is determined, under regulations of the department, to be physically or mentally unable to perform gainful activity or to be providing care for a child who is experiencing a disability that requires 24-hour care, as certified by a physician or other licensed medical professional. However, if the commissioner determines that temporary economic conditions have resulted in decreased employment opportunities during those months and a reduction in cash assistance would impose an undue hardship on a family, the department may waive application of this subsection with respect to that family.
  4. The department shall reduce cash assistance under this section to the extent that the family’s shelter costs are lower than the standard shelter allowance used by the department for similar families. The shelter allowance for a family whose costs are below the standard allowance shall be an amount equal to the family’s actual verified shelter costs. In this subsection,
    1. “shelter allowance” means the portion of the cash assistance provided under this section that is allocated by the department for shelter costs;
    2. “shelter costs” means
      1. rental payments or mortgage payments for the family’s housing, including payments made for property or mortgage insurance and property taxes; and
      2. the cost of utilities, including heat, electricity, basic telephone service, water, sewer, and garbage services incurred for the family’s housing; the department may establish different utility cost standards for different areas of the state and may use an average utility cost per month based on estimated level payments over a 12-month period.
  5. The department may, instead of paying all of the cash assistance to a family under this section, use all or part of the cash assistance as a wage subsidy paid to an employer who employs a person in the family at a wage that is higher than the wage subsidy. If authorized under AS 47.25.975(b) , the department may, instead of paying all of a family’s food stamp allotment under AS 47.25.975 47.25.990 in a form restricted to buying food, use all or part of the value of the family’s food stamp allotment as a wage subsidy paid to an employer who employs a person in the family at a wage that is higher than the total of the wage subsidies paid under this subsection for employment of the person. A subsidy under this subsection may not exceed one year in duration.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 75 SLA 2001; am §§ 21 — 25 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.026. Diversion payments.

  1. The department may offer a lump-sum diversion payment in place of ongoing cash assistance to an adult applicant who applies under AS 47.27.020 if the adult applicant is job ready and is determined to need only short-term financial assistance and self-sufficiency services to meet critical needs in order to secure employment and support for the adult applicant’s family. The department shall set standards and conditions for diversion payments and self-sufficiency services by regulation.
  2. The department may pay a diversion payment to an applicant’s family only if that family appears to be eligible for cash assistance under AS 47.27.020 and to include a job-ready individual based on the information provided to the department in the application completed under AS 47.27.020 . The department may offer to an applicant with the potential to participate in the diversion project a choice between
    1. having the Alaska temporary assistance program application processed under AS 47.27.020 and the regulations adopted by the department; or
    2. having the application referred to the diversion project of the Alaska temporary assistance program for a determination of eligibility for a diversion project payment and self-sufficiency services under this section.
  3. The amount of a diversion payment with self-sufficiency services must be sufficient to meet the family’s immediate needs as determined by the department and the participant. A diversion payment may not exceed the amount the family would be eligible to receive as cash assistance in the first three months of eligibility under AS 47.27.025 if the family did not elect to receive a diversion payment.
  4. As a condition of a family receiving a diversion payment under this section, the participant must sign an agreement that
    1. specifies
      1. the amount of the diversion payment and the needs it is intended to cover;
      2. the self-sufficiency services required to meet the family’s immediate needs;
    2. provides that, during the three-month period beginning with the month in which the diversion payment was received, child support collected on behalf of a child whose needs were considered in determining the diversion payment shall be paid to the family; and
    3. provides that if the family reapplies under AS 47.27.020 during the three months beginning with the month in which the family received a diversion payment, the diversion payment shall be treated as unearned income, prorated over the three-month period, and deducted from any cash assistance that the family may be eligible for under the new application.
  5. A family that receives a diversion payment may not receive another diversion payment before the 12th month following the month in which it last received a diversion payment. A family may not receive more than four diversion payments.
  6. To the extent that (d)(2) of this section is inconsistent with AS 25.27.120 or 25.27.130 , or with another provision of this chapter, (d)(2) of this section governs.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am §§ 26 — 30 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.027. Assistance to minors.

  1. If an applicant under AS 47.27.020 is not married, is under the age of 18, and has not been previously emancipated under AS 09.55.590 , the applicant must
    1. live in a home maintained by the applicant’s parent, legal guardian, or other adult relative, unless the applicant establishes that there is good cause, as established by the department in regulation, to waive this requirement; if the department waives this requirement, the applicant must live in an approved, adult-supervised, supportive living environment;
    2. agree that cash assistance on behalf of the applicant’s family may be paid to the applicant’s parent, legal guardian, or other adult relative, or, if applicable, to the adult head of the adult-supervised, supportive living environment in which the applicant resides; and
    3. maintain attendance in a secondary school or other appropriate training program unless the applicant has a high school diploma or general equivalent diploma.
  2. The department shall reduce the cash assistance for which an assistance unit is otherwise eligible under this chapter if a minor parent in the assistance unit fails, without good cause, to meet standards of adequate levels of school attendance, as defined in regulations of the department. The reduction under this subsection shall be achieved by disregarding the needs of the person who failed to meet the school attendance standards. The person’s needs shall be disregarded until the minor parent complies.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 31 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.030. Family self-sufficiency services.

  1. A participant in the Alaska temporary assistance program shall cooperate with the department, or its designee, to develop and sign a family self-sufficiency plan that includes
    1. the steps the family will take towards the self-sufficiency of the family;
    2. the self-sufficiency services the department will provide to assist the family to attain self-sufficiency;
    3. specific benchmarks to indicate the steps toward successful completion of the family plan;
    4. a statement that the family may be subject to reductions in cash assistance or self-sufficiency services or other sanctions if the family fails to comply with the family plan; and
    5. a statement that describes the necessary conditions and the steps that must be taken to renegotiate the terms of the family plan.
  2. The family self-sufficiency plan must set a time period for the achievement of self-sufficiency from cash assistance under the Alaska temporary assistance program. Initially, that time period may not provide for any more than a total of 60 months of cash assistance under the Alaska temporary assistance program even though the family may eventually be eligible for an exemption under AS 47.27.015(a)(1) . Unless the members of the family who are not dependent children are all exempt under AS 47.27.035(b) — (d), the time period for receiving cash assistance may not exceed a cumulative total of 24 months unless each nonexempt person is in compliance with the work activity assignment made under AS 47.27.035 .
  3. A family is exempt from the requirement that the family have a self-sufficiency plan under this section if the family
    1. does not include a needy adult; or
    2. [Repealed, § 3 ch 75 SLA 2001.]
    3. is receiving a diversion payment under AS 47.27.026 .
  4. The department may provide only self-sufficiency services to a family that no longer qualifies for cash assistance due to employment, a family that is disqualified from receiving cash assistance under AS 47.27.015(a)(1) , (c), or (g), or a family that qualifies for cash assistance but requests only self-sufficiency services. Self-sufficiency services that are made available to a family under this subsection shall be based on a determination of need established by the department in regulation. If a family receives only self-sufficiency services, the department may waive the self-sufficiency plan requirements specified in (a) and (b) of this section.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 75 SLA 2001; am §§ 32 — 34 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.035. Participation in work activities.

  1. An Alaska temporary assistance program participant shall, after the participant’s family has received a cumulative total of 24 months of cash assistance or sooner if assigned to do so by the department, participate in work activities as assigned by the department or its designee in order for the family to continue to receive cash assistance or self-sufficiency services from the department under the Alaska temporary assistance program, unless the participant is exempt from the work participation requirements under one or more of the exemptions set out in (b) — (d) of this section.
  2. A parent or caretaker with a dependent child of up to 12 months of age may be exempt from work participation requirements for up to 12 months, as established in the family self-sufficiency plan.
  3. A parent or caretaker may be exempt from work participation requirements in the family self-sufficiency plan if
    1. the parent or caretaker is providing home care for a child who is experiencing a disability or a related, disabled person who requires 24-hour care;
    2. the parent or caretaker establishes an inability to participate for medical reasons supported by documentation from a physician or other licensed medical professional;
    3. the participation would impose an unreasonable hardship on the family; or
    4. there is a dependent child in the home that has not yet attained six years of age and the parent or caretaker demonstrates an inability to obtain needed child care because appropriate child care is not available.
  4. The department may not require a person to participate in work activities under (a) of this section
    1. if the person is the sole custodial parent for a child under six years of age unless the department agrees to pay for the costs of child care determined by the department to be necessary for the person’s participation; and
    2. unless the department agrees to pay for transportation expenses determined by the department to be necessary for the person’s participation in the activity.
  5. A participant in work activities under this section is not a state employee for purposes of AS 39.25 (State Personnel Act).
  6. A participant in work activities under this section is not considered an employee of the state or other public employer for purposes of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 (Public Employment Relations Act) nor shall any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 be construed to interfere with the department’s authority to assign participants to work activities as authorized under this section.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 35 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.040. Assignment of support rights; cooperation with child support services agency.

  1. An Alaska temporary assistance program applicant is considered to have assigned to the state, through the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue, all rights to accrued and continuing child support, from all sources, that is due for the support of any individuals in the family for whom support is sought. The assignment takes effect upon a determination that the applicant’s family is eligible for cash assistance under this chapter. Except with respect to the amount of any unpaid support obligation accrued under the assignment, the assignment terminates when the family ceases to receive cash assistance under the Alaska temporary assistance program.
  2. An Alaska temporary assistance program participant shall cooperate with the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue in establishing paternity or establishing, modifying, or enforcing a child support order requiring the payment of support by the noncustodial parent for a dependent child for whom Alaska temporary assistance program cash assistance is received. The child support enforcement agency shall determine whether the participant is in good faith compliance with the requirements of this subsection and shall inform the Department of Health and Social Services of its determination. The Department of Health and Social Services shall establish whether the participant has good cause for refusing to cooperate.
  3. The department may distribute to an Alaska temporary assistance program participant $50 per month from a monthly child support payment, or the amount of the child support payment if it is less than $50, received by the child support services agency for the support of a child for whom Alaska temporary assistance program cash assistance is paid.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 147 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 36 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed amendments to (b) of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which were to take effect July 1, 2001, were repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.

Sec. 47.27.045. Alienation and attachment.

Cash assistance granted under this chapter is inalienable by assignment or transfer and is exempt from garnishment, levy, or execution as is provided in AS 09.38.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 37 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Sec. 47.27.050. Grants and contracts for services.

  1. The department may contract with or award grants to qualified entities in the state to administer an Alaska temporary assistance program or a distinct part of the Alaska temporary assistance program. The department may establish standards for the administration of services under the grant or contract, including fees to be charged to applicants for or recipients of those services.
  2. Contracts authorized under this section are to be administered in accordance with AS 47.05.015 . Grants authorized under this section are to be awarded using requirements, established in regulation, that are substantially similar to those set out in AS 47.05.015 for contracts.
  3. This section may not be construed to expand the powers of a municipality.
  4. In this section, “qualified entities” include municipalities, other political subdivisions of the state, nonprofit corporations formed under AS 10.20, churches and religious organizations, and incorporated and unincorporated businesses operating within the state that meet the requirements established by the department in regulation.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Sec. 47.27.055. Agency collaboration.

  1. The department shall coordinate with other state agencies that provide assistance, benefits, or services to applicants that are eligible for and to participants in the Alaska temporary assistance program in order to facilitate the application for and delivery of assistance, benefits, or services to promote family self-sufficiency. Subject to appropriations, state agencies may locate their facilities and operations near each other in order to improve service delivery.
  2. The department may provide information received under this chapter to other state agencies in order to facilitate the delivery of services. Information received from an applicant for or participant in the Alaska temporary assistance program shall be treated as confidential by all state agencies that share the information under this section and is not open to public inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.125 . Misuse of public assistance lists or information is punishable as a violation of AS 47.05.030 .
  3. Departments in the executive branch shall cooperate in fulfilling the purposes of this chapter, including, subject to appropriations, the establishment of temporary positions that will provide job opportunities for families participating in the Alaska temporary assistance program. Temporary positions established for this purpose are in the exempt service under AS 39.25.110 but are not subject to AS 39.25.195 . An individual participating in the Alaska temporary assistance program who holds a temporary position established for purposes of this subsection is not a public employee for purposes of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 .

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.125 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.125” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.125.

Sec. 47.27.060. Job development.

The department may establish cooperative agreements with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Department of Education and Early Development, and Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, and with other public or private sector organizations for the purpose of developing job, training, and educational opportunities for families eligible for cash assistance or self-sufficiency services under this chapter.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 75 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 38 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, in this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Sec. 47.27.065. Federal-state cooperation.

In the administration of this chapter, the department shall cooperate with the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services and shall take actions necessary to comply with the requirements of federal law to obtain public assistance block grants or other federal assistance available for the purposes of this chapter. The department shall make reports in the form and containing the information required to the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The department may cooperate with federal agencies charged with the administration of the federal public assistance block grants and other financial assistance.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Sec. 47.27.070. Alaska native organizations’ family assistance programs.

  1. The department may coordinate only with the following Alaska Native organizations, as designated under federal law, in the development of family assistance programs:
    1. Arctic Slope Native Association;
    2. Kawerak, Inc.;
    3. Maniilaq Association;
    4. Association of Village Council Presidents;
    5. Tanana Chiefs Conference;
    6. Cook Inlet Tribal Council;
    7. Bristol Bay Native Association;
    8. Aleutian and Pribilof Island Association;
    9. Chugachmiut;
    10. Tlingit Haida Central Council;
    11. Kodiak Area Native Association;
    12. Copper River Native Association; and
    13. Metlakatla Indian Community of the Annette Islands Reserve; however, the department may cooperate with the Metlakatla Indian Community under this chapter only if the community waives any claim to sovereign immunity with respect to matters involved with the family assistance program.
  2. The department may cooperate with the Alaska Native organizations named in (a) of this section to propose program criteria to the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services in order to promote programs comparable to the state program in the same area.
  3. [Repealed, § 1 ch 13 31 SLA 2020.]

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 13 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (c) of this section, “Department of Commerce and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Community and Economic Development” in accordance with § 88, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in (c) of this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2020 amendment, effective July 19, 2020, repealed (c).

Sec. 47.27.075. Emergency account established.

There is established within the general fund the Alaska temporary assistance program emergency account. The account consists of appropriations that were made by the legislature from federal money available for cash assistance, diversion payments, and self-sufficiency services under this chapter, including lapsing money that was previously appropriated from federal money for the Alaska temporary assistance program, but that were not expended or obligated in the fiscal year for which they were appropriated.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 39 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Sec. 47.27.080. Appeals; dispute resolution.

  1. An applicant or participant who receives a determination from the department that denies, limits, or modifies the cash assistance, diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services provided under this chapter may request a hearing before the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ). The office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) shall conduct the hearing under the regulations adopted by the department. The appeal is not subject to AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 .
  2. The department may require an applicant or participant to participate in an informal dispute resolution process before a formal hearing. The department may adopt regulations establishing the informal dispute resolution process.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 40 ch 69 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 116, § 11 (2012))

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), in the first sentence, substituted “office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “department or a representative of the department appointed for that purpose”; in the second sentence, substituted “The office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “If a representative is appointed, the representative”.

Sec. 47.27.085. Sanctions; recovery of costs.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, the department shall reduce the amount of cash assistance provided to the family of an Alaska temporary assistance program applicant or participant who, without good cause, fails to comply with a condition of the family self-sufficiency plan, who fails to participate in work activities required as a part of the Alaska temporary assistance program, or who fails to cooperate with the child support services agency as required under AS 47.27.040 . The reduction shall be,
    1. beginning on the date the department makes a finding that the family is not in compliance under this subsection, 40 percent of the maximum cash assistance that would be payable under AS 47.27.025 for a family of the same size, assuming the family has no income counted for purposes of this chapter, until the date the department determines that the family is in compliance under this subsection if the family comes into compliance within the first four months after the date of the department’s finding of noncompliance under this subsection; on the date the department determines that the family is in compliance, the department shall begin to pay the family the full amount of cash assistance for which the family is eligible;
    2. beginning five months after the date the department made the finding that the family was not in compliance under this subsection, 75 percent of the maximum cash assistance that would be payable under AS 47.27.025 for a family of the same size, assuming the family has no income counted for purposes of this chapter, until the date the department determines that the family is in compliance under this subsection if the family comes into compliance during the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth month after the date the department initially determined that the family was not in compliance under this subsection; on the date the department determines that the family is in compliance, the department shall begin to pay the family the full amount of cash assistance for which the family is eligible;
    3. beginning nine months after the date the department made the finding that the family was not in compliance under this subsection, the full amount of the family’s cash assistance if the noncompliance under this subsection is not corrected within eight months after the date of the department’s initial finding of noncompliance under this subsection; in order to again receive cash assistance under this chapter, the family shall reapply under AS 47.27.020 and satisfy all requirements applicable to applicants under that section.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department may not reduce a family’s cash assistance under (a)(2) or (3) of this section unless there is, in the family’s case record, (1) documented evidence that the department has attempted to visit the family’s home after the imposition of a reduction under (a)(1) of this section and (2) a written finding by the department that, considering the results of any home visit attempted under (1) of this subsection and the availability of other services in the community that are appropriate to the family’s needs, the health, safety, and well-being of the children in the family will not be significantly jeopardized by imposition of a reduction under (a)(2) or (3) of this section. If the department does not reduce a family’s cash assistance based on the provisions of this subsection, the department may manage the family’s cash assistance on behalf of the family under regulations that the department shall adopt concerning management of cash assistance under this subsection.
  3. An Alaska temporary assistance program applicant or participant who receives cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services when not entitled to them under this chapter because the information provided by the applicant or participant was inaccurate or incomplete is liable to the department for the value of the cash assistance, diversion payment, and self-sufficiency services improperly provided to the applicant or participant.
  4. In a civil action brought by the state to recover the value of cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services improperly provided under this chapter, the state may recover costs of investigation and prosecution of the civil action, including attorney fees as determined under court rules.
  5. The department shall adopt regulations necessary to implement this section.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am §§ 41 — 45 ch 69 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (a) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Article 3. Alaska Native Family Assistance Grants.

Sec. 47.27.200. Alaska Native family assistance grants.

  1. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this chapter, and in addition to grants awarded under AS 47.27.050 , the Department of Health and Social Services may award and administer Alaska Native family assistance grants in accordance with this section. Unless specified otherwise in this section, the provisions of AS 47.27.010 47.27.085 do not apply to grants under this section or to an Alaska Native family assistance program operated under such a grant. To be awarded a grant under this section, an applicant shall
    1. meet the requirements of AS 47.27.070 ;
    2. have received approval for, and have agreed to operate, a federally approved tribal family assistance plan in this state;
    3. agree to operate the plan approved under this section on a state fiscal year basis; and
    4. meet the other requirements of this section.
  2. If an organization intends to apply for a grant under this section, the organization shall first submit to the department a letter of intent along with a copy of the proposed federal tribal family assistance plan that will be submitted to the federal government for approval. The organization shall make its submission to the department at least six months before the proposed effective date of the federal tribal family assistance plan. The department shall review the submission and notify the organization of significant deficiencies that would make the organization ineligible to be considered for an Alaska Native family assistance grant without significant changes to the federal tribal family assistance plan regardless of whether federal approval is received or whether federal grant money is awarded for implementation of that plan. The organization may make a supplemental submission to the department to resolve deficiencies noted by the department. If, after departmental review and supplemental revision, an organization’s plan remains eligible for consideration for a grant award under this section, the department shall notify the organization that the organization may submit a proposal for a grant award after the organization has received notice of federal approval of the federal tribal family assistance plan and the pending award of federal grant money. The commissioner may waive the time deadline specified in this subsection if the commissioner
    1. enters into a joint planning agreement between the department and the organization; or
    2. finds good cause and the waiver is in the state’s best interest.
  3. If the department awards a grant under this section, the grant must be in an amount that
    1. for the first fiscal year under the plan accepted by the department, represents a fair and equitable portion of the state appropriations for the state public assistance program administered under this chapter intended to serve the state residents who will be served by the plan; and
    2. for the second and subsequent state fiscal years under the plan accepted by the department, represents a fair and equitable portion of state appropriations made for public assistance programs that is allocated for Alaska Native family assistance grants to be awarded under this section in order to serve the state residents who will be served by the plan; if the money is not allocated for these grants, the amounts shall be made in the same manner as described in (1) of this subsection.
  4. For an organization to be eligible to be awarded a grant under this section, the organization’s proposal must include
    1. documentation that the organization
      1. has received federal approval of its federal tribal family assistance plan to operate a tribal assistance program in this state; and
      2. will receive a grant directly from the federal government to implement the federal tribal family assistance plan;
    2. a plan for operation of the Alaska Native family assistance grant that meets the requirements of (e) of this section; and
    3. if the commissioner determines that a federally approved tribal family assistance plan would be a cost-effective and efficient means of administering the program established in this chapter in that region of the state and the needs of state public assistance recipients receiving assistance under this chapter can be met through a contract awarded under AS 47.27.300 , the organization’s agreement to enter into a contract with the department to provide state public assistance to those eligible state residents in the region who are not included in the population to be served by the federally approved tribal family assistance plan.
  5. An organization’s plan for operation of the Alaska Native family assistance grant must
    1. be designed to facilitate self-sufficiency of assistance recipients in the region specified in the federally approved tribal family assistance plan by addressing the conditions specific to that region;
    2. provide for a reasonable pattern of service delivery from all providers serving that region;
    3. serve a specified region that consists of a geographically cohesive group of communities that share similar interests, resources, and traditions;
    4. establish the same maximum number of months of benefits as is established for the state program under AS 47.27.015(a)(1) ; and
    5. provide for administration of the grant money received under this section to establish a program in accordance with the plan accepted by the department and in compliance with other requirements of this section; the program must include the following standards for providing assistance to eligible families:
      1. only families with at least one dependent child or a woman in the last trimester of pregnancy are eligible for assistance paid from an Alaska Native family assistance grant;
      2. amounts for assistance provided from an Alaska Native family assistance grant to eligible families may not exceed the amounts specified under AS 47.27.025(b) when combined with assistance provided under the federally approved tribal family assistance grant;
      3. to remain eligible for assistance paid from an Alaska Native family assistance grant, a minor parent of a dependent child must meet the requirements of AS 47.27.027 ;
      4. families receiving assistance paid from an Alaska Native family assistance grant shall comply with the provisions of AS 47.27.035(a) regarding participation in work activities;
      5. families receiving assistance paid from Alaska Native family assistance grant money shall comply with the provisions of (l) — (n) of this section regarding assignment of support rights and cooperation with the child support services agency;
      6. the organization has an impartial appeals process to allow affected families in the region of the state covered by the plan accepted by the department to have a fair hearing.
  6. The department may award a grant under this section only if the department determines that the proposal, including a plan for operation of the grant, meets the criteria specified in (d) and (e) of this section and that an award of the grant to the organization would be in the public interest. The grant agreement must state that the Alaska Native family assistance program will require all program participants to assign child support rights to the Alaska Native family assistance program unless the Alaska Native organization elects to require participants to assign those child support rights to the state. The department may not distribute grant money until a grant agreement between the organization and the department is executed that meets the requirements of this section.
  7. Records pertaining to recipients of assistance from an Alaska Native family assistance grant awarded under this section are confidential public assistance records under AS 47.05.020 and regulations adopted under AS 47.05.020 . Use and misuse of these records are subject to the provisions of AS 47.05.030 . It is an official purpose under AS 47.05.020 for an organization receiving a grant under this section and the department or another agency of the state to exchange information concerning recipients of assistance under this section if the information requested is for purposes directly connected with the administration of a grant under this section.
  8. An organization receiving a grant under this section shall provide to the department a copy of its quarterly report made under 42 U.S.C. 611. The organization shall have its financial records audited annually by a certified public accountant authorized to practice under AS 08.04. The department may prescribe the form and specify the information required to document compliance with this section.
  9. If an organization wishes to terminate its program before the end of the time period for which the grant was awarded under this section, the organization must obtain the consent of the department or provide notice to the department 120 days before the anticipated date of termination. At the end of a grant agreement or by early termination under this section, the organization shall provide an inventory of property valued at $1,000 or over and purchased, in whole or in part, with grant money awarded under this section. The department shall notify the organization of the required disposition of the property listed on the inventory.
  10. If the department awards a grant under this section, a person applying for assistance under this chapter who is covered by the federally approved tribal family assistance plan in that region of the state may obtain assistance from the department only through the organization designated by the department to serve the region. A person aggrieved by a decision made by an organization under a grant awarded under this section may use the appeal procedure specified in AS 47.27.300(e) .
  11. Notwithstanding (j) of this section, a person applying for assistance under this chapter in a region of the state that is served by both an Alaska Native family assistance program that receives a grant under this section and a program administered directly by the department may request to receive assistance under the program administered directly by the department by applying to the department under this subsection and in accordance with regulations adopted under this subsection. The department shall approve the application if the department finds that the applicant has shown that special circumstances exist that support the request to use the state program.
  12. A participant in an Alaska Native family assistance program shall assign to the Alaska Native family assistance program, unless the program has elected to require assignment to the state, all rights to ongoing child support that accrues after the effective date of the assignment for the support of the individuals in the family for whom assistance is provided, but not to exceed the total amount of assistance paid by the Alaska Native family assistance program to the family. The assignment takes effect when information required under (n) of this section is provided to the child support services agency following the determination of eligibility. Except with respect to any unpaid support that accrued under the assignment, the assignment terminates when the family ceases to participate in the Alaska Native family assistance program. All assignments to an Alaska Native family assistance program of unpaid child support obligations transfer to the state upon the termination of an Alaska Native family assistance program.
  13. An Alaska Native family assistance program participant shall cooperate with the child support services agency in the manner described in AS 47.27.040(b) in establishing paternity or establishing, modifying, or enforcing a child support order requiring the payment of support by the noncustodial parent for a dependent child for whom assistance is received. The child support services agency shall inform the Alaska Native family assistance program if it determines that the participant is not in good faith compliance with the requirements of AS 47.27.040(b) . The Alaska Native family assistance program shall determine whether the participant has good cause for refusing to cooperate.
  14. An Alaska Native family assistance program that receives assignments of ongoing child support shall provide public assistance information concerning those assignments to the child support services agency in a timely manner in order to establish a valid assignment. The information shall be provided by electronic means and in a format acceptable to the child support services agency. For the purposes of this subsection, “timely manner” means within the time constraints established for child support agency distributions under federal law.
  15. The applicability of AS 25.27 in the case of a recipient under an Alaska Native family assistance program includes the following:
    1. an obligor is liable to the Alaska Native family assistance program in the amount of the family assistance provided by the program to a child to whom the obligor owes a duty of support except that, if a support order has been entered, the liability of the obligor for assistance provided by an Alaska Native family assistance program may not exceed the amount of support provided for in the support order, and, if a medical support order, cash medical support order, or both, has been entered, the liability of the obligor for assistance granted under AS 47.07 may not exceed the amount of support provided for in the medical support order, cash medical support order, or both; the child support services agency shall send notice of accruing liability under this paragraph in the same manner as required under AS 25.27.120(c) , and, if the agency fails to comply with the notice requirement of this paragraph, interest does not accrue on the liability to the Alaska Native family assistance program unless a support order or medical support order, or cash medical support order, as applicable, has been entered;
    2. the child support services agency may appear in an action authorized under AS 25.27.045 at the agency’s own discretion if an obligor under AS 25.27 is liable to the Alaska Native family assistance program under (1) of this subsection;
    3. an Alaska Native family assistance program to which the child support services agency erroneously disburses an overpayment of child support under an income withholding order is liable to the state for the amount disbursed, plus interest at the rate imposed under AS 25.27.062(l)(1) ;
    4. when the right to receive child support has been assigned to an Alaska Native family assistance program, an agreement under AS 25.27.065(a) that has not been adopted as an administrative order of the child support services agency is not effective during a period when the obligee is receiving assistance under an Alaska Native family assistance program;
    5. the child support services agency, on behalf of an Alaska Native family assistance program, shall take all necessary action permitted by law to enforce child support orders entered under AS 25.27, including petitioning the court for orders to aid in the enforcement of child support;
    6. if an obligor under AS 25.27 is liable to an Alaska Native family assistance program under (1) of this subsection, the state is subrogated to the rights of the obligee to take actions authorized under AS 25.27.130(a) ;
    7. notwithstanding AS 25.27.130(c) , the recovery of an amount for which an obligor under AS 25.27 is liable that exceeds the total assistance granted under AS 47.07 and this chapter shall be paid to the obligee;
    8. except as provided in AS 25.27.130(f) , if an obligee under AS 25.27 is not receiving assistance under AS 47.07 or this chapter at the time the state recovers money in an action under AS 25.27.130(d) or (1) of this subsection, the recovery of any amount for which the obligor is liable shall be distributed to the obligee for support payments, including medical support payments, that had become due and unpaid since the termination of assistance under AS 47.07 or this chapter under a support order in favor of the obligee;
    9. after payment to the obligee under (8) of this subsection, the state may retain an amount not to exceed the total unreimbursed assistance paid on behalf of the obligee under AS 47.07 or this chapter;
    10. if an alleged obligor is liable to an Alaska Native family assistance program under (1) of this subsection, and a support order has not been entered, the child support services agency may, at its own discretion, undertake an action to establish paternity and a duty of support using the procedures prescribed in AS 25.27 and may enforce a duty of support using the procedures prescribed in AS 25.27; the agency may also institute administrative proceedings to determine the paternity of a child born out of wedlock upon application of an Alaska Native family assistance program; the agency may not recover costs of genetic tests required under this paragraph from a person who is a recipient of assistance under an Alaska Native family assistance program;
    11. when a hearing officer makes a determination under AS 25.27.170(d) , the hearing officer shall, in addition to the factors described in AS 25.27.170(e) , consider the amount of the alleged obligor’s liability to an Alaska Native family assistance program under (1) of this subsection;
    12. notwithstanding AS 25.27.255(a) , the child support services agency may not pay to an obligee any money that has been assigned to an Alaska Native family assistance program.
  16. Nothing in this section requires the department to continue to fund an Alaska Native family assistance grant program at a level funded before the current grant period or to replace federal funds for the program with state funding.

History. (§ 1 ch 22 SLA 2005; am § 12 ch 45 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For transitional provision relating to the continuing validity of regulations adopted by the Department of Health and Social Services to implement ch. 96, SLA 2000 (initially authorizing the Alaska Native family assistance grant program as a temporary pilot program), that are in effect on June 29, 2005, as applicable to the program enacted in this section, see § 4, ch. 22, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision prescribing the applicability of the 2009 amendment of (o)(1) of this section, see § 14, ch. 45, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (o)(1), substituted “medical support order, cash medical support order, or both” for “medical order of support” twice, and added “, or cash medical support order,” following “unless a support order or medical support order”.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 22, SLA 2005 (SB 51), adding this section, see 2005 Senate Journal 40 — 42.

Article 4. Regional Programs.

Sec. 47.27.300. Regional public assistance programs.

  1. The department may develop a regional public assistance program for the administration of this chapter in order to provide state public assistance in a uniform and cost-effective manner in a region of this state if an Alaska Native organization is authorized to implement a federally approved tribal family assistance plan that includes that region and has been awarded an Alaska Native family assistance grant for a program that includes that region for the applicable fiscal year under AS 47.27.200 . The regional public assistance program developed under this section must be designed to serve eligible state residents in the region covered by the program who are not already covered by a federally approved tribal family assistance plan in that region.
  2. The department may award contracts to implement a program developed under (a) of this section. A contract authorized for delivery of state public assistance under a regional public assistance program under this section is exempt from the competitive bid requirements of AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code). Subject to appropriation, a contract under this section must be in an amount that represents a fair and equitable share of the money appropriated under this chapter to serve the state residents specified in (a) of this section. This section provides additional authority to contract to that available under AS 47.05.015 or other law.
  3. The department may award a contract under this section only to an organization that
    1. has been awarded an Alaska Native family assistance grant under AS 47.27.200 for a program that includes that region;
    2. agrees to administer state public assistance under this chapter to state residents in the region who are not served by the Alaska Native family assistance grant awarded under AS 47.27.200 ;
    3. agrees to provide state public assistance identical to that provided under the federally approved tribal family assistance plan for which Alaska Native family assistance grant money has been awarded under AS 47.27.200; and
    4. agrees to implement an appeals process as described in (e) of this section.
  4. Records pertaining to recipients of state public assistance under a contract awarded under this section have the same confidential protections as are provided to recipients of assistance from Alaska Native family assistance grants under AS 47.27.200 .
  5. An organization that receives a contract under this section shall provide an appeals process to applicants for or recipients of state public assistance covered by the contract awarded under this section. The appeals process must be the same as the method available under the federally approved tribal family assistance plan, except that the decision reached shall be considered as a recommended decision to the department. Within 30 days after receiving a recommended decision, the department shall review the recommended decision and issue a decision accepting or rejecting the recommended decision. If the department rejects the recommended decision, the department shall independently review the record and issue its final decision. The final decision of the department on the matter is appealable to the courts of this state.
  6. If the department establishes a regional public assistance program and awards a contract to provide state public assistance under this section, a person applying for state public assistance under this chapter in the region of the state covered by the regional public assistance program may obtain state public assistance from the department only through the organization designated by the department to serve the region.

History. (§ 2 ch 22 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For transitional provision relating to the continuing validity of regulations adopted by the Department of Health and Social Services to implement ch. 96, SLA 2000 (initially authorizing the Alaska Native family assistance grant program as a temporary pilot program), that are in effect on June 29, 2005, as applicable to the program enacted in this section, see § 4, ch. 22, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 22, SLA 2005 (SB 51), adding this section, see 2005 Senate Journal 40 — 42.

Article 5. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.27.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “Alaska Native family assistance grant” means a grant under AS 47.27.200 ;
  2. “Alaska Native family assistance program” means a program funded in part by a grant under AS 47.27.200 ;
  3. “cash assistance” means assistance for basic living expenses provided under the Alaska temporary assistance program; “cash assistance” includes cash, vouchers, or third-party vendor payments; “cash assistance” does not include a diversion payment under AS 47.27.026 or self-sufficiency services;
  4. “child care assistance” means payments made by the Department of Health and Social Services or the Department of Education and Early Development to Alaska temporary assistance program participant families or to providers for the care of children of the participant families;
  5. “child support” includes court-ordered or administratively ordered child support, medical support, and spousal support;
  6. “child support services agency” means the child support services agency in the Department of Revenue;
  7. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  8. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  9. “dependent child” means an individual who
    1. has not attained
      1. 18 years of age; or
      2. 19 years of age and is a full-time student in a secondary school or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training; and
    2. is not an applicant under AS 47.27.020 ;
  10. “diversion payment” means a diversion payment paid under AS 47.27.026 ;
  11. “federally approved tribal family assistance plan” means a plan that meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 612 and has been approved for financing through a tribal family assistance grant directly from the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
  12. “self-sufficiency services” means work-related services, community service work referrals, child care assistance, emergency assistance, service vouchers, equipment vouchers, work stipends, transportation assistance, wage subsidies, and other work supports and services determined by the department in regulation to promote family self-sufficiency;
  13. “work activities” includes job readiness assessments, on-the-job training, education and vocational training, job sampling, job search requirements, subsidized and unsubsidized work, and community work service.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 76 ch 58 SLA 1999; am §§ 46 — 48 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 3 ch 22 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Renumbered in 2002 to maintain the terms in alphabetical order. Paragraphs (1) and (2) were enacted as paragraphs (11) and (12) and paragraph (11) was enacted as paragraph (13); renumbered in 2005, at which time former paragraphs (1) — (8) were renumbered as (3) — (10) and former paragraphs (9) and (10) were renumbered as (12) and (13).

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective June 30, 2005, added paragraphs (11)-(13) [now (1), (2), and (11) respectively].

Sec. 47.27.990. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Alaska temporary assistance program.

History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1996)

Chapter 30. Mental Health.

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 1 et seq.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, § 1 et seq.

41 C.J.S., Hospitals, § 1 et seq.

56 C.J.S., Mental Health, § 1 et seq.

Article 1. Mental Health Trust Authority.

Cross references. —

For provisions related to the Mental Health Trust, see AS 37.14.001 37.14.099 .

Sec. 47.30.010. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.011. Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority.

  1. The Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority is established as a public corporation of the state within the Department of Revenue.
  2. The purpose of the authority is to ensure an integrated comprehensive mental health program and to administer the office of the long term care ombudsman established in AS 47.62.010 .
  3. The authority
    1. shall, as provided in AS 37.14.009 , administer the trust established under the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act of 1956;
    2. may sue and be sued;
    3. may retain the services of independent counsel when, in the judgment of the authority’s board of trustees, independent counsel is needed;
    4. shall insure or indemnify and protect the board, a member of the board, or an agent or employee of the authority against financial loss and expense, including reasonable legal fees and costs, arising out of a claim, demand, suit, or judgment by reason of alleged negligence, alleged violation of civil rights, or alleged wrongful act resulting in death or bodily injury to a person or accidental damage to or destruction of property if the board member, agent, or employee, at the time of the occurrence, was acting under the direction of the authority within the course or scope of the duties of the board member, agent, or employee;
    5. shall exercise the powers granted to it under AS 37.14.041 , subject to the limitations imposed by AS 37.14.045 ; and
    6. shall administer the office of the long term care ombudsman established in AS 47.62.010 .
  4. The provisions of AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 do not apply to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 23 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am E.O. No. 102 §§ 6, 7 (2001))

Sec. 47.30.016. Board establishment, membership, quorum, fees, and expenses.

  1. The authority shall be governed by its board of trustees.
  2. The board consists of seven members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature. The members appointed under this subsection shall be appointed
    1. based upon their ability in financial management and investment, in land management, or in services for the beneficiaries of the trust;
    2. after the governor has considered a list of persons prepared by a panel of six persons who are beneficiaries, or who are the guardians, family members, or representatives of beneficiaries; the panel shall consist of
      1. one person selected by the Alaska Mental Health Board established by AS 47.30.661 ;
      2. one person selected by the Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education;
      3. one person selected by the Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse established by AS 44.29.100 ;
      4. one person selected by the Alaska Commission on Aging established by AS 47.45.200 ;
      5. one person selected by the Alaska Native Health Board; and
      6. one person selected by the authority.
  3. A member of the board appointed by the governor under (b) of this section may not
    1. be an officer or employee of the state; or
    2. within the preceding two years or during the member’s term of office have an interest in, served on the governing board of, or been employed by an organization that has received, during that same period, money from the mental health trust settlement income account under a grant or contract for services.
  4. A quorum of the board is four members.
  5. A member of the board is entitled to
    1. an honorarium of $200 for each day or any part of a day spent at a meeting of the board, at a meeting of a subcommittee of the board, or as a representative of the board; and
    2. per diem and travel expenses authorized for boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180 .

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am §§ 24, 25 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 14 ch 131 SLA 1994; am § 3 ch 24 SLA 2004; am § 33 ch 99 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1992, under § 6, ch. 13, SLA 1992 and AS 01.05.031 , “Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education” was substituted for “Governor’s Council for the Handicapped and Gifted.” In 1995, the reference in subparagraph (b)(2)(C) was changed from AS 44.29.110 to AS 44.29.100 to correct a manifest error.

In 1996, in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Cross references. —

For qualifications of initial members of the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, see § 51, ch. 66, SLA 1991 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2004 amendment, effective July 24, 2004, substituted “AS 47.45.200 ” for “AS 44.21.200 ” in paragraph (b)(2)(D).

The second 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, substituted “AS 47.45.200 ” for “AS 44.21.200 ” in paragraph (b)(2)(D).

Sec. 47.30.020. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.021. Term of office, vacancies, removal, and reappointment.

  1. The members of the board serve staggered five-year terms. A member shall continue to serve until the member’s successor is appointed and confirmed.
  2. A vacancy occurring in the membership of the board shall be filled within 60 days by appointment of the governor for the unexpired portion of the vacated term.
  3. The governor may remove a member of the board only for cause, including incompetence, neglect of duty, misconduct in office, poor attendance, or lack of contribution to the board’s work. A member being removed for cause shall be given a copy of the charges and afforded an opportunity to publicly present a defense in person or by counsel upon not less than 10 days’ written notice. If a member is removed for cause, the governor shall file with the lieutenant governor a complete statement of all charges made against the member and the governor’s findings based on the charges, together with a complete record of the proceedings. The removal of a member for cause constitutes a final administrative order. A member seeking to appeal the governor’s removal of a member for cause under this subsection shall file a notice of appeal with the superior court under AS 44.62.560 .
  4. Except for a trustee who has served two consecutive five-year terms, a member of the board may be reappointed. A member of the board who has served two consecutive five-year terms is not eligible for reappointment to the board until one year has intervened.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Cross references. —

For terms of initial members of the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, see § 51, ch. 66, SLA 1991 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

For temporary provisions relating members of the board with terms expiring March 1, 2020 and to confirmation of appointments to the board presented by the governor o the legislature during the second regular session of the Thirty-First Alaska State Legislature, see § 1, ch. 9, SLA 2020 in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.30.026. Officers and staff.

  1. The board shall annually elect a presiding officer and other officers it considers necessary from among its membership.
  2. The board shall employ a chief executive officer who shall be selected by the board. The chief executive officer shall be compensated at no less than range 26 of the pay plan for state employees under AS 39.27.011(a) . The chief executive officer may
    1. hire additional employees;
    2. appoint hearing officers to perform the responsibilities set out in AS 47.30.031(b)(4) ; and
    3. contract for the services of consultants and others.
  3. The chief executive officer is directly responsible to the board.
  4. The chief executive officer and employees hired under this section are in the exempt service under AS 39.25.110 .

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 2 ch 15 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, in (b)(2) of this section, “AS 47.30.031(b)(4) ” was substituted for “AS 47.30.031(b)(5) ” to reflect the 2008 renumbering of AS 47.30.031(b)(5) .

Sec. 47.30.030. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.031. Regulations.

  1. The board shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) consistent with state law and the fiduciary responsibilities imposed by law on members of boards of directors of corporations having trust responsibilities.
  2. The regulations shall address, but are not limited to,
    1. the requirements of AS 47.30.056(h) and (j);
    2. procedures by which an aggrieved person or group who believe they have not received services that should be provided from the trust may apply to the authority for redress;
    3. provisions that allow and encourage entities providing trust funded services to integrate those services with other community human services funded by other sources;
    4. administrative adjudication procedures, including but not limited to
      1. the acceptance of applications under (3) of this subsection;
      2. investigations;
      3. hearings; and
      4. the issuance of administrative orders, as necessary;
    5. provisions that establish a process for long-range planning for expenditures from the mental health trust settlement income account; and
    6. criteria for determining the nature and extent of necessary services and related expenses to be funded by the trust.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 39 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (b)(6) [now (b)(5)] of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

In 2008, former paragraphs (b)(3) — (7) were renumbered as (b)(2) — (6) to reflect the 1994 repeal of former paragraph (b)(2), and an internal reference in (b)(4)(A) was conformed.

Administrative Code. —

For fiscal matters generally, see 20 AAC 40, art. 1.

For MHTAAR grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 2.

For authority grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 3.

For beneficiaries of the trust, see 20 AAC 40, art. 5.

For administration of the trust, see 20 AAC 40, art. 6.

For real property assets, see 20 AAC 40, art. 7.

Sec. 47.30.036. Duties of the board.

The board shall

  1. preserve and protect the trust corpus under AS 37.14.009 ;
  2. coordinate with other state agencies involved with programs affecting persons in need of mental health services;
  3. review and consider the recommendations submitted under AS 44.29.140(a)(2) , AS 47.30.666 (6), AS 47.45.240(a)(8) , and AS 47.80.090 (13);
  4. adopt bylaws governing its meetings, selection of officers, proceedings, and other aspects of board procedure;
  5. make an annual written report of its activities to the governor and the public and notify the legislature that the report is available; and
  6. fulfill its obligations under AS 47.30.046 .

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 26 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 110 ch 21 SLA 1995; am § 34 ch 99 SLA 2004; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

A reference to “AS 47.45.240 (a)(10)” was substituted for a reference to “AS 47.44.230(a)(10)” in the amendment to paragraph (3) of this section made by § 34, ch. 99, SLA 2004, to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.44.230 as AS 47.45.240 .

Cross references. —

For provisions authorizing an exchange with the federal government of certain Mental Health Trust land for certain United States Forest Service land if the chair of the board of trustees of the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority certifies that the conditions in sec. 6(a), ch. 22, SLA 2017, have been satisfied. The certification was made on January 4, 2019, and Chapter 22, SLA 2017, and the grant of the authority to complete the exchange took effect January 5, 2019.

Administrative Code. —

For fiscal matters generally, see 20 AAC 40, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, deleted “AS 44.21.230(a)(10)” following “submitted under” in paragraph (3) and inserted “AS 47.44.230(a)(10)” in that paragraph.

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “AS 47.45.240(a)(8) ” for “AS 47.45.240(a)(10)” in paragraph (3).

Sec. 47.30.040. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.041. Board advisors.

The commissioners of health and social services, natural resources, and revenue, or their respective designees, are advisors to the board.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.046. Budget recommendations; reports.

  1. The board shall annually, not later than September 15, submit to the governor and the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee a budget for the next fiscal year and a proposed plan of implementation based on the integrated comprehensive mental health program plan prepared under AS 47.30.660(a)(1) . The budget must include the authority’s determination of the amount
    1. recommended for expenditure from the general fund during the next fiscal year to meet the operating and capital expenses of the integrated comprehensive mental health program;
    2. in the mental health trust settlement income account, if any, that is not reasonably necessary to meet the projected operating and capital expenses of the integrated comprehensive mental health program that may be transferred into the general fund; and
    3. of the expenditures the authority intends to make under AS 37.14.041 and 37.14.045 , including the specific purposes and amounts of any grants or contracts as part of the state’s integrated comprehensive mental health program.
  2. When the authority submits its proposed budget under (a) of this section, the authority shall also provide a report to the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee, the governor, the Office of Management and Budget, the commissioner of health and social services, and all entities providing services with money in the mental health trust settlement income account, and shall make it available to the public. The report must describe at least the following:
    1. the assets, earnings, and expenditures of the trust as of the end of the preceding fiscal year;
    2. comparisons of the trust’s assets, earnings, and expenditures with the prior five fiscal years;
    3. projections of the trust’s assets, earnings, and expenditures for the next five fiscal years;
    4. the authority’s budget recommendations submitted under (a) of this section, and its reasons for making those recommendations;
    5. the authority’s guidelines for the establishment of services; the provision of services shall be based on the principle that services paid for from the trust are provided to recipients as close to the recipient’s home and family as practical with due consideration of demographics, mental health service requirements, use of mental health services, economic feasibility, and capital expenditures required for provision of minimum levels of service;
    6. forecasts of the number of persons needing services;
    7. projections of the resources required to provide the necessary services and facilities; and
    8. reviews of the status of the integrated comprehensive mental health program, including evaluation of program goals, objectives, targets and timelines, and overall effectiveness.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 27 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (a)(2) and, in 1997, in subsection (b) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Administrative Code. —

For fiscal matters generally, see 20 AAC 40, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Litigation over management of trust lands. —

For discussion of approval of agreement settling a class action lawsuit concerning the lands granted to Alaska under the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act, see Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380 (Alaska), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 948, 118 S. Ct. 366, 139 L. Ed. 2d 285 (U.S. 1997).

Sec. 47.30.050. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.051. Submissions requiring use of trust money.

An agency or entity proposing an expenditure of money by the trust shall present its proposal to the authority under regulations adopted under AS 47.30.031 .

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Administrative Code. —

For fiscal matters generally, see 20 AAC 40, art. 1.

For MHTAAR grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 2.

For authority grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 3.

Sec. 47.30.056. Use of money in the mental health trust settlement income account.

  1. The money in the mental health trust settlement income account established in AS 37.14.036 shall be used as provided in AS 37.14.041 , including to
    1. provide an integrated comprehensive mental health program as required by this section;
    2. meet the authority’s annual administrative expenses; and
    3. offset the effect of inflation on the mental health trust fund.
  2. Expenditures under (a)(1) of this section must provide for a reasonable level of necessary services to persons who
    1. are mentally ill;
    2. have an intellectual disability, a developmental disability, or both;
    3. are chronic alcoholics suffering from psychoses;
    4. as a result of senility, suffer major mental illness; and
    5. need mental health services, as the legislature may determine.
  3. The integrated comprehensive mental health program for which expenditures are made under this section
    1. must give priority in service delivery to persons who, as a result of a mental disorder or of a disorder identified in (b) of this section,
      1. may require or are at risk of hospitalization; or
      2. experience such major impairment of self-care, self-direction, or social and economic functioning that they require continuing or intensive services;
    2. may, at the discretion of the board, include services to persons who are not included under (b) or (c)(1) of this section.
  4. In (b)(1) of this section, “the mentally ill” includes persons with the following mental disorders:
    1. schizophrenia;
    2. delusional (paranoid) disorder;
    3. mood disorders;
    4. anxiety disorders;
    5. somatoform disorders;
    6. organic mental disorders;
    7. personality disorders;
    8. dissociative disorders;
    9. other psychotic or severe and persistent mental disorders manifested by behavioral changes and symptoms of comparable severity to those manifested by persons with mental disorders listed in this subsection; and
    10. persons who have been diagnosed by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician licensed to practice medicine in the state and, as a result of the diagnosis, have been determined to have a childhood disorder manifested by behaviors or symptoms suggesting risk of developing a mental disorder listed in this subsection.
  5. In (b)(2) of this section, “persons who have an intellectual disability, developmental disability, or both” includes persons with the following neurologic or mental disorders:
    1. cerebral palsy;
    2. epilepsy;
    3. autistic disorder;
    4. severe organic brain impairment;
    5. significant developmental delay during early childhood indicating risk of developing a disorder listed in this subsection;
    6. other severe and persistent intellectual disability or developmental disability manifested by behaviors and symptoms similar to those manifested by persons with disorders listed in this subsection.
  6. In (b)(3) of this section, “chronic alcoholics suffering from psychoses” includes persons with the following disorders:
    1. alcohol withdrawal delirium (delirium tremens);
    2. alcohol hallucinosis;
    3. alcohol amnestic disorder;
    4. dementia associated with alcoholism;
    5. alcohol-induced organic mental disorder;
    6. alcoholic depressive disorder;
    7. other severe and persistent disorders associated with a history of prolonged or excessive drinking or episodes of drinking out of control and manifested by behavioral changes and symptoms similar to those manifested by persons with disorders listed in this subsection.
  7. In (b)(4) of this section, “persons who, as a result of senility, suffer major mental illness” includes persons with the following mental disorders:
    1. primary degenerative dementia of the Alzheimer type;
    2. multi-infarct dementia;
    3. senile dementia;
    4. presenile dementia;
    5. other severe and persistent mental disorders manifested by behaviors and symptoms similar to those manifested by persons with disorders listed in this subsection.
  8. The authority shall adopt regulations defining the disorders identified in this section to reflect revisions in the diagnostic nomenclature of the health professions serving the beneficiaries of the trust. The authority shall review and revise the regulations as necessary. Regulations adopted under this subsection must be in the long term best interest of the trust and of persons with disorders equivalent to those identified in (b) and (c) of this section.
  9. In this section, “an integrated comprehensive mental health program”
    1. means public health programs and services that, on December 16, 1994, are separately recognizable and administered, without regard to the administrative unit directly responsible for the delivery of the service; among the services included are services for the mentally ill, community mental health services, services for the developmentally disabled, alcoholism services, and services for children, youth, adults, and seniors with mental disorders;
    2. includes, at a minimum, each of the following services as appropriate:
      1. emergency services on a 24-hour basis;
      2. screening examination and evaluation services required to complete the involuntary commitment process under AS 47.30.700 47.30.815 ;
      3. inpatient care;
      4. crisis stabilization services, which may include
        1. active community outreach;
        2. in-hospital contact;
        3. mobile crisis teams of mental health professionals;
        4. crisis beds to provide a short term residential program for persons experiencing an acute episode of mental illness that requires temporary removal from a home environment;
      5. treatment services, which may include
        1. diagnosis, testing, and evaluation of medical needs;
        2. medication monitoring;
        3. physical examinations;
        4. dispensing psychotropic and other medication;
        5. detoxification;
        6. individual or group therapy;
        7. aftercare;
      6. case management, which may include
        1. evaluation of needs;
        2. development of individualized treatment plans;
        3. enhancement of access to available resources and programs;
        4. development of interagency contacts and family involvement;
        5. advocacy;
      7. daily structure and support, which may include
        1. daily living skills training;
        2. socialization activities;
        3. recreation;
        4. transportation;
        5. day care services;
        6. client and care provider education and support services;
      8. residential services, which may include
        1. crisis or respite care;
        2. board and care;
        3. foster care, group homes, halfway houses, or supervised apartments;
        4. intermediate care facilities;
        5. long-term care facilities;
        6. in-home care;
      9. vocational services, which may include
        1. prevocational services;
        2. work adjustment;
        3. supported work;
        4. sheltered work;
        5. training in which participants achieve useful work experience;
      10. outpatient screening, diagnosis, and treatment services, including individual, family, and group psychotherapy, counseling, and referral;
      11. prevention and education services, including consultation with organizations, providers, and the public; and
      12. administrative services, including appropriate operating expenses of state agencies and other service providers.
  10. The authority shall adopt regulations regarding the services described in (i) of this section to reflect advances in the appropriate professions. The authority shall review and revise the regulations as necessary. Regulations adopted under this subsection must be in the long term best interest of the mental health trust.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 28 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am §§ 22, 23 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 59 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in subsection (a) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions related to development of mental health income account mechanism, see § 43, ch. 5, FSSLA in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For fiscal matters generally, see 20 AAC 40, art. 1.

For MHTAAR grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 2.

For authority grants, see 20 AAC 40, art. 3.

For beneficiaries of the trust, see 20 AAC 40, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b)(2), substituted “have an intellectual disability, a developmental disability, or both” for “the mentally defective and retarded”; in (b)(4), deleted “senile people who” at the beginning, made related stylistic changes; in the introductory language in (e), substituted “ ‘persons who have an intellectual disability, developmental disability, or both’ ” for “ ‘the mentally defective and retarded’ ”, deleted (e)(3), which read, “mental retardation”, in (e)(6) substituted “intellectual disability or developmental disability” for “mental disorders”, and made related changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (g), substituted “persons” for “senile people” and made related stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.30.060. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.061. Definitions.

In AS 47.30.011 47.30.061 ,

  1. “authority” means the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established by AS 47.30.011 ;
  2. “board” means the board of trustees of the authority;
  3. “trust” means the trust established by the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act of 1956, P.L. 84-830, 70 Stat. 709.

History. (§ 26 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Secs. 47.30.070 — 47.30.170. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 47.30.180. [Renumbered as AS 47.30.880.]

Secs. 47.30.190 — 47.30.340. [Repealed, § 7 ch 84 SLA 1981.]

Article 2. Construction of Mental Health Hospitals and Facilities.

Sec. 47.30.350. Department powers and duties; ratification of authority’s actions.

  1. The department shall
    1. develop and submit to the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service a comprehensive program for the constructing and equipping of hospitals and other facilities for the examination, observation, care, and treatment of the mentally ill;
    2. develop and submit to the Surgeon General plans and specifications for the constructing and equipping of the hospitals and other facilities;
    3. construct and equip the hospitals and other facilities in accordance with the program, plans, and specifications approved by the Surgeon General; construction and equipping under this paragraph is governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code);
    4. cooperate, coordinate, and contract, wherever indicated and desirable, with other state boards, departments and agencies, and agencies of the United States in the construction program, and hire necessary personnel and enter into contracts with private individuals and companies, to the end that the hospitals and other facilities are constructed in the most economical and expeditious manner; contracting and construction under this section are governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).
  2. An action, agreement, or transaction taken or entered before April 3, 1957, by the Mental Health Authority consistent with AS 47.30.350 47.30.400 is affirmed and ratified.

History. (§ 2 ch 160 SLA 1957; am § 58 ch 106 SLA 1986)

Sec. 47.30.360. Acceptance and expenditure of funds.

The department may accept on behalf of the state and deposit separate and apart from other public funds grants from the federal government or gifts or contributions from other sources to assist in carrying out the purposes of AS 47.30.350 47.30.400 and may expend the funds for those purposes.

History. (§ 3 ch 160 SLA 1957)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990 the phrase “may expend” was substituted for “to expend” in the last line of this section to correct a manifest error in the 1962 codification.

Sec. 47.30.370. Review by legislative budget and audit committee.

Before implementation, the programs, plans, and actions of the department made under AS 47.30.350 , except for the proposed geographic location of the mental health hospital, shall be reviewed by the legislative budget and audit committee. The review and findings of the budget and audit committee shall be made public.

History. (§ 4 ch 160 SLA 1957; am § 54 ch 71 SLA 1972)

Sec. 47.30.380. Appropriation authorized.

Funds to carry out AS 47.30.350 47.30.400 shall be set out in the appropriation bill authorizing the operating and capital expenditures of the state’s integrated comprehensive mental health program under AS 37.14.003(a) and submitted to the legislature under AS 37.07.020(a)(1).

History. (§ 6 ch 160 SLA 1957; am § 11 ch 30 SLA 1997; am § 14 ch 59 SLA 1997)

Sec. 47.30.390. Acquisition of existing mental health care facilities.

The department may acquire existing facilities for mental health care.

History. (§ 1 ch 155 SLA 1959)

Sec. 47.30.400. Purpose of AS 47.30.350—47.30.400.

The purpose of AS 47.30.350 47.30.400 is to provide for the constructing and equipping of hospitals and other facilities in this state needed for carrying out a comprehensive mental health program, to accept the benefits of 42 U.S.C. 274, and to authorize the department to take action necessary to accomplish these purposes.

History. (§ 1 ch 160 SLA 1957)

Revisor’s notes. —

The federal law referred to in this section, 42 U.S.C. 274, related to grants to the state for mental health programs and payment for hospital facility construction. The provision was omitted in the 1984 general revision of that part of the federal code by Pub. L. 98-501, Title II, § 201.

Article 3. Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind.

Sec. 47.30.410. Persons subject to extradition.

A person alleged to be of unsound mind found in this state, who has fled from another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which the person fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state where, at the time of the flight the person

  1. was under detention by law in a hospital, asylum, or other institution for the insane as a person of unsound mind;
  2. had been determined by legal proceedings to be of unsound mind, the finding being unreversed and in full force and effect, and the control of the person having been acquired by a court of competent jurisdiction of the state from which the person fled; or
  3. was subject to detention in that state, which was then the person’s legal domicile (personal service of process having been made) based on legal proceedings there pending to have the person declared of unsound mind.

History. (§ 51-4-22 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.30.420. Extradition proceedings.

If the executive authority of a state demands of the executive authority of this state a fugitive under AS 47.30.410 and produces a copy of the commitment decree or other judicial process and proceedings, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state from which the person so charged has fled, with an affidavit made before a proper officer showing the person to be a fugitive, the executive authority of this state shall have the fugitive apprehended and secured, if found in this state, and have immediate notice of the apprehension given to the executive authority making the demand, or to the agent of that authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and have the fugitive delivered to the agent when the agent appears. If no agent appears within 30 days from the time of the apprehension the fugitive may be discharged. All costs and expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, maintaining, and transmitting the fugitive to the state making the demand shall be paid by that state. An agent so appointed who receives the fugitive into custody is empowered to transmit the fugitive to the state from which the fugitive fled. The executive authority of this state may, on the application of a person interested, demand the return to this state of a fugitive under AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 .

History. (§ 51-4-23 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.30.430. Time to commence proceedings.

All proceedings under AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 shall be begun within one year after the flight referred to in AS 47.30.410 .

History. (§ 51-4-24 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.30.440. Interpretation and construction.

AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.

History. (§ 51-4-25 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 47.30.450. Definitions.

In AS 47.30.410 47.30.460

  1. “executive authority,” “governor,” and “chief magistrate,” respectively, as applied to a request to return a person under AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 to or from the District of Columbia, include a justice of the supreme court of the District of Columbia and other authority;
  2. “flight” and “fled” mean a voluntary or involuntary departure from the jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings mentioned in AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 have been instituted and are still pending, with the effect of avoiding, impeding, or delaying the action of the court in which the proceedings have been instituted or are pending, or a voluntary or involuntary departure from the state where the person demanded then was, if the person then was under detention by law as a person of unsound mind and subject to detention;
  3. “state” includes states, territories, districts, and insular and other possessions of the United States.

History. (§ 51-4-21 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990 this section was reorganized to alphabetize the terms defined, at which time paragraph (1) was rewritten to conform to the style of the Alaska Statutes.

Sec. 47.30.460. Short title.

AS 47.30.410 47.30.460 may be cited as the Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind.

History. (§ 51-4-26 ACLA 1949)

Article 4. Alcoholism and Drug Abuse.

Cross references. —

For Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, see AS 47.37.

Sec. 47.30.470. Powers and duties of department.

The department shall

  1. ascertain and keep current a list of all institutions in the state that have available facilities for the care and treatment of alcoholics and drug abusers;
  2. encourage the development and advancement of standards of treatment of alcoholics and drug abusers in institutions;
  3. promote and encourage educational activities to make the public aware of the effects of intemperate use of alcoholic beverages and drugs, and promote and encourage the education of the general public about scientific facts regarding alcoholism and drug abuse;
  4. identify and utilize whatever facilities and services are available or can be made available through community organization for carrying out the purposes of this section, including identification and utilization for detoxification of under-utilized hospital beds;
  5. engage in research and educational activities that will aid in the understanding of alcoholism and drug abuse and in the treatment of alcoholics and drug abusers;
  6. administer a community grant-in-aid program for alcoholism and drug abuse;
  7. submit an annual report concerning alcoholism and drug abuse in the state and the grant-in-aid program within 10 days after the convening of the legislature in each regular session;
  8. prepare that part of the plan for the integrated comprehensive mental health program under AS 47.30.056 that relates to the services and facilities that are necessary for the care and treatment of persons identified as chronic alcoholics suffering from psychoses, as defined in AS 47.30.056(b)(3) and (f); in preparing the plan of services for persons identified in this paragraph, the department shall coordinate with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority and the Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse;
  9. use money awarded to the department by grant or contract from the mental health trust settlement income account established under AS 37.14.036 and appropriated from the general fund to provide the necessary services identified in (8) of this section and in accordance with AS 47.30.056 .

History. (§ 2 ch 163 SLA 1966; am §§ 1, 3 ch 101 SLA 1970; am § 3 ch 117 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 71 § 9 (1988); am § 27 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 29 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (7) was enacted as § 3, ch. 101, SLA 1970 and was codified in 1970.

In 1996, in paragraph (9) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Collateral references. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Drugs and Controlled Substances, § 259 et seq.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, §§ 140-144.

Sec. 47.30.475. Grant-in-aid program.

  1. A nonprofit corporation, a city or borough government, or other political subdivision of the state, or a combination of these, is eligible for grant-in-aid funds under this section. Applications shall be sent to the department.
  2. Money available under this section shall be awarded by the department to applicants on the basis of community need, but only after consideration of comment and advice of the Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. In awarding grants, the department shall further consider the amount of money that is available for all applications and whether an application would contribute to the wise development of a comprehensive program of alcoholic and drug abuse rehabilitation and prevention.
  3. Grants shall be awarded in a ratio of 75 percent state money to 25 percent community money for the costs of providing staff and limited improvement, renovation, or new construction of facilities for alcohol or drug detoxification, rehabilitation, or “half-way house” care. The department may waive all or part of the requirement that state money be matched by community money if the department finds that community money is unavailable and waiver of the requirement is in the best interests of the state. A grant for improving, renovating, or constructing may not exceed $50,000 except when there is a lack of applicants for available money and then only with the approval of the Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. The department is not required to award all money available under this program, or the full percentages specified in this subsection, when another source of money is available or could reasonably be made available to the applicant.
  4. Money used by the applicant to qualify for state money may be from any source other than the state.  The cost of developing an application is not reimbursable from the grant. The value of real property to be used directly in conjunction with the grant may be used in calculating the required amount of community money, as allowed by regulations of the department.
  5. A grant may not be awarded under this section unless the application includes a plan that provides for
    1. the expenditure of grant money for education and other preventative measures, or the treatment of alcoholics and drug abusers;
    2. the reception of advice and comment from a local advisory board, or, if a local advisory board cannot be formed because the area is sparsely populated, from the governing bodies of private nonprofit health organizations, regarding the design, implementation, and evaluation of the plan and action to be taken;
    3. goals, expressed in quantifiable terms that express the intended effect of the assistance provided under the plan upon the number of individuals needing or utilizing that assistance.
  6. The department shall monitor the implementation of the plan required under (e) of this section, and shall terminate payment of grant money if the plan is not implemented or approval of the program as a public or private treatment program under AS 47.37.140 is not granted within one year of the award of the grant, or is suspended, revoked, limited, or restricted. Modification of the plan required by (e) of this section shall be approved by the department before implementation of the modification.
  7. The department shall provide management training for persons administering a program receiving grant money under this section.
  8. If the department determines, after the award of a grant under (c) of this section, that the community is capable of bearing a greater portion of the cost of a program than originally determined, the department may
    1. reduce the award by that portion of the cost of a program that the department subsequently determined the community could bear; or
    2. terminate payment of the grant entirely.

History. (§ 2 ch 101 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 126 SLA 1975; am §§ 1, 2 ch 116 SLA 1978; am § 33 ch 168 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 71 §§ 10 — 12 (1988); am §§ 20, 21 ch 6 SLA 1993; am §§ 26, 27 ch 36 SLA 1993; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective September 4, 2003, in the first sentence in subsection (c) substituted “75 percent” for “90 percent” and “25 percent” for “10 percent.”

Collateral references. —

Alcoholic as entitled to public assistance under poor laws. 43 ALR3d 554.

Sec. 47.30.477. Grant-in-aid program regulations.

The department shall adopt regulations implementing AS 47.30.475 . The regulations must provide for the method of application, the time for consideration of applications, the processing of applications, the type of record keeping, the requirements for reporting the progress and statistics regarding the program, and the notification of the applicant as to the action taken on the application. The department shall also establish the necessary forms of application and may adopt other regulations considered necessary to meet the requirements of health and safety and the orderly administration of the grant-in-aid program. The regulations must include reporting requirements that will permit an evaluation of the success of the program.

History. (§ 2 ch 101 SLA 1970; am § 3 ch 116 SLA 1978)

Administrative Code. —

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Sec. 47.30.480. Judicial notice.

The superior courts of this state may take judicial notice of the fact that an alcoholic is suffering from an illness and is in need of proper medical, advisory, or rehabilitative treatment.

History. (§ 2 ch 163 SLA 1966)

Sec. 47.30.490. Acceptance of funds.

The department may accept on behalf of the state and deposit, apart from other public funds, grants from the federal government or gifts or contributions from other sources to assist in carrying out the purposes of AS 47.30.470 .

History. (§ 2 ch 163 SLA 1966)

Sec. 47.30.500. Definitions.

In AS 47.30.470 47.30.490 ,

  1. “alcoholism” means a condition related to alcohol and concerns a physical compulsion which exists, coupled with a mental obsession;
  2. “costs of improvement, renovation, or new construction of facilities” includes, in addition to costs directly related to the project, the sum total of all costs of financing and carrying out the project; these include, but are not limited to, the costs of all necessary studies, surveys, plans and specifications, architectural, engineering, or other special services, acquisition of real property, site preparation and development, purchase, construction, reconstruction, and improvement of real property, and the acquisition of machinery and equipment as may be necessary in connection with the project; an allocable portion of the administrative and operating expenses of the grantee; the cost of financing the project, including interest on bonds issued to finance the project; and the cost of other items, including any indemnity and surety bonds and premiums on insurance, legal fees, fees and expenses of trustees, depositaries, financial advisors, and paying agents for the bonds issued as the issuer considers necessary;
  3. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services.

History. (§ 2 ch 163 SLA 1966; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 2 ch 126 SLA 1975; am § 34 ch 168 SLA 1978; am § 33 ch 23 SLA 1995)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1984 to alphabetize the terms defined.

Notes to Decisions

Chronic alcoholism per se cannot be pled as criminal defense. —

It cannot be concluded on the current state of medical knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication. Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1969).

Defendant was not entitled to be relieved of accountability for the offense of public drunkenness because of his habits and drinking pattern in the use of alcoholic beverages. To impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction of that offense is not the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1969).

Article 5. Community Mental Health Services Act.

Administrative Code. —

For community mental health services, see 7 AAC 71.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Community mental health grantees who receive funds from the Department of Health and Social Services through the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities are required to report to the department and DMHDD all income they receive, including Medicaid, insurance claims, cash, and any other third-party payments. Grantees are required to disclose all funding sources, apart from the grant awarded by the department, if the income is earned by the grant project. Insurance reimbursements are encompassed in the definition of grant income. 1999 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10.

This statutory framework allows the state to provide the support needed for communities to establish community mental health centers. However, the framework also clearly envisions a system whereby community mental health centers seek funding from other sources to augment funding received from the Department of Health and Social Services through a grant. Grants from the department are not a sole source of funding for any grantee. 1999 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10.

Sec. 47.30.520. Legislative purpose.

It is the purpose of the Community Mental Health Services Act to

  1. provide a range of community-based inpatient, outpatient, and support services for persons with mental disorders;
  2. assist communities in planning, organizing, and financing community mental health services through locally developed, administered, and controlled community mental health programs;
  3. better develop and use resources at both state and local levels;
  4. develop and implement plans for comprehensive mental health services based on demonstrated need on a regional basis;
  5. improve the effectiveness of existing mental health services;
  6. integrate state-operated and community mental health programs into a unified mental health system;
  7. ensure that consumers, families, and representatives of communities within mental health planning regions can participate in planning for, determining the need for, and allocating mental health resources;
  8. provide a means of allocating money available for state mental health services according to community needs;
  9. encourage the full use of all existing public or private agencies, facilities, personnel, and funds to accomplish these objectives; and
  10. prevent unnecessary duplication and fragmentation of services and expenditures.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 1 ch 47 SLA 1987; am § 28 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 30 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

Sec. 47.30.523. Community mental health program policy and principles.

  1. It is the policy of the state that
    1. the community mental health program provide a comprehensive and integrated system of community-based facilities, supports, and mental health services, including child and adolescent screening and diagnosis, inpatient, outpatient, prevention, consultation, and education services;
    2. persons most in need of community mental health services receive appropriate services as provided under AS 47.30.056 ;
    3. the community mental health program be coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with the programs established under AS 47.37, AS 47.65, AS 47.80, and other programs affecting the well being of persons in need of mental health services.
  2. Community mental health program service delivery principles include the principles that persons
    1. have ready and prompt access to necessary screening, diagnosis, and treatment;
    2. receiving community mental health services be informed of their rights, including their rights to confidentiality and to treatment with dignity;
    3. be provided community mental health services by staff and programs that reflect the culture, linguistic, and other social characteristics of their community and that incorporate multidisciplinary professional staff to meet client functional levels and diagnostic and treatment needs;
    4. in need of community mental health services, and their families, be encouraged to participate in formulating, delivering, and evaluating treatment and rehabilitation;
    5. in need of community mental health services be provided treatment and rehabilitation services designed to minimize institutionalization and maximize individual potential;
    6. be treated in the least restrictive alternative environment consistent with their treatment needs, enabling the person to live as normally as possible;
    7. be provided necessary treatment as close to the person’s home as possible;
    8. be informed of and allowed to participate in planning their own treatment as much as possible.

History. (§ 29 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.530. Duties of department.

  1. The department shall administer the provisions of AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 and shall
    1. define and develop standards for various levels and qualities of mental health care;
    2. provide fiscal and professional technical assistance in planning, organizing, developing, implementing, and administering local mental health services;
    3. develop budgets and receive and distribute state appropriations and funds in accordance with the provisions of AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 ;
    4. establish standards of education and experience for professional, technical, and administrative personnel employed in community mental health services;
    5. assist the community in establishing the organization and operation of community mental health services;
    6. develop a standardized system for measuring and reporting to the department the types, quantities, and quality of services; and develop a cost accounting system that will demonstrate the cost of various levels and qualities of care;
    7. provide each local community planning and services delivery entity with statistics, reports, and other data relevant to development of indices indicating the need for mental health services, or relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of existing services;
    8. review each local community plan and require each plan to include
      1. an affirmative showing that the most effective and economic use will be made of all available public and private resources in the community including careful consideration of the most effective and economic alternative forms and patterns of services;
      2. a five-year projection of needs, services, and resources; and
      3. adequate provisions for review and evaluation of services provided in the local community;
    9. adopt regulations and establish priorities, after consultation with local communities affected and in conjunction with the Alaska Mental Health Board, that are necessary to carry out the purposes of AS 47.30.520 — 47.30.620.
  2. In performing its duties under (a) of this section, the department shall coordinate with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established in AS 47.30.011 .

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 30 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 31 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For scope, see 7 AAC 71, art. 1.

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

For standards for operation of a community mental health center, see 7 AAC 71, art. 3.

For client rights, see 7 AAC 71, art. 4.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Sec. 47.30.540. Local community entities.

  1. A city or borough government or other political subdivision of the state, a nonprofit corporation, or a combination of these, is eligible to receive funds and administer local programs under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 .  In order to ensure equitable access to funds and programs through the state, the department shall determine appropriate geographical areas to be served by local programs in consultation with representatives of the geographical areas in question.
  2. An entity designated by the department to receive money under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 shall ensure a broad base of community support as evidenced by a governing board reasonably representative of the professional, civic, and citizen groups in the community and including persons with mental disorders or family members of persons with mental disorders. No more than two members, or 40 percent of the membership, whichever is greater, may be providers of services under the program. In order to receive money under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 , a local community entity shall agree
    1. to give priority to mental health programs and services consistent with the priorities set out in AS 47.30.056 and that provide the maximum services for the least expenditure of money from the mental health trust settlement income account;
    2. to furnish services through a qualified staff meeting reasonable standards of experience and training;
    3. to conform to a state cost accounting system showing the true cost of services rendered, collect fees for services according to a schedule based on an analysis of reasonable ability to pay, and provide that a person may not be refused services because of inability to pay for those services;
    4. to maintain adequate clinical and administrative records and furnish periodic reports to the department;
    5. to furnish the authority and the department an annual report of the preceding fiscal year, including an evaluation of the effectiveness of the previous year’s programs and their costs;
    6. to furnish the authority and the department satisfactory needs assessments for the population and area it serves and an annual update of a long-range planning and budget statement that describes program goals for the coming year, the steps and resources necessary to implement the goals, the projected means by which these resources will be secured, and the procedures necessary to evaluate the program;
    7. to furnish the department with confidential and other information about recipients of services paid for, in whole or part, under AS 47.30.520 — 47.30.620 and comply with regulations of the department regarding the submission of this information; and
    8. to notify the department immediately of emergency situations involving recipients of services paid for, in whole or in part, under AS 47.30.520 — 47.30.620 and comply with regulations of the department regarding this notification; for purposes of this paragraph, “emergency situations” include the disappearance, injury, or death of a recipient.
  3. Members of local governing boards may be reimbursed for necessary travel expenses incurred in the organization and operation of local programs as may be determined by the department.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 31 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 2 ch 74 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Administrative Code. —

For scope, see 7 AAC 71, art. 1.

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

For standards for operation of a community mental health center, see 7 AAC 71, art. 3.

For client rights, see 7 AAC 71, art. 4.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Sec. 47.30.545. Populations to be served.

The entities designated by the department to receive money under AS 47.30.540(b) shall provide one or more of the services that are set out in AS 47.30.056(i) to persons identified in AS 47.30.056 .

History. (§ 2 ch 47 SLA 1987; am § 32 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.546. Services for mentally and emotionally disturbed. [Repealed, § 49 ch 66 SLA 1991.]

Sec. 47.30.547. Standards for community mental health services.

An entity that provides community mental health services shall

  1. make services available at times and locations that enable residents of the entity’s service area to obtain services readily;
  2. ensure each client’s right to confidentiality and treatment with dignity;
  3. establish staffing patterns of qualified and trained personnel that reflect the cultural, linguistic, and other social characteristics of the community and that incorporate multidisciplinary professional staff to meet client functional levels and diagnostic and treatment needs;
  4. promote client and family participation in formulating, delivering, and evaluating treatment and rehabilitation;
  5. design screening, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation services to maximize individual potential and to minimize institutionalization; and
  6. provide services in the least restrictive setting, enabling the person receiving the services to live as normally as possible.

History. (§ 2 ch 47 SLA 1987; am § 33 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.550. Cost sharing formulas; use of income.

  1. In a district designated by the department as a poverty area, the department may fund not more than 90 percent of the eligible costs of the community mental health services to be furnished under an entity’s approved plan.
  2. In a district that has not been designated by the department as a poverty area, the department may fund not more than 75 percent of the eligible costs of the community mental health services to be furnished under an entity’s approved plan.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, if the department determines that sufficient funds from other sources are unavailable, then the department shall fund the percent of the eligible costs that is necessary in order to ensure that services for chronically mentally ill adults and severely mentally ill children, and other community mental health services to be furnished under an entity’s approved plan are made available by the entity. Funding under this subsection is subject to the availability of legislative appropriations for the purpose.
  4. Income earned by an entity through a community mental health project funded under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 shall be used to augment or enhance the entity’s mental health services.
  5. In (a) and (b) of this section, “poverty area” means a census district in which at least 15 percent of the population, based upon the most recent census data, falls under 125 percent of the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Poverty Income Guidelines for Alaska, as reported in the Federal Register.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 3 ch 47 SLA 1987; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 1991; am § 32 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 55 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Administrative Code. —

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “data” for “date” in subsection (e).

Sec. 47.30.560. Contracts and expenditures.

The contracts for services provided for in AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 shall be reviewed, revised if necessary, and approved at the expiration of each contract year. A contract shall be approved if the department finds that the community entity has complied with its plan, AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 , and any applicable regulations adopted by the department. Expenditures for the purchase of services shall be made in accordance with the approved contract, budgets, and program projections.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975)

Administrative Code. —

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

Sec. 47.30.570. Regulations; eligible services and costs.

The department shall adopt regulations specifying the types of services and program costs eligible for state participation. These regulations must include

  1. a provision excluding capital expenditures as eligible costs; and
  2. a requirement that the community entity contractor or applicant agrees as a condition of contract approval that it will not supplant existing local fund support of community mental health services with funds received under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 and that it will continue local funding support of community mental health services, in any year in which it contracts with the department, at a level that is at least equal to the local funding support in the previous year.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975)

Administrative Code. —

For contracts for services, see 7 AAC 71, art. 2.

Sec. 47.30.580. Comprehensive services.

Plans and regulations adopted under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 must allow local programs sufficient administrative and program flexibility so that local community mental health programs may be joined with other programs such as intellectual and developmental disability programs, drug abuse programs, alcoholism programs, and comprehensive mental health services programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 24 ch 42 SLA 2013)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, substituted “intellectual and developmental disability” for “mental retardation”.

Sec. 47.30.590. Patient rights and the confidential nature of records and information.

  1. The department shall adopt regulations to assure patient rights and to safeguard the confidential nature of records and information about the recipients of services provided under this chapter. The regulations must require that entities identified in AS 47.30.540(b) develop and include in any plan submitted for approval adequate provisions for safeguarding confidential information. The regulations must provide for disclosure of confidential information to parents or guardians, to mental health professionals providing services to a recipient, and to other appropriate service agencies when it is in the defined best interests of the patient.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department is authorized to review, obtain, and copy confidential and other records and information about the clients of services requested or furnished under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 to evaluate compliance with those statutes. The department may obtain the records and information regarding clients from the client or directly from an entity designated by the department under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 that furnished those services. Records obtained by the department under this subsection are medical records, shall be handled confidentially, and are exempt from public inspection and copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 .

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am § 34 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 3 ch 74 SLA 2001)

Administrative Code. —

For client rights, see 7 AAC 71, art. 4.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Sec. 47.30.600. Applicability to existing programs. [Repealed, § 6 ch 47 SLA 1987.]

Sec. 47.30.605. Mental Health Advisory Council. [Repealed, § 13 ch 48 SLA 1987.]

Sec. 47.30.610. Definitions.

In AS 47.30.520 47.30.610 ,

  1. “authority” means the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established in AS 47.30.011 ;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “persons with mental disorders” means persons with disorders currently included within nationally accepted diagnostic systems of the mental health professions;
  4. “trust” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.061 .

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975; am §§ 4, 5 ch 47 SLA 1987; am § 35 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.620. Short title.

AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 may be cited as the Community Mental Health Services Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 121 SLA 1975)

Article 6. State Mental Health Policy.

Administrative Code. —

For civil commitment, see 7 AAC 72.

Sec. 47.30.655. Purpose and principles of major revision.

The purpose of the 1981 major revision of Alaska civil commitment statutes (AS 47.30.660 and 47.30.670 47.30.915 ) is to more adequately protect the legal rights of persons suffering from mental illness. The legislature has attempted to balance the individual’s constitutional right to physical liberty and the state’s interest in protecting society from persons who are dangerous to others and protecting persons who are dangerous to themselves by providing due process safeguards at all stages of commitment proceedings. In addition, the following principles of modern mental health care have guided this revision:

  1. that persons be given every reasonable opportunity to accept voluntary treatment before involvement with the judicial system;
  2. that persons be treated in the least restrictive alternative environment consistent with their treatment needs;
  3. that treatment occur as promptly as possible and as close to the individual’s home as possible;
  4. that a system of mental health community facilities and supports be available;
  5. that patients be informed of their rights and be informed of and allowed to participate in their treatment program as much as possible;
  6. that persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others be committed only if there is a reasonable expectation of improving their mental condition.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 1 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Revisor’s notes. —

The parenthetical reference in the first sentence was added in 1981 under AS 01.05.031 , and revised in 1987 to reflect the enactment of AS 47.30.661 47.30.666 .

Notes to Decisions

No less restrictive alternative available. —

Where a patient believed that she had to take unprescribed illegally obtained amphetamines and Oxycontin to manage the stresses of bipolar disorder, an involuntary commitment to a psychiatric institute for a period not to exceed 30 days was reasonable. No less restrictive alternative was available. In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012).

State had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, a respondent was gravely disabled and commitment was the least restrictive alter- native because proving an inability to function independently with support, when relevant, was part of the burden to prove no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., 375 P.3d 51 (Alaska 2016).

Conflict with substantive law. —

Statement of purpose found in paragraph (6) conflicts with the substantive commitment statutes, and the substantive statutes control. The legislature’s specific requirement that the state allege that a gravely disabled person’s condition will improve indicates that no such requirement exists in the case of mentally ill persons likely to harm themselves or others. If the legislature intended to require that the state allege that mentally ill persons likely to harm themselves would be improved by treatment, it could have done so — as it did for gravely disabled people. The state is not required to show a likelihood that, in the case of a mentally ill person who poses a danger to himself, treatment will improve his condition. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Improvement. —

There was substantial evidentiary support for the finding that there was reason to believe a patient's mental condition could be improved with treatment because a psychiatric nurse practitioner testified that the patient had already seen slight improvement. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Burden of proof. —

When the State seeks to commit a mentally ill person on a theory of grave disability, it must prove a reasonable expectation of improvement with treatment; this showing must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 47.30.660. Powers and duties of department.

  1. The department shall
    1. prepare, and periodically revise and amend, a plan for an integrated comprehensive mental health program, as that term is defined by AS 47.30.056(i) ; the preparation of the plan and any revision or amendment of it shall
      1. be made in conjunction with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority;
      2. be coordinated with federal, state, regional, local, and private entities involved in mental health services;
    2. in planning expenditures from the mental health trust settlement income account, conform to the regulations adopted by the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority under AS 47.30.031(b)(5) ; and
    3. implement an integrated comprehensive system of care that, within the limits of money appropriated for that purpose and using grants and contracts that are to be paid for from the mental health trust settlement income account, meets the service needs of the beneficiaries of the trust established under the Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act of 1956, as determined by the plan.
  2. The department, in fulfilling its duties under this section and through its division responsible for mental health, shall
    1. administer a comprehensive program of services for persons with mental disorders, for the prevention of mental illness, and for the care and treatment of persons with mental disorders, including inpatient and outpatient care and treatment and the procurement of services of specialists or other persons on a contractual or other basis;
    2. take the actions and undertake the obligations that are necessary to participate in federal grants-in-aid programs and accept federal or other financial aid from whatever sources for the study, prevention, examination, care, and treatment of persons with mental disorders;
    3. administer AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 ;
    4. designate, operate, and maintain treatment facilities equipped and qualified to provide inpatient and outpatient care and treatment for persons with mental disorders;
    5. provide for the placement of patients with mental disorders in designated treatment facilities;
    6. enter into arrangements with governmental agencies for the care or treatment of persons with mental disorders in facilities of the governmental agencies in the state or in another state;
    7. enter into contracts with treatment facilities for the custody and care or treatment of persons with mental disorders; contracts under this paragraph are governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code);
    8. enter into contracts, which incorporate safeguards consistent with AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 and the preservation of the civil rights of the patients with another state for the custody and care or treatment of patients previously committed from this state under 48 U.S.C. 46 et seq., and P.L. 84-830, 70 Stat. 709;
    9. prescribe the form of applications, records, reports, requests for release, and consents to medical or psychological treatment required by AS 47.30.660 — 47.30.915;
    10. require reports from the head of a treatment facility concerning the care of patients;
    11. visit each treatment facility at least annually to review methods of care or treatment for patients;
    12. investigate complaints made by a patient or an interested party on behalf of a patient;
    13. delegate upon mutual agreement to another officer or agency of it, or a political subdivision of the state, or a treatment facility designated, any of the duties and powers imposed upon it by AS 47.30.660 — 47.30.915;
    14. after consultation with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, adopt regulations to implement the provisions of AS 47.30.660 — 47.30.915;
    15. provide technical assistance and training to providers of mental health services; and
    16. set standards under which each designated treatment facility shall provide programs to meet patients’ medical, psychological, social, vocational, educational, and recreational needs.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 59 ch 106 SLA 1986; am § 36 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 2 ch 109 SLA 1992; am § 33 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 74 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994. In 2008, in (a)(2) of this section, “AS 47.30.031(b)(5) ” was substituted for “AS 47.30.031(b)(6) ” to reflect the 2008 renumbering of AS 47.30.031(b)(6) .

Administrative Code. —

For standards for operation of a community mental health center, see 7 AAC 71, art. 3.

For scope and applicability, see 7 AAC 72, art. 1.

For designation of facilities, see 7 AAC 72, art. 2.

For requirements for designated facilities, see 7 AAC 72, art. 3.

For procedures for emergency examinations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 4.

For procedures for evaluations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 5.

For procedures for designation of evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 6.

For procedures for evaluations conducted by evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 7.

For appeals, see 7 AAC 72, art. 9.

For mental health treatment assistance program, see 7 AAC 72, art. 10.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, rewrote the lead-in language of (b), which read, “The department, in fulfilling its duties under this section and through its division of mental health and developmental disabilities, shall”.

Opinions of attorney general. —

The commissioner of Health and Social Services is clearly vested with the discretion to designate a properly licensed private facility for placement of persons civilly committed by the courts to the commissioner’s custody, and such discretion exists whether such commitments be pursuant to AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , AS 12.47.090 , or AS 12.47.110 ; however, a statutory revision to more clearly define such powers and duties regarding criminal commitments would be beneficial. July 8, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 1 et seq.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, § 1 et seq.

56 C.J.S., Mental Health, § 1 et seq.

Article 7. Alaska Mental Health Board.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and purpose of the Act that enacted this article, see § 1, ch. 48, SLA 1987 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.30.661. Alaska Mental Health Board.

The Alaska Mental Health Board is established. For budgetary purposes, the board is located within the department. The board is the state planning and coordinating agency for the purposes of federal and state laws relating to the mental health program of the state. The purpose of the board is to assist the state in ensuring an integrated comprehensive mental health program.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987)

Sec. 47.30.662. Composition; non-voting members.

  1. The board consists of not fewer than 12 nor more than 16 members appointed by the governor, with due regard for the demographics of the state and balanced geographic representation of the state. The membership and committees of the board shall fulfill the requirements of P.L. 99-660, as amended.
  2. Not less than one-half of the members shall be persons with a mental disorder identified in AS 47.30.056(b)(1) or members of their families.
  3. The board members
    1. shall include the director of the division of the department responsible for mental health; and
    2. may include representatives of the principal state agencies with respect to education, vocational rehabilitation, criminal justice, housing, social services, medical assistance, substance abuse, and aging.
  4. Board members appointed under (c) of this section may not vote on matters before the board.
  5. The board members shall include at least two licensed mental health professionals who represent public and private providers of mental health services and at least one member who is admitted to practice law in the state. Members appointed under this subsection may also be family members identified under (b) of this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987; am § 37 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 34 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 75 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions relating to members of the board as affected by the 1991 and 1994 amendments, see § 46, ch. 5, FSSLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (c)(1), substituted “division of the department responsible for mental health” for “division of mental health and developmental disabilities in the department”.

Sec. 47.30.663. Terms of office; vacancies; removal.

  1. Board members serve staggered terms of three years.
  2. A vacancy occurring in the membership of the board shall be filled by appointment of the governor for the unexpired portion of the vacated term.
  3. Members may be removed only for cause, including, but not limited to, poor attendance or lack of contribution to the board’s work.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987)

Sec. 47.30.664. Officers and staff.

  1. The board, by a majority of its membership, shall annually elect a chair and other officers it considers necessary from among its membership.
  2. The board shall have a paid staff provided by the department, including, but not limited to, an executive director who shall be selected by the board. The executive director is in the partially exempt service and may hire additional employees in the classified service of the state. The department shall provide for the assignment of personnel to the board to ensure the board has the capacity to fulfill its responsibilities. The executive director of the board shall be directly responsible to the board in the performance of the director’s duties.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987; am § 38 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.665. Bylaws.

The board, on approval of a majority of its membership and consistent with state law, shall adopt and amend bylaws governing its composition, proceedings, and other activities consistent with state law and including, but not limited to, provisions concerning a quorum to transact board business and other aspects of procedure, frequency and location of meetings, and establishment, functions, and membership of committees.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987)

Sec. 47.30.666. Duties of the board.

The board is the state planning and coordinating body for the purpose of federal and state laws relating to mental health services for persons with mental disorders identified in AS 47.30.056(b)(1) . On behalf of those persons, the board shall

  1. prepare and maintain a comprehensive plan of treatment and rehabilitation services;
  2. propose an annual implementation plan consistent with the comprehensive plan and with due regard for the findings from evaluation of existing programs;
  3. provide a public forum for the discussion of issues related to the mental health services for which the board has planning and coordinating responsibility;
  4. advocate the needs of persons with mental disorders before the governor, executive agencies, the legislature, and the public;
  5. advise the legislature, the governor, the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, and other state agencies in matters affecting persons with mental disorders, including, but not limited to,
    1. development of necessary services for diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation;
    2. evaluation of the effectiveness of programs in the state for diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation;
    3. legal processes that affect screening, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation;
  6. provide to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority for its review and consideration recommendations concerning the integrated comprehensive mental health program for those persons who are described in AS 47.30.056(b)(1) and the use of money in the mental health trust settlement income account in a manner consistent with regulations adopted under AS 47.30.031 ; and
  7. submit periodic reports regarding its planning, evaluation, advocacy, and other activities.

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987; am § 39 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 35 ch 5 FSSLA 1994)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (6) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Sec. 47.30.667. Compensation, per diem, and expenses.

The board members appointed under AS 47.30.662(b) and (e) are not entitled to a salary, but are entitled to per diem, reimbursement for travel, and other expenses authorized by law for boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180 .

History. (§ 40 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.30.669. Definition.

In AS 47.30.661 47.30.669 , “board” means the Alaska Mental Health Board established in AS 47.30.661 .

History. (§ 6 ch 48 SLA 1987)

Article 8. Voluntary Admission for Treatment.

Sec. 47.30.670. Criteria for voluntary admission.

A person 18 years of age or older may be voluntarily admitted to a treatment facility if the person is suffering from mental illness and voluntarily signs the admission papers.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 2 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.675. Required notices.

  1. Upon the application of a person for voluntary admission, or at the time a person admitted under AS 47.30.690 reaches the age of 18, the person shall be given a copy of the following documents which shall be explained as necessary:
    1. notice of rights as set out in AS 47.30.825 47.30.865 and an explanation of any document served upon the person; and
    2. notice that should the person desire to leave at a time when the treatment facility determines that the person is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause serious harm to self or others or is gravely disabled, the facility could initiate commitment proceedings against the person.
  2. If an applicant for voluntary admission does not understand English, the explanation shall be given in a language the applicant understands.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 3 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 47.30.680. Required discharge.

A patient who no longer meets the standards established in AS 47.30.670 shall be discharged from the treatment facility.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.685. Request to leave; evaluation; 48-hour hold for commitment.

A voluntary patient who is 18 years of age or older and who desires to leave a treatment facility shall submit to the facility a request to leave on a form provided by the facility. When the investigation is completed, the patient shall be evaluated immediately in writing and discharged immediately or given written notice that involuntary commitment proceedings will be initiated against the patient. The treatment facility may detain the patient for no more than 48 hours after receipt of the patient’s request to leave in order to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 4 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.690. Admission of minors under 18 years of age.

  1. A minor under the age of 18 may be admitted for 30 days of evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment at a designated treatment facility if the minor’s parent or guardian signs the admission papers and if, in the opinion of the professional person in charge,
    1. the minor is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and as a result is likely to cause serious harm to the minor or others;
    2. there is no less restrictive alternative available for the minor’s treatment; and
    3. there is reason to believe that the minor’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate further if untreated.
  2. A guardian ad litem for a minor admitted under this section shall be appointed under AS 25.24.310 to monitor the best interests of the minor as soon as possible after the minor’s admission.  If the guardian ad litem finds that placement is not appropriate, the guardian ad litem may request that an attorney be appointed under AS 25.24.310 to represent the minor. The attorney may request a hearing on behalf of the minor during the 30-day admittance.
  3. The minor may be released by the treatment facility at any time if the professional person in charge or the minor’s designated mental health professional determines the minor would no longer benefit from continued treatment and the minor is not dangerous.  The minor’s parents or guardian must be notified by the facility of the contemplated release.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 5 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

Initial evaluation order was affirmed because it was consistent with due process; the Office of Children’s Services was not a parent or guardian authorized to use the statute to admit children in its custody for mental health treatment, and because OCS’s authority over a child’s medical care was statutory, it was subject to statutory boundaries. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of April S., 499 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.693. Notice to parent or guardian of minor.

When a minor under 18 years of age is detained at or admitted or committed to a treatment facility, the facility shall inform the parent or guardian of the location of the minor as soon as possible after the arrival of the minor at the facility.

History. (§ 6 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.695. Request by parent or guardian for release of minors under 18 years of age from detention and commitment.

The parent or guardian of a minor who is less than 18 years of age may file a notice to withdraw the minor from the facility. On receipt of the notice,

  1. the facility may discharge the minor to the custody of the parent or guardian; or
  2. if, in the opinion of the treating physician, release of the minor would be seriously detrimental to the minor’s health, the treating physician may
    1. discharge the minor to the custody of the parent or guardian after advising the parent or guardian that this action is against medical advice and after receiving a written acknowledgment of the advice; or
    2. refuse to discharge the minor, initiate involuntary commitment proceedings, and continue to hold the minor until a court order under AS 47.30.700 has been issued; or
  3. if, in the opinion of the treating physician, the minor is likely to cause serious harm to self or others and there is reason to believe the release could place the minor in imminent danger, the treating physician shall refuse to discharge the minor, and shall initiate involuntary commitment proceedings and continue to hold the minor until a court order under AS 47.30.700 has been issued.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 7 ch 142 SLA 1984; am § 28 ch 58 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 10, 2010, moved “the facility may” from the introductory language to the beginning of (1); in (2)(A), substituted “acknowledgment” for “acknowledgement”.

Article 9. Involuntary Admission for Treatment.

Sec. 47.30.700. Initial involuntary commitment procedures.

  1. Upon petition of any adult, a judge shall immediately conduct a screening investigation or direct a local mental health professional employed by the department or by a local mental health program that receives money from the department under AS 47.30.520 47.30.620 or another mental health professional designated by the judge, to conduct a screening investigation of the person alleged to be mentally ill and, as a result of that condition, alleged to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others. Within 48 hours after the completion of the screening investigation, a judge may issue an ex parte order orally or in writing, stating that there is probable cause to believe the respondent is mentally ill and that condition causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others.  The court shall provide findings on which the conclusion is based, appoint an attorney to represent the respondent, and may direct that a peace officer take the respondent into custody and deliver the respondent to the nearest appropriate facility for emergency examination or treatment.  The ex parte order shall be provided to the respondent and made a part of the respondent’s clinical record.  The court shall confirm an oral order in writing within 24 hours after it is issued.
  2. The petition required in (a) of this section must allege that the respondent is reasonably believed to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others or is gravely disabled as a result of mental illness and must specify the factual information on which that belief is based including the names and addresses of all persons known to the petitioner who have knowledge of those facts through personal observation.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Administrative Code. —

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Elements. —

AS 47.30.700 identifies three key events that must occur before an individual may be involuntarily hospitalized. First, an adult must petition a superior court for the respondent's involuntary hospitalization. Second, a judge or mental health professional must conduct a screening investigation to evaluate the allegations in the petition. Third, the court must find probable cause that the respondent is mentally ill and that this mental illness causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others. Only then may a judge issue an ex parte order for the respondent's involuntary hospitalization. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Process the minor received, an immediate ex parte inquiry, complied with due process even though she was not given an opportunity to participate; because the minor’s initial hospitalization was consistent with due process, the initial evaluation order was affirmed. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of April S., 499 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2021).

Public interest mootness exception for appeal. —

Allegedly mentally ill woman’s contest of an evaluation order was considered under the public interest mootness exception because the disputed is- sues did not depend heavily on the woman’s unique facts and could arise in any AS 47.30.710(b) evaluation petition, evaluation orders would repeatedly circumvent review as a 72-hour confinement period would expire before hearing an appeal, and the scope and interpretation of statutes letting the state curtail liberty are of significant importance. In re Heather R., 366 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2016).

Scope of immunity for court-appointed doctor. —

In a mental health patient’s medical malpractice suit, although the doctor might not have followed proper procedure when evaluating plaintiff patient in making the decision to discharge her by not providing her with an aftercare plan, the doctor was appointed by court order to evaluate the patient’s mental health and to make recommendations regarding whether she should be released or committed involuntarily; thus, the complaints were about acts that were integrally linked to the doctor’s judicially-appointed function and absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied. Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234 (Alaska 2007).

Failure to interview patient. —

Evaluation order was vacated because a master did not interview an allegedly mentally ill woman as AS 47.30.700 required, ask a mental health professional to do so, or find an interview was not reasonably possible, the error was not harmless, as a probable cause finding was minimally supported, so the lack of an interview prejudiced the hearing’s outcome, and the credibility of lay persons making allegations was not found. In re Heather R., 366 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2016).

Under the language of AS 47.30.700 and AS 47.30.915 , a screening investigation should omit an interview with the respondent only if such an interview would not be reasonably possible. Case law confirms that a screening investigation should, if reasonably possible, include an interview with the respondent. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Taken together, AS 47.30.700 and AS 47.30.915 (19) indicate that: (1) the required screening investigation should take place after a petition has been filed, and (2) the screening investigation should, if possible, include an interview with the respondent. Accordingly the statutory language supports the assertion that a court violates AS 47.30.700 when it neither ensures that a post-petition interview with the respondent is conducted nor attempts to determine whether conducting such an interview would be reasonably possible. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

After a court is petitioned to involuntarily hospitalize a respondent under AS 47.30.700 , the court must either itself conduct a screening investigation or appoint a local mental health professional to do so. This screening investigation must include post-petition interviews with the person(s) making the allegations, any other significant witnesses, and if reasonably possible, the respondent. AS 47.30.915 (19). In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Court's error in failing to conduct an adequate screening investigation was not harmless error as there was little evidence for the finding that respondent threatened self-harm. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Reviewing an Indian child's hospitalization order under the public interest exception to the mootness, doctrine, the order violated Alaska's commitment statutes in a manner prejudicial to the child where, after finding that the child was not in emergency custody when a physician's assistant petitioned for hospitalization, the superior court failed to conduct a screening investigation of the petition's allegations or direct a mental health professional to do so, thereby violating AS 47.30.700 . The error was not harmless where the evidence supporting the finding that the child was likely to harm herself or other was limited, and thus, interviews with the physician's assistant and the child could have persuaded the court that involuntary hospitalization was unnecessary. In re Gabriella B., — P.3d — (Alaska July 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Even though the trial court erred by failing to perform a screening investigation as required by this section, the error was harmless because the court made findings supported by clear and convincing evidence when ordering a 30-day commitment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Rabi R., 468 P.3d 721 (Alaska 2020).

Involuntary medication. —

Superior court did not err in finding that involuntary medication was in a criminal defendant's best interests. The record showed that the superior court made its own independent conclusions that the administration of medication was in the defendant's best interests and that there were no less intrusive alternatives to involuntary medication. In re Hospitalization of Linda M., 440 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2019).

Evidence sufficient. —

Evidence presented at a civil commitment hearing established that respondent was likely to cause harm to someone where a psychiatrist's cross-examination testimony showed that during an evaluation and while giving testimony, the psychiatrist was considering respondent's recent conduct at the institute where the evaluation occurred, as well as the institute's records of staff encounters with respondent, and that evidence was admissible and deemed credible. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of A.S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 21, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Quoted in

Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).

Stated in

Lord v. State, 262 P.3d 855 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); Maness v. Daily, 184 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2008); In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Meredith B., 462 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2020); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Necessity and sufficiency of statements informing one under investigation for involuntary commitment of right to remain silent. 23 ALR4th 563.

Sec. 47.30.705. Emergency detention for evaluation.

  1. A peace officer, a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed to practice in this state or employed by the federal government, or a clinical psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners who has probable cause to believe that a person is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and is likely to cause serious harm to self or others of such immediate nature that considerations of safety do not allow initiation of involuntary commitment procedures set out in AS 47.30.700 , may cause the person to be taken into custody and delivered to the nearest crisis stabilization center as defined in AS 47.32.900 or the nearest evaluation facility. A person taken into custody for emergency evaluation may not be placed in a jail or other correctional facility except for protective custody purposes and only while awaiting transportation to a crisis stabilization center or treatment facility. However, emergency protective custody under this section may not include placement of a minor in a jail or secure facility. The peace officer or mental health professional shall complete an application for examination of the person in custody and be interviewed by a mental health professional at the crisis stabilization center, evaluation facility, or treatment facility.
  2. In this section, “minor” means an individual who is under 18 years of age.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 8 ch 142 SLA 1984; am §§ 3, 4 ch 95 SLA 2004; am § 4 ch 28 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners” was substituted for “Psychologists and Psychological Examiners” to correct a manifest error.

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for evaluations conducted by evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 7.

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, inserted the next-to-last sentence in subsection (a), and added subsection (b).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 28, 2020, in (a), inserted “crisis stabilization center as defined in AS 47.32.900 or the nearest” near the end of the first sentence, inserted “crisis stabilization center or” following “awaiting transportation to a” near the end of the second sentence, and “crisis stabilization center, evaluation facility, or treatment” near the end of the last sentence.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 95, SLA 2004 (SB 340), proposing legislation conforming the state’s juvenile detention laws with federal requirements set out in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2003, see 2004 Senate Journal 2184.

Notes to Decisions

Involuntary evaluation. —

Superior court's order authorizing the patient's involuntary evaluation, commitment, and medication for treatment of mental illness was affirmed because the patient's attorney agreed that the nurse practitioner was an expert and did not question his testimony or opinions; and the court based its decisions upon the expert's testimony that there was no less restrictive alternative to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute and that the patient was not capable at that time of giving or withholding informed consent to medication. In re: Brandi A., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 23, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Scope of immunity for court-appointed doctor. —

In a mental health patient’s medical malpractice suit, although the doctor might not have followed proper procedure when evaluating plaintiff patient in making the decision to discharge her by not providing her with an aftercare plan, the doctor was appointed by court order to evaluate the patient’s mental health and to make recommendations regarding whether she should be released or committed involuntarily; thus, the complaints were about acts that were integrally linked to the doctor’s judicially appointed function and absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied. Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234 (Alaska 2007).

Quoted in

In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2014); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); City of Kotzebue v. State, 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.710. Examination; hospitalization.

  1. A respondent who is delivered under AS 47.30.700 47.30.705 to an evaluation facility, except for delivery to a crisis stabilization center as defined in AS 47.32.900 , for emergency examination and treatment shall be examined and evaluated as to mental and physical condition by a mental health professional and by a physician within 24 hours after arrival at the facility. A respondent who is delivered under AS 47.30.705 to a crisis stabilization center shall be examined by a mental health professional as defined in AS 47.30.915 within three hours after arriving at the center.
  2. If the mental health professional who performs the emergency examination has reason to believe that the respondent is (1) mentally ill and that condition causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious harm to self or others, and (2) is in need of care or treatment, the mental health professional may hospitalize the respondent, or arrange for hospitalization, on an emergency basis.  If a judicial order has not been obtained under AS 47.30.700 , the mental health professional shall apply for an ex parte order authorizing hospitalization for evaluation.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 5 ch 28 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1981, the word “respondent” was substituted for “person” in (b)(1) of this section to correct a manifest error in § 1, ch. 84, SLA 1981.

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for emergency examinations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 4.

For procedures for evaluations conducted by evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2020 amendment, effective July 28, 2020, in (a), inserted “, except for delivery to a crisis stabilization center as defined in AS 47.32.900 ,” following “an evaluation facility”, and added the second sentence.

Notes to Decisions

Scope of immunity for court-appointed doctor. —

In a mental health patient’s medical malpractice case, although the doctor might not have followed proper procedure when evaluating plaintiff patient in making the decision to discharge her by not providing her with an aftercare plan, the doctor was appointed by court order to evaluate the patient’s mental health and to make recommendations regarding whether she should be released or committed involuntarily; thus, the complaints were about acts that were integrally linked to the doctor’s judicially appointed function and absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied. Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234 (Alaska 2007).

Commitment of individual without personal interview. —

Allegedly mentally ill woman’s contest of an evaluation order was considered under the public interest mootness exception because the disputed is- sues did not depend heavily on the woman’s unique facts and could arise in any AS 47.30.710(b) evaluation petition, evaluation orders would repeatedly circumvent review as a 72-hour confinement period would expire before hearing an appeal, and the scope and interpretation of statutes letting the state curtail liberty are of significant importance. In re Heather R., 366 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2016).

Psychiatric emergency. —

Based on this section’s provision for hospitalization for a 72-hour evaluation on an emergency basis, the legislature clearly envisioned that a psychiatric emergency could continue past the initial emergency detention; the ex parte order authorizing a psychiatric patient’s detention after the initial detention was appropriately issued on an emergency basis under this section. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2014).

Superior court erred in authorizing the involuntary hospitalization of two women for evaluation following psychiatric emergencies. One had dementia and the other had attempted suicide, and because their continued detention before being moved to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) violated their state and federal due process rights where they were not transported to API for more than 14 calendar days after their initial detentions, there was no reasonable relation between the limited purpose of the evaluation orders and the extended duration of the respondents' confinements, and the State's only explanation for the length of the pre-evaluation detentions was API's lack of capacity, which was an insufficient justification. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021).

Quoted in

In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012); In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200 (Alaska 2019); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.30.715. Procedure after order.

When a facility receives a proper order for evaluation, it shall accept the order and the respondent for an evaluation period not to exceed 72 hours. The facility shall promptly notify the court of the date and time of the respondent’s arrival. The court shall set a date, time, and place for a 30-day commitment hearing, to be held if needed within 72 hours after the respondent’s arrival, and the court shall notify the facility, the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney of the hearing arrangements. Evaluation personnel, when used, shall similarly notify the court of the date and time when they first met with the respondent.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 9 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for evaluations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 5.

For procedures for evaluations conducted by evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 7.

Notes to Decisions

Expedited process. —

An involuntarily held psychiatric patient challenged the ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The emergency psychiatric detention and evaluation statutes applied satisfied the requirements of Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007) because they provided for an expedited process that was appropriately protective of the patient’s liberty interests and avoided unnecessarily prolonging his emergency detention. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of A.S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 21, 2021).

Sec. 47.30.720. Release before expiration of 72-hour period.

If at any time in the course of the 72-hour period the mental health professionals conducting the evaluation determine that the respondent does not meet the standards for commitment specified in AS 47.30.700 , the respondent shall be discharged from the facility or the place of evaluation by evaluation personnel and the petitioner and the court so notified.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for evaluations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Scope of immunity for court-appointed doctor. —

In a mental health patient’s medical malpractice suit, although the doctor might not have followed proper procedure when evaluating plaintiff patient in making the decision to discharge her by not providing her with an aftercare plan, the doctor was appointed by court order to evaluate the patient’s mental health and to make recommendations regarding whether she should be released or committed involuntarily; thus, the complaints were about acts that were integrally linked to the doctor’s judicially appointed function and absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied. Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234 (Alaska 2007).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 47.30.725. Rights; notification.

  1. When a respondent is detained for evaluation under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , the respondent shall be immediately notified orally and in writing of the rights under this section. Notification must be in a language understood by the respondent. The respondent’s guardian, if any, and if the respondent requests, an adult designated by the respondent, shall also be notified of the respondent’s rights under this section.
  2. Unless a respondent is released or voluntarily admitted for treatment within 72 hours of arrival at the facility or, if the respondent is evaluated by evaluation personnel, within 72 hours from the beginning of the respondent’s meeting with evaluation personnel, the respondent is entitled to a court hearing to be set for not later than the end of that 72-hour period to determine whether there is cause for detention after the 72 hours have expired for up to an additional 30 days on the grounds that the respondent is mentally ill, and as a result presents a likelihood of serious harm to the respondent or others, or is gravely disabled.  The facility or evaluation personnel shall give notice to the court of the releases and voluntary admissions under AS 47.30.700 47.30.815 .
  3. The respondent has a right to communicate immediately, at the department’s expense, with the respondent’s guardian, if any, or an adult designated by the respondent and the attorney designated in the ex parte order, or an attorney of the respondent’s choice.
  4. The respondent has the right to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses who testify against the respondent at the hearing.
  5. The respondent has the right to be free of the effects of medication and other forms of treatment to the maximum extent possible before the 30-day commitment hearing; however, the facility or evaluation personnel may treat the respondent with medication under prescription by a licensed physician or by a less restrictive alternative of the respondent’s preference if, in the opinion of a licensed physician in the case of medication, or of a mental health professional in the case of alternative treatment, the treatment is necessary to
    1. prevent bodily harm to the respondent or others;
    2. prevent such deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition that subsequent treatment might not enable the respondent to recover; or
    3. allow the respondent to prepare for and participate in the proceedings.
  6. A respondent, if represented by counsel, may waive, orally or in writing, the 72-hour time limit on the 30-day commitment hearing and have the hearing set for a date no more than seven calendar days after arrival at the facility.  The respondent’s counsel shall immediately notify the court of the waiver.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 10 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Right to self-representation. —

Respondent in involuntary commitment proceedings has at least an implied statutory right to self-representation, although that right is not absolute. If a respondent clearly and unequivocally invokes the self-representation right, the superior court must hold a preliminary hearing and consider factors outlined in McCracken v. State to determine whether self-representation should be allowed, and because respondent's self-representation request was denied without adherence to the McCracken framework, the court concluded that the 30-day commitment order had to be vacated. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Arthur A., 457 P.3d 540 (Alaska 2020).

Place of detention. —

Superior court properly rejected simply releasing defendant, and that left only the jail as the immediately available least restrictive alternative for his protection while he was detained awaiting transport; the social worker explicitly testified that she did not believe that defendant had any social supports. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Vern H., 486 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2021).

Use of telephonic testimony at hearing permitted. —

Because involuntary commitment hearing had to occur within 72 hours of the initial detention, the use of telephonic testimony assisted in helping the State protect the patient's interest by providing evidence in a short amount of time. In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Stated in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007); Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State, 239 P.3d 1252 (Alaska 2010); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M., 433 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 47.30.730. Petition for 30-day commitment.

  1. In the course of the 72-hour evaluation period, a petition for commitment to a treatment facility may be filed in court.  The petition must be signed by two mental health professionals who have examined the respondent, one of whom is a physician. The petition must
    1. allege that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others or is gravely disabled;
    2. allege that the evaluation staff has considered but has not found that there are any less restrictive alternatives available that would adequately protect the respondent or others; or, if a less restrictive involuntary form of treatment is sought, specify the treatment and the basis for supporting it;
    3. allege with respect to a gravely disabled respondent that there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought;
    4. allege that a specified treatment facility or less restrictive alternative that is appropriate to the respondent’s condition has agreed to accept the respondent;
    5. allege that the respondent has been advised of the need for, but has not accepted, voluntary treatment, and request that the court commit the respondent to the specified treatment facility or less restrictive alternative for a period not to exceed 30 days;
    6. list the prospective witnesses who will testify in support of commitment or involuntary treatment; and
    7. list the facts and specific behavior of the respondent supporting the allegation in (1) of this subsection.
  2. A copy of the petition shall be served on the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any, before the 30-day commitment hearing.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 11 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for emergency examinations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 4.

For procedures for evaluations, see 7 AAC 72, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

Classifying the minor’s commitment as initially voluntary was error under the parental admission statute as her commitment was involuntary from the start; because the Office of Children’s Services sought to continue her commitment past September 22, longer than the 30 days allowed, it was required to seek a 90-day commitment order; this triggered additional rights for the minor, including the right to a jury trial, as she asserted. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of April S., 499 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2021).

Failure to list witnesses held not plain error. —

Failure to list witnesses in the 30-day petition for commitment as required by paragraph (a)(6) of this section was not plain error where the petition was signed by two state psychiatric hospital physicians and the only witness testifying at the commitment hearing was not a hospital physician. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007), overruled in part, In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Burden of proof. —

Because a petition for a respondent’s involuntary 30-day commitment must allege that evaluation staff has considered but has not found that there are any less restrictive alternatives available that would adequately protect the respondent or others, and because a trial court’s deliberate consideration of this issue is critical to the protection of the respondent’s liberty interests, a petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the petition’s allegation that there are no less restrictive alternatives, and this is not a secondary concern, nor some- thing to be considered only after the court has decided that the respondent should be committed, as finding that no less restrictive alternative exists is a constitutional prerequisite to involuntary hospitalization. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., 375 P.3d 51 (Alaska 2016).

Superior court applied the correct legal standard to the chance of improvement issue; the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was reason to believe the patient's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

When the State seeks to commit a mentally ill person on a theory of grave disability, it must prove a reasonable expectation of improvement with treatment; this showing must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

No less restrictive alternative available. —

There was no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment, as supervision by the patient's brother was not an acceptable alternative to treatment until the patient showed a more robust response to medication and his delusions softened. In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Superior court's orders authorizing the patient's involuntary evaluation, commitment, and medication for treatment of mental illness was affirmed because the patient's attorney agreed that the nurse practitioner was an expert and did not question his testimony or opinions; and the court based its decisions upon the expert's testimony that there was no less restrictive alternative to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute and that the patient was not capable at that time of giving or withholding informed consent to medication. In re: Brandi A., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 23, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly committed a 73-year-old woman for involuntary treatment for 30 days because commitment was necessary for the protection of the woman and others from physical injury and that outpatient treatment was not feasible, inasmuch as she was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, had previous admissions to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute, was currently aggressive and hostile, had assaulted a police officer and attempted to do the same to hospital staff, was disorganized in her speech and appeared delusional, was likely to cause harm to others, and the woman testified that she would not participate in outpatient treatment at the institute, which both parties acknowledged was a potential alternative. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200 (Alaska 2019).

“Mentally ill.” —

Appellant was properly admitted to a psychiatric facility because, although appellant’s alcohol abuse and inhaling gasoline fumes to get high originally caused appellant’s mental deficiencies, appellant was mentally ill; “huffing” damaged the frontal lobe of appellant’s brain, resulting in dementia and personality disorder. Appellant’s continued intent to huff gas, as a result of impaired judgment and understanding, met the standards of this section. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Improvement. —

Commitment statutes do not explicitly require the court to make any finding on whether treatment could improve a condition; they merely require the initial petition to allege that there is reason to believe that the respondent's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought, but this guidance is sufficient, as it provides a clear formulation of what the legislature intended. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

There was substantial evidentiary support for the finding that there was reason to believe a patient's mental condition could be improved with treatment because a psychiatric nurse practitioner testified that the patient had already seen slight improvement. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that plaintiff's condition could be improved by hospitalization given his long history of alcohol abuse and high risk of relapse. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Duane M., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 11, 2020).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011); In re Protective Proceeding of Amy D., 502 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2022).

Stated in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007); Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of A.S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 21, 2021).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.735. 30-day commitment; hearing.

  1. Upon receipt of a proper petition for commitment, the court shall hold a hearing at the date and time previously specified according to procedures set out in AS 47.30.715 .
  2. The hearing shall be conducted in a physical setting least likely to have a harmful effect on the mental or physical health of the respondent, within practical limits.  At the hearing, in addition to other rights specified in AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , the respondent has the right
    1. to be present at the hearing; this right may be waived only with the respondent’s informed consent; if the respondent is incapable of giving informed consent, the respondent may be excluded from the hearing only if the court, after hearing, finds that the incapacity exists and that there is a substantial likelihood that the respondent’s presence at the hearing would be severely injurious to the respondent’s mental or physical health;
    2. to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file of the respondent’s case;
    3. to have the hearing open or closed to the public as the respondent elects;
    4. to have the rules of evidence and civil procedure applied so as to provide for the informal but efficient presentation of evidence;
    5. to have an interpreter if the respondent does not understand English;
    6. to present evidence on the respondent’s behalf;
    7. to cross-examine witnesses who testify against the respondent;
    8. to remain silent;
    9. to call experts and other witnesses to testify on the respondent’s behalf.
  3. At the conclusion of the hearing the court may commit the respondent to a treatment facility for not more than 30 days if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to the respondent or others or is gravely disabled.
  4. If the court finds that there is a viable less restrictive alternative available and that the respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court may order the less restrictive alternative treatment for not more than 30 days if the program accepts the respondent.
  5. The court shall specifically state to the respondent, and give the respondent written notice, that if commitment or other involuntary treatment beyond the 30 days is to be sought, the respondent has the right to a full hearing or jury trial.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 12 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

“Mentally ill.” —

Under subsection (c), trial court properly granted a psychiatric facility’s petition to commit appellant because, although appellant’s alcohol abuse and inhaling gasoline fumes to get high originally caused appellant’s mental deficiencies, appellant was mentally ill; “huffing” damaged the frontal lobe of appellant’s brain, resulting in dementia and personality disorder. Appellant’s continued intent to huff gas, as a result of impaired judgment and understanding, met the statutory standard. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Where a patient was delusional and believed that she had to take unprescribed illegally obtained controlled substances to manage the stresses of bipolar disorder, she had a mental illness and was likely to cause harm to herself due to the mental illness. In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that plaintiff was mentally ill where although a doctor did not clearly differentiate the symptoms of his mental illness from those of his alcoholism, past diagnoses, prior hospitalizations, taking of anti-psychotic medication, and the doctor's diagnosis of a mood disorder supported a finding of a distinct mental illness. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Duane M., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 11, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Likely to cause harm. —

Superior court did not err in signing the 30-day involuntary commitment order because the patient was likely to cause harm to himself or others. The patient had been behaving erratically leading up to his leaving or being fired from the Veterans Administration; he acted irately at the airport with both a ticket agent and an officer, he had loaded weapons in a gun case with no visible lock; and both the officer and a psychiatrist testified that they believed the patient's behavior was threatening. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Luciano G., 450 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2019).

“Gravely disabled.” —

Trial court did not err by granting the Alaska Psychiatric Institute's (API) commitment petition for the patient because its finding that she was gravely disabled was not clearly erroneous, as the physician testified that the patient did not have housing, her disorder was severe enough that she could not be expected to find housing on her own, and that she may not have been able to eat and shower regularly unless API provided her those remedies. The trial court found that her delusions of rape and bodily harm became more acute during the time she refused to take medication or participate in planning her treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Granting of a 30-day commitment order was appropriate because the individual was gravely disabled as clear and convincing evidence showed a substantial deterioration of the individual's previous ability to function independently; diagnosis of bipolar disorder, impaired judgment, bizarre behavior and speech, a high level of agitation, and hyper-verbosity, and the condition would continue if not treated. The individual lacked the ability to exist safely outside an institutional framework due to high-risk behaviors and inability to retain housing. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Randy N., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in determining that an individual was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.735(c) and 47.30.915 (9)(B) where the findings that he would have discontinued his medication, stopped eating, and would have had no feasible living arrangement if discharged were not clearly erroneous. Moreover, outpatient therapy was not a viable option, and although forward-looking, the order was couched in the present tense In re Marvin S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 3, 2019).

Plaintiff was gravely disabled given his family's testimony about his health and unsafe housing situation. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Duane M., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 11, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that respondent was gravely disabled because it showed that respondent was suffering from schizophrenia, upon arrival his clothes were covered in feces and vomit and he was not keeping himself dry, attending to his toileting needs, or showering, and the trial court found that respondent's failure to acknowledge that he was covered in vomit and feces, understand that such a physical condition was a problem, or understand that his condition would lead to further deterioration and isolation was evidence of his grave disability. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Rabi R., 468 P.3d 721 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court did not clearly err when it found that the patient was gravely disabled and when it entered a 30-day involuntary commitment order because the patient broke all the windows in her family's home to release demons; her home was uninhabitable; she was not eating or sleeping well outside of the Alaska Psychiatric Institute; her psychiatrist opined she could not survive safely in the community; and her psychiatrist predicted her condition would continue to decline without appropriate treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Melody B., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 16, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Evidence. —

The decision to commit a patient for 30 days under this section was based on partial and unclear evidence, much of which was hearsay and in tension with significant evidence in favor of patient’s ability to function independently and live outside of a controlled environment. In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

In a case in which a superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order, the superior court's finding that no less restrictive placement alternatives were available was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The superior court was entitled to rely on a psychiatric nurse practitioner's expert opinion that outpatient services were not a realistic option. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Connor J., 440 P.3d 159 (Alaska 2019).

Trial court did not err by determining that there was no feasible less restrictive alternative to hospitalizing the patient at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute because (API) the State had no duty to re-open a private facility and operate a similar facility to meet its burden in the case, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that no feasible less restrictive alternative to involuntarily committing the patient to API existed In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that plaintiff's condition could be improved by hospitalization given his long history of alcohol abuse and high risk of relapse. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Duane M., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 11, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Supreme Court independently reviewed the record to determine if there was clear and convincing evidence supporting an order for involuntary commitment. Based on that independent review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was error to find that clear and convincing evidence existed that respondent was likely to cause harm to herself or others. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Bree H., — P.3d — (Alaska May 20, 2020) (memorandum decision).

In a case in which respondent appealed an ex parte order authorizing her hospitalization for evaluation and a subsequent 30-day commitment order, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence supported the superior court’s finding that as a result of a mental illness respondent was in danger of physical harm due to her neglect of her basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety so as to render serious accident or illness highly probable. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Meredith B., 462 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that a young man was likely to cause harm to himself or others as a result of mental illness given his recent behavior, i.e., being argumentative, irrational, threatening in nature, experiencing paranoia, and getting into an altercation with his parents, caused concern, the dangerousness of a booby trap, blow torch, and Molotov cocktails in his room, and his treating psychiatrist's testimony that if left untreated he could have significantly deteriorated and could have reacted in a very violent way because his feeling of persecution was very real. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mason J., — P.3d — (Alaska June 10, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Court did not clearly err in finding that involuntary civil commitment was appropriate in that an individual was likely to cause harm to others as a result of mental illness because the finding of likely to cause harm was supported by a treating facility psychiatrist's testimony that the individual regularly threatened physical harm to other patients and to the facility's staff— averted only by safety precautions —and that if released the individual would likely stop taking medications, deteriorate, cause a fight, and end up back in jail. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Keegan N., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 2, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Burden of proof —

State had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, a respondent was gravely disabled and commitment was the least restrictive alternative because proving an inability to function independently with support, when relevant, was part of the burden to prove no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., 375 P.3d 51 (Alaska 2016).

When the State seeks to commit a mentally ill person on a theory of grave disability, it must prove a reasonable expectation of improvement with treatment; this showing must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

In a case in which respondent appealed an ex parte order authorizing her hospitalization for evaluation and a subsequent 30-day commitment order, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence supported the superior court's finding that as a result of a mental illness respondent was in danger of physical harm due to her neglect of her basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety so as to render serious accident or illness highly probable. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Meredith B., 462 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2020).

Right to be present. —

Assuming it was error not to inquire further about respondent's capability in the context of his waiver of his presence at the involuntary commitment hearing, it was not plain error requiring reversal of the 30-day commitment order. The assumed error was not obvious for purposes of the plain error test In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Connor J., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2019), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2019), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 440 P.3d 159 (Alaska 2019).

Proper application. —

Involuntary commitment petition based on appellant’s condition at the time of the hearing considered appellant’s recent symptoms and behavior in making that determination. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Diagnosis of illness. —

While the superior court was entitled to weigh the evidence of a patient’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder in its gravely disabled determination, the diagnosis of illness and eligibility for Social Security benefits on the basis of the diagnosis did not contribute much to the elevated burden of proof required to justify commitment. In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

Religious beliefs. —

Although there was much discussion at the commitment hearing about a patient’s religious background, belief, and practice, there was nothing harmful or dangerous about his religious beliefs or experiences. None of his activities or experiences rendered him gravely disabled or interfered with his ability to live safely outside of a controlled environment. In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

Mootness. —

All appeals of involuntary admissions for treatment and involuntary medication were categorically exempt from the mootness doctrine under the public interest exception. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Quoted in

In re Protective Proceeding of Amy D., 502 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2022).

Stated in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007); Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of G.L., 449 P.3d 694 (Alaska 2019); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.740. Procedure for 90-day commitment following 30-day commitment.

  1. At any time during the respondent’s 30-day commitment, the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, may file with the court a petition for a 90-day commitment of that respondent.  The petition must include all material required under AS 47.30.730(a) except that references to “30 days” shall be read as “90 days”; and
    1. allege that the respondent has attempted to inflict or has inflicted serious bodily harm upon the respondent or another since the respondent’s acceptance for evaluation, or that the respondent was committed initially as a result of conduct in which the respondent attempted or inflicted serious bodily harm upon the respondent or another, or that the respondent continues to be gravely disabled, or that the respondent demonstrates a current intent to carry out plans of serious harm to the respondent or another;
    2. allege that the respondent has received appropriate and adequate care and treatment during the respondent’s 30-day commitment;
    3. be verified by the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, during the 30-day commitment.
  2. The court shall have copies of the petition for 90-day commitment served upon the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the respondent’s guardian, if any.  The petition for 90-day commitment and proofs of service shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and a date for hearing shall be set, by the end of the next judicial day, for not later than five judicial days from the date of filing of the petition. The clerk shall notify the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, and the petitioner of the hearing date at least three judicial days in advance of the hearing.
  3. Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing under AS 47.30.735 shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted except that newly discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 13 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

Classifying the minor’s commitment as initially voluntary was error under the parental admission statute as her commitment was involuntary from the start; because the Office of Children’s Services sought to continue her commitment past September 22, longer than the 30 days allowed, it was required to seek a 90-day commitment order; this triggered additional rights for the minor, including the right to a jury trial, as she asserted. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of April S., 499 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2021).

Attorney’s fees denied. —

Patient was not entitled to attorney’s fees under Alaska R. Civ. P. 82 when a psychiatric institute’s petition to commit the patient was voluntarily dismissed; application of Rule 82 is inconsistent with the character and purpose of civil commitment proceedings, which are designed to protect society’s interests. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007).

“Mentally ill.” —

Appellant was properly admitted to a psychiatric facility because, although appellant’s alcohol abuse and inhaling gasoline fumes to get high originally caused appellant’s mental deficiencies, appellant was mentally ill; “huffing” damaged the frontal lobe of appellant’s brain, resulting in dementia and personality disorder. Appellant’s continued intent to huff gas, as a result of impaired judgment and understanding, met the standards of this section. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Improvement. —

Commitment statutes do not explicitly require the court to make any finding on whether treatment could improve a condition; they merely require the initial petition to allege that there is reason to believe that the respondent's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought; however, this guidance is sufficient, as it provides a clear formulation of what the legislature intended. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

There was substantial evidence for the finding that there was reason to believe a patient's mental condition could be improved with treatment where a psychiatric nurse practitioner testified that the patient had already seen slight improvement. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Burden of proof. —

Superior court applied the correct legal standard to the chance of improvement issue; the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was reason to believe the patient's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

When the State seeks to commit a mentally ill person on a theory of grave disability, it must prove a reasonable expectation of improvement with treatment; this showing must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Applied in

In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Quoted in

Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.745. 90-day commitment hearing rights; continued commitment.

  1. A respondent subject to a petition for 90-day commitment has, in addition to the rights specified elsewhere in this chapter, or otherwise applicable, the rights enumerated in this section. Written notice of these rights shall be served on the respondent and the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if any, and may be served on an adult designated by the respondent at the time the petition for 90-day commitment is served.  An attempt shall be made by oral explanation to ensure that the respondent understands the rights enumerated in the notice. If the respondent does not understand English, the explanation shall be given in a language the respondent understands.
  2. Unless the respondent is released or is admitted voluntarily following the filing of a petition and before the hearing, the respondent is entitled to a judicial hearing within five judicial days of the filing of the petition as set out in AS 47.30.740(b) to determine if the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others, or if the respondent is gravely disabled.  If the respondent is admitted voluntarily following the filing of the petition, the voluntary admission constitutes a waiver of any hearing rights under AS 47.30.740 or under AS 47.30.685 .  If at any time during the respondent’s voluntary admission under this subsection, the respondent submits to the facility a written request to leave, the professional person in charge may file with the court a petition for a 180-day commitment of the respondent under AS 47.30.770 .  The 180-day commitment hearing shall be scheduled for a date not later than 90 days after the respondent’s voluntary admission.
  3. The respondent is entitled to a jury trial upon request filed with the court if the request is made at least two judicial days before the hearing.  If the respondent requests a jury trial, the hearing may be continued for no more than 10 calendar days.  The jury shall consist of six persons.
  4. If a jury trial is not requested, the court may still continue the hearing at the respondent’s request for no more than 10 calendar days.
  5. The respondent has a right to retain an independent licensed physician or other mental health professional to examine the respondent and to testify on the respondent’s behalf.  Upon request by an indigent respondent, the court shall appoint an independent licensed physician or other mental health professional to examine the respondent and testify on the respondent’s behalf.  The court shall consider an indigent respondent’s request for a specific physician or mental health professional.  A motion for the appointment may be filed in court at any reasonable time before the hearing and shall be acted upon promptly.  Reasonable fees and expenses for expert examiners shall be determined by the rules of court.
  6. The proceeding shall in all respects be in accord with constitutional guarantees of due process and, except as otherwise specifically provided in AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 , the rules of evidence and procedure in civil proceedings.
  7. Until the court issues a final decision, the respondent shall continue to be treated at the treatment facility unless the petition for 90-day commitment is withdrawn.  If a decision has not been made within 20 days of filing of the petition, not including extensions of time due to jury trial or other requests by the respondent, the respondent shall be released.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 14 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007).

Cited in

In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Sec. 47.30.750. Conduct of hearing.

The hearing under AS 47.30.745 shall be conducted in the same manner, and with the same rights for the respondent, as set out in AS 47.30.735(b) .

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1981, “under AS 47.30.745 ” was inserted following “hearing” in this section to correct an oversight in § 1, ch. 84, SLA 1981.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, § 23 et seq.

56 C.J.S., Mental Health, § 1 et seq.

Right to counsel in insanity or incompetency adjudication proceedings. 87 ALR2d 950.

Modern status of rules as to standard of proof required in civil commitment proceedings. 97 ALR3d 780.

Sec. 47.30.755. Court order.

  1. After the hearing and within the time limit specified in AS 47.30.745 , the court may commit the respondent to a treatment facility for no more than 90 days if the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others, or is gravely disabled.
  2. If the court finds that there is a less restrictive alternative available and that the respondent has been advised of and refused voluntary treatment through the alternative, the court may order the less restrictive alternative treatment after acceptance by the program of the respondent for a period not to exceed 90 days.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Notes to Decisions

Evidence support commitment. —

Superior court properly granted the petition for an additional 180-day commitment and approving administration of psychotropic medication because the record supported the superior court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent’s long-standing mental health issues continued to worsen, he posed a serious risk of harm to others, he lacked capacity to make an informed decision about medication, involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was in his best interests, and there was no less restrictive alternative. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 19, 2022).

Evidence Support Commitment. —

Involuntary commitment order was supported by the findings that the patient's partner had serious concern about his doing things that he was disavowing such as connecting an electric welder to their home's metal door, presence of bottles used to make Molotov cocktails, and a doctor's statements that the patient's delusions were resulting in behavior that posed a substantial risk to others. In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Burden of proof. —

When the State seeks to commit a mentally ill person on a theory of grave disability, it must prove a reasonable expectation of improvement with treatment; this showing must be made by clear and convincing evidence. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Quoted in

In re Protective Proceeding of Amy D., 502 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2022).

Stated in

Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of G.L., 449 P.3d 694 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.30.760. Placement at closest facility.

Treatment shall always be available at a state-operated hospital; however, if space is available and upon acceptance by another treatment facility, a respondent who is committed by the court shall be placed by the department at the designated treatment facility closest to the respondent’s home unless the court finds that

  1. another treatment facility in the state has a program more suited to the respondent’s condition, and this interest outweighs the desirability of the respondent being closer to home;
  2. another treatment facility in the state is closer to the respondent’s friends or relatives who could benefit the respondent through their visits and communications; or
  3. the respondent wants to be further removed from home, and the mental health professionals who sought the respondent’s commitment concur in the desirability of removed placement.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.765. Appeal.

The respondent has the right to an appeal from an order of involuntary commitment. The court shall inform the respondent of this right.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Notes to Decisions

Mootness. —

Mootness is a judicial doctrine that is intended to avoid needlessly deciding issues in cases in which there is no actual controversy and which would effectively result in advisory opinions. This section does not require an appellate review of a moot civil commitment dispute. The court expressed no opinion about whether a statute could validly require the courts of this state to review moot issues or whether any such statute would violate the separation of powers. In re Mark V., 324 P.3d 840 (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012).

Sec. 47.30.770. Additional 180-day commitment.

  1. The respondent shall be released from involuntary treatment at the expiration of 90 days unless the professional person in charge files a petition for a 180-day commitment conforming to the requirements of AS 47.30.740(a) except that all references to “30-day commitment” shall be read as “the previous 90-day commitment” and all references to “90-day commitment” shall be read as “180-day commitment”.
  2. The procedures for service of the petition, notification of rights, and judicial hearing shall be as set out in AS 47.30.740 47.30.750 .  If the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for 90-day commitment as set out in AS 47.30.755 are present, the court may order the respondent committed for an additional treatment period not to exceed 180 days from the date on which the first 90-day treatment period would have expired.
  3. Successive 180-day commitments are permissible on the same ground and under the same procedures as the original 180-day commitment.  An order of commitment may not exceed 180 days.
  4. Findings of fact relating to the respondent’s behavior made at a 30-day commitment hearing under AS 47.30.735 , a 90-day commitment hearing under AS 47.30.750 , or a previous 180-day commitment hearing under this section shall be admitted as evidence and may not be rebutted except that newly discovered evidence may be used for the purpose of rebutting the findings.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 15 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

“Mentally ill.” —

Appellant was properly admitted to a psychiatric facility because, although appellant’s alcohol abuse and inhaling gasoline fumes to get high originally caused appellant’s mental deficiencies, appellant was mentally ill; “huffing” damaged the frontal lobe of appellant’s brain, resulting in dementia and personality disorder. Appellant’s continued intent to huff gas, as a result of impaired judgment and understanding, met the standards of this section. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Improvement. —

Commitment statutes do not explicitly require the court to make any finding on whether treatment could improve a condition; they merely require the initial petition to allege that there is reason to believe that the respondent's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought, but this guidance is sufficient, as it provides a clear formulation of what the legislature intended. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

There was substantial evidence for the finding that there was reason to believe a patient's mental condition could be improved with treatment where a psychiatric nurse practitioner testified that the patient had already seen slight improvement. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Basis for involuntary commitment. —

Involuntary commitment order was appropriate as the court based the decision on patient's condition at the time of the hearing and considered the patient's recent symptoms and behavior. Relying on the testimony of a psychiatrist, an advanced nurse practitioner, and a social worker the court found that the patient posed a substantial risk of harm to others—based on patient's perceived intent to discontinue medication upon discharge and history of violence when patient decompensated—and that no less restrictive and feasible alternative existed. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of G.L., 449 P.3d 694 (Alaska 2019).

Burden of proof. —

Superior court applied the correct legal standard to the chance of improvement issue; the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was reason to believe the patient's mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment sought. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Stated in

Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.772. Medication and treatment.

An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may administer medication or other treatment to an involuntarily committed patient only in a manner that is consistent with the provisions of AS 47.30.817 47.30.865 .

History. (§ 16 ch 142 SLA 1984; am § 3 ch 109 SLA 1992; am § 76 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, substituted “AS 47.30.817 47.30.865 ” for “AS 47.30.825 47.30.865 ”.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.30.775. Commitment of minors.

The provisions of AS 47.30.700 47.30.815 apply to minors. However, all notices required to be served on the respondent in AS 47.30.700 47.30.815 shall also be served on the parent or guardian of a respondent who is a minor, and parents or guardians of a minor respondent shall be notified that they may appear as parties in any commitment proceeding concerning the minor and that as parties they are entitled to retain their own attorney or have the office of public advocacy appointed for them by the court. A minor respondent has the same rights to waiver and informed consent as an adult respondent under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 ; however, the minor shall be represented by counsel in waiver and consent proceedings.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 18 ch 55 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.780. Early discharge.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, the professional person in charge shall at any time discharge a respondent on the ground that the respondent is no longer gravely disabled or likely to cause serious harm as a result of mental illness. A certificate to this effect shall be sent to the court, which shall enter an order officially terminating the involuntary commitment.
  2. The professional person in charge shall give the prosecuting authority 10 days’ notice before discharging a respondent who was committed after having been found incompetent to proceed under AS 12.47.110 .

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am §§ 36, 37 ch 75 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, added “Except as provided in (b) of this section” at the beginning, and added subsection (b).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 43(d), ch. 75, SLA 2008, provides that the 2008 amendment of (a) and enactment of (b) of this section “apply to procedures occurring after July 1, 2008, regardless of whether the offense occurred before, on, or after, July 1, 2008.”

Section 44, ch. 75, SLA 2008 explicitly declares that secs. 36 and 37, ch. 75, SLA 2008, amending (a) and enacting (b) of this section, are subject to severability as authorized by AS 01.10.030 .

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 47.30.785. Authorized absences.

A respondent undergoing involuntary treatment on an inpatient basis under AS 47.30.700 47.30.815 may be authorized to be absent from the treatment facility during times specified by the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, when an authorization to be absent is in the best interests of the respondent and the respondent is not likely to cause harm to self or others.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.790. Unauthorized absences: return to facility; required notice.

When a respondent undergoing involuntary treatment on an inpatient basis is absent from the treatment facility without, or in excess of, authorization under AS 47.30.785 , the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, may contact the appropriate peace officers who shall take the respondent into custody and return the respondent to the treatment facility. If it is determined by the professional person in charge to be necessary, a member of the treatment facility staff shall accompany the peace officers when they take the respondent into custody. In addition, the family or guardian of the patient and any person known to have been threatened by the patient shall be notified of the patient’s unauthorized absence immediately upon its discovery.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 17 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Alto v. State, 64 P.3d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).

Sec. 47.30.795. Involuntary outpatient care for committed persons.

  1. A respondent who was originally committed to involuntary inpatient care under AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 may be released before the expiration of the commitment period if a provider of outpatient care accepts the respondent for specified outpatient treatment for a period of time not to exceed the duration of the commitment, and if the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, finds that
    1. it is not necessary to treat the respondent as an inpatient to prevent the respondent from harming self or others; and
    2. there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental condition would improve as a result of the outpatient treatment.
  2. A copy of the conditions for early release shall be given to the respondent and the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if any, the provider of outpatient care, and the court.
  3. If during the commitment period the provider of outpatient care determines that the respondent can no longer be treated on an outpatient basis because the respondent is likely to cause harm to self or others or is gravely disabled, the provider shall give the respondent oral and written notice that the respondent must return to the treatment facility within 24 hours, with copies to the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if any, the court, and the inpatient treatment facility.  If the respondent fails to arrive at the treatment facility within 24 hours after receiving the notice, the professional person in charge may contact the appropriate peace officers who shall take the respondent into custody and transport the respondent to the facility.  If it is determined by the professional person in charge to be necessary, a member of the treatment facility staff shall accompany the peace officers when they take the respondent into custody.
  4. If the provider of outpatient care determines that the respondent will require continued outpatient care after the expiration of the commitment period, the provider may initiate further commitment proceedings as if the provider were the professional person in charge, and the provisions of AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 apply, except that provisions relating to inpatient treatment shall be read as applicable to outpatient treatment.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.800. Conversion of involuntary outpatient treatment to inpatient commitment.

  1. A respondent ordered by the court under the provisions of AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 to receive involuntary outpatient treatment may be required to undergo inpatient treatment when the provider of outpatient care finds that (1) the respondent is mentally ill and is likely to cause serious harm to self or others or is still gravely disabled; (2) the respondent’s behavior since the hearing resulting in court-ordered treatment indicates that the respondent now needs inpatient treatment to protect self or others; (3) there is reason to believe that the respondent’s mental condition will improve as a result of inpatient treatment; and (4) there is an inpatient facility appropriate to the respondent’s need that will accept the respondent as a patient.  Treatment for these respondents shall be available at state-operated hospitals at all times.
  2. Upon making the findings specified in (a) of this section, the provisions of AS 47.30.795(c) relating to notice and AS 47.30.745 relating to hearings apply.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 4 ch 109 SLA 1992)

Sec. 47.30.803. Conversion from involuntary to voluntary status.

A patient subject to involuntary hospitalization under AS 47.30.705 , 47.30.735 , or AS 47.30.755 may at any time convert to voluntary status if the responsible physician agrees that

  1. the patient is an appropriate patient for voluntary hospitalization; and
  2. the conversion is made in good faith.

History. (§ 18 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.805. Computation, extension, and expiration of periods of time.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section,
    1. computations of a 72-hour evaluation period under AS 47.30.715 or a 48-hour detention period under AS 47.30.685 do not include Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, or any period of time necessary to transport the respondent to the treatment facility;
    2. a 30-day commitment period expires at the end of the 30th day after the 72 hours following initial acceptance;
    3. a 90-day commitment period expires at the end of the 90th day after the expiration of a 30-day period of treatment;
    4. a 180-day commitment period expires at the end of the 180th day, after the expiration of a 90-day period of treatment or previous 180-day period, whichever is applicable.
  2. When a respondent has failed to appear or been absent through the respondent’s own actions contrary to any order properly made or entered under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , the relevant commitment period shall be extended for a period of time equal to the respondent’s absence if written notice of absence is promptly provided to the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if there is one, and if, within 24 hours after the respondent has returned to the evaluation or treatment facility, written notice of the corresponding extension and the reason for it is given to the respondent and the respondent’s attorney and guardian, if any, and to the court.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 19 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 47.30.810. Habeas corpus not limited.

Nothing in AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 may be construed as limiting a person’s right to a writ of habeas corpus.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.815. Limitation of liability; bad faith application a felony.

  1. A person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information who makes application for evaluation or treatment of another person under AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 is not subject to civil or criminal liability.
  2. The following persons may not be held civilly or criminally liable for detaining a person under AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 or for releasing a person under AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 at or before the end of the period for which the person was admitted or committed for evaluation or treatment if the persons have performed their duties in good faith and without gross negligence:
    1. an officer of a public or private agency;
    2. the superintendent, the professional person in charge, the professional designee of the professional person in charge, and the attending staff of a public or private agency;
    3. a public official performing functions necessary to the administration of AS 47.30.700 — 47.30.915;
    4. a peace officer or mental health professional responsible for detaining or transporting a person under AS 47.30.700 — 47.30.915.
  3. A person who wilfully initiates an involuntary commitment procedure under AS 47.30.700 without having good cause to believe that the other person is suffering from a mental illness and as a result is gravely disabled or likely to cause serious harm to self or others, is guilty of a felony.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 20 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Cross references. —

For classification of the offense set out in (c) of this section as a class C felony, see AS 11.81.250(b) ; for penalties for class C felonies, see AS 12.55.035(b)(4) and 12.55.125(e) .

Notes to Decisions

Officers entitled to qualified immunity. —

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity under this section as to the arrestee’s tort claims because the troopers were attempting to detain and transport the arrestee pursuant to an involuntary commitment order and their conduct was objectively reasonable. The fact that their car did not show any evidence of gunshot damage and some stray comments they made during their stakeout did not support an inference of malice. Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007).

Article 10. Patient Rights.

Sec. 47.30.817. Advance health care directives.

A health care provider or a health care institution may not require or prohibit the execution or revocation of an advance health care directive as a condition for admission, discharge, or providing health care. In this section, “advance health care directive,” “health care institution,” and “health care provider” have the meanings given in AS 13.52.390 .

History. (§ 8 ch 83 SLA 2004)

Sec. 47.30.825. Patient medical rights.

  1. A patient who is receiving services under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 has the rights described in this section.
  2. The patient and the following persons, at the request of the patient, are entitled to participate in formulating the patient’s individualized treatment plan and to participate in the evaluation process as much as possible, at minimum to the extent of requesting specific forms of therapy, inquiring why specific therapies are or are not included in the treatment program, and being informed as to the patient’s present medical and psychological condition and prognosis: (1) the patient’s counsel, (2) the patient’s guardian, (3) a mental health professional previously engaged in the patient’s care outside of the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility, (4) a representative of the patient’s choice, (5) a person designated as the patient’s agent or surrogate with regard to mental health treatment decisions under AS 13.52, and (6) the adult designated under AS 47.30.725 . The mental health care professionals may not withhold any of the information described in this subsection from the patient or from others if the patient has signed a waiver of confidentiality or has designated the person who would receive the information as an agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 with regard to mental health treatment.
  3. A patient who is capable of giving informed consent has the right to give and withhold consent to medication and treatment in all situations that do not involve a crisis or impending crisis as described in AS 47.30.838(a)(1) . A facility shall follow the procedures required under AS 47.30.836 47.30.839 before administering psychotropic medication.
  4. A locked quiet room, or other form of physical restraint, may not be used, except as provided in this subsection, unless a patient is likely to physically harm self or others unless restrained. The form of restraint used shall be that which is in the patient’s best interest and which constitutes the least restrictive alternative available. When practicable, the patient shall be consulted as to the patient’s preference among forms of adequate, medically advisable restraints including medication, and that preference shall be honored. Nothing in this section is intended to limit the right of staff to use a quiet room at the patient’s request or with the patient’s knowing concurrence when considered in the best interests of the patient. Patients placed in a quiet room or other physical restraint shall be checked at least every 15 minutes or more often if good medical practice so indicates. Patients in a quiet room must be visited by a staff member at least once every hour and must be given adequate food and drink and access to bathroom facilities. At no time may a patient be kept in a quiet room or other form of physical restraint against the patient’s will longer than necessary to accomplish the purposes set out in this subsection. All uses of a quiet room or other restraint shall be recorded in the patient’s medical record, the information including but not limited to the reasons for its use, the duration of use, and the name of the authorizing staff member.
  5. [Repealed, § 12 ch 109 SLA 1992.]
  6. A patient capable of giving informed consent has the absolute right to accept or refuse electroconvulsive therapy or aversive conditioning. A patient who lacks substantial capacity to make this decision may not be given this therapy or conditioning without a court order unless the patient expressly authorized that particular form of treatment in an advance health care directive properly executed under AS 13.52 or has authorized an agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 to make this decision and the agent or surrogate consents to the treatment on behalf of the patient.
  7. In no event may treatment include psychosurgery, lobotomy, or other comparable form of treatment without specific informed consent of the patient, including a minor unless the minor is clearly too young or disabled to give an informed consent in which case the consent of the minor’s legal guardian is required.  In addition, this treatment may not be given without a court order after hearing compatible with full due process.
  8. When, in the written opinion of a patient’s attending physician, a true medical emergency exists and a surgical operation is necessary to save the life, physical health, eyesight, hearing, or member of the patient, the professional person in charge, or that person’s professional designee, may give consent to the surgical operation if time will not permit obtaining the consent of the proper relatives or guardian or appropriate judicial authority.  However, an operation may not be authorized if the patient is not a minor and knowingly withholds consent on religious grounds.
  9. A patient upon discharge shall be given a discharge plan specifying the kinds and amount of care and treatment the patient should have after discharge and such other steps as the patient might take to benefit the patient’s mental health after leaving the facility.  The patient shall have the right to participate, as far as practicable, in formulating the patient’s discharge plan.  A copy of the plan shall be given to the patient, the patient’s guardian, an adult designated in accordance with AS 47.30.725 , the court if appropriate, and any follow-up agencies.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 21 ch 142 SLA 1984; am §§ 5 — 7, 12 ch 109 SLA 1992; am §§ 4, 5 ch 63 SLA 1996; am §§ 9, 10 ch 83 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2005, substituted references for agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 for references to attorney-in-fact in subsections (b) and (f), and substituted “an advance health care directive” for “a declaration” in subsection (f).

Notes to Decisions

Electroconvulsive therapy ordered. —

This section permitted the court to order electroconvulsive therapy for a patient who lacked substantial capacity to decide whether to allow or refuse such treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

Construction and Application of State Patient Bill of Rights Statutes. 87 ALR5th 277.

Sec. 47.30.830. Prohibition of experimental treatments.

  1. Experimental treatments involving any significant risk of physical or psychological harm may not be administered to a patient.
  2. If the personnel of an evaluation or treatment facility are uncertain as to whether a proposed treatment is experimental or is experimental as applied to a particular patient or would involve a significant risk of mental or physical harm to the patient, the matter may be referred to the commissioner for a determination.  The patient, the patient’s attorney and guardian, if any, and an adult designated by the patient, shall, simultaneously with the referral to the commissioner, be provided with copies of all the documents by which the referral is made and shall have the opportunity to provide evidence to the commissioner on the question.
  3. A determination by the commissioner that a treatment is experimental and entails significant risks of mental or physical harm is binding upon all persons involved in the administration of treatment to a patient.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.833. Nutritional evaluation; right to proper diet.

  1. A treatment facility shall conduct a nutritional evaluation of a person admitted or committed to a treatment facility for evaluation or treatment, whether the person is a voluntary or involuntary patient.  The evaluation shall be conducted within the first week after the patient is admitted or committed.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a treatment facility is not required to conduct a nutritional evaluation of a patient who is released within 72 hours of arrival.
  3. A patient has the right to a nutritionally sound and medically appropriate diet.  After conducting the nutritional evaluation required under (a) of this section, the treatment facility shall take appropriate steps to correct the patient’s nutritional deficiencies.

History. (§ 22 ch 142 SLA 1984)

Sec. 47.30.835. Civil rights not impaired.

  1. A person may not deny to a person who is undergoing evaluation or treatment under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 a civil right, including but not limited to, the right to free exercise of religion and the right to dispose of property, sue and be sued, enter into contractual relationships, and vote.  A person who violates this subsection commits the crime of interference with constitutional rights under AS 11.76.110 .
  2. Court-ordered evaluation or treatment under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 is not a determination of legal incapacity under AS 13.26.005 13.26.580 .

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 77 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, “AS 13.26.005 13.26.580 ” was substituted for “AS 13.26.005 13.26.320 ” to reflect the renumbering of that section.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (b), substituted “AS 13.26.005 13.26.320 ” for “AS 13.26.005 — 13.26.330”.

Sec. 47.30.836. Psychotropic medication in non-crisis situation.

An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may not administer psychotropic medication to a patient in a situation that does not involve a crisis under AS 47.30.838(a)(1) unless the patient

  1. has the capacity to give informed consent to the medication, as described in AS 47.30.837 , and gives that consent; the facility shall document the consent in the patient’s medical chart;
  2. authorized the use of psychotropic medication in an advance health care directive properly executed under AS 13.52 or authorized an agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 to consent to the use of psychotropic medication for the patient and the agent or surrogate does consent; or
  3. is determined by a court to lack the capacity to give informed consent to the medication and the court approves use of the medication under AS 47.30.839 .

History. (§ 8 ch 109 SLA 1992; am § 6 ch 63 SLA 1996; am § 11 ch 83 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2005, substituted “an advance healthcare directive” for “a declaration” and references for agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 for references to attorney-in-fact in paragraph (2).

Notes to Decisions

Patient denied due process due to inadequate notice and lack of access to medical chart. —

On a challenge from an order approving a petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs under AS 47.30.839 , because the psychiatric patient did not receive adequate notice of the nature of the proceedings and access to his medical chart, he was denied due process. He should have been provided the treatment plan and given access to his psychiatric and medical records in advance of the hearing. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 47.30.837. Informed consent.

  1. A patient has the capacity to give informed consent for purposes of AS 47.30.836 if the patient is competent to make mental health or medical treatment decisions and the consent is voluntary and informed.
  2. When seeking a patient’s informed consent under this section, the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility shall give the patient information that is necessary for informed consent in a manner that ensures maximum possible comprehension by the patient.
  3. If an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility has provided to the patient the information necessary for the patient’s consent to be informed and the patient voluntarily consents, the facility may administer psychotropic medication to the patient unless the facility has reason to believe that the patient is not competent to make medical or mental health treatment decisions. If the facility has reason to believe that the patient is not competent to make medical or mental health treatment decisions and the facility wishes to administer psychotropic medication to the patient, the facility shall follow the procedures of AS 47.30.839 .
  4. In this section,
    1. “competent” means that the patient
      1. has the capacity to assimilate relevant facts and to appreciate and understand the patient’s situation with regard to those facts, including the information described in (2) of this subsection;
      2. appreciates that the patient has a mental disorder or impairment, if the evidence so indicates; denial of a significantly disabling disorder or impairment, when faced with substantial evidence of its existence, constitutes evidence that the patient lacks the capability to make mental health treatment decisions;
      3. has the capacity to participate in treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process; and
      4. is able to articulate reasonable objections to using the offered medication;
    2. “informed” means that the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility has given the patient all information that is material to the patient’s decision to give or withhold consent, including
      1. an explanation of the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, or their predominant symptoms, with and without the medication;
      2. information about the proposed medication, its purpose, the method of its administration, the recommended ranges of dosages, possible side effects and benefits, ways to treat side effects, and risks of other conditions, such as tardive dyskinesia;
      3. a review of the patient’s history, including medication history and previous side effects from medication;
      4. an explanation of interactions with other drugs, including over-the-counter drugs, street drugs, and alcohol;
      5. information about alternative treatments and their risks, side effects, and benefits, including the risks of nontreatment; and
      6. a statement describing the patient’s right to give or withhold consent to the administration of psychotropic medications in nonemergency situations, the procedure for withdrawing consent, and notification that a court may override the patient’s refusal;
    3. “voluntary” means having genuine freedom of choice; a choice may be encouraged and remain voluntary, but consent obtained by using force, threats, or direct or indirect coercion is not voluntary.

History. (§ 8 ch 109 SLA 1992)

Notes to Decisions

Standards for administration of psychotrophic drugs. —

Trial court’s order approving administration of psychotropic drugs to the patient pursuant to AS 47.30.839 was vacated because the liberty and privacy guarantees in Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 7 and 22 require that trial courts first find that such medication was in the patient’s best interests and that no less intrusive alternative was available; at a minimum, courts should consider the information that this section directs the treatment facility to give to its patients in order to ensure the patient’s ability to make an informed treatment choice, such as the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, the patient’s history, and alternative treatments and their risks and side effects. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006).

Single element sufficient. —

Superior court may find an involuntary committed patient incompetent to make medical treatment decisions based on the lack of a single element in this section. In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Grant of petition upheld. —

Trial court did not err by granting the involuntary medication petition because respondent's treating psychiatrist testified that he was spiraling into an isolated existence, cut off from social contact or ostracized by other people due to his belief that he was totally well. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Rabi R., 468 P.3d 721 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court properly granted the petition for an additional 180-day commitment and approving administration of psychotropic medication because the record supported the superior court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent’s long-standing mental health issues continued to worsen, he posed a serious risk of harm to others, he lacked capacity to make an informed decision about medication, involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was in his best interests, and there was no less restrictive alternative. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 19, 2022).

Superior court did not err in granting a medication petition because the evidence presented demonstrated that appellant did not have the capacity to participate in treatment decisions or to raise reasonable objections to the medications; the superior court did not clearly err in finding that he was not competent under this section. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Patient denied due process due to inadequate notice and lack of access to medical chart. —

On a challenge from an order approving a petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs under AS 47.30.839 , because the psychiatric patient did not receive adequate notice of the nature of the proceedings and access to his medical chart, he was denied due process. He should have been provided the treatment plan and given access to his psychiatric and medical records in advance of the hearing. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 47.30.838. Psychotropic medication in crisis situations.

  1. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may administer psychotropic medication to a patient without the patient’s informed consent, regardless of whether the patient is capable of giving informed consent, only if
    1. there is a crisis situation, or an impending crisis situation, that requires immediate use of the medication to preserve the life of, or prevent significant physical harm to, the patient or another person, as determined by a physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse; the behavior or condition of the patient giving rise to a crisis under this paragraph and the staff’s response to the behavior or condition must be documented in the patient’s medical record; the documentation must include an explanation of alternative responses to the crisis that were considered or attempted by the staff and why those responses were not sufficient; and
    2. the medication is ordered by a physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse; the order
      1. may be written or oral and may be received by telephone, facsimile machine, or in person;
      2. may include an initial dosage and may authorize additional, as needed, doses; if additional, as needed, doses are authorized, the order must specify the medication, the quantity of each authorized dose, the method of administering the medication, the maximum frequency of administration, the specific conditions under which the medication may be given, and the maximum amount of medication that may be administered to the patient in a 24-hour period;
      3. is valid for only 24 hours and may be renewed by a physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse for a total of 72 hours, including the initial 24 hours, only after a personal assessment of the patient’s status and a determination that there is still a crisis situation as described in (1) of this subsection; upon renewal of an order under this subparagraph, the facts supporting the renewal shall be written into the patient’s medical record.
  2. When a patient is no longer in the crisis situation that led to the use of psychotropic medication without consent under (a) of this section, an appropriate health care professional shall discuss the crisis with the patient, including precursors to the crisis, in order to increase the patient’s and the professional’s understanding of the episode and to discuss prevention of future crises. The professional shall seek and consider the patient’s recommendations for managing potential future crises.
  3. If crisis situations as described in (a)(1) of this section occur repeatedly, or if it appears that they may occur repeatedly, the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may administer psychotropic medication during no more than three crisis periods without the patient’s informed consent only with court approval under AS 47.30.839 .
  4. An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may administer psychotropic medication to a patient without the patient’s informed consent if the patient is unable to give informed consent but has authorized the use of psychotropic medication in an advance health care directive properly executed under AS 13.52 or has authorized an agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 to consent to this form of treatment for the patient and the agent or surrogate does consent.

History. (§ 8 ch 109 SLA 1992; am §§ 7, 8 ch 63 SLA 1996; am § 12 ch 83 SLA 2004; am § 78 ch 41 SLA 2009; am § 52 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 6 ch 28 SLA 2020)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2005, substituted “an advance healthcare directive” for “a declaration” and references for agent or surrogate under AS 13.52 for references to attorney-in-fact in subsection (d).

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (b), substituted “led” for “lead” following “the crisis situation that”.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (a)(1), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse”.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 28, 2020, in (a)(1), substituted “as determined by a physician, physician assistant,” for “as determined by a licensed physician or a registered”, in (a)(2), substituted “by a physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse” for “by a licensed physician”, and in (a)(2)(C), inserted “, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse” following “physician”.

Notes to Decisons

Cited in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 47.30.839. Court-ordered administration of medication.

  1. An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may use the procedures described in this section to obtain court approval of administration of psychotropic medication if
    1. there have been, or it appears that there will be, repeated crisis situations as described in AS 47.30.838(a)(1) and the facility wishes to use psychotropic medication in future crisis situations; or
    2. the facility wishes to use psychotropic medication in a noncrisis situation and has reason to believe the patient is incapable of giving informed consent.
  2. An evaluation facility or designated treatment facility may seek court approval for administration of psychotropic medication to a patient by filing a petition with the court, requesting a hearing on the capacity of the person to give informed consent.
  3. A patient who is the subject of a petition under (b) of this section is entitled to an attorney to represent the patient at the hearing. If the patient cannot afford an attorney, the court shall direct the Public Defender Agency to provide an attorney. The court may, upon request of the patient’s attorney, direct the office of public advocacy to provide a guardian ad litem for the patient.
  4. Upon the filing of a petition under (b) of this section, the court shall direct the office of public advocacy to provide a visitor to assist the court in investigating the issue of whether the patient has the capacity to give or withhold informed consent to the administration of psychotropic medication. The visitor shall gather pertinent information and present it to the court in written or oral form at the hearing. The information must include documentation of the following:
    1. the patient’s responses to a capacity assessment instrument administered at the request of the visitor;
    2. any expressed wishes of the patient regarding medication, including wishes that may have been expressed in a power of attorney, a living will, an advance health care directive under AS 13.52, or oral statements of the patient, including conversations with relatives and friends that are significant persons in the patient’s life as those conversations are remembered by the relatives and friends; oral statements of the patient should be accompanied by a description of the circumstances under which the patient made the statements, when possible.
  5. Within 72 hours after the filing of a petition under (b) of this section, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the patient’s capacity to give or withhold informed consent as described in AS 47.30.837 and the patient’s capacity to give or withhold informed consent at the time of previously expressed wishes regarding medication if previously expressed wishes are documented under (d)(2) of this section. The court shall consider all evidence presented at the hearing, including evidence presented by the guardian ad litem, the petitioner, the visitor, and the patient. The patient’s attorney may cross-examine any witness, including the guardian ad litem and the visitor.
  6. If the court determines that the patient is competent to provide informed consent, the court shall order the facility to honor the patient’s decision about the use of psychotropic medication.
  7. If the court determines that the patient is not competent to provide informed consent and, by clear and convincing evidence, was not competent to provide informed consent at the time of previously expressed wishes documented under (d)(2) of this section, the court shall approve the facility’s proposed use of psychotropic medication. The court’s approval under this subsection applies to the patient’s initial period of commitment if the decision is made during that time period. If the decision is made during a period for which the initial commitment has been extended, the court’s approval under this subsection applies to the period for which commitment is extended.
  8. If an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility wishes to continue the use of psychotropic medication without the patient’s consent during a period of commitment that occurs after the period in which the court’s approval was obtained, the facility shall file a request to continue the medication when it files the petition to continue the patient’s commitment. The court that determines whether commitment shall continue shall also determine whether the patient continues to lack the capacity to give or withhold informed consent by following the procedures described in (b) — (e) of this section. The reports prepared for a previous hearing under (e) of this section are admissible in the hearing held for purposes of this subsection, except that they must be updated by the visitor and the guardian ad litem.
  9. If a patient for whom a court has approved medication under this section regains competency at any time during the period of the patient’s commitment and gives informed consent to the continuation of medication, the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility shall document the patient’s consent in the patient’s file in writing.

History. (§ 8 ch 109 SLA 1992; am § 13 ch 83 SLA 2004)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2005, inserted “an advance healthcare directive” in paragraph (d)(2).

Notes to Decisions

Findings required for involuntary administration of psychotrophic drugs. —

Trial court’s order approving administration of psychotropic drugs to the patient pursuant to this section was vacated because the patient’s right to choose or reject medication was a fundamental right, and thus the liberty and privacy guarantees in Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 7 and 22 required the courts, not physicians, to protect and enforce those guarantees: In future non-emergency cases, a court may not permit a treatment facility to administer psychotropic drugs unless the court makes findings that comply with all applicable statutory requirements and, in addition, expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is in the patient’s best interests and that no less intrusive alternative is available. Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006).

Inability to give or withhold informed consent to medication. —

Superior court's orders authorizing the patient's involuntary evaluation, commitment, and medication for treatment of mental illness was affirmed because the patient's attorney agreed that the nurse practitioner was an expert and did not question his testimony or opinions; and the court based its decisions upon the expert's testimony that there was no less restrictive alternative to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute and that the patient was not capable at that time of giving or withholding informed consent to medication. In re: Brandi A., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 23, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Court has discretion to conduct a separate proceeding on constitutional questions. —

Because subsection (e) is ambiguous, and because an interpretation that imposes a rigid 72-hour limit may in some circumstances violate due process, the statute should be interpreted as offering the court the discretion to conduct a separate proceeding on the constitutional questions required by the Myers best interest factors that does not occur within 72 hours of the medication petition. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2009).

Visitor’s report required to support order for psychotropic medication. —

Failure to provide a visitor’s report during the hearing on a petition for the administration of a psychotropic medication to an individual as required by subsection (d) of this section was plain error in a non-emergency situation where the report was an essential component of the statutory scheme. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007), overruled in part, In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Access to medical and psychiatric records. —

Patient must have access to his medical and psychiatric records once a petition to involuntarily medicate the patient has been filed. Furthermore, there is no need to wait until the commitment proceeding is completed to provide this information to an attorney who will be representing the patient in a subsequent medication proceeding. Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2009).

Grant of petition upheld. —

Superior court did not err in determining that the administration of alternative psychotropic medication over an involuntarily committed patient's objection was in the patient's best interests and the least intrusive option as the court reasonably decided that the administration of one or the other of the psychotropic medications listed was in the patient's best interests in the immediate future and decided to leave the choice of treatment to a medical expert's judgment based upon the individual's response to treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Keegan N., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 2, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly granted the petition for an additional 180-day commitment and approving administration of psychotropic medication because the record supported the superior court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent’s long-standing mental health issues continued to worsen, he posed a serious risk of harm to others, he lacked capacity to make an informed decision about medication, involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was in his best interests, and there was no less restrictive alternative. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 19, 2022).

Stated in

Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 167 P.3d 701 (Alaska 2007).

Cited in

In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lucy G., 448 P.3d 868 (Alaska 2019); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V., 501 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 47.30.840. Right to privacy and personal possessions; other rights.

  1. A person undergoing evaluation or treatment under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915
    1. may not be photographed without the person’s consent and that of the person’s guardian if a minor, except that the person may be photographed upon admission to a facility for identification and for administrative purposes of the facility; all photographs shall be confidential and may only be released by the facility to the patient or the patient’s designee unless a court orders otherwise;
    2. at the time of admission to an evaluation or treatment facility, shall have reasonable precautions taken by the staff to inventory and safeguard the patient’s personal property; a copy of the inventory signed by the staff member making it shall be given to the patient and made available to the patient’s attorney and any other person authorized by the patient to inspect the document;
    3. shall have access to an individual storage space for the patient’s private use while undergoing evaluation or treatment;
    4. shall be permitted to wear personal clothing, to keep and use personal possessions including toilet articles if they are not considered unsafe for the patient or other patients who might have access to them, and to keep and be allowed to spend a reasonable sum of the patient’s own money for the patient’s needs and comfort;
    5. shall be allowed to have visitors at reasonable times;
    6. shall have ready access to letter writing materials, including stamps, and have the right to send and receive unopened mail;
    7. shall have reasonable access to a telephone, both to make and receive confidential calls;
    8. has the right to be free of corporal punishment;
    9. has the right to reasonable opportunity for indoor and outdoor exercise and recreation;
    10. has the right, at any time, to have a telephone conversation with or be visited by an attorney;
    11. may not be retaliated against or subjected to any adverse change of conditions or treatment solely because of assertion of rights under this section.
  2. The patient’s rights under (a)(4), (5), (7) and (9) of this section may be suspended temporarily, following the initial evaluation period, if the professional person in charge of the patient determines that granting the patient those rights will pose a threat to the safety or well-being of the patient or others.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am §§ 23, 24 ch 142 SLA 1984; am § 9 ch 109 SLA 1992)

Sec. 47.30.845. Confidential records.

Information and records obtained in the course of a screening investigation, evaluation, examination, or treatment are confidential and are not public records, except as the requirements of a hearing under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 may necessitate a different procedure. Information and records may be copied and disclosed under regulations established by the department only to

  1. a physician or a provider of health, mental health, or social and welfare services involved in caring for, treating, or rehabilitating the patient;
  2. the patient or an individual to whom the patient has given written consent to have information disclosed;
  3. a person authorized by a court order;
  4. a person doing research or maintaining health statistics if the anonymity of the patient is assured and the facility recognizes the project as a bona fide research or statistical undertaking;
  5. the Department of Corrections in a case in which a prisoner confined to the state prison is a patient in the state hospital on authorized transfer either by voluntary admission or by court order;
  6. a governmental or law enforcement agency when necessary to secure the return of a patient who is on unauthorized absence from a facility where the patient was undergoing evaluation or treatment;
  7. a law enforcement agency when there is substantiated concern over imminent danger to the community by a presumed mentally ill person;
  8. the department in a case in which services provided under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 are paid for, in whole or in part, by the department or in which a person has applied for or has received assistance from the department for those services;
  9. the Department of Public Safety as provided in AS 47.30.907 ; information provided under this paragraph may not include diagnostic or clinical information regarding a patient.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 25 ch 142 SLA 1984; am E.O. No. 55, § 44 (1984); am § 4 ch 74 SLA 2001; am § 2 ch 73 SLA 2014)

Administrative Code. —

For requirements for designated facilities, see 7 AAC 72, art. 3.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective October 8, 2014, added (9), and made a related change.

Notes to Decisions

Disclosure to husband not permitted. —

Dismissal of the husband’s action alleging that he suffered emotional distress caused by the medical center’s release of his wife to her daughter was appropriate, in part because his argument that the medical center failed to disclose facts to him where it had a duty to do so was without merit. The medical center was legally obligated to not disclose the results of the wife’s assessment to the husband without her written consent. Clemensen v. Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 203 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2009).

Quoted in

In re Mark V., 324 P.3d 840 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 47.30.847. Patients’ grievance procedures.

  1. A patient has the right to bring grievances about the patient’s treatment, care, or rights to an impartial body within an evaluation facility or designated treatment facility.
  2. An evaluation facility and a designated treatment facility shall have a formal grievance procedure for patient grievances brought under (a) of this section. The facility shall inform each patient of the existence and contents of the grievance procedure.
  3. An evaluation facility and a designated treatment facility shall have a designated staff member who is trained in mental health consumer advocacy who will serve as an advocate, upon a patient’s request, to assist the patient in bringing grievances or pursuing other redress for complaints concerning care, treatment, and rights.

History. (§ 10 ch 109 SLA 1992)

Sec. 47.30.850. Sealing records.

Following the discharge of a person from a treatment facility or the issuance of a court order denying a petition for commitment, the person may at any time move to have all court records pertaining to the proceedings sealed on condition that the person file a full release of all claims of whatever nature arising out of the proceedings and the statements and actions of persons and facilities in connection with the proceedings. Upon the filing of the motion and full release, the court shall order the court records sealed.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 11 ch 109 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 73 SLA 2014)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective October 8, 2014, substituted “person” for “respondent” three times, substituted “sealed” for “expunged” following “pertaining to the proceedings”, deleted “either expunged or” following “order the court records”, and deleted “, whichever the court considers appropriate under the circumstances” at the end.

Notes to Decisions

Purpose. —

This section grants courts the authority to expunge or seal the records of persons who have been subject to civil commitment proceedings. The remedies provided by AS 47.30.850 may avert many of the most onerous collateral consequences that potentially attach to an involuntary civil commitment order. In re Mark V., 324 P.3d 840 (Alaska 2014).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 47.30.851. Relief from legal disability.

  1. A person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) as a result of an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence that occurred in this state may, at any time, move to be relieved from the disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence.
  2. In ruling on a motion under (a) of this section, the court
    1. shall consider
      1. the circumstances of the involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence;
      2. the time that has elapsed since the involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence;
      3. the person’s reputation and mental health and criminal history records;
      4. any conduct by the person that would constitute a crime against a person under AS 11.41 or a violation of AS 11.61.190 11.61.250 ; and
      5. any changes in the person’s condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought; and
    2. shall grant relief from the disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
      1. the person is unlikely to act in a manner dangerous to self or to public safety; and
      2. granting the relief is not contrary to the public interest.
  3. The court shall order a hearing conducted under (b) of this section to be held open or closed to the public at the option of the person.
  4. A decision to grant or deny relief under this section may be appealed as provided in AS 22.05.010 . In reviewing the decision of the superior court, the standard of review may be de novo.

History. (§ 4 ch 73 SLA 2014)

Effective dates. —

Section 4, ch. 73, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on October 8, 2014.

Sec. 47.30.855. Posting of rights.

The rights set out in AS 47.30.817 47.30.855 shall be prominently posted in all treatment facilities in places accessible to all patients. A patient who does not understand English shall have the patient rights explained in a language the patient understands.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 79 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, substituted “AS 47.30.817 47.30.855 ” for “AS 47.30.825 47.30.855 ”.

Sec. 47.30.860. Documents and notices in other languages.

When practicable, all documents and notices required by AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 to be served on a respondent, or on the respondent’s parents, guardian or adult designee, shall be explained in a language the person understands if the respondent is not competent in English.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.865. Discrimination prohibited.

  1. The fact that a person is or has been evaluated or treated for mental illness may not be a basis for discrimination in
    1. seeking employment;
    2. resuming or continuing professional practice or previous occupation;
    3. obtaining or retaining housing;
    4. obtaining or retaining licenses or permits, including but not limited to a motor vehicle license, motor vehicle operator’s and chauffeur’s license, and a professional or occupational license.
  2. Applications for positions, licenses, and housing may not contain requests for information concerning evaluation or treatment experiences.
  3. A person may not aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of an act forbidden under this section or attempt to do so.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Article 11. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 47.30.870. Transportation.

When a person is to be involuntarily committed to a facility, the department shall arrange, and is authorized to pay for, the person’s necessary transportation to the designated facility accompanied by appropriate persons and, if necessary, by a peace officer. The department shall pay return transportation of a person, the person’s escorts, and, if necessary, a peace officer, after a determination that the person is not committable, at the end of a commitment period, or at the end of a voluntary stay at a treatment facility following an evaluation conducted in accordance with AS 47.30.715 . When advisable, one or more relatives or friends shall be permitted to accompany the person. The department may pay necessary travel, housing, and meal expenses incurred by one relative or friend in accompanying the person if the department determines that the person’s best interests require that the person be accompanied by the relative or friend and the relative or friend is indigent.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.875. Residence; nonresident patients; interstate agreements.

  1. The admission papers of a person who is admitted to a treatment facility under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 must include a statement as to the person’s residence.  The department may return a patient who is not a resident of the state to the state of the person’s residence with court approval if the person has been committed. If the state in which the person has residence does not accept the person as a patient, the person shall be treated as a resident of this state under the provisions of AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 .
  2. To facilitate the return of nonresident patients the department may enter into a reciprocal agreement or compact with another state providing for the prompt return under appropriate supervision of residents of that state who are mentally ill.  A mentally ill resident of this state who has been placed in a facility outside this state may be admitted with the approval of the department to a treatment facility in the state designated by the department.  The department may enter into reciprocal agreements or contracts with another state providing for custody, care or treatment, or return of mentally ill residents of this state by the other state and for the custody and care or treatment of mentally ill residents of that state by this state on a reimbursable basis.  A resident of this state who has been committed in another state and is returned in accordance with this section shall, within 72 hours of admission to the designated facility, be examined. After examination the mental health professional in charge shall release the person or shall petition for involuntary commitment as prescribed in AS 47.30.740 .
  3. In taking action under (a) and (b) of this section, consideration shall be given to the best interests of the patient, particularly to the relationship of the patient to the patient’s family, legal guardian, or friends to maintain relationships and encourage visits beneficial to the patient.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.880. Interstate Compact on Mental Health ratified.

This state ratifies and adopts by reference “The Interstate Compact on Mental Health” consisting of 14 articles approved on September 30, 1955, by the Northeast State Governments Conference on Mental Health. The department is designated as compact administrator with full power to carry out the purpose of the compact and to adopt all necessary regulations to implement the compact.

History. (§ 119(e) ch 87 SLA 1957; added by § 11 ch 127 SLA 1959)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.30.180 . Renumbered in 1981.

Sec. 47.30.885. Rights outside state.

Nothing in AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 alters or impairs the application or availability to a patient, while hospitalized in another state under contractual arrangements entered in accordance with AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , of the rights, remedies, or safeguards provided by the laws of this state.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, § 75 et seq.

Sec. 47.30.890. Provision for personal needs upon discharge.

The department shall ensure that

  1. a patient is not discharged from a treatment facility without suitable clothing; and
  2. a discharged indigent patient is furnished
    1. suitable transportation to the patient’s permanent residence in this state or to another suitable place at the discretion of the department; and
    2. a reasonable amount of money to meet the patient’s immediate needs.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.895. Disposition of unclaimed property; recovery of personal property.

  1. Those unclaimed articles of personal property that are covered by AS 34.45.110 34.45.260 and the unclaimed money in the custody of a treatment facility that belong to a patient who dies before discharge, or to a patient who leaves the hospital without authority, if unclaimed by the patient or the legal heirs or representatives of the patient within one year after the patient’s death or departure, shall be disposed of in accordance with AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , and the other articles of the patient’s personal property shall be disposed of in the manner prescribed by the department and the proceeds deposited in the general fund.
  2. If a mentally ill individual has died in a foreign facility and the department desires to recover the patient’s personal property under this section, the commissioner or the commissioner’s designated representative may secure the property and for that purpose only is designated the decedent’s administrator.  Property so recovered shall be disposed of as provided by law.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 13 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 47.30.900. Diligent inquiry; personal property delivery and claims.

The department shall make diligent inquiry in every instance after departure without authority or death of a patient, to ascertain the whereabouts of the patient or that of the patient’s legal heirs or representatives, and shall turn over to the proper person the money or articles of personal property in the custody of the facility to the credit of the patient. Claims to the money or articles of personal property, including claims by the state, may be presented to the department at any time. If a claim other than by the state is established by clear and convincing evidence more than one year after the death or departure without authority of a patient, it shall be certified to the legislature for consideration and the legislature may pay the claim.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.905. Fees and expenses for judicial proceedings.

  1. The witnesses, expert witnesses, and the jury in commitment proceedings under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 are entitled to the fees, compensation, and mileage established by the administrative rules of court for other jurors and witnesses. Compensation, mileage, fees, transportation expenses for a respondent, and other expenses arising from evaluation and commitment proceedings shall be audited and allowed by the superior court of the judicial district in which the proceedings are held.  To the extent that services of a peace officer are used to carry out the provisions of AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , the officer is entitled to fees and actual expenses from the same source and in the same manner as for the officer’s other official duties.
  2. An attorney appointed for a person under AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 shall be compensated for services as follows:
    1. the person for whom an attorney is appointed shall, if the person is financially able under standards as to financial capability and indigency set by the court, pay the costs of the legal services;
    2. if the person is indigent under those standards, the costs of the services shall be paid by the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981)

Sec. 47.30.907. Report to Department of Public Safety.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 47.30.845 , when a superior court orders the involuntary commitment of a person under AS 47.30.735 47.30.755 or when relief from a disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence is granted under AS 47.30.851(b) , the court shall immediately transmit the following information, if known, to the Department of Public Safety:
    1. the person’s
      1. name, date of birth, and address;
      2. aliases;
      3. social security number;
      4. driver’s license or state identification card number;
    2. the date of the order and whether the order is
      1. an involuntary commitment; or
      2. relief from the disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence;
    3. the statutory authority for the involuntary commitment or the disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence;
    4. whether the person was offered an opportunity to be heard and represented by counsel in the involuntary commitment proceeding or adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence; and
    5. any other information required by the Department of Public Safety or by the United States Department of Justice for inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System established under P.L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
  2. This section does not apply to initial involuntary commitment procedures, emergency detention for evaluation, or hospitalization for examination under AS 47.30.700 47.30.715 if the person is released under AS 47.30.720 .

History. (§ 5 ch 73 SLA 2014)

Effective dates. —

Section 5, ch. 73, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on October 8, 2014.

Sec. 47.30.910. Payment of patient expenses.

  1. A patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age shall pay the charges for the care, transportation, and treatment of the patient when the patient is hospitalized under AS 47.30.670 47.30.915 at a state-operated facility, an evaluation facility, or a designated treatment facility providing services under AS 47.30.670 47.30.915 . The patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age shall make arrangements with a state-operated facility, an evaluation facility, or a designated treatment facility for payment of charges, including providing income information necessary to determine eligibility for benefits under AS 47.31. Charges assessed for services provided under AS 47.30.670 — 47.30.915 when a patient is hospitalized at a state-operated facility may not exceed the actual cost of care and treatment. The department may, when assessing charges for services provided at a state-operated facility, consider the ability to pay of a patient, a patient’s spouse, or a patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age. In order to impose liability for a patient’s cost of care at a state-operated facility, the department shall issue an order for payment within six months after the date on which the charge was incurred. The order remains in effect unless modified by subsequent court order or department order. The department may not impose liability for a patient’s cost of care at a state-operated facility if the patient would otherwise meet the eligibility criteria, other than location of service, in AS 47.31.010 .
  2. The department, the evaluation facility, or a designated treatment facility shall make reasonable efforts to determine whether the patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age has a third-party payor or has the available means to substantially contribute to the payment of charges, or whether the patient is eligible for assistance under AS 47.31.
  3. If a patient is hospitalized at a state-operated facility and the patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age fails to provide to the department information necessary to determine whether there is a third-party payor or available means to substantially contribute to the payment of charges, or whether the patient would, if not hospitalized at a state-operated facility, be eligible for assistance under AS 47.31, the department may issue an administrative order imposing full liability for the patient’s actual cost of care on the patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age. The order remains in effect unless modified by subsequent court order or department order.
  4. If a person who is hospitalized under AS 47.30.670 47.30.915 at an evaluation facility or a designated treatment facility cannot pay or substantially contribute to the payment of charges described under this section, the patient may apply for assistance under AS 47.31.
  5. The department may charge or accept money or property from a person for the care or treatment of a patient at a state-operated facility.
  6. Money paid by the patient or on the patient’s behalf to the department under this section shall be deposited in the general fund.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am § 95 ch 138 SLA 1986; am §§ 41, 42 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am § 36 ch 5 FSSLA 1994; am § 1 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed amendment of this section by § 2, ch. 87, SLA 1999, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 1, ch. 59, SLA 2001.

Collateral references. —

Constitutionality of statute imposing liability upon estate of relative of insane person for his support in asylum. 20 ALR3d 363.

Sec. 47.30.915. Definitions.

In AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 ,

  1. “adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence” means a court order finding that a person is
    1. not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill under AS 12.47.040 ;
    2. incompetent to stand trial for a criminal offense under AS 12.47.100 12.47.120 ; or
    3. a danger to self or others, or is gravely disabled because of incapacity, incompetence, mental illness, dementia, or some other cause;
  2. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  3. “court” means a superior court of the state;
  4. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  5. “designated treatment facility” or “treatment facility” means a hospital, clinic, institution, center, or other health care facility that has been designated by the department for the treatment or rehabilitation of mentally ill persons under AS 47.30.670 47.30.915 but does not include correctional institutions;
  6. “disability resulting from an involuntary commitment or an adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence” means the prohibition against the possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) that results from an involuntary commitment or adjudication of mental illness or mental incompetence;
  7. “evaluation facility” means a health care facility that has been designated or is operated by the department to perform the evaluations described in AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 , or a medical facility licensed under AS 47.32 or operated by the federal government;
  8. “evaluation personnel” means mental health professionals designated by the department to conduct evaluations as prescribed in AS 47.30.660 47.30.915 who conduct evaluations in places in which no staffed evaluation facility exists;
  9. “gravely disabled” means a condition in which a person as a result of mental illness
    1. is in danger of physical harm arising from such complete neglect of basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety as to render serious accident, illness, or death highly probable if care by another is not taken; or
    2. will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of the person’s previous ability to function independently;
  10. “inpatient treatment” means care and treatment rendered inside or on the premises of a treatment facility, or a part or unit of a treatment facility, for a continual period of 24 hours or longer;
  11. “least restrictive alternative” means mental health treatment facilities and conditions of treatment that
    1. are no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than necessary to achieve the treatment objectives of the patient; and
    2. involve no restrictions on physical movement nor supervised residence or inpatient care except as reasonably necessary for the administration of treatment or the protection of the patient or others from physical injury;
  12. “likely to cause serious harm” means a person who
    1. poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person’s self, as manifested by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening that harm;
    2. poses a substantial risk of harm to others as manifested by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm, and is likely in the near future to cause physical injury, physical abuse, or substantial property damage to another person; or
    3. manifests a current intent to carry out plans of serious harm to that person’s self or another;
  13. “mental health professional” means a psychiatrist or physician who is licensed by the State Medical Board to practice in this state or is employed by the federal government; a clinical psychologist licensed by the state Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners; a psychological associate trained in clinical psychology and licensed by the Board of Psychologist and Psychological Associate Examiners; an advanced practice registered nurse or a registered nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing, licensed by the State Board of Nursing; a marital and family therapist licensed by the Board of Marital and Family Therapy; a professional counselor licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors; a clinical social worker licensed by the Board of Social Work Examiners; and a person who
    1. has a master’s degree in the field of mental health;
    2. has at least 12 months of post-masters working experience in the field of mental illness; and
    3. is working under the supervision of a type of licensee listed in this paragraph;
  14. “mental illness” means an organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has substantial adverse effects on an individual’s ability to exercise conscious control of the individual’s actions or ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand; intellectual disability, developmental disability, or both, epilepsy, drug addiction, and alcoholism do not per se constitute mental illness, although persons suffering from these conditions may also be suffering from mental illness;
  15. “peace officer” includes a state police officer, municipal or other local police officer, state, municipal, or other local health officer, public health nurse, United States marshal or deputy United States marshal, or a person authorized by the court;
  16. “persons with mental disorders” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.610 ;
  17. “professional person in charge” means the senior mental health professional at a facility or that person’s designee; in the absence of a mental health professional it means the chief of staff or a physician designated by the chief of staff;
  18. “provider of outpatient care” means a mental health professional or hospital, clinic, institution, center, or other health care facility designated by the department to accept for treatment patients who are ordered to undergo involuntary outpatient treatment by the court or who are released early from inpatient commitments on condition that they undergo outpatient treatment;
  19. “screening investigation” means the investigation and review of facts that have been alleged to warrant emergency examination or treatment, including interviews with the persons making the allegations, any other significant witnesses who can readily be contacted for interviews, and, if possible, the respondent, and an investigation and evaluation of the reliability and credibility of persons providing information or making allegations;
  20. “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the approval of the United States Congress, Canada.

History. (§ 1 ch 84 SLA 1981; am §§ 26 — 30 ch 142 SLA 1984; am § 43 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 3 ch 87 SLA 1999; am § 1 ch 73 SLA 2002; am § 32 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 25 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 6 ch 73 SLA 2014; am § 53 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (14) (now (16)) was enacted as (18) and renumbered in 1991. Paragraphs (1) and (6) were enacted as paragraphs (19) and (20) and renumbered in 2014. Reorganized in 1991 and 2014 to maintain alphabetical order.

In 2000, “Psychologist” was substituted for “Psychologists” in the definition of “mental health professional” to correct a manifest error.

Administrative Code. —

For procedures for designation of evaluation personnel, see 7 AAC 72, art. 6.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (5).

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (12), substituted “intellectual disability, developmental disability, or both” for “mental retardation”.

The 2014 amendment, effective October 8, 2014, added (19) [now (1)] and (20) [now (6)] and made related changes.

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (13), inserted “an advanced practice registered nurse or” following “Psychological Associate Examiners;”.

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed amendment of (4) of this section by § 4, ch. 87, SLA 1999, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 1, ch. 59, SLA 2001.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality of paragraph (7)(B). —

Definition of “gravely disabled” in subsection (7)(B) of this section is constitutional if construed to require a level of incapacity so substantial that the individual is incapable of surviving safely in freedom. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007), overruled in part, In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

In order to be constitutional, paragraph (7)(B) of this section must be construed so that the “distress” that justifies commitment refers to a level of incapacity that prevents the person in question from being able to live safely outside of a controlled environment. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007), overruled in part, In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

“Gravely disabled.” —

Patient who had bipolar I disorder was gravely disabled on the day of an involuntary commitment hearing; she could not properly access outpatient treatment because her thinking was so impaired, and without further treatment she would likely be hospitalized again. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Tracy C., 249 P.3d 1085 (Alaska 2011).

Superior court did not err in concluding that patient was gravely disabled as defined in subsection (7)(B); patient’s own testimony at the commitment hearing supported a psychiatrist’s conclusion that he lacked insight into his illness, and his equivocal and contradictory testimony about whether he would continue taking his medication for catatonia did not directly contradict the psychiatrist’s conclusion that he would not take his medication in the future. In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84 (Alaska 2012).

Conclusion that patient was gravely disabled under subsection (7)(B) was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The court’s decision to commit the patient for 30 days was based on partial and unclear evidence, much of which was hearsay, and was in tension with significant evidence in favor of the patient’s ability to function independently and live outside of a controlled environment. In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

Finding that a patient is gravely disabled by clear and convincing evidence requires the superior court to have a firm belief in the fact that the patient could not live safely outside of a controlled environment, and has a condition of mental illness that, if left untreated, would cause him to suffer significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior. Patient’s willingness to get treatment if the court so ordered demonstrated his ability to reason and make autonomous choices, contrary to the involuntary commitment ordered. In re Stephen O., 314 P.3d 1185 (Alaska 2013).

State had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, a respondent was gravely disabled and commitment was the least restrictive alternative because proving an inability to function independently with support, when relevant, was part of the burden to prove no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., 375 P.3d 51 (Alaska 2016).

Any error in the jury instructions on the unanimity requirement relating to a finding of grave disability was invited error, and the patient waived any challenge to the instructions because he requested them; the patient did not object to the jury instruction and did not request a jury instruction that would require the jury to agree on a specific basis for a finding of grave disability, thus, his claim of error was waived when he expressly endorsed the instructions that were read to the jury. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M., 426 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2018).

Trial court did not err by granting the Alaska Psychiatric Institute's (API) commitment petition for the patient because its finding that she was gravely disabled was not clearly erroneous, as the physician testified that the patient did not have housing, her disorder was severe enough that she could not be expected to find housing on her own, and that she may not have been able to eat and shower regularly unless API provided her those remedies. The trial court found that her delusions of rape and bodily harm became more acute during the time she refused to take medication or participate in planning her treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2019).

Granting of a 30-day commitment order was appropriate because the individual was gravely disabled as clear and convincing evidence showed a substantial deterioration of the individual's previous ability to function independently—diagnosis of bipolar disorder, impaired judgment, bizarre behavior and speech, a high level of agitation, and hyper-verbosity—and the condition would continue if not treated. The individual lacked the ability to exist safely outside an institutional framework due to high-risk behaviors and inability to retain housing. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Randy N., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in determining that an individual was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.735(c) and 47.30.915 (9)(B) where the findings that he would have discontinued his medication, stopped eating, and would have had no feasible living arrangement if discharged were not clearly erroneous. Moreover, outpatient therapy was not a viable option, and although forward-looking, the order was couched in the present tense. In re Marvin S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Plaintiff was gravely disabled given his family's testimony about his health and unsafe housing situation. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Duane M., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 11, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in finding an individual gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915 (9)(B) where the court not only compared her present functioning to her pre-hospitalization functioning, but alsofocused on whether her judgment and behavior were so significantly impaired that she could not function independently. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Annika G., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Patient met the definition of gravely disabled in AS 47.30.915 (9)(B); although the doctor stated that the patient was not malnourished when admitted, she had no housing and had been evicted from apartments due to erratic behaviors, and while the doctor acknowledged that he heard about the patient's housing situation from her mother, the patient did not attempt to contradict that testimony, and as an expert, the doctor was entitled to rely on and testify regarding hearsay that informed his opinions and recommended treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Naomi B., — P.3d — (Alaska May 20, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that respondent was gravely disabled because it showed that respondent was suffering from schizophrenia, upon arrival his clothes were covered in feces and vomit and he was not keeping himself dry, attending to his toileting needs, or showering, and the trial court found that respondent's failure to acknowledge that he was covered in vomit and feces, understand that such a physical condition was a problem, or understand that his condition would lead to further deterioration and isolation was evidence of his grave disability. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Rabi R., 468 P.3d 721 (Alaska 2020).

Superior court did not clearly err when it found that the patient was gravely disabled and when it entered a 30-day involuntary commitment order because the patient broke all the windows in her family's home to release demons; her home was uninhabitable; she was not eating or sleeping well outside of the Alaska Psychiatric Institute; her psychiatrist opined she could not survive safely in the community; and her psychiatrist predicted her condition would continue to decline without appropriate treatment. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Melody B., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 16, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Delusional thinking. —

In a case in which a patient appealed a superior court's 30-day involuntary commitment order, the Supreme Court concluded that the patient demonstrated disorganized and delusional thinking. The patient's testimony meandered as she mentioned being beaten, kidnapped and held for ransom in connection with a government program, starring in films with John Wayne, and associating with other actors. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Margo T., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 5, 2020) (memorandum decision).

“Least restrictive alternative.” —

Superior court did not err when it determined that there was no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment where a psychiatrist explained why living in a shelter, in the wilderness, or with family and friends were not feasible, In addition, it was not error to conclude that involuntary commitment at the facility, allowing the individual's psychosis to stabilize, was necessary before outpatient treatment became a feasible alternative. In re Marvin S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Superior court did not err in concluding that the patient's involuntarily placement at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) was the least restrictive treatment option because she was delusional and had not been taking her medicine since moving out of an assisted living facility; the assisted living facility required its residents to take prescribed medication, but she refused; she continued to deny her diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and refused medication despite her hospitalization at API; and she needed to stabilize in a controlled environment, but due to the medication requirement at the assisted living facility and her resistance to medication, API was the only viable environment for such stabilization. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Denise F., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 25, 2019) (memorandum decision).

In a case in which the superior signed a 30-day involuntary commitment order, the superior court did not err in finding that no less restrictive alternative than commitment existed because the patient did not appear to have anywhere to stay and was unlikely to follow up with treatment if not committed; the psychiatrist believed the patient's symptoms would continue if not treated. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Luciano G., 450 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2019).

Superior court did not err when it found no less restrictive alternatives where it appropriately balanced the competing rights and interests, concluding that although she had shown improvement, her delusions caused impaired judgment and aggression, and the court was concerned about her ability to access a shelter, a medical provider, and a care provider given her current care provider's continued unwillingness to be alone with her. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Annika G., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2020) (memorandum decision).

There was no less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment where, even if doctors could not say that the young mans condition would have improved with hospitalization, commitment would keep others safe from harm in the event his delusions suddenly worsened and he decided to use the weapons he had surrounded himself with at home. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mason J., — P.3d — (Alaska June 10, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment because it showed that respondent had been unable to care for himself outside an institution and had refused to take the medication needed to allow him to function independently. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Rabi R., 468 P.3d 721 (Alaska 2020).

“Mentally ill.” —

Appellant was properly admitted to a psychiatric facility because, although appellant’s alcohol abuse and inhaling gasoline fumes to get high originally caused appellant’s mental deficiencies, appellant was mentally ill within the definition in paragraph (12); “huffing” damaged the frontal lobe of appellant’s brain, resulting in dementia and personality disorder. Appellant had little or no insight into the fact that huffing gas was harmful. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009).

Where a patient was delusional and believed that she had to take unprescribed, illegally obtained controlled substances to manage the stresses of bipolar disorder, she had a mental illness and was likely to cause harm to herself due to the mental illness. In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2012).

Valid screening investigation not conducted. —

Evaluation order was vacated because a master did not interview an allegedly mentally ill woman as AS 47.30.700 required, ask a mental health professional to do so, or find an interview was not reasonably possible, the error was not harmless, as a probable cause finding was minimally supported, so the lack of an interview prejudiced the hearing’s outcome, and the credibility of lay persons making allegations was not found. In re Heather R., 366 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2016).

Likely to cause serious harm. —

Trial court's determination that the patient was likely to cause harm to others was supported by findings that the patient's partner had serious concern about his doing things that he was disavowing such as connecting an electric welder to their home's metal door, presence of bottles used to make Molotov cocktails, and a doctor's statements that the patient's delusions were resulting in behavior that posed a substantial risk to others. In re Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2016).

Superior court did not err in signing the 30-day involuntary commitment order as the patient was likely to cause harm to himself or others because the patient had been behaving erratically leading up to his leaving or being fired from the Veterans Administration; he acted irately at the airport with both a ticket agent and an officer, and he had loaded weapons in a gun case with no visible lock; and both the officer and a psychiatrist testified that they believed the patient's behavior was threatening. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Luciano G., 450 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2019).

Court did not clearly err in finding that involuntary civil commitment was appropriate in that an individual was likely to cause harm to others as a result of mental illness because the finding of likely to cause harm was supported by a treating facility psychiatrist's testimony that the individual regularly threatened physical harm to other patients and to the facility's staff, averted only by safety precautions, and that if released the individual would likely stop taking medications, deteriorate, cause a fight, and end up back in jail. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Keegan N., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 2, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's 30-day commitment order for appellant under because at the commitment hearing appellant's nurse-practitioner at an evaluation facility testified that appellant had threatened staff, struck staff with his hands, and exhibited erratic and disorganized behavior. The nurse practitioner also testified that appellant posed a risk to the community. In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Quade M., — P.3d — (Alaska May 5, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Superior court properly granted the petition for an additional 180-day commitment and approving administration of psychotropic medication because the record supported the superior court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent’s long-standing mental health issues continued to worsen, he posed a serious risk of harm to others, he lacked capacity to make an informed decision about medication, involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was in his best interests, and there was no less restrictive alternative. In re Hospitalization of Mark V., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 19, 2022).

Evaluation order vacated.

Evaluation order was vacated because a master did not interview an allegedly mentally ill woman as AS 47.30.700 required, ask a mental health professional to do so, or find an interview was not reasonably possible, the error was not harmless, as a probable cause finding was minimally supported, so the lack of an interview prejudiced the hearing’s outcome, and the credibility of lay persons making allegations was not found. In re Heather R., 366 P.3d 530 (Alaska 2016).

Quoted in

In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Danielle B., 453 P.3d 200 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006); Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2009); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Connor J., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2019); In re Hospitalization of Linda M., 440 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2019); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Meredith B., 462 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2020); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mabel B., 485 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2021); In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of A.S., — P.3d — (Alaska July 21, 2021).

Article 12. Personal Declaration of Preference for Mental Health Treatment.

Secs. 47.30.950 — 47.30.980. Personal Declaration of Preference for Mental Health Treatment. [Repealed, § 15 ch 83 SLA 2004. For current law, see AS 13.52.]

Chapter 31. Mental Health Treatment Assistance Program.

Administrative Code. —

For state training and employment program, see 8 AAC 87.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 7, ch. 87, SLA 1999 provides that this chapter applies “to expenses incurred for mental health services received on or after July 1, 1999.”

The repeal of this chapter by § 6, ch. 87, SLA 1999, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 1, ch. 59, SLA 2001.

Sec. 47.31.005. Applicability.

This chapter applies only to those patients who have received evaluation or treatment at an evaluation facility or a designated treatment facility that is not a state-operated hospital.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Sec. 47.31.010. Eligibility for assistance.

  1. The department shall provide financial assistance under this chapter to a patient who
    1. does not have the available means to pay or substantially contribute to the payment of charges assessed by a facility;
    2. has no other third party to pay for the evaluation or treatment provided under AS 47.30; and
    3. meets the criteria in this chapter.
  2. To be eligible for assistance under this chapter, a patient must have
    1. been admitted for inpatient evaluation or treatment at an evaluation facility or a designated treatment facility other than a state-operated hospital after either
      1. an involuntary commitment under AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 ; or
      2. a voluntary admission chosen by the patient after a determination by the patient’s treating physician that the patient meets the involuntary commitment criteria in AS 47.30.700 47.30.915 and that involuntary commitment proceedings would be initiated if the patient did not choose to be admitted voluntarily; and
    2. a gross monthly household income that does not exceed 185 percent of the federal poverty guideline for this state for the calendar month in which service was provided.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Cross references. —

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

Sec. 47.31.015. Application for assistance.

  1. To receive assistance under this chapter, a patient or a patient’s legal representative must apply in writing on a form provided by the department. A patient must apply for assistance within 180 days after the date of discharge from the facility.
  2. A patient is considered to have applied for assistance under (a) of this section if the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility notifies the department on a form provided by the department that there is good cause to believe that the patient would be eligible for assistance under this chapter and
    1. the patient, the patient’s spouse, or the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age failed within 150 days after the date of discharge from the facility to make arrangements to pay the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility; or
    2. the patient lacks the mental capacity to apply for benefits under this chapter.
  3. A patient who applies or is considered to have applied for assistance under this chapter, the patient’s spouse, the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age, or a person in the patient’s household shall release records and information to the department necessary to verify eligibility for the assistance.
  4. If a patient, the patient’s spouse, the patient’s parent if the patient is under 18 years of age, or a person in the patient’s household fails to provide records and information to the department necessary to verify eligibility, the department may issue an administrative order imposing full liability for the patient’s cost of care and treatment to the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Administrative Code. —

For mental health treatment assistance program, see 7 AAC 72, art. 10.

Sec. 47.31.020. Decision on eligibility.

  1. Within 30 days after receiving a complete application, the department shall give notice in writing of an eligibility determination to the patient or the patient’s legal representative. If the patient is found ineligible, the notice must contain the reason for the denial and an explanation of the patient’s right to an administrative appeal of the denial.
  2. The department shall provide a copy of the notice of eligibility or ineligibility to the facility at which the patient was treated.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Sec. 47.31.025. Eligible services; rates.

The department shall identify the type and level of services for which assistance is available under this chapter. An evaluation facility or a designated treatment facility shall be reimbursed at a rate established by the department that is equivalent to the Medicaid rate for that facility at the time service was rendered as determined under AS 47.07.070 .

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Administrative Code. —

For scope and applicability, see 7 AAC 72, art. 1.

For designation of facilities, see 7 AAC 72, art. 2.

For mental health treatment assistance program, see 7 AAC 72, art. 10.

Sec. 47.31.030. Payment.

If the department determines that a patient is eligible for assistance under this chapter, the department shall provide for payment of assistance directly to the facility. By endorsing the check received from the department or authorizing the endorsement by the facility’s agent, the facility certifies that the claim for which the check is payment is true and accurate unless written notice of an error is sent to the department by the facility within 30 days after the date the check is presented by the facility for payment.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Sec. 47.31.032. Access to records and information by the department.

The department is authorized to review, obtain, and copy confidential and other records and information about the patients who were eligible for or were provided financial assistance under this chapter to evaluate compliance with this chapter. The department may obtain the records and information from the patient or directly from the evaluation facility or the designated treatment facility. Records obtained by the department under this section are medical records, shall be handled confidentially, and are exempt from public inspection and copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 .

History. (§ 5 ch 74 SLA 2001)

Sec. 47.31.035. Appeals.

  1. A patient or the patient’s legal representative may appeal a denial of assistance by sending written notice of objection to the department within 30 days after the date of the notice of denial. The written notice of objection must include an explanation of the reasons for the objection and may include documentation supporting the objection. AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) does not apply to the appeal.
  2. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee shall review the notice of objection and issue a decision within 90 days after its receipt. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee may request additional information on the appeal from either the patient, the evaluation facility or designated treatment facility, or department staff. A request for additional information suspends the time period for the appeal until the department determines that the additional information has been received. If more than 180 days have passed from the date of submission of a notice of appeal and the additional information requested by the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee has not been received from a patient, the evaluation facility, the designated treatment facility, or the department, the appeal shall be considered denied.
  3. The decision on the appeal under (b) of this section, including an appeal denied for failure to submit additional information, is a final agency decision and may be appealed to the superior court under the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Sec. 47.31.090. Regulations.

The department shall, after consultation with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, adopt regulations to interpret or implement this chapter.

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.31.900. Renumbered in 1999.

Administrative Code. —

For standards for operation of a community mental health center, see 7 AAC 71, art. 3.

For scope and applicability, see 7 AAC 72, art. 1.

For designation of facilities, see 7 AAC 72, art. 2.

For mental health treatment assistance program, see 7 AAC 72, art. 10.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Sec. 47.31.100. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “designated treatment facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
  4. “evaluation facility” means a health care facility that has been designated by the department to perform the evaluations described in AS 47.30.670 47.30.915 , including a facility licensed under AS 47.32 or operated by the federal government;
  5. “gross monthly household income” means all earned or unearned income from any source of a member of the patient’s household;
  6. “household” means a patient and each person
    1. residing with the patient; and
    2. related to the patient by marriage or other legal relationship giving rise to a duty of support and maintenance;
  7. “mental illness” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 .

History. (§ 5 ch 87 SLA 1999; am § 33 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.31.990. Renumbered in 1999.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (4).

Chapter 32. Centralized Licensing and Related Administrative Procedures.

Cross references. —

Under § 52, ch. 57, SLA 2005, the changes involving licensing and related administrative procedures that are affected by the enactment of this chapter apply to (1) applications or requests submitted within the 90 days before, or submitted on or after, July 2, 2005, for initial licensure, certification, or other approval of an entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) ; and (2) applications submitted within the 90 days before, or submitted on or after, July 2, 2005, for renewal of a license issued before July 2, 2005, under a statute repealed or amended by ch. 57, SLA 2005, regarding a type of entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) .

For transitional provisions regarding applications for licenses or approvals under the chapter that were submitted more than 90 days before July 2, 2005, see § 56, ch. 57, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

For transitional provisions concerning requirements, standards, monitoring, enforcement actions, and the validity of license issued before July 2, 2005, for a facility that is a type of entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) , see sec. 55, ch. 57, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 69, SLA 2018 (SB 81), which served as a basis for the 2018 changes to provisions of this chapter, see 2017 Senate Journal 452 — 454.

Sec. 47.32.010. Purpose and applicability.

  1. The purpose of this chapter is to establish centralized licensing and related administrative procedures for the delivery of services in this state by the entities listed in (b) of this section. These procedures are intended to promote safe and appropriate services by setting standards for licensure that will reduce predictable risk; improve quality of care; foster individual and patient rights; and otherwise advance public health, safety, and welfare.
  2. This chapter and regulations adopted under this chapter apply to the following entities:
    1. ambulatory surgical centers;
    2. assisted living homes;
    3. child care facilities;
    4. child placement agencies;
    5. foster homes;
    6. freestanding birth centers;
    7. home health agencies;
    8. hospices, or agencies providing hospice services or operating hospice programs;
    9. hospitals;
    10. intermediate care facilities for individuals with an intellectual disability or related condition;
    11. maternity homes;
    12. nursing facilities;
    13. residential child care facilities;
    14. residential psychiatric treatment centers;
    15. runaway shelters;
    16. rural health clinics;
    17. crisis stabilization centers.
  3. The provisions of AS 47.05.300 47.05.390 , regarding criminal history, criminal history checks, criminal history use standards, and civil history databases, apply to entities listed in (b) of this section, as provided in AS 47.05.300 .

History. (§§ 34, 35 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 26 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 18 ch 69 SLA 2018; am § 7 ch 28 SLA 2020)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, the entities listed in subsection (b) were reorganized to maintain alphabetical order.

Cross references. —

For provisions governing the applicability of (c) of this section to certain applications or requests for initial licensure, certification, or other approval or selection, or for renewal of a license, certification, or other approval or selection, see § 53, ch. 57, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For specialized hospitals, see 7 AAC 12, art. 4.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For frontier extended stay clinics, see 7 AAC 12, art. 10.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For care and services, see 7 AAC 50, art. 5.

For environment, see 7 AAC 50, art. 6.

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For admission, see 7 AAC 57, art. 4.

For care and services, see 7 AAC 57, art. 5.

For environment, see 7 AAC 57, art. 6.

For specializations, see 7 AAC 57, art. 7.

For licensing of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 1.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective March 1, 2006, added subsection (c).

The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b)(10), substituted “individuals with an intellectual disability or related condition” for “the mentally retarded”.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in (c), substituted “civil history databases” for “a centralized registry” following “criminal history use standards, and”.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 28, 2020, in (b), added (17) and made a related change.

Notes to Decisions

Facility liability for independent contractor. —

In a medical malpractice suit where plaintiffs argued the hospital was liable for the negligence of an independent contractor surgeon who had staff privileges at the hospital, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed under a direct liability theory of corporate negligence. It is the hospital as an institution which bears ultimate responsibility for complying with the mandates of the law. Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003).

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, §§ 5, 6.

73A C.J.S., Public and Private Institutional Care Facilities, § 1 et seq.

41 C.J.S., Hospitals, §§ 8-10.

Sec. 47.32.020. Requirement to obtain a license; exemption.

  1. An entity may not operate a facility described in AS 47.32.010(b) without first obtaining a license under this chapter unless the entity is exempt under regulations adopted under AS 47.32.030 or is exempt under (c) of this section.
  2. If an entity encompasses more than one type of activity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) , the entity shall apply for and receive a separate license under this chapter before operating that type of activity unless exempt under regulations adopted under AS 47.32.030 .
  3. If a nonprofit organization operates a program that assists parents to find temporary care for a child, the nonprofit organization is exempt from the licensing and other requirements of this chapter when operating the program.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 6, 7 ch 28 SLA 2016)

Cross references. —

Under § 55(a), ch. 57, SLA 2005, notwithstanding AS 47.32.020 , a facility that is a type of entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) and that, on July 2, 2005, is being operated under a valid license or under an approval issued by the department under a statute repealed or amended by ch. 57, SLA 2005, may continue to be operated under that license or approval as provided in § 55, ch. 57, SLA 2005. Under § 55(c), ch. 57, SLA 2005, until renewal or expiration of a current license under § 55(d) or (e), the requirements and standards, including department oversight, monitoring, and enforcement actions, regarding operation of a facility that is authorized to continue operating are those that were in effect in statute or regulation on July 1, 2005. Under § 55(d), ch. 57, SLA 2005, unless the terms of the facility’s current license provide for an earlier expiration date, and unless an enforcement action taken by the department as provided in § 55(c) affects the validity of the current license, the expiration date of the current license of a facility described in § 55(a) is June 30, 2006. Section 55(e) directs that application for license renewal must be made under AS 47.32.060 , by the date required by that statute, for a facility described in § 55(a) for which renewal of licensure is desired before expiration of the facility’s current license and provides that, for purposes of renewal of a license under AS 47.32.060 , the current license for the facility is considered to be a biennial license under this chapter.

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For specialized hospitals, see 7 AAC 12, art. 4.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For frontier extended stay clinics, see 7 AAC 12, art. 10.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective September 20, 2016, in (a), inserted “or is exempt under (c) of this section” following “AS 47.32.020 ”; added (c).

Sec. 47.32.030. Powers of the department; delegation to municipality.

  1. The department may
    1. administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter;
    2. coordinate and develop policies, programs, and planning related to licensure and operation of entities listed in AS 47.32.010(b) as defined by regulation;
    3. adopt regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter, including regulations that
      1. establish fees for licensing of each type of entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) ;
      2. impose requirements for licensure, including standards for license renewal, that are in addition to the requirements of this chapter or of any other applicable state or federal statute or regulation;
      3. impose requirements and standards on licensed entities that are in addition to those imposed by this chapter or by any other applicable state or federal statute or regulation, including
        1. requirements and standards necessary for an entity or the state to receive money from the department from any source, including federal money;
        2. record-keeping requirements;
        3. reporting requirements; and
        4. requirements and standards regarding health, safety, and sanitation;
      4. provide for waivers, variances, and exemptions from the requirements of this chapter, including the requirement to obtain a license, if the department finds it necessary for the efficient administration of this chapter; and
      5. establish requirements for the operation of entities licensed under this chapter;
    4. investigate
      1. entities described in AS 47.32.010(b);
      2. applicants for licensure, including individuals named in an application; and
      3. other persons that the department has reason to believe are operating an entity required to be licensed under this chapter, or are residing or working in an entity for which licensure has been sought under this chapter; this subparagraph does not apply to persons receiving services from an entity for which licensure has been sought under this chapter;
    5. inspect and monitor licensed entities for compliance with this chapter, regulations adopted under this chapter, and any other applicable statutes or regulations;
    6. enter into contracts and agreements necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the department under this chapter;
    7. enter into agreements with private entities, municipalities, and individuals to investigate and make recommendations to the department regarding the licensure and monitoring of entities under this chapter;
    8. require an individual who is or will be operating an entity to complete training related to the operation of the entity;
    9. waive the application requirements for an entity seeking licensure if the entity submits documentation verifying that it
      1. has a license issued by an organization or other agency that has licensing authority under state or federal law if the standards for that licensure are approved by the department under this chapter or regulations adopted under this chapter;
      2. has accreditation from a nationally recognized organization if the standards for that accreditation are equal to or more stringent than the standards for licensure under this chapter or regulations adopted under this chapter; or
      3. is an entity that federal law does not require to be licensed.
  2. The department shall delegate the department’s authority to regulate child care facilities to a municipality that has adopted an ordinance providing for child care licensing under home rule powers under AS 29.10.010 or as authorized under AS 29.35.200 29.35.210 . The department shall make the delegation described in this subsection within 90 days after receiving a written request from the municipality to delegate the authority. A municipality receiving a delegation under this subsection may adopt additional requirements for child care facilities operating within the boundaries of the municipality if the requirements meet or exceed the requirements under state law.
  3. The issuance of a license by the department does not obligate the department to place or maintain an individual in an entity or through an entity, or to provide financial support to an entity.
  4. The department may not require a licensed entity to increase services for the sole purpose of accommodating a physician’s practice of prescribing, dispensing, or administering an investigational drug, biological product, or device, or providing related treatment, to a patient. In this subsection, “investigational drug, biological product, or device” has the meaning given in AS 08.64.367 .

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 53 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For specialized hospitals, see 7 AAC 12, art. 4.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For frontier extended stay clinics, see 7 AAC 12, art. 10.

For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For care and services, see 7 AAC 50, art. 5.

For environment, see 7 AAC 50, art. 6.

For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

For admission, see 7 AAC 57, art. 4.

For care and services, see 7 AAC 57, art. 5.

For environment, see 7 AAC 57, art. 6.

For specializations, see 7 AAC 57, art. 7.

For licensing of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 1.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective October 11, 2018, added (d).

Sec. 47.32.032. Foster care license; variance.

  1. The department shall streamline the application and licensing paperwork necessary for a person to be approved as a foster parent or relative placement to the extent consistent with federal law.
  2. The department shall approve a variance of the applicable building code requirements for licensure of a foster care home to the extent permitted by federal law if an applicant does not meet the requirements at the time of inspection and
    1. the home design and construction is consistent with homes located in the community; and
    2. the home is otherwise a safe environment for a child.
  3. To the extent feasible, the department shall approve or deny a foster care home license, including a request for a variance under this section, not more than 45 days after the date the department receives the application for a foster care home license. If it is not feasible to approve or deny a foster care home license not more than 45 days after receiving the application, a supervisory-level employee may authorize a longer period of time for the decision, but the period must be the shortest period feasible.

History. (§ 8 ch 59 SLA 2012; am § 21 ch 15 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of subsection (c), see sec. 22(b), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (c).

Effective dates. —

Section 8, ch. 59, SLA 2012 which enacted this section, took effect on September 9, 2012.

Sec. 47.32.040. Application for license.

A person shall apply to the department for a license under this chapter. The application must be made to the department on a form provided by the department or in a format approved by the department, and must be accompanied by

  1. any fee established by regulation; and
  2. documents and information required by regulation.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For frontier extended stay clinics, see 7 AAC 12, art. 10.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.050. Provisional license; biennial license.

  1. The department may issue a provisional license to an entity for which application is made under AS 47.32.040 if, after inspection and investigation, the department determines that the application and the entity meet the requirements of this chapter, regulations adopted under this chapter, and any other applicable statutes or regulations. A provisional license is valid for a period not to exceed one year, except that the department may extend a provisional license for one additional period not to exceed one year.
  2. Before expiration of a provisional license issued under (a) of this section, the department shall inspect and investigate the entity to determine whether the entity is operating in compliance with this chapter, regulations adopted under this chapter, and any other applicable statutes or regulations. After inspection and investigation under this subsection and before expiration of a provisional license, the department shall issue a biennial license for the entity if the department finds that
    1. the entity meets the requirements for biennial licensure established in this chapter, regulations adopted under this chapter, and other applicable statutes and regulations;
    2. a ground for nonrenewal of a license does not exist; and
    3. any applicable fee has been paid.
  3. The department may place one or more conditions on a provisional or biennial license issued under this section in order to further the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For frontier extended stay clinics, see 7 AAC 12, art. 10.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.060. License renewal.

  1. At least 90 days before expiration of a biennial license, a licensed entity that intends to remain licensed shall submit an application for renewal of the license on a form provided by the department or in a format approved by the department, accompanied by
    1. all documents and information identified in regulation as being required for renewal of the license; and
    2. any fee established by regulation.
  2. Before expiration of a biennial license, the department or its representative may inspect an entity that is the subject of a renewal application to determine whether the entity is operating in compliance with this chapter, regulations adopted under this chapter, and other applicable statutes or regulations. After any inspection and investigation under this subsection and before expiration of the biennial license, the department shall renew a biennial license if the department finds that
    1. the licensed entity meets the requirements for renewal;
    2. a ground for nonrenewal of a license does not exist; and
    3. any applicable fee has been paid.
  3. If an application for renewal of a license is submitted but the department is unable to complete its review of the application before the expiration of the biennial license, the license is automatically extended for six months or until the department completes its review and either approves or denies the application, whichever occurs earlier.
  4. The department may place one or more conditions on a renewed license issued under this section to further the purposes of this section.
  5. The department shall adopt regulations establishing the grounds for nonrenewal of a license for purposes of AS 47.32.050 and this section.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.070. Notice of denial or conditions; appeal.

  1. If the department denies an application for or places conditions on a provisional or biennial license or license renewal, the department shall provide the applicant or entity with a notice of the action by certified mail. The notice must contain a written statement of the reason for the action and information about requesting a hearing under (b) of this section.
  2. An applicant or entity that receives a notice of action under (a) of this section may appeal the department’s decision by requesting a hearing within 15 days after receipt of the notice. The appeal must be on a form provided by the department or in a format approved by the department.
  3. In considering whether to deny an application for or place a condition on a license, the department shall consider the licensing history of the applicant, including any enforcement action under this chapter.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 19 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, added (c).

Sec. 47.32.080. Posting; license not transferable.

  1. A license issued under this chapter shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the licensed premises. Any notice of a variance issued by the department shall be posted near the license.
  2. A license issued under this chapter is not transferable unless authorized by the department.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.090. Complaints; investigation; retaliation.

  1. A person who believes that an entity has violated an applicable statute or regulation or a condition of a license issued under this chapter may file a verbal or written complaint with the department.
  2. The department may investigate a complaint filed under this section. The department may decline to investigate a complaint if the department reasonably concludes and documents that the complaint is without merit based on information available to the department at the time of the complaint. The department may consolidate complaints if the department concludes that a single investigation would further the efficient administration of this chapter.
  3. A licensed entity may not take retaliatory action against a person who files a complaint. Except as provided in AS 47.05.350 and AS 47.32.160 , a complainant against whom a retaliatory action has been taken may recover treble damages in a civil action upon a showing that the action was taken in retaliation for the filing of a complaint.
  4. The department may investigate an employee, contractor, or volunteer of a licensed entity and may substantiate that the individual engaged in conduct that would significantly affect the health, safety, or welfare of an individual who is receiving a service from the entity. If the conduct is substantiated against an employee, contractor, or volunteer, the department shall issue a notice of the finding to the person and include the person in the appropriate civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 . Before a substantiated finding against an employee, contractor, or volunteer may be included in a civil history database and provided as part of a check under AS 47.05.325 , the department shall provide the applicant notice of the finding and an opportunity to appeal the finding. The department shall adopt regulations to implement this subsection. In this subsection, “volunteer” includes an individual placed in a facility for training, educational, or internship purposes.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 20 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, added (d).

Sec. 47.32.100. Cooperation with investigation.

An entity shall cooperate with an investigation initiated by the department. An investigated entity shall

  1. permit representatives of the department to inspect the entity; review records, including files of individuals who received services from the entity; interview staff; and interview individuals receiving services from the entity; and
  2. upon request, provide the department with information and documentation regarding compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.110. Right of access and inspection.

  1. A designated agent or employee of the department shall have right of access to an entity
    1. to determine whether an application for licensure or renewal is appropriate;
    2. to conduct a complaint investigation;
    3. to conduct a standard inspection;
    4. to inspect documents, including personnel records, accounts, the building, or the premises;
    5. to interview staff or residents; or
    6. if the department has reasonable cause to believe that the entity is operating in violation of this chapter or the regulations adopted under this chapter.
  2. If an entity denies access, the department may petition the court for an order permitting access, or the department may seek to revoke the entity’s license under AS 47.32.140 .
  3. Upon petition of the department and after a hearing held upon reasonable notice to the entity, the court shall issue an order to an officer or employee of the department authorizing the officer or employee to enter for any of the purposes described in (a) of this section.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For hospice agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 7.

For free-standing birth centers, see 7 AAC 12, art. 9.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Sec. 47.32.120. Report.

  1. Within 10 working days after completing an investigation or inspection under AS 47.32.090 47.32.110 , the department shall prepare a report of the results of the investigation or inspection and mail a copy of the report to the entity. The report shall include a description of
    1. any violation, including a citation to each statute or regulation that has been violated; and
    2. any enforcement action the department intends to take under AS 47.32.130 or 47.32.140 .
  2. An entity that receives a copy of a report under this section may submit a written response to the report to the department. The department may require an entity to submit a response to a report received under this section.
  3. Within 14 days after the entity receives a copy of the report under this section, upon request of the complainant, the department shall provide a copy of the report to the complainant.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Even though owner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a license for her care facility, she could not assert a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against a licensing specialist who was investigating a report of harm to a vulnerable adult resident. The owner presented no admissible evidence to show that her agreement to stop taking residents during the investigation was not voluntary, and all of the specialist’s actions, other than the request that the owner stop taking new clients, were explicitly authorized or required by AS 47.32.120 47.32.150 . Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.32.130. Enforcement action: immediate revocation or suspension.

  1. If the department’s report of investigation or inspection under AS 47.32.120 concludes that the department has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of an applicable statute or regulation has occurred that presents an immediate danger to the health, safety, or welfare of an individual receiving services from the entity, the department, without an administrative hearing and without providing an opportunity to cure or correct the violation, may immediately revoke or suspend the entity’s license or, if the entity is not licensed under this chapter, may revoke the entity’s ability to become licensed under this chapter or to provide services as an entity exempted under this chapter. A suspension or revocation under this subsection takes effect immediately upon initial notice to the entity from the department, is in addition to any enforcement action under AS 47.32.140 , and continues until a final determination under (c) of this section or AS 47.32.150 .
  2. Notice under this section shall be provided as follows:
    1. the department shall provide initial notice to the entity at the time the department determines that an immediate suspension or revocation is required; initial notice may be oral, except that, if an entity representative is not present at the entity, the department shall post written notice on the front door of the entity; the initial notice must provide information regarding the entity’s appeal rights;
    2. the department shall provide formal written notice to the entity within 14 working days after the immediate revocation or suspension decision; formal written notice must include
      1. a copy of the department’s report under AS 47.32.120 , a statement of the entity’s right to submit a written response to the report, and any department requirement that the entity submit a written response to the report;
      2. a description of any enforcement action the department intends to take under AS 47.32.140(d) or (f); and
      3. information regarding the entity’s appeal rights.
  3. An entity to which a notice has been provided under this section may appeal the department’s decision to impose the enforcement action, including an enforcement action the department intends to take under AS 47.32.140(d) or (f), by filing a written request for a hearing, on a form provided by the department, within 15 days after receipt of the notice. If a hearing is not timely requested under this subsection, the department’s notice constitutes a final administrative order for which the department may seek the court’s assistance in enforcing.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Even though owner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a license for her care facility, she could not assert a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against a licensing specialist who was investigating a report of harm to a vulnerable adult resident. The owner presented no admissible evidence to show that her agreement to stop taking residents during the investigation was not voluntary, and all of the specialist’s actions, other than the request that the owner stop taking new clients, were explicitly authorized or required by AS 47.32.120 47.32.150 . Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.32.140. Violations, compliance, and enforcement.

  1. If the department’s report of investigation or inspection under AS 47.32.120 concludes that the department has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of an applicable statute or regulation has occurred, the department shall provide notice to the entity of the violation and an opportunity to cure the violation within a reasonable time specified by the department. The notice must include a copy of the department’s report under AS 47.32.120 , a statement that the entity may submit a written response to the report, any department requirement that the entity submit a written response to the report, a description of any enforcement action the department intends to take under (d) or (f) of this section, and information regarding the entity’s appeal rights.
  2. An entity receiving a notice under (a) of this section, or a notice under AS 47.32.130(b)(2) that contains the information specified in AS 47.32.130(b)(2) (B), shall submit a plan of correction to the department for approval. Once it has cured its violations, the entity shall submit to the department an allegation of compliance. Upon receipt of the allegation of compliance, the department may conduct a follow-up investigation or inspection to determine compliance. The department may take one or more enforcement actions under (d) and (f) of this section regardless of whether the entity achieves compliance under this subsection.
  3. If the department believes that an entity has not voluntarily corrected the violation or entered into a plan of correction with the approval of the department, the department may require that the entity participate in a plan of correction under regulations of the department. Once the entity has cured its violations, it shall submit to the department an allegation of compliance. Upon receipt of the allegation of compliance, the department may conduct a follow-up investigation or inspection to determine compliance. The department may take one or more enforcement actions under (d) and (f) of this section regardless of whether the entity achieves compliance under this subsection.
  4. The department may take one or more of the following enforcement actions under this section:
    1. delivery of a warning notice to the licensed entity and to any additional person who was the subject of the investigation or inspection;
    2. modification of the term or scope of the entity’s existing license, including changing a biennial license to a provisional license or adding a condition to the license;
    3. suspension of the entity’s operations for a period of time set by the department;
    4. suspension of or a ban on the entity’s provision of services to individuals not already receiving services from the entity for a period of time set by the department;
    5. nonrenewal of the entity’s license;
    6. revocation of the entity’s license or, if the entity is not licensed under this chapter, revocation of the entity’s ability to become licensed under this chapter;
    7. issuance of an order requiring closure, immediate or otherwise, of the entity regardless of whether the entity is licensed or unlicensed;
    8. denial of payments under AS 47.07 for the entity’s provision of services to an individual not already receiving services from the entity;
    9. assumption of either temporary or permanent management of the entity or pursuit of a court-ordered receiver for the entity;
    10. reduction of the number of individuals receiving services from the entity under the license;
    11. imposition of a penalty authorized under law;
    12. inclusion in a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 .
  5. The department may not take action under (d)(9) of this section unless the commissioner has reasonable cause to believe that continued management by the entity while the entity is attempting to cure a violation would be injurious to the health, safety, or welfare of an individual who is receiving a service from the entity.
  6. In addition to any other enforcement actions the department may take under this section, the department may assess a civil fine against an entity for a violation of an applicable statute or regulation, taking into account the type and size of the entity and the type and severity of the violation. A fine assessed under this subsection may not exceed $2,500 a day for each day of violation for a continuing violation or $25,000 for a single violation.
  7. An entity to which a notice has been provided under this section regarding an enforcement action under (d) or (f) of this section may appeal the department’s decision to impose the enforcement action by filing a written request for a hearing, on a form provided by the department, within 15 days after receipt of the notice of the enforcement action.
  8. An enforcement action under (d) or (f) of this section may not be imposed until
    1. the time period for requesting a hearing under AS 47.32.130(c) or under (g) of this section, as applicable, has passed without a hearing being requested; or
    2. a final agency decision has been issued following a hearing requested under AS 47.32.130(c) or under (g) of this section, as applicable.
  9. If a hearing is not timely requested under AS 47.32.130(c) or under (g) of this section, as applicable, the department’s notice regarding an enforcement action under (d) or (f) of this section constitutes a final administrative order. The department may seek the court’s assistance in enforcing the final administrative order.
  10. An entity against which an enforcement action under (d) or (f) of this section has been taken may not apply for a license or license renewal until after the time period set by the department in its final administrative order under AS 47.32.130(c) , this section, or AS 47.32.150 , as applicable. If a time period has not been set, a final administrative order against the entity has the effect of a permanent revocation, and the entity may not apply for a license or license renewal. If the ownership, control, or management of an entity changes, the department may allow the entity to seek licensure if the entity submits documents showing the change.
  11. Assessment of a civil fine under this section does not preclude imposition of a criminal penalty under AS 47.32.170 .

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 21 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in (d), substituted “a civil history database identified” for “the registry established” following “inclusion in” in (d)(12), deleted (d)(13), which read, “(13) requirement that the entity prepare and submit a plan of correction”.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Even though owner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a license for her care facility, she could not assert a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against a licensing specialist who was investigating a report of harm to a vulnerable adult resident. The owner presented no admissible evidence to show that her agreement to stop taking residents during the investigation was not voluntary, and all of the specialist’s actions, other than the request that the owner stop taking new clients, were explicitly authorized or required by AS 47.32.120 47.32.150 . Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.32.150. Hearings.

  1. Upon receipt of a timely request for a hearing by an entity regarding an enforcement action under AS 47.32.130(a) or 47.32.140(d)(3) , (5), (6), (7), or (9), the department shall request the chief administrative law judge appointed under AS 44.64.020 to appoint an administrative law judge employed or retained by the office of administrative hearings to preside over a hearing conducted under this section. AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 and AS 44.64.060 apply to the hearing.
  2. Upon receipt of a timely request for a hearing by an entity regarding an enforcement action under AS 47.05.310 , AS 47.32.070 , or 47.32.140(d)(1) , (2), (4), (8), (10), (11), or (12) or (f), the department shall conduct a hearing in front of an officer appointed by the commissioner. A hearing under this subsection may be conducted on the record, in an informal manner, and may not be conducted under AS 44.62 or AS 44.64. The appointed hearing officer may be a state employee.
  3. The decision following a hearing conducted under (a) or (b) of this section constitutes a final agency administrative order.
  4. A hearing conducted under this section shall take place within 120 days after the department’s receipt of the request for hearing. A hearing may be held on an expedited basis upon a showing of good cause. An expedited hearing shall be held within 60 days after the department’s receipt of the request for a hearing.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 22 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in the first sentence in (b), inserted “AS 47.05.310 ,” at the beginning of the citation list, and, at the end of the list, substituted “(11), or (12) or (f)” for “(11), (12), or (13)”.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Even though owner had a constitutionally protected property interest in a license for her care facility, she could not assert a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against a licensing specialist who was investigating a report of harm to a vulnerable adult resident. The owner presented no admissible evidence to show that her agreement to stop taking residents during the investigation was not voluntary, and all of the specialist’s actions, other than the request that the owner stop taking new clients, were explicitly authorized or required by AS 47.32.120 47.32.150 . Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.32.160. Immunity.

  1. The department, its employees, and its agents are not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in the licensure process, the monitoring of a licensed entity, or any activities under this chapter.
  2. A volunteer who works for a hospice program licensed under this chapter is not liable for damages for personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage for an act or omission committed in the course of hospice-related duties unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Claims barred. —

In a case arising after a report of harm was filed relating to a vulnerable adult resident in an owner’s facility, state law claims against the state agency and a licensing specialist were barred because the claims were based on actions taken during the monitoring of a licensed entity. Moreover, the owner’s claim was not based on a theory that the State breached a duty to supervise employees other than the intentional tortfeasor, but was merely a claim that the State negligently supervised or trained the licensing specialist; there was no evidence to support a negligent supervision claim based on a theory that the State breached a separate protective duty it owed to the owner. Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 47.32.170. Criminal penalty.

A person who intentionally or with criminal negligence violates a provision of this chapter or a regulation adopted under this chapter related to the health and safety of persons served by an entity required to comply with this chapter is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Sec. 47.32.180. Confidentiality; release of certain information.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by law, the following are confidential and may not be disclosed to the public without a court order: complaints; investigations; inspections; records related to a complaint, investigation, or inspection; and the identity of a complainant and of individuals receiving services from an entity.
  2. With the exception of information that identifies a complainant or a recipient of services from an entity, a copy of the department’s report of investigation or inspection under AS 47.32.120 , an entity’s written response to the report, and information regarding any department imposition of an enforcement action under AS 47.32.130 or 47.32.140 are public records under AS 40.25.100 40.25.295 . The department shall make this information available to the public for inspection and copying within time frames specified in AS 40.25.100 40.25.295 or regulations adopted under AS 40.25.100 — 40.25.295 after the
    1. entity receives its copy of the report of investigation under AS 47.32.120 , if the department has determined that an enforcement action under AS 47.32.130 or 47.32.140 will not be taken regarding the entity;
    2. department’s notice of enforcement action under AS 47.32.130 or 47.32.140 becomes a final administrative order without a hearing under AS 47.32.130(c) or 47.32.140(i) ; or
    3. issuance of a decision following a hearing under AS 47.32.150 .
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the department may, upon request, share information with a law enforcement agency that is investigating a crime that is also the subject of a licensing investigation obtained during a current investigation.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 60 ch 22 SLA 2015; am § 23 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective May 15, 2015, in the introductory language of (b), substituted “AS 40.25.100 40.25.295 ” for “AS 40.25” three times and substituted “time frames” for “timeframes”.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, added (c).

Sec. 47.32.190. Access to information.

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, the divisions of the department assigned to implement this chapter shall have access to any information compiled or retained by other divisions of the department, regardless of the nature of the information or whether the information is considered confidential, in order to assist in administering the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 24 ch 69 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, substituted “to implement this chapter” for “public health and public assistance functions” following “the department assigned” and made a stylistic change.

Sec. 47.32.200. Notices required of entities.

  1. An entity shall provide the department with written notice of a change of mailing address at least 14 days before the effective date of the change.
  2. An entity shall notify the department within 24 hours after having knowledge that an administrator, employee, volunteer, or household member, as required by the type of entity under department regulations, has been
    1. convicted of, has been charged by information or complaint with, or is under indictment or presentment for an offense listed in regulations adopted under AS 47.05.310 or a law or ordinance of this or another jurisdiction with similar elements; or
    2. found to have neglected or abused a child as described in AS 47.10.
  3. An entity shall notify the department within 24 hours after having knowledge of any allegation or suspicion of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of money or other property of an individual receiving services from the entity. The entity shall conduct an investigation and make a written report to the department within five days following notification to the department under this subsection.
  4. Not less than 20 days before the effective date of a decision to relinquish the entity’s license, the entity shall notify the department of the decision.
  5. Not more than one day after signing a contract for sale of the licensed entity, the entity shall notify the department of the sale.
  6. Not less than 30 days before an entity wishes to change the location of the entity, the entity shall notify the department of the change.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.

For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.

Sec. 47.32.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “ambulatory surgical center” means a facility that
    1. is not a part of a hospital or a physician’s general medical practice; and
    2. operates primarily for the purpose of providing surgical services to patients who do not require hospitalization;
  2. “assisted living home”
    1. means a residential facility that serves three or more adults who are not related to the owner by blood or marriage, or that receives state or federal payment for services regardless of the number of adults served; the department shall consider a facility to be an assisted living home if the facility
      1. provides housing and food services to its residents;
      2. offers to provide or obtain for its residents assistance with activities of daily living;
      3. offers personal assistance as defined in AS 47.33.990 ; or
      4. provides or offers any combination of these services;
    2. does not include
      1. a correctional facility;
      2. an emergency shelter;
      3. a program licensed under AS 47.10.310 for runaway minors;
      4. a type of entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b)(5) , (8), (9), (10), (11), or (12);
  3. “child placement agency” means an agency that arranges for placement of a child
    1. in a foster home, residential child care facility, or adoptive home; or
    2. for guardianship purposes;
  4. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  5. “crisis stabilization center” means
    1. a facility, or a part or unit of a facility, that has been designed to evaluate, stabilize, and treat, on a short-term basis and without the use of hospitalization, individuals experiencing an acute behavioral health crisis;
    2. a 23-hour crisis stabilization center;
    3. a crisis residential center; or
    4. a subacute facility;
  6. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  7. “entity” means an entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) ;
  8. “foster home” means a place where the adult head of household provides 24-hour care on a continuing basis to one or more children who are apart from their parents;
  9. “freestanding birth center” means a facility that is not a part of a hospital and that provides a birth service to maternal clients;
  10. “frontier extended stay clinic” means a rural health clinic that is authorized to provide 24-hour care to one or more individuals;
  11. “home health agency” means a public agency or private organization, or a subdivision of a public agency or private organization, that primarily engages in providing skilled nursing services in combination with physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, or services provided by a home health aide to an individual in the individual’s home, an assisted living home, or another residential setting; in this paragraph,
    1. “public agency” means an agency operated by the state or a local government;
    2. “subdivision” means a component of a multi-function facility or home health agency, such as the home health care division of a hospital or the division of a public agency, that independently meets the requirements for licensure as a home health agency;
  12. “hospice” or “agency providing hospice services or operating hospice programs” means a program that provides hospice services;
  13. “hospice services” means a range of interdisciplinary palliative and supportive services
    1. provided in a home or at an inpatient facility to persons who are terminally ill and to those persons’ families in order to meet their physical, psychological, social, emotional, and spiritual needs; and
    2. based on hospice philosophy; for purposes of this subparagraph, “hospice philosophy” means a philosophy that is life affirming, recognizes dying as a normal process of living, focuses on maintaining the quality of remaining life, neither hastens nor postpones death, strengthens the client’s role in making informed decisions about care, and stresses the delivery of services in the least restrictive setting possible and with the least amount of technology necessary by volunteers and professionals who are trained to help a client with the physical, social, psychological, spiritual, and emotional issues related to terminal illness so that the client can feel better prepared for the death that is to come;
  14. “hospital” means a public or private institution or establishment devoted primarily to providing diagnosis, treatment, or care over a continuous period of 24 hours each day for two or more unrelated individuals suffering from illness, physical or mental disease, injury or deformity, or any other condition for which medical or surgical services would be appropriate; “hospital” does not include a frontier extended stay clinic;
  15. “intermediate care facility for individuals with an intellectual disability or related condition” has the meaning given in 42 C.F.R. 440.150;
  16. “licensed entity” means an entity that has a license issued under this chapter;
  17. “maternity home” means a place of residence the primary function of which is to give care, with or without compensation, to pregnant individuals, regardless of age, or that provides care, as needed, to mothers and their newborn infants;
  18. “nursing facility” means a facility that is primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care or rehabilitative services and related services for those who, because of their mental or physical condition, require care and services above the level of room and board; “nursing facility” does not include a facility that is primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases;
  19. “residential child care facility” means a place, staffed by employees, where one or more children who are apart from their parents receive 24-hour care on a continuing basis;
  20. “residential psychiatric treatment center” means a secure or semi-secure facility, or an inpatient program in another facility, that provides, under the direction of a physician, psychiatric diagnostic, evaluation, and treatment services on a 24-hour-a-day basis to children with severe emotional or behavioral disorders;
  21. “runaway shelter” means a facility housing a runaway child;
  22. “rural health clinic”
    1. means a facility or clinic that is authorized to provide health care services and is located in a rural area;
    2. includes a frontier extended stay clinic;
    3. does not include a rehabilitation agency or a facility primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases.

History. (§ 34 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 27 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 8 ch 28 SLA 2020)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2020, the paragraphs in this section were reorganized to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2020 amendment, effective July 28, 2020, added (22) [now (5)].

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Mat-Su Valley Med. Ctr. v. Bolinder, 427 P.3d 754 (Alaska 2018).

Chapter 33. Assisted Living Homes.

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions, see §§ 16 and 17, ch. 130, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter on SB 249, from which ch. 130, SLA 1994, which enacted this chapter, derived, see 1994 Senate Journal 2505 — 2508.

Article 1. Scope; Services; Operations.

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.005. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to

  1. contribute to the development of a system of care by encouraging the establishment of assisted living homes that provide a homelike environment for elderly persons and persons with a mental or physical disability who need assistance with the activities of daily living;
  2. promote the establishment of homes that help
    1. the elderly to age in place; and
    2. adults with a physical or mental disability to become integrated into the community and to reach their highest level of functioning;
  3. establish standards that will protect residents of assisted living homes, while at the same time promoting an environment that will encourage resident growth and independence, without discouraging the establishment and continued operation of those homes;
  4. require that a resident of an assisted living home have an assisted living plan that identifies the services that will be used to meet the resident’s reasonable wants and needs; and
  5. provide a resident of an assisted living home, or the resident’s representative, with the opportunity to participate to the fullest extent possible in the design and implementation of the resident’s assisted living plan and in any decisions involving the resident’s care.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 1.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.010. Applicability.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, this chapter applies to assisted living homes, as defined in AS 47.32.900 .
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, this chapter does not apply to
    1. a correctional facility;
    2. a facility for treatment of alcoholism that is regulated under AS 47.37;
    3. an emergency shelter;
    4. a medical facility, including a nursing home, licensed under AS 47.32;
    5. a program for runaway minors licensed under AS 47.10.310 ; or
    6. a maternity home licensed under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 49 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 36 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.

For licensing of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 1.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, rewrote this section.

Sec. 47.33.020. Health-related services allowed in assisted living homes.

  1. This chapter does not prohibit the resident of an assisted living home from self-administering the resident’s own medications, unless the resident’s assisted living plan specifically provides otherwise.
  2. An assisted living home may provide, obtain, or offer to provide or obtain the health-related services described in (c) — (i) of this section. A service under (c) — (i) of this section may only be provided or obtained in addition to, and as a supplemental service to, the long-term provision by the home to the resident of assistance with the activities of daily living or personal assistance.
  3. If self-administration of medications is included in a resident’s assisted living plan, the assisted living home may supervise the resident’s self-administration of medications, notwithstanding a limitation imposed by AS 08 or by a regulation adopted under AS 08. The supervision may be performed by any home staff person and may include
    1. reminding a resident to take medication;
    2. opening a medication container or prepackaged medication for a resident;
    3. reading a medication label to a resident;
    4. observing a resident while the resident takes medication;
    5. checking a resident’s self-administered dosage against the label of the medication container;
    6. reassuring a resident that the resident is taking the dosage as prescribed; and
    7. directing or guiding, at the request of the resident, the hand of a resident who is administering the resident’s own medications.
  4. An assisted living home may provide intermittent nursing services to a resident who does not require 24-hour nursing services and supervision. Intermittent nursing services may be provided only by a nurse licensed under AS 08.68 or by a person to whom a nursing task has been delegated under (e) of this section.
  5. A person who is on the staff of an assisted living home and who is not a nurse licensed under AS 08.68 may perform a nursing task in that home if
    1. the authority to perform that nursing task is delegated to that person by a nurse licensed under AS 08.68; and
    2. that nursing task is specified in regulations adopted by the Board of Nursing as a task that may be delegated.
  6. A resident who needs skilled nursing care may, with the consent of the assisted living home, arrange for that care to be provided in the home by a nurse licensed under AS 08.68 if that arrangement does not interfere with the services provided to other residents.
  7. As part of a plan to avoid transfer of a resident from the home for medical reasons, the home may provide, through the services of a nurse who is licensed under AS 08.68, 24-hour skilled nursing care to the resident for not more than 45 consecutive days.
  8. If a resident has received 24-hour skilled nursing care for the 45-day limit set by (g) of this section, the resident or the resident’s representative may elect to have the resident remain in the home without continuation of 24-hour skilled nursing care if the home agrees to retain the resident after
    1. the home and either the resident or the resident’s representative have consulted with the resident’s physician;
    2. the home and either the resident or the resident’s representative have discussed the consequences and risks involved in the election to remain in the home; and
    3. the portion of the resident’s assisted living plan that relates to health-related services has been revised to provide for the resident’s health-related needs without the use of 24-hour skilled nursing care, and the revised plan has been reviewed by a registered or advanced practice registered nurse licensed under AS 08.68 or by the resident’s attending physician.
  9. A terminally ill resident may remain in the home if (1) the home and either the resident or the resident’s representative agree that the resident may remain in the home; and (2) the resident is under the care of a physician who certifies that the needs of the resident are being met in the home. The time limitation of (g) of this section does not apply in the case of a terminally ill resident.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 54 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For environmental health and safety, see 7 AAC 10, art. 4.

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (h)(3), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse”.

Sec. 47.33.030. Advance payments.

  1. An assisted living home may not require a resident or prospective resident of the home or a resident or prospective resident’s representative, to make an advance payment to the home except as security for performance of the contract or as advance rent for the immediately following rental period as the rental period is defined in the contract. If a home requires a resident or prospective resident to make an advance payment for security or as advance rent,
    1. the home shall promptly deposit the money in a designated trust account in a financial institution, separate from other money and property of the home;
    2. the home may not represent on a financial statement that the advance payment money is part of the assets of the home;
    3. the advance payment money may be used only for the account of the resident;
    4. the home shall notify the resident or the resident’s representative, in writing, of the name and address of the depository in which the advance payment money is being held; and
    5. the home shall provide to the resident or the resident’s representative the terms and conditions under which the advance payment money may be withheld by the home.
  2. An assisted living home shall establish a written policy for the refund of unused advance payments in the event of termination of a residential services contract or death of a resident. The policy must provide that a resident is entitled to a prorated refund of the unused portion of an advance payment, less reasonable charges for damages to the home resulting from other than normal use.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.040. Residents’ money.

  1. Except for advance payments under AS 47.33.030 , an assisted living home may not require a resident of the home to deposit with the home money that belongs to the resident. The provisions of (b) of this section do not apply to money that constitutes an advance payment under AS 47.33.030 .
  2. An assisted living home may accept, for safekeeping and management, money that belongs to a resident. The home shall establish a written policy for the management of such money and shall act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to that money, in accordance with regulations adopted by the licensing agency. A home is not required to accept money that belongs to a resident.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.050. Temporary absence.

  1. An assisted living home may agree to reserve space for a resident of the home who is temporarily absent from the home and plans to return to the home. The absent resident, or the resident’s representative, shall notify the home in writing if the resident’s plan to return to the home changes.
  2. Until the assisted living home receives written notice that an absent resident does not intend to return to the home, the home may charge the resident an agreed-upon daily rate during the resident’s absence from the home.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.060. House rules.

  1. An assisted living home may establish house rules. The house rules must be consistent with 42 C.F.R. 441.301(c)(4) and subject to the limitations provided for under this chapter.
  2. An assisted living home shall give a copy of the house rules to a prospective resident or the prospective resident’s representative before the prospective resident enters into a residential services contract with the home, and shall post the house rules in a conspicuous place in the home.
  3. House rules may address various issues, including
    1. times and frequency of use of the telephone;
    2. hours for viewing and volume for listening to television, radio, and other electronic equipment that could disturb other residents;
    3. visitors;
    4. movement of residents in and out of the home;
    5. use of personal property;
    6. use of tobacco and alcohol; and
    7. physical, verbal, or other abuse of other residents or staff.
  4. An assisted living home may not adopt a house rule that unreasonably restricts a right of a resident provided for under this chapter or under any other provision of law. A provider of residential supported-living and habilitation services, as determined by the department in regulation, shall allow visitation consistent with 42 C.F.R. 441.301(c)(4)(vi)(D).

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am §§ 1, 2 ch 27 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective November 23, 2021, in (a), inserted “, The house rules must be consistent with 42 C.F.R. 441.301(c)(4) and” following “establish house rules” and made a related change; added the second sentence in (d).

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 27, SLA 2021 (SB 89), amending (a) and (d) of this section, see 2021 Senate Journal 293 — 294.

Sec. 47.33.070. Resident files.

  1. An assisted living home shall maintain, for each resident of the home, a file that includes
    1. the name and birth date, and, if provided by the resident, the social security number of the resident;
    2. the name, address, and telephone number of the resident’s closest relative, service coordinator, if any, and representative, if any;
    3. a statement of what actions, if any, the resident’s representative is authorized to take on the resident’s behalf;
    4. a copy of the resident’s assisted living plan;
    5. a copy of the residential services contract between the home and the resident;
    6. a notice, as required under AS 47.33.030 , regarding the depository in which the resident’s advance payment money is being held;
    7. written acknowledgment by the resident or the resident’s representative that the resident has received a copy of and has read, or has been read the
      1. resident’s rights under AS 47.33.300 ;
      2. resident’s right to pursue a grievance under AS 47.33.340 ;
      3. resident’s right to protection from retaliation under AS 47.33.350 ;
      4. provisions of AS 47.32.160 , regarding immunity; and
      5. home’s house rules;
    8. an acknowledgment and agreement relating to home safekeeping and management of the resident’s money, as required by AS 47.33.040 ;
    9. a copy of the resident’s living will, if any, or an advance health care directive made under AS 13.52, if any; and
    10. a copy of a power of attorney or other written designation, including an advance health care directive made under AS 13.52, of an agent, representative, or surrogate by the resident.
  2. An assisted living home shall retain a resident’s file for at least one year after the resident terminates residency at the home.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 14 ch 83 SLA 2004; am § 37 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2005, inserted references to “an advance health care directive” in paragraphs (a)(9) and (10), and made stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in subparagraph (a)(7)(D).

Sec. 47.33.080. Closure or relocation; change of mailing address.

  1. Not later than 90 days before the voluntary closing or relocation of an assisted living home, the home shall provide written notice of the closure or relocation to the licensing agency, each resident of the home, all representatives of residents, and all service coordinators for residents.
  2. Not later than 14 days before a change of an assisted living home’s mailing address, the home shall provide written notice of the change to the licensing agency, each resident of the home, all representatives of residents, and all service coordinators for residents.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.090. Rate increase.

An assisted living home may not increase the rate charged for services provided by the home unless the home notifies each resident or the resident’s representative of the increase at least 30 days before the increase is to take effect.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.100. Criminal background check for employees. [Repealed, § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Article 2. Residency; Assisted Living Plans.

Sec. 47.33.200. Commencement of residency.

A person may not begin to reside in an assisted living home without that person’s consent, or, if the person is not competent, the consent of the person’s representative.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.210. Residential services contracts.

  1. A person may not begin residency in an assisted living home unless a representative of the home and either the person or the person’s representative sign a residential services contract that complies with the provisions of this section. Upon the signing of the contract, the home shall give the resident and the resident’s representative, if any, a copy of the contract and place a copy of the contract in the resident’s file.
  2. A residential services contract must
    1. specifically describe the services and accommodations to be provided by the assisted living home;
    2. set out the rates charged by the home;
    3. specifically describe the rights, duties, and obligations of the resident, other than those specified in this chapter;
    4. set out the policies and procedures for termination of the contract as provided for in this chapter;
    5. state the amount and purpose of any advance payments required by the home; and
    6. set out the home’s policy for refund of advance payments in the event of termination of the contract or death of the resident.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.220. Assisted living plan required.

An assisted living home shall ensure that an assisted living plan for a resident of the home is developed, and approved by the resident or the resident’s representative, within 30 days after the resident was admitted to the home. The assisted living plan must be developed by the resident or the resident’s representative with participation from

  1. the resident’s service coordinator, if any;
  2. representatives of providers of services to the resident; and
  3. the administrator of the home.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Sec. 47.33.230. Assisted living plan contents; distribution.

  1. An assisted living plan for a resident of an assisted living home must
    1. promote the resident’s participation in the community and increased independence through training and support, in order to provide the resident with an environment suited to the resident’s needs and best interests;
    2. recognize the responsibility and right of the resident or the resident’s representative to evaluate and choose, after discussion with all relevant parties, including the home, the risks associated with each option when making decisions pertaining to the resident’s abilities, preferences, and service needs; and
    3. recognize the right of the home to evaluate and to either consent or refuse to accept the resident’s choice of risks under (2) of this subsection.
  2. An assisted living plan for a resident must identify and describe
    1. the resident’s specific strengths and limitations in performing the activities of daily living;
    2. any physical disabilities and impairments, and the aspects of the resident’s medical condition, general health, emotional health, mental health, or other conditions or problems that are relevant to the services needed by the resident;
    3. the resident’s preference in roommates, living environment, food, recreational activities, religious affiliation, and relationships and visitation with friends, family members, and others;
    4. specific activities of daily living with which the resident needs assistance;
    5. how assistance with the activities of daily living will be provided or arranged for by the home or the resident;
    6. the frequency of the resident’s training for independent living, if habilitation is part of the plan;
    7. the resident’s need for personal assistance and how those needs will be met by home staff or another service provider from the community;
    8. the resident’s need for health-related services and how that need will be met;
    9. the resident’s reasonable wants and the services that will be used to meet those wants.
  3. If the assisted living home provides or arranges for the provision of health- related services to a resident, the home shall ensure that a
    1. registered or advanced practice registered nurse licensed under AS 08.68 reviews the portion of an assisted living plan that describes how the resident’s need for health-related services will be met; and
    2. physician’s statement about the resident is included in the plan.
  4. A resident’s assisted living plan must be in writing, in language that can be understood by the resident.
  5. If a person’s reasonable wants and needs can be met by a particular assisted living home and a decision is made to enter into a residential services contract between the person and the home, the resident’s assisted living plan shall be approved, dated, and signed by the administrator of that home and either the resident or the resident’s representative.
  6. The assisted living plan shall be retained by the home in the resident’s file. The home shall provide a copy of the plan to the resident and to the resident’s representative, if any.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 55 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (c)(1), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse”.

Sec. 47.33.240. Evaluation of assisted living plan.

  1. An assisted living home resident or the resident’s representative, and the home administrator or the administrator’s designee, shall evaluate the resident’s assisted living plan, determine whether the plan is meeting the resident’s reasonable wants and needs, and revise the plan if necessary. At the request of the resident or the resident’s representative, the resident’s service coordinator, if any, and family members may participate in the evaluation. If the assisted living home provides or arranges for the provision of health-related services to a resident, the resident’s evaluation shall be done at three-month intervals. If the assisted living home does not provide or arrange to provide health-related services to a resident, the resident’s evaluation shall be done at least at one-year intervals.
  2. The administrator or the administrator’s designee shall
    1. document the results of the evaluation in the resident’s record;
    2. sign and date any revisions to the resident’s assisted living plan;
    3. place a copy of the revisions in the resident’s file; and
    4. provide the resident and the resident’s representative, if any, with a copy of the revisions.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.

Article 3. Resident’s Rights.

Sec. 47.33.300. Residents’ rights.

  1. Subject to (c) of this section, a resident of an assisted living home has the right to
    1. live in a safe and sanitary environment free from abuse and discrimination;
    2. be treated with consideration and respect for personal dignity, individuality, and the need for privacy, including privacy in
      1. a medical examination or health-related consultation;
      2. the resident’s room or portion of a room;
      3. bathing and toileting, except for any assistance in those activities that is specified in the resident’s assisted living plan; and
      4. the maintenance of personal possessions and the right to keep at least one cabinet or drawer locked;
    3. possess and use personal clothing and other personal property, unless the home can demonstrate that the possession or use of certain personal property would be unsafe or an infringement of the rights of other residents;
    4. engage in private communications, including
      1. receiving and sending unopened correspondence;
      2. having access to a telephone, or having a private telephone at the resident’s own expense;
      3. visiting with persons of the resident’s choice, subject to visiting hours established by the home and consistent with AS 47.33.060 ; and
      4. having access to the Internet provided by the home, subject to availability to the home in the community, and having a private device to access the Internet at the resident’s own expense;
    5. close the door of the resident’s room at any time, including during visits in the room with guests or other residents;
    6. at the resident’s own expense unless otherwise provided in the residential services contract, participate in and benefit from community services and activities to achieve the highest possible level of independence, autonomy, and interaction with the community;
    7. manage the resident’s own money;
    8. participate in the development of the resident’s assisted living plan;
    9. share a room with a spouse if both are residents of the home;
    10. have a reasonable opportunity to exercise and to go outdoors at regular and frequent intervals, when weather permits;
    11. exercise civil and religious liberties;
    12. have access to adequate and appropriate health care and health care providers of the resident’s own choosing, consistent with established and recognized standards within the community;
    13. self-administer the resident’s own medications, unless specifically provided otherwise in the resident’s assisted living plan;
    14. receive meals that are consistent with cultural preferences and religious or health-related restrictions;
    15. receive the prior notice of relocation of the home or the home’s intent to terminate the residential services contract of the resident required by AS 47.33.080 and 47.33.360 , respectively;
    16. present to the home grievances and recommendations for change in the policies, procedures, or services of the home without fear of reprisal or retaliation;
    17. at the resident’s own expense unless otherwise provided in the residential services contract, have access to and participate in advocacy or special interest groups;
    18. at the resident’s own expense unless otherwise provided in the residential services contract, intervene or participate in, or refrain from participating in, adjudicatory proceedings held under this chapter, unless provided otherwise by other law;
    19. reasonable access to home files relating to the resident, subject to the constitutional right of privacy of other residents of the home;
    20. receive information in a language the resident understands; and
    21. receive quality care; in this paragraph, “quality care” means care of a resident in accordance with the resident’s assisted living plan, plan of care, personal preferences, and health care providers’ recommendations.
  2. An assisted living home may not establish or apply a policy, procedure, or rule that is inconsistent with or contrary to a right provided by this section or by other law.
  3. The rights set out in (a)(3), (4), (7), (12), and (14) of this section do not create an obligation for an assisted living home to expend money for the specified rights unless otherwise provided in the residential services contract.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 3 ch 27 SLA 2021)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2021 amendment, effective November 23, 2021, in (a), at the end of (a)(1) added “free from abuse or discrimination”, at the end of (a)(4)(C), added “and consistent with AS 47.33.060 ;”, added (a)(4)(D), in (a)(14), inserted “cultural preferences and” following “that are consistent with”, at the end of (a)(16), added “without fear of reprisal or retaliation”, added (a)(19) and (20), and made related changes.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 27, SLA 2021 (SB 89), amending (a) of this section, see 2021 Senate Journal 293 — 294.

Sec. 47.33.310. Notice of rights.

  1. At the time a person begins residency in an assisted living home, the home shall provide the resident and the resident’s representative, if any, with a copy of the rights set out in AS 47.33.300 . The home shall obtain from the resident or the resident’s representative a signed and dated acknowledgement stating that the resident has read or been read the rights, understands the rights, and has had any questions about the rights answered by the home.
  2. An assisted living home shall post in a prominent place in the home
    1. a copy of the rights set out in AS 47.33.300 ;
    2. the name, address, and phone number of the long term care ombudsman hired under AS 47.62.010 and, if relevant to residents, of the advocacy agency for persons with a developmental disability or mental illness;
    3. the telephone number of an information or referral service for vulnerable adults; and
    4. a copy of the grievance procedure established under AS 47.33.340 .

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am E.O. No. 102 § 8 (2001))

Sec. 47.33.320. Access to assisted living home.

An assisted living home shall allow advocates and the representatives of community legal services programs access to the home at reasonable times to, subject to the resident’s consent,

  1. visit with a resident of the home and make personal, social, and legal services available to the resident;
  2. distribute educational and informational materials to advise a resident or resident’s representative of applicable rights; and
  3. assist a resident or a resident’s representative in asserting legal rights or claims.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.330. Prohibitions.

  1. An assisted living home, including staff of the home, may not
    1. deprive a resident of the home of the rights, benefits, or privileges guaranteed to the resident by law;
    2. enter a resident’s room without first obtaining permission, except
      1. during regular, previously announced, fire, sanitation, or other licensing inspections;
      2. when a condition or situation presents an imminent danger;
      3. as required by the resident’s assisted living plan to provide services specified in the residential services contract; or
      4. for other vital health or safety reasons;
    3. impose religious beliefs or practices upon a resident or require a resident to attend religious services;
    4. place a resident under physical restraint unless the resident’s own actions present an imminent danger to the resident or others;
    5. place a resident under chemical restraint; this paragraph does not prevent a resident from voluntarily taking tranquilizers, or other medication, prescribed by a licensed physician;
    6. compel a resident to perform services for the home, except as contracted for by the resident and the home or as provided for in the resident’s assisted living plan; or
    7. restrain, interfere with, coerce, discriminate against, or retaliate against a resident for asserting a right specified by this chapter or by other law.
  2. An assisted living home may not physically restrain a resident unless the home has a written physical restraint procedure that has been approved by the licensing agency. The home shall terminate the physical restraint as soon as the resident no longer presents an imminent danger.
  3. An owner, administrator, employee, or agent of an assisted living home may not act as a representative of a resident.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.340. Resident grievance procedure.

  1. An assisted living home shall establish a written grievance procedure for handling complaints of residents of the home. At the time a person begins residency in an assisted living home, the home shall give a copy of the grievance procedure to the resident and the resident’s representative, if any.
  2. The grievance procedure established under this section must provide that a resident and the resident’s representative have the right to
    1. present both a written and an oral explanation of the resident’s grievance;
    2. have an advocate of the resident’s choice, and the resident’s representative, if any, attend meetings concerning the resident’s grievance; and
    3. be notified in writing, within 30 days after the filing of the grievance, of the final decision of the home regarding the grievance.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Sec. 47.33.350. Retaliation against home resident.

  1. An assisted living home may not take retaliatory action against a resident of that home if the resident or the resident’s representative
    1. exercises a right provided by this chapter or by other law;
    2. appears as a witness, or refuses to appear as a witness, in an adjudicatory proceeding regarding the home;
    3. files a civil action alleging a violation of this chapter; or
    4. claims a violation of this chapter before a state or federal agency having jurisdiction over the home or its employees.
  2. Termination of a resident’s residential services contract by an assisted living home within 60 days after the resident engages in an activity described in (a) of this section creates a rebuttable presumption that the termination was retaliatory.
  3. At the time, or before, a person begins residency in an assisted living home, the home shall give the resident and the resident’s representative, if any, written notice of the protection from retaliation provided under this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contrs., Inc., 127 P.3d 807 (Alaska 2005).

Sec. 47.33.360. Involuntary termination of contract.

  1. An assisted living home may not terminate a residential services contract with a resident of the home against the resident’s will, except
    1. for medical reasons;
    2. for engaging in a documented pattern of conduct that is harmful to the resident, other residents, or staff of the home;
    3. for violation of the terms of the residential services contract, including failure to pay costs incurred under the contract;
    4. when emergency transfer out of the home is ordered by the resident’s physician;
    5. when the home is closing; or
    6. when the home can no longer provide or arrange for services in accordance with the resident’s needs and the resident’s assisted living plan.
  2. At least 30 days before terminating the residential services contract with a resident under (a)(2), (3), (5), or (6) of this section, the assisted living home shall provide written notice of the proposed contract termination to the resident or the resident’s representative, and to the resident’s service coordinator, if any. The notice must state the
    1. basis for the termination; and
    2. resident’s right to contest the termination in the manner provided in the contract, which must include an offer by the home to participate in a case conference as described in (c) of this section.
  3. Before terminating the residential services contract with a resident under (a)(2), (3), (5), or (6) of this section, the assisted living home shall participate in a case conference if requested by the resident or the resident’s representative. The case conference must include the resident, the resident’s representative, if any, the resident’s advocate, if any, the resident’s service coordinator, if any, the home administrator, and appropriate care providers who may discuss the appropriateness of the contract termination.
  4. If a home terminates the residential services contract with a resident under this section, the home shall cooperate with the resident, the resident’s service coordinator, if any, and the resident’s representative, if any, in making arrangements to relocate the resident.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994)

Article 4. Forms.

Secs. 47.33.400, 47.33.410. License required; Licensing agency. [Repealed, § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Sec. 47.33.420. Standard forms.

The Department of Health and Social Services shall develop standard forms that assisted living homes may use to comply with the requirements of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am E.O. No. 108 § 19 (2003))

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, deleted reference to the Department of Administration.

Sec. 47.33.430. Authority of state agencies to impose additional requirements. [Repealed, § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Secs. 47.33.500 — 47.33.570. Complaint; Immunity; Investigation; Notice of violation; Report of compliance; Administrative sanctions; Administrative procedures; Criminal penalty. [Repealed, § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Article 5. General Provisions.

Administrative Code. —

For general provisions: definitions, see 7 AAC 75.990.

Secs. 47.33.910, 47.33.920. Fees; Regulations. [Repealed, § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Sec. 47.33.990. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “activities of daily living” means walking, eating, dressing, bathing, toileting, and transfer between a bed and a chair;
  2. “administrator” means a person who has general administrative charge and oversight of an assisted living home;
  3. “adult” means a person 18 years of age or older who is not a ward of the state under AS 47.10.080(f) or AS 47.12.120(d) ;
  4. “advocate” means a public or private officer, agency, or organization designated by federal or state statute, or a state plan developed under a federal or state statute, to represent the interests of and speak on behalf of a resident of an assisted living home;
  5. “aging in place” means choosing to remain in a familiar living environment and manage the risks associated with the physical or mental decline that can occur with increasing age;
  6. “assisted living home” means a residential facility to which this chapter applies, as described in AS 47.33.010 ;
  7. “assisted living plan” means a written description of
    1. a person’s functional capabilities;
    2. the person’s needs and preferences for assistance with the activities of daily living; and
    3. the services to be provided to meet the person’s reasonable wants and needs;
  8. “health-related services” means services described in AS 47.33.020(c) — (i);
  9. “home” means an assisted living home;
  10. “imminent danger” means a danger that could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm to the resident’s self, to the staff of a home, or to others;
  11. “instrumental activities of daily living” means doing laundry, cleaning of living areas, food preparation, managing money and conducting business affairs, using public transportation, writing letters, obtaining appointments, using the telephone, and engaging in recreational or leisure activities;
  12. “person with a developmental disability” has the meaning given in AS 47.80.900 ;
  13. “personal assistance” means the provision by an assisted living home of one or more of the following personal services to a resident of the home:
    1. assisting a resident in obtaining supportive services as provided for in the resident’s assisted living plan;
    2. assisting a resident in obtaining instrumental activities of daily living, as provided for in the resident’s assisted living plan;
    3. being aware of a resident’s general whereabouts while the resident is traveling independently in the community;
    4. monitoring a resident’s activities while on the home premises to provide for the resident’s and others’ safety and well-being;
  14. “physician’s statement” means a written statement by a person’s primary physician that includes a
    1. medical history and physical, not older than six months, of the person;
    2. listing of the person’s complete current medicine regimen; and
    3. statement of current therapy regimen necessary to maintain or increase the person’s functioning, mobility, or independence;
  15. “representative” means a guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, or other person designated by a court, or in writing by a legally competent person, to act on behalf of that person;
  16. “resident” means an adult who has signed a residential services contract with and resides in an assisted living home;
  17. “retaliation” means an adverse action taken, or threatened, by an assisted living home or an agent of an assisted living home against a resident in response to a complaint made to, or about, the home;
  18. “service coordinator” means a person who is responsible for
    1. coordinating the services of community agencies that provide services to a resident of an assisted living home;
    2. participating in inter-agency case management for a resident; or
    3. planning for the placement of a person in an assisted living home;
  19. “supportive services” means recreational and leisure activities, transportation, social services, legal services, financial management services, educational and vocational services, medical, dental, and other health care services, habilitation or rehabilitation services, respite services, case management, day care, and other services required to meet a resident’s needs;
  20. “terminally ill resident” means an ill resident who has a medical prognosis, certified in writing by the resident’s attending physician, that the life expectancy of the resident is no more than six months if the illness runs its normal course.

History. (§ 1 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 50 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 49 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 27 SLA 2021)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, the paragraphs in this section were renumbered to maintain alphabetical order and to account for the 2005 repeal of former paragraphs (8), (11), and (14). The paragraphs were renumbered again in 2021 to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, repealed paragraphs (8), (11), and (14).

The 2021 amendment, effective November 23, 2021, added (20) [now (17)].

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 27, SLA 2021 (SB 89), amending (17) of this section, see 2021 Senate Journal 293 — 294.

Chapter 35. Child Care Facilities, Child Placement Agencies, Child Treatment Facilities, Foster Homes, and Maternity Homes.

[Repealed, § 50 ch 57 SLA 2005.]

Chapter 37. Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act.

Collateral references. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Drugs and Controlled Substances, § 259 et seq.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mentally Impaired Persons, §§ 140-144.

14 C.J.S., Chemical Dependents, § 13 et seq.

Alcoholic as entitled to public assistance under poor laws. 43 ALR3d 554.

Validity, construction and effect of Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act. 85 ALR3d 701.

Sec. 47.37.010. Declaration of policy.

It is the policy of the state to recognize, appreciate, and reinforce the example set by its citizens who lead, believe in, and support a life of sobriety. It is also the policy of the state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons should not be criminally prosecuted for their consumption of alcoholic beverages and that they should be afforded a continuum of treatment that can introduce them to, and help them learn, new life skills and social skills that would be useful to them in attaining and maintaining normal lives as productive members of society.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 1996)

Cross references. —

For other provisions concerning the treatment of alcoholics, see AS 47.30.470 47.30.500 .

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of the legislature in enacting this chapter. —

See Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

The purpose of this chapter is to afford alcoholics and intoxicated persons a continuum of treatment, rather than subject them to criminal prosecution. Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1978).

This chapter establishes a comprehensive program for the treatment of alcoholism as a disease. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Public drunkenness should not be made the subject of criminal sanctions. —

See Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

This chapter does not make drunkenness a defense to criminal liability for nonalcoholic substantive offenses committed by one under the influence of liquor. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975); Walton v. State, 568 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1977).

One addicted to heroin is afflicted with an illness as much as is one addicted to alcohol. Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1977).

This chapter repealed by implication former 13 AAC 02.175(c), which prohibits a person from being upon or along a highway while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

There is an irreconcilable conflict between this chapter, a principal purpose of which is to decriminalize public drunkenness, and former 13 AAC 02.175(c), making it a misdemeanor to appear upon or along a highway or street in an intoxicated condition. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Quoted in

In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976); Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 47.37.020. Division of alcoholism and drug abuse. [Repealed, E.O. No. 108, § 88 (2003).]

Sec. 47.37.030. Powers of department.

The department may

  1. plan, establish, and maintain programs for the prevention and treatment of alcoholism, drug abuse, and misuse of hazardous volatile materials and substances by inhalant abusers;
  2. make contracts and award grants necessary or incidental to the performance of its duties and the execution of its powers, including contracts with the grants to public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals, to pay them for services rendered or furnished to alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, or inhalant abusers; to the maximum extent possible, contracts and grants must be for a period of two years; contracts under this paragraph are governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code);
  3. solicit and accept for use a gift of money or property or a grant of money, services, or property from the federal government, the state or a political subdivision of it, or a private source, and do all things necessary to cooperate with the federal government or any of its agencies in making an application for a grant;
  4. administer or supervise the administration of the provisions relating to alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers of state plans submitted for federal funding under federal health, welfare, or treatment legislation;
  5. coordinate its activities and cooperate with alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse programs in this and other states, and make contracts and other joint or cooperative arrangements with state, local, or private agencies for the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drugs abusers, and inhalant abusers, and for the common advancement of alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse programs in this and other states;
  6. keep records and engage in research and the gathering of relevant statistics;
  7. do other acts necessary to implement the authority expressly granted to it;
  8. acquire, hold, or dispose of real property or any interest in it, and construct, lease, or otherwise provide treatment facilities for alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers; however, the department shall encourage local initiative, involvement, and financial participation under grants-in-aid whenever possible in preference to the construction or operation of facilities directly by the department; contracting and construction under this paragraph are governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code);
  9. strengthen and enhance the process for identifying people who have co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders;
  10. establish a secure enhanced detoxification and treatment center for persons involuntarily detained because they are likely to inflict physical harm to self or others; in this paragraph, “enhanced” means the ability to treat co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders;
  11. develop and implement a substance abuse treatment system using evidence-based best practices or, if evidence-based best practices do not exist, research-based practices, that includes a procedure for adapting the practices to new situations and for collaboration with consumer-based programs; if research-based practices are not known or available, the department may include consensus-based or, if funds are available, promising practices; a practice must promote independence, recovery, employment, education, ongoing community-based treatment, housing, and other aspects of harm reduction.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 117 SLA 1978; am § 61 ch 106 SLA 1986; am E.O. No. 71, §§ 13 — 17 (1988); am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 76 § 3 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 37 (2003); am § 2 ch 59 SLA 2007)

Administrative Code. —

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “division” in the introductory language and in two places in paragraph (8).

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraphs (9) — (11).

Sec. 47.37.040. Duties of department.

The department shall

  1. develop, encourage, and foster statewide, regional, and local plans and programs for the prevention of alcoholism and drug abuse and treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers in cooperation with public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals, and provide technical assistance and consultation services for these purposes;
  2. coordinate the efforts and enlist the assistance of all public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals interested in prevention of alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse, and treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers;
  3. cooperate with the Department of Corrections in establishing and conducting programs to provide treatment for alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers in or on parole from penal institutions;
  4. cooperate with the Department of Education and Early Development, school boards, schools, police departments, courts, and other public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals in establishing programs for the prevention of alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse, and treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers, and preparing curriculum materials for use at all levels of school education;
  5. prepare, publish, evaluate, and disseminate educational material dealing with the nature and effects of alcohol and drugs, and the misuse of hazardous volatile substances;
  6. develop and implement, as an integral part of treatment programs, an educational program for use in the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers that includes the dissemination of information concerning the nature and effects of alcohol, drugs, and hazardous volatile substances;
  7. organize and foster training programs for all persons engaged in treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers, and establish standards for training paraprofessional alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse workers;
  8. sponsor and encourage research into the causes and nature of alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse, and the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers, and serve as a clearinghouse for information relating to alcoholism, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse;
  9. specify uniform methods for keeping statistical information by public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals, and collect and make available relevant statistical information, including number of persons treated, frequency of admission and readmission, and frequency and duration of treatment;
  10. conduct program planning activities approved by the Advisory Board on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse;
  11. review all state health, welfare, and treatment plans to be submitted for federal funding, and advise the commissioner on provisions to be included relating to alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers;
  12. assist in the development of, and cooperate with, alcohol, drug abuse, and inhalant abuse education and treatment programs for employees of state and local governments and businesses and industries in the state;
  13. use the support and assistance of interested persons in the community, particularly recovered alcoholics, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers, to encourage alcoholics, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers to voluntarily undergo treatment;
  14. cooperate with the Department of Public Safety and the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities in establishing and conducting programs designed to deal with the problem of persons operating motor vehicles while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, inhalant, or controlled substance, and develop and approve alcohol information courses required to be taken by drivers under AS 28.15 or made available to drivers to reduce points assessed for violation of traffic laws;
  15. encourage hospitals and other appropriate health facilities to admit without discrimination alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers and to provide them with adequate and appropriate treatment;
  16. encourage all health insurance programs to include alcoholism and drug abuse as a covered illness;
  17. prepare an annual report covering the activities of the department and notify the legislature that the report is available;
  18. develop and implement a training program on alcoholism and drug abuse for employees of state and municipal governments, and private institutions;
  19. develop curriculum materials on drug and alcohol abuse and the misuse of hazardous volatile substances for use in grades kindergarten through 12, as well as a course of instruction for teachers to be charged with presenting the curriculum;
  20. develop and implement or designate, in cooperation with other state or local agencies, a juvenile alcohol safety action program that provides alcohol and substance abuse screening, referral, and monitoring of persons under 18 years of age who have been referred to it by
    1. a court in connection with a charge or conviction of a violation or misdemeanor related to the use of alcohol or a controlled substance;
    2. the agency responsible for the administration of motor vehicle laws in connection with a license action related to the use of alcohol or a controlled substance; or
    3. department staff after a delinquency adjudication that is related to the use of alcohol or a controlled substance;
  21. develop and implement, or designate, in cooperation with other state or local agencies, an alcohol safety action program that provides alcohol and substance abuse screening, referral, and monitoring services to persons who have been referred by a court in connection with a charge or conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance or under AS 04.16.049 or 04.16.050 or referred by an agency of the state with the responsibility for administering motor vehicle laws in connection with a driver’s license action involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance;
  22. whenever possible, apply evidence-based, research-based, and consensus-based substance abuse and co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders treatment practices and remove barriers that prevent the use of those practices;
  23. collaborate with first responders, hospitals, schools, primary care providers, developmental disability treatment providers, law enforcement, corrections, attorneys, the Alaska Court System, community behavioral treatment providers, Alaska Native organizations, and federally funded programs in implementing programs for co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders treatment.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 39 § 11 (1977); am §§ 2, 4 ch 117 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 55 § 45 (1984); am E.O. No. 71 § 18 (1988); am § 2 ch 75 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 76 § 4 (1990); am § 44 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 111 ch 21 SLA 1995; am § 109 ch 56 SLA 1996; am § 12 ch 93 SLA 1998; am § 18 ch 65 SLA 2001; am §§ 51, 52 ch 60 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 38 (2003); am § 6 ch 56 SLA 2006; am § 3 ch 59 SLA 2007; am § 170 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 26 ch 13 SLA 2017; am § 71 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and statement of intent relating to treatment for driving while intoxicated and other alcohol-related offenses, see § 1, ch. 60, SLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For alcohol safety action program services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 3.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “division” in the introductory language and paragraph (17) and inserted “staff” in subparagraph (20)(C).

The 2006 amendment, effective June 9, 2006, inserted “referred by a court under AS 28.35.028 ” in paragraph (21).

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraphs (22) and (23).

The 2016 amendment, effective July 12, 2016, in (21), deleted “alcohol and substance abuse screening, referral, and monitoring” preceding “services to persons”, deleted “in connection with a charge or conviction of a misdemeanor involving the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft and alcohol or a controlled substance, referred by a court” preceding “under AS 28.35.028 ”, inserted “28.35.030, or 28.35.032 ,” preceding “or referred by”.

The 2017 amendment, effective June 20, 2017, in (21) inserted “AS 04.16.049 , 04.16.050 ,” following “referred by a court under”.

The amendment of paragraph (21) by sec. 71, ch. 1, 4SSLA 2017, took effect July 1, 2018, under sec. 79, ch, 1, 4SSLA 2017, as amended by sec. 32, ch. 22, SLA 2018.

The amendment of paragraph (21) by sec. 71, ch. 1, 4SSLA, was conditional. The condition was repealed by sec. 28, ch. 22, SLA 2018.

Sec. 47.37.045. Community action against substance abuse grants.

  1. [Repealed, § 12 ch 42 SLA 1997.]
  2. A school district, municipality, nonprofit organization, local governing body of an established village, or community organization may file an application with the department for a community action against substance abuse grant. The application must include a description of the purpose for which grant funds will be used, goals to be achieved by the program or project, methods of measuring achievement of goals, a proposed budget, and statements of the need for and support of the proposed program or project.
  3. Community action against substance abuse grant funds awarded under this section may be used for
    1. Police-In-School Liaison programs staffed by officers that are certified by the Alaska Police Standards Council;
    2. technical assistance for neighborhood based substance abuse prevention or treatment programs;
    3. coordinators for court ordered community service;
    4. preventative or educational programs for youth that involve the community, parents, youth, and local schools;
    5. programs or projects that the department determines are effective in preventing or treating substance abuse at the community level;
    6. supervised youth recreation programs that focus on preventing or treating substance abuse; or
    7. youth assessment and referral programs that provide substance abuse screening services to and monitor compliance for a minor required to participate in an alcoholism or drug education or rehabilitation treatment program under AS 28.15.183 or before the minor’s driver’s license may be reinstated under AS 28.15.211 .
  4. A proposed program or project that includes matching local funds or in-kind contributions shall have priority over a proposed program or project that does not include matching local funds or in-kind contributions.  Grants awarded under this section are subject to the restrictions on use provided under AS 37.05.321 .
  5. In addition to the priority given under (d) of this section, the department shall grant a priority to a proposed program or project under (c)(5) of this section if the proposed program or project provides prompt substance abuse treatment for a pregnant woman by advancing the woman on a waiting list for the program or project and by streamlining paperwork for admission of the woman to the program.
  6. In addition to the priorities given under (d) and (e) of this section, the department shall grant a priority to a proposed program or project under (c)(5) of this section if the proposed program or project
    1. creates alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders;
    2. provides rehabilitation services to prisoners who have substance abuse problems;
    3. measures and demonstrates a high rate of harm reduction for participants;
    4. is based on scientifically sound principles of prevention and treatment;
    5. provides job training or employment opportunities after completion of substance abuse treatment;
    6. provides youth treatment;
    7. focuses on drug and alcohol abuse prevention;
    8. addresses alcohol or substance abuse in targeted populations that have statistically higher incidences of alcohol or substance abuse problems; or
    9. addresses co-occurring substance abuse and mental health disorders.
  7. The department may consider not funding a proposed program or project that has been previously funded under this section unless the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of success of the program or project.
  8. The department may not deny funding for a program under this section solely on the basis that the program relies on faith-based strategies so long as the strategies are effective for preventing or treating substance abuse.
  9. In this section,
    1. “established village” means an unincorporated community that is in
      1. the unorganized borough and that has 25 or more permanent residents; or
      2. an organized borough, has 25 or more permanent residents, and
        1. is on a road system and is located more than 50 miles outside the boundary limits of a unified municipality, or
        2. is not on a road system and is located more than 15 miles outside the boundary limits of a unified municipality;
    2. “local governing body” has the meaning given in AS 04.21.080(b) ;
    3. “nonprofit organization” means an organization that qualifies for exemption from taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) or (4) (Internal Revenue Code).

History. (§ 2 ch 81 SLA 1990; am § 68 ch 101 SLA 1995; am § 12 ch 42 SLA 1997; am § 13 ch 93 SLA 1998; am E.O. No. 108 §§ 39, 40 (2003); am § 4 ch 59 SLA 2007)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (e) — (h) were enacted as (f) — (i) and relettered in 2007, at which time former subsection (e) was relettered as (i) and an internal reference in subsection (f) was conformed.

Cross references. —

For legislative purpose in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 81, SLA 1990 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “division” in subsection (b) and in paragraph (c)(5).

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added subsections (f) — (i) [now (e) — (h)].

Sec. 47.37.050. Interdepartmental coordinating committee.

  1. An interdepartmental coordinating committee is created, composed of the commissioners of health and social services, education and early development, transportation and public facilities, labor and workforce development, and public safety, and the director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. The committee shall meet at least twice annually at the call of the commissioner of health and social services who is its chairman. The committee shall provide for the coordination and exchange of information on all programs relating to alcoholism or drug abuse and act as a permanent liaison among state departments engaged in activities affecting alcoholics, intoxicated persons, and drug abusers. The committee shall assist the commissioner of health and social services in formulating a comprehensive plan for prevention of alcoholism and drug abuse and for treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, and drug abusers.
  2. In exercising its coordinating functions, the committee shall assure that the appropriate state agencies
    1. provide all necessary medical, social, treatment, and educational services for alcoholics, intoxicated persons, and drug abusers and for the prevention of alcoholism and drug abuse, without unnecessary duplication of services;
    2. cooperate in the use of facilities and in the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, and drug abusers;
    3. adopt approaches for the prevention of alcoholism and drug abuse and the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, and drug abusers consistent with the policy of AS 47.37.010 47.37.270 .

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 3 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 71 § 19 (1988); am E.O. No. 76 § 5 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 41 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, in (a) of this section, “and early development” was added after “education”, and “and workforce development” was added after “labor” in accordance with §§ 89 and 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, deleted “the director” in the first and last sentences in subsection (a).

Secs. 47.37.060 — 47.37.110. Review board on alcoholism; alcoholism program coordinator. [Repealed, E.O. No. 71 § 23 (1988).]

Sec. 47.37.120. Program development and implementation.

  1. The department shall carry out the development and implementation of a comprehensive program dealing with the prevention and treatment of, and research on, problems of alcoholism and drug abuse as they affect the state.
  2. The comprehensive program carried out under this section must include a strategy for expanding substance abuse treatment services and reducing waiting lists for eligible participants in a substance abuse prevention or treatment program and must include one or more of the factors listed under AS 47.37.045(f) .

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 71 § 20 (1988); am E.O. No. 76 § 6 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 42 (2003); am § 5 ch 59 SLA 2007)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.069. Renumbered in 1972. In 2007, in subsection (b), “AS 47.37.045(f) ” was substituted for “AS 47.37.045(g) ” to reflect the 2007 relettering of AS 47.37.045(g) .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director.”

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added subsection (b).

Sec. 47.37.125. Payment for services.

Subject to appropriation by the legislature, money in the mental health trust settlement income account established in AS 37.14.036 may be used to support a service provided under the authority given in this chapter.

History. (§ 45 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

Sec. 47.37.130. Comprehensive program for treatment; regional facilities.

  1. The department shall establish a comprehensive and coordinated program for the treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers. The department may divide the state into appropriate regions to conduct the program and establish standards for the development of the program on the regional level. In establishing the regions, consideration shall be given to the city and borough lines and population concentrations and, when feasible, programs must be established with maximum local community involvement.
  2. The program of the department must include
    1. emergency treatment provided by a facility affiliated with or part of the medical service of a general hospital;
    2. inpatient treatment;
    3. intermediate treatment;
    4. outpatient and follow-up treatment;
    5. standards for alcohol safety action programs; the standards may vary in their requirements and stringency according to the population, price level, remoteness, access to transportation, and availability of ancillary services of the area to be served; a program must meet the applicable standards before it is approved by the department as an alcohol safety action program; the standards required under this paragraph shall be established in a manner that provides protection of the health, safety, and well-being of clients of the affected programs and protection for the affected programs from exposure to malpractice and liability actions;
    6. the priorities created under AS 47.37.045(e) and (f); and
    7. standards that are consistent with scientifically sound principles for measuring outcomes.
  3. The department shall ensure that adequate and appropriate treatment is provided to alcoholics and intoxicated persons admitted under AS 47.37.160 47.37.190 within the limits of available state and federal funds.
  4. The department shall maintain, supervise, and control all facilities operated by it subject to the regulations of the department.
  5. If possible, the department shall coordinate the activities of the program with all appropriate public and private resources.
  6. [Repealed, § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994.]
  7. The department may contract for the use of any facility as an approved public treatment facility if the department, subject to the regulations of the department, considers this an effective and economical course to follow. Contracting under this subsection is governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).
  8. The department shall
    1. inspect, on a regular basis, approved public and private alcohol safety action programs at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner;
    2. maintain a list of approved public and private alcohol safety action programs; and
    3. develop regulations for the operation and management of alcohol safety action programs that ensure
      1. screenings are conducted using a validated risk tool; and
      2. monitoring of participants is appropriate to the risk of reoffense of the participant as determined by the screening.
  9. An approved public and private alcohol safety action program shall file with the department on request data, statistics, schedules, and information that the department reasonably requires. An approved program that fails without good cause to furnish any data, statistics, schedules, or information as requested, or files fraudulent returns of them, shall be removed from the list of approved programs.
  10. The department, after holding a hearing conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) under the provisions of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act), may suspend, revoke, limit, restrict, or refuse to grant an approval for an alcohol safety action program for failure to meet standards established under (b) of this section.
  11. The public and private alcohol safety action programs established under AS 47.37.040 (21) shall provide
    1. screening of eligible persons to determine the risk of the person to reoffend and the criminal risk factors that are contributing to the risk; and
    2. monitoring of participants based on the risk to reoffend as determined by the screening.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 5 ch 150 SLA 1980; am § 62 ch 106 SLA 1986; am E.O. No. 71 § 21 (1988); am § 3 ch 75 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 76 § 7 (1990); am §§ 33, 35 ch 126 SLA 1994; am §§ 53, 54 ch 60 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 §§ 43 — 51 (2003); am § 6 ch 59 SLA 2007; am E.O. No. 116, § 12 (2012); am §§ 171, 172 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.070. Renumbered in 1972. In 2007, in (b)(6) of this section, “AS 47.37.045(e) and (f)” was substituted for “AS 47.37.045(f) and (g)” to reflect the 2007 relettering of AS 47.37.045(f) and (g).

Cross references. —

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted references to the department for references to the division and to the director throughout.

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (j), inserted “conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” following “The department, after holding a hearing”.

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (h)(3); added (k); made a related change.

Sec. 47.37.140. Treatment facilities.

  1. The department shall establish standards for facilities, which standards may vary in their requirements and stringency according to the population, price level, remoteness, access to transportation, and availability of ancillary services of the area to be served, and shall fix the fees to be charged for the required inspections of those facilities. A facility shall meet the applicable standards before it is approved as a public or private treatment facility. The standards shall be enacted in a manner that will provide protection of the health, safety, and well-being of clients of the affected programs and protection for the affected programs from exposure to malpractice and liability actions.
  2. The department shall inspect, on a regular basis, approved public and private treatment facilities at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner.
  3. The department shall maintain a list of approved public and private treatment facilities.
  4. An approved public and private treatment facility shall file with the department, on request, data, statistics, schedules, and information which the department reasonably requires. An approved public or private treatment facility that without good cause fails to furnish any data, statistics, schedules, or information as requested, or files fraudulent returns of them, shall be removed from the list of approved treatment facilities.
  5. The department, after holding a hearing conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62), may suspend, revoke, limit, restrict, or refuse to grant an approval for a treatment facility, for failure to meet its standards.
  6. Upon petition of the department and after a hearing held upon reasonable notice to the facility, the district court may issue a warrant to an officer or employee of the department authorizing the officer or employee to enter and inspect at reasonable times, and examine the books and accounts of, an approved public or private treatment facility refusing to consent to inspection or examination by the department or which the department has reasonable cause to believe is operating in violation of this chapter.
  7. The standards established for facilities under this section must be based on scientifically sound evidence and be consistent with the priorities created under AS 47.37.045(e) and (f).

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 105 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 76 § 8 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 52 (2003); am § 7 ch 59 SLA 2007; am E.O. No. 116, § 13 (2012))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.080. Renumbered in 1972. In 2007, in (g) of this section, “AS 47.37.045(e) and (f)” was substituted for “AS 47.37.045(f) and (g)” to reflect the 2007 relettering of AS 47.37.045(f) and (g).

Cross references. —

For the legislative intent of the 1978 amendment concerning facility standards, see § 1, ch. 105, SLA 1978 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For standards for facilities and programs, see 7 AAC 29, art. 1.

For methadone programs, see 7 AAC 33.

For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.

For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.

For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.

For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.

For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” and for “division” throughout.

The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added subsection (g).

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (e), inserted “conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” following “The department, after holding a hearing”.

Sec. 47.37.150. Admission for treatment.

The department shall adopt regulations for the admission of persons into the treatment program, considering available treatment resources and facilities, for the purpose of early and effective treatment of alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers. In adopting the regulations the department shall be guided by the following standards:

  1. if possible a patient must be treated on a voluntary rather than an involuntary basis;
  2. a patient must be initially assigned or transferred to outpatient or intermediate treatment, unless the patient is found to require inpatient treatment;
  3. a person may not be denied treatment solely because the person has withdrawn from treatment against medical advice on a prior occasion or because the person has relapsed after earlier treatment;
  4. an individualized treatment plan must be prepared and maintained on a current basis for each patient;
  5. provision must be made for a continuum of coordinated treatment services, so that a person who leaves a facility or a form of treatment will use other appropriate treatment and facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 71 § 22 (1988); am § 4 ch 75 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 76 § 9 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 53 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.090. Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” in two places in the introductory language.

Sec. 47.37.160. Voluntary treatment of alcoholics.

  1. An alcoholic may voluntarily apply for treatment directly to an approved public treatment facility.
  2. Subject to regulations adopted by the department, the administrator in charge of an approved public treatment facility may determine who shall be admitted for treatment. If a person is refused admission to an approved public treatment facility, the administrator shall, if possible, refer the person to another approved public treatment facility.
  3. When a patient receiving inpatient care leaves an approved public treatment facility, the patient shall be encouraged to consent to appropriate outpatient or intermediate treatment. If it appears to the administrator in charge of the treatment facility that the patient is an alcoholic who requires help, the administrator shall arrange for assistance in obtaining supportive services and residential facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 6 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 76 § 10 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 54 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.100. Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” in subsection (b).

Sec. 47.37.170. Treatment and services for intoxicated persons and persons incapacitated by alcohol or drugs.

  1. An intoxicated person may come voluntarily to an approved public treatment facility for emergency treatment. A person who appears to be intoxicated in a public place and to be in need of help or a person who appears to be intoxicated in or upon licensed premises where intoxicating liquors are sold or consumed who refuses to leave upon being requested to leave by the owner, an employee, or a peace officer may be taken into protective custody and assisted by a peace officer or a member of the emergency service patrol to the person’s home, an approved public treatment facility, an approved private treatment facility, or another appropriate health facility. If all of the preceding facilities, including the person’s home, are determined to be unavailable, a person taken into protective custody and assisted under this subsection may be taken to a state or municipal detention facility in the area. However, emergency protective custody under this subsection may not include placement of a minor in a jail or secure facility.
  2. A person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol or drugs in a public place shall be taken into protective custody by a peace officer or a member of the emergency service patrol and immediately brought to an approved public treatment facility, an approved private treatment facility, or another appropriate health facility or service for emergency medical treatment. If no treatment facility or emergency medical service is available, a person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol or drugs in a public place shall be taken to a state or municipal detention facility in the area if that appears necessary for the protection of the person’s health or safety. However, emergency protective custody under this subsection may not include placement of a minor in a jail or secure facility.
  3. A person who voluntarily appears or is brought to an approved public treatment facility shall be examined by a licensed physician or other qualified health practitioner as soon as possible. The department shall, by regulation, determine which health practitioners may be authorized to perform the examination.  After the examination, the person may be admitted as a patient or referred to another health facility. The approved public treatment facility which refers the person shall arrange for transportation.
  4. A person who, after medical examination at an approved private treatment facility, or another appropriate health facility or service for emergency medical treatment, is found to be incapacitated by alcohol or drugs at the time of admission or to have become incapacitated by alcohol or drugs at any time after admission, may not be detained at a facility after the person is no longer incapacitated by alcohol or drugs. A person may not be detained at a facility if the person remains incapacitated by alcohol for more than 48 hours after admission as a patient. A person may consent to remain in the facility as long as the physician in charge considers it appropriate.
  5. A person who is not admitted to an approved public treatment facility, is not referred to another health facility, and has no funds, may be taken to the person’s home, if any.  If the person has no home, the approved public treatment facility shall assist the person in obtaining shelter.
  6. If a patient is admitted to an approved public treatment facility, family or next of kin shall be promptly notified. If an adult patient who is not incapacitated by alcohol or drugs requests that there be no notification of next of kin, the request shall be granted.
  7. A person may not bring an action for damages based on the decision under this section to take or not to take an intoxicated person or a person incapacitated by alcohol or drugs into protective custody, unless the action is for damages caused by gross negligence or intentional misconduct.
  8. If the physician in charge of the approved public treatment facility determines it is for the patient’s benefit, an attempt shall be made to encourage the patient to submit to further diagnosis and appropriate voluntary treatment.
  9. A person taken to a detention facility under (a) or (b) of this section may be detained only (1) until a treatment facility or emergency medical service is made available, (2) until the person is no longer intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol or drugs, or (3) for a maximum period of 12 hours, whichever occurs first. A detaining officer or a detention facility official may release a person who is detained under (a) or (b) of this section at any time to the custody of a responsible adult. A peace officer or a member of the emergency service patrol, in detaining a person under (a) or (b) of this section and in taking the person to a treatment facility, an emergency medical service, or a detention facility, is taking the person into protective custody and the officer or patrol member shall make reasonable efforts to provide for and protect the health and safety of the detainee. In taking a person into protective custody under (a) and (b) of this section, a detaining officer, a member of the emergency service patrol, or a detention facility official may take reasonable steps for self-protection, including a full protective search of the person of a detainee. Protective custody under (a) and (b) of this section does not constitute an arrest and no entry or other record may be made to indicate that the person detained has been arrested or charged with a crime, except that a confidential record may be made that is necessary for the administrative purposes of the facility to which the person has been taken or that is necessary for statistical purposes where the person’s name may not be disclosed.
  10. [Repealed, § 21 ch 66 SLA 1996.]
  11. In this section, “minor” means an individual who is under 18 years of age.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am §§ 1 — 4 ch 101 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 68 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 62 SLA 1990; am §§ 1 — 5, 21 ch 66 SLA 1996; am §§ 5 — 7 ch 95 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.110. Renumbered in 1972.

Cross references. —

For legislative intent in connection with the 1989 amendment of (g) of this section, see § 1, ch. 68, SLA 1989 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For standards for facilities and programs, see 7 AAC 29, art. 1.

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, added the last sentence of subsection (a) and the last sentence of subsection (b), added subsection (k), and made stylistic changes.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 3, ch. 68, SLA 1989 provides that the 1989 amendment of (g) of this section “applies to causes of action that accrue on or after May 31, 1989.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 95, SLA 2004 (SB 340), proposing legislation conforming the state’s juvenile detention laws with federal requirements set out in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2003, see 2004 Senate Journal 2185.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

For case holding that this section as it existed prior to the 1976 amendment, which among other things rewrote subsection (b), did not countenance an unreasonable search in violation of the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution, see Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Actionable duty imposed on municipality. —

This section imposes upon a municipality an actionable duty to take persons incapacitated by alcohol in a public place into protective custody. Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230 (Alaska 1987).

Duty of care. —

In a mother’s wrongful death action alleging that a city’s negligence led to her son’s death, the superior court did not err by giving an ordinary negligence instruction rather than requiring gross negligence to establish liability; because the mother’s claim of negligence concerned the city’s actions once the son was in custody rather than the decision to take the son into custody in the first place, the jury instruction stated the appropriate duty of care owed by the city. City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Construction with AS 47.37.235 . —

Plain language of AS 47.37.235(b)(4) only applies the gross negligence standard to liability for detaining or failing to detain a person or for releasing a person; it does not purport to apply the gross negligence standard to actions taken while the person is detained, but rather it mirrors the scope of the immunity provided by AS 47.37.170(g) . City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Immunity not conferred. —

This provision does not immunize a city from liability or create a gross negligence standard of care for the actions taken by the city while a son was detained because his mother’s action for damages was not based on the decision to take the son into custody; the action was based on the city’s alleged violation of its duty of care to protect detainees from harm, including self-harm. City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Instructions. —

Because the safety patrollers' duty to take people who appeared to be incapacitated by alcohol or drugs in a public place into protective custody was mandatory rather than optional, this statute authorized members of the safety patrol to use a limited amount of force in order to assist an incapacitated person to an approved facility, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on lawful force. Standifer v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. June 19, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Quoted in

Kanayurak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1984); Estate of Logusak v. City of Togiak, 185 P.3d 103 (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 47.37.180. Emergency commitment.

  1. An intoxicated person who (1) has threatened, attempted to inflict, or inflicted physical harm on another or is likely to inflict physical harm on another unless committed, or (2) is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs, may be committed to an approved public treatment facility for emergency treatment. A refusal to undergo treatment does not constitute evidence of lack of judgment as to the need for treatment.
  2. The certifying physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, spouse, guardian, or relative of the person to be committed, or any other responsible person, may make a written application for commitment under this section, directed to the administrator of the approved public treatment facility. The application must state facts to support the need for emergency treatment and be accompanied by a physician’s, physician assistant’s, or advanced practice registered nurse’s certificate supporting the need for emergency treatment and stating that the physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse has examined the person sought to be committed within two days before the certificate’s date.
  3. Upon approval of the application by the administrator in charge of the facility, the person may be brought to the facility by a peace officer, a health officer, a member of the emergency service patrol, the applicant for commitment, the patient’s spouse, the patient’s guardian, or any other interested person.  The person shall be retained at the facility to which the person was admitted, or transferred to another appropriate public or private treatment facility, until discharged under (e) of this section.  However, a person may not be detained under this section for more than 48 hours unless a district or superior court judge has reviewed and approved the commitment application.
  4. The administrator in charge of an approved public treatment facility may refuse an application if in the administrator’s opinion the application and certificate fail to sustain the grounds for commitment.
  5. When on the advice of the medical staff the administrator determines that the grounds for commitment no longer exist, the administrator shall discharge a person committed under this section.  A person committed under this section may not be detained in a treatment facility for more than five days. If a petition for involuntary commitment under AS 47.37.190 has been filed within the five days and the administrator in charge of an approved public treatment facility finds that grounds for emergency commitment still exist, the administrator may detain the person until the petition has been heard and determined, but no longer than 10 days after filing the petition.
  6. A copy of the written application for commitment and of the physician’s, physician assistant’s, or advanced practice registered nurse’s certificate, and a written explanation of the person’s right to legal counsel, shall be given to the person within 24 hours after commitment by the administrator, who shall provide a reasonable opportunity for the person to consult with legal counsel.
  7. The administrator of an approved public treatment facility may accept an application for commitment under this section from a health facility and may authorize the health facility to hold the person who is the subject of the commitment petition at the health facility as long as medically necessary, before transferring the person to the approved public treatment facility. An administrator who accepts an application for commitment from a health facility shall comply with the provisions of (c) — (f) of this section if the person being committed is held for longer than 48 hours from the time the administrator accepts the application for commitment under this subsection. A person committed under this subsection shall be transported from the health facility to the approved public treatment facility as soon as the person is discharged from the health facility. If the person being committed under this subsection is physically present at the health facility at the time an application for extension of detention is filed under (c) of this section or is physically present at the health facility when a petition for involuntary commitment is filed under (e) of this section, the administrator accepting the application for commitment under this subsection shall inform the court of where the person being committed is being held and when the person being committed is expected to be capable of being transferred to the approved public treatment facility.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am §§ 6, 7 ch 66 SLA 1996; am §§ 1, 2 ch 72 SLA 2001; am §§ 56, 57 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.120 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (b), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner” in two places, and substituted “practice registered nurse’s” for “nurse practitioner’s”; in (f), substituted “practice registered nurse’s” for “nurse practitioner’s”.

Sec. 47.37.190. Involuntary commitment.

  1. A spouse or guardian, a relative, the certifying physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, or the administrator in charge of an approved public treatment facility may petition the court for a 30-day involuntary commitment order. The petition must allege that the person is an alcoholic or drug abuser who (1) has threatened, attempted to inflict, or inflicted physical harm on another and that unless committed is likely to inflict physical harm on another; or (2) is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs. A refusal to undergo treatment does not constitute evidence of lack of judgment as to the need for treatment. The petition must be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse who has examined the person within two days before submission of the petition, unless the person whose commitment is sought has refused to submit to a medical examination, in which case the fact of refusal must be alleged in the petition. The certificate must set out the physician’s, physician assistant’s, or advanced practice registered nurse’s findings of the examination in support of the allegations of the petition.
  2. After the petition is filed, the court shall fix a date for a hearing no later than 10 days after the date the petition was filed. A copy of the petition and of the notice of the hearing, including the date fixed by the court, shall be served on
    1. the petitioner;
    2. the person whose commitment is sought or the person’s guardian, if any;
    3. the attorney representing the person whose commitment is sought;
    4. the administrator in charge of the approved public or private treatment facility in which the committed person has been committed for emergency care; and
    5. any other person the court considers appropriate.
  3. A person who is the subject of a petition filed under this section does not have the right to a jury.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 7 ch 150 SLA 1980; am §§ 8 — 10 ch 66 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 72 SLA 2001; am § 58 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.130 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (a), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner” in two places and substituted “practice registered nurse’s” for “nurse practitioner’s”.

Collateral references. —

Necessity and sufficiency of statements informing one under investigation for involuntary commitment of right to remain silent. 23 ALR4th 563.

Sec. 47.37.200. Hearing, commitment, facility, discharge, transfer, and rights.

  1. At the hearing for a 30-day commitment required under AS 47.37.190(b) , the court shall hear all relevant testimony, including, if possible, the testimony of at least one person who has examined the person whose commitment is sought under AS 47.37.180(b) or 47.37.190(a) . The person whose commitment is sought shall be present unless the court believes that being present is likely to be injurious to the person, in which case the court may conduct the hearing telephonically. The court may examine the person in open court, or, if advisable, examine the person out of court. If the person has refused to be examined under AS 47.37.180(b) or 47.37.190(a) , the person shall be given an opportunity to request examination by a court-appointed licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse. If the person fails to request a medical examination and there is sufficient evidence to believe that the allegations of the petition are true, or, if the court believes that more medical evidence is necessary, the court may issue a temporary order committing the person to a private or public facility for a period of not more than five days for purposes of a diagnostic examination.
  2. If after hearing all relevant evidence, including the results of any diagnostic examination by the private or public facility, the court finds that grounds for involuntary commitment have been clearly established, the court shall issue an order of 30-day commitment to the private or public facility.
  3. A person committed for a 30-day period shall remain in the custody of a private or public facility for treatment for a period of not more than 30 days. At the end of the 30-day period, the person shall be automatically discharged unless the director of the approved public facility or approved private facility, before the expiration of the period, files a petition for recommitment under AS 47.37.205 .
  4. A private or public facility must be capable of providing adequate and appropriate treatment for a person in its custody. A public facility may transfer a person in its custody from one approved public treatment facility to another if the transfer is medically advisable.
  5. A person committed to the custody of an approved public facility or an approved private facility shall be discharged at any time before the end of the period for which the person has been committed if either of the following conditions is met:
    1. further treatment is not likely to bring about significant improvement in the person’s condition; or
    2. treatment is no longer adequate or appropriate.
  6. The court shall inform the person whose commitment or recommitment is sought of the right to contest the petition, to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings relating to commitment and recommitment, to have counsel appointed by the court or provided by the court, if the person is unable to obtain counsel, and of the right to a jury trial if recommitment is sought under AS 47.37.205 . The person whose commitment or recommitment is sought shall be informed of the right to be examined by a licensed physician of the person’s choice. If the person is unable to obtain a licensed physician and requests examination by a physician, the court shall appoint a licensed physician for the examination.
  7. If a private treatment facility agrees with the request of a competent patient or the patient’s parent, adult sibling, adult child, or guardian to accept the patient for treatment, the administrator of the public treatment facility shall transfer the patient to the private treatment facility.
  8. A person committed under this chapter may at any time seek discharge from commitment by writ of habeas corpus under AS 12.75.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am §§ 8 — 12 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 76 §§ 11 — 13 (1990); am § 11 ch 66 SLA 1996; am § 4 ch 72 SLA 2001; am § 59 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.140 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (a), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner”.

Sec. 47.37.205. Procedure for recommitment following 30-day commitment.

  1. At any time during a person’s 30-day commitment, the director of an approved public facility or approved private facility may file with the court a petition for a 180-day commitment of that person. The petition must include all material required under AS 47.37.190(a) except that references to “30 days” shall be read as “180 days” and must allege that the person continues to be an alcoholic or drug abuser who is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs, or who continues to be at risk of serious physical harm or illness.
  2. Upon the filing of a petition for recommitment under (a) of this section, the court shall fix a date for hearing no later than 10 days after the date the petition was filed. A copy of the petition and of the notice of hearing, including the date fixed by the court, shall be served on
    1. the petitioner;
    2. the person whose recommitment is sought or the person’s guardian, if any;
    3. the attorney representing the person whose recommitment is sought;
    4. the original petitioner under AS 47.37.190(a) , if different from the petitioner for recommitment;
    5. any other person the court considers appropriate.
  3. If, not less than two days before the date set for a recommitment hearing under (a) of this section, the person being recommitted or the person’s counsel or advisor files a written request with the court, the court shall summon and impanel a jury of six residents of the judicial district to hear and consider evidence concerning the condition of the person being recommitted.
  4. At the hearing regarding recommitment for a 180-day period, the court or jury shall proceed as provided in AS 47.37.200(a) and (b).
  5. The provisions of AS 47.37.200(c) — (h) shall apply equally to periods of recommitment under this section, except that references to “30 days” shall be read as “180 days.”

History. (§ 12 ch 66 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.37.207. Unauthorized absences: return to facility.

When a person committed under AS 47.37.190 47.37.205 is absent from a treatment facility without authorization, the administrator, or that person’s designee, may contact peace officers who shall take the person into custody and return the respondent to the treatment facility.

History. (§ 13 ch 66 SLA 1996)

Sec. 47.37.210. Records of alcoholics, drug abusers, and intoxicated persons.

  1. Except as required by AS 28.35.030(d) , the registration and other records of treatment facilities shall remain confidential and are privileged to the patient.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department may make available information from patients’ records for purposes of research into the causes and treatment of alcoholism or drug abuse. Information may not disclose a patient’s name.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 4 ch 152 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 76 § 14 (1990); am § 14 ch 66 SLA 1996; am E.O. No. 108 § 55 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.150 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” in subsection (b).

Notes to Decisions

Inapplicable to child in need of aid proceedings. —

To whatever extent this section may be interpreted to create an evidentiary privilege, such privilege does not apply in CINA proceedings where a parent’s alcohol abuse is at issue. In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994).

Confidentiality does not preclude duty to protect from harm. —

Hospital’s family treatment center was not shielded from liability where a rapist in its alcohol treatment program raped another participant; the confidentiality statute does not preclude the hospital’s duty to protect patients participating in the treatment program from harm. Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2004).

Sec. 47.37.220. Visitation and communication with patients.

  1. Patients in any approved treatment facility under this chapter shall be granted reasonable opportunities for adequate consultation with counsel, and for continuing contact with family and friends including the use of telephone facilities, consistent with an effective treatment program.
  2. Mail or other communication to or from a patient in any approved treatment facility may not be intercepted, read, or censored.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.160 . Renumbered in 1972.

Sec. 47.37.230. Establishment of emergency service patrol.

  1. Cities and boroughs may establish emergency service patrols. An emergency service patrol consists of persons trained to give assistance in public places to persons who are intoxicated.  Members of an emergency service patrol shall be capable of providing first aid in emergency situations and shall be capable of transporting intoxicated persons to their homes and to and from public treatment facilities.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations for the establishment, training, and conduct of emergency service patrols.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 13 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 76 § 15 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 56 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.170 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” in subsection (b).

Sec. 47.37.235. Limitations on liability; bad faith application a felony.

  1. Except as provided under (b) of this section, a person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information who takes a person into protective custody or detains a person under AS 47.37.170 47.37.180 , or who petitions for commitment under AS 47.37.180 47.37.205 , is not subject to civil or criminal liability.
  2. The following persons may not be held civilly or criminally liable for detaining or failing to detain a person under AS 47.37.170 47.37.270 or for releasing a person under AS 47.37.170 47.37.270 at or before the end of the period for which the person was admitted or committed for protective custody or treatment if the persons have performed their duties in good faith and without gross negligence:
    1. an officer of an approved public or private treatment facility;
    2. the administrator of an approved public or private treatment facility, and the staff of an approved public or private treatment facility;
    3. a public official performing functions necessary to the administration of AS 47.37.170 — 47.37.270;
    4. a peace officer or other person responsible for detaining or transporting a person under AS 47.37.170 — 47.37.270.
  3. A person who knowingly initiates an involuntary commitment petition under AS 47.37.180 47.37.205 without having good cause to believe that the other person is an alcoholic or drug abuser and is incapacitated or at risk of serious physical harm or illness if not treated is guilty of a class C felony.

History. (§ 15 ch 66 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

Construction. —

Plain language of AS 47.37.235(b)(4) only applies the gross negligence standard to liability for detaining or failing to detain a person or for releasing a person; it does not purport to apply the gross negligence standard to actions taken while the person is detained, but rather mirrors the scope of the immunity provided by AS 47.37.170(g) . City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Duty of care. —

In a mother’s wrongful death action alleging that a city’s negligence led to her son’s death, the superior court did not err by giving an ordinary negligence instruction rather than requiring gross negligence to establish liability; because the mother’s claim of negligence concerned the city’s actions once the son was in custody rather than the decision to take the son into custody in the first place, the jury instruction stated the appropriate duty of care owed by the city. City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Gross negligence standard. —

Both the plain text of the statute and its legislative history demonstrate that the gross negligence standard in AS 47.37.235(b)(4) , like that in AS 47.37.170(g) , is relevant only to the decision whether to take an individual into custody. City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972 (Alaska 2015).

Sec. 47.37.240. Payment for treatment.

  1. A patient in an approved treatment facility, or the person obligated to provide for the cost of treatment of a person committed under this chapter, is liable to the public or private facility for the cost of maintenance and treatment of the patient in accordance with rates established by the department.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations governing financial ability that take into consideration the income, savings, and other personal and real property of the person liable for the cost and maintenance of the patient.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 14 ch 150 SLA 1980; am E.O. No. 76 § 16 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 57 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.180 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director” in one place in subsections (a) and (b).

Sec. 47.37.245. Wages of patients.

  1. A participant in a residential drug abuse or alcoholism treatment program may be paid wages for work therapy.  The payment of wages for work therapy by a drug or alcoholism treatment program shall be considered an allowable cost under the department’s regulations governing costs a grantee may pay with money received from a grant.
  2. No part of the wage earned by the patient worker may be deducted for the cost of room, board, or services.  The program, however, after the payment of wages, may assess and collect the reasonable cost of treatment according to rates established under AS 47.37.240 , and on the same basis it assesses and collects from nonworking patients.
  3. Wages earned by the patient worker may be held in trust by the program for the benefit of the patient, and, except as provided in (d) of this section, may be disbursed by the program only with the patient’s consent
    1. for the support of the patient’s dependents;
    2. to pay a civil judgment;
    3. for the purchase of gifts, clothing, and items of personal use;
    4. to pay restitution or a fine;
    5. for other purposes considered appropriate by the treatment program.
  4. Wages earned by the patient worker may be disbursed without the patient’s consent in accordance with a final court order.

History. (§ 2 ch 58 SLA 1983)

Sec. 47.37.250. Effect of chapter on other laws.

  1. Nothing in this chapter affects a statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to
    1. drunken driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, or other similar offenses involving alcohol and the operation of a vehicle, aircraft, boat, machinery, or other equipment;
    2. the sale, purchase, dispensation, possession, or use of alcoholic beverages at specified times and places or by a particular class of persons, including prohibitions against drinking intoxicating beverages in specified public places; or
    3. being upon the traveled portion of a highway so as to be a hazard to the motoring public.
  2. Nothing in this chapter affects AS 11.81.630 , relating to the defense of voluntary intoxication.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 186 SLA 1976)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.190 . Renumbered in 1972. In 1990, a reference to AS 11.81.630 was substituted for “former AS 11.70.030” in (b) of this section to reflect the repeal of the latter provision and enactment of substantially similar provisions in AS 11.81.630 by ch. 166, SLA 1978.

Notes to Decisions

This section refers only to the sale, purchase, dispensation or use of alcoholic beverages. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

And not to being intoxicated at “specific times and places.” —

See Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

A construction to expand the nonapplicability section to include anyone intoxicated on a highway would have the effect of emasculating the statute. Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Sec. 47.37.260. Application of Administrative Procedure Act.

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) applies to and governs all administrative action taken by the department under this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 76 § 17 (1990); am E.O. No. 108 § 58 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.200 . Renumbered in 1972.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “director.”

Sec. 47.37.270. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “alcoholic or drug abuser” means a person who demonstrates increased tolerance to alcohol or drugs, who suffers from withdrawal when alcohol or drugs are not available, whose habitual lack of self-control concerning the use of alcohol or drugs causes significant hazard to the person’s health, and who continues to use alcohol or drugs despite the adverse consequences;
  2. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  3. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  4. “drugs” means a drug that is included in the controlled substance schedules set out in AS 11.71.140 11.71.190 ;
  5. “emergency service patrol” means a patrol established under AS 47.37.230 ;
  6. “hazardous volatile material or substance”
    1. means a material or substance that is readily vaporizable at room temperature and whose vapors or gases, when inhaled,
      1. pose an immediate threat to the life or health of the person; or
      2. are likely to have adverse delayed effects on the health of the person;
    2. includes, but is not limited to,
      1. gasoline;
      2. materials and substances containing petroleum distillates; and
      3. common household materials and substances whose containers bear a notice warning that inhalation of vapors or gases may cause physical harm;
  7. “incapacitated by alcohol or drugs” means a person who, as a result of alcohol or drugs, is unconscious or whose judgment is otherwise so impaired that the person (A) is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to the need for treatment and (B) is unable to take care of the person’s basic safety or personal needs, including food, clothing, shelter, or medical care;
  8. “incompetent person” means a person who has been adjudged incompetent by the appropriate court;
  9. “inhalant abuse” means the misuse of a hazardous volatile material or substance by inhaling its vapors;
  10. “intoxicated person” means a person whose mental or physical functioning is substantially impaired as a result of the use of alcohol or drugs;
  11. “treatment” means the broad range of emergency, outpatient, intermediate, and inpatient services and care that may be extended to alcoholics, intoxicated persons, or drug abusers, including diagnostic evaluation, medical, psychiatric, psychological, and social service care, vocational rehabilitation and career counseling;
  12. “work therapy”
    1. means an activity that involves a patient in basic employment skills and assists the patient in reintegration into a community;
    2. does not include
      1. activities such as personal housekeeping chores or cooperative responsibilities expected of each patient in the program; or
      2. work that produces goods or services for sale or distribution, the proceeds of which would be returned to the owners, operators, or businesses of the rehabilitation program.

History. (§ 1 ch 207 SLA 1972; am § 4 ch 116 SLA 1978; am §§ 15 — 18 ch 150 SLA 1980; am § 3 ch 58 SLA 1983; am § 69 ch 37 SLA 1986; am E.O. No. 71, § 23 (1988); am § 5 ch 75 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 76 §§ 18 — 20 (1990); am §§ 16 — 20 ch 66 SLA 1996; am E.O. No. 108 §§ 59, 88 (2003); am § 51 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.37.210 . Renumbered in 1972. Reorganized in 1983 to alphabetize the terms defined, and in 1989, 1990, and 2008 to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “department” for “division” in two places in paragraph (3) and repealed paragraphs (6) and (7).

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, repealed paragraphs (2) and (3).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).

Chapter 38. Alcohol and Substance Abuse Accountability.

Effective dates. —

Although the 2014 amendments were to have taken effect July 1, 2014 under Sec. 42, ch. 83, SLA 2014, the Governor did not sign the bill until July 16, 2014, and so the actual effective date of the 2014 amendments was July 17, 2014 under AS 01.10.070(d) .

Article 1. Alcohol and Substance Abuse Monitoring and Treatment for Persons Released on Bail or on Probation.

Sec. 47.38.010. Cooperation with the Department of Corrections.

The department shall cooperate with the Department of Corrections in establishing and conducting programs to provide treatment for alcoholics, intoxicated persons, drug abusers, and inhalant abusers who are on conditions of release as provided in AS 12.30 or on probation.

History. (§ 34 ch 83 SLA 2014)

Sec. 47.38.020. Alcohol and substance abuse monitoring program.

  1. The commissioner, in cooperation with the commissioner of corrections, shall establish a program using a competitive procurement process for certain persons with release conditions ordered as provided under AS 12.30, or offenders with conditions of probation, that include not consuming controlled substances or alcoholic beverages.
  2. The commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement the program. The regulations must include regulations regarding products and services that provide alcohol and substance abuse monitoring.
  3. The commissioner shall include in the program
    1. a requirement for twice-a-day testing, either remotely or in person, for alcoholic beverage use and random testing for controlled substances;
    2. a means to provide the probation officer, prosecutor’s office, or local law enforcement agency with notice within 24 hours, so that a complaint may be filed alleging a violation of AS 11.56.757 , a petition may be filed with the court seeking appropriate sanctions and may be scheduled by the court for a prompt hearing, or an arrest warrant may be issued for the person on release or offender with conditions of probation provided in this subsection, if the person or offender
      1. fails to appear for an appointment or fails to complete a test through the use of remote alcohol or substance abuse monitoring technology as required by the program requirements; or
      2. tests positive for the use of controlled substances or alcoholic beverages; and
    3. a requirement that the person or offender pay, based on the person’s or offender’s ability under financial guidelines established by the commissioner, for the cost of participating in the program.
  4. The department shall contract with one or more vendors using a competitive procurement process in accordance with AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code) to provide or conduct the testing required under (c) of this section.

History. (§ 34 ch 83 SLA 2014; am § 173 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), inserted “using a competitive procurement process” following “program”; in (b), added the second sentence; in (c)(1), inserted “either remotely or” following “testing” and deleted “if practicable” following “in person”, in (c)(2)(A), inserted “or fails to complete a test through the use of remote alcohol or substance abuse monitoring technology” following “appointment”; in (d), inserted “contract with one or more vendors using a competitive procurement process in accordance with AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code) to” following “The department shall”.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 36(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014, this section applies to convictions occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014 for offenses occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014.

Article 2. Recidivism Reduction Program.

Sec. 47.38.100. Recidivism reduction program.

  1. The recidivism reduction program is established to promote the rehabilitation of persons on probation or parole or incarcerated for offenses and recently released from correctional facilities.
  2. The commissioner, in cooperation with the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission established in AS 44.19.641 , may provide for programs that have, as a primary focus, rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism for persons on probation or parole or incarcerated for offenses and recently released from correctional facilities. The commissioner may enter into contracts to provide for programs under this section. An eligible program under this section must accomplish at least one of the following objectives:
    1. increasing access to evidence-based rehabilitation programs, including drug and alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, and cognitive behavioral programs; or
    2. supporting offenders’ transition and re-entry from correctional facilities to the community, including transitional housing services, employment services, vocational training, educational support, counseling, and medical care.
  3. The commissioner and the commissioner of corrections shall prepare a joint annual report on the program provided under (a) of this section, and notify the legislature on or before January 15 of each year that the report is available. The report must include an analysis of the program’s effects on recidivism for program participants.
  4. In this section, “evidenced-based” means a program or practice that offers a high level of research on effectiveness.

History. (§ 34 ch 83 SLA 2014; am §§ 174 — 176 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective October 9, 2016, in (a), deleted “through transitional re-entry programs” following “rehabilitation” and inserted “on probation or parole or” preceding “incarcerated”; rewrote (b); added (d).

Article 3. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.38.190. Regulations.

The department may adopt regulations necessary to implement this chapter.

History. (§ 39(c) ch 83 SLA 2014)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was enacted as uncodified law in sec. 39(c), ch. 83, SLA 2014; codified in 2014.

Sec. 47.38.199. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services.

History. (§ 34 ch 83 SLA 2014)

Chapter 40. Purchase of Services.

Article 1. Purchase of Services for Minors.

Sec. 47.40.010. Purchase of services. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Sec. 47.40.011. Purchase of services.

  1. When the department purchases residential services for minors for whom the state has assumed responsibility under AS 47.10 or AS 47.12, the department shall
    1. purchase the services only under grants to local governmental units or nonprofit corporations;
    2. award grants for a specified number of beds as provided in AS 47.40.041 .
  2. The department shall adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 , including regulations establishing the procedures to be followed in awarding grants, the types of services for which payment may be made, costs that may be paid with grant money, and the method of payment.
  3. Services of jails and other penal institutions may not be included in services purchased by the state under AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 .

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1984; am § 52 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

Sec. 47.40.020. Licensing and supervision. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Sec. 47.40.021. Licensing and supervision.

Facilities providing services that are purchased by the department under AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 shall, if required by the department, be licensed and supervised under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1984; am § 38 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference.

Collateral references. —

43 C.J.S., Infants, § 370 et seq.

Sec. 47.40.030. Required accounting procedures. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Sec. 47.40.031. Required accounting procedures.

Facilities that solicit or receive grants from the department for the cost of services provided under AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 shall

  1. meet accepted standards of fiscal accountability for public money and shall, upon request, submit to the department and to the division of legislative audit a complete financial statement prepared by an independent certified public accountant;
  2. keep records of the expenditures for the services provided, using cost-accounting procedures in accordance with department regulations;
  3. upon request, furnish the department and the division of legislative audit all fiscal information, books, records, and accounts pertaining to services paid for under AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 .

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1984)

Administrative Code. —

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

Sec. 47.40.040. Determination of full cost of services. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Sec. 47.40.041. Grants.

  1. The department shall award grants in accordance with its regulations.  The department may award grants for periods not to exceed three years. The department may adjust grant amounts annually, using a cost-of-living allowance formula adopted in its regulations. Grant awards are subject to legislative appropriation.  If insufficient money is appropriated to fund all grants awarded, the department shall prorate grant amounts, reduce the number of beds contracted for, or otherwise adjust grants to the extent of the appropriated funds.
  2. Notices published by the department concerning the opening of the application process for a grant award must specify the geographical area in which services are needed, the type of services, the number of beds anticipated to be needed, the maximum number of days of care, and any other requirements established by the department.  Grants authorized under this section are exempt from AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).
  3. Grants may not include payment for
    1. costs, including salaries and fees, incurred in raising funds or lobbying;
    2. costs of academic education that duplicate the public education system, except as provided for in regulations;
    3. costs of religious training; and
    4. costs that are funded by other government sources.

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1984; am § 63 ch 106 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 102 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, paragraphs (c)(3) — (5) were renumbered as (c)(2) — (4) to reflect the 1996 repeal of former paragraph (2).

Administrative Code. —

For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Sec. 47.40.050. Services. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Secs. 47.40.060, 47.40.070. Placements. [Repealed, § 1 ch 210 SLA 1970.]

Sec. 47.40.080. Definitions. [Repealed, § 7 ch 119 SLA 1984.]

Sec. 47.40.091. Definitions.

In AS 47.40.011 47.40.091 ,

  1. “bed” means space in a facility that may be occupied by a minor for 365 days a year;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “nonprofit corporation” means a corporation organized under AS 10.20;
  4. “residential services” means 24-hour care and supervision of minors in residential child care facilities that are commonly known as group homes or institutions.

History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1984)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.40.200. Renumbered in 1984.

Article 2. Purchase of Services for Pregnant Women.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and purpose in connection with ch. 37, SLA 1984, which enacted AS 47.40.100 47.40.120 , see § 1, ch. 37, SLA 1984 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For services for pregnant women, see 7 AAC 55.610 — 7 AAC 55.690.

Sec. 47.40.100. Purchase of services for pregnant women.

The Department of Health and Social Services shall pay within appropriation the cost of prenatal services which are not available from an existing state or federal program other than medical services for a pregnant woman experiencing social and economic difficulties, including the costs of transportation to and from a maternity home or a foster home, counseling, adoption assistance, maternity home and foster home care, and parenting skills.

History. (§ 2 ch 37 SLA 1984)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.42.010. Renumbered in 1984.

Administrative Code. —

For services for pregnant women, see 7 AAC 55, art. 3.

Sec. 47.40.110. Licensing and supervision.

A person providing services purchased by the Department of Health and Social Services under AS 47.40.100 47.40.120 shall, if required to be licensed under AS 47.32, be licensed and supervised in the same manner as foster homes and maternity homes under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 2 ch 37 SLA 1984; am § 19 ch 124 SLA 1994; am § 39 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.42.020. Renumbered in 1984.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated section references.

Sec. 47.40.120. Regulations.

The Department of Health and Social Services shall adopt regulations to implement AS 47.40.100 47.40.120 .

History. (§ 2 ch 37 SLA 1984)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.42.030. Renumbered in 1984.

Administrative Code. —

For services for pregnant women, see 7 AAC 55, art. 3.

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Chapter 45. Older Alaskans and Long-term Care Facility Residents.

Article 1. Alaska Longevity Bonus.

Revisor’s notes. —

Chapter 99, SLA 1985 established, subject to a contingency requiring legislative action, an annuity program funded by permanent fund dividends. The contingency was never satisfied and the sections establishing the proposed annuity program were repealed by § 17, ch. 20, SLA 2002.

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Legislative history reports. —

For report on ch. 205, SLA 1972 (FCCS HCS CSSB 211), which enacted this chapter, see 1972 House Journal, p. 751.

Collateral references. —

70A Am. Jur. 2d, Social Security and Medicare, § 1 et seq.

81 C. J. S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 187-192.

Sec. 47.45.010. Persons who may qualify for longevity bonus.

  1. A person who is 65 years of age or over who resides in the state for at least one year immediately preceding application for a longevity bonus under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 may apply to the commissioner of administration no later than December 31, 1996, for qualification to receive a monthly bonus of
    1. $250, if the person’s application was submitted before January 1, 1994;
    2. $200, if the person’s application was submitted on or after January 1, 1994, but before January 1, 1995;
    3. $150, if the person’s application was submitted on or after January 1, 1995, but before January 1, 1996; or
    4. $100, if the person’s application was submitted on or after January 1, 1996, but before January 1, 1997.
  2. When the commissioner of health and social services determines that an applicant qualifies under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 the commissioner shall immediately begin payment of the bonus.
  3. A person who otherwise qualifies to receive a bonus provided for in AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 may continue to do so only as long as that person continues to be a resident of the state.
  4. [Repealed, § 62 ch 21 SLA 1991.]

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 33 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 89 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 147 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 13 SLA 1981; am § 2 ch 38 SLA 1984; am §§ 5, 6 ch 107 SLA 1989; am §§ 61, 62 ch 21 SLA 1991; am § 2 ch 64 SLA 1993; am E.O. No. 108 § 61 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and purpose in connection with the 1984 amendment to this section, see § 1, ch. 38, SLA 1984 in the Temporary and Special Acts; for legislative findings in connection with the 1989 amendment to (a) of this section, see § 1(b), ch. 107, SLA 1989 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration” in subsection (b).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 8, ch. 107, SLA 1989 provides that notwithstanding the amendment to (a) of this section by § 5 of ch. 107, “ if an individual received a longevity bonus payment for any month during 1989, the individual’s eligibility to receive bonus payments during 1990 shall be determined under the law as it existed before that amendment.”

Section 6(a), ch. 64, SLA 1993 provides that “[u]nder AS 01.10.030 , if any provision of AS 47.45.010(a)(1) -(4), amended by § 2 of this Act, AS 47.45.045 , added by § 3 of this Act, or AS 47.45.070(a)(5) and (6), added by § 4 of this Act, or the application of a provision of this Act to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.”

For the right to reapply under § 2, ch. 55, SLA 2000, see the editor’s notes following AS 47.45.070 .

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The 1989 amendment to subsection (a) of this section, imposing a two-year residency requirement for applicants, is un- constitutional; the former one year requirement in subsection (d) is the applicable period, since no appeal is pending. Lindly, et al. v. Malone, Superior Court, 3rd Jud. Dist. 3AN-90-02586 CI (1990). (The 1991 amendment to this section codified this decision).

Challenge to residency and domicile requirements. —

State of Alaska and former administrator of longevity bonus program could not be held liable, either on constitutional grounds or under the federal Civil Rights Act, for monetary damages sought on behalf of plaintiff class members who had successfully challenged the former 25-year residency and pre-statehood domicile requirements of this chapter. Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904, 109 S. Ct. 3184, 105 L. Ed. 2d 693 (U.S. 1989).

Governor’s veto of bonus. —

Elimination of a longevity bonus for senior citizens did not violate this chapter because the state’s payments for the bonus were made out of annual appropriations. Simpson v. Murkowski, 129 P.3d 435 (Alaska 2006).

Longevity Bonus Program is unconstitutional. —

The Longevity Bonus Program creates an exclusive class that is to receive special benefits due to the length of the class member’s residence in Alaska and thus is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and § 1, art. I, of the state constitution. Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1984), (decided prior to 1984 amendments).

Sec. 47.45.020. Continuous eligibility procedures.

After qualification, monthly applications for bonuses may be made in person to any office of the Department of Health and Social Services. Mailed monthly applications shall also be considered by the department. In-person or mailed applications shall be made on forms provided by the department and shall conform to the conditions as provided by regulation. The commissioner of health and social services may make exceptions for those residents who are isolated in rural areas and cannot mail a monthly application; however, they shall mail an application at least once every six months.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 108 § 62 (2003))

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” and “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.45.030. Absence from the state.

  1. After qualification, a recipient shall notify the commissioner of health and social services when the recipient expects to be absent from the state if the absence is for a continuous period that exceeds 60 days. After that notification, the recipient may no longer receive bonuses from the Department of Health and Social Services after the last regularly approved monthly application. Upon returning to the state, the recipient may again make application for a bonus. Failure to notify the commissioner of an expected absence may be grounds for disqualification.
  2. [Repealed, § 4 ch 78 SLA 2002.]
  3. A recipient who has been absent from the state for a continuous period that exceeds three years is permanently disqualified from receiving bonuses.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 3 ch 38 SLA 1984; am § 19 ch 99 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 58 SLA 1996; am §§ 1, 2, 4 ch 78 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 63 (2003))

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” and “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration” in subsection (a).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 5, ch. 78, SLA 2002, provides that the 2002 amendments to subsection (a), the repeal of subsection (b), and the addition of subsection (c) apply “only to absences from the state that begin after September 18, 2002”, and also provides that the section as it read before September 18, 2002, applies “to a period of absence that began before [that date].”

Sec. 47.45.035. Unpaid sabbaticals. [Repealed, § 4 ch 78 SLA 2002.]

Editor’s notes. —

Section 5, ch. 78, SLA 2002, provides that the 2002 repeal of this section applies “only to absences from the state that begin after September 18, 2002”, and also provides that AS 47.45.035 as it read before September 18, 2002, applies “to a period of absence that began before [that date].”

Sec. 47.45.040. Disqualification.

Disqualification under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 shall rest solely with the commissioner of health and social services and shall be outlined in the regulations adopted under AS 47.45.100 .

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 108 § 64 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.45.045. Reapplication after disqualification. [Repealed, § 4 ch 78 SLA 2002.]

Editor’s notes. —

Section 5, ch. 78, SLA 2002, provides that the 2002 repeal of this section applies “only to absences from the state that begin after September 18, 2002”, and also provides that AS 47.45.035 as it read before September 18, 2002, applies “to a period of absence that began before [that date].”

Sec. 47.45.050. Department hearing.

The Department of Health and Social Services may arrange with the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) to hold a hearing upon the request of an applicant or recipient who has been disqualified. Before this hearing, the department shall, by certified mail, notify an applicant or recipient in plain and comprehensive language the exact reason for the disqualification. Form letters using only referral to state statutes or department regulations, or otherwise vague in detail, are not considered compliance by the department with this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 108 § 65 (2003); am § 90 ch 163 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” at the beginning of the section.

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted “arrange with the office of administrative hearing (AS 44.64.010 ) to hold a hearing” for “hold a departmental hearing” in the first sentence.

Sec. 47.45.060. Legal remedy.

Legal remedy from disqualification may be sought by an applicant or recipient in any court of competent jurisdiction in the state. The burden of proof shall rest solely upon the applicant or recipient and any costs related to a disqualification verdict determined against the applicant or recipient may be recoverable by the attorney general from that person, or from any agency representing that person supported in whole, or in part, with state appropriations.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.45.070. Unqualified persons.

  1. An unqualified person is one who
    1. does not meet the age or residence requirements as provided for under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ;
    2. meets the age and residence requirements of AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 but either is confined in a state or federal mental health institution or facility and is certified by the state as unable to manage personal affairs, or resides in a nursing home as that term is defined in AS 08.70.180 ; however, if that person, at the time of commitment or commencement of residence, provided the principal support of a spouse, the commissioner of health and social services may determine to pay the confined person’s bonus to the person’s spouse until the spouse is qualified for a bonus;
    3. is otherwise qualified but confined in a penal or correctional institution or facility; upon completion of sentence or upon the conferral of a pardon, parole, or probation, the person may make application; confinement outside the state shall be considered as residence in the state if a person was convicted and sentenced from a court in Alaska; revocation of parole or probation shall be cause for immediate disqualification until release from confinement is again effected;
    4. is permanently disqualified under AS 47.45.030(c) ;
    5. did not apply, under AS 47.45.010(a) , before January 1, 1997, for qualification to receive a longevity bonus;
    6. was found qualified to receive a longevity bonus and was subsequently permanently disqualified under former AS 47.45.030(b) or former AS 47.45.045 .
  2. Notwithstanding (a)(2) of this section, a person who meets the age and residence requirements of AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 qualifies for the bonus during any period of residence in a nursing home that does not exceed 90 consecutive days if the bonus is exempt from the determination of income eligibility under Supplemental Security Income in 42 U.S.C. 1382a (Sec. 1612(b)(2)(B), Social Security Act), as amended.
  3. Notwithstanding (a)(2) of this section, a person who resides in a nursing home who meets the age and residence requirements of AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 qualifies for the bonus if the costs of care of the person at the nursing home are paid for entirely from private sources, veterans’ benefits, or a combination of private sources and veterans’ benefits.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 20 ch 99 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 78 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 108 SLA 1992; am § 4 ch 64 SLA 1993; am § 3 ch 58 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 55 SLA 2000; am § 3 ch 78 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 66 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration” in paragraph (a)(2).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 6(a), ch. 64, SLA 1993 provides that “[u]nder AS 01.10.030 , if any provision of AS 47.45.010(a)(1) -(4), amended by § 2 of this Act, AS 47.45.045 , added by § 3 of this Act, or AS 47.45.070(a)(5) and (6), added by § 4 of this Act, or the application of a provision of this Act to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.”

Section 2, ch. 55, SLA 2000 provides as follows: “ APPLICATIONS AND REAPPLICATIONS FOR LONGEVITY BONUS PAYMENTS. (a) Notwithstanding AS 47.45.045 , a person who qualified to receive a monthly longevity bonus payment under AS 47.45.010 before January 1, 1997, but was later disqualified under AS 47.45.070(a)(2) may reapply for qualification for bonus payments. If the Department of Administration determines that the person is eligible for bonus payments under AS 47.45.070(c) , as amended in sec. 1 of this Act, and is otherwise eligible, the amount of the person’s monthly bonus shall be the amount the person was receiving before reapplying under this subsection.

“(b) Notwithstanding AS 47.45.010 , a person who originally applied before January 1, 1997, and did not qualify to receive a monthly longevity bonus under AS 47.45.070(a)(2) but who otherwise would have qualified may file a new application. If the Department of Administration determines that the person is eligible for bonus payments under AS 47.45.070(c) , as amended in sec. 1 of this Act, and is otherwise eligible, the amount of the person’s monthly bonus shall be the amount the person would have received had the person qualified under the original application.”

Section 5, ch. 78, SLA 2002, provides that the 2002 amendments to subsection (a) apply “only to absences from the state that begin after September 18, 2002”, and also provides that the subsection as it read before September 18, 2002, applies “to a period of absence that began before [that date].” See § 5, ch. 78, SLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.45.080. Accrual of bonuses.

A recipient may not for any reason, receive an accrual of bonuses in excess of two monthly payments. Interest may not be paid on accrued bonuses. Upon the death of a recipient the commissioner of health and social services shall pay to the beneficiary of the recipient any accrued bonuses not to exceed two monthly payments.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 108 § 67 (2003))

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.45.090. Alaska longevity bonus fund. [Repealed, § 12 ch 42 SLA 1997.]

Sec. 47.45.100. Regulations.

The commissioner of health and social services shall adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 .

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994; am § 12 ch 42 SLA 1997; am E.O. No. 108 § 68 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.45.110. Treasurer of system.

The commissioner of revenue is the treasurer of the system and has powers and duties for this purpose.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 7 ch 42 SLA 1997)

Sec. 47.45.120. Exemption from state and local taxation and from debt collection.

  1. Bonuses received under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 are exempt from all state and political subdivision taxes except sales and use taxes. A bonus received under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 is not exempt from a federal tax requirement.
  2. Bonuses received under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 are exempt from levy to enforce the collection of a debt as provided in AS 09.38 (Alaska Exemptions Act).

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 13 ch 62 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Sec. 47.45.122. Eligibility for public assistance.

  1. An individual whose public assistance is denied or reduced solely because of the receipt of a bonus under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 by the individual or by a member of the individual’s household is eligible for assistance under the general relief assistance program in AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 . Notwithstanding the limit in AS 47.25.130 , the individual is entitled to receive the same amount as the individual would have received under other public assistance programs had the individual not received a longevity bonus.
  2. In this section “other public assistance” means
    1. Supplemental Security Income under 42 U.S.C. 1381  — 1385;
    2. Medicaid under 42 U.S.C. 1396  —  1396p; and
    3. Adult Public Assistance under AS 47.25.430 47.25.615 .

History. (§ 21 ch 99 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Sec. 47.45.130. Death or cessation of residency.

The commissioner of health and social services shall establish procedures to stop a bonus when a recipient under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 no longer qualifies. When a recipient dies or discontinues residency in the state the recipient’s qualification for a bonus shall stop at the time of the recipient’s last approved monthly application.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am E.O. No. 108 § 69 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.45.140. Penalty for false statements or records.

A person who wilfully or knowingly makes a false statement, or falsifies or permits to be falsified any record required by AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 , is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both, forfeits all rights under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 , and shall make adequate restitution for any bonuses illegally received.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Sec. 47.45.150. Definitions.

In AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ,

  1. “bonus” means a monthly Alaska longevity bonus payment made to a person or the person’s beneficiary who qualifies under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ;
  2. “resident” or “resident of the state” means an individual who is physically present in the state with the intent to remain in the state indefinitely and to make a home in the state; a person demonstrates the requisite intent by maintaining a principal place of abode in the state for one year and by providing other proof of intent the commissioner may require by regulation, including proof that the person is not claiming residency outside the state or obtaining benefits under a claim of residency outside the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972; am § 5 ch 38 SLA 1984)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Administrative Code. —

For longevity bonus program, see 2 AAC 40.

Sec. 47.45.160. Administrative Procedure Act not applicable.

AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) does not apply to AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 .

History. (§ 1 ch 205 SLA 1972)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2003, “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “this chapter” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Sec. 47.45.170. Purpose. [Repealed, § 6 ch 38 SLA 1984.]

Article 2. Alaska Commission on Aging.

Sec. 47.45.200. Alaska Commission on Aging.

  1. The Alaska Commission on Aging is established in the Department of Health and Social Services. The members of the commission include
    1. the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee;
    2. the commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development or the commissioner’s designee;
    3. a senior services provider, regardless of age, appointed by the governor;
    4. the chair of the Alaska Pioneers’ Homes Advisory Board under AS 44.29.500 ; and
    5. seven persons selected on the basis of their knowledge and demonstrated interest in the concerns of older Alaskans, appointed by the governor in accordance with (b) of this section.
  2. After requesting from senior citizens’ organizations the names of persons who are qualified for and interested in serving on the commission, the governor shall appoint the members of the commission under (a)(5) of this section. Appointments shall be made by the governor to assure representation of low-income persons and minorities, and representation from rural and urban areas of the state, and to secure statewide geographical representation on the commission. At least six of the persons appointed by the governor shall be 60 years of age or older. At least two of these persons shall be 65 years of age or older. Each member appointed by the governor shall be a resident of the state.
  3. The persons appointed under (a)(3) and (a)(5) of this section serve overlapping four-year terms, and serve at the pleasure of the governor. A member may be reappointed, but a member appointed under (a)(3) or (a)(5) of this section may not serve more than two consecutive terms or eight consecutive years, whichever is longer.
  4. If a person appointed under (a)(3) or (a)(5) of this section fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the commission, a majority of the members of the commission may request the governor to terminate the membership of the member and to fill the vacancy.
  5. A vacancy in the membership of persons appointed under (a)(3) and (a)(5) of this section shall be filled by appointment by the governor. The person appointed serves for the unexpired portion of the term.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003); am §§ 1 — 4 ch 92 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.200. Renumbered in 2003.

In 2004, in (a) of this section, “commissioner of community and economic development” was changed to “commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective August 20, 2005, rewrote paragraph (a)(3), which read “the commissioner of administration or the commissioner’s designee”; and inserted paragraph references in subsections (c)-(e).

Sec. 47.45.210. Meetings and officers.

  1. The commission shall meet at the call of the chair, at the request of a majority of the members, or at a regularly scheduled time as determined by a majority of the members. The commission shall meet at least four times each year.
  2. A majority of the members of the commission constitutes a quorum for conducting business and exercising the powers of the commission.
  3. The commission shall elect one of its members as chairperson, and may select other officers it considers necessary.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003); am § 5 ch 92 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.210. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.45.200 ” was substituted for “AS 47.44.200” to conform to the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.44.200.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective August 20, 2005, in subsection (b) deleted the first sentence, which read “The members of the commission listed in AS 47.45.200(a)(2) and (3) may not vote on matters before the commission” and deleted “listed in AS 47.45.200(a)(1) , (4), and (5)” following “members of the commission.”

Sec. 47.45.220. Compensation.

Members of the commission receive no compensation for their services, but are entitled to per diem and travel allowances authorized by law for other boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180 .

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.220. Renumbered in 2003.

Sec. 47.45.230. Executive director.

The executive director of the commission shall formulate and submit to the department a comprehensive statewide plan that identifies the concerns and needs of older Alaskans and present that plan to the commission.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003); am § 3 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.225. Renumbered in 2003.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, deleted the paragraph (1) designation, deleted paragraphs (2) and (3), relating to the administration of certain federal and state programs, and inserted “and submit to the department.”

Sec. 47.45.240. Powers, duties, and limitations.

  1. The commission shall
    1. subject to review by the department, approve a comprehensive statewide plan that identifies and addresses the concerns and needs of older Alaskans and, with reference to the approved plan, prepare and submit to the governor and legislature an annual analysis and evaluation of the services that are provided to older Alaskans;
    2. make recommendations directly to the governor and the legislature with respect to legislation, regulations, and appropriations for programs or services that benefit older Alaskans;
    3. encourage the development of municipal commissions serving older Alaskans and community-oriented programs and services for the benefit of older Alaskans;
    4. employ an executive director who serves at the pleasure of the commission;
    5. help older Alaskans lead dignified, independent, and useful lives;
    6. request and receive reports and audits from state agencies and local institutions concerned with the conditions and needs of older Alaskans;
    7. give assistance, on request, to the senior housing office in the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation in administration of the senior housing loan program under AS 18.56.710 18.56.799 and in the performance of the office’s other duties under AS 18.56.700 ; and
    8. provide to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, for its review and consideration, recommendations concerning the integrated comprehensive mental health program for persons who are described in (d) of this section and the use of the money in the mental health trust settlement income account in a manner consistent with regulations adopted under AS 47.30.031 .
  2. To accomplish its duties, the commission may
    1. review, evaluate, and comment upon state programs concerned with the problems and the needs of older Alaskans;
    2. collect facts and statistics, and make studies of conditions and problems pertaining to the employment, health, housing, financial security, social welfare, and other concerns that bear upon the well-being of older Alaskans;
    3. provide information about public programs that would be of interest or benefit to older Alaskans;
    4. appoint special committees, which may include persons who are not members of the commission, to complete necessary studies;
    5. promote community education efforts regarding the problems and concerns of older Alaskans;
    6. contract for necessary services;
    7. consult and cooperate with persons, organizations, and groups interested in or concerned with programs of assistance to older Alaskans;
    8. advocate improved programs of benefit to older Alaskans; and
    9. recommend standards for levels of services for older Alaskans for programs administered by the department.
  3. The commission may not investigate, review, or undertake any responsibility for the longevity bonus program under AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 or the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or Alaska Veterans’ Home under AS 47.55.
  4. When the commission formulates a comprehensive statewide plan under (a) of this section, it shall include within the plan specific reference to the concerns and needs of older Alaskans who have a disorder described in AS 47.30.056(b)(4) .

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003); am § 14 ch 59 SLA 2004; am § 6 ch 92 SLA 2005; am §§ 4, 5 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.230. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 ” was substituted for “AS 47.44.200 — 47.44.240” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.44.200 — 47.44.240, and “AS 47.45.010 47.45.160 ” was substituted for “AS 47.45” to reflect the 2003 addition of AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, inserted “or Alaska Veterans’ Home” in subsection (c), and made stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendment, effective August 20, 2005, deleted “and evaluate grant applicants and award grants under those programs” from the end of former paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8).

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, inserted “subject to review by the department” and “and addresses” in paragraph (a)(1), deleted paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8), relating to setting policy for certain federal and state programs, substituted “recommend” for “set” and “commission” for “department” in paragraph (b)(9), deleted paragraph (b)(10), relating to the adoption of regulations, and made related changes.

Sec. 47.45.290. Definitions.

In AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 ,

  1. “commission” means the Alaska Commission on Aging;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “older Alaskan” means a resident who is 60 years of age or older.

History. (E.O. No. 108 § 60 (2003); am § 6 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.44.240. Renumbered in 2003, at which time “AS 47.45.200 47.45.290 ” was substituted for “AS 47.44.200 — 47.44.240” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.44.200 — 47.44.240. Paragraph (2) was enacted as (3); renumbered in 2008, at which time paragraph (2) was renumbered as (3).

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, added paragraph (3) [now (2)].

Article 3. Senior Benefits Payment Program.

Cross references. —

For a statement of legislative intent applicable to the program described in AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 , see § 1, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, in the 2007 Temporary and Special Acts. For provisions limiting eligibility for payments under the program described in AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 by a person receiving cash assistance or a prescription drug benefit under a separate state senior benefit program, see § 5, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, in the 2007 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.45.300. Senior care program. [Repealed, § 4 ch 89 SLA 2005.]

Sec. 47.45.301. Alaska senior benefits payment program.

  1. The Alaska senior benefits payment program is established in the Department of Health and Social Services to provide cash benefits as far as practicable under appropriations provided by law.
  2. The department shall administer the program and adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out the purposes of the program.
  3. If the department estimates that appropriations for the program are insufficient to meet the demands of the program in a fiscal year, the department may reduce or eliminate the cash benefit available to recipients.

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007)

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under § 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by § 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, § 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , this section, AS 47.45.302 , 47.45.304 , 47.45.306 , 47.45.308 , and 47.45.309 would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this date was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Sec. 47.45.302. Cash assistance benefit.

  1. An individual is eligible for a cash assistance benefit under the program if the individual
    1. is 65 years of age or older;
    2. is a resident of the state;
    3. is a citizen of the United States or a qualified alien under 8 U.S.C. 1613 and 1641;
    4. has a household income that does not exceed 175 percent of the annual federal poverty line for Alaska, as determined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);
    5. has not received a longevity bonus payment under AS 47.45.010 - 47.45.160 for the same period; and
    6. applies in the format prescribed by the department; the department may use an abbreviated form for an individual who received a payment under an assistance program for seniors that paid $120 a month and was administered by the department on or before July 29, 2007.
  2. An eligible individual shall receive a monthly cash assistance payment beginning on August 1, 2007, as follows:
    1. $250 if the individual’s household income does not exceed 75 percent of the federal poverty line for Alaska;
    2. $175 if the individual’s household income does not exceed 100 percent but is above 75 percent of the federal poverty line for Alaska;
    3. $125 if the individual’s household income does not exceed 175 percent but is above 100 percent of the federal poverty line for Alaska.
  3. Cash assistance provided under this section is subject to appropriation.

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007; am § 1 ch 11 SLA 2016)

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, sec. 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , AS 47.45.301 , this section, 47.45.304 , 47.45.306 , 47.45.308 , and 47.45.309 would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

In 2007, “or on the effective date of this Act, whichever is later,” was deleted from subsection (b) because the effective date of ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, was July 29, 2007.

Cross references. —

For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 11, SLA 2016, see 2016 Senate Journal 1614 — 1615.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, in (a), added (3), and made related and stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.45.304. Continuation of benefits.

An eligible individual who leaves the state may not receive a cash benefit under AS 47.45.302 during the absence unless the individual’s absence is temporary and is for one of the following reasons:

  1. to receive medical treatment for the individual;
  2. to accompany the individual’s family member who is receiving medical treatment outside the state; or
  3. for a vacation, business trip, or other absence of less than 30 consecutive days, unless the individual has applied for and received a time extension from the department for special circumstances.

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007)

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, sec. 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , AS 47.45.301 , 47.45.302 , this section, 47.45.306 , 47.45.308 , and 47.45.309 would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this date was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Sec. 47.45.306. Appeal rights.

An individual who receives a determination from the department that denies, limits, or modifies a cash benefit under AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 , other than a determination under AS 47.45.301 (c) to reduce or eliminate benefits, may request a hearing before the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) under regulations adopted by the department.

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007; am E.O. No. 116, § 14 (2012))

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, sec. 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , AS 47.45.301 , 47.45.302 , 47.45.304 , this section, 47.45.308 , and 47.45.309 would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this date was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

E.O. No. 116, effective July 1, 2012, provided that “[s]ection 14 of this Order takes effect only if a bill is passed during the Second Session of the Twenty-Seventh Alaska State Legislature and enacted into law, so that AS 47.45.306 is in effect on July 1, 2012.” The Act extending the date of repeal for AS 47.45.306 , ch. 6, SLA 2011, was amended by a bill passed in the first session of the Twenty-Seventh Legislature. It is not clear that the conditions in § 17 of E.O. No. 116 have been met. However, the changes made in § 14 of E.O. No. 116 have been given effect in the text of the section.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “department” following “may request a hearing before the”.

Sec. 47.45.308. Ability to recover or recoup improper assistance or benefits.

An individual is liable to the department for the value of assistance or benefits improperly paid to the individual under AS 47.45.302 or former AS 47.45.310 or 47.45.320 if the improper payment was based on inaccurate or incomplete information provided by the individual. In a civil action brought by the state to recover from the individual the value of assistance or benefits improperly paid under AS 47.45.302 or former AS 47.45.310 or 47.45.320, the state may recover from the individual the costs of investigation and prosecution of the civil action, including attorney fees as determined under court rules.

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007)

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, sec. 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , AS 47.45.301 , AS 47.45.302 , 47.45.304 , 47.45.306 , this section, and 47.45.309 would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this date was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Sec. 47.45.309. Definitions.

In AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 ,

  1. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  2. “eligible individual” means an individual who meets the requirements of AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 and regulations adopted under those statutes for eligibility for the program;
  3. “family member” means a person who is
    1. legally related to an eligible individual through marriage or guardianship; or
    2. an eligible individual’s sibling, parent, grandparent, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, or first cousin;
  4. “program” means the senior benefits payment program established in AS 47.45.301 47.45.309 ;
  5. “resident” has the meaning given in AS 47.25.430(a) .

History. (§ 3 ch 1 FSSLA 2007)

Delayed repeal of section. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, as amended by sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, sec. 1, ch. 113, SLA 2014, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, this section is repealed June 30, 2024.

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 1, FSSLA 2007, provided that AS 09.38.015(a)(11) , AS 47.45.301 , 47.45.302 , 47.45.304 , 47.45.306 , 47.45.308 , and this section would be repealed effective June 30, 2011. Under Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, the date of the repeal was extended to June 30, 2015 (this date was later amended to June 30, 2018). However, the effective date of Sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011 was July 31, 2011. Under sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, the date of the repeal was again extended to June 30, 2024. However, the effective date of sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, was August 8, 2018. The legal effect of sec. 5, ch. 6, SLA 2011, and sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2018, is uncertain.. See AS 01.10.090 and 01.10.100 for law concerning retroactivity and the effect of repeals and amendments.

Administrative Code. —

For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.

Secs. 47.45.310 — 47.45.390. Cash assistance benefit; prescription drug benefit; continuation of benefits; appeal rights; ability to recover or recoup improper assistance benefits; Alaska senior care fund; definitions. [Repealed, § 4 ch 89 SLA 2005.]

Article 4. Long-term Care Allowance.

Sec. 47.45.400. Long-term care allowance.

  1. The department shall exclude a personal needs allowance of $200 a month from the income calculation made for the reimbursed cost of long-term care facility services, including swing-bed facility services, paid by the department for a person who is a recipient of medical assistance benefits under AS 47.07.020 .
  2. The department shall pay a personal needs allowance of $200 a month to a resident of a long-term care facility in the state who is without income or resources.
  3. In this section, “long-term care facility” means an establishment, other than an Alaska Pioneers’ Home or an Alaska Veterans’ Home, that is
    1. licensed by the department under AS 47.32 as a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility; or
    2. owned or operated as a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility by the United States, an Indian tribe, or a tribal organization and exempt from state licensure under applicable law.

History. (§ 1 ch 6 SLA 2011)

Effective dates. —

Section 1, ch. 6, SLA 2011, which enacted this article, took effect on July 31, 2011.

Chapter 50. Office of Child Advocacy.

[Repealed, § 18 ch 16 SLA 1990.]

Chapter 55. Alaska Pioneers’ Home and Alaska Veterans’ Home.

Cross references. —

For the exclusion of the Alaska Pioneers’ Home from the definition of health care facility for purposes of the certificate of need program, see AS 18.07.111 .

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 59, SLA 2004 (SB 301) making a series of amendments to this chapter, see 2004 Senate Journal 2087 - 2088.

Sec. 47.55.010. Maintenance and operation of Alaska Pioneers’ Home and Alaska Veterans’ Home.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the state shall maintain and operate facilities known as the Alaska Pioneers’ Home at Sitka, Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Ketchikan, Palmer, and other sites designated by the commissioner of health and social services. The state may maintain and operate one or more facilities known as the Alaska Veterans’ Home at sites designated by the commissioner of health and social services. The only Pioneers’ Home that may be maintained and operated as a Veterans’ Home is the Pioneer’s Home located in Palmer, Alaska. The Alaska Pioneers’ Home and the Alaska Veterans’ Home shall be collectively administered by the Department of Health and Social Services as the Alaska Pioneers’ Home and Alaska Veterans’ Home.
  2. The department shall formulate general policies for the homes designated under (a) of this section. It may hold hearings and subpoena witnesses and documents and may administer oaths in connection with the homes.
  3. The department shall
    1. cooperate with the federal government in matters pertaining to the welfare of Alaska pioneers and of veterans who reside in the homes operated under this chapter, make the reports in the form and containing the information the federal government from time to time desires, and accept money and prescription drug benefits allotted by the federal government, its agencies, or its instrumentalities in establishing, extending, and strengthening services for pioneers and veterans who reside in a home operated under this chapter;
    2. adopt regulations necessary to conduct business and to carry out the provisions of this chapter, require bonds and undertakings from persons employed by a home as in its judgment are necessary, and pay the premiums on them, and establish regional and local offices and the advisory groups that are necessary or considered expedient to carry out or assist in carrying out a duty or authority assigned to it;
    3. perform all executive or administrative duties necessary and advisable to carry out the purpose of this chapter, including the power to make contracts and to make disbursements on vouchers against appropriations for the purpose of this chapter, within the limit of appropriations available;
    4. study the needs of pioneers and veterans of this state who reside in the homes operated under this chapter and submit recommendations for new regulations and proposed legislation.
  4. The department may employ the necessary subordinate officers and employees, and shall prescribe methods for operation of the homes, standards of care and service to home residents, and rules governing personnel. The methods for operation and standards of care and services to residents prescribed under this subsection shall be the same as the methods for operation and standards of care established by the department for an assisted living home licensed under AS 47.32.
  5. The department may engage in activities directed to increase revenue from a home. These activities may include the use of excess bed or floor space, up to 50 percent of the total floor space in a home, or lease of space or buildings that are not in use or are underutilized.
  6. The department shall conduct, at least annually, an unannounced inspection of each site of the Alaska Pioneers’ Home and the Alaska Veterans’ Home to determine compliance of the facilities with all applicable laws and regulations.

History. (§ 51-2-11(a), (c) ACLA 1949; § 51-2-12 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 71 SLA 1963; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am §§ 1, 2 ch 11 SLA 1979; am § 1 ch 35 SLA 1990; am § 34 ch 126 SLA 1994; am § 112 ch 21 SLA 1995; am §§ 3 — 5 and 9 ch 4 SSSLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 70 (2003); am § 15 ch 59 SLA 2004; am §§ 39, 41 ch 99 SLA 2004; am § 40 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 1 ch 90 SLA 2010; am § 1 ch 23 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.010 . Renumbered in 1990.

Cross references. —

For provision contingently changing the name of the “Alaska Pioneers’ Home” to “Alaska Pioneers’ and Veterans’ Home” until July 1, 2005, see § 11(a), ch. 4, SSSLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote this section.

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference at the end of subsection (d).

The 2010 amendment, effective September 15, 2010, in (c)(1), added “and prescription drug benefits” following “and accept money”.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in the second sentence of (e), substituted “use” for “lease”.

Sec. 47.55.020. Admission to home; payments; assistance.

  1. Every person residing in the state who is 60 years of age or older, has been a resident of the state continuously for more than one year immediately preceding application for admission, and is in need of residence at a home because of physical disability or other reason, is eligible for admission to the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home under conditions prescribed in regulations. The spouse of a person who is eligible for admission under other provisions of this subsection is also eligible for admission to a home under conditions prescribed by the department if the spouse is 60 years of age or older and has been a resident of the state continuously for more than one year immediately preceding application for admission.
  2. Every person admitted to a home who receives income from any source in excess of $300 a month shall be required by the department to pay the excess to the department immediately upon receipt of the money in payment, or part payment, of the cost of the person’s care. However, the department may not require in any month the payment of an amount greater than the monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b) except to satisfy indebtedness incurred under AS 47.55.070 . The department may not evict a person from a home if the income and assets of the person are insufficient to pay the monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b) and the person is otherwise in compliance with requirements under this chapter.
  3. At the end of each month, the payments made under (b) of this section shall be transmitted to the commissioner of revenue. The department shall pay the sum of $200 a month to a resident who is without income or resources.
  4. Notwithstanding AS 47.55.070 and (b) of this section, a resident of a home whose income, assets, and other resources are insufficient to pay the monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b) , and who does not have private insurance to cover the cost of care, qualifies for payment assistance if the resident is otherwise in compliance with requirements under this chapter. The amount of payment assistance equals the amount needed, when added to other income and assets of the resident, to pay the monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b) . Payment assistance received by a home resident is a debt to the state. In determining the amount of payment assistance for which a home resident qualifies, the following income, assets, and other resources of the resident shall be disregarded:
    1. income from any source in an amount up to $300 a month as established by the department by regulation;
    2. the following assets received under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act):
      1. cash dividends and other income equal to at least $2,000 as established by the department by regulation;
      2. stock;
      3. noncash dividends from stock; and
      4. land;
    3. a permanent fund dividend issued under AS 43.23;
    4. compensation to volunteers under the federal retired and senior volunteers (42 U.S.C. 5001), foster grandparents (42 U.S.C. 5011), and senior companion (42 U.S.C. 5013) programs made in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 5044(f);
    5. federal World War II restitution payments made under 50 U.S.C. App. 1989b-4 and c-5;
    6. payments under AS 18.67 (Violent Crimes Compensation Board);
    7. an amount, determined by the department by regulation, that is sufficient for burial expenses of the resident, the resident’s spouse, and dependents of the resident;
    8. real property being used as the primary residence of the resident’s spouse or a dependent of the resident;
    9. other real or personal property equal to at least a total value of up to $10,000 as established by the department by regulation;
    10. federal payments that are excluded by law from income for federal assistance purposes.
  5. As a condition for receipt of payment assistance under (d) of this section, the department, under regulations adopted by the department, shall require a person to
    1. apply for other state or federally sponsored programs that may reduce the amount of the payment assistance; and
    2. submit to the department a copy of the person’s application for medical assistance coverage under AS 47.07 and the decision letter the person receives regarding the application.
  6. Instead of accepting federal prescription drug benefits under AS 47.55.010(c)(1) , the department may adopt regulations to provide comparable prescription drug benefits to pioneers and veterans who reside in an Alaska Pioneers’ Home operated under this chapter and who are eligible for federal prescription drug benefits.

History. (§ 51-2-13 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 158 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 118 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 89 SLA 1961; am § 1 ch 63 SLA 1965; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am §§ 1, 2 ch 7 SLA 1971; am § 3 ch 11 SLA 1979; am §§ 1, 2 ch 155 SLA 1984; am § 2 ch 35 SLA 1990; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 90 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 101 SLA 1997; am §§ 6, 7 ch 4 SSSLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 §§ 71 — 74 (2003); am § 16 ch 59 SLA 2004; am § 87 ch 56 SLA 2005; am § 7 ch 34 SLA 2008; am § 2 ch 90 SLA 2010; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 6 SLA 2011; am § 50 ch 25 SLA 2016; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 23 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.020 . Renumbered in 1990.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote this section.

The 2005 amendment, effective June 25, 2005, updated a federal reference in paragraph (d)(2).

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, added paragraph (d)(10).

The 2010 amendment, effective September 15, 2010, added (f).

The 2011 amendment, effective July 31, 2011, substituted “$200” for “$100” in the first sentence in (b), rewrote the second sentence in (c) which read, “The department may pay the sum of $100 a month to a resident without money” and substituted “$200” for “$100” in (d)(1).

The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, in (e), substituted “shall” for “may”, designated part of (e) as (e)(1), added (e)(2).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a), substituted “60 years” for “65 years” in two places; in (b) , substituted “$300” for “$200” in the first sentence, twice substituted “monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b) ” for “monthly rate set under AS 47.55.030(b) ”; in (d), substituted “monthly or daily rates set under AS 47.55.030(f) plus charges under AS 47.55.030(b)” for “monthly rate set under AS 47.55.030(b)” and substituted “$300” for “$200” in (d)(1).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 26, ch. 59, SLA 2004 reads as follows §The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read:

“TRANSITION: STATUS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF THE ALASKA PIONEERS’ HOME OR THE ALASKA VETERANS’ HOME. (a) If a resident of an Alaska Pioneers’ Home facility or Alaska Veterans’ Home facility was admitted to the facility before the Department of Health and Social Services received the United States Veterans Administration certification for the Alaska Veterans’ Home to begin receiving per diem payments for eligible veterans, the resident may not be evicted or required to relocate to a different Alaska Pioneers’ Home or Alaska Veterans’ Home facility solely because of that certification.

“(b) The commissioner of health and social services shall promptly post on the Alaska Online Public Notice System ( AS 44.62.175 ) the date that the certification described in (a) of this section was received.”

Opinions of attorney general. —

The existence of an Arizona law or some other state’s law similar to the residency requirements in this section would not help Alaska in sustaining another long-term residency requirement (even if substantially less than 15 years). April 14, 1993 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The 15-year residency requirement for admission to an Alaska Pioneers’ Home set out in former (a) of this section is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions. Johnston v. Keller, Superior Court, 3rd Jud. Dist., Case No. 3PA-91-487CI (1992) (decision not appealed).

Quoted in

Wilson v. State, 355 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2015).

Sec. 47.55.030. Rates; agreement to pay.

  1. A person eligible for admission under AS 47.55.020 may, on application, be admitted to the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home upon the person’s agreement to pay to the state the applicable amount specified in (f) of this section plus charges under (b) of this section. When this agreement is entered into, the department may require security for the payments.
  2. The department may charge a home resident reasonable fees to cover the cost of supplies, medication, equipment, and services provided to the home resident that are not included in the monthly or daily rates specified in (f) of this section.
  3. [Repealed, § 9 ch 23 SLA 2020.]
  4. [Repealed, § 9 ch 23 SLA 2020.]
  5. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]
  6. Except as provided in (b) and (g) of this section, the department may charge a home resident a monthly or daily rate of not more than
    1. $2,976 a month for the provision of level I care;
    2. $5,396 a month for the provision of level II care;
    3. $7,814 a month for the provision of level III care;
    4. $9,333 a month for the provision of level IV care;
    5. a monthly rate the department considers sufficient to compensate the state for the cost of care and support of the home resident for the provision of level V care;
    6. $200 a day for services provided to a home resident who requires the provision of housing, meals, emergency assistance, medication administration, health-related services, recreation, and extensive assistance with activities of daily living for up to eight hours a day between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., including meals scheduled during the period the recipient is receiving the services;
    7. $322 a day for room and board provided in a home to a recipient who requires the provision of housing, meals, emergency assistance, medication administration, health-related services, recreation, and extensive assistance with activities of daily living for 24 hours a day for up to 14 consecutive days.
  7. Not later than 90 days after social security benefits are increased under 42 U.S.C. 415(i) (Social Security Act), the department shall adjust the monthly and daily rates in (f) of this section by a percentage equal to the percentage increase in the cost-of-living adjustment provided for the social security benefits. The department may not make any other changes to the rates in (f) of this section.
  8. The department shall by regulation define and establish criteria for each level of care in (f)(1) — (5) of this section.

History. (§ 51-2-14 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 89 SLA 1961; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am § 3 ch 155 SLA 1984; am § 94 ch 138 SLA 1986; am §§ 3, 4 ch 35 SLA 1990; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am E.O. No. 108 §§ 75 — 78 (2003); am §§ 17, 18 ch 59 SLA 2004; am §§ 5 — 7, 9 ch 23 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.030 . Renumbered in 1990.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” throughout and substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration” in subsection (b).

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted “department” for “Department of Health and Human Services” throughout the section, substituted “the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home” for “home” in subsection (a), and made related changes.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (a), substituted “the applicable amount specified in (f) of this section plus charges under (b) of this section” for “each month an amount the department considers sufficient to compensate the state for the cost of care and support of the person at the home” in the first sentence; rewrote (b); repealed (c) and (d); and added (f) – (h).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes limiting or barring public health care to indigent aliens. 113 ALR5th 95.

Sec. 47.55.035. Exception to admission criteria.

An applicant for admission to the home who has been a resident of the state for 30 years and is otherwise qualified for admission under AS 47.55.020 may not be disqualified for admission because of absence from the state if the commissioner of health and social services determines the absence was reasonable and admission is consistent with the intent of AS 47.55.010 47.55.100 .

History. (§ 2 ch 89 SLA 1978; am § 5 ch 35 SLA 1990; am E.O. No. 108 § 79 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.035 . Renumbered in 1990.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “commissioner of health and social services” for “commissioner of administration.”

Sec. 47.55.040. Transfer of mentally ill residents to an institution.

A person regularly admitted into the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home who is found to be insane may be transferred to an institution provided for the care and custody of insane persons for the state in the manner provided by law for the admission of other persons to the institution.

History. (§ 51-2-15 ACLA 1949; am § 19 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.040 . Renumbered in 1990.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted “the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home” for “home.”

Sec. 47.55.050. Maintenance funds.

The legislature shall, each session, appropriate the necessary funds for the maintenance of the Alaska Pioneers’ Home and the Alaska Veterans’ Home to be expended by the department, and the department may receive funds, donations, and bequests from private individuals, societies, or organizations, and funds from the federal government for the support and maintenance of the homes.

History. (§ 51-2-16 ACLA 1949; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am E.O. No. 108 § 80 (2003); am § 20 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.050 . Renumbered in 1990.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration.”

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted “the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home” for “home” and “department” for “Department of Health and Social Services,” and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.55.060. Trust fund.

Unless otherwise provided by the donor, money bequeathed to the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home constitutes a special trust fund. Unless otherwise provided by the donor, interest from the special trust fund is under the control and at the disposal of the department, and expenditure from it is limited to the benefit and comfort of the residents of the homes.

History. (§ 51-2-17 ACLA 1949; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am § 8 ch 42 SLA 1997; am E.O. No. 108 § 81 (2003); am § 21 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.060 . Renumbered in 1990.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration.”

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, substituted “the Alaska Pioneers’ Home or the Alaska Veterans’ Home” for “home” and “department” for “Department of Health and Social Services,” and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 47.55.070. Indebtedness of home resident to state.

The following expenses incurred for an Alaska Pioneers’ Home or Alaska Veterans’ Home resident under this chapter and not recoverable from a collateral source are a debt of the resident to the state and may be recovered during the life of the resident:

  1. costs of standard or nursing care provided in the home each month to the resident not exceeding the rates and charges established under AS 47.55.030 , with credit given for any amounts paid by or collected from the resident;
  2. allowances paid under AS 47.55.020(c) ;
  3. arrearages in fees for television and telephone services provided in the home; and
  4. costs of prescription medicine.

History. (§ 51-2-101 ACLA 1949; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am §§ 4, 5 ch 11 SLA 1979; am § 4 ch 155 SLA 1984; am § 6 ch 35 SLA 1990; am E.O. No. 108 § 82 (2003); am § 22 ch 59 SLA 2004; am § 8 ch 23 SLA 2020)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.070 . Renumbered in 1990.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote this section.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 1, 2020, in (1), substituted “rates and charges established” for “rate established by the department”.

Notes to Decisions

Conduct of decedent entitling claim of state to priority. —

Where (1) the decedent swears initially and annually thereafter that she owns no property, although during all that time she has approximately $10,000 in cash; and (2) the transfer thereof is without consideration, the claim of the state is entitled to priority in conformity with the provisions of this section. In re Jackson's Estate, 123 F. Supp. 143, 15 Alaska 116 (D. Alaska 1954).

Sec. 47.55.080. Enforcement against estate.

If a beneficiary under this chapter dies leaving an estate in the state, the attorney general or the Department of Health and Social Services shall file with the executor or administrator, or with the probate court, the claim of the state against the estate, and the attorney general shall take the steps necessary to enforce and collect the claim. Money collected shall be paid into the treasury of the state.

History. (§ 51-2-102 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 46 SLA 1957; am E.O. No. 30 (1968); am E.O. No. 108 § 83 (2003))

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.080 . Renumbered in 1990.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration.”

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

In re Jackson's Estate, 123 F. Supp. 143, 15 Alaska 116 (D. Alaska 1954).

Sec. 47.55.090. Enforcement against property outside state.

If a beneficiary under this chapter dies leaving property outside the state, the attorney general on direction of the governor shall take the steps with respect to the property that will protect and secure the rights of the state as a creditor.

History. (§ 51-2-103 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.090 . Renumbered in 1990.

Sec. 47.55.095. Limitation on enforcement of claims against estate.

Notwithstanding AS 47.55.080 and 47.55.090 , upon the death of an Alaska Pioneers’ Home or Alaska Veterans’ Home resident or of a recipient of day care or respite services, a state claim for unpaid debt owed to the home may be satisfied only out of the decedent’s estate. The state may not pursue a claim to the extent doing so would work undue hardship, as determined by the department by regulation, on the surviving spouse or dependent of the decedent. Family portraits and heirlooms of the type identified under AS 09.38.020(a)(3) , without regard to value, may not be taken by the state in satisfaction of a debt to the home.

History. (§ 2 ch 101 SLA 1997; am E.O. No. 108 § 84 (2003); am § 23 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration.”

The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, inserted “or Alaska Veterans’ Home” in the first sentence, substituted “the department by regulation” for “regulation of the Department of Health and Social Services” in the second sentence, and made related changes.

Sec. 47.55.100. Certificate as evidence.

A certificate by the attorney general to the effect that a decedent was a beneficiary under this chapter and that the state has a claim against the decedent’s estate, is prima facie evidence of these facts in a proceeding in the courts of the state.

History. (§ 51-2-104 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 46 SLA 1957)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.25.100 . Renumbered in 1990.

Sec. 47.55.900. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  2. “home” means
    1. the Alaska Pioneers’ Home; or
    2. the Alaska Veterans’ Home;
  3. “physical disability or other reason” means inability of an individual to maintain a household without regular assistance in shopping, housekeeping, meal preparation, dressing, or personal hygiene because of physical or medical impairment, infirmity, or disability;
  4. “resident of the state” has the meaning given “resident” in AS 47.25.430(a) ;
  5. “veteran” means a person who has been discharged from the armed forces of the United States, including the Alaska National Guard or the Alaska Territorial Guard; the discharge from the armed forces must be other than dishonorable.

History. (§ 24 ch 59 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska pioneers’ homes, see 7 AAC 74, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Wilson v. State, 355 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2015).

Chapter 60. Multipurpose Senior Centers.

Sec. 47.60.010. Legislative findings.

The legislature finds that there is a need for multipurpose senior centers in certain areas of the state to provide certain services for elderly persons, that this need can be at least partially met utilizing nonprofit corporations which would undertake the establishment of multipurpose senior center projects, and that the establishment of these projects constitutes a public purpose worthy of the cooperation of the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.020. Authorization of nonprofit corporations for establishment of multipurpose senior centers.

Private nonprofit corporations incorporated under state law may undertake or may be incorporated for the purpose of undertaking the development and operation of multipurpose senior centers.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.030. Purposes of multipurpose senior centers.

A multipurpose senior center is a facility where persons 60 years of age or older are provided with services and activities suited to their particular needs. The services and activities may include, but are not limited to, health examinations, legal assistance, recreation programs, general social activities, telephone reassurance programs, nutrition classes, meals at minimum cost, counseling, protective services, programs for shut-ins, and education programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.040. Powers of corporations.

A nonprofit corporation that undertakes the development and operation of multipurpose senior centers may

  1. operate in one or more municipality;
  2. issue notes, bonds, or other obligations for the purpose of developing and operating multipurpose senior centers;
  3. perform other functions necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.050. Acceptance and use of assistance, cooperation, and contributions.

A nonprofit corporation may accept and use the assistance, cooperation, and contributions of private persons, charitable organizations, and public agencies for the purpose of establishing and operating a multipurpose senior center.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.060. Lease of property from state.

The Department of Health and Social Services may lease property under its jurisdiction, suitable for use as a multipurpose senior center, to a nonprofit corporation that undertakes the development and operation of a multipurpose senior center.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974; am E.O. No. 108 § 85 (2003))

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration.”

Sec. 47.60.070. Municipal contributions.

The governing body of a municipality may give financial assistance to a nonprofit corporation that undertakes the development and operation of a multipurpose senior center.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.080. Exemption from taxation.

A multipurpose senior center developed and operated by a nonprofit corporation under this chapter is not subject to real or personal property taxation by a municipality. The exemption granted under this section continues in force only while the multipurpose senior center is owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation under the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Sec. 47.60.090. Federal regulation.

Nothing in this chapter may be construed as a limitation on the power of the federal government to regulate the development and operation of multipurpose senior centers.

History. (§ 1 ch 87 SLA 1974)

Chapter 62. Office of the Long Term Care Ombudsman.

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions relating to litigation, hearings, investigations, and other proceedings pending under a law repealed or a function transferred by, or a contract, right, liability, or obligation affected by, the executive order setting out the office of the long-term care ombudsman under the Alaska Mental Health Authority, see § 11, Executive Order 102, in the Executive Orders pamphlet.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 19, SLA 2017 (SB 83), which amended this chapter, see 2017 Senate Journal 456 — 457.

Sec. 47.62.010. Office established.

  1. The office of the long term care ombudsman is established in the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority (AS 47.30.011 ).
  2. The ombudsman shall be hired by the authority. A member of the authority who has a financial interest in a long term care facility in the state, or who has any other conflict of interest, may not participate in the hiring of the ombudsman. The ombudsman is a full-time position in the classified service. The ombudsman shall be compensated at no less than Range 21 of the pay plan for state employees under AS 39.27.011 .
  3. The ombudsman may not have a financial interest in a long term care facility in the state. The authority shall adopt regulations to ensure that the ombudsman, and employees and volunteers of the office, do not have a conflict of interest or an appearance of a conflict of interest.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001); am § 3 ch 15 SLA 2001)

Sec. 47.62.015. Duties and powers of the long term care ombudsman.

  1. The ombudsman shall investigate and resolve a complaint made by or on behalf of an older Alaskan who resides in a long term care facility in the state if the complaint relates to a decision, action, or failure to act by a provider or a representative of a provider of long term care services, or by a public agency or social services agency, that may adversely affect the health, safety, welfare, or rights of the older Alaskan. At the discretion of the ombudsman, the ombudsman may investigate and resolve a complaint made by or on behalf of a resident who is not an older Alaskan if the complaint relates to a decision, action, or failure to act by a provider or a representative of a provider of long term care services, or by a public agency or social services agency, that may adversely affect the health, safety, welfare, or rights of the resident.
  2. The ombudsman may investigate and resolve a complaint made by or on behalf of an older Alaskan relating to the long term care or residential circumstances of the older Alaskan. Complaints under this subsection may relate to any issue not covered under (a) of this section, including the older Alaskan’s landlord, senior citizen housing, a public assistance program, a public grant program for services to older Alaskans, public utilities, health care facilities, and health care providers.
  3. The ombudsman may
    1. subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, require the production of evidence, administer oaths, and examine any person under oath in connection with a complaint described under (a) of this section; the powers described in this paragraph shall be enforced by the superior court;
    2. pursue administrative, legal, or other appropriate remedies on behalf of a resident of a long term care facility in the state.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001); am §§ 8, 9 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, in (a), added the second sentence; in (c)(2), substituted “a resident of” for “an older Alaskan who resides in” following “on behalf of”.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Hymes v. DeRamus, 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 47.62.020. Training and certification of staff.

  1. The ombudsman shall provide for the training and certification of office staff, including volunteers and other representatives of the office. Training must include instruction in federal, state, and local laws and policies relating to long term care facilities in the state, and in investigative techniques. The ombudsman may require other appropriate training. The ombudsman may decertify a person under this section for good cause in accordance with regulations adopted by the authority.
  2. An employee, volunteer, or other representative of the office may not investigate a complaint under AS 47.62.015 unless certified as having completed training under this section and approved by the ombudsman as qualified to investigate the complaint.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001))

Sec. 47.62.025. Access to long term care facilities, residents, and records.

  1. A person may not deny access to a long term care facility or to a resident of a long term care facility by the ombudsman or an employee, volunteer, or other representative of the office.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of AS 47.62.015(c)(1) , the ombudsman may obtain medical or other records of a resident of a long term care facility in the state only with the consent of the resident or the person’s resident representative or legal guardian or, if the resident is unable or incompetent to consent and does not have a resident representative, only with a subpoena or court order.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001); am § 10 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, rewrote the section.

Sec. 47.62.030. Confidentiality.

  1. Records obtained or maintained by the ombudsman are confidential, are not subject to inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.120 and, except as provided in (b) of this section, may be disclosed only at the discretion of the ombudsman.
  2. The identity of a complainant or an older Alaskan or resident of a long term care facility on whose behalf a complaint is made may only be disclosed with the consent of the identified person or the person’s legal guardian or resident representative or by court order. However, if an older Alaskan is unable to provide consent and does not have a legal guardian, or if a resident of a long term care facility is unable to provide consent and does not have a resident representative, the ombudsman may disclose the identity of an identified person for the purpose of making a referral to an agency or person, if the ombudsman or an employee or volunteer of the office
    1. has reasonable cause to believe that an action, inaction, or decision, including an action, inaction, or decision by a resident representative or a legal guardian of an older Alaskan, may adversely affect the health, safety, welfare, or rights of the older Alaskan or resident;
    2. has reasonable cause to believe the referral is in the best interest of the older Alaskan or resident;
    3. obtains the approval of the ombudsman for the disclosure and referral; and
    4. does not have evidence that the older Alaskan or resident would disagree with the referral.

History. (E.O. 102 § 9 (2001); am § 11 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, rewrote (b), which read, “The identity of a complainant or an older Alaskan on whose behalf a complaint is made may not be disclosed without the consent of the identified person or the person's legal guardian, unless required by court order.”

Sec. 47.62.035. Immunity from liability.

  1. A person who, in good faith, makes a complaint described in AS 47.62.015 is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise exist for making the complaint.
  2. The ombudsman, or an employee, volunteer, or other representative of the office, is immune from civil or criminal liability for the good faith performance of official duties.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001))

Sec. 47.62.040. Interference with the long term care ombudsman and retaliation prohibited.

  1. A person may not intentionally interfere with the ombudsman, or an employee, volunteer, or representative of the office, in the performance of official duties under AS 47.62.015 .
  2. If a person makes a good faith complaint described in AS 47.62.015 , an employer or supervisor of the person, or a public or private agency or entity that provides benefits, services, or housing to the person, may not discharge, demote, transfer, reduce the pay or benefits or work privileges of, prepare a negative work performance evaluation of, deny or withhold benefits or services, evict, or take other detrimental action against the person because of the complaint. The person making the complaint may bring a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages against an employer, supervisor, agency, or entity that violates this subsection. In the civil action there is a rebuttable presumption that the detrimental action was retaliatory if it was taken within 90 days after the complaint was made.
  3. A person who violates this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001))

Sec. 47.62.050. Legal counsel for the long term care ombudsman.

The attorney general shall provide legal advice and representation in connection with any matter relating to the powers, duties, and operation of the office, and in any legal action brought against the ombudsman or an employee, volunteer, or other representative of the office. If the attorney general cannot provide legal advice or representation because of a conflict of interest, the ombudsman may employ private legal counsel.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001))

Sec. 47.62.060. Cooperative agreements.

The authority shall enter into cooperative agreements concerning the operations of the office, including protocols for investigations, with state and local agencies that have jurisdiction over long term care facilities or over the abuse and neglect of older Alaskans or residents of long term care facilities.

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001); am § 12 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, added “or residents of long term care facilities” at the end.

Sec. 47.62.090. Definitions.

In AS 47.62.010 47.62.090 ,

  1. “authority” means the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established in AS 47.30.011 ;
  2. “long term care facility” means an assisted living home, as defined in AS 47.32.900 , and a nursing facility, as defined in AS 47.32.900 ;
  3. “office” means the office of the long term care ombudsman;
  4. “older Alaskan” means a person who is 60 years of age or older and who resides in the state;
  5. “ombudsman” means the long term care ombudsman hired under AS 47.62.010 ;
  6. “resident” means a person who resides in a long term care facility in the state;
  7. “resident representative” means
    1. an individual chosen by a resident to act on behalf of the resident to
      1. support the resident in decision making;
      2. access medical, social, or other personal information of the resident;
      3. manage financial matters; or
      4. receive notifications;
    2. a person authorized by federal or state law to act on behalf of a resident.
  8. “senior citizen housing” has the meaning given “senior housing” in AS 18.56.799 .

History. (E.O. No. 102 § 9 (2001); am § 41 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 13, 14 ch 19 SLA 2017)

Revisor's notes. —

Paragraphs (6) and (7) were enacted as (7) and (8); renumbered in 2017, at which time former paragraph (6) was renumbered as (8).

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, rewrote paragraph (2).

The 2017 amendment, effective October 31, 2017, rewrote (4), which read, “‘older Alaskan’ means a resident who is 60 years of age or older”; added (7) and (8) [now (6) and (7)].

Chapter 65. Service Programs for Older Alaskans and Other Adults.

Administrative Code. —

For older Alaskans’ pilot project grants, see 7 AAC 79.

Legislative history reports. —

For conflicting views on the status of HB 611 amS, which became ch. 162, SLA 1980, which enacted this chapter, see memorandum of legislative counsel at page 1723, 1980 Senate Journal and the opinion of the Attorney General at 1980 Senate Journal page 1764 and 1980 House Journal page 2221.

Article 1. Service Programs for Older Alaskans.

Sec. 47.65.010. Appropriations for service programs.

An amount to carry out the provisions of AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 may be appropriated annually by the legislature. The amount appropriated shall be fully distributed by the department to sponsors of older Alaskans service programs in accordance with the provisions of AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 .

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am § 5 ch 79 SLA 1981; am § 1 ch 37 SLA 1990; am § 15 ch 131 SLA 1994; am § 9 ch 42 SLA 1997; am § 8 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Administrative Code. —

For older Alaskans pilot project grants, see 7 AAC 79.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “Alaska Commission on Aging” in the second sentence.

Sec. 47.65.020. Grants for community service programs.

Not less than 60 percent of the amount appropriated by the legislature for older Alaskans service programs under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 shall be allocated annually by the department as community program grants to sponsors of older Alaskans service programs. Payments shall be made on the basis of applications submitted to the department by sponsors of community programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am § 6 ch 79 SLA 1981; am § 10 ch 42 SLA 1997; am § 9 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “commission” in each sentence.

Sec. 47.65.030. Pilot project grants.

  1. The balance of the amount appropriated for older Alaskans service programs under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 not allocated under AS 47.65.020 shall be allocated annually by the department as grants to support pilot projects for the benefit of older Alaskans under this section.
  2. The department shall adopt standards for pilot project grants and, after adoption of the standards as regulations, in accordance with AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act), shall apply the standards to determine eligibility of applicants for pilot project grants. In awarding pilot project grants, the department shall
    1. enter into agreements with the project sponsor to operate one or more of the selected pilot projects consistent with the standards adopted;
    2. monitor and evaluate, in a written report, each pilot project; the report must include
      1. a description of the project and of the persons served by it;
      2. the problems presented by the persons served by the project;
      3. a description of the problems most effectively handled by the project; and
      4. an estimate of projected cost of operation of the project for the next three succeeding years.

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am § 7 ch 79 SLA 1981; am § 11 ch 42 SLA 1997; am § 10 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Administrative Code. —

For older Alaskans pilot project grants, see 7 AAC 79.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “commission” once in subsection (a) and twice in subsection (b).

Sec. 47.65.040. Required contribution by sponsor.

  1. Except as provided in (f) of this section, a sponsor receiving a grant under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 shall contribute to the total cost of the program or project. The contribution may be in cash or in-kind services. The amount of the sponsor’s required contribution is determined by the application of the following formula: average per capita full and true value of all property in the municipality or community in which the project or program takes place divided by the average per capita full and true value of all property in the state, and then multiplied by the contribution percentage to the estimated total program or project cost as determined by the department at the time of approval of a grant application. However, the amount of the sponsor’s contribution may not amount to more than 10 percent of the total program or project cost.
  2. For purposes of this section,
    1. the contribution percentage for
      1. a program or project in a municipality or community having a population of 5,000 or less is 10 percent of the total program or project cost;
      2. a program or project in a municipality or community having a population of 5,001 to 10,000 is 20 percent of the total program or project cost; and
      3. a program or project in a municipality or community having a population of more than 10,000 is 30 percent of the total program or project cost.
  3. If an application is submitted for a program or project in a municipality or community for which no average per capita full and true property value determination has been made,
    1. if the population of the municipality or community is 750 or more, the department shall request the state assessor to compute the average per capita full and true property value of that municipality or community and report it;
    2. if the population is less than 750, the department may substitute for the average per capita full and true value of property in the municipality or community an amount equal to the average per capita full and true value of property in the smallest municipality for which that amount has been determined by the state assessor.
  4. The required contribution rate of the sponsor may not exceed the contribution percentage established in (b) of this section;
  5. The grant awarded by the department may not exceed the estimated total program or project cost as determined by the department less the contribution by the sponsor determined in accordance with this section.
  6. When awarding a grant to support a pilot project under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 , the department may waive all or part of the sponsor contribution required under this section if waiver is in the public interest. The department shall adopt regulations establishing standards for granting waivers under this subsection.

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am § 8 ch 79 SLA 1981; am § 2 ch 37 SLA 1990; am §§ 16, 17 ch 131 SLA 1994; am §§ 11 — 14 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1984, subsection designations were added to this section.

Administrative Code. —

For older Alaskans pilot project grants, see 7 AAC 79.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “commission” in the last sentence of subsection (a), in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2), twice in subsection (e), and in each sentence of subsection (f).

Sec. 47.65.050. Administrative requirements.

  1. Payments received by a sponsor under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 may be used only to meet costs of services that the department has determined directly benefit older Alaskans. A payment may not be made by the department under this section unless the department determines that the sponsor
    1. meets accepted standards of fiscal accountability for public funds;
    2. can demonstrate, when requested, the actual cost of services that it is providing for the benefit of older Alaskans; and
    3. agrees to make available, upon request, all fiscal information relating to service for which payments are provided under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 .
  2. The department may not make payments to a sponsor whose program includes family respite care services or home care services unless the sponsor has agreed to request criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 for the individual who will provide the services within 10 business days after the individual is hired to provide the services and review the information within five business days after receiving it.

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am § 9 ch 79 SLA 1981; am § 3 ch 37 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 45 SLA 1994; am § 3 ch 23 SLA 2004; am § 15 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

P.L. 105-277, division A, Sec. 101(b) (title I, Sec. 124(a)), 112 Stat. 2681-73, provided that: “A nursing facility or home health care agency may submit a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange of [criminal history records corresponding to the fingerprints or other identification information submitted] regarding an applicant for employment if the employment position is involved in direct patient care.”

Administrative Code. —

For older Alaskans pilot project grants, see 7 AAC 79.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective April 24, 2004, in subsection (b), substituted “criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62” for “records under AS 12.62.035(a)” and made related changes.

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “commission” three times in the opening language of subsection (a) and once in subsection (b), and made a stylistic change.

Article 2. Adult Day Care and Family Respite Care.

Sec. 47.65.100. Adult day care and family respite care.

  1. In addition to administering grants for adult day care programs and family respite care services for older Alaskans under AS 47.65.010 47.65.050 , the department may make grants under this section from funds otherwise available to it for adult day care programs and family respite care services for frail older persons and other similarly disabled adults.
  2. In order to fund grants under this section, the department may seek and enter into contracts or grants with any party, including reimbursable service agreements with other state agencies.
  3. The department shall, by regulation, set fees for services provided under this section. The fees must be based on a sliding scale formula that takes into account the client’s income.
  4. Fees established under (c) of this section may not exceed the cost of the service.  A person may not be denied service based solely on inability to pay a fee established under this section.
  5. The department may not award a grant under this section for family respite care services or for adult day care services that include home care services unless the grantee has agreed to request criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 for the individual who will provide the services within 10 business days after the individual is hired to provide the services and review the information within five business days after receiving it.
  6. In this section,
    1. “frail older person” means a state resident who is at risk of institutional placement and
      1. is age 55 or older; or
      2. has Alzheimer’s disease or a related disorder;
    2. “similarly disabled adult” means a state resident who is 18 years of age or older who is at risk of institutional placement but who is not a frail older person or an older Alaskan.

History. (§ 4 ch 37 SLA 1990; am § 7 ch 45 SLA 1994; am E.O. No. 108 § 86 (2003); am § 4 ch 23 SLA 2004; am §§ 16 — 19 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.65.055. Renumbered in 1990. Subsection (e) was enacted as (f). Relettered in 1994, at which time former (e) was relettered as (f).

Cross references. —

P.L. 105-277, division A, Sec. 101(b) (title I, Sec. 124(a)), 112 Stat. 2681-50, 2681-73, provided that: “A nursing facility or home health care agency may submit a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange of [criminal history records corresponding to the fingerprints or other identification information submitted] regarding an applicant for employment if the employment position is involved in direct patient care.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services” for “Department of Administration” in subsection (b).

The 2004 amendment, effective April 24, 2004, in subsection (e), substituted “criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62” for “records under AS 12.62.035(a)” and made related changes.

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, substituted “department” for “commission” in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e), and deleted “and the department of health and social services” preceding “may seek and enter” in subsection (b).

Article 3. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.65.290. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “adult day care” means nonresidential care for a group of persons that offers supervision, custodial care, and other appropriate social, indoor and outdoor recreational, physical, medical, or psychological services for persons at risk of institutional placement;
  2. “at risk of institutional placement” means that a person is either already a resident of an adult foster home or is likely to need placement in a 24-hour care residential or nursing facility, not including a mental health hospital;
  3. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  4. “family respite care” means intermittent and substitute care that provides relief for a family caregiver or adult foster home provider by providing intermittent care in the form of companionship, temporary supervision, and minor personal care to a person who is at risk of institutional placement; the service may be provided either in the home of the client or the caregiver, including in an adult foster care home if that is the client’s residence;
  5. “home care services” means homemaker services, chore services, personal care services, home health care services, or similar services in or around the residence of an older Alaskan or of a frail older person or similarly disabled adult, as defined in AS 47.65.100 ;
  6. “older Alaskan” means a resident of Alaska who is 60 years of age and older;
  7. “service program” means the following general categories of services to older Alaskans, including reasonable costs of administration:
    1. nutritional programs;
    2. volunteer programs;
    3. adult day care programs and family respite care services;
    4. health services;
    5. housing services;
    6. legal services and assistance;
    7. home health and homemaker services;
    8. counseling;
    9. information and referral services;
    10. programs which train persons to work with or assist older Alaskans;
    11. transportation services;
    12. educational activities; and
    13. employment services;
  8. “sponsor” means the provider of one or more service programs or pilot projects for the benefit of older Alaskans, including
    1. a municipality of the state;
    2. a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the state; and
    3. an educational institution.

History. (§ 1 ch 152 SLA 1980; am §§ 10-12 ch 79 SLA 1981; §§ 5, 6 ch 37 SLA 1990; am § 8 ch 45 SLA 1994; am § 18 ch 131 SLA 1994; am E.O. No. 108 § 87 (2003); am § 20 ch 34 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 47.65.060. Renumbered in 1990. Reorganized in 1984 to alphabetize the terms defined and in 1990 and 1994 to maintain alphabetical order.

In 2003, “AS 47.45.200 ” was substituted for “AS 47.44.200” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.44.200.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, repealed and reenacted paragraph (3).

Chapter 70. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

Sec. 47.70.010. Compact enacted.

The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children as contained in this section is enacted into law and entered into on behalf of the state with any and all other states legally joining in it in a form substantially as follows:

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN.

Article I. Purpose and Policy

It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children to the end that:

  1. Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
  2. The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child.
  3. The proper authorities of the state from which the placement is made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
  4. Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of children will be promoted.

Article II. Definitions

As used in this compact:

  1. “Child” means a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental, guardianship or similar control.
  2. “Sending agency” means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state.
  3. “Receiving state” means the state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for placement with private agencies or persons.
  4. “Placement” means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not include any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital or other medical facility.

Article III. Conditions for Placement

  1. No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein.
  2. Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state.  The notice shall contain:
    1. The name, date and place of birth of the child.
    2. The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
    3. The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
    4. A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
  3. Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency’s state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
  4. The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child.

Article IV. Penalty for Illegal Placement

The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child in violation of the terms of this compact shall constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such violations may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children.

Article V. Retention of Jurisdiction

  1. The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency’s state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law.  The sending agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the placement.  Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein.
  2. When the sending agency is a public agency, it may enter into an agreement with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state providing for the performance of one or more services in respect of such case by the latter as agent for the sending agency.
  3. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private charitable agency authorized to place children in the receiving state from performing services or acting as agent in that state for a private charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the agency in the receiving state from discharging financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without relieving the responsibility set forth in paragraph (a) hereof.

Article VI. Institutional Care of Delinquent Children

A child adjudicated delinquent may be placed in an institution in another party jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such placement shall be made unless the child is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian with opportunity to be heard, before the child is sent to such other party jurisdiction for institutional care and the court finds that:

  1. Equivalent facilities for the child are not available in the sending agency’s jurisdiction; and
  2. Institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child and will not produce undue hardship.

Article VII. Compact Administrator

The executive head of each jurisdiction party to this compact shall designate an officer who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in the officer’s jurisdiction and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party jurisdictions, shall have power to adopt regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.

Article VIII. Limitations

This compact does not apply to

  1. The sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by the child’s parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or non-agency guardian in the receiving state.
  2. Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state pursuant to any other interstate compact to which both the state from which the child is sent or brought and the receiving state are party, or to any other agreement between said states which has the force of law.

Article IX. Enactment and Withdrawal

This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress, the Government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become effective with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has enacted the same into law. Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute repealing the same, but shall not take effect until two years after the effective date of such statute and until written notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing state to the governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a party state shall not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this compact of any sending agency therein with respect to a placement made prior to the effective date of withdrawal.

Article X. Construction and Severability

The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

Delayed amendment of section. —

Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes an amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required ratifications had not occurred. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner's designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

If the amendment does take effect, under § 1, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “Compact enacted. The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children as contained in this section is enacted into law and entered into on behalf of the state with all other states legally joining in it in a form substantially as follows:

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “The purpose of this Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children is to:

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(A) Provide a process through which children subject to this compact are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(B) Facilitate ongoing supervision of a placement, the delivery of services, and communication between the states.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(C) Provide operating procedures that will ensure that children are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(D) Provide for the promulgation and enforcement of administrative rules implementing the provisions of this compact and regulating the covered activities of the member states.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(E) Provide for uniform data collection and information sharing between member states under this compact.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(F) Promote coordination between this compact, the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance and other compacts affecting the placement of and which provide services to children otherwise subject to this compact.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(G) Provide for a state’s continuing legal jurisdiction and responsibility for placement and care of a child that it would have had if the placement were intrastate.

“ARTICLE I. PURPOSE “(H) Provide for the promulgation of guidelines, in collaboration with Indian tribes, for interstate cases involving Indian children as is or may be permitted by federal law.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(A) Provide a process through which children subject to this compact are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(B) Facilitate ongoing supervision of a placement, the delivery of services, and communication between the states.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(C) Provide operating procedures that will ensure that children are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(D) Provide for the promulgation and enforcement of administrative rules implementing the provisions of this compact and regulating the covered activities of the member states.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(E) Provide for uniform data collection and information sharing between member states under this compact.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(F) Promote coordination between this compact, the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance and other compacts affecting the placement of and which provide services to children otherwise subject to this compact.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(G) Provide for a state’s continuing legal jurisdiction and responsibility for placement and care of a child that it would have had if the placement were intrastate.

“INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN. “(H) Provide for the promulgation of guidelines, in collaboration with Indian tribes, for interstate cases involving Indian children as is or may be permitted by federal law.

“(A) Provide a process through which children subject to this compact are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“(B) Facilitate ongoing supervision of a placement, the delivery of services, and communication between the states.

“(C) Provide operating procedures that will ensure that children are placed in safe and suitable homes in a timely manner.

“(D) Provide for the promulgation and enforcement of administrative rules implementing the provisions of this compact and regulating the covered activities of the member states.

“(E) Provide for uniform data collection and information sharing between member states under this compact.

“(F) Promote coordination between this compact, the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance and other compacts affecting the placement of and which provide services to children otherwise subject to this compact.

“(G) Provide for a state’s continuing legal jurisdiction and responsibility for placement and care of a child that it would have had if the placement were intrastate.

“(H) Provide for the promulgation of guidelines, in collaboration with Indian tribes, for interstate cases involving Indian children as is or may be permitted by federal law.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “As used in this compact,

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(A) “Approved placement” means the public child-placing agency in the receiving state has determined that the placement is both safe and suitable for the child.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(B) “Assessment” means an evaluation of a prospective placement by a public child-placing agency in the receiving state to determine if the placement meets the individualized needs of the child, including but not limited to the child’s safety and stability, health and well-being, and mental, emotional and physical development. An assessment is only applicable to a placement by a public child-placing agency.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(C) “Child” means an individual who has not attained the age of eighteen (18).

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(D) “Certification” means to attest, declare, or swear before a judge or notary public.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(E) “Default” means the failure of a member state to perform the obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, the bylaws or rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(F) “Home study” means an evaluation of a home environment conducted in accordance with the applicable requirements of the state in which the home is located, and documents the preparation and the suitability of the placement resource for placement of a child in accordance with the laws and requirements of the state in which the home is located.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(G) “Indian tribe” means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary of the Interior because of their status as Indians, including any Alaskan native village as defined in section 3 (c) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act at 43 USC 1602(c).

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(H) “Interstate Commission for the Placement of Children” means the commission that is created under Article VIII of this compact and which is generally referred to as the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(I) “Jurisdiction” means the power and authority of a court to hear and decide matters.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(J) “Legal risk” means that a child can be ordered to be returned to the sending state, or the birth mother’s state of residence if different from the sending state, and a final decree of adoption may not be entered in any jurisdiction until all consents are obtained or are dispensed with in accordance with applicable law.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(K) “Member state” means a state that has enacted this compact.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(L) “Non-custodial parent” means a person who, at the time of the commencement of court proceedings in the sending state, does not have sole legal custody of the child or has joint legal custody of a child, and who is not the subject of allegations or findings of child abuse or neglect.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(M) “Non-member state” means a state which has not enacted this compact.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(N) “Notice of residential placement” means information regarding a placement into a residential facility provided to the receiving state including, but not limited to the name, date and place of birth of the child, the identity and address of the parent or legal guardian, evidence of authority to make the placement, and the name and address of the facility in which the child will be placed. Notice of residential placement shall also include information regarding a discharge and any unauthorized absence from the facility.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(O) “Placement” means the act by a public or private child-placing agency intended to arrange for the care or custody of a child in another state.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(P) “Private child-placing agency” means any private corporation, agency, foundation, institution, or charitable organization, or any private person or attorney that facilitates, causes, or is involved in the placement of a child from one state to another and that is not an instrumentality of the state or acting under color of state law.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(Q) “Provisional placement” means a determination made by the public child-placing agency in the receiving state that the proposed placement is safe and suitable, and, to the extent allowable, the receiving state has temporarily waived its standards or requirements otherwise applicable to prospective foster or adoptive parents so as to not delay the placement. Completion of the receiving state requirements regarding training for prospective foster or adoptive parents shall not delay an otherwise safe and suitable placement.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(R) “Public child-placing agency” means any government child welfare agency or child protection agency or a private entity under contract with such an agency, regardless of whether they act on behalf of a state, county, municipality or other governmental unit and which facilitates, causes, or is involved in the placement of a child from one state to another.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(S) “Receiving state” means the state to which a child is sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(T) “Relative” means someone who is related to the child as a parent, step-parent, sibling by half or whole blood or by adoption, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or first cousin or a non-relative with such significant ties to the child that they may be regarded as relatives as determined by the court in the sending state.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(U) “Residential Facility” means a facility providing a level of care that is sufficient to substitute for parental responsibility or foster care, and is beyond what is needed for assessment or treatment of an acute condition. For purposes of the compact, residential facilities do not include institutions primarily educational in character, hospitals or other medical facilities.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(V) “Rule” means a written directive, mandate, standard or principle issued by the Interstate Commission promulgated pursuant to Article XI of this compact that is of general applicability and that implements, interprets or prescribes a policy or provision of the compact. “Rule” has the force and effect of an administrative regulation in a member state, and includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(W) “Sending state” means the state from which the placement of a child is initiated.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(X) “Service member’s permanent duty station” means the military installation where an active duty Armed Services member is currently assigned and is physically located under competent orders that do not specify the duty as temporary.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(Y) “Service member’s state of legal residence” means the state in which the active duty Armed Services member is considered a resident for tax and voting purposes.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(Z) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Marianas Islands and any other territory of the United States.

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(AA) “State court” means a judicial body of a state that is vested by law with responsibility for adjudicating cases involving abuse, neglect, deprivation, delinquency or status offenses of individuals who have not attained the age of eighteen (18).

“ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS “(BB) “Supervision” means monitoring provided by the receiving state once a child has been placed in a receiving state pursuant to this compact.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(A) Except as otherwise provided in Article III, Section B, this compact shall apply to:

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(1) The interstate placement of a child subject to ongoing court jurisdiction in the sending state, due to allegations or findings that the child has been abused, neglected, or deprived as defined by the laws of the sending state, provided, however, that the placement of such a child into a residential facility shall only require notice of residential placement to the receiving state prior to placement.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(2) The interstate placement of a child adjudicated delinquent or unmanageable based on the laws of the sending state and subject to ongoing court jurisdiction of the sending state if:

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(a) the child is being placed in a residential facility in another member state and is not covered under another compact; or

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(b) the child is being placed in another member state and the determination of safety and suitability of the placement and services required is not provided through another compact.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(3) The interstate placement of any child by a public child-placing agency or private child-placing agency as defined in this compact as a preliminary step to a possible adoption.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(B) The provisions of this compact do not apply to:

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(1) The interstate placement of any child by a public child-placing agency or private child-placing agency as defined in this compact as a preliminary step to a possible adoption.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(2) The interstate placement of a child with a non-relative in a receiving state by a parent with the legal authority to make such a placement provided, however, that the placement is not intended to effectuate an adoption.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(3) The interstate placement of a child by one relative with the lawful authority to make such a placement directly with a relative in a receiving state.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(4) The placement of a child, not subject to Article III, Section A, into a residential facility by his parent.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(5) The placement of a child with a non-custodial parent provided that:

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(a) The non-custodial parent proves to the satisfaction of a court in the sending state a substantial relationship with the child; and

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(b) The court in the sending state makes a written finding that placement with the non-custodial parent is in the best interests of the child; and

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(c) The court in the sending state dismisses its jurisdiction over the child’s case.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(6) A child entering the United States from a foreign country for the purpose of adoption or leaving the United States to go to a foreign country for the purpose of adoption in that country.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(7) Cases in which a U.S. citizen child living overseas with his family, at least one of whom is in the U.S. Armed Services, and who is stationed overseas, is removed and placed in a state.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(8) The sending of a child by a public child-placing agency or a private child-placing agency for a visit as defined by the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(C) For purposes of determining the applicability of this compact to the placement of a child with a family in the Armed Services, the public child-placing agency or private child-placing agency may choose the state of the service member’s permanent duty station or the service member’s declared legal residence.

“ARTICLE III. APPLICABILITY “(D) Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prohibit the concurrent application of the provisions of this compact with other applicable interstate compacts including the Interstate Compact for Juveniles and the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance. The Interstate Commission may in cooperation with other interstate compact commissions having responsibility for the interstate movement, placement or transfer of children, promulgate like rules to ensure the coordination of services, timely placement of children, and the reduction of unnecessary or duplicative administrative or procedural requirements.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(A) Except as provided in Article IV, Section (G) and in Article V, Section (B)(2) and (3), concerning private and independent adoptions, and in interstate placements in which the public child-placing agency is not a party to a custody proceeding, the sending state shall retain jurisdiction over a child with respect to all matters of custody and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending state. Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to order the return of the child to the sending state.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(B) When an issue of child protection or custody is brought before a court in the receiving state, such court shall confer with the court of the sending state to determine the most appropriate forum for adjudication.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(C) In accordance with its own laws, the court in the sending state shall have authority to terminate its jurisdiction if:

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(1) The child is reunified with the parent in the receiving state who is the subject of allegations or findings of abuse or neglect, only with the concurrence of the public child-placing agency in the receiving state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(2) The child is adopted; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(3) The child reaches the age of majority under the laws of the sending state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(4) The child achieves legal independence pursuant to the laws of the sending state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(5) A guardianship is created by a court in the receiving state with the concurrence of the court in the sending state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(6) An Indian tribe has petitioned for and received jurisdiction from the court in the sending state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(7) The public child-placing agency of the sending state requests termination and has obtained the concurrence of the public child-placing agency in the receiving state.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(D) When a sending state court terminates its jurisdiction, the receiving state child-placing agency shall be notified.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(E) Nothing in this article shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state court sufficient to deal with an act of truancy, delinquency, crime or behavior involving a child as defined by the laws of the receiving state committed by the child in the receiving state which would be a violation of its laws.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(F) Nothing in this article shall limit the receiving state’s ability to take emergency jurisdiction for the protection of the child.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(G) The substantive laws of the state in which an adoption will be finalized shall solely govern all issues relating to the adoption of a child, and the court in which the adoption proceeding is filed shall have subject matter jurisdiction regarding all substantive issues relating to the adoption, except when:

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(1) the child is a ward of another court that established jurisdiction over the child prior to the placement;

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(2) the child is in the legal custody of a public agency in the sending state; or

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(3) a court in the sending state has otherwise appropriately assumed jurisdiction over the child prior to the submission of the request for approval of placement.

“ARTICLE IV. JURISDICTION “(H) A final decree of adoption may not be entered in any jurisdiction until the placement is authorized as an “approved placement” by the public child-placing agency in the receiving state.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(A) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing a child to be sent or brought into a receiving state, the public child-placing agency shall provide a written request for assessment to the receiving state.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(B) For placements by a private child-placing agency, a child may be sent or brought, or caused to be sent or brought, into a receiving state, upon receipt and immediate review of the required content in a request for approval of a placement in both the sending and receiving state public child-placing agency. The required content to accompany a request for provisional approval must include all of the following:

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(1) a request for approval identifying the child, the birth parents, the prospective adoptive parents, and the supervising agency, signed by the person requesting approval;

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(2) the appropriate consents or relinquishment is signed by the birth parents in accordance with the laws of the sending state or, when permitted, with the laws of the state where the adoption will be finalized;

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(3) certification by a licensed attorney or authorized agent of a private adoption agency that the consent or relinquishment is in compliance with the applicable laws of the sending state, or when permitted, the laws of the state where finalization of the adoption will occur;

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(4) a home study; and

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(5) an acknowledgment of legal risk signed by the prospective adoptive parents.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(C) The sending state and the receiving state may request additional information or documents prior to finalization of an approved placement, but they may not delay travel by the prospective adoptive parents with the child if the required content for approval has been submitted, received, and reviewed by the public child-placing agency in both the sending state and the receiving state.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(D) Approval from the public-child placing agency in the receiving state for a provisional or approved placement is required as provided for in the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(E) The procedures for making and the request for an assessment shall contain all information and be in such form as provided for in the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(F) Upon receipt of a request from the public child-placing agency of the sending state, the receiving state shall initiate an assessment of the proposed placement to determine its safety and suitability. If the proposed placement is a placement with a relative, the public child-placing agency of the sending state may request a determination for a provisional placement.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(G) The public child-placing agency in the receiving state may request from the public child-placing agency or the private child-placing agency in the sending state, and shall be entitled to receive supporting or additional information necessary to complete the assessment.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(H) The public child-placing agency in the receiving state shall approve a provisional placement and complete or arrange for the completion of the assessment within the timeframes established by the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(I) For a placement by a private child-placing agency, the sending state shall not impose any additional requirements to complete the home study that are not required by the receiving state, unless the adoption is finalized in the sending state.

“ARTICLE V. PLACEMENT EVALUATION “(J) The Interstate Commission may develop uniform standards for the assessment of the safety and suitability of interstate placements.

“ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “(A) Except as provided in this compact, no child subject to this compact shall be placed into a receiving state until approval for such placement is obtained.

“ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “(B) If the public child-placing agency in the receiving state does not approve the proposed placement then the child shall not be placed. The receiving state shall provide written documentation of any such determination in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission. Such determination is not subject to judicial review in the sending state.

“ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “(C) If the proposed placement is not approved, any interested party shall have standing to seek an administrative review of the receiving state’s determination.

“ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “(1) The administrative review and any further judicial review associated with the determination shall be conducted in the receiving state pursuant to its applicable administrative procedures.

“ARTICLE VI. PLACEMENT AUTHORITY “(2) If a determination not to approve the placement of the child in the receiving state is overturned upon review, the placement shall be deemed approved, provided however that all administrative or judicial remedies have been exhausted or the time for such remedies has passed.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(A) For the interstate placement of a child made by a public child-placing agency or state court:

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(1) The public child-placing agency in the sending state shall have financial responsibility for:

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(a) the ongoing support and maintenance for the child during the period of the placement, unless otherwise provided for in the receiving state; and

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(b) as determined by the public child-placing agency in the sending state, services for the child beyond the public services for which the child is eligible in the receiving state.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(2) The receiving state shall only have financial responsibility for:

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(a) any assessment conducted by the receiving state; and

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(b) supervision conducted by the receiving state at the level necessary to support the placement as agreed upon by the public child-placing agencies of the receiving and sending state.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(3) Nothing in this provision shall prohibit public child-placing agencies in the sending state from entering into agreements with licensed agencies or persons in the receiving state to conduct assessments and provide supervision.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(B) For the placement of a child by a private child-placing agency preliminary to a possible adoption, the private child-placing agency shall be:

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(1) Legally responsible for the child during the period of placement as provided for in the law of the sending state until the finalization of the adoption.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(2) Financially responsible for the child absent a contractual agreement to the contrary.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(C) A private child-placing agency shall be responsible for any assessment conducted in the receiving state and any supervision conducted by the receiving state at the level required by the laws of the receiving state or the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(D) The public child-placing agency in the receiving state shall provide timely assessments, as provided for in the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(E) The public child-placing agency in the receiving state shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, supervision and services for the child, including timely reports, during the period of the placement.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(F) Nothing in this compact shall be construed as to limit the authority of the public child-placing agency in the receiving state from contracting with a licensed agency or person in the receiving state for an assessment or the provision of supervision or services for the child or otherwise authorizing the provision of supervision or services by a licensed agency during the period of placement.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(G) Each member state shall provide for coordination among its branches of government concerning the state’s participation in, and compliance with, the compact and Interstate Commission activities, through the creation of an advisory council or use of an existing body or board.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(H) Each member state shall establish a central state compact office, which shall be responsible for state compliance with the compact and the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(I) The public child-placing agency in the sending state shall oversee compliance with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USC 1901 et seq.) for placements subject to the provisions of this compact, prior to placement.

“ARTICLE VII. PLACING AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY “(J) With the consent of the Interstate Commission, states may enter into limited agreements that facilitate the timely assessment and provision of services and supervision of placements under this compact.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “The member states hereby establish, by way of this compact, a commission known as the “Interstate Commission for the Placement of Children.” The activities of the Interstate Commission are the formation of public policy and are a discretionary state function. The Interstate Commission shall:

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(A) Be a joint commission of the member states and shall have the responsibilities, powers and duties set forth herein, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent concurrent action of the respective legislatures of the member states.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(B) Consist of one commissioner from each member state who shall be appointed by the executive head of the state human services administration with ultimate responsibility for the child welfare program. The appointed commissioner shall have the legal authority to vote on policy related matters governed by this compact binding the state.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(1) Each member state represented at a meeting of the Interstate Commission is entitled to one vote.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(2) A majority of the member states shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the bylaws of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(3) A representative shall not delegate a vote to another member state.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(4) A representative may delegate voting authority to another person from their state for a specified meeting.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(C) In addition to the commissioners of each member state, the Interstate Commission shall include persons who are members of interested organizations as defined in the bylaws or rules of the Interstate Commission. Such members shall be ex officio and shall not be entitled to vote on any matter before the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE VIII. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN “(D) Establish an executive committee which shall have the authority to administer the day-to-day operations and administration of the Interstate Commission. It shall not have the power to engage in rulemaking.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “The Interstate Commission shall have the following powers:

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(A) To promulgate rules and take all necessary actions to effect the goals, purposes and obligations as enumerated in this compact.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(B) To provide for dispute resolution among member states.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(C) To issue, upon request of a member state, advisory opinions concerning the meaning or interpretation of the interstate compact, its bylaws, rules or actions.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(D) To enforce compliance with this compact or the bylaws or rules of the Interstate Commission pursuant to Article XII.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(E) Collect standardized data concerning the interstate placement of children subject to this compact as directed through its rules which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange and reporting requirements.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(F) To establish and maintain offices as may be necessary for the transacting of its business.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(G) To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(H) To hire or contract for services of personnel or consultants as necessary to carry out its functions under the compact and establish personnel qualification policies, and rates of compensation.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(I) To establish and appoint committees and officers including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by Article X.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(J) To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose thereof.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(K) To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal, or mixed.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(L) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal or mixed.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(M) To establish a budget and make expenditures.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(N) To adopt a seal and bylaws governing the management and operation of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(O) To report annually to the legislatures, governors, the judiciary, and state advisory councils of the member states concerning the activities of the Interstate Commission during the preceding year. Such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(P) To coordinate and provide education, training and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of children for officials involved in such activity.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(Q) To maintain books and records in accordance with the bylaws of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE IX. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(R) To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(A) Bylaws

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) Within 12 months after the first Interstate Commission meeting, the Interstate Commission shall adopt bylaws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the compact.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) The Interstate Commission’s bylaws and rules shall establish conditions and procedures under which the Interstate Commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The Interstate Commission may exempt from disclosure information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(B) Meetings

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) The Interstate Commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of a simple majority of the member states shall call additional meetings.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) Public notice shall be given by the Interstate Commission of all meetings and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set forth in the rules or as otherwise provided in the compact. The Interstate Commission and its committees may close a meeting, or portion thereof, where it determines by two-thirds vote that an open meeting would be likely to:

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(a) relate solely to the Interstate Commission’s internal personnel practices and procedures; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(b) disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by federal law; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(c) disclose financial or commercial information which is privileged, proprietary or confidential in nature; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(d) involve accusing a person of a crime, or formally censuring a person; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(e) disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or physically endanger one or more persons; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(f) disclose investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes; or

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(g) specifically relate to the Interstate Commission’s participation in a civil action or other legal proceeding.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(3) For a meeting, or portion of a meeting, closed pursuant to this provision, the Interstate Commission’s legal counsel or designee shall certify that the meeting may be closed and shall reference each relevant exemption provision. The Interstate Commission shall keep minutes which shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in a meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of actions taken, and the reasons therefore, including a description of the views expressed and the record of a roll call vote. All documents considered in connection with an action shall be identified in such minutes. All minutes and documents of a closed meeting shall remain under seal, subject to release by a majority vote of the Interstate Commission or by court order.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(4) The bylaws may provide for meetings of the Interstate Commission to be conducted by telecommunication or other electronic communication.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(C) Officers and Staff

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) The Interstate Commission may, through its executive committee, appoint or retain a staff director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the Interstate Commission may deem appropriate. The staff director shall serve as secretary to the Interstate Commission, but shall not have a vote. The staff director may hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) The Interstate Commission shall elect, from among its members, a chairperson and a vice chairperson of the executive committee and other necessary officers, each of whom shall have such authority and duties as may be specified in the bylaws.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(D) Qualified Immunity, Defense and Indemnification

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) The Interstate Commission’s staff director and its employees shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for a claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of or relating to an actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred, or that such person had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; provided, that such person shall not be protected from suit or liability for damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by a criminal act or the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of such person.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(a) The liability of the Interstate Commission’s staff director and employees or Interstate Commission representatives, acting within the scope of such person’s employment or duties for acts, errors, or omissions occurring within such person’s state may not exceed the limits of liability set forth under the Constitution and laws of that state for state officials, employees, and agents. The Interstate Commission is considered to be an instrumentality of the states for the purposes of any such action. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to protect such person from suit or liability for damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by a criminal act or the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of such person.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(b) The Interstate Commission shall defend the staff director and its employees and, subject to the approval of the Attorney General or other appropriate legal counsel of the member state shall defend the commissioner of a member state in a civil action seeking to impose liability arising out of an actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such person.

“ARTICLE X. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(c) To the extent not covered by the state involved, member state, or the Interstate Commission, the representatives or employees of the Interstate Commission shall be held harmless in the amount of a settlement or judgment, including attorney’s fees and costs, obtained against such persons arising out of an actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such persons.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(A) The Interstate Commission shall promulgate and publish rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the compact.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(B) Rulemaking shall occur pursuant to the criteria set forth in this article and the bylaws and rules adopted pursuant thereto. Such rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the “Model State Administrative Procedures Act,” 1981 Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 15, p.1 (2000), or such other administrative procedure acts as the Interstate Commission deems appropriate consistent with due process requirements under the United States Constitution as now or hereafter interpreted by the U. S. Supreme Court. All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified, as published with the final version of the rule as approved by the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(C) When promulgating a rule, the Interstate Commission shall, at a minimum:

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) Publish the proposed rule’s entire text stating the reason(s) for that proposed rule; and

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) Allow and invite any and all persons to submit written data, facts, opinions and arguments, which information shall be added to the record, and be made publicly available; and

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(3) Promulgate a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on input from state or local officials, or interested parties.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(D) Rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission shall have the force and effect of administrative regulations and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent of and in the manner provided for in this compact.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(E) Not later than 60 days after a rule is promulgated, an interested person may file a petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Federal District Court where the Interstate Commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of such rule. If the court finds that the Interstate Commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(F) If a majority of the legislatures of the member states rejects a rule, those states may by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the compact cause that such rule shall have no further force and effect in any member state.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(G) The existing rules governing the operation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children superseded by this act shall be null and void no less than 12, but no more than 24 months after the first meeting of the Interstate Commission created hereunder, as determined by the members during the first meeting.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(H) Within the first 12 months of operation, the Interstate Commission shall promulgate rules addressing the following:

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) Transition rules

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) Forms and procedures

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(3) Time lines

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(4) Data collection and reporting

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(5) Rulemaking

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(6) Visitation

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(7) Progress reports/supervision

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(8) Sharing of information/confidentiality

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(9) Financing of the Interstate Commission

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(10) Mediation, arbitration and dispute resolution

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(11) Education, training and technical assistance

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(12) Enforcement

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(13) Coordination with other interstate compacts

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(I) Upon determination by a majority of the members of the Interstate Commission that an emergency exists:

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(1) The Interstate Commission may promulgate an emergency rule only if it is required to:

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(a) Protect the children covered by this compact from an imminent threat to their health, safety and well-being; or

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(b) Prevent loss of federal or state funds; or

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(c) Meet a deadline for the promulgation of an administrative rule required by federal law.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(2) An emergency rule shall become effective immediately upon adoption, provided that the usual rulemaking procedures provided hereunder shall be retroactively applied to said rule as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 90 days after the effective date of the emergency rule.

“ARTICLE XI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION “(3) An emergency rule shall be promulgated as provided for in the rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(A) Oversight

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(1) The Interstate Commission shall oversee the administration and operation of the compact.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(2) The executive, legislative and judicial branches of state government in each member state shall enforce this compact and the rules of the Interstate Commission and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the compact’s purposes and intent. The compact and its rules shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent of and in the manner provided for in this compact.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(3) All courts shall take judicial notice of the compact and the rules in any judicial or administrative proceeding in a member state pertaining to the subject matter of this compact.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(4) The Interstate Commission shall be entitled to receive service of process in any action in which the validity of a compact provision or rule is the issue for which a judicial determination has been sought and shall have standing to intervene in any proceedings. Failure to provide service of process to the Interstate Commission shall render any judgment, order or other determination, however so captioned or classified, void as to the Interstate Commission, this compact, its bylaws or rules of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(B) Dispute Resolution

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(1) The Interstate Commission shall attempt, upon the request of a member state, to resolve disputes which are subject to the compact and which may arise among member states and between member and non-member states.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(2) The Interstate Commission shall promulgate a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among compacting states. The costs of such mediation or dispute resolution shall be the responsibility of the parties to the dispute.

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(C) Enforcement

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(1) If the Interstate Commission determines that a member state has defaulted in the performance of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, its bylaws or rules, the Interstate Commission may:

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(a) Provide remedial training and specific technical assistance; or

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(b) Provide written notice to the defaulting state and other member states, of the nature of the default and the means of curing the default. The Interstate Commission shall specify the conditions by which the defaulting state must cure its default; or

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(c) By majority vote of the members, initiate against a defaulting member state legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the federal district where the Interstate Commission has its principal office, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the compact, its bylaws or rules. The relief sought may include both injunctive relief and damages. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorney’s fees; or

“ARTICLE XII. OVERSIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ENFORCEMENT “(d) Avail itself of any other remedies available under state law or the regulation of official or professional conduct.

“ARTICLE XIII. FINANCING OF THE COMMISSION “ARTICLE XIII. FINANCING OF THE COMMISSION “(A) The Interstate Commission shall pay, or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization and ongoing activities.

“ARTICLE XIII. FINANCING OF THE COMMISSION “(B) The Interstate Commission may levy on and collect an annual assessment from each member state to cover the cost of the operations and activities of the Interstate Commission and its staff which must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the Interstate Commission’s annual budget as approved by its members each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the Interstate Commission which shall promulgate a rule binding upon all member states.

“ARTICLE XIII. FINANCING OF THE COMMISSION “(C) The Interstate Commission shall not incur obligations of any kind prior to securing the funds adequate to meet the same; nor shall the Interstate Commission pledge the credit of any of the member states, except by and with the authority of the member state.

“ARTICLE XIII. FINANCING OF THE COMMISSION “(D) The Interstate Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its bylaws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the Interstate Commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE XIV. MEMBER STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT “ARTICLE XIV. MEMBER STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT “(A) Any state is eligible to become a member state.

“ARTICLE XIV. MEMBER STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT “(B) The compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than 35 states. Thereafter it shall become effective and binding as to any other member state upon enactment of the compact into law by that state. The executive heads of the state human services administration with ultimate responsibility for the child welfare program of non-member states or their designees shall be invited to participate in the activities of the Interstate Commission on a non-voting basis prior to adoption of the compact by all states.

“ARTICLE XIV. MEMBER STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT “(C) The Interstate Commission may propose amendments to the compact for enactment by the member states. No amendment shall become effective and binding on the member states unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the member states.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(A) Withdrawal

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(1) Once effective, the compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every member state; provided that a member state may withdraw from the compact specifically repealing the statute which enacted the compact into law.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(2) Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute repealing the same. The effective date of withdrawal shall be the effective date of the repeal of the statute.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(3) The withdrawing state shall immediately notify the president of the Interstate Commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state. The Interstate Commission shall then notify the other member states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(4) The withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(5) Reinstatement following withdrawal of a member state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting the compact or upon such later date as determined by the members of the Interstate Commission.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(B) Dissolution of Compact

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(1) This compact shall dissolve effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the member state which reduces the membership in the compact to one member state.

“ARTICLE XV. WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION “(2) Upon the dissolution of this compact, the compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission shall be concluded and surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the bylaws.

“ARTICLE XVI. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION “ARTICLE XVI. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION “(A) The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be enforceable.

“ARTICLE XVI. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION “(B) The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

“ARTICLE XVI. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION “(C) Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prohibit the concurrent applicability of other interstate compacts to which the states are members.

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(A) Other Laws

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(1) Nothing herein prevents the enforcement of any other law of a member state that is not inconsistent with this compact.

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(2) All member states’ laws conflicting with this compact or its rules are superseded to the extent of the conflict.

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(B) Binding Effect of the Compact

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(1) All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all rules and bylaws promulgated by the Interstate Commission, are binding upon the member states.

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(2) All agreements between the Interstate Commission and the member states are binding in accordance with their terms.

“ARTICLE XVII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS “(3) In the event any provision of this compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any member state, such provision shall be ineffective to the extent of the conflict with the constitutional provision in question in that member state.

“ARTICLE XVIII. INDIAN TRIBES “Notwithstanding any other provision in this compact, the Interstate Commission may promulgate guidelines to permit Indian tribes to utilize the compact to achieve any or all of the purposes of the compact as specified in Article I. The Interstate Commission shall make reasonable efforts to consult with Indian tribes in promulgating guidelines to reflect the diverse circumstances of the various Indian tribes.”

Cross references. —

For effect of the 2008 reenactment of Article XII(A)(4) of this section on Rules 4 and 24(b), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, see § 9, ch. 93, SLA 2008, in the 2008 Temporary and Special Acts.

Notes to Decisions

Placement with grandmother properly denied. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in prioritizing the child's adoption by her long-term foster parents over continued pursuit of a potential relative placement with the grandmother, whose background check revealed evidence of past child abuse and neglect. Shelly C. v. Jonah C., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 21, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Cited in

O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997); C.J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001); Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, §§ 40-45

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 44, 53.

Sec. 47.70.020. Financial responsibility.

Financial responsibility for a child placed in accordance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children shall be determined in accordance with art. V of the compact. However, in the event of partial or complete default of performance under the compact, the provisions of AS 47.14.100(b) apply.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976; am § 53 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Delayed amendment of section. —

Under § 3, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “Financial responsibility for a child placed in accordance with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children shall be determined in accordance with art. VII of the compact. However, in the event of partial or complete default of performance under the compact, the provisions of AS 47.14.100(b) apply.” Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes this amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.030. Designation of authority.

  1. The “appropriate public authorities” as used in art. III of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children shall, with reference to this state, mean the Department of Health and Social Services.  The department shall receive and act with reference to notices required by art. III of the compact.
  2. As used in Art. V of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, the phrase “appropriate authority in the receiving state” with reference to this state means the Department of Health and Social Services.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

Conditional repeal of section. —

Under § 8, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section is repealed. Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes the repeal conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the repeal takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.040. Agreements.

The officers and agencies of this state and its subdivisions having authority to place children are empowered to enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of or in other party states under art. V(b) of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

Delayed amendment of section. —

Under § 4, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “The officers and agencies of this state and its subdivisions having authority to place children are empowered to enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of or in other party states under art. V(B) and art. VII(J) of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children.” Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes this amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.050. Delegation by agreement.

Requirements for visitation, inspection, or supervision of children, homes, institutions, or other agencies in another party state which may apply under AS 47.14.110 shall be considered to be met if performed under an agreement entered into by appropriate officers or agencies of this state or a subdivision of this state as contemplated by art. V(b) of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976; am § 54 ch 59 SLA 1996)

Delayed amendment of section. —

Under § 5, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “Requirements for visitation, inspection, or supervision of children, homes, institutions, or other agencies in another party state that may apply under AS 47.14.110 shall be considered to be met if performed under an agreement entered into by appropriate officers or agencies of this state or a subdivision of this state as contemplated by art. V(B) and art. VII(J) of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children.” Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes this amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.060. Executive head.

As used in Art. VII of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, the term “executive head” means the governor. The governor is authorized to appoint a compact administrator in accordance with the terms of art. VII.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

Delayed amendment of section. —

Under § 6, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “As used in art. VIII(B) and XIV(B) of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, the term “executive head” means the commissioner of health and social services. The commissioner is authorized to establish a central compact office in accordance with the terms of art. VII(H).” Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes this amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.070. Violations of compact.

A person who sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought into this state from any party state, or from this state into any party state, a person under the age of 19, in violation of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $200.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

Conditional repeal of section. —

Under § 8, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section is repealed. Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes the repeal conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the repeal takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Sec. 47.70.080. Short title.

AS 47.70.010 may be cited as the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

History. (§ 1 ch 216 SLA 1976)

Delayed amendment of section. —

Under § 1, ch. 93, SLA 2008, this section will read as follows: “Short title. AS 47.70.010 may be cited as the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children.” Section 11(a), ch. 93, SLA 2008, makes this amendment conditional upon ratification of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children by at least 34 other states. As of January 2022, the required notice had not been received. If the condition occurs, the amendment takes effect “on the day after the date on which the commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner's designee notifies the revisor of statutes that the contingency has occurred.”

Chapter 75. Social Services Planning.

Sec. 47.75.010. Purpose.

The purpose of the state plan for social services is to assess the state’s needs for existing and new social services, to establish priorities among these needs, and to present an annual implemental plan to meet those needs based upon available state and federal financing with the goals of

  1. achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or eliminate dependency;
  2. achieving or maintaining self-sufficiency, including reduction or prevention of dependency;
  3. preventing or remedying neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults unable to protect their own interests, or preserving, rehabilitating, or reuniting families;
  4. preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care by providing alternative types of care including community-based care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive care; and
  5. securing referral or admission for institutional care when other forms of care are not appropriate, or providing services to individuals in institutions.

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976)

Sec. 47.75.020. State plan.

  1. The department shall annually provide to the legislature a detailed state plan for the delivery of social services.  It includes the following:
    1. a needs analysis of social services presently provided or purchased by the state;
    2. a needs analysis of social services that are not presently provided or purchased by the state or not available from any other source in the state;
    3. a needs analysis of social services provided by local governments, nonprofit and charitable organizations, and profit corporations and partnerships, with an emphasis on their availability for purchase by the state;
    4. a priority listing of social services to be provided or purchased by the state for the succeeding fiscal year, including
      1. a justification of how each proposed social service shall meet the goals established under AS 47.75.010 ;
      2. the categories of individuals to whom the services are to be provided, including categories based on the income of individuals or their families;
      3. the geographic areas in which the services are to be provided, with the nature and amount of the services to be provided in each area;
      4. a description of the planning, evaluation, and reporting activities to be carried out in order to provide the service;
      5. a description of the organizational structure through which the program will be administered, including the extent to which public and private agencies and volunteers will be utilized in the provision of the services;
      6. estimated expenditures required for each of the services to be provided, each of the categories of individuals to whom the services are to be provided, and each of the geographic areas in which the services are to be provided; and a comparison between estimated state and other expenditures for the services necessary to insure adequate availability of services to the entire population of the state;
    5. a comprehensive budget for services provided or purchased by the state based upon the prioritized listing required in (4) of this subsection including expenditures for administration, planning, evaluation, and personnel training directly related to the provision of those services; and
    6. recommendations as to any necessary changes in existing laws, including licensing to improve the quality and availability of social services, facilities and institutions, and social services manpower.
  2. The state plan required by this chapter is the official state plan prepared for the delivery of social services in the state and shall include and meet all the applicable provisions required by title XX of the Social Security Act, P.L. 93-647. The state plan may not be limited to the planning of services funded by title XX, but must include all the social services purchased or provided by the state or any of its subdivisions.

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976)

Sec. 47.75.030. Annual public meetings required.

  1. During the first quarter of each fiscal year, the department shall hold public meetings for the purposes of gathering information and testimony on the availability and need of social services in the regional office service areas designated by the department.
  2. Notice of these public meetings shall be made by publication in newspapers of general circulation published in each region at least once each week for three successive weeks before the meeting.
  3. All meetings shall be recorded.  The recordings and all information submitted at the meeting shall be maintained by the department for a period of at least two years.

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976)

Sec. 47.75.040. Public hearings on proposed state plan.

  1. Upon completion of the needs analysis required in AS 47.75.020 and the public meetings required in AS 47.75.030 , the department shall prepare a state plan.
  2. At least 90 days before the first day of each regular legislative session, the department shall publish and make available to the public and members of the legislature the proposed state plan for the following fiscal year.
  3. The department shall conduct public hearings for the purpose of obtaining comment on the proposed state plan as provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62).

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976)

Sec. 47.75.050. Submission to the legislature.

  1. The department shall submit the state plan and supporting commentary reflecting the public input and comment provided for in AS 47.75.030 and 47.75.040 to the legislature on the first day of each regular session.
  2. The department shall submit a budget for proposed state expenditures in conformity with the state plan.  In addition, the department shall submit a budget and a detailed analysis of those prioritized needs and funds which were addressed in the needs analysis and public hearings, but were not included in the published state plan as a result of fiscal or legal constraints.

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976)

Sec. 47.75.060. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  2. “social services” means child care services, protective services for children and adults, services for children and adults in foster care, services related to the management and maintenance of the home, day care services for adults, transportation services, training and related services, employment services, information, referral, and counseling services, the preparation and delivery of meals, health support services, a full range of legal services, and appropriate combinations of services designed to meet the special needs of children, the aged, persons with developmental disabilities, persons who are blind, persons with mental illness, persons with physical disabilities, and persons with substance abuse disorders.

History. (§ 1 ch 273 SLA 1976; am § 23 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “persons with developmental disabilities, persons who are blind, persons with mental illness, persons with physical disabilities, and persons with substance abuse disorders” for “the developmentally disabled, the blind, the mentally ill, the physically handicapped, and alcoholic and drug addicts” in paragraph (2), and made a minor stylistic change.

Chapter 80. Persons with Disabilities.

Cross references. —

For legislative intent in connection with the enactment of this chapter, see § 1, ch. 165, SLA 1978 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of chapter. —

The purpose of AS 47.80 is to provide affirmative services to the handicapped. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Minimal institutionalization a goal. —

A fundamental goal of AS 47.80 is to minimize institutionalization in the habilitation of handicapped individuals. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981)See AS 47.80.110 .

No authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. —

The statutory scheme of AS 47.80 does not give the court authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Article 1. Rights.

Sec. 47.80.010. Rights of persons with disabilities.

Persons with disabilities have the same legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all other persons by the Constitution of the United States and federal laws and by the constitution and laws of the state. An otherwise qualified person may not be excluded, by reason of having a disability, from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that receives public funds. Some persons with disabilities may be unable, due to the severity of their disability, to exercise for themselves all of their rights in a meaningful way; for others modification of some or all of their rights is appropriate. The procedure used for modification of rights must contain proper legal safeguards against every form of abuse, must be based on an evaluation of the social capability of the person by qualified experts, and must be subject to periodic reviews and to the right of appeal to higher authorities.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 24 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps” and “disability” for “handicap” throughout the section.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Collateral references. —

Construction and effect of state legislation forbidding discrimination in housing on account of physical handicap. 28 ALR4th 685.

Sec. 47.80.020. Protection and advocacy of rights.

The department shall establish a system to protect and advocate rights of persons with disabilities. The system

  1. has the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to assure the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities; and
  2. shall be independent of any state agency that provides treatment, services, or habilitation of persons with disabilities.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 25 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps” throughout the section.

Notes to Decisions

This section was enacted in response to a federal statute, former 42 U.S.C. § 6012(a), providing for joint federal and state protection and advocacy of the rights of developmentally disabled individuals. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

No authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. —

This section should not be read so broadly as to create the implied authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Purpose of chapter. —

The purpose of AS 47.80 is to provide affirmative services to the handicapped. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Minimal institutionalization a goal. —

A fundamental goal of AS 47.80 is to minimize institutionalization in the habilitation of handicapped individuals. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981)See AS 47.80.110 .

No authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. —

The statutory scheme of AS 47.80 does not give the court authority to involuntarily commit the handicapped. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Article 2. Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education.

Sec. 47.80.030. Governor’s council on disabilities and special education.

There is established the Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education. For budgetary purposes, the council is located within the Department of Health and Social Services but is the interdepartmental planning and coordinating agency of the Department of Health and Social Services, the Department of Education and Early Development, and other departments that deliver services to persons who are experiencing a disability. In addition, except as provided in AS 47.80.300 - 47.80.330 , the council is the state planning council and interagency coordinating council for purposes of federal laws relating to persons who are experiencing a disability.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 13 SLA 1992; am § 1 ch 66 SLA 1995; am § 1 ch 5 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective August 2, 2016, twice deleted “gifted or” preceding “experiencing a disability.”

Sec. 47.80.040. Composition.

  1. The council consists of no fewer than 18 nor more than 26 members appointed by the governor in a manner that satisfies the requirements for a state interagency coordinating council under 20 U.S.C. 1482 and a state planning council under 42 U.S.C. 6024.
  2. [Repealed, § 5 ch 13 SLA 1992.]
  3. [Repealed, § 5 ch 13 SLA 1992.]
  4. [Repealed, § 5 ch 13 SLA 1992.]
  5. [Repealed, § 5 ch 13 SLA 1992.]
  6. In the appointment of all members other than state agency members, due regard shall be given to geographically balanced representation of areas of the state and to representation of persons with a variety of different mental and physical disabilities.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am §§ 2, 5 ch 13 SLA 1992; am § 26 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps” at the end of subsection (f).

Sec. 47.80.050. Term of office.

  1. Council members serve staggered terms of three years.
  2. A vacancy occurring in the membership of the council shall be filled by appointment of the governor for the unexpired portion of the vacated term.
  3. Council members serve at the pleasure of the governor, notwithstanding their terms of office.
  4. It is the legislative intent that the governor replace any member who, by poor attendance or lack of contribution to the council’s work, demonstrates ineffectiveness as a council member.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 37 ch 168 SLA 1990)

Sec. 47.80.060. Compensation, per diem, and expenses.

Members of the council receive no salary but are entitled to per diem and reimbursement for travel and other expenses as authorized by law for boards.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978)

Cross references. —

For per diem and travel expenses, see AS 39.20.180 .

Sec. 47.80.070. Officers and staff.

  1. The council, by a majority of its membership, shall elect a chairman and other officers it considers necessary from among its membership, to serve on a yearly basis.
  2. The council shall have a paid staff provided by the department, including an executive director selected by the council. The executive director is in the partially exempt service and may hire additional employees in the classified service of the state. The department shall provide for the assignment of personnel to the council to ensure that the council has the capacity to fulfill its responsibilities. The personnel shall be directly responsible to the council for performance of their duties.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 46 ch 66 SLA 1991)

Sec. 47.80.080. Bylaws.

The council, on approval of a majority of its membership, shall adopt and amend bylaws governing its composition, proceedings and other activities consistent with AS 47.80.030 47.80.090 and including, but not limited to, provisions concerning a quorum to transact council business and other aspects of procedure, frequency and location of meetings, and establishment, functions and membership of council committees.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.80.090. Responsibilities.

The council shall

  1. serve as a forum by which issues and benefits regarding current and potential services to disabled persons may be discussed by consumer, public, private, professional, and lay interests;
  2. advocate the needs of disabled persons before the executive and legislative branches of the state government and before the public;
  3. advise the executive and legislative branches of the state government and the private sector on programs and policies pertaining to current and potential services to disabled persons and their families;
  4. submit periodic reports to the commissioner of health and social services, the commissioner of education and early development, and to other appropriate departments, on the effects of current federal and state programs regarding services to disabled persons; these reports must include program performance reports to the governor, the federal government, and state agencies as required under 20 U.S.C. 1482 and 42 U.S.C. 15025;
  5. in conjunction with the Departments of Health and Social Services and Education and Early Development, develop, prepare, adopt, periodically review, and revise as necessary an annual state plan prescribing programs that meet the needs of persons with developmental disabilities as required under 42 U.S.C. 15024;
  6. review and comment to commissioners of state departments on all state plans and proposed regulations relating to programs for persons who are experiencing disabilities before the adoption of a plan or regulation; for this purpose, the appropriate departments shall submit the plans and proposed regulations to the council;
  7. recommend the priorities and specifications for the use of funds received by the state under 20 U.S.C. 1471 — 1482 and 42 U.S.C. 15001 — 15083;
  8. submit annually to the commissioner of health and social services, the commissioner of education and early development, and the commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development a proposed interdepartmental program budget for services to disabled persons that includes, insofar as possible, projected revenues and expenditures for programs implemented by state agencies, local governmental agencies, and private organizations; the interdepartmental program budget is an informational supplement to the regular annual budgetary submissions of the departments to the Office of the Governor;
  9. provide information and guidance for the development of appropriate special educational programs and services for a child with a disability as defined in AS 14.30.350 ;
  10. monitor and evaluate budgets or other implementation plans and programs for disabled persons to assure nonduplication of services and encourage efficient and coordinated use of federal, state, and private resources in the provision of services; members of the council, with the approval of the council, have access to information in the possession of state agencies subject to disclosure restrictions imposed by state or federal confidentiality or privacy laws;
  11. perform other duties required under applicable federal laws or AS 14.30.231 and as the governor may assign;
  12. govern the special education service agency and may hire personnel necessary to operate the agency; and
  13. provide to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority for its review and consideration recommendations concerning the integrated comprehensive mental health program for the people of the state who are described in AS 47.30.056(b)(2) and the use of the money in the mental health trust settlement income account in a manner consistent with regulations adopted under AS 47.30.031 .

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 6 ch 112 SLA 1986; am § 47 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 3 ch 13 SLA 1992; am § 39 ch 67 SLA 2001; am § 2 ch 5 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in paragraph (13) of this section, “mental health trust settlement income account” was substituted for “mental health trust income account” pursuant to sec. 17, ch. 1, SSSLA 1994.

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of education” was changed to “commissioner of education and early development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999, and “commissioner of community and regional affairs” was changed to “commissioner of community and economic development” in accordance with § 91(a)(14), ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in this section, “commissioner of community and economic development” was changed to “commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

In 2008, in (5) of this section, “and Early Development” was inserted after “Education” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective August 2, 2016, in (1) — (4), (8), (10), deleted “and gifted”; in (4), substituted “42 U.S.C. 15025” for “42 U.S.C. 6024”; in (5), substituted “42 U.S.C. 15024” for “42 U.S.C. 6022”; in (7), substituted “20 U.S.C. 1471 — 1482” for “20 U.S.C. 1471 — 1485” and “42 U.S.C. 15001 — 15083” for “42 U.S.C. 6000 — 6083”; and made related changes.

Sec. 47.80.095. Legislative findings related to persons with disabilities; policy.

  1. The legislature finds that
    1. self-direction and autonomy enhance quality of life, support independence, build self-confidence, and generate skills that help people protect themselves from abuse;
    2. the people of the state share a vision of a flexible system of support for persons with physical and mental disabilities that allows persons with physical and mental disabilities to participate actively, with assistance based on each person’s strengths and abilities, in managing their own support services so that all persons with physical and mental disabilities can achieve a meaningful life in their homes, jobs, and communities; and
    3. as a part of this vision, professional staff and support services should be made available to families of persons with physical and mental disabilities throughout the state now and into the future.
  2. It is the policy of the state that the department and the legislature consider the vision of support services described in (a) of this section when determining the need for new and existing services for persons with physical and mental disabilities and establishing priorities among those needs. It is also the policy of the state to encourage and enable persons with physical and mental disabilities to participate fully in the social and economic life of the state.
  3. Nothing in this section
    1. creates a right;
    2. supersedes another law relating to eligibility for programs for persons with physical or mental disabilities; or
    3. authorizes the department to apply for a waiver under 42 U.S.C. 1396n(j) to provide medical assistance payments for self-directed personal assistance services.

History. (§ 1 ch 92 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 1, ch. 92, SLA 2018, which enacted this section, took effect on November 23, 2018.

Article 3. Programs and Plans.

Sec. 47.80.100. Programs for persons with disabilities.

  1. The Department of Health and Social Services, the Department of Education and Early Development, and other departments of the state as appropriate, shall, in coordination, plan, develop, and implement a comprehensive system of services and facilities for persons with disabilities that is consistent with the state plan adopted under AS 47.80.090 (5) and is dispersed geographically within the state.
  2. The services required in (a) of this section are specialized services or special adaptations of services available to the general population and shall be directed toward the social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of persons with disabilities.
  3. Within the limits of appropriations and other available funds, the appropriate department may itself provide the services and establish, operate, and maintain the facilities required under (a) and (b) of this section, or it may provide the services or facilities entirely or in part through contractual arrangements with public or private agencies.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am §§ 27, 28 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (a) of this section, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps” in subsections (a) and (b).

Sec. 47.80.110. Program principles.

The system of services and facilities required under AS 47.80.100 shall accord with the principles that service providers shall

  1. make services available at times and locations that enable residents of the provider’s service area to obtain services readily;
  2. ensure each client’s right to confidentiality and treatment with dignity;
  3. establish staffing patterns that reflect the cultural, linguistic, and other social characteristics of the community and that incorporate multidisciplinary professional staff to meet client functional levels and diagnostic and treatment needs;
  4. promote client and family participation in formulating, delivering, and evaluating treatment and rehabilitation;
  5. design treatment and habilitation to maximize individual potential and minimize institutionalization; and
  6. provide services in the least restrictive setting, enabling a person to live as normally as possible within the limitations of the disability.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 48 ch 66 SLA 1991; am § 29 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disability” for “handicap” in paragraph (6).

Notes to Decisions

Goal of minimal institutionalization. —

A fundamental goal of AS 47.80 is to minimize institutionalization in the habilitation of handicapped individuals. In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Sec. 47.80.120. Habilitation plans.

A state agency, contractor, or grantee who is directly responsible for providing services to persons with disabilities shall develop an individual habilitation plan for each person whose program of services utilizes state funds. The plan shall be completed in writing and furnished to the department within 30 days of admission of a client to the program of services. The plan, its renewals, and any changes of it shall have the written concurrence of the client, or the client’s parent or guardian when appropriate, and the agency or contractor responsible for providing services. The development and content of a plan shall conform to requirements established by the department by regulation. Insofar as practicable, the requirements shall conform to those established for individual habilitation plans under P.L. 91-517 or P.L. 94-103, as amended. Each plan shall be time-limited, evaluated, and renewed at least annually.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 30 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disabilities” for “handicaps.”

Sec. 47.80.130. Powers and duties of the department.

  1. The department shall
    1. develop budgets and receive and distribute appropriations and funds under this section;
    2. adopt regulations regarding standards of services and facilities for persons with disabilities and the quality of services and the process by which services are to be delivered;
    3. adopt any other regulations necessary to implement this chapter;
    4. provide technical assistance to public and private agencies in planning, developing, and implementing programs to serve persons with disabilities;
    5. operate programs and facilities and enter into agreements, contracts, or grants necessary to provide services required under this chapter;
    6. take the actions and undertake the obligations that are necessary to participate in federal grant-in-aid programs and accept federal or other financial aid for the study, examination, care, and treatment of persons with disabilities;
    7. take a flexible approach to administering programs for persons with disabilities that allows each person to participate actively, with assistance based on the person’s strengths and abilities, in managing the person’s support services so that the person can achieve a meaningful life in the person’s home, job, and community.
  2. For purposes of P.L. 91-517 and P.L. 94-103, as amended, the department is designated the sole administering agency; it shall make applications for, receive, and expend grants under P.L. 91-517 or P.L. 94-103, as amended, and otherwise exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions necessary to comply with P.L. 91-517 and P.L. 94-103, as amended.
  3. The Department of Education and Early Development may make applications for, receive, and expend grants under P.L. 91-230 (The Education for the Handicapped Act), as amended, and otherwise exercise the powers and perform the functions necessary to comply with that Act.
  4. When state funding is not adequate to meet service needs, the department shall establish a waiting list for persons with developmental disabilities who would be eligible to receive state-funded services under AS 47.80.100 47.80.170 if adequate state funding were available. The department shall, on an annual basis, review the waiting list and submit a report to the governor containing the information required under this subsection. The department shall send a copy of the report to the persons chairing the house and senate finance committees and the persons chairing the house and senate health, education and social services committees and shall notify the full legislature that the report is available to all legislators. The report must
    1. describe the purpose for the waiting list and the strategies used to notify persons about the waiting list, and must include a copy of the information used by the department to inform individuals and families about their rights and responsibilities under AS 47.80.100 47.80.170 ;
    2. explain how an individual is placed on the waiting list, what criteria determine rank on the list, and how the waiting list is used to select individuals equitably and fairly across the state;
    3. give the basic demographic information across all regions about the age, sex, and racial and ethnic background of the individuals on the waiting list;
    4. identify the level of need and preferences of the individuals and families on the waiting list for the services and the supports that may be necessary to meet their needs and project an annual cost to meet this need;
    5. identify how many individuals were removed from the waiting list during the 12 months covered by the report, why they were removed from the list, and how long the individuals had been waiting for services or supports before they were removed from the list;
    6. list the number of individuals who have been on the waiting list for 90 days or more with an account of the department’s steps to regularly review each individual’s status while waiting for services or supports;
    7. report annual data from the Department of Education and Early Development about the number of students in special education with developmental disabilities graduating from high school, dropping out of high school before reaching age 22, or reaching age 22 without graduating from high school; and
    8. indicate that written or electronic copies of policies, manuals, and procedures used by the department to implement AS 47.80.100 — 47.80.170 are available.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 2000; am § 31 ch 25 SLA 2006; am § 2 ch 92 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (c) of this section, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions applicable to preparation of the first report required by (d) of this section, see sec. 2, ch. 76, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary & Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.

For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “persons with disabilities” for “persons with handicaps” in paragraph (a)(2), for “handicapped persons” in paragraph (a)(4), and for “the handicapped” in paragraph (a)(6).

The 2018 amendment, effective November 23, 2018, added (a)(7), and made a related change.

Sec. 47.80.135. Gainful employment of persons with disabilities.

  1. When carrying out duties under AS 47.80.130 related to the provision of services to a person with a disability, the department’s primary objective and preferred outcome is to help the person become gainfully employed in the general workforce of the public or private sector in an integrated workplace where persons with disabilities work with and alongside of persons without disabilities.
  2. By December 31 of each year, the commissioner of health and social services shall provide to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established by AS 47.30.011 a report on the department’s progress toward the objective under (a) of this section.
  3. In this section, “gainfully employed” means employed full time or part time for compensation that is
    1. at or above the minimum wage; and
    2. not less than the compensation paid by the employer for the same or similar work performed by a person who is not disabled.

History. (§ 5 ch 19 SLA 2014)

Effective dates. —

Section 5, ch. 19, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on August 27, 2014.

Sec. 47.80.140. Licensing and certificates of need.

  1. A person may not establish or operate a residential facility until the facility has been licensed under AS 47.32.
  2. A certificate of need is required as a prerequisite for the licensing of a residential facility established after July 1, 1978, and not otherwise provided for in AS 18.07.031 18.07.111 . A certificate shall be issued and regulated in the same manner as provided in AS 18.07.031 18.07.111 for certificates of need for health care facilities. This subsection does not apply to an assisted living home licensed under AS 47.32.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 14 ch 130 SLA 1994; am § 42 ch 57 SLA 2005)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, rewrote this section.

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, §§ 5, 6.

73A C.J.S., Public and Private Institutional Care Facilities, §§ 8-10.

Sec. 47.80.150. Liability for expense of services.

  1. A person with a disability or the person’s legal representative acting in a representative capacity, the person’s spouse, or the person’s parents if the person is a minor shall pay or contribute to the payment of the charges for the care or treatment in accordance with the fee schedule adopted under AS 44.29.022 . The order of the department relating to the payment of charges shall be prospective in effect and may relate only to charges to be incurred, except that, if a person intentionally conceals ability to pay, the person shall be ordered to pay to the extent of the person’s ability to pay the charges accruing during the period of the concealment. The order of the department relating to the payment of charges by the person with a disability or the person’s legal representative, or the person’s spouse or parents, shall be issued within six months of the date on which the charge was incurred. The department may make necessary investigations to determine the ability to pay. The order shall remain in full force and effect unless modified by subsequent court or department orders.
  2. As used in (a) of this section, the term “actual cost of the care and treatment” means the lesser of (1) the rate provided for by a contract entered into under this chapter, (2) the fee established under AS 44.29.022 for services provided under this chapter, or (3) if the person is under the age of 18, the cost of care of a person of the same age who is not a person with a disability and who resides with a parent or guardian, and includes expenses of transportation incidental to treatment and carrying out the intent of this chapter. In establishing fees for services under this chapter, the commissioner shall consider the income and family size of the responsible party, age of the person receiving the services, and other factors that relate to the ability to pay. Fees may not exceed the actual cost of the care or treatment.
  3. [Repealed, § 101 ch 138 SLA 1986.]
  4. The department may charge, or accept money or property from a person, for the care or treatment of an inpatient or outpatient or for other purposes, even if the payment is not required by an order of the department.  The total payments received may not exceed the actual cost of care or treatment.
  5. All money paid to the department by the person with a disability or on the person’s behalf, under this section, shall be deposited in the general fund.
  6. If an order of payment is entered by the department under this section and delinquency in the payment of any amount due the state under the order continues for a period of more than 30 days after the notification by the department to the person, the legal representative, parent, or spouse of the person with a disability, the state may proceed to collect the amounts due by appropriate proceedings. Actions to enforce the collection of payments may only be brought within three years after the date of notification of a delinquent payment.
  7. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am §§ 96 — 101 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am §§ 32 — 35 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “disability” for “handicap” in the first and third sentences of subsection (a), in clause (b)(3), in subsection (e), and in the first sentence of subsection (f).

Sec. 47.80.160. Transportation.

When an individual is to be treated under this chapter, the department shall arrange, upon the request of a person having a proper interest in the individual’s treatment, and may pay for the individual’s transportation to the designated facility, with appropriate medical or nursing attendants and by the available means that are appropriate and suitable. The department may pay return transportation of an individual and appropriate medical and nursing attendants. When practicable, one or more relatives or friends of the individual to be treated shall be permitted to accompany the individual. The department may pay necessary travel, housing, and meal expenses incurred by one relative or friend in accompanying the individual to the facility if the department determines

  1. that the best interests of the individual’s health require that the individual be accompanied by the relative or friend;
  2. the relative or friend accompanying the individual is indigent.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978)

Sec. 47.80.170. Provision for personal needs upon discharge.

The department shall make arrangements which are necessary to ensure that

  1. no patient is discharged or placed on convalescent status from a designated facility without suitable clothing; and
  2. an indigent patient discharged or placed on convalescent status is furnished suitable transportation to the patient’s permanent residence in this state or other suitable place at the discretion of the department, and a reasonable amount of money to meet immediate needs.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978)

Secs. 47.80.200 — 47.80.290. Self-sufficiency trust fund. [Repealed, § 12 ch 42 SLA 1997.]

Article 4. Statewide Independent Living Council.

Sec. 47.80.300. Statewide independent living council.

There is established the Statewide Independent Living Council. For budgetary purposes, the council is located in the department. The department shall provide reasonable and necessary professional and technical assistance when requested by the council.

History. (§ 2 ch 66 SLA 1995; am § 81 ch 58 SLA 1999; am E.O. No. 117, § 2 (2016))

Cross references. —

For the governor's transmittal letter for Executive Order 117 which amended this section, see 2016 Senate Journal 1579 — 1580.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted “department” for “department of labor and workforce development” two times. E.O. No. 117, § 3, provides that the 2016 amendment to this section takes “effect July 1, 2016.” However, E.O. No. 117 was signed by the governor July 28, 2016.

Sec. 47.80.310. Composition; terms; compensation.

  1. The governor shall appoint members to the council who meet the applicable requirements of 29 U.S.C. 796d after soliciting personal applications and after soliciting recommendations from the public, from organizations representing a broad range of individuals experiencing disabilities, and from organizations interested in individuals experiencing disabilities. The council shall select a chairperson from among its voting members.
  2. The members shall be appointed to staggered terms of three years, except that a person appointed to fill a vacancy shall be appointed for the remaining years of the prior member’s term. A member may not serve more than two consecutive full terms. Notwithstanding their terms of office, the members serve at the pleasure of the governor.
  3. Members of the council who are not state employees are entitled to per diem and travel expenses as authorized for members of boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180 . In addition, if required by federal law, a member is entitled to
    1. reimbursement of the necessary expenses of attending council meetings and performing council duties, including expenses for child care and personal assistance services;
    2. compensation of up to $150 for each day of performing council duties and each day spent traveling to attend a council meeting if the member is not employed or must forfeit wages from other employment in order to perform council duties or travel to a council meeting.

History. (§ 2 ch 66 SLA 1995)

Cross references. —

For appointments of initial members of Statewide Independent Living Council, see § 3, ch. 66, SLA 1995 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 47.80.320. Powers and duties.

  1. The council shall perform the duties set out in 29 U.S.C. 796d in a manner that will maximize the state’s receipt of federal financial assistance for independent living services and centers of independent living for residents with severe disabilities, including the following duties:
    1. joint development of the state plan required under 29 U.S.C. 796c and evaluation of the implementation of the plan;
    2. development of a plan for the provision of resources, including staff and personnel, that may be necessary to carry out the council’s functions with funds from the federal government and other public and private sources; and
    3. coordination of the council’s activities with other state agencies that address the needs of specific disability populations and issues under federal law.
  2. The council may
    1. hold hearings and forums as determined by the council to be necessary to carry out its duties;
    2. solicit and accept money or other resources on behalf of the state from any public or private source.

History. (§ 2 ch 66 SLA 1995)

Sec. 47.80.330. Definition.

Notwithstanding AS 47.80.900 , in AS 47.80.300 47.80.320 , “council” means the Statewide Independent Living Council established under AS 47.80.300 .

History. (§ 2 ch 66 SLA 1995)

Article 5. Teachers Who Teach the Use of Certain Aids or Devices for the Blind or Visually Impaired.

Sec. 47.80.400. Qualifications for teaching the use of certain aids or devices for the blind or visually impaired.

  1. A person who is employed to teach the use of orientation and mobility aids or assistive technology devices to students who are 16 years of age or older and who are blind or visually impaired may not receive payment from the state or a political subdivision of the state unless the person meets the training and experience requirements established by the department under this section.
  2. The department shall, by regulation, establish minimum requirements for training and experience of persons who teach the use of orientation and mobility aids or assistive technology devices to students who are 16 years of age or older and who are blind or visually impaired. The department shall consider the standards adopted by national organizations that provide services to the blind and visually impaired when setting requirements under this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 102 SLA 1998)

Administrative Code. —

For services to the blind or visually impaired, see 7 AAC 82.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 102, SLA 1998 provides that nothing in this section “modifies or terminates a contract in effect on September 14, 1998.”

Article 6. Traumatic or Acquired Brain Injury.

Effective dates. —

Section 5, ch. 109, SLA 2010, which enacted this article, makes this article effective September 23, 2010.

Sec. 47.80.500. Statewide traumatic or acquired brain injury program.

  1. A statewide traumatic or acquired brain injury program is established in the department for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness and availability of information and services for the prevention and treatment of traumatic or acquired brain injury in the state. The department shall consult and collaborate with state agencies, private nonprofit entities, and other organizations in the state that provide brain injury services in implementing all aspects of the program.
  2. The program established under this section must include
    1. review and consideration of data collected under (c)(1) of this section;
    2. supervision and coordination of services provided to persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury;
    3. evaluation of standards pertaining to the treatment, care, and support of persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury;
    4. assessment of the availability of acute and long-term treatment, care, and support options in and outside the state for persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury;
    5. evaluation of the need for and scope of community services for persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury throughout the state;
    6. investigation of the models of service coordination that can be replicated at a local level in the state;
    7. coordination and expansion of publicly and privately funded residential and nonresidential acute and long-term services to persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury, including education, referral, and home and community-based services;
    8. facilitation of admissions to and discharges from acute and long-term care facilities for the treatment of traumatic or acquired brain injury;
    9. identification and description of available treatment and care facilities of all types for persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury based on length of stay, patient capacity, available services, and barriers encountered to community placement after discharge;
    10. a plan that describes recommendations for the development of a statewide service delivery continuum of comprehensive rehabilitative, supportive living, and community programs.
  3. The department shall
    1. establish and implement a traumatic or acquired brain injury registry of information from service providers that includes
      1. health status, including age, cause, and severity of injury and region of brain affected;
      2. acute recovery period;
      3. location of the
        1. event that caused the injury;
        2. hospital treating the injury; and
        3. residence of the person with traumatic or acquired brain injury;
      4. access to and use of rehabilitation services, including behavioral, vocational, and long-term care services;
      5. access to and use of neuropsychological assessment;
      6. status of long-term recovery at five-year intervals;
      7. financial and social effects on family;
      8. cost associated with services;
    2. establish standards and recommendations for improvement of prevention, assessment, treatment, and care of persons with traumatic or acquired brain injury in the state;
    3. contract with service providers and qualified entities to carry out the purposes of this section;
    4. provide a standardized reporting form for use in gathering data for the registry.
  4. In (c) of this section, “service provider” means a public or private entity that provides health education, group shelter, or criminal justice services to individuals in the state.

History. (§ 5 ch 109 SLA 2010)

Sec. 47.80.529. Definition.

In AS 47.80.500 47.80.529 , “traumatic or acquired brain injury” means an insult from physical force or internal damage to the brain or its coverings, not of a degenerative or congenital nature, that produces an altered mental state and that results in a decrease in cognitive, behavioral, emotional, or physical functioning.

History. (§ 5 ch 109 SLA 2010)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 47.80.590; renumbered in 2010, at which time an internal reference was conformed.

Article 7. General Provisions.

Sec. 47.80.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “council” means the Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education created by AS 47.80.030 ;
  2. “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
  3. “facilities for persons with disabilities” means publicly or privately operated facilities, or specified portions of facilities, designed primarily for the delivery of services to those persons; the term includes residential facilities;
  4. “habilitation” means education or training for persons with disabilities to enable them to function better in society;
  5. “least restrictive setting” means a residential or other setting for meeting the needs of a person with a disability that requires the least amount of restriction of personal liberty by enabling the person to function in as normal an environment as possible and to live as normally as possible, within the limitations of the disability;
  6. “person with a developmental disability” means a person who is experiencing a severe, chronic disability that
    1. is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments;
    2. is manifested before the person attains age 22;
    3. is likely to continue indefinitely;
    4. results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity: self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, self-direction, capacity for independent living, and economic self-sufficiency; and
    5. reflects the person’s need for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services that are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated;
  7. “person with a disability” means a person with a developmental disability as defined in (6) of this section or a person who is hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually impaired, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically or otherwise health impaired, or who has a specific learning disability; the term includes a child with a disability as defined in AS 14.30.350 ;
  8. “residential facility” means a publicly or privately operated facility that provides 24-hour care for four or more persons with disabilities, excluding family, foster family, or adoptive homes;
  9. “substantial disability” means a disability that prevents or substantially impedes the person’s participating in and benefiting from the social, economic, educational, recreational, or other opportunities generally available to peers in the community who are not similarly disabled.

History. (§ 2 ch 165 SLA 1978; am § 4 ch 13 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 77 SLA 1992; am § 40 ch 67 SLA 2001; am §§ 36 — 41 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1992, under § 6, ch. 13, SLA 1992, and AS 01.05.031 , “Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special Education” was substituted for “Governor’s Council for the Handicapped and Gifted”.

Paragraphs (6) and (7) were renumbered in 2006, at which time an internal reference in paragraph (7) was conformed.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “persons with disabilities” for “persons with handicaps” in paragraphs (3), (4), and (8), deleted “but is not limited to” preceding “residential facilities” in paragraph (3), substituted “person with a disability” for “handicapped person” in paragraphs (5) and (6) [now (7)], substituted “handicap” for “disability” at the end of paragraph (5) and in paragraph (9), substituted “impaired” for “handicapped” in paragraph (6) [now (7)], substituted “disabled” for “handicapped” in paragraph (9), and made a minor stylistic change.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

In re Necessity of the Hospitalization of K.M.L., 626 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1981).

Chapter 90. Displaced Homemakers.

Cross references. —

For legislative intent in connection with the enactment of this chapter, see § 1, ch. 61, SLA 1982 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For displaced homemakers’ program, see 8 AAC 88.

Sec. 47.90.010. Program established.

  1. The commissioner, in consultation with state and local government agencies, community groups, and groups concerned with displaced homemakers, may
    1. contract with eligible private profit and nonprofit corporations for multipurpose service centers for displaced homemakers; contracting under this paragraph is governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code); and
    2. coordinate existing state programs for displaced homemakers.
  2. The commissioner shall adopt regulations prescribing the standards to be met by each multipurpose service center for displaced homemakers in accordance with the policies established in this chapter.
  3. [Repealed, § 67 ch 106 SLA 1986.]
  4. To be eligible for an award of a contract under this chapter a private profit or nonprofit corporation must be governed by a board of directors whose membership is broadly representative of the community in which it operates as determined by the commissioner.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982; am §§ 64, 67 ch 106 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For introductory provisions, see 8 AAC 88, art. 1.

For conditions of contracting, see 8 AAC 88, art. 2.

For contractors’ administrative responsibilities, see 8 AAC 88, art. 3.

Sec. 47.90.020. Services provided by centers.

  1. A multipurpose service center for displaced homemakers established under AS 47.90.010 may provide the following services:
    1. job counseling services that
      1. are specifically designed for displaced homemakers;
      2. counsel displaced homemakers regarding job opportunities; and
      3. consider and build on the skills and experience of a homemaker and emphasize job readiness as well as skill development;
    2. job training and job placement services that
      1. emphasize short-term training programs that expand upon homemaking skills and volunteer experience and that lead to gainful employment;
      2. develop through cooperation with state and local government agencies and private employers training and placement programs for jobs in the public and private sector;
      3. assist displaced homemakers in gaining admission to existing public and private job-training programs and opportunities including vocational education, reentry into secondary and post-secondary education, and apprenticeship training programs; and
      4. assist in identifying community needs and creating new jobs for displaced homemakers in the public and private sector;
    3. health counseling services including referral to existing health programs with respect to
      1. general principles of preventive health care;
      2. health care consumer education, particularly in the selection of physicians and health care services including health maintenance organizations and health insurance;
      3. mental health care and transitional counseling;
      4. family health care and nutrition;
      5. alcohol and drug abuse, including the abuse of prescription drugs; and
      6. other related health care matters;
    4. financial management services that provide information and assistance relating to insurance, taxes, estate and probate matters, mortgages, loans, and related financial matters;
    5. educational services including
      1. information relating to courses offering credit through secondary or postsecondary education programs and reentry programs, including bilingual programs if appropriate, and information relating to the availability of financial assistance; and
      2. information about other programs of benefit to displaced homemakers;
    6. legal counseling and referral services;
    7. information services with respect to federal and state employment, education, health, public assistance, and unemployment assistance programs that the commissioner determines to be of benefit to displaced homemakers.
  2. A multipurpose center for displaced homemakers may provide assistance in obtaining child care, temporary babysitting expenses, and transportation when it will aid a displaced homemaker to receive services under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.90.030. Employment of displaced homemakers.

The staff positions of multipurpose centers established under AS 47.90.010 , including supervisory, technical, and administrative positions, shall to the maximum extent possible be filled by displaced homemakers.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.90.040. Consultation and cooperation.

The commissioner shall consult and cooperate with the Department of Health and Social Services; the Department of Education and Early Development; the director of the division of vocational rehabilitation; the University of Alaska, community colleges, and other colleges as appropriate; and other persons or agencies that the commissioner considers appropriate in the implementation of this chapter.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982; am § 82 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 47.90.050. State employment assistance.

Contractors operating programs under AS 47.90.010 shall, to the maximum extent possible, provide displaced homemakers with assistance in qualifying on state employment registers under regulations of the commissioner.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.90.060. Regulations.

The commissioner may adopt regulations to implement this chapter.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982)

Sec. 47.90.070. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of labor and workforce development;
  2. “displaced homemaker” means a person who
    1. has worked as a homemaker providing unsalaried services for the family for a period of at least three years;
    2. faces a significant reduction in family income or support through divorce, death, separation, desertion, or disability; and
    3. has encountered difficulty in finding employment.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 26 SLA 1984; am § 83 ch 58 SLA 1999)

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