Revisor’s notes. —
The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1984 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982, and in 1984, 1990, 1995, 2008, and 2016 to make other minor word changes.
Administrative Code. —
For health and social services, see 7 AAC.
For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 57(b), ch. 16, SLA 2021, provides that the 2021 changes made by ch. 16, SLA 2021, apply to minors subject to AS 47.12.030(a) , as amended by sec. 22, ch. 16, SLA 2021, and AS 47.12.100 “who are held in a facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a facility operated by the Department of Health and Social Services on or after July 9, 2021.”
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 16, SLA 2021 (HB 105), the basis of a number of amendments to this title relating to juveniles and criminal justice, see 2021 House Journal 181 — 182.
Chapter 05. Administration of Welfare, Social Services, and Institutions.
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
Article 1. General Administrative Provisions.
Sec. 47.05.010. Duties of department.
The Department of Health and Social Services shall
- administer adult public assistance, the Alaska temporary assistance program, and all other assistance programs, and receive and spend money made available to it;
- adopt regulations necessary for the conduct of its business and for carrying out federal and state laws granting adult public assistance, temporary cash assistance, diversion payments, or self-sufficiency services for needy families under the Alaska temporary assistance program, and other assistance;
- establish minimum standards for personnel employed by the department and adopt necessary regulations to maintain those standards;
- require those bonds and undertakings from persons employed by it that, in its judgment, are necessary, and pay the premiums on them;
- cooperate with the federal government in matters of mutual concern pertaining to adult public assistance, the Alaska temporary assistance program, and other forms of public assistance;
- make the reports, in the form and containing the information, that the federal government from time to time requires;
- cooperate with the federal government, its agencies, or instrumentalities in establishing, extending, and strengthening services for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and neglected children in danger of becoming delinquent, and receive and expend funds available to the department by the federal government, the state, or its political subdivisions for that purpose;
- cooperate with the federal government in adopting state plans to make the state eligible for federal matching in appropriate categories of assistance, and in all matters of mutual concern, including adoption of the methods of administration that are found by the federal government to be necessary for the efficient operation of welfare programs;
- adopt regulations, not inconsistent with law, defining need, prescribing the conditions of eligibility for assistance, and establishing standards for determining the amount of assistance that an eligible person is entitled to receive; the amount of the assistance is sufficient when, added to all other income and resources available to an individual, it provides the individual with a reasonable subsistence compatible with health and well-being; an individual who meets the requirements for eligibility for assistance shall be granted the assistance promptly upon application for it;
- grant to a person claiming or receiving assistance and who is aggrieved because of the department’s action or failure to act, reasonable notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ), and the department shall adopt regulations relative to this;
- enter into reciprocal agreements with other states relative to public assistance, welfare services, and institutional care that are considered advisable;
- establish the requirements of residence for public assistance, welfare services, and institutional care that are considered advisable, subject to the limitations of other laws of the state, or law or regulation imposed as conditions for federal financial participation;
- establish the divisions and local offices that are considered necessary or expedient to carry out a duty or authority assigned to it and appoint and employ the assistants and personnel that are necessary to carry on the work of the divisions and offices, and fix the compensation of the assistants or employees, except that a person engaged in business as a retail vendor of general merchandise, or a member of the immediate family of a person who is so engaged, may not serve as an acting, temporary, or permanent local agent of the department, unless the commissioner of health and social services certifies in writing to the governor, with relation to a particular community, that no other qualified person is available in the community to serve as local welfare agent; for the purposes of this paragraph, a “member of the immediate family” includes a spouse, child, parent, brother, sister, parent-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law;
- provide education and health-related services and referrals designed to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and the number of induced pregnancy terminations in the state;
- investigate reports of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property by certified nurse aides in facilities licensed by the department under AS 47.32;
- establish state policy relating to and administer federal programs subject to state control as provided under 42 U.S.C. 3001 — 3058ee (Older Americans Act of 1965), as amended, and related federal regulations;
- administer the older Alaskans service grants under AS 47.65.010 — 47.65.050 and the adult day care and family respite care grants under AS 47.65.100 ;
- actively seek to recruit quality foster parents and adoptive parents when a shortage of quality foster parents or adoptive parents exists.
History. (§ 51-1-3(a) — (m) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 1 ch 63 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 175 SLA 1968; am § 2 ch 136 SLA 1970; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 120 — 122 ch 59 SLA 1982; am §§ 8 — 10 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 6 ch 119 SLA 1984; am §§ 29 — 32 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 8 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 69 SLA 2002; am § 17 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 1 ch 34 SLA 2008; am E.O. No. 116, § 6 (2012); am § 2 ch 7 4SSLA 2016)
Cross references. —
For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For special procedures, see 7 AAC 5, art. 3.
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For permanent fund dividend distribution, see 7 AAC 38.
For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.
For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.
For definitions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 5.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.
For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.
For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.
For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.
For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.
For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.
For rates for mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 16.
For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.
For substance abuse rehabilitative services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 18.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.
For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.
For chiropractic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 25.
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.
For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.
For telemedicine applications, see 7 AAC 43, art. 30.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.
For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.
For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.
For federal heating assistance program, see 7 AAC 44, art. 1.
For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.
For senior benefits program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 3.
For Alaska senior assistance program, see 7 AAC 47, art. 5.
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
For chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48, art. 2.
For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.
For applicability, see 7 AAC 52, art. 1.
For admission to juvenile correctional facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 2.
For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.
For program and treatment, see 7 AAC 52, art. 4.
For communications and visiting, see 7 AAC 52, art. 5.
For discipline, see 7 AAC 52, art. 6.
For supervision, see 7 AAC 52, art. 7.
For juvenile detention facilities, see 7 AAC 52, art. 8.
For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.
For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.
For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54, art. 2.
For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.
For grant programs, see 7 AAC 78.
For family and youth services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 2.
For alcohol safety action program services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 3.
For grant services for individuals, see 7 AAC 81.
For services to the blind or visually impaired, see 7 AAC 82.
For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.
For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.
For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.
For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.
For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.
For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.
For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.
For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.
For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.
For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.
For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.
For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.
For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.
For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.
For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.
For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (15).
The 2008 amendment, effective August 20, 2008, added paragraphs (16) and (17).
The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (10), substituted “office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” for “department” following “for a fair hearing by the”.
The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, added (18), and made a related change.
Notes to Decisions
Stated in
Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979); Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015).
Collateral references. —
39 Am. Jur. 2d, Health, §§ 1 et seq., 19-44
63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Funds, § 53
70A Am. Jur. 2d, Social Security and Medicare, § 1 et seq.
79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, § 1 et seq.
81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 1-51.
Sec. 47.05.012. Material incorporated by reference.
Under AS 44.62.245(a)(2) , in adopting or amending a regulation that incorporates a document or other material by reference, the department may incorporate future amended versions of the document or other material if the document or other material is one of the following:
-
a document that is published, compiled, or prepared by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and is included in the following list:
- the international classification of diseases, clinical modifications;
- the common procedure coding system;
- the specifications for national uniform billing data elements;
- the federal poverty guidelines for the state;
- the Indian Health Service encounter rates; or
- the relative value units used in the Medicare program for determination of fee schedules;
- the current procedural terminology for physicians published by the American Medical Association;
- the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association;
- the length of stay in hospitals by diagnosis and operation for the western region of the United States, published by Solucient;
- the relative value guide published by the American Society of Anesthesiologists;
- the consumer price index published by the United States Department of Labor;
- the health plan employer data and information set published by the National Committee for Quality Assurance;
- practice standards adopted by the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Diabetes Association, American Cancer Society, American Academy of Family Physicians, American College of Physicians, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, or the National Asthma Education and Prevention Program;
- the compendium of animal rabies prevention and control published by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
- the control of communicable diseases manual published by the American Public Health Association;
- the standards manual and interpretative guidelines for behavioral health, employment and community support services, and for medical rehabilitation published by the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitative Facilities;
- consumer assessment of health plans published by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research;
- resources for optimal care of the injured patient published by the Committee on Trauma, American College of Surgeons;
- a document related to a resuscitation protocol that is published, compiled, or prepared based on the recommendations from the International Liaison Committee on Resuscitation;
- the preferred drug list adopted by the department under AS 47.07.065(b) ; or
- a prior authorization medications list under a state program permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (Title XIX, Social Security Act).
History. (§ 2 ch 119 SLA 1998; am § 15 ch 20 SLA 2002; am § 68 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 9 ch 59 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 2012; am § 5 ch 18 SLA 2019)
Cross references. —
For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
Administrative Code. —
For trauma centers and trauma registry, see 7 AAC 26, art. 7.
For control of diseases of public health importance, see 7 AAC 27, art. 1.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.
For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.
For public health services, see 7 AAC 80, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, inserted “prevention and” and “, 2002,” in paragraph (9).
The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, deleted “2002” following “prevention and control” in paragraph (9).
The 2012 amendment, effective August 22, 2012, added (14) and made a related stylistic change.
The 2019 amendment, effective August 9, 2019, added (15) and (16) and made related stylistic changes.
Sec. 47.05.015. Contracts.
- The department may contract with a person or local government for the delivery of services to be provided by the department under AS 47.05.010 if the commissioner determines the service will be provided at less cost to the state or will be provided in a more effective manner.
- Services that may be provided by contract under this section include accepting applications for assistance, conducting interviews, making eligibility determinations, and issuing benefits, but do not include adoption of program standards or other matters involving the exercise of agency discretion.
- A contract authorized under this section is exempt from the competitive bid requirements of AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code). In awarding a contract under this section the department shall request proposals in accordance with regulations of the Department of Administration under AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).
- This section does not limit the authority provided by law for the department to contract for the delivery of services other than those provided under AS 47.05.010 .
History. (§ 11 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 57 ch 106 SLA 1986)
Administrative Code. —
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.
For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.
For residential child care facility grants, see 7 AAC 53, art. 5.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Sec. 47.05.017. Home care providers.
- State money may not be used for a home care provider unless criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 is requested for the provider within 10 business days after the provider is hired to provide the care and is reviewed within five business days after it is received. The department shall require the grantee or contractor to do the information request and review required under this subsection for a home care provider employed by a person who has a grant or contract from the department to provide home care services.
-
The department shall adopt regulations identifying actions that it will take, in addition to those otherwise required under AS 47.17 and AS 47.24, when a report of harm is made under AS 47.17 or AS 47.24 that might relate to harm caused by actions or inactions of a public home care provider. The regulations must
- address circumstances under which the department will, or will require a contractor or grantee to, reassign, suspend, or terminate a person alleged to have perpetrated harm;
- include appropriate procedural safeguards to protect the due process rights of public home care providers who may be reassigned, suspended, or terminated under the circumstances described in (1) of this subsection; and
- if the home care provider is a certified nurse aide, include procedures under which the department shall notify the Board of Nursing if the nurse aide is suspected of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property.
- In this section, “public home care provider” means a person who is paid by the state, or by an entity that has contracted with the state or received a grant from state funds, to provide homemaker services, chore services, personal care services, home health care services, or similar services in or around a client’s private residence or to provide respite care in either the client’s residence or the caregiver’s residence or facility.
History. (§ 2 ch 45 SLA 1994; am § 9 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 23 SLA 2004)
Cross references. —
P.L. 105-277, division A, Sec. 101(b) (title I, Sec. 124(a)), 112 Stat. 2681-50, 2681-73, provided that: “A nursing facility or home health care agency may submit a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange of [criminal history records corresponding to the fingerprints or other identification information submitted] regarding an applicant for employment if the employment position is involved in direct patient care.”
Administrative Code. —
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2004 amendment, effective April 24, 2004, in subsection (a), substituted “criminal history record information as permitted by P.L. 105-277 and AS 12.62 is” for “records under AS 12.62.035(a) are” and made related changes in the first sentence, and substituted “information” for “records” in the second sentence.
Sec. 47.05.020. Regulations concerning records; disclosure of information.
- The power of the department to adopt regulations includes the power to adopt and enforce reasonable regulations governing the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, files, and communications of the department. The regulations must provide that financial information concerning an eligibility determination of a person applying for or receiving cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services under the Alaska temporary assistance program shall be disclosed to a legislator on request of the legislator in connection with official purposes within the scope of the legislator’s legislative functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law. When, under the law, names and addresses of recipients of public assistance are furnished to or held by another agency or department of government, the agency or department of government shall adopt regulations necessary to prevent the publication of the lists or their use for purposes not directly connected with the administration of public assistance and legislative functions. A legislator to whom information relating to the Alaska temporary assistance program is disclosed under this section may not further disclose the information except to another legislator and then only in connection with official purposes within each legislator’s legislative functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law.
- In addition to any access to public assistance records authorized under (a) of this section, the department shall provide a copy of a public assistance record prepared or maintained by or on behalf of the department to the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, upon the request of the respective agency. If the record is in an electronic data base, the department shall provide the requesting agency with either access to the data base, or a copy of the information in the data base and a statement certifying its contents. The agency receiving the information under this subsection may use the information only for child support purposes authorized under law.
History. (§ 51-1-3(n) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 33 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 145 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 7 ch 69 SLA 2002)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Editor’s notes. —
The delayed repeal of (b) of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.
Collateral references. —
Communications to social worker as privileged. 50 ALR3d 563.
Confidentiality of records as to recipients of public welfare. 54 ALR3d 768.
Sec. 47.05.030. Misuse of public assistance lists and records.
- Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this section and for purposes directly connected with the administration of general assistance, adult public assistance, the day care assistance program authorized under AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.095 , or the Alaska temporary assistance program, and in accordance with the regulations of the department, a person may not solicit, disclose, receive, make use of, or authorize, knowingly permit, participate in, or acquiesce in the use of, a list of or names of, or information concerning, persons applying for or receiving the assistance directly or indirectly derived from the records, papers, files, or communications of the department or subdivisions or agencies of the department, or acquired in the course of the performance of official duties.
- It is not a violation of (a) of this section for the department or an employee of the department to disclose to a legislator, or for a legislator to solicit, receive, or make use of, financial information concerning an eligibility determination of a person applying for or receiving cash assistance, a diversion payment, or self-sufficiency services under the Alaska temporary assistance program if the disclosure, solicitation, receipt, and use are for official purposes in connection with the legislator’s official functions and related to the administration of the program consistent with federal law. Information provided to a legislator under this subsection shall remain confidential and may not be further disclosed except as provided in AS 47.05.020 .
- It is not a violation of (a) of this section for the department or an employee of the department to disclose information to the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, if the receiving agency requests the information only for purposes authorized under AS 47.05.020 .
History. (§ 51-1-3(o) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1951; am § 56 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 6 ch 272 SLA 1976; am §§ 34, 35 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 146 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 74 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 8 ch 69 SLA 2002; am E.O. No. 108 § 9 (2003))
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2003, “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.095 ” was substituted for “AS 47.25.001 — 47.25.009” to reflect the 2003 renumbering of AS 47.25.002 — 47.25.009.
In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in (c) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.
In 2016, in subsection (a), “and (c)” was added following ‘‘provided in (b)’’ to correct a manifest error of omission in ch. 87, SLA 1997.
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Editor’s notes. —
The delayed repeal of (c) of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.
Notes to Decisions
The legislature has made disclosure of welfare records unlawful. It has left no room for the exercise of agency discretion to decide whether or not records not directly connected with the administration of welfare programs should be produced in compliance with a court order. Mace v. Jung, 386 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1963), overruled, Adkins v. Lester, 530 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1974), overruled in part, Adkins v. Lester, 530 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1974).
Quoted in
Hertz v. Hertz, 847 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1993).
Sec. 47.05.032. Disclosures to legislators.
A legislator to whom confidential information is disclosed under AS 47.05.020 — 47.05.030 is not subject to a penalty for further disclosure of the information unless, at the time the information was provided to the legislator, the legislator was given written notification that the material was confidential.
History. (§ 36 ch 107 SLA 1996)
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
Sec. 47.05.040. Consent to conditions of federal programs.
In order to take advantage of the training grants provisions of 42 U.S.C. 301 — 1397f (Social Security Act), as amended, the state, through the department, consents and agrees to all conditions required by federal statute and regulation necessary for the state to participate fully in the training grants or other programs.
History. (§ 4 ch 133 SLA 1957)
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.
For operations, see 7 AAC 52, art. 3.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
For confidentiality of client records: juvenile justice, see 7 AAC 54, art. 3.
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
Sec. 47.05.050. Cooperation with federal government.
It is the public policy of the state to cooperate and coordinate with the United States government and its agencies in providing for and administering federal and state laws for adult public assistance and the other assistance that is provided for or extended to the people of the state.
History. (§ 51-1-4 ACLA 1949; am § 12 ch 138 SLA 1982)
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For adult public assistance, see 7 AAC 40.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For Alaska temporary assistance program, see 7 AAC 45.
For hearings, see 7 AAC 49.
For subsidized adoption and subsidized guardianship payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 2.
Sec. 47.05.055. Certified nurse aides.
- If the department has reason to believe that a certified nurse aide employed in a facility licensed by the department under AS 47.32 as a hospital or nursing home has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property in connection with the person’s duties as a certified nurse aide at the facility, the department shall investigate the matter. The department shall conduct proceedings to determine whether a finding of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property should be made. These proceedings shall be conducted under AS 44.62.330 — 44.62.630 . A finding under this subsection that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property shall be reported by the department to the Board of Nursing.
- If the certified nurse aide is employed in a skilled nursing facility or nursing facility, other than an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, that is participating in the Medicaid or Medicare program, only the state survey and certification agency may make, and report to the Board of Nursing, a finding that a certified nurse aide has committed abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property in connection with the nurse aide’s employment at the facility.
History. (§ 10 ch 2 SLA 1998; am § 18 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 14 ch 42 SLA 2013)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, in subsection (a) substituted “under AS 47.32 as a hospital or nursing home” for “under AS 18.20” and made a stylistic change.
The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.
Sec. 47.05.060. Purpose and policy relating to children.
The purpose of this title as it relates to children is to secure for each child the care and guidance, preferably in the child’s own home, that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen the child’s family ties unless efforts to preserve and strengthen the ties are likely to result in physical or emotional damage to the child, removing the child from the custody of the parents only as a last resort when the child’s welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the child is removed from the family, to secure for the child adequate custody and care and adequate planning for permanent placement of the child. It is the policy of the state to acknowledge and take into account the principles of early childhood and youth brain development and, whenever possible, consider the concepts of early adversity, toxic stress, childhood trauma, and the promotion of resilience through protective relationships, supports, self-regulation, and services.
History. (§ 2 ch 152 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 29 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 75 SLA 2018)
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added the last sentence.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
Many of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under former AS 47.10.280 .
Protection of children is the paramount purpose governing enactment of laws pertaining to children’s courts and institutions. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Child in Need of Aid proceedings are designed to protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well-being. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).
No actionable duty in tort. —
In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
Notions of benevolent protective policies cannot be used to validate departures from positive law relating to the adjudicative and dispositive phases of children’s proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Nor to justify dispensing with constitutional safeguards. —
The benevolent social theory supposedly underlying children’s court acts does not furnish justification for dispensing with constitutional safeguards. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Hearing required. —
So long as a child remains a a ward of the court the parents are entitled to review of the order terminating rights upon a showing of good cause. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
Denial of Rita T. Hearing. —
Superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying father a Rita T. hearing when he subsequently sought to withdraw his relinquishment of parental rights; the record demonstrated that the father did not have the ability to properly care for the special needs of his children. Alden H. v. Office of Children's Servs., 108 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2005).
The purpose of the supervision or treatment contemplated by the creation of the child in need of supervision [now child in need of aid] and its predecessor noncriminal delinquency was reintegration of the child into her family and resumption of parental custody including parental control. L. A. M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
Applied in
Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981); E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).
Quoted in
In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1986); In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987); In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).
Stated in
D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).
Cited in
Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018); State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Sec. 47.05.065. Legislative findings related to children.
The legislature finds that
-
parents have the following rights and responsibilities relating to the care and control of their child while the child is a minor:
- the responsibility to provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care;
- the right and responsibility to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, including the right to direct the child’s medical care and the right to exercise reasonable corporal discipline;
- the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live;
- the right and responsibility to make decisions of legal or financial significance concerning the child;
- the right to obtain representation for the child in legal actions; and
- the responsibility to provide special safeguards and care, including appropriate prenatal and postnatal protection for the child;
-
it is the policy of the state to strengthen families and to protect children from child abuse and neglect; the state recognizes that, in some cases, protection of a child may require removal of the child from the child’s home; however,
- except in those cases involving serious risk to a child’s health or safety, the Department of Health and Social Services should provide time-limited family support services to the child and the child’s family in order to offer parents the opportunity to remedy parental conduct or conditions in the home that placed the child at risk of harm so that a child may return home safely and permanently; and
- the state also recognizes that when a child is removed from the home, visitation between the child and the child’s parents or guardian and family members reduces the trauma for the child and enhances the likelihood that the child will be able to return home; therefore, whenever a child is removed from the parental home, the Department of Health and Social Services should encourage frequent, regular, and reasonable visitation of the child with the child’s parent or guardian and family members;
- it is the policy of the state to recognize that, when a child is a ward of the state, the child is entitled to reasonable safety, adequate care, and adequate treatment and that the Department of Health and Social Services as legal custodian and the child’s guardian ad litem as guardian of the child’s best interests and their agents and assignees, each should make reasonable efforts to ensure that the child is provided with reasonable safety, adequate care, and adequate treatment for the duration of time that the child is a ward of the state;
-
it is in the best interests of a child who has been removed from the child’s own home for the state to apply the following principles in resolving the situation:
- the child should be placed in a safe, secure, and stable environment;
- the child should not be moved unnecessarily;
- a planning process should be followed to lead to permanent placement of the child;
- every effort should be made to encourage psychological attachment between the adult caregiver and the child;
- frequent, regular, and reasonable visitation with the parent or guardian and family members should be encouraged;
- parents and guardians must actively participate in family support services so as to facilitate the child’s being able to remain in the home; when children are removed from the home, the parents and guardians must actively participate in family support services to make return of their children to the home possible; and
- to the extent practicable, the Department of Health and Social Services should enable a child’s contact with previous out-of-home caregivers when appropriate and in the best interests of the child;
-
numerous studies establish that
- children undergo a critical attachment process before the time they reach six years of age;
- a child who has not attached with an adult caregiver during this critical stage will suffer significant emotional damage that frequently leads to chronic psychological problems and antisocial behavior when the child reaches adolescence and adulthood; and
- it is important to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that all children, especially those under the age of six years, who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes expeditiously.
History. (§ 14 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Cross references. —
For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to this section, see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (4)(G) and made related changes.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Child’s continuous residence with foster parents. —
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that among several factors, many of which weighed equally between the parties, the child’s continuous residence with foster parents for 30 of his 37 months by the end of trial took on the most importance; this did not amount to a single factor outweighing all others in applying the “best interests of the child” standard and accorded with the finding in AS 47.05.065 (5)(C). In re Adoption of Bernard A., 77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003).
In father’s suit claiming that a social worker and supervisor failed to comply with CINA procedures, qualified immunity applied to bar most of father’s state law tort claims because the social worker and her supervisor acted within the scope of their authority and discretion; subsection (4)(A) of this section precluded father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008).
Reinstatement of parental rights. —
Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because it was not clearly erroneous to find that the mother and her sister were similarly situated with respect to their bonds with the child, who had lived with the sister; over two years passed between the initial reinstatement order and the superior court's supplemental findings, and the superior court most heavily weighed the child's emotional well-being, namely his ability to maintain all familial bonds. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).
Child’s need for permanency. —
Superior court may consider a child’s need for permanency at the time of a termination trial when making its best interest determination, as the legislature has recognized that children under six can suffer significant emotional damage if they do not have permanency in their lives. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).
Young children have unique needs for permanency and bonding. At the time of termination, the child was only eight months old. He had spent his entire life in his grandmother’s care and had developed a strong bond with his grandmother and his older sister. It was in his best interests to remain with the grandmother, and the best interests of the child, not the parent, are paramount. Mother had not bonded with her son and had continued her long-time abuse of cocaine both during and after the pregnancy. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father a termination trial continuance because the father showed no serious prejudice by showing the father could timely remedy conduct causing the father's child to be in need of aid, as (1) a short continuance did not provide enough time for needed services, and (2) a long continuance was not in the child's best interests. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Consideration of necessary factors. —
Remand on the mother's request for reinstatement of parental rights was necessary because, despite stating it considered the factors in this section, the court did not make any findings about the child's best interest. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Because the disputed factual findings supporting the best interests determination were not material or not clearly erroneous, the decision granting a mother reinstatement of her parental rights had to be affirmed; the superior court made findings about the child's age, his attachment to caregivers, his opportunities to maintain visitation with those to whom he was bonded, the safety, security, and stability of the mother's home, and the necessity of moving the child from his placement. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).
Stated in
Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).
Cited in
M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008); Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009); Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).
Sec. 47.05.070. Third party liability subrogation.
- The department may not pay medical claims that are payable by a third party payor. Medical providers shall attempt collection from the third party payor before billing Medicaid. Before payment by Medicaid, evidence of third-party denial or partial payment shall be presented with the claim.
- When the department provides or pays for medical assistance for injury or illness under this title, the department is subrogated to not more than the part of an insurance payment or other recovery by the recipient that is for medical expenses provided by the department. Notwithstanding the assertion of any action or claim by the recipient of medical assistance, the department may bring an action in the superior court against an alleged third-party payor to recover an amount subrogated to the department for medical assistance provided on behalf of a recipient.
- If a recipient of medical assistance under this title settles a claim or obtains an award or judgment arising from the injury or illness for which the medical assistance was received, the amount of the claim to which the department is entitled under (b) of this section shall be reduced by a pro rata share of the attorney fees and litigation costs. Regardless of the manner in which the amount of the attorney fees is derived in the particular case, the pro rata reduction of the subrogated claim for reimbursement of attorney fees shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable rules of court governing the award of attorney fees in civil matters.
- The department is authorized to enter into contracts for the collection of medical expenses already paid by Medicaid from potential third-party payors. The department may pay, from the funds recovered by the contractor, any amounts owing to the federal government as its share of the Medicaid paid claim, and the costs of collecting the funds.
- [Repealed, § 9 ch 96 SLA 2006.]
- The department may adopt regulations to interpret and implement this section.
History. (§ 2 ch 105 SLA 1986; am §§ 6 — 8 ch 85 SLA 2000; am §§ 2, 9 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Cross references. —
For applicability of the 2000 amendments of subsections (b) and (c), and the addition of subsections (e) and (f), see sec. 10(b), ch. 85, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary & Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2006 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, rewrote subsection (b) and repealed subsection (e).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional amendment of (b) of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 2, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 2, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Notes to Decisions
Stated in
Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010).
Sec. 47.05.071. Duty of a medical assistance recipient.
- A medical assistance recipient shall cooperate with and assist the department in identifying and providing information concerning third parties who may be liable to pay for care and services received by the recipient under the medical assistance program.
-
As a condition of medical assistance eligibility, a person who applies for medical assistance shall, at the time of application,
- assign to the department the applicant’s rights of payment for care and services from any third party to the extent the department has paid medical assistance for care and services;
- cooperate with and assist the department in identifying and providing information concerning third parties who may be liable to pay for care and services received by the recipient under the medical assistance program; and
- agree to make application for all other available third-party resources that may be used to provide or pay for the cost of care or services received by the medical assistance recipient or that may be used to finance reimbursement to the state for the cost of care or services received by the medical assistance recipient; a medical assistance recipient is under no duty to file a civil or other action for the purpose of reimbursing the state for the cost of care or services.
History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Sec. 47.05.072. Duty of attorney for medical assistance recipient.
- An attorney representing a medical assistance recipient shall notify the attorney general’s office.
-
The notice to the attorney general’s office required under (a) of this section includes submission of the following:
- identification of the medical assistance recipient’s name, last known address, and telephone number, and the date of the injury or illness giving rise to the action or claim;
- copies of the pleadings and other papers related to the action or claim;
- the identification of each potentially liable third party, including that party’s name, last known address, and telephone number;
- the identification of any insurance policy potentially responsive to the action or claim; and
- a description of the facts and circumstances supporting the action or claim.
- An attorney who represents a medical assistance recipient shall give the attorney general’s office notice within 30 days of any judgment, award, or settlement in an action or claim by the medical assistance recipient to recover damages for an injury or illness that has resulted in the department’s providing or paying for medical assistance.
- If a medical assistance recipient is handling the action or claim on a pro se basis, the provisions of this section apply as if the medical assistance recipient were an attorney representing the medical assistance recipient.
History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Sec. 47.05.073. Judgment, award, or settlement of a medical assistance lien.
- A medical assistance recipient may not maintain any rights to payment for medical costs as a result of a judgment, award, or settlement of an action or claim for which another person may be legally obligated to pay without first making repayment to the department for costs of past medical assistance services provided to or paid for on behalf of the medical assistance recipient that relate to that action or claim.
- A medical assistance recipient may not place any payment as a result of a judgment, award, or settlement of an action or claim for which another person was legally obligated to pay because of injury or illness into any trust for the purpose of maintaining public assistance or medical assistance eligibility without first making repayment to the department for costs of past medical assistance services provided to the medical assistance recipient related to that action or claim.
- The attorney general may only discharge a medical assistance lien under AS 47.05.075 if the discharge complies with federal law.
- Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, a third-party payor shall have no further liability if it settles or compromises a dispute in good faith and without knowledge that the individual is a recipient of medical assistance.
History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Sec. 47.05.074. Conflict with federal requirements.
If any provision of this chapter related to subrogation, assignment, or lien conflicts with federal law concerning the Medicaid program or receipt of federal money to finance the medical assistance program, the provision does not apply to the extent of the conflict.
History. (§ 3 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional enactment of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 3, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Sec. 47.05.075. Medical assistance lien.
- The department has a lien upon any sum that may be due to the recipient of medical assistance from a third-party payor. The lien is in the amount of the medical assistance paid for medical services under this title, together with reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the enforcement of the lien.
- A lien against a sum due from a third-party payor for medical services provided to a recipient of medical assistance under this title attaches and is effective upon filing with a recorder’s office in any recording district in the state. However, a lien filed under this subsection is not perfected and has no effect unless notice of filing of the lien is served by the department upon the third-party payor, personally or by registered, certified, or insured mail, return receipt requested.
- If a recipient of medical assistance under this title settles a claim or obtains an award or judgment arising from the injury or illness for which the medical assistance was received, the amount of the lien to which the department is entitled under (a) of this section shall be reduced by a pro rata share of the attorney fees and litigation costs. Regardless of the manner in which the amount of the attorney fees is derived in the particular case, the pro rata reduction of the lien shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable rules of court governing the award of attorney fees in civil matters.
- A perfected lien under this section has priority over all other liens except tax liens and a lien perfected for attorney fees and costs.
History. (§ 9 ch 85 SLA 2000; am § 4 ch 96 SLA 2006)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2006 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “over all other liens except tax liens and a lien perfected for attorney fees and costs” for “immediately after a lien perfected by a hospital, nurse, or physician under AS 34.35.450 — 34.35.480 ” in subsection (d).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 10, ch. 96, SLA 2006, provides that the 2006 conditional amendment of (d) of this section applies “to a cause of action related to a subrogation, assignment, or lien by the Department of Health & Social Services that accrues on or after the effective date of [§ 4, ch. 96, SLA 2006].” Under § 4, ch. 39, SLA 2008, the effective date of § 4, ch. 96, SLA 2006 is May 23, 2008.
Sec. 47.05.080. Recovery of overpayments.
- Except for overpayments recovered under AS 47.07 that cover the value of services paid from federal sources, benefit overpayments collected by the department in administering public assistance programs under AS 47.05.010 shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue under AS 37.10.050(a) .
- The permanent fund dividend of a former recipient of a public assistance program listed under (a) of this section may be taken under AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.170 to satisfy the balance due on a defaulted overpayment claim.
History. (§ 91 ch 36 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 35 SLA 1995; am § 37 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 10 SLA 2016)
Revisor's notes. —
In 2018, “AS 43.23.140(b)(6) and 43.23.170 ” was substituted for “AS 43.23.065(b)(6) and 43.23.068 ” to reflect the renumbering of those sections.
Cross references. — For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 10, SLA 2016, see 2016 Senate Journal 1611 — 1612.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote (a).
Editor's notes. — Under sec. 2, ch. 10, SLA 2016, the changes made to subsection (a) in sec. 1, ch. 10, SLA 2016, apply to “to the recovery of benefit overpayments for public assistance programs administered by the Department of Health and Social Services under AS 47.05.010 , regardless of whether the overpayments occurred before, on, or after July 1, 2016.”
Sec. 47.05.085. Subpoena power.
- The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee at the director level may issue subpoenas to compel the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records considered necessary as evidence in connection with an investigation under or the administration of AS 47.07 (medical assistance), AS 47.08 (assistance for catastrophic illnesses and acute or chronic medical conditions), AS 47.25 (day care assistance, child care grants, general relief, adult public assistance, and food stamps), and AS 47.27 (Alaska temporary assistance program).
- In case of refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person under (a) of this section, the superior court may, upon application by the department, issue an order requiring the person to appear before the department to produce evidence if ordered. Failure to obey the order of the court is punishable as contempt.
- A person who, without just cause, fails or refuses to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records, if it is in the person’s power to do so, in obedience to a subpoena of the department or an authorized representative of it, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $200, or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by both. Each day the failure or refusal continues is a separate offense.
History. (§ 2 ch 97 SLA 2004)
Sec. 47.05.090. Authorization of the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance.
- The Department of Health and Social Services may, on behalf of the state, enter into the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance and supplementary agreements with agencies of other states for the provision of adoption and medical assistance under AS 47.07 and other provisions of this title for eligible children with special needs.
- In this section, “state” includes a state, territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
History. (§ 15 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Administrative Code. —
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Sec. 47.05.100. Monthly reports concerning children.
By the 15th day of each month, the Department of Health and Social Services shall provide a report summarizing child protection activities carried out during the previous calendar month and the status of children committed to the department’s custody, including information on the number and type of reports of child abuse and neglect received, the outcome of investigations completed, the number of placements of children committed to the department’s custody, and the number of foster homes licensed. The report shall be made accessible to the public through the Internet.
History. (§ 15 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Sec. 47.05.105. Enhanced computerized eligibility verification system.
- The department shall establish an enhanced computerized income, asset, and identity eligibility verification system for the purposes of verifying eligibility, eliminating duplication of public assistance payments, and deterring waste and fraud in public assistance programs administered by the department under AS 47.05.010 . Nothing in this section prohibits the department from verifying eligibility for public assistance through additional procedures or authorizes the department or a third-party vendor to use data to verify eligibility for a federal program if the use of that data is prohibited by federal law.
- The department shall enter into a competitively bid contract with a third- party vendor for the purpose of developing a system under this section to prevent fraud, misrepresentation, and inadequate documentation when determining an applicant’s eligibility for public assistance before the payment of benefits and for periodically verifying eligibility between eligibility redeterminations and during eligibility redeterminations and reviews. The department may also contract with a third-party vendor to provide information to facilitate reviews of recipient eligibility and income verification.
- The annual savings to the state resulting from the use of the system under this section must exceed the cost of implementing the system. A contract under this section must require the third-party vendor to report annual savings to the state realized from implementing the system. Payment to the third-party vendor may be based on a fee for each applicant and may include incentives for achieving a rate of success established by the department for identifying duplication, waste, and fraud in public assistance programs.
- To avoid a conflict of interest, the department may not award a contract to provide services for the enrollment of public assistance providers or applicants under this title to a vendor that is awarded a contract under this section.
History. (§ 39 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Section 39, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect September 19, 2016.
Article 2. Oversight of Medical Care Programs.
Sec. 47.05.200. Annual audits.
- The department shall annually contract for independent audits of a statewide sample of all medical assistance providers in order to identify overpayments and violations of criminal statutes. The audits conducted under this section may not be conducted by the department or employees of the department. The number of audits under this section may not be less than 50 each year. The audits under this section must include both on-site audits and desk audits and must be of a variety of provider types. The department may not award a contract under this subsection to an organization that does not retain persons with a significant level of expertise and recent professional practice in the general areas of standard accounting principles and financial auditing and in the specific areas of medical records review, investigative research, and Alaska health care criminal law. The contractor, in consultation with the commissioner, shall select the providers to be audited and decide the ratio of desk audits and on-site audits to the total number selected. In identifying providers who are subject to an audit under this section, the department shall attempt to minimize concurrent state or federal audits.
-
Within 90 days after receiving each audit report from an audit conducted under this section, the department shall begin administrative procedures to recoup overpayments identified in the audits and shall allocate the reasonable and necessary financial and human resources to ensure prompt recovery of overpayments unless the attorney general has advised the commissioner in writing that a criminal investigation of an audited provider has been or is about to be undertaken, in which case, the commissioner shall hold the administrative procedure in abeyance until a final charging decision by the attorney general has been made. The commissioner shall provide copies of all audit reports to the attorney general so that the reports can be screened for the purpose of bringing criminal charges. The department may assess interest and penalties on any identified overpayment. Interest under this subsection shall be calculated using the statutory rates for postjudgment interest accruing from the date of the issuance of the final agency decision to recoup overpayments identified in the audit. In this subsection, the date of issuance of the final agency decision is the later of the date of
- the department’s written notification of the decision and the provider’s appeal rights; or
- if timely appealed by the provider, a final agency decision under AS 44.64.060 .
- Each fiscal year, the state’s share of recovered overpayments obtained because of the required contract audits under this section shall be deposited with the commissioner of revenue under AS 37.10.050 and separately accounted for by the commissioner of administration under AS 37.05.142 . The legislature may appropriate a portion of the estimated balance in the account to the department to pay for the annual audits described in this section.
-
As a condition of obtaining payment under AS 47.07 and AS 47.08 and for purposes of this section, a provider shall allow
- the department reasonable access to the records of medical assistance recipients and providers; and
- audit and inspection of the records by state and federal agencies.
- This section does not preclude the department from performing audits that are allowed or required under other laws.
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003; am §§ 40, 41 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, in (a), inserted “may not be less than 50” preceding “each year”, deleted “, as a total for the medical assistance programs under AS 47.07 and AS 47.08, shall be .75 percent of all enrolled providers under the programs, adjusted annually on July 1, as determined by the department, except that the number of audits under this section may not be less than 75” following “each year”, added the last sentence; in (b), added the language beginning “The department may assess interest” to the end of the subsection.
Notes to Decisions
Quoted in
Smart v. State, 237 P.3d 1010 (Alaska 2010).
Sec. 47.05.210. Medical assistance fraud.
-
A person commits the crime of medical assistance fraud if the person
- knowingly submits or authorizes the submission of a claim to a medical assistance agency for property, services, or a benefit with reckless disregard that the claimant is not entitled to the property, services, or benefit;
- knowingly prepares or assists another person to prepare a claim for submission to a medical assistance agency for property, services, or a benefit with reckless disregard that the claimant is not entitled to the property, services, or benefit;
-
except as otherwise authorized under the medical assistance program, confers, offers to confer, solicits, agrees to accept, or accepts property, services, or a benefit
- to refer a medical assistance recipient to a health care provider; or
- for providing health care to a medical assistance recipient if the property, services, or benefit is in addition to payment by a medical assistance agency;
- does not produce medical assistance records to a person authorized to request the records;
- knowingly makes a false entry in or falsely alters a medical assistance record;
- knowingly destroys, mutilates, suppresses, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a medical assistance record knowing that the person lacks the authority to do so; or
- violates a provision of AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 or a regulation adopted under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08.
-
Medical assistance fraud under (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section is
- a class B felony if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is $25,000 or more;
- a class C felony if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is $500 or more but less than $25,000;
- a class A misdemeanor if the portion of the claim or claims submitted in violation of (a)(1) or (2) of this section, or the value of the property, services, or benefit that is in violation of (a)(3) of this section, is less than $500.
- Medical assistance fraud under (a)(4), (5), or (6) of this section is a class A misdemeanor.
- Medical assistance fraud under (a)(7) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.
Sec. 47.05.220. Notice of charges.
Upon the filing of a complaint, information, presentment, or indictment charging a medical assistance provider with a crime under AS 47.05.210 , the attorney general shall, in writing, notify the commissioner of the filing. Upon receiving notice from the attorney general under this section, the commissioner shall immediately undertake a review of all unpaid claims or requests for reimbursements attributable to services claimed to have been provided by the person charged.
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
Sec. 47.05.230. Determination of value; aggregation of amounts.
In AS 47.05.210 , whenever it is necessary to determine the value of property, that value shall be determined in accordance with AS 11.46.980 . In determining the degree or classification of a crime described under AS 47.05.210 , amounts involved in criminal acts committed under one course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, shall be aggregated.
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Sec. 47.05.235. Duty to identify and repay self-identified overpayments.
- Unless a provider is being audited under AS 47.05.200(a) , an enrolled medical assistance provider shall conduct a biennial review or audit of a statistically valid sample of claims submitted to the department for reimbursement. If overpayments are identified, the medical assistance provider shall report the overpayment to the department not later than 10 business days after identification of the overpayment. The report must also identify how the medical assistance provider intends to repay the department. After the department receives the report, the medical assistance provider and the department shall enter into an agreement establishing a schedule for repayment of the identified overpayment. The agreement may authorize repayment in a lump sum, in a payment plan, or by offsetting future billings, as approved by the department.
- The department may not assess interest or penalties on an overpayment identified and repaid by a medical assistance provider under this section.
History. (§ 42 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Section 42, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.
Sec. 47.05.240. Exclusion from medical assistance programs.
-
The commissioner may exclude an applicant to or disenroll a medical assistance provider in the medical assistance program in AS 47.07 or AS 47.08, or both, for a period of up to 10 years after unconditional discharge on a conviction
- for medical assistance fraud under AS 47.05.210 or misconduct involving a controlled substance under AS 11.71; or
- in a court of the United States or a court of another state or territory, for a crime with elements similar to the crimes included under (1) of this subsection.
- After a period of exclusion under (a) of this section, an applicant may not participate in a medical assistance program under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 until the applicant establishes to the commissioner by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant possesses all required licenses and certificates and is qualified to participate.
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.
Sec. 47.05.250. Civil penalties.
- The department may assess a civil penalty against a provider who violates this chapter, AS 47.07, or regulations adopted under this chapter or AS 47.07.
- The department shall adopt regulations establishing a range of civil penalties that the department may assess against a provider under this section. In establishing the range of civil penalties, the department shall take into account appropriate factors, including the seriousness of the violation, the service provided by the provider, and the severity of the penalty. The regulations may not provide for a civil penalty of less than $100 or more than $25,000 for each violation.
- The provisions of this section are in addition to any other remedies available under this chapter, AS 47.07, or regulations adopted under this chapter or AS 47.07.
- A provider against whom a civil penalty of less than $2,500 is assessed may appeal the decision assessing the penalty to the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish time limits and procedures for an appeal under this subsection. The decision of the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee may be appealed to the office of administrative hearings established under AS 44.64.
- A provider against whom a civil penalty of $2,500 or more is assessed may appeal the decision assessing the penalty to the office of administrative hearings established under AS 44.64.
History. (§ 43 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Section 43, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.
Sec. 47.05.270. Medical assistance reform program.
-
The department shall adopt regulations to design and implement a program for reforming the state medical assistance program under AS 47.07. The reform program must include
- referrals to community and social support services, including career and education training services available through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development under AS 23.15, the University of Alaska, or other sources;
- electronic distribution of an explanation of medical assistance benefits to recipients for health care services received under the program;
- expanding the use of telehealth for primary care, behavioral health, and urgent care;
- enhancing fraud prevention, detection, and enforcement;
- reducing the cost of behavioral health, senior, and disabilities services provided to recipients of medical assistance under the state’s home and community-based services waiver under AS 47.07.045 ;
- pharmacy initiatives;
- enhanced care management;
-
redesigning the payment process by implementing fee agreements that include one or more of the following:
- premium payments for centers of excellence;
- penalties for hospital-acquired infections, readmissions, and outcome failures;
- bundled payments for specific episodes of care; or
- global payments for contracted payers, primary care managers, and case managers for a recipient or for care related to a specific diagnosis;
- stakeholder involvement in setting annual targets for quality and cost-effectiveness;
- to the extent consistent with federal law, reducing travel costs by requiring a recipient to obtain medical services in the recipient’s home community, to the extent appropriate services are available in the recipient’s home community;
- guidelines for health care providers to develop health care delivery models supported by evidence-based practices that encourage wellness and disease prevention.
-
The department shall, in coordination with the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, efficiently manage a comprehensive and integrated behavioral health program that uses evidence-based, data-driven practices to achieve positive outcomes for people with mental health or substance abuse disorders and children with severe emotional disturbances. The goal of the program is to assist recipients of services under the program to recover by achieving the highest level of autonomy with the least dependence on state-funded services possible for each person. The program must include
- a plan for providing a continuum of community-based services to address housing, employment, criminal justice, and other relevant issues;
- services from a wide array of providers and disciplines, including licensed or certified mental health and primary care professionals; and
- efforts to reduce operational barriers that fragment services, minimize administrative burdens, and reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.
- The department shall identify the areas of the state where improvements in access to telehealth would be most effective in reducing the costs of medical assistance and improving access to health care services for medical assistance recipients. The department shall make efforts to improve access to telehealth for recipients in those locations. The department may enter into agreements with Indian Health Service providers, if necessary, to improve access by medical assistance recipients to telehealth facilities and equipment.
-
On or before November 15 of each year, the department shall prepare a report and submit the report to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available. The report must include
- realized cost savings related to reform efforts under this section;
- realized cost savings related to medical assistance reform efforts undertaken by the department other than the reform efforts described in this section;
- a statement of whether the department has met annual targets for quality and cost-effectiveness;
- recommendations for legislative or budgetary changes related to medical assistance reforms during the next fiscal year;
- changes in federal laws that the department expects will result in a cost or savings to the state of more than $1,000,000;
- a description of any medical assistance grants, options, or waivers the department applied for in the previous fiscal year;
- the results of demonstration projects the department has implemented;
- legal and technological barriers to the expanded use of telehealth, improvements in the use of telehealth in the state, and recommendations for changes or investments that would allow cost-effective expansion of telehealth;
- the percentage decrease in costs of travel for medical assistance recipients compared to the previous fiscal year;
- the percentage decrease in the number of medical assistance recipients identified as frequent users of emergency departments compared to the previous fiscal year;
- the percentage increase or decrease in the number of hospital readmissions within 30 days after a hospital stay for medical assistance recipients compared to the previous fiscal year;
- the percentage increase or decrease in state general fund spending for the average medical assistance recipient compared to the previous fiscal year;
- the percentage increase or decrease in uncompensated care costs incurred by medical assistance providers compared to the percentage change in private health insurance premiums for individual and small group health insurance;
- the cost, in state and federal funds, for providing optional services under AS 47.07.030(b) ;
- the amount of state funds saved as a result of implementing changes in federal policy authorizing 100 percent federal funding for services provided to American Indian and Alaska Native individuals eligible for Medicaid, and the estimated savings in state funds that could have been achieved if the department had fully implemented the changes in policy.
- In this section, “telehealth” means the practice of health care delivery, evaluation, diagnosis, consultation, or treatment, using the transfer of health care data through audio, visual, or data communications, performed over two or more locations between providers who are physically separated from the recipient or from each other or between a provider and a recipient who are physically separated from each other.
History. (§ 43 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Except for paragraphs (a)(5), (8), and (10), this section took effect under sec. 43, ch. 25, SLA 2016, on September 19, 2016. Paragraphs (a)(5), (8), and (10) were subject to a condition and took effect September 15, 2017, under secs. 43, and 61 — 64, ch. 25, SLA 2016, after the condition was satisfied.
Sec. 47.05.290. Definitions.
- “benefit” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “claim” includes a request for payment for medical assistance services under applicable state or federal law or regulations, whether the request is in an electronic format or paper format or both;
- “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
- “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
- “falsely alters” has the meaning given in AS 11.46.580 ;
- “knowingly” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “makes a false entry” has the meaning given in AS 11.56.820 ;
- “medical assistance agency” means the department, an agency of the department, and an agent, contractor, or designee of the department or of one of its agencies that performs one or more of the activities of the department or an agency of the department;
- “medical assistance program” means a program under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08;
- “medical assistance provider” or “provider” means a person or organization that provides, attempts to provide, or claims to have provided services or products to a medical assistance recipient that may qualify for reimbursement under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08 or a person or organization that participates in or has applied to participate in a medical assistance program as a supplier of a service or product;
- “medical assistance recipient” means a person on whose behalf another claims or receives a payment from a medical assistance agency, without regard to whether the individual was eligible for benefits under a medical assistance program;
- “medical assistance record” means records required to be kept by state or federal law or regulation regarding claims to a medical assistance agency;
- “organization” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “person” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “property” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “reckless disregard” means acting recklessly, as that term is defined in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “services” or “medical assistance services” means a health care benefit that may qualify for reimbursement under AS 47.07 or AS 47.08, including health care benefits provided, attempted to be provided, or claimed to have been provided to another, by a medical assistance provider, or “services” as defined in AS 11.81.900 ;
- “unconditional discharge” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .
History. (§ 3 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Article 3. Criminal and Civil History.
Cross references. —
Section 53 ch. 57, SLA 2005, directs that the provisions of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 apply to (1) applications or requests submitted within the 30 days before, or submitted on or after, the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 for initial licensure, certification, or other approval or selection; and (2) applications or requests submitted within the 30 days before, or submitted on or after, the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 for renewal of a license, certification, or other approval or selection for an entity or individual service provider that is subject to those sections. It further provides that the Department of Health and Social Services may not make a final determination regarding an application or request described in sec. 53 (a) earlier than the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390.
For transitional provisions regarding applications for licenses or approvals under the chapter that were submitted more than 30 days before the effective date of AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 , see § 57, ch. 57, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
For provision relating to the applicability of the 2018 changes to AS 47.05.300 - 47.05.390 , see sec. 26, ch. 69, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Sec. 47.05.300. Applicability.
- The provisions of AS 47.05.310 — 47.05.390 apply to any individual or entity that is required by statute or regulation to be licensed or certified by the department or that is eligible to receive payments, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department.
-
Those individual service providers subject to AS
47.05.310
—
47.05.390
under (a) of this section include
- public home care providers described in AS 47.05.017 ;
- providers of home and community-based waiver services financed under AS 47.07.030(c) ; and
- case managers to coordinate community mental health services under AS 47.30.530 .
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)
Cross references. —
For provision relating to the applicability of the 2018 changes to AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 , see sec. 26, ch. 69, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.
For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.
For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.
For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.
For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.
For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.
For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 69, SLA 2018 (SB 81), which was the basis for changes to AS 47.05.300 - 47.05.390 , see 2017 Senate Journal 452 — 454.
Sec. 47.05.310. Criminal history; criminal history check; compliance.
-
If an individual has been charged with, convicted of, found not guilty by reason of insanity for, or adjudicated as a delinquent for, a crime that is inconsistent with the standards for licensure or certification established by the department by regulation, that individual may not own an entity, or be an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns an entity. In addition, an entity may not
- allow that individual to operate the entity;
- hire or retain that individual at the entity as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity;
- allow that individual to reside in the entity if not a recipient of services; or
- allow that individual to be present in the entity if the individual would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, unless that individual is a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
- The department may not issue or renew a license or a certification for an entity or an individual that is in violation of (a) of this section or that would be in violation based on the information received as part of the application process.
- [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
-
An entity or an individual shall provide to the department a release of information authorization for a criminal history check under this section for each individual who is not a recipient of services from the entity, who is not in the custody of the department, and, after the entity applies for or has been issued a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal by the department,
- who intends to become an owner of the entity, or an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns the entity;
- whom the entity intends to hire or retain as the operator of the entity’s business;
- whom the entity intends to hire or retain as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity; or
- who will be present in the entity or at the places of operation of the entity, and would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, but who is not a family member or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
- An individual for whom a release of information authorization has been provided to the department shall submit the individual’s fingerprints to the department, with the fee established under AS 12.62.160 , for a report of criminal justice information under AS 12.62 and for submission by the Department of Public Safety to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check. The Department of Public Safety shall provide the report of criminal justice information and the results of the national criminal history record check to the department for its use in considering an application for a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal, or in considering other approval or selection regarding an entity or individual, for compliance with the standards established in this section. The department may waive the requirement for fingerprint submission if an individual is unable to provide fingerprints due to a medical or physical condition that is documented by a licensed physician.
- The provisions of this section do not apply if the department grants an exception from a requirement of (a) — (e) of this section under a regulation adopted by the department or if the department grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 .
- The department shall adopt regulations listing those criminal offenses that are inconsistent with the standards for licensure or certification by the department.
- For purposes of this section, in place of nonissuance or nonrenewal of a license or certification, an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department or a person wishing to become an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department is ineligible to receive a payment, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department if the entity or individual is in violation of this section or would be in violation of this section based on information received by the department as part of an application, approval, or selection process.
- [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
- An individual who possesses a valid teacher certificate issued under AS 14.20.015 — 14.20.025 and applies to work at a facility licensed or certified by the Department of Education and Early Development or who applies to work in a child care facility or residential child care facility in a position as a certificated teacher with supervised access may request that the individual’s criminal justice information and national criminal history record check on file with the Department of Education and Early Development be used to satisfy the requirements of (d) and (e) of this section.
-
A person is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil or criminal liability if the person
- makes a report of medical assistance fraud, abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
- submits information to a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 ; or
- fails to hire or retain an employee or unsupervised volunteer because the employee or unsupervised volunteer is included in a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 .
-
The department may issue or renew a foster home license under AS 47.32 or provide payments under AS
47.14.100(b)
or (d) to an entity, individual service provider, or person if the applicant or a person who resides in the home is barred from licensure or payment under (c), (i)(2), or (i)(3) of this section and
- a person in the home is an adult family member or family friend of a child in the custody or supervision of the state under AS 47.10;
- the department finds that placing the child with the entity, individual service provider, or person is in the best interests of the child; and
- the conduct that is the basis of the finding under (c), (i)(2), or (i)(3) of this section occurred at least 10 years before the date the department receives the application for licensure or renewal or makes a payment to the entity, individual service provider, or person.
-
In this section,
- “adult family member” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990 ;
- “child care facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.25.095 ;
- “foster home” has the meaning given in AS 47.32.900 ;
- “residential child care facility” has the meaning given in AS 47.32.900 ;
- “supervised access” means that a supervisor maintains a prudent level of awareness of the whereabouts of the individual for whom supervised access is required to ensure the protection of recipients of services.
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 19 ch 2 SSSLA 2015; am § 4 — 7 ch 15 SLA 2018; am §§ 4 — 9, 25 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Revisor's notes. —
Subsection (k) was enacted as ( l ); relettered in 2018, at which time (k) was relettered as (m). Paragraphs (m)(1) and (3) were enacted as (4) and (5); renumbered in 2018, at which time other paragraphs were renumbered to maintain alphabetical consistency.
Cross references. —
For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendments to this section, see sec. 22(b), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative code. —
For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.
For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.
For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.
For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.
For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.
For provisions for families, see 7 AAC 41, art. 3.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.
For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.
For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2015 amendment, effective October 7, 2015, added (j) and (k) [now (m)].
The first 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (k)(4) and (5) [now (m)(1) and (3)]; added ( l ).
The second 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, repealed (c); in the introductory language in (d), inserted “or an individual” following “An entity”, substituted “check under this section for each individual” for “check for an individual”, inserted “, who is not in the custody of the department” following “after the entity” and inserted “applies for or” preceding “has been issued”, made a stylistic change in (d)(4); in (e), inserted “or individual” following “regarding an entity” near the end of the second sentence, deleted the former third sentence, which read, “For purposes of obtaining access to criminal justice information maintained by the Department of Public Safety under AS 12.62, the department is a criminal justice agency conducting a criminal justice activity.”; in (f), added “or if the department grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 ” at the end; rewrote (h); repealed (i); added ( l ) [now (k)].
Editor's notes. —
Under secs. 4 and 5, ch. 15, SLA 2018, effective September 5, 2018, former subsections (c) and (i) were amended. Under sec. 25, ch. 69, SLA 2018, effective September 25, 2018, former subsections (c) and (i) were repealed. The repeals were given effect.
Sec. 47.05.320. Criminal history use standards.
The department shall by regulation establish standards for the consideration and use by the department, an entity, or an individual service provider of the criminal history of an individual obtained under AS 47.05.310 .
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)
Administrative Code. —
For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.
For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.
For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.
For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.
For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.
Sec. 47.05.325. Civil history; civil history check; compliance.
-
The department shall establish by regulation civil history standards for denial of issuance or renewal of a license or certification for an individual or for an entity if the individual who is applying for a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal is
- a biological or adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or Indian custodian of a child who is or was the subject of a child-in-need-of-aid petition under AS 47.10 and the individual had custody of the child at the time the child was the subject of a petition; or
- the subject of a finding or circumstance described in AS 47.05.330(a) .
-
If an individual is the subject of a petition or finding or circumstance described in (a) of this section, or a substantially similar provision in another jurisdiction, the individual may not own an entity or be an officer, director, partner, member, employee, or principal of the business organization that owns an entity. In addition, an entity may not
- allow that individual to operate the entity;
- hire or retain that individual at the entity as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity;
- allow that individual to reside in the entity, unless that individual receives services from the entity or is in the custody of the state; or
- allow that individual to be present in the entity if the individual would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, unless that individual is a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
-
An entity or an individual shall provide to the department a release of information authorization for a civil history check under this section for each individual who is not a recipient of services from the entity, who is not in the custody of the department, and, after the entity applies for or has been issued a license, license renewal, certification, or certification renewal by the department,
- who intends to become an owner of the entity, or an officer, director, partner, member, or principal of the business organization that owns the entity;
- whom the entity intends to hire or retain as the operator of the entity’s business;
- whom the entity intends to hire or retain as an employee, independent contractor, or unsupervised volunteer of the entity; or
- who will be present in the entity or at the places of operation of the entity, and would have regular contact with individuals who receive services from the entity, but who is not a family member of or visitor of an individual who receives services from the entity.
- For purposes of this section, in place of nonissuance or nonrenewal of a license or certification, an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department or a person wishing to become an entity or individual that is not required to be licensed or certified by the department is instead ineligible to receive a payment, in whole or in part, from the department to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of persons who are served by the programs administered by the department if the entity or individual is in violation of this section or would be in violation of this section based on information received by the department as part of an application, approval, or selection process.
- The department shall by regulation identify other governmental agencies or political subdivisions of the state that can request information that is required under this section for a similar purpose.
- The provisions of this section do not apply if the department grants an exception from the requirements of (a) or (b) of this section under a regulation adopted by the department or if the department grants a variance under AS 47.05.360 .
-
A person is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil and criminal liability if the person
- makes a report of medical assistance fraud, abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
- submits information to a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 ; or
- fails to hire or retain an employee or unsupervised volunteer because the employee or unsupervised volunteer is included in a civil history database identified under AS 47.05.330 .
- The department shall by regulation establish standards for the consideration and use by the department, an entity, or an individual of the civil history of an individual obtained under this section.
History. (§ 10 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Effective dates. —
Section 28, ch. 69, SLA 2018 makes this section effective July 25, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .
Sec. 47.05.330. Identification of civil history databases for a civil history check; confidentiality.
-
The department shall by regulation identify each database the department will review when conducting a civil history check under AS
47.05.325
to identify each individual
-
whom a court or the department has found
- to have committed abuse, neglect, undue influence, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult;
- under AS 47.32 or regulations adopted under AS 47.32, to have significantly adversely affected the health, safety, or welfare of an individual who is receiving a service from an entity licensed under AS 47.32; a finding described in this subparagraph includes a decision to revoke, suspend, or deny a license or license renewal, or the relinquishment of a license as part of a settlement agreement;
- who has been subject to criminal or civil penalties for a violation of AS 09.58, AS 47.05, AS 47.07, AS 47.08, or regulations adopted under AS 09.58, AS 47.05, AS 47.07, or AS 47.08;
- about whom the department or a court has made a substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect under AS 47.10 or AS 47.14;
- who was a biological or adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or Indian custodian of a child at the time the child was the subject of a child-in-need-of- aid petition under AS 47.10;
- who, in the course of employment with the state, has been terminated from employment or has had an allegation of assaultive, abusive, neglectful, or exploitive behavior or actions substantiated;
- who, in this state or another jurisdiction, for reasons related to abuse, neglect, undue influence, exploitation, or other reasons that are inconsistent with standards for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare, has had a professional license, certification, or similar professional designation revoked, suspended, or denied, or has had a request for renewal of a professional license, certification, or similar professional designation denied;
- whom another state or jurisdiction has identified on a civil registry or database substantially similar to the databases identified under this section for reasons substantially similar to the reasons identified in (1) — (6) of this subsection.
-
whom a court or the department has found
- The information gathered under this section is not a public record under AS 40.25.110 and is not subject to public inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 — 40.25.125 . However, information gathered under this section may be released to an entity, an individual who is included in a database, a governmental agency, and a political subdivision of the state in a manner provided under this section and regulations adopted under this chapter.
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 11 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Administrative Code. —
For purpose, applicability, and administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 10, art. 1.
For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.
For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.
For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.
For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.
For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.
For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, rewrote the section.
Sec. 47.05.340. Regulations.
The department shall adopt regulations to implement AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 .
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005)
Administrative Code. —
For barrier crimes, criminal history checks, and centralized registry, see 7 AAC 10, art. 3.
For inspections and investigations, see 7 AAC 10, art. 6.
For home health agencies, see 7 AAC 12, art. 11.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 41, art. 1.
For provisions for providers, see 7 AAC 41, art. 2.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 50, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 50, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 56, art. 1.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 56, art. 3.
For licensing process, see 7 AAC 57, art. 1.
For administration, see 7 AAC 57, art. 2.
For personnel, see 7 AAC 57, art. 3.
For operation of assisted living homes, see 7 AAC 75, art. 2.
For variances, see 7 AAC 75, art. 3.
Sec. 47.05.350. Use of information; immunity.
An entity that obtains information about an employee under a criminal history check under AS 47.05.310 or a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 may use that information only as provided for in regulations adopted by the department under this chapter. However, if an entity reasonably relies on the information provided under the regulations adopted by the department to deny employment to an individual who was selected for hire as an employee, including during a period of provisional employment, the entity is not liable in an action brought by the individual based on the employment determination resulting from the information.
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am § 12 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in the first sentence, deleted “or individual service provider” following “An entity”, inserted “or a civil history check under AS 47.05.325 ” following “history check under AS 47.05.310 ”, and substituted “this chapter” for “AS 47.05.320 ” at the end, in the second sentence, twice deleted “or individual service provider” following “entity”.
Sec. 47.05.360. Variance request; final decision.
- An individual or entity subject to the provisions of AS 47.05.310 or 47.05.325 may request a variance from the provisions of AS 47.05.310 or 47.05.325 under procedures established by the department by regulation. The procedures must include the establishment of a variance committee to consider requests for variances. A request for a variance may include a request that the department issue a written explanation of incorrect information contained in the civil history databases identified under AS 47.05.330 .
- An individual or entity that is dissatisfied with a decision by a variance committee may, not more than 30 days after the committee issues the decision, apply to the commissioner for reconsideration of the decision. A determination by the commissioner is a final agency decision for purposes of appeal to the superior court.
- The department shall disclose information and records pertaining to a child subject to AS 47.10 or AS 47.17 to a variance committee as provided under AS 47.10.093(b) .
History. (§ 13 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Effective dates. —
Section 28, ch. 69, SLA 2018 makes this section effective July 25, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .
Sec. 47.05.390. Definitions.
In AS 47.05.300 — 47.05.390 , unless the context otherwise requires,
- [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
- [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
- [Repealed, § 25 ch 69 SLA 2018.]
- “criminal justice information” has the meaning given in AS 12.62.900 ;
- “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
- “entity” means an entity listed in AS 47.32.010(b) or an individual service provider as described in AS 47.05.300 and includes an owner, officer, director, member, or partner of the entity;
- “individual service provider” means an individual described in AS 47.05.300(a) , and includes those listed in AS 47.05.300(b) ;
- “license” includes a provisional license;
- “unsupervised” means that an individual who is licensed under AS 47.32, after submitting a criminal history background check, is not physically present to observe the volunteer at the entity.
History. (§ 19 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 14, 25 ch 69 SLA 2018)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, repealed (1) – (3), in (6), inserted “or an individual service provider as described in AS 47.05.300 ” following “listed in AS 47.32.010(b) ”.
Chapter 07. Medical Assistance for Needy Persons.
Administrative Code. —
For Medicaid assistance eligibility, see 7 AAC 100. For Medicaid coverage and payment, see 7 AAC 105 — 7 AAC 160.
Sec. 47.07.010. Purpose.
It is declared by the legislature as a matter of public concern that the needy persons of this state who are eligible for medical care at public expense under this chapter should seek only uniform and high quality care that is appropriate to their condition and cost-effective to the state and receive that care, regardless of race, age, national origin, or economic standing. It is equally a matter of public concern that providers of services under this chapter should operate honestly, responsibly, and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations in order to maintain the integrity and fiscal viability of the state’s medical assistance program, and that those who do not operate in this manner should be held accountable for their conduct. It is vital that the department administer this chapter in a manner that promotes effective, long-term cost containment of the state’s medical assistance expenditures while providing medical care to recipients. Accordingly, this chapter authorizes the department to apply for participation in the national medical assistance program as provided for under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act).
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 4 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective September 9, 2003, rewrote the first sentence, added the second sentence, and in the last sentence substituted “department” for “Department of Health and Social Services.”
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003); Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).
Collateral references. —
79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, §§ 33-38.
81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 231-269.
Criminal prosecution or disciplinary action against medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under Medicaid, Medicare or similar welfare program for providing medical services. 50 ALR3d 549, 70 ALR4th 132.
Imposition of civil penalties, under state statute, upon medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under medicaid, medicare, or similar welfare programs providing medical services. 32 ALR4th 671.
Criminal liability of pharmacy or pharmacist for welfare fraud in connection with supplying prescription drugs. 16 ALR5th 390.
Sec. 47.07.020. Eligible persons.
- All residents of the state for whom the Social Security Act requires Medicaid coverage are eligible to receive medical assistance under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act).
-
In addition to the persons specified in (a) of this section, the following optional groups of persons for whom the state may claim federal financial participation are eligible for medical assistance:
- persons eligible for but not receiving assistance under any plan of the state approved under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act, Supplemental Security Income) or a federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
- persons in a general hospital, skilled nursing facility, or intermediate care facility, who, if they left the facility, would be eligible for assistance under one of the federal programs specified in (1) of this subsection;
- persons under 21 years of age who are under supervision of the department, for whom maintenance is being paid in whole or in part from public funds, and who are in foster homes or private child-care institutions;
- aged, blind, or disabled persons, who, because they do not meet income and resources requirements, do not receive supplemental security income under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act), and who do not receive a mandatory state supplement, but who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility to receive an optional state supplementary payment;
- persons under 21 years of age who are in an institution designated as an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities and who are financially eligible as determined by the standards of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
- persons in a medical or intermediate care facility whose income while in the facility does not exceed 300 percent of the supplemental security income benefit rate under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act) but who would not be eligible for an optional state supplementary payment if they left the hospital or other facility;
- persons under 21 years of age who are receiving active treatment in a psychiatric hospital and who are financially eligible as determined by the standards of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
- persons under 21 years of age and not covered under (a) of this section, who would be eligible for benefits under the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program, except that they have the care and support of both their natural and adoptive parents;
- pregnant women not covered under (a) of this section and who meet the income and resource requirements of the federal program designated as the successor to the aid to families with dependent children program;
- persons under 21 years of age not covered under (a) of this section who the department has determined cannot be placed for adoption without medical assistance because of a special need for medical or rehabilitative care and who the department has determined are hard-to-place children eligible for subsidy under AS 25.23.190 — 25.23.210 ;
-
persons who can be considered under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(e)(3) (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) to be individuals with respect to whom a supplemental security income is being paid under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act) because they meet all of the following criteria:
- they are 18 years of age or younger and qualify as disabled individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a) (Title XVI, Social Security Act);
-
the department has determined that
- they require a level of care provided in a hospital, nursing facility, or intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities;
- it is appropriate to provide their care outside of an institution; and
- the estimated amount that would be spent for medical assistance for their individual care outside an institution is not greater than the estimated amount that would otherwise be expended individually for medical assistance within an appropriate institution;
- if they were in a medical institution, they would be eligible for medical assistance under other provisions of this chapter; and
- home and community-based services under a waiver approved by the federal government are either not available to them under this chapter or would be inappropriate for them;
- disabled persons, as described in 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIII), who are in families whose income, as determined under applicable federal regulations or guidelines, is less than 250 percent of the official poverty line applicable to a family of that size according to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and who, but for earnings in excess of the limit established under 42 U.S.C. 1396d(q)(2)(B), would be considered to be individuals with respect to whom a supplemental security income is being paid under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c; a person eligible for assistance under this paragraph who is not eligible under another provision of this section shall pay a premium or other cost-sharing charges according to a sliding fee scale that is based on income as established by the department in regulations;
- persons under 19 years of age who are not covered under (a) of this section and whose household income does not exceed 175 percent of the federal poverty line as defined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);
- pregnant women who are not covered under (a) of this section and whose household income does not exceed 175 percent of the federal poverty line as defined by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and revised under 42 U.S.C. 9902(2);
- persons who have been diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer and who are eligible for coverage under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII).
- Receipt of medical assistance under this chapter is considered to be an additional benefit to these individuals and does not affect other assistance payments, federal or state, for which the recipient is eligible.
- Additional groups may not be added unless approved by the legislature.
- Notwithstanding (b)(4) of this section, a person is not eligible for Medicaid benefits until a final determination is made on the eligibility of that person for benefits under 42 U.S.C. 1381 — 1383c (Title XVI, Social Security Act).
-
A person may not be denied eligibility for medical assistance under this chapter on the basis of a diversion of income or transfer of assets, whether by assignment or after receipt of the income, into a Medicaid-qualifying trust or annuity that, according to a determination made by the department,
- has provisions that require that the state will receive all of the trust or annuity assets remaining at the death of the individual, subject to a maximum amount that equals the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual; and
- otherwise meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4) for a trust and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F) and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(e)(1) for an annuity.
- A person’s eligibility for medical assistance under this chapter may not be denied or delayed on the basis of a transfer of assets for less than fair market value if the person establishes to the satisfaction of the department that the denial or delay would work an undue hardship on the person as determined on the basis of criteria in applicable federal regulations.
- A person who meets the eligibility requirements of (a) or (b) of this section, except that the person is a qualified alien as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1641, is eligible for medical assistance unless the person is not eligible under the limited eligibility provision of 8 U.S.C. 1613.
- The department may allow a person under 19 years of age who is determined to be eligible for benefits under this chapter to remain eligible for those benefits for up to 11 calendar months following the month that the person is determined eligible for benefits or until the person is 19 years old, whichever occurs earlier.
- [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]
- [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]
- Notwithstanding the eligibility provisions under (a) and (b) of this section, a person may not receive medical assistance under this section unless the person first enrolls in the Medicare program under 42 U.S.C. 1395 to the extent that the person is eligible to receive benefits and services under the program.
- Except as provided in (g) of this section, the department shall impose a penalty period of ineligibility for the transfer of an asset for less than fair market value by an applicant or an applicant’s spouse consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1).
- [Repealed, § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008.]
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 105 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 117 SLA 1975; am § 1 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 11 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 132 SLA 1982; am § 13 ch 138 SLA 1982; am § 3 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 119 SLA 1988; am § 38 ch 168 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1993; am § 17 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 38 — 42 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 130 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 2 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 9 SLA 2003; am § 2 ch 31 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 34 SLA 2003; am § 85 ch 56 SLA 2005; am §§ 6, 7 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 2007; am § 1 ch 39 SLA 2008; am § 1 ch 81 SLA 2010; am § 15 ch 42 SLA 2013)
Revisor’s notes. —
Subsections (j), (k), and (n) were repealed by § 1, ch. 39, SLA 2008 before they took effect.
Cross references. —
For exclusion of certain funds from income calculation of certain long-term care facility residents, see AS 47.45.400 .
For federal poverty guidelines, see https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.
For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.
For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.
For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.
For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.
For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.
For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.
For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.
For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.
For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.
For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.
For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.
For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of subsection (h) by § 1, ch. 82, SLA 1997 (CSHB 153 (FIN)), see 1997 House Journal 442. For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the addition of paragraphs (b)(13) and (14) and subsection (i) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 34, SLA 2003 (SB 105), which amended (d) and added former subsection (f), see 2003 Senate Journal 389 — 390.
Notes to Decisions
Retroactive application of eligibility rules. —
State did not err by temporarily denying a mother’s Medicaid application filed in September 2008 under AS 47.07.020(m) because she had transferred funds to her son in February 2007 based upon the then-existing Medicaid eligibility rules. The legislature’s retroactive change to the eligibility rules was valid, the State was not equitably estopped from applying those rules, and the application of the rules did not violate the mother’s constitutional rights. Pfeifer v. State, 260 P.3d 1072 (Alaska 2011).
Cited in
Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. Assistance v. Gross, 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015); State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).
Collateral references. —
Validity, construction, and application of state statutes limiting or barring public health care to indigent aliens. 113 ALR5th 95.
Sec. 47.07.025. Assignment of medical support rights.
- An applicant for or recipient of assistance under this chapter is considered to have assigned to the state, through the department and the child support services agency, all rights to accrued and continuing medical support that the applicant and other persons for whom assistance is sought may have from all sources. The assignment takes effect upon a determination that the applicant is eligible for assistance under this chapter. Except with respect to the amount of any unpaid medical support obligation accrued under the assignment, the assignment under this section terminates when the applicant ceases to receive assistance under this chapter.
-
Through the child support services agency or on its own behalf, the department may garnish the wages, salary, or other employment income of a person who
- is required by a medical support order, cash medical support order, or both, under AS 25.27.060(c) to provide insurance or cash coverage of the costs of medical care to a child who is eligible for medical assistance under this chapter;
- has received payment from a third party for the costs of the services; and
- has not used the payments to reimburse, as appropriate, the other parent or custodian of the child, the provider of the services, or the department.
- Garnishment under (b) of this section is limited to the amount necessary to reimburse the department for expenditures for the child under this chapter. Claims for current support or support arrearages take priority over claims under this section.
History. (§ 18 ch 102 SLA 1994; am § 22 ch 106 SLA 2000; am § 11 ch 45 SLA 2009)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (a) and (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.
Cross references. —
For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (b)(1), added “, cash medical support order, or both,” following “medical support order”, and “insurance or cash” following “under AS 25.27.060(c) to provide”.
Sec. 47.07.030. Medical services to be provided.
- The department shall offer all mandatory services required under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
- [See conditional effective date note.] In addition to the mandatory services specified in (a) of this section and the services provided under (d) of this section, the department may offer only the following optional services: case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury; case management and nutrition services for pregnant women; personal care services in a recipient’s home; emergency hospital services; long-term care noninstitutional services; medical supplies and equipment; advanced practice registered nurse services; clinic services; rehabilitative services for children eligible for services under AS 47.07.063 , substance abusers, and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults; targeted case management services; inpatient psychiatric facility services for individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age; psychologists’ services; clinical social workers’ services; marital and family therapy services; professional counseling services; midwife services; prescribed drugs; physical therapy; occupational therapy; chiropractic services; low- dose mammography screening, as defined in AS 21.42.375(e) ; hospice care; treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders; adult dental services; prosthetic devices and eyeglasses; optometrists’ services; intermediate care facility services, including intermediate care facility services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities; skilled nursing facility services for individuals under 21 years of age; and reasonable transportation to and from the point of medical care.
- Notwithstanding (b) of this section, the department may offer a service for which the department has received a waiver from the federal government if the department was authorized, directed, or requested to apply for the waiver by law or by a concurrent or joint resolution of the legislature.
-
The department shall establish as optional services a primary care case management system or a managed care organization contract in which certain eligible individuals are required to enroll and seek approval from a case manager or the managed care organization before receiving certain services. The purpose of a primary care case management system or managed care organization contract is to increase the use of appropriate primary and preventive care by medical assistance recipients while decreasing the unnecessary use of specialty care and hospital emergency department services. The department shall
- establish enrollment criteria and determine eligibility for services consistent with federal and state law; the department shall require recipients with multiple hospitalizations to enroll in a primary care case management system or with a managed care organization under this subsection, except that the department may exempt recipients with chronic, acute, or terminal medical conditions from the requirement under this paragraph;
- define the coordinated care services and the provider types eligible to participate as primary care providers;
- create a performance and quality reporting system; and
- integrate the coordinated care demonstration projects described under AS 47.07.039 and the demonstration projects described under AS 47.07.036(e) with the primary care case management system or managed care organization contract established under this subsection.
- The department shall provide the services set out in (a) and (b) of this section to an eligible person, notwithstanding the person’s participation in an approved clinical trial. In this subsection, “approved clinical trial” has the meaning given in AS 21.42.415 .
-
When the department authorizes the purchase of durable medical equipment under this section, the department may require a recipient of medical assistance services to purchase used or refurbished durable medical equipment if used or refurbished durable medical equipment
- is available;
- is less expensive, including shipping, than new durable medical equipment of the same type;
- is able to withstand at least three years of use; and
- equally meets the needs of the recipient.
-
For purposes of medical assistance coverage, the department may require behavioral health clinic services to be provided by or under the direct supervision of a physician licensed under AS 08.64. In this subsection, “direct supervision” means that a physician licensed under AS 08.64 is available, either in person or by a communication device, to
- provide clinical consultation or oversight to the supervisee;
- approve behavioral health treatment plans;
- review each case to determine the need for continued care;
- ensure that the services provided to recipients of behavioral health clinic services are medically necessary and clinically appropriate; and
- assume professional responsibility for the services provided.
-
In this section,
- “case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury” means services furnished to assist individuals who reside in a community setting or who are transitioning to a community setting to gain access to needed medical, social, educational, and other available services;
-
“durable medical equipment” means equipment that
- can withstand repeated use;
- is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose;
- generally is not useful to an individual in the absence of an illness or injury; and
- is appropriate for use in the home, school, or community.
- “traumatic or acquired brain injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.80.529 .
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 35 SLA 1973; am § 2 ch 105 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1978; am § 25 ch 40 SLA 1981; am § 2 ch 132 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 1986; am § 4 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 2 ch 119 SLA 1988; am § 3 ch 45 SLA 1989; am § 3 ch 69 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 70 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 38 SLA 1992; am § 1 ch 110 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 51 SLA 1993; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1993; am § 2 ch 76 SLA 1993; am § 19 ch 102 SLA 1994; am § 108 ch 21 SLA 1995; am §§ 3, 4 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 5 ch 130 SLA 2002; am § 2 ch 106 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 2004; am §§ 2, 3 ch 109 SLA 2010; am § 3 ch 117 SLA 2010; am § 16 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 1 ch 26 SLA 2015; am § 44 ch 25 SLA 2016; am § 48 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 7 ch 75 SLA 2018; am § 1 ch 97 SLA 2018; am § 1 ch 18 SLA 2020)
Delayed amendment. —
Under § 1, ch. 18, SLA 2020, subsection (b) is amended to read as follows: “(b) In addition to the mandatory services specified in (a) of this section and the services provided under (d) of this section, the department may offer only the following optional services: case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury; case management and nutrition services for pregnant women; personal care services in a recipient's home; emergency hospital services; long-term care noninstitutional services; medical supplies and equipment; advanced practice registered nurse services; clinic services; rehabilitative services for children eligible for services under AS 47.07.063 , substance abusers, and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults; targeted case management services; inpatient psychiatric facility services for individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age; psychologists' services; clinical social workers' services; marital and family therapy services; professional counseling services; midwife services; prescribed drugs; physical therapy; occupational therapy; chiropractic services; low-dose mammography screening, as defined in AS 21.42.375(e) ; hospice care; treatment of speech, hearing, and language disorders; adult dental services; prosthetic devices and eyeglasses; optometrists' services; intermediate care facility services, including intermediate care facility services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities; skilled nursing facility services for individuals under 21 years of age; and reasonable transportation to and from the point of medical care.”.
Under § 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this amendment is conditional upon the commissioner of health and social services notifying the revisor of statutes in writing on or before October 1, 2021 “if the United States Department of Health and Human services approves the amendments to the state plan for medical assistance coverage under AS 47.07.030(b) , as amended by sec. 1 of this Act, and AS 47.07.900 (20), enacted by sec. 2 of this Act.” Under § 5, ch. 18, SLA 2020, if the condition occurs, the amendment of subsection (b) takes effect “on the day after the date the revisor of statutes receives notice from the commissioner of health and social services under sec. 4 of this Act.” As of October 2021, the notification had not occurred.
Revisor's notes. —
Reorganized in 2010, 2015, and 2018, to conform to the style of the Alaska Statutes; subsection (h) was enacted as (e) in 2010; subsection (f) was enacted as (g) in 2015; paragraph (h)(2) was enacted as AS 47.07.900 (20) in 2015; and subsection (g) was enacted as (h) in 2018.
Cross references. —
For provision requiring a report to the legislature on “the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the coverage of marital and family therapy services”, see sec. 9, ch. 75, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
For provisions relating to application for federal approval of an amended state plan to implement changes to the medical assistance program described in this chapter and the obligation of the commissioner of health and social services to notify the revisor of statutes of the date of that federal approval of the amended state plan, see §§ 3 and 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.
For a temporary provision relating to expending money for abortions that are not mandatory during the COVID-19 public health disaster emergency, see sec. 12, ch. 2, SLA 2021, in the 2021 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.
For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.
For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.
For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.
For visual care services and dispensing, see 7 AAC 43, art. 13.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.
For rates for mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 16.
For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.
For substance abuse rehabilitative services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 18.
For consumer-directed and agency-based personal care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 19.
For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.
For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For chiropractic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 25.
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.
For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.
For telemedicine applications, see 7 AAC 43, art. 30.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.
For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.
For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.
For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.
For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.
For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.
For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective September 14, 2003, deleted the last two sentences in subsection (c), relating to the department annually making available to the legislature its recommendations.
The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, deleted “for substance abusers, chronically mentally ill adults, and severely emotionally disturbed persons under the age of 21” following “targeted case management services” in subsection (b).
The first 2010 amendment, effective September 23, 2010, inserted “case management services for traumatic or acquired brain injury;” in subsection (b); and added subsection (e) (now (f)).
The second 2010 amendment, effective September 29, 2010, added subsection (e).
The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b), substituted “individuals 65 years of age or older and individuals under 21 years of age” for “individuals age 65 or older and individuals under age 21”; substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”; substituted “under 21 years of age” for “age 21” near the end.
The 2015 amendment, effective May 20, 2015, added (g) [now (f)].
The first 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, rewrote (d).
The second 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (b), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner”.
The first 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, in (b), inserted “marital and family therapy services;” following “clinical social workers’ services;”.
The second 2018 amendment, effective November 27, 2018, added (h) [now (g)].
Legislative history reports. —
For governor's transmittal letter concerning the amendment of subsections (b) and (d) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.
Notes to Decisions
Dental care. —
Denial by the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Medical Assistance, of routine dental services to a severely retarded Medicaid recipient was reversed and the case was remanded for further findings, because the Department abused its discretion by failing to determine whether its “undue hardship” regulation, 7 AAC 43.080(a) [now repealed], applied; and, as the recipient made a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination under Title II (42 U.S.C.S. § 12132) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Department was obliged to consider reasonable accommodations for the recipient. Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003).
Cited in
State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).
Collateral references. —
Transsexual surgery as covered operation under state medical assistance program. 2 ALR4th 775.
Limitation on right of chiropractors and osteopathic physicians to participate in public medical welfare programs. 8 ALR4th 1056.
Sec. 47.07.032. Inpatient psychiatric services for persons under 21 years of age.
-
Notwithstanding AS
47.07.030
, the department may not grant assistance under this chapter for inpatient psychiatric services to a person under 21 years of age who is in an out-of-state psychiatric hospital facility or an out-of-state residential psychiatric treatment center unless the department determines that the assistance is for
- psychiatric hospital services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state; or
- residential psychiatric treatment center services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and appropriately address the person’s needs and that these services are unavailable in the state.
- The department shall, on a monthly basis, evaluate what types of services are available in the state for inpatient psychiatric care for persons under 21 years of age. If inpatient psychiatric services that are consistent with the person’s clinical diagnosis and that appropriately address the person’s needs become available at a location in the state for a person under 21 years of age who is receiving the services under this chapter at a location outside the state, the department shall, as a condition of continued eligibility for coverage of the services under this chapter, require the person to be transferred to the in-state facility unless the department determines that the transfer would be detrimental to the person’s health, established therapeutic relationship, or clinical need.
History. (§ 1 ch 137 SLA 2003)
Sec. 47.07.035. Priority of medical assistance. [Repealed, § 4 ch 106 SLA 2003.]
Sec. 47.07.036. Cost containment measures authorized.
- If the department finds that the costs of medical assistance for all persons eligible under this chapter will exceed the amount allocated in the state budget for a fiscal year, the department may implement cost containment measures to reduce anticipated program costs for that fiscal year as authorized under this section.
- The department, in implementing this section, shall take all reasonable steps to implement cost containment measures that do not eliminate program eligibility or the scope of services required or authorized under AS 47.07.020 and 47.07.030 before implementing cost containment measures under (c) of this section that directly affect program eligibility or coverage of services. The cost containment measures taken under this subsection may include new utilization review procedures, changes in provider payment rates, precertification requirements for coverage of services, and agreements with federal officials under which the federal government will assume responsibility for coverage of some individuals or some services for some individuals through such federal programs as the Indian Health Service or Medicare.
- If cost containment measures authorized under (b) of this section are insufficient to reduce the anticipated program costs for a fiscal year to the amount allocated in the state budget for the program for that fiscal year, the department may, to the extent authorized under federal law and the state’s constitution, deny any or all optional services listed in AS 47.07.030(b) — (d) to a person eligible for services under AS 47.07.020 or deny program eligibility to a person who is eligible for the medical assistance program under the optional coverage provisions of AS 47.07.020(b) — (i). However, the department may not eliminate program participation of a person who is eligible for coverage under AS 47.07.020 (a), nor may the department deny coverage of a service described in AS 47.07.030(a) for a person who is eligible for the medical assistance program under AS 47.07.020.
-
Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, the department may
- apply for a section 1915(i) option under 42 U.S.C. 1396n to improve services and care through home and community-based services to obtain, at a minimum, a 50 percent federal match;
- apply for a section 1915(k) option under 42 U.S.C. 1396n to provide home and community-based services and support to increase the federal match for these programs from 50 percent to 56 percent;
- apply for a section 1945 option under 42 U.S.C. 1396w-4 to provide coordinated care through health homes for individuals with chronic conditions and to increase the federal match for the services to 90 percent for the first eight quarters the required state plan amendment is in effect;
- evaluate and seek permission from the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to participate in various demonstration projects, including payment reform, care management programs, workforce development and innovation, and innovative services delivery models; and
- provide incentives for telehealth, including increasing the capability for and reimbursement of telehealth for recipients.
-
Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, and in addition to the projects and services described under (d) and (f) of this section, the department shall apply for a section 1115 waiver under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) to establish one or more demonstration projects focused on innovative payment models for one or more groups of medical assistance recipients in one or more specific geographic areas. The demonstration project or projects may include
- managed care organizations as described under 42 U.S.C. 1396u-2;
- community care organizations;
- patient-centered medical homes as described under 42 U.S.C. 256a-1; or
- other innovative payment models that ensure access to health care without reducing the quality of care.
-
Notwithstanding (a) — (c) of this section, and in addition to the projects and services described under (d) and (e) of this section, the department shall apply for a section 1115 waiver under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) to establish one or more demonstration projects focused on improving the state’s behavioral health system for medical assistance recipients. The department shall engage stakeholders and the community in the development of a project or projects under this subsection. The demonstration project or projects must
- be consistent with the comprehensive and integrated behavioral health program described under AS 47.05.270(b) ; and
- include continuing cooperation with the grant-funded community mental health clinics and drug and alcohol treatment centers that have historically provided care to recipients of behavioral health services.
- In this section, “telehealth” has the meaning given in AS 47.05.270(e) .
History. (§ 3 ch 106 SLA 2003; am § 45 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Cross references. —
For a statement of legislative intent relating to ch. 106, SLA 2003, which added this section, see § 1, ch. 106, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, added (d) — (g).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 5, ch. 106, SLA 2003, provides that this section “applies only to eligibility determinations made and medical services performed on or after July 1, 2003.”
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 106, SLA 2003 (Senate Bill 109), adding this section, see 2003 Senate Journal 395.
Sec. 47.07.038. Collaborative, hospital-based project to reduce use of emergency department services.
History. [Repealed, § 61[d] ch 25 SLA 2016.]
Revisor's note.—
This section was enacted conditionally under secs. 46 and 61(d), ch. 25, SLA 2016. The condition was never satisfied and therefore the section never took effect. As this section was included in the statutes in anticipation of the conditional effect being satisfied, the revisor of statutes has chosen to treat the failure of the condition as a repeal to ensure that the statutory record is accurately reflected and preserved.
Sec. 47.07.039. Coordinated care demonstration projects.
-
The department shall contract with one or more third parties to implement one or more coordinated care demonstration projects for recipients of medical assistance identified by the department. The purpose of a demonstration project under this section is to assess the efficacy of a proposed health care delivery model with respect to cost for, access to, and quality of care for medical assistance recipients. The department may contract for separate demonstration projects to coordinate care for different groups of medical assistance recipients to achieve more effective care for recipients at greater cost savings for the medical assistance program. The department shall request proposals for at least one project under this section on or before December 31, 2016, and may annually request proposals for additional projects under this section thereafter. The department may use an innovative procurement process as described under AS
36.30.308
to award a contract for a project under this section. A proposal for a demonstration project under this section must be submitted to the committee established under (b) of this section and must include three or more of the following elements:
- comprehensive primary-care-based management for medical assistance services, including behavioral health services and coordination of long-term services and support;
- care coordination, including the assignment of a primary care provider located in the local geographic area of the recipient, to the extent practical;
- health promotion;
- comprehensive transitional care and follow-up care after inpatient treatment;
- referral to community and social support services, including career and education training services available through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development under AS 23.15, the University of Alaska, or other sources;
- sustainability and the ability to achieve similar results in other regions of the state;
- integration and coordination of benefits, services, and utilization management;
- local accountability for health and resource allocation;
- an innovative payment process, including bundled payments or global payments.
-
A project review committee is established in the department for the purpose of reviewing proposals for demonstration projects under this section. The project review committee consists of
- the commissioner of the department, or the commissioner’s designee;
- the commissioner of administration, or the commissioner’s designee;
- the chief executive officer of the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, or the chief executive officer’s designee, who shall serve as chair of the committee;
-
two representatives of stakeholder groups, appointed by the governor for staggered three-year terms, as follows:
- one representative of a stakeholder group who has direct experience with health plan management and cost control for the medical assistance population;
- one representative of a stakeholder group who has direct experience with health plan management and cost control for a nongovernment employer of 500 or more employees in the state;
- a nonvoting member who is a member of the senate, appointed by the president of the senate; and
- a nonvoting member who is a member of the house of representatives, appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives.
- The department may contract with a managed care organization, primary care case manager, accountable care organization, prepaid ambulatory health plan, or provider-led entity to implement a demonstration project under this section. The fee structure for a contract under this subsection may include global payments, bundled payments, capitated payments, shared savings and risk, or other payment structures. The department shall work with the division of insurance, Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, to streamline the application process for a company to obtain a certificate of authority required under AS 21.09.010 as necessary to participate in a demonstration project under this section.
- A proposal for a demonstration project under this section must include, in addition to the elements required under (a) of this section, information demonstrating how the project will implement additional cost-saving measures, including innovations to reduce the cost of care for medical assistance recipients through the expanded use of telehealth for primary care, urgent care, and behavioral health services. The department shall identify legal or cost barriers preventing the expanded use of telehealth and shall recommend remedies for identified barriers.
- The department shall contract with a third-party actuary to review demonstration projects established under this section. The actuary shall review each demonstration project after two years of implementation and make recommendations for the implementation of a similar project on a statewide basis. The actuary shall evaluate each project based on cost savings for the medical assistance program, health outcomes for participants in the project, and the ability to achieve similar results on a statewide basis. On or before December 31 of each year, starting in 2018, the actuary shall submit a final report to the department regarding any demonstration project that has been in operation for at least two years.
- The department shall prepare a plan regarding regional or statewide implementation of a coordinated care project based on the results of the demonstration projects under this section. On or before November 15, 2019, the department shall submit the plan to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the plan is available. On or before November 15 of each year thereafter, the department shall submit a report regarding any changes or recommendations regarding the plan developed under this subsection to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available.
- In this section, “telehealth” has the meaning given in AS 47.05.270(e) .
History. (§ 46 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Section 46, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on September 19, 2016.
Sec. 47.07.040. State plan for provision of medical assistance.
The department shall prepare a state plan in accordance with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) and submit it for approval to the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The plan shall designate that the Department of Health and Social Services is the single state agency to administer this plan. The department shall act for the state in any negotiations relative to the submission and approval of the plan. The department may make those arrangements or regulatory changes, not inconsistent with law, as may be required under federal law to obtain and retain approval of the United States Department of Health and Human Services to secure for the state the optimum federal payment under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance).
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 6 ch 105 SLA 1986; am E.O. No. 72 § 3 (1989); am § 32 ch 126 SLA 1994)
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.
For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
For mental health services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 7.
For authorization of mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 8.
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.
For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.
For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For mental health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 15.
For mental health rehabilitation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 17.
For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.
For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.
For durable medical equipment and medical supplies; related services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 33.
For definitions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 34.
For submission of information, see 7 AAC 85, art. 1.
For use, disclosure, and access, see 7 AAC 85, art. 2.
For electronic medical records, see 7 AAC 85, art. 3.
For security, see 7 AAC 85, art. 4.
For common medicaid eligibility requirements, see 7 AAC 100, art. 1.
For family medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 2.
For transitional medicaid and extended medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 3.
For under-21 medicaid, see 7 AAC 100, art. 4.
For medicaid for title IV-E adoption and foster care assistance recipients, see 7 AAC 100, art. 5.
For Denali kidcare: pregnant women and newborns, see 7 AAC 100, art. 6.
For Denali kidcare: poverty-level children, see 7 AAC 100, art. 7.
For medicaid eligibility for the aged and disabled, see 7 AAC 100, art. 8.
For long-term care medicaid eligibility, see 7 AAC 100, art. 9.
For long-term care medicaid post eligibility and cost of care, see 7 AAC 100, art. 10.
For medicaid treatment of trusts, see 7 AAC 100, art. 11.
For specialized medicaid eligibility categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 12.
For medicare premium assistance categories, see 7 AAC 100, art. 13.
For recipient rights and responsibilities, and program integrity, see 7 AAC 100, art. 14.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Garner v. State, 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003); Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).
Sec. 47.07.042. Recipient cost-sharing.
- Except as provided in (b) — (d) of this section, the state plan developed under AS 47.07.040 shall impose deductible, coinsurance, and copayment requirements on persons eligible for assistance under this chapter to the maximum extent allowed under federal law and regulations. The plan must provide that health care providers shall collect the allowable charge. The department shall reduce payments to each provider by the amount of the allowable charge. A provider may not deny services because a recipient is unable to share costs, but an inability to share costs imposed under this section does not relieve the recipient of liability for the costs.
-
The state plan developed under AS
47.07.040
shall impose a copayment requirement for inpatient hospital services in an amount that is the lesser of
- $50 a day, up to a maximum of $200 per discharge; or
- the maximum allowed under federal law and regulations.
- If the department has clear and compelling reason to believe that application of the maximum allowable charges under (a) of this section to a specific service would not reduce state expenditures or would generate savings to the state that are insignificant in relation to the total cost containment possible, then the department may waive the charges otherwise required under (a) of this section as to that specific service.
-
In addition to the requirements established under (a) and (b) of this section, the department may require premiums or cost-sharing contributions from recipients who are eligible for benefits under AS
47.07.020(b)(13)
and whose household income is between 150 and 175 percent of the federal poverty line. If the department requires premiums or cost-sharing contributions under this subsection, the department
- shall adopt in regulation a sliding scale for those premiums or contributions based on household income;
- may not exceed the maximums allowed under federal law; and
- shall implement a system by which the department or its designee collects those premiums or contributions.
-
Except as provided in (c) of this section and notwithstanding (b) of this section, the department may require premiums and other cost-sharing contributions from recipients who are eligible for assistance under AS
47.07.020(b)(15)
to the maximum extent allowed by federal law. If the department requires premiums or other cost-sharing contributions under this subsection, the department shall
- adopt in regulation a sliding scale for those premiums or contributions based on household income; and
- implement a system by which the department or its designee collects the premiums or other cost-sharing contributions.
- [Repealed, § 3 ch 48 SLA 2007.]
History. (§ 20 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 5, 6 ch 140 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 9 SLA 2003; am §§ 2, 3 ch 34 SLA 2003; am §§ 2, 3 ch 48 SLA 2007)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 1998, in subsection (d), “AS 47.07.020(b)(13) ” was substituted for “AS 47.07.020(b)(12) ” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of AS 47.07.020(b)(12) .
Former subsection (f) was enacted as (e); relettered in 2003, at which time “(f) of this section” was substituted for “(e) of this section” in subsection (d).
Cross references. —
For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.
For statement of legislative intent for subsection (e), see § 1, ch. 9, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts. For transitional provisions related to continued eligibility of current recipients, current program regulations, and continued eligibility for assistance under current state plan provisions until amended, see §§ 5 — 7, ch. 9, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.
For federal poverty guidelines, see aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The first 2003 amendment, effective April 17, 2003, added subsection (e).
The second 2003 amendment, effective August 31, 2003, substituted “income is greater than the applicable amount set out in (e) of this section” for “income is between 150 and 200 percent of the federal poverty guideline” in the first sentence in subsection (d) and added subsection (f).
The 2007 amendment, effective July 10, 2007, substituted “between 150 and 175 percent of the federal poverty line” for “greater than the applicable amount set out in (f) of this section” in the first sentence of subsection (d), and repealed subsection (f).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 22, ch. 102, SLA 1994 provides that the charges provided for under this section “apply to services performed on or after July 1, 1994.”
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the amendment of subsection (a) and the addition of subsection (d) by ch. 140, SLA 1998 (CSHB 369(FIN)am), see 1998 House Journal 2159.
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 34, SLA 2003 (SB 105), which amended (d) and added (f) of this section, see 2003 Senate Journal 389—390.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 151 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2006).
Sec. 47.07.045. Home and community-based services.
- The department may provide home and community-based services under a waiver in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act), this chapter, and regulations adopted under this chapter, if the department has received approval from the federal government and the department has appropriations allocated for the purpose. To supplement the standards in (b) of this section, the department shall establish in regulation additional standards for eligibility and payment for the services.
-
Before the department may terminate payment for services provided under (a) of this section
- the recipient must have had an annual assessment to determine whether the recipient continues to meet the standards under (a) of this section;
-
the annual assessment must have been reviewed by an independent qualified health care professional under contract with the department; for purposes of this paragraph, “independent qualified health care professional” means,
- for a waiver based on intellectual or developmental disability, a person who is qualified under 42 C.F.R. 483.430 as a qualified intellectual disability professional;
- for other allowable waivers, a registered or advanced practice registered nurse licensed under AS 08.68 who is qualified to assess children with complex medical conditions, older Alaskans, and adults with physical disabilities for medical assistance waivers; and
-
the annual assessment must find that the recipient’s condition has materially improved since the previous assessment; for purposes of this paragraph, “materially improved” means that a recipient who has previously qualified for a waiver for
- a child with complex medical conditions, no longer needs technical assistance for a life-threatening condition, and is expected to be placed in a skilled nursing facility for less than 30 days each year;
- intellectual or developmental disability, no longer needs the level of care provided by an intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities either because the qualifying diagnosis has changed or the recipient is able to demonstrate the ability to function in a home setting without the need for waiver services; or
- an older Alaskan or adult with a physical disability, no longer has a functional limitation or cognitive impairment that would result in the need for nursing home placement, and is able to demonstrate the ability to function in a home setting without the need for waiver services.
-
If a child who is financially dependent on a military service member is eligible for home and community-based services while physically present in the state, the department shall provide for home and community-based services when the child returns to the state as though the child had remained in the state if the military service member provides proof acceptable to the department that
- the member has maintained residency in the state for the period of eligibility; proof under this paragraph must include official military personnel records;
- the member and the dependent child are physically present in the state and intend to reside permanently in the state while receiving the home and community-based services;
- the member returned to the state within 18 months after separating from military service; and
- the member’s dependent child is not eligible for coverage of home and community-based services under another health insurance plan.
- In (c) of this section, “military” means the armed forces of the United States, the United States Coast Guard, or the Alaska National Guard.
History. (§ 8 ch 96 SLA 2006; am § 17 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 10 ch 102 SLA 2014; am § 49 ch 33 SLA 2016)
Cross references. —
For transitional provision extending program regulations on home and community-based services that are in effect on August 1, 2006, if the regulations are not inconsistent with the language and purposes of this section, see § 12, ch. 96, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts. For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 102, SLA 2014, adding subsections (c) and (d) to this section, see 2014 Senate Journal 1469 — 1470.
Administrative Code. —
For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.
For home and community-based waiver services; residential psychiatric treatment center level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 29.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (b)(2)(A), rewrote the subparagraph, which read, “for a waiver based on mental retardation or developmental disability, a person who is qualified under 42 CFR 483.430 as a mental retardation professional”; in (b)(3)(B), substituted “intellectual” for “mental retardation” at the beginning, and substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.
The 2014 amendment, effective July 29, 2014, added (c) and (d).
The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (b)(2)(B), inserted “or advanced practice registered” preceding “nurse”.
Notes to Decisions
Substantial evidence. —
Substantial evidence supported a final agency decision to terminate in-home nursing care benefits contrary to an administrative law judge's (ALJ) findings, under heightened scrutiny, because (1) an assessment found the recipient's condition improved, (2) an assessment review made that conclusion, (3) another review found the assessment consistent with narrative information and clinical diagnoses, (4) prior assessments showed improved functioning, and (5) the decision directly responded to the ALJ's opinion and noted a failure to account for eyewitness observations. Radebaugh v. State, 397 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2017).
Sec. 47.07.046. Traumatic or acquired brain injury services.
- The department shall provide traumatic or acquired brain injury services under a waiver in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act), this chapter, and regulations adopted under this chapter, if the department has received approval from the federal government and the department has appropriations allocated for the purpose. In addition to the annual assessment required in (b) of this section, the department shall establish in regulation additional standards for eligibility and payment for the services.
- Before the department may terminate payment for services provided under (a) of this section, the recipient must have had an annual assessment to determine whether the recipient continues to meet the standards established by regulation under (a) of this section.
- In this section, “traumatic or acquired brain injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.80.529 .
History. (§ 4 ch 109 SLA 2010)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2010, in (c) of this section, “AS 47.80.529 ” was substituted for “AS 47.80.590” to conform to the 2010 renumbering of that section.
Effective dates. —
Section 4, ch. 109, SLA 2010, which enacted this section, is effective September 23, 2010.
Sec. 47.07.050. Implementation of the medical assistance program.
The department shall take the steps necessary to adopt those regulations, prepare necessary documentation for the state and providers, and undertake the systems design that may be necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter on or before November 1, 1972. Implementation of the medical assistance program shall include appropriate controls and reporting capabilities as required by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and the department shall make those necessary reports as required by that federal agency or as requested by the legislature.
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972)
Administrative Code. —
For public assistance, see 7 AAC 37.
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.
For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
For medical transportation and accommodation services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 9.
For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.
For prescribed drugs and medical supplies, see 7 AAC 43, art. 11.
For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.
For family planning services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 21.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For home and community-based waiver services; nursing facility and ICF/MR level of care, see 7 AAC 43, art. 28.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
Sec. 47.07.055. Recovery of medical assistance from estates.
-
The estate of an individual who received medical assistance payments is subject to a claim for recovery of the medical assistance after the individual’s death that, except as provided in (b) of this section, may be secured by a lien filed against the individual’s real property during the individual’s lifetime if the
- individual was an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, or other medical institution;
- department required the individual, as a condition of receiving medical assistance under this chapter, to spend for medical expenses all but a minimal amount of that individual’s income; and
- department determined during the individual’s lifetime, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the individual could not reasonably be expected to be discharged from the institution and to return home.
-
A lien may not be filed under (a) of this section against an individual’s home if the home is lawfully occupied by the individual’s
- spouse;
- child under age 21;
- blind or disabled child as described in AS 47.25.615 (3) or (5) or 42 U.S.C. 1382(c); or
- sibling, if the sibling has an equity interest in the home and was residing in the home for at least one year before the date of the individual’s admission to the institution.
-
The state may not recover the costs of medical assistance under a lien on a home under (a) of this section until after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when neither of the following is lawfully residing in the home:
- a sibling of the individual who was residing in the individual’s home for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the individual’s institutionalization and who has continuously resided in the home since the institutionalization began; or
-
a son or daughter of the individual who
- resided in the home for at least two years immediately preceding the date of the individual’s institutionalization;
- has continuously resided in the home since the institutionalization began; and
- establishes to the department’s satisfaction that the son or daughter provided care to the individual that allowed the individual to reside in the home rather than in an institution.
- A lien and claim authorized under (a) of this section are extinguished if, during the individual’s lifetime, the individual is discharged from the institution and returns home. However, a new lien and claim are authorized for subsequent expenses if the circumstances described in (a) of this section occur after the individual returns home.
-
In addition to recovery of medical assistance upon sale of property subject to a lien authorized under (a) — (d) of this section, after an individual’s death, the individual’s estate is subject to a claim for reimbursement for medical assistance payments made on behalf of the individual under this chapter for the following services to the extent that those services were provided when the individual was 55 years of age or older:
- services received while an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, or other medical institutions; and
- home and community-based services provided through a waiver received from the federal government that allows home and community-based services to be covered under this chapter for persons who are eligible for coverage under this chapter while in an institution but who are able to avoid institutionalization because of the provision of home and community-based services.
- Other than a recovery upon sale of a home, a claim under this section may be made only after the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child under age 21 and no surviving child who is blind or totally and permanently disabled.
- For purposes of AS 13.16.470 , the claims authorized under this section are debts with preference under the laws of the state.
- In addition to the claims allowed under the other provisions of this section, the state may file a claim under AS 06.65.320 against the amount in an individual’s program account after the individual dies. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the claim is subject to the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 529A(f) (Internal Revenue Code). In this subsection, “program account” has the meaning given in AS 06.65.390 .
History. (§ 21 ch 102 SLA 1994; am §§ 18, 19 ch 42 SLA 2013; am § 6 ch 56 SLA 2016)
Cross references. —
For legislative purposes in enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 102, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For recovery of medicaid expenditures from recipients, see 7 AAC 43, art. 32.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (a)(1), and in (e)(1), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.
The 2016 amendment, effective November 4, 2016, added (h).
Sec. 47.07.060. Receipt of federal money.
The Department of Administration shall accept and receive all grants of money awarded to the state under 42 U.S.C. 1396 — 1396p (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance). All money received shall be deposited by the Department of Administration in a special account of the general fund and shall be used by the state exclusively for medical assistance and the administration of medical assistance under the provisions of this chapter. This money shall be paid from the account on a certified disbursement voucher from the department.
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972)
Sec. 47.07.063. Payment for certain services furnished or paid for by a school district.
-
The department may pay medical assistance under this chapter to a school district on behalf of an eligible child with a disability for rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services covered under this chapter that are furnished or paid for by the school district if
- the school district and the department have entered into an agreement requiring the school district to reimburse the department for any state financial share required by the federal government;
-
the rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services are
- included in the child’s individualized education program developed under AS 14.30.278 ; and
- otherwise eligible for reimbursement under this chapter;
-
the child is a child with a disability who
- is eligible for medical assistance under this chapter for the services; and
- complies with all applicable provisions of this chapter for that assistance;
- the school district fully complies with billing, auditing, and reporting required under the approved state plan described in AS 47.07.040 ;
- reimbursement of payment for the rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional services under this section does not exceed reimbursement allowable for the services under this chapter; and
- all other requirements of federal and state law are met.
- Notwithstanding any contrary provision of state law, the school district shall allow the department access to medical, financial, and other records of the child that are in the possession of the school district in order to verify eligibility for services under this chapter. The department shall keep information received under this subsection confidential to the same extent as the school district is required to keep the information confidential under law.
- The department may adopt regulations to carry out this section.
- In this section, unless the context otherwise requires,
History. (§ 6 ch 130 SLA 2002; am §§ 2, 3 ch 93 SLA 2004)
Revisor’s notes. —
Subsection (d) of this section was reorganized in 2004 to maintain alphabetical order.
Administrative Code. —
For children’s services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 6.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, inserted “rehabilitative and other mandatory and optional” three times in subsection (a), and added paragraph (d)(2).
Sec. 47.07.065. Payment for prescribed drugs.
- The department shall pay for prescribed drugs under AS 47.07.030(b) under regulations adopted by the commissioner in conformity with applicable federal regulations.
- The department shall adopt in regulation and regularly update a preferred drug list and a prior authorization medications list under a state program permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (Title XIX, Social Security Act). The department shall take other reasonable cost savings and cost containment measures, including pursuing and securing negotiated rates, rebates, and contracts or other agreements on covered outpatient drugs. In this subsection, “preferred drug list” means a list of prescription medications within a therapeutic class and suggested as the first choice when prescribed for individuals within the medical assistance program.
History. (§ 5 ch 45 SLA 1989; am § 6 ch 18 SLA 2019)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2019 amendment, effective August 9, 2019, added (b).
Sec. 47.07.067. Payment for adult dental services.
-
Subject to appropriation, the department shall pay for minimum treatment and for preventative and restorative adult dental services provided under AS
47.07.030(b)
and under regulations adopted by the commissioner in conformity with applicable federal requirements and this chapter. Regulations adopted under this section must include the following:
- except as provided in (d) of this section, a maximum amount of benefits for preventative and restorative adult dental services of $1,150 for each eligible recipient in a fiscal year; and
- specification of the scope of coverage for preventative and restorative adult dental services.
- On or before June 30 of each year, the department shall review appropriations available for the purposes of this section for the following fiscal year, and estimate the scope of services to be used and the number of eligible recipients anticipated to be served during the following fiscal year. Notwithstanding the maximum amount of benefits specified in (a)(1) of this section, the department shall reduce, by regulation, the specified maximum amount of benefits for the following fiscal year if the department’s estimates under this subsection would exceed appropriations available for that fiscal year.
- Notwithstanding any contrary provision of AS 44.62, the department may adopt emergency regulations to implement (b) of this section.
- If the department authorizes or approves payment for complete or partial dentures for an eligible recipient, the department may authorize the payment in one fiscal year of the maximum payment amount for not more than two fiscal years. A recipient is not eligible for additional benefits under this section for a two-year period.
- As used in this section, “minimum treatment” means the application or prescription of a medication or material deemed necessary by a licensed dentist for the immediate relief of pain or to reduce the spread of infection.
History. (§ 2 ch 52 SLA 2006; § 1 ch 35 SLA 2009; am §§ 1, 2 ch 60 SLA 2010)
Revisor’s notes. —
Section 1, ch. 35, SLA 2009 repealed § 5, ch. 52, SLA 2006, which was to have repealed this section June 30, 2009.
Subsection (d) was enacted as (e); relettered in 2010, at which time subsection (d) was relettered as (e) and a conforming amendment made in the 2010 amendment of subsection (a).
Administrative Code. —
For dental services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 12.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2010 amendment, effective September 7, 2010, in (a)(1), added “except as provided in (d) of this section,”; added (e) (now (d)).
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 52, SLA 2006 (HB 105), proposing coverage for adult dental services for eligible recipients under the Medicaid program (AS 47.07), see 2005 House Journal 151 - 153.
Sec. 47.07.068. Payment for abortions.
- The department may not pay for abortion services under this chapter unless the abortion services are for a medically necessary abortion or the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. Payment may not be made for an elective abortion.
-
In this section,
- “abortion” has the meaning given in AS 18.16.090 ;
- “elective abortion” means an abortion that is not a medically necessary abortion;
- “medically necessary abortion” means that, in a physician’s objective and reasonable professional judgment after considering medically relevant factors, an abortion must be performed to avoid a threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of a woman from continuation of the woman’s pregnancy;
-
“serious risk to the life or physical health” includes, but is not limited to, a serious risk to the pregnant woman of
- death; or
-
impairment of a major bodily function because of
- diabetes with acute metabolic derangement or severe end organ damage;
- renal disease that requires dialysis treatment;
- severe pre-eclampsia;
- eclampsia;
- convulsions;
- status epilepticus;
- sickle cell anemia;
- severe congenital or acquired heart disease, class IV;
- pulmonary hypertension;
- malignancy if pregnancy would prevent or limit treatment;
- kidney infection;
- congestive heart failure;
- epilepsy;
- seizures;
- coma;
- severe infection exacerbated by pregnancy;
- rupture of amniotic membranes;
- advanced cervical dilation of more than six centimeters at less than 22 weeks gestation;
- cervical or cesarean section scar ectopic implantation;
- any pregnancy not implanted in the uterine cavity;
- amniotic fluid embolus; or
- another physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy that places the woman in danger of death or major bodily impairment if an abortion is not performed.
History. (§ 2 ch 8 SLA 2014)
Effective dates. —
Section 2, chapter 8, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on July 16, 2014.
Editor’s notes. —
For a statement of legislative intent relating to this section and the funding of existing women’s health programs, see sec. 1, ch. 8, SLA 2014.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality. —
Restrictions placed upon Alaska's Medicaid funding of abortions by a statute and a regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the restrictions were not narrowly tailored to meet the ends of preserving Medicaid funds. Moreover, the State of Alaska did not show that the differences between the affected classes—women who chose to have abortions versus women who chose to carry their pregnancies to term—justified the discriminatory treatment that was imposed. State v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, 436 P.3d 984 (Alaska 2019).
Sec. 47.07.070. Payment rates for health facilities.
- The department shall, by regulation, set rates of payment for health facilities under this chapter and AS 47.25.120 — 47.25.300 in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1396 (Title XIX, Social Security Act, Medical Assistance) and this section. A rate established under this section takes effect under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) but not until approved in writing by the commissioner. The commissioner may delegate the performance of these functions.
-
In determining the rates of payment for health facilities for a fiscal year, the department shall, within the limit of appropriations made by the legislature for the department’s programs under this chapter and under AS
47.25.120
—
47.25.300
for that fiscal year, including anticipated available federal revenue for that fiscal year, set rates for facilities that are based on
- reasonable costs related to patient care; and
- audit and inspection results and reports, when the audit or inspection is conducted under AS 47.07.074 .
- This section does not apply to the minimum daily reimbursement rate specified by law under AS 47.24.017 or AS 47.25.195(e) for assisted living homes.
History. (§ 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 3 ch 95 SLA 1983; am § 7 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1989; am E.O. No. 72 § 4 (1989); am §§ 1, 2 ch 153 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 95 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 83 SLA 2000; am § 1 ch 28 SLA 2003)
Cross references. —
For transitional provision relating to regulations adopted under AS 47.07.070 before its 2003 repeal and reenactment, see § 7, ch. 28, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For physician services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 2.
For long-term care — intermediate care facilities and skilled nursing facilities, see 7 AAC 43, art. 3.
For intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded or persons with related conditions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 4.
For hospital services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 5.
For inpatient psychiatric services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 10.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For home health care services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 20.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For outpatient surgical clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 24.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, rewrote this section.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 28, SLA 2003 (SB 108), see 2003 Senate Journal 393—394.
Notes to Decisions
“Fair rate” of compensation. —
The state statutory standard of a “fair rate” does not require the state to compensate a provider fully for increases in workers’ compensation insurance. State and federal law mandate only that the overall rate paid to a facility be fair in relation to the costs incurred by the facility, not that each component of a facility’s costs be compensated at a fair rate. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).
Federal reimbursement requirements. —
Federal Medicaid law, specifically the Boren Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, does not require actual reimbursement of a provider’s costs. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).
Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) violated a hospital’s due process rights under Alaska Const., art. I, § 7 when it used erroneous information to calculate a Medicaid reimbursement rate under 7 AAC 43.685 because application of the regulation was not reasonable since there was no compelling reason for using inaccurate data; however, a superior court should not have ordered DHSS to use a report to calculate the correct rate because that was not the only reasonable method of doing so. State v. Valley Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 116 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2005).
Reimbursement on modified cost basis. —
Under the regulatory scheme in Alaska, a Medicaid facility is reimbursed based on a modified “cost plus” basis—actual operating costs incurred two fiscal years ago plus an inflation factor anticipating capital improvement costs. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Hope Cottages, Inc., 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).
Recoupment. —
Although this section authorized the commission prospectively to determine the rate of payment to be made to a health care facility, the statute was silent on the subject of prospective recoupment from a health care facility based on audit results. The section could not fairly be read as implicitly authorizing the commission to consider audit results in its determination of prospective payment rates for the current fiscal year. Cordova v. Medicaid Rate Comm'n., 789 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990) (decided prior to the second 1989 amendment, which made the department responsible for setting the rates of payment, with commission advice).
Sec. 47.07.071. Reports by health facilities.
After the end of each fiscal year of a health facility, the facility shall submit to the department a report on the facility’s financial performance during the fiscal year. The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish the date by which this financial report is due.
History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 5 (1989); am § 2 ch 95 SLA 1997)
Administrative Code. —
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
Sec. 47.07.072. Report by the department. [Repealed, § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994.]
Sec. 47.07.073. Uniform accounting, budgeting, and reporting.
- The department by regulation shall require a uniform system of accounting, budgeting, and reporting for health facilities receiving payments under this chapter. The regulations must provide for reporting revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities, units of service, and other items considered necessary by the department to implement this chapter.
- [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
- The department may waive or modify a requirement for accounting, budgeting, or reporting for a health facility if waiver or modification is consistent with the policies of this chapter.
- Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, the department may, by regulation, modify the system of accounting, budgeting, and reporting required under this section for a health facility having fewer than 25 acute care beds in order to reduce the operating costs of that facility.
History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 7 (1989); am §§ 2 — 4, 6 ch 28 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, in subsection (a) deleted “financial” preceding “reporting” and “prospective” preceding “payments” in the first sentence, added the language beginning “, and other items” to the end of the last sentence, and deleted the former last sentence, which read “The department shall specify the date the system becomes effective for each health facility”; repealed subsection (b); rewrote subsection (c); and in subsection (d) deleted “financial” preceding “reporting.”
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 28, SLA 2003 (SB 108), see 2003 Senate Journal 393—394.
Sec. 47.07.074. Audits and inspections.
-
As a condition of obtaining payment under AS
47.07.070
, a health facility shall allow
- the department reasonable access to the records of medical assistance recipients and providers; and
- audit and inspection of the records by state and federal agencies.
- The department may establish the scope and timing of audits under this chapter. The department may provide that audits will be conducted less frequently than annually.
History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am §§ 3, 4 ch 95 SLA 1997; am § 5 ch 28 SLA 2003; am § 5 ch 66 SLA 2003)
Administrative Code. —
For administrative provisions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 1.
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
For rural health clinic services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 22.
For federally qualified health centers, see 7 AAC 43, art. 23.
For program participation — administrative remedies and sanctions, see 7 AAC 43, art. 27.
For audit and appeal, see 7 AAC 43, art. 31.
Effect of amendments. —
The first 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, deleted “and the commission” following “department” in paragraph (a)(1).
The second 2003 amendment, effective September 9, 2003, in subsection (a) substituted “records of medical assistance recipients and providers” for “financial records of medical assistance beneficiaries” in paragraph (1) and in paragraph (2) substituted “the records” for “financial records.”
Notes to Decisions
Entitlement to records. —
Even if the Division of Medical Assistance had not received medical and billing records as part of a settlement agreement with a physician, his participation in Medicaid entitled the department to full access to his records. McConnell v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance, 991 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1999).
Recoupment. —
This section does not provide authority for recoupment from a health care facility based on audit results. The text of the statute does not state or imply that the amount of the payment will be affected by any audit. Cordova v. Medicaid Rate Comm'n., 789 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990).
Sec. 47.07.075. Administrative procedure.
- Actions of the department regarding health facility payment rates under this chapter and AS 47.25.120 — 47.25.300 are subject to provisions of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) except as provided in (b) of this section, and the hearing for an appeal must be conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ).
-
The commissioner shall, by regulation, establish time limits applicable to the various phases of an administrative appeal process involving an appeal of the amount of a payment rate set by the department for a facility. The time limits set under the regulations supersede conflicting time limits in AS
44.62.330
—
44.62.630
. The regulations must provide that
- a hearing for an appeal described in this subsection must be scheduled under AS 44.62.410 to occur no more than 120 days after written notice of rate appeal has been received by the department from a facility unless the facility requests a delay or good cause for the delay is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the hearing officer;
- the commissioner must, within 30 days after receiving the recommendation of the hearing officer, either render a decision in the case or refer the case back to a hearing officer for additional findings;
- if either time limit set under (1) or (2) of this subsection is not met, the department shall report the noncompliance to the legislature and the governor by the following January 20 with an explanation of the length of delay, reasons for the delay, and proposed corrective action by the department to ameliorate the causes of delay.
History. (§ 4 ch 95 SLA 1983; am E.O. No. 72 § 8 (1989); am §§ 3, 4 ch 153 SLA 1990; am E.O. No. 116, § 7 (2012))
Cross references. —
For transition provisions for pending proceedings, rights, liabilities, or obligations under this section in effect on July 1, 2012, and regulations implementing this section in effect on July 1, 2012, see § 16, E.O. No. 116, in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For prospective payment system; other payment, see 7 AAC 43, art. 14.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (a), added “, and the hearing for an appeal must be conducted by the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 )” following “as provided in (b) of this section”.
Sec. 47.07.076. Reports to legislature.
-
The department and the attorney general shall annually prepare a report relating to the medical assistance program under this chapter. The report must include the following information:
- the amount and source of funds used to prevent or prosecute fraud, abuse, payment errors, and errors in eligibility determinations for the previous fiscal year;
- actions taken to address fraud, abuse, payment errors, and errors in eligibility determinations during the previous fiscal year;
- specific examples of fraud or abuse that were prevented or prosecuted;
- identification of vulnerabilities in the medical assistance program, including any vulnerabilities identified by independent auditors with whom the department contracts under AS 47.05.200 ;
- initiatives the department has taken to prevent fraud or abuse;
- recommendations to increase effectiveness in preventing and prosecuting fraud and abuse;
- the return to the state for every dollar expended by the department and the attorney general to prevent and prosecute fraud and abuse;
- the most recent payment error rate measurement report for the medical assistance program, including fee for service programs and pilot or demonstration projects; the report must also explain the reasons for the payment errors and the total amount of state and federal funds paid in error during the reporting period and not recovered by the department at the time of the report;
- results from the Medicaid Eligibility Quality Control program.
- On or before November 15 of each year, the department shall submit the report required under (a) of this section to the senate secretary and the chief clerk of the house of representatives and notify the legislature that the report is available.
- [Repealed, §§ 53, 61(f), 66 ch 25 SLA 2016.]
History. (§ 47 ch 25 SLA 2016; am §§ 53, 61(f), 66 ch 25 SLA 2016)
Effective dates. —
Section 47, ch. 25, SLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect July 1, 2016.
Sec. 47.07.080. [Renumbered as AS 47.07.900.]
Sec. 47.07.085. Supplemental reimbursement for emergency medical transportation services.
- The department shall develop a program to provide supplemental reimbursement to eligible emergency medical transportation service providers for the cost of providing services to medical assistance recipients. Except as provided in (b) of this section, the amount of the supplemental reimbursement paid to a provider must be equal to the amount of federal financial participation that the department receives for the nonfederal matching funds paid by the provider through intergovernmental transfers or certified public expenditures, less any administrative fee described in (d) or (e) of this section. Under the program, the department shall use intergovernmental transfers, or certified public expenditures, or both, for the nonfederal share of emergency medical transportation services that are eligible for federal financial participation under the medical assistance program.
- The amount a provider receives in supplemental reimbursements under the program, when combined with the amount the provider receives from all other sources, including medical assistance reimbursement under the state plan, may not exceed the provider’s actual cost for providing emergency medical transportation services to medical assistance recipients.
-
An emergency medical transportation service provider is eligible to participate in the program if the provider
- is enrolled with the department as a medical assistance provider;
- voluntarily enters into an agreement with the department to participate in the program;
- is owned or operated by the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a federally recognized tribe or tribal organization;
- charges for emergency medical transportation services on a fee-for- service or other federally permissible basis; and
- certifies that the provider’s expenditures for emergency medical transportation services qualify for federal financial participation.
- If the department authorizes the use of intergovernmental transfers under the program, the department shall charge an administrative fee to a provider to cover the department’s costs of administering the program. The administrative fee may not exceed 20 percent of the nonfederal share the provider pays to the department. A provider may include the administrative fee in the provider’s cost for providing an emergency medical transportation service to a medical assistance recipient.
- If the department authorizes the use of certified public expenditures under the program, the department may establish an administrative fee for a provider. If the department establishes an administrative fee under this subsection, the department may allow a provider to include the administrative fee in the provider’s cost for providing an emergency medical transportation service to a medical assistance recipient.
- This section authorizes the department to provide supplemental reimbursements to a ground, water, or air emergency medical transportation service provider only if the United States Department of Health and Human Services approves payments to that type of emergency medical transportation service provider.
- If the United States Department of Health and Human Services revokes approval of the program, the department shall provide notice to the legislature. The department shall submit written notice to the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives as early as possible after the United States Department of Health and Human Services expresses its intent to revoke approval of the program.
- Supplemental reimbursement payments are subject to appropriation.
-
In this section,
- “program” means the supplemental reimbursement program developed by the department under this section;
- “provider” means an eligible emergency medical transportation service provider;
- “state plan” means the state plan for medical assistance coverage developed under AS 47.07.040 .
History. (§ 1 ch 34 SLA 2018)
Effective dates. —
Section 2, ch. 34, SLA 2018 makes this section effective June 21, 2018, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .
Secs. 47.07.110 — 47.07.190. Medicaid Rate Advisory Commission. [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
Sec. 47.07.900. Definitions.
In this chapter,
- [Repealed, § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006.]
- “advanced practice registered nurse services” means services furnished by a person who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under AS 08.68.850 that are within the scope of regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) , whether or not the person is under the supervision of, or associated with, a physician or other health care provider;
- “chiropractic services” includes only services that are provided by a chiropractor licensed under AS 08.20 that consist of treatment by means of manual manipulation of the spine and x-rays necessary for treatment;
- “clinic services” means services provided by state-approved outpatient community mental health clinics, state-operated community mental health clinics, outpatient surgical care centers, and physician clinics;
- “clinical social workers’ services” means clinical social work services provided by a person licensed as a clinical social worker under AS 08.95;
- [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
- “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
-
“emergency hospital services” means services that
- are necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health of the individual; and
-
because of the threat to the life or health of the individual, necessitate the use of the most accessible hospital available that is equipped to furnish the services, even if the hospital does not currently meet
- the conditions for participation under Medicare; or
- the definitions of inpatient or outpatient hospital services under 42 C.F.R. 440.10 and 440.20;
- “emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults” includes only persons who receive mental health services from an entity that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 — 47.30.620 ;
- “eyeglasses” are lenses, including frames when necessary, and other aids to vision prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye, or by an optometrist, whichever the patient may select, to aid or improve vision;
-
“health facility” includes a
- hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, rehabilitation facility, inpatient psychiatric facility, home health agency, rural health clinic, and outpatient surgical clinic; and
- birthing center if birthing centers are authorized for coverage under the state plan approved under AS 47.07.040 by the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
- “hospice care” means services to a terminally ill individual of the type and under the circumstances described in 42 U.S.C. 1396d(o), as amended, and applicable federal regulations;
- “midwife services” means services within the practice of midwifery, as defined in AS 08.65.190 , that are performed by a certified direct-entry midwife, and miscellaneous fees, other than facility fees, for birth kits, oxygen, and other ancillary expenses necessary for a birth attended by a certified direct-entry midwife;
- [Repealed, § 60 ch 33 SLA 2016.]
- “personal care services in a recipient’s home” means services authorized under a service plan in accordance with applicable federal and state law;
- “psychologists’ services” means services within the practice of psychology provided by a person licensed as a psychologist or psychological associate under AS 08.86;
-
“rehabilitative services” means services for substance abusers and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults provided by
- a drug or alcohol treatment center; or
- an outpatient community mental health clinic;
- “substance abuser” means a person who
- “targeted case management services” means services for populations designated by the department in regulation that will assist individuals eligible for medical assistance under this chapter in gaining access to needed medical, social, educational, or other services provided to persons through the department;
- [See conditional effective date note.] “professional counseling services” means services within the practice of professional counseling provided by a person licensed as a professional counselor under AS 08.29; professional counseling services may be provided at a facility that is not a provider of clinic services.
History. (am E.O. No. 72 § 12 (1989); § 1 ch 182 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 12 SLA 1976; am § 3 ch 221 SLA 1976; am § 26 ch 40 SLA 1981; am § 4 ch 132 SLA 1982; am §§ 5, 10 ch 95 SLA 1983; am § 3 ch 20 SLA 1986; am §§ 9, 10 ch 105 SLA 1986; am § 3 ch 70 SLA 1991; am § 3 ch 38 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 110 SLA 1992; am § 4 ch 51 SLA 1993; am § 3 ch 75 SLA 1993; am § 3 ch 130 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003; am § 4 ch 93 SLA 2004; am § 1 ch 78 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006; am §§ 1, 2 ch 35 SLA 2009; am § 20 ch 42 SLA 2013; am §§ 48, 49 ch 25 SLA 2016; am § 50, 60 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 56 ch 3 SLA 2017; am § 2 ch 18 SLA 2020)
Delayed amendment. —
Under § 2, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this section is amended to read as follows: “In this chapter,
“(1) [Repealed, § 4 ch 52 SLA 2006.]
“(2) ‘advanced practice registered nurse services’ means services furnished by a person who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under AS 08.68.850 that are within the scope of regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) , whether or not the person is under the supervision of, or associated with, a physician or other health care provider;
“(3) ‘chiropractic services’ includes only services that are provided by a chiropractor licensed under AS 08.20 that consist of treatment by means of manual manipulation of the spine and x-rays necessary for treatment;
“(4) ‘clinic services’ means services provided by state-approved outpatient community mental health clinics, state-operated community mental health clinics, outpatient surgical care centers, and physician clinics;
“(5) ‘clinical social workers’ services’ means clinical social work services provided by a person licensed as a clinical social worker under AS 08.95;
“(6) [Repealed, § 6 ch 28 SLA 2003.]
“(7) ‘department’ means the Department of Health and Social Services;
“(8) ‘emergency hospital services’ means services that
“(A) are necessary to prevent the death or serious impairment of the health of the individual; and
“(B) because of the threat to the life or health of the individual, necessitate the use of the most accessible hospital available that is equipped to furnish the services, even if the hospital does not currently meet
“(i) the conditions for participation under Medicare; or
“(ii) the definitions of inpatient or outpatient hospital services under 42 C.F.R. 440.10 and 440.20;
“(9) ‘emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults’ includes only persons who receive mental health services from an entity that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 — 47.30.620 ;
“(10) ‘eyeglasses’ are lenses, including frames when necessary, and other aids to vision prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye, or by an optometrist, whichever the patient may select, to aid or improve vision;
“(11) ‘health facility’ includes a
“(A) hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, rehabilitation facility, inpatient psychiatric facility, home health agency, rural health clinic, and outpatient surgical clinic; and
“(B) birthing center if birthing centers are authorized for coverage under the state plan approved under AS 47.07.040 by the United States Department of Health and Human Services;
“(12) ‘hospice care’ means services to a terminally ill individual of the type and under the circumstances described in 42 U.S.C. 1396d(o), as amended, and applicable federal regulations;
“(13) ‘midwife services’ means services within the practice of midwifery, as defined in AS 08.65.190 , that are performed by a certified direct-entry midwife, and miscellaneous fees, other than facility fees, for birth kits, oxygen, and other ancillary expenses necessary for a birth attended by a certified direct-entry midwife;
“(14) [Repealed, § 60 ch 33 SLA 2016.]
“(15) ‘personal care services in a recipient’s home’ means services authorized under a service plan in accordance with applicable federal and state law;
“(16) ‘psychologists’ services’ means services within the practice of psychology provided by a person licensed as a psychologist or psychological associate under AS 08.86;
“(17) ‘rehabilitative services’ means services for substance abusers and emotionally disturbed or chronically mentally ill adults provided by
“(A) a drug or alcohol treatment center; or
“(B) an outpatient community mental health clinic;
“(18) ‘substance abuser’ means a person who
“(A) is an alcoholic, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ;
“(B) participates in inhalant abuse, as defined in AS 47.37.270 ; or
“(C) misuses illegal or prescription drugs;
“(19) ‘targeted case management services’ means services for populations designated by the department in regulation that will assist individuals eligible for medical assistance under this chapter in gaining access to needed medical, social, educational, or other services provided to persons through the department;
“(20) ‘professional counseling services’ means services within the practice of professional counseling provided by a person licensed as a professional counselor under AS 08.29; professional counseling services may be provided at a facility that is not a provider of clinic services.”
Under § 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, this amendment is conditional upon the commissioner of health and social services notifying the revisor of statutes in writing on or before October 1, 2021 “if the United States Department of Health and Human services approves the amendments to the state plan for medical assistance coverage under AS 47.07.030(b) , as amended by sec. 1 of this Act, and AS 47.07.900 (20), enacted by sec. 2 of this Act.” Under § 5, ch. 18, SLA 2020, if the condition occurs, the amendment of this section takes effect “on the day after the date the revisor of statutes receives notice from the commissioner of health and social services under sec. 4 of this Act.” As of October 2021, the notification had not occurred.
Revisor’s notes. —
Formerly AS 47.07.080 . Renumbered in 1983, at which time it was reorganized to alphabetize the defined terms. Reorganized in 1986, 1991, 1992, and 1993 to maintain alphabetical order.
Sections 1 and 2, ch. 35, SLA 2009 repealed §§ 3 and 7, ch. 52, SLA 2006, which were to have added, effective June 30, 2009, a definition of “adult dental services.”
In 2010, in paragraphs (2) and (14), references to “AS 08.68.850 ” were substituted for references to “AS 08.68.410 ” to reflect the 2010 renumbering of AS 08.68.410 .
The definition of “durable medical device” was renumbered in 2015 and 2018 to maintain alphabetical order.
Cross references. —
For provisions relating to application for federal approval of an amended state plan to implement changes to the medical assistance program described in this chapter and the obligation of the commissioner of health and social services to notify the revisor of statutes on the date of that federal approval of the amended state plan, see §§ 3 and 4, ch. 18, SLA 2020, in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For other services, see 7 AAC 43, art. 26.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, repealed paragraph (6).
The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, rewrote paragraph (19).
The 2005 amendment, effective October 12, 2005, in paragraph (11) added the subparagraph (A) designation and subparagraph (B).
The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, repealed a former paragraph (1), which had defined “adult dental services”.
The 2013 amendment, effective September 1, 2013, in (11)(A), substituted “persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities” for “the mentally retarded”.
The first 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, in (4), deleted “that receive grants under AS 47.30.520 – 47.30.620 ” following “health clinics”; in (17)(A), deleted “that is funded with a grant under AS 47.30.475 ” following “treatment center”, in (17)(B), deleted “that has a contract to provide community mental health services under AS 47.30.520 – 47.30.620 ” following “health clinic”.
The second 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (2), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner” in two places, substituted “licensed” for “certified”, substituted “regulations adopted under AS 08.68.100(a) ” for “the person’s certified authority”; repealed (14).
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (9), substituted “includes only persons who receive” for “and ‘severely emotionally disturbed persons under age 21’ include only persons who receive”.
Chapter 08. Assistance for Catastrophic Illness and Chronic or Acute Medical Conditions.
Administrative Code. —
For catastrophic illness and chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48.
Article 1. Catastrophic Illness Assistance.
Sec. 47.08.010. Reimbursement of providers.
- Subject to (b) of this section, under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 , the Department of Health and Social Services may reimburse providers of medical care for unpaid costs incurred in the treatment of a person suffering an illness or accident that results in financial catastrophe to the person or the person’s family.
-
At the beginning of each fiscal year, the commissioner of health and social services shall determine whether sufficient appropriations have been made for the anticipated costs of services to needy persons under AS
47.08.150
and the anticipated costs of reimbursements under (a) of this section. The Department of Health and Social Services may not accept applications for reimbursement under (a) of this section for a fiscal year if, at the beginning of the fiscal year the department determines that
- there are insufficient funds appropriated for the anticipated costs of services for needy persons under AS 47.08.150 ; or
- after subtracting anticipated costs under AS 47.08.150, there are insufficient funds appropriated for anticipated reimbursements under (a) of this section.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am §§ 4, 6 ch 130 SLA 1998)
Conditional amendment of section. —
Under §§ 5, 8, and 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, subsection (b) is repealed and subsection (a) is amended to read as follows: “(a) Under the provisions of this chapter, the Department of Health and Social Services shall reimburse providers of medical care for unpaid costs incurred in the treatment of a person suffering an illness or accident that results in financial catastrophe to the person or the person’s family.” Under § 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, this repeal of subsection (b) and amendment of subsection (a) take effect “on the day after the later of (1) the date on which time expires for appeal of a judgment declaring any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional, or (2) if an appeal is taken, the date of entry of the final order on appeal that any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional.” As of January 2022, the contingency had not occurred.
Collateral references. —
Criminal prosecution or disciplinary action against medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under Medicaid, Medicare or similar welfare program for providing medical services. 50 ALR3d 549, 70 ALR4th 132.
Imposition of civil penalties, under state statute, upon medical practitioner for fraud in connection with claims under medicaid, medicare, or similar welfare programs providing medical services. 32 ALR4th 671.
Criminal liability of pharmacy or pharmacist for welfare fraud in connection with supplying prescription drugs. 16 ALR5th 390.
Sec. 47.08.020. Catastrophic Illness Committee.
There is created the Catastrophic Illness Committee, consisting of a medical review officer from the Department of Health and Social Services, a member appointed by the governor who has suffered a catastrophic illness, and a representative of the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development appointed by the governor.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 1999, in this section, “Department of Commerce and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Community and Economic Development” in accordance with § 88, ch. 58, SLA 1999.
In 2004, in this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.
Sec. 47.08.030. Notice.
The committee shall enlist the assistance of medical providers in making the public aware of the catastrophic illness assistance program.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Sec. 47.08.040. Applications for assistance.
An application for financial assistance under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 may be filed by a person who has suffered catastrophic illness or by a parent, spouse, or legal guardian of that person, or by any other interested party with the written consent of the person who has suffered the catastrophic illness.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Revisor’s notes. —
Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.
Sec. 47.08.050. Services excluded from coverage.
Annually, the committee shall determine in light of appropriated funds and expected need the medical expenses reimbursable under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 , except that the following are not reimbursable:
- dentistry and optometry unless prescribed by a licensed dentist or physician as medically necessary as the result of the injury or illness;
- elective medical or surgical procedures;
- drugs and medications not prescribed by a licensed physician;
- services received as a result of a pregnancy or birth without unusual complications;
- private psychological or psychiatric treatment or private alcoholism treatment, unless not available from public agencies or programs;
- chiropractic services and services provided by a person who practices naturopathy;
- services not of a medical nature;
- medical services currently provided to persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections;
- costs incurred before July 1976.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am E.O. No. 55, § 41 (1984); am § 7 ch 56 SLA 1986)
Revisor’s notes. —
Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.
Sec. 47.08.060. Calculation of applicant’s share.
- As frequently as necessary the committee shall adopt, in light of appropriated funds and expected need, a formula to be used in determining the applicant’s share of total medical expenses incurred as a result of a catastrophic illness, based on the applicant’s annual gross income, number of dependents, amount of assets, and forthcoming third-party payments, all considered in light of the requirement that the applicant’s share will be paid to the provider on a payment schedule covering a period of at least three years.
- For the purposes of applying the formula to determine the applicant’s share, multiple catastrophic illness occurring within a 12-month period to the applicant or other members of the applicant’s family shall be treated as one catastrophic illness.
-
In applying the formula to determine the applicant’s share, the total gross income and the total assets of the family of the applicant may be taken into account, with the following exceptions:
- the applicant’s permanent place of abode;
- one noncommercial vehicle;
- tools, equipment, vehicles and other assets required in a trade or business;
- ordinary household and personal effects;
- $1,000 of liquid assets;
- all nonliquid assets unless this exclusion would bring about an inequitable result; however, all income derived from this property shall be taken into consideration in determining the recipient’s gross income;
- inalienable shares in a Native corporation created under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), for the period of their inalienability as specified in the Act;
- Alaska longevity bonus payments;
- any other assets specifically restricted for the use of the recipient by state or federal law.
- Assets received by the applicant as a custodian, guardian, conservator, or trustee for another are not considered assets of the custodian, guardian, conservator, or trustee.
- The applicant’s share shall be reduced in the amount of any premiums paid for health insurance or a prepaid medical plan up to $500 if incurred in the 12-month period beginning with the occurrence of the injury or the onset of the illness.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the committee may waive payment of an applicant’s share when the catastrophic illness is the proximate result of an immunization required by law.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978; am § 108 ch 56 SLA 1996; am § 86 ch 56 SLA 2005)
Administrative Code. —
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective June 25, 2005, updated a federal reference in paragraph (c)(7).
Sec. 47.08.070. Standards for reimbursement to providers.
The amount that the committee reimburses providers for medical services rendered to a person who has suffered catastrophic illness may not be greater than 100 percent of the total unpaid bills related to the catastrophic illness and shall be determined by the following standards:
- only unpaid medical expenses for periods not to exceed 12 months, and related to catastrophic illness, may be considered; the initial 12-month period begins with the date of the first charges incurred because of the illness;
- the committee may not reimburse a provider if the applicant’s total medical expenses related to the catastrophic illness are less than $1,000 in any period not exceeding 12 months described in (1) of this section after all sources of third-party payment have been exhausted by the applicant or by someone acting on behalf of the applicant;
- the committee may not reimburse a provider for the applicant’s share of the total medical expenses; moreover, a reimbursement to the provider shall be conditioned on the provider’s agreement that the provider enter into a payment schedule with the applicant which will result in full liquidation of the applicant’s share; payment schedules may not be for a term of less than three years.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Administrative Code. —
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
Sec. 47.08.080. Reconsideration of decision by committee.
The committee shall promptly notify an applicant of its decision with written reasons for the amount of the award or denial. An applicant who is dissatisfied with a decision of the committee may apply to the committee for reconsideration within 30 days of receipt of the decision. The request for reconsideration must include a written statement of grounds for reconsideration and any supporting documentation which was not available to the committee for its original decision. Within 30 days after receipt of a request for reconsideration, the committee shall affirm, amend, or reverse its original decision. The committee shall promptly notify the applicant of its decision upon reconsideration with written reasons for its action. Information describing hearing rights and procedures must be furnished with the written notification of denial.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Sec. 47.08.090. Hearing.
An applicant who is dissatisfied with the committee’s decision upon reconsideration may request a hearing in accordance with procedures established under AS 47.25.180 .
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Sec. 47.08.100. Finality of decisions.
Decisions as to catastrophic illness awards are final
- 30 days after the applicant receives the committee’s decision unless a reconsideration is requested during that time;
- 30 days after the applicant receives the committee’s decision upon reconsideration unless a hearing is requested during that time;
- 15 days after the applicant receives the hearing authority’s decision if that decision is not appealed to the director during that time;
- upon being notified of the decision of the director if an appeal is taken to the director under AS 47.25.180 .
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Sec. 47.08.110. Extension of time limits.
Time limits for reconsideration or for requesting an appeal may be extended, at the discretion of the committee, upon application or upon the committee’s own motion. A request for reconsideration or for a hearing shall be considered made on the date when the request is dispatched rather than the date when it is received by the committee.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Sec. 47.08.120. Recovery from a collateral source.
If the applicant or a provider receives payment from any other source for medical expenses that have been paid by the committee, the applicant or provider is liable to the committee in the amount of that payment. An application may not be considered by the committee unless the applicant agrees to this provision. A provider may not be paid by the committee under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 unless the provider agrees to this provision.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Revisor’s notes. —
Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.
Sec. 47.08.130. Regulations.
The department may adopt regulations, under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) that establish rates of reimbursement to providers for medical expenses incurred, as well as other regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 .
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Revisor’s notes. —
Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.
Administrative Code. —
For catastrophic illness, see 7 AAC 48, art. 1.
Sec. 47.08.140. Definitions.
- “applicant” means a person who has suffered a catastrophic illness and is applying for assistance under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 or is the subject of an application for assistance under AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ;
- “applicant’s share” means the amount of the total medical expense related to the catastrophic illness that the committee determines the applicant can reasonably be expected to pay based on income, assets, and number of dependents under AS 47.08.060 ;
- “catastrophic illness” means illness or injury that results in medical expenses of over $1,000 during a period not to exceed 12 months, after all other sources of third-party payment have been exhausted;
- “committee” means the Catastrophic Illness Committee, created under AS 47.08.020 ;
- “elective medical or surgical procedures” means treatment that is not essential to the life or health of a person;
- “family” means two or more persons related by blood or marriage or adoption living as one economic unit;
- “liquid assets” means assets that can be readily converted to cash;
- “medical expense” means any financial obligation incurred in the course of treatment of illness as prescribed by a physician, including bills for ancillary services, patient transportation, transportation of a medical or family escort when reasonably necessary, or living expenses while receiving outpatient treatment in a community to which the applicant is not reasonably able to commute from the applicant’s permanent place of abode;
- “nonliquid assets” means all assets that are not liquid assets;
- “permanent place of abode” means a dwelling, or a dwelling unit in a multiple dwelling, including lots and outbuildings or an appropriate portion of these, that are necessary to convenient use of the dwelling unit;
- “provider” means a licensed physician, pharmacist, dentist, or other health service worker or a licensed hospital, clinic, skilled nursing home, intermediate care facility or health maintenance organization that has provided services not excluded by AS 47.08.050 to an applicant as a result of a catastrophic illness;
- “third-party payments” means payments of medical expenses related to a catastrophic illness by sources other than the applicant or the committee, including but not limited to state and federal medical assistance programs, private health insurance, employment-related health insurance, military health insurance, workers’ compensation, violent crimes compensation, Indian Health Service of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and awards in legal actions.
History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1978)
Revisor’s notes. —
Under § 11, ch. 130, SLA 1998, “AS 47.08.010 — 47.08.140 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.
Article 2. Medical Assistance for Chronic or Acute Medical Conditions.
Sec. 47.08.150. Assistance for chronic or acute medical conditions.
- Under the provisions of this section, the Department of Health and Social Services may pay providers of medical care for services described in (c) of this section that are provided to needy persons suffering from a chronic or acute medical condition who may apply for assistance under (b) of this section.
- A needy person suffering from a chronic or an acute medical condition who is eligible for general relief assistance under AS 47.25.120 and is not eligible for the medical assistance program under AS 47.07 may apply for assistance under this section. The department shall make a determination of eligibility based on a general relief assistance application. The requirements of AS 47.08.020 — 47.08.140 do not apply to assistance sought under this section, except that, notwithstanding (c) of this section, neither reimbursement nor assistance may be paid by the department for services that are listed in AS 47.08.050 as those services are defined in AS 47.08.140 .
-
The services eligible for payment under this section for a needy person with a chronic or acute medical condition are the following:
-
prescription drugs and medical supplies prescribed to treat a person who has
- a terminal illness;
- cancer and requires chemotherapy; or
-
a chronic condition that would normally, in its untreated course, result in the death or disability of the recipient, but that is amenable to outpatient medication; the chronic conditions for which the cost of prescription drugs may be paid include the following diagnoses:
- diabetes and diabetes insipidus;
- seizure disorders;
- chronic mental illness;
- hypertension;
-
physician services
- related to care under (3) of this subsection;
- provided in a hospital emergency room the same day on which the recipient is admitted for care under (3) of this subsection;
- provided to a recipient residing in a nursing home; or
- provided in either an outpatient or an inpatient setting to a recipient with a diagnosis described in (1) of this subsection;
- inpatient hospital services that cannot be performed on an outpatient basis and that are certified as necessary by a professional review organization consulted by the Department of Health and Social Services but not including inpatient psychiatric hospital services;
- outpatient laboratory and x-ray services;
- medical transportation related to care under (3) of this subsection or nursing facility care;
- outpatient surgical services;
- nursing facility care.
-
prescription drugs and medical supplies prescribed to treat a person who has
- The payment rate for facilities under this section shall be the same as that established by regulation for medical services under AS 47.25.195 , and payment rates under this section for other providers may not exceed those established under AS 47.07.
- The Department of Health and Social Services may limit the amount, duration, and scope of services covered under this section by regulation. If the Department of Health and Social Services finds that the cost of assistance for all persons eligible under this section will exceed the amount allocated for that assistance during the fiscal year, the Department of Health and Social Services may limit coverage for certain medical services by regulation in order to provide the most critical care within the available appropriations.
- The Department of Health and Social Services may adopt regulations to implement this section.
History. (§ 7 ch 130 SLA 1998)
Conditional repeal. —
Under §§ 8 and 13, ch. 130, SLA 1998, this section is repealed “on the day after the later of (1) the date on which time expires for appeal of a judgment declaring any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional, or (2) if an appeal is taken, the date of entry of the final order on appeal that any part of AS 47.08.150 . . . is unconstitutional.” As of January 2022, the contingency had not occurred.
Administrative Code. —
For chronic and acute medical assistance, see 7 AAC 48, art. 2.
Chapter 10. Children in Need of Aid.
Opinions of attorney general. —
For analysis of the question of when tribes in Alaska may exercise jurisdiction over tribal children in child custody proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), see 2004 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (October 1, 2004).
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979); Allam v. State, 830 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Article 1. Children’s Proceedings.
Cross references. —
For court rules governing children’s proceedings, see Alaska Rules of Court, Child in Need of Aid Rules (CINA Rules) and Delinquency Rules.
Sec. 47.10.005. Construction.
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to
- achieve the end that a child coming within the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter may receive the care, guidance, treatment, and control that will promote the child’s welfare and the parents’ participation in the upbringing of the child to the fullest extent consistent with the child’s best interests; and
- follow the findings set out in AS 47.05.065 .
History. (§ 16 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of act enacting this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the paragraph (1) designation and paragraph (2), and in paragraph (1) added “achieve” at the beginning and added the language beginning “and the parents’ participation” to the end of the paragraph.
Notes to Decisions
Applicability. —
Father’s claims that a social worker failed to comply with Child in Need of Aid (CINA) procedures were not actionable because AS 47.10.960 precluded the father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008); Rowan B. v. State, 361 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2015).
Foster parent intervention in child in need of aid cases. —
Child in need of aid laws shall be liberally construed so that a child receives the care, guidance, treatment, and control that will promote the child's welfare and the parents' participation in the upbringing of the child to the fullest extent consistent with the child's best interests; when the cautious use of permissive intervention is necessary to promote the child's best interest, the trial court has the discretion to employ it. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Quoted in
Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018).
Cited in
Theresa L. v. State, 353 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2015); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Sec. 47.10.010. Jurisdiction; guardians and attorneys; support.
- Proceedings relating to a child under 18 years of age residing or found in the state are governed by this chapter when the child is alleged to be or may be determined by the court to be a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 .
- In a controversy concerning custody of a child under this chapter, the court may appoint a guardian of the person and property of a child, may appoint an attorney to represent the legal interests of the child, and may order support from either or both parents. Custody of a child may be given to the department and payment of support money to the department may be ordered by a court.
History. (§ 4 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1961; am §§ 1, 2 ch 110 SLA 1967; am § 1 ch 64 SLA 1969; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 7, 8 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 1 ch 104 SLA 1982; am § 5 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 17 ch 50 SLA 1987; am § 6 ch 125 SLA 1988; am § 3 ch 130 SLA 1988; am § 6 ch 125 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 5 ch 81 SLA 1995; am §§ 17, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 17 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the 1998 amendment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendment to this section applies to
“(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after the effective date of this Act in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.030 . Cases decided under former provisions of this section concerning children in need of aid may also be found at AS 47.10.011 and 47.10.088 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the amendment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:
“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;
“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;
“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”
Constitutionality. —
The statutory scheme of this chapter is not so vague as to deprive parents of their procedural due process rights. R.C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1988).
Applicability of 1977 amendment. —
All cases pending at the time of the enactment of the new children’s statute by the 1977 acts are entitled to hearing under the new, rather than the old, standards. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).
In order to provide guidance to the superior court for the administration of juvenile justice, children adjudged dependent under the standards of former subsection (a)(5) of this section prior to its repeal in 1977 were entitled, on request, to a dispositional hearing under the standards of former subsection (a)(2)(C) of this section. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).
Children adjudged dependent under former (a)(5) of this section are entitled on request to an adjudicative hearing under the standards of subsection (a)(2)(C). In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
There is no statute authorizing awards of attorney’s fees in child in need of aid proceedings, nor has any rule or order authorizing such an award been promulgated. Cooper v. State, 638 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1981).
Residency retained. —
CINA statutes govern proceedings relating to minors who are residents of Alaska, regardless of whether the minor is physically present in Alaska, and the superior court’s findings that the boys retained their Alaska residency were not clearly erroneous where the mother’s only relevant evidence was her own testimony that she had gone to Edmonton, Canada with an intent to remain there. E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).
Applied in
E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).
Cited in
Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999); Damon W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 14, 2018); Shelly C. v. Jonah C., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 21, 2020).
Collateral references. —
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 40 et seq.
43 C.J.S., Infants, § 12 et seq.
Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquents or dependents. 14 ALR2d 336.
Sec. 47.10.011. Children in need of aid.
Subject to AS 47.10.019 , the court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to any of the following:
- a parent or guardian has abandoned the child as described in AS 47.10.013 , and the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter;
- a parent, guardian, or custodian is incarcerated, the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter, and the incarcerated parent has not made adequate arrangements for the child;
- a custodian with whom the child has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care, supervision, or support for the child, and the whereabouts of the parent or guardian is unknown;
- the child is in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent substantial physical harm or is in need of treatment for mental injury and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian has knowingly failed to provide the treatment;
- the child is habitually absent from home or refuses to accept available care and the child’s conduct places the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury;
- the child has suffered substantial physical harm, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer substantial physical harm, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian to supervise the child adequately;
- the child has suffered sexual abuse, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer sexual abuse, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian to adequately supervise the child; if a parent, guardian, or custodian has actual notice that a person has been convicted of a sex offense against a minor within the past 15 years, is registered or required to register as a sex offender under AS 12.63, or is under investigation for a sex offense against a minor, and the parent, guardian, or custodian subsequently allows a child to be left with that person, this conduct constitutes prima facie evidence that the child is at substantial risk of being sexually abused;
-
conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have
- resulted in mental injury to the child; or
-
placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of
- a pattern of rejecting, terrorizing, ignoring, isolating, or corrupting behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury; or
- exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 , 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432 , an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 , 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432 , an attempt to commit an offense that is a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432, or an attempt to commit an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.220 or 11.41.410 — 11.41.432; or
- repeated exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250 — 11.41.270 or an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250 — 11.41.270 ;
- conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have subjected the child or another child in the same household to neglect;
- the parent, guardian, or custodian’s ability to parent has been substantially impaired by the addictive or habitual use of an intoxicant, and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child; if a court has previously found that a child is a child in need of aid under this paragraph, the resumption of use of an intoxicant by a parent, guardian, or custodian within one year after rehabilitation is prima facie evidence that the ability to parent is substantially impaired and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child as described in this paragraph;
- the parent, guardian, or custodian has a mental illness, serious emotional disturbance, or mental deficiency of a nature and duration that places the child at substantial risk of physical harm or mental injury;
- the child has committed an illegal act as a result of pressure, guidance, or approval from the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
Some of the cases set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.010 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the enactment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:
“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;
“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;
“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”
Statutory interpretation. —
In interpreting child in need of aid statutes and other laws, the court applies its independent judgment, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).
The discretion allotted a parent in the administration of punishment is not unlimited. Clearly it does not extend to punishment regularly causing the “substantial physical harm” which under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] determines that a child is in need of aid. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).
Mental examination of parent. —
That Alaska CINA R. 16(b) allows a court to order mental and physical examinations of a child’s parents at the predisposition phase of a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding does not limit the court’s authority under Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a) to order a mental examination at the adjudication stage. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).
In child-in-need-of-aid proceedings, Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a) should be invoked cautiously, only after the movant has demonstrated sufficient justification for a mental or physical examination. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).
As a mother’s mental state was in controversy because her mental or emotional condition allegedly placed her child at risk within the meaning of paragraph (11) of this section, and there was sufficient evidence to establish good cause for a psychological evaluation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering her to undergo such an evaluation under Alaska R. Civ. P. 35(a). Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).
Willingness of parents to provide care. —
A court was not bound to accept at face value the parents’ expression of willingness to care for their children, but could look to the objective conduct of the parents in determining whether they were willing to provide care. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Inability to care for child. —
Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The child had special needs that the father simply did not seem to understand. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Where superior court did not clearly err in finding that parent was unwilling to care for child, the termination of parental rights was affirmed. R.J.M. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).
Mother's contention that the appearance of judicial partiality violated her due process rights was rejected because, although the trial court may have exhibited partiality related to whether substance abuse continued to substantially impair the mother's ability to parent, that only impacted one of the grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother's ability to be heard and adequately represent her interests with respect to the domestic violence and mental illness findings was not prejudiced, and the child's best interests would not be served by delaying permanency and prolonging the judicial proceedings given that the mother had yet to remedy the conduct or conditions that made him a child in need of aid. Sarah A. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children Servs., 427 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2018).
Termination held inappropriate where father arranged for care of infant. —
Termination of the father’s parental rights was inappropriate under paragraph (2) where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support the conclusion that the incarcerated father failed to make arrangements for his daughter’s care upon her birth. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).
Refusal of guardianship proper. —
Trial court did not err by failing to establish a guardianship instead of terminating the father’s parental rights because the potential that the father may one day be able to change was not sufficient to suggest, much less prove, that guardianship was in the son’s best interests. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).
Finding of inability to care. —
A child may not be adjudicated “in need of aid” under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] on the grounds that his parent or caregiver is unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. A parent’s or caregiver’s ability to care may be considered only under the specific, explicit standards of [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ]. In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996) (overruling In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), and A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), to the limited extent that those cases stated that ability to care may be considered under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010].
In a case in which there are relatives willing to care for the children, children in need of aid (CINA) jurisdiction under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] does not exist. K.F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996).
Parent’s substance abuse placed her girls at substantial risk of harm and caused the parent to neglect the girls and on multiple occasions the parent was found passed out and unable to care for the girls; the record adequately supported the lower court’s finding and it did not err in terminating the parent’s parental rights. A.J. v. State, 62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003).
Where a father’s addiction to substances, including alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana, resulted in repeated incarcerations, and he had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, his frequent and prolonged absences impaired his ability to parent and were harmful to his children; thus, a trial court did not err in finding that the children were in need of aid under paragraph (10) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that a father’s youngest child was a child in need of aid because the evidence showed that the child was in substantial risk of injury if he returned home. The father’s previous lack of cooperation and the exhaustion of resources mitigated Office of Children Services’ failure to refer the father to service providers in a case plan. Burke P. v. State, 162 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2007).
While the trial court erred by finding that the son was a child in need of aid as a result of the father’s previous incarceration where the father was not incarcerated at the time of the termination trial, the trial court properly found the son to be a child in need of aid under paragraphs (6), (8), (10), and (11). The evidence showed that the father had a history of violent behavior, he did not comply with his case plan to address his anger, an alcohol assessment concluded that the father was significantly disabled by his alcohol abuse, and some of his acts of violence involved alcohol. Jeremy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).
Court termination of incarcerated parent’s rights held proper. —
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the state with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the state had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Termination of father’s right to his children was proper based on finding that the children were in need of aid under paragraph (8) of this section, where the father’s long history of domestic violence against women created a substantial risk of harm to the children if they were placed with him, and the father failed to complete parenting and anger management classes, as witnessing domestic violence is mentally harmful to children; fact that because a parent has never directed violence against his child does not show that the child has not faced “a substantial risk of mental injury” under paragraph (8)(B)(i). Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).
Order terminating parents’ rights to their child was upheld where the parents, who had a history of substance abuse, mental problems, and criminal activity, did not remedy the conditions in the home that threatened the child’s safety. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).
Where a father was incarcerated for the first 20 months of his child’s life, then was in her life for only five months before disappearing to avoid incarceration on a probation violation, and where there was no evidence that he maintained any contact with her during his flight, a finding of abandonment and termination of his parental rights was proper, especially in light of the child’s young age and the proportion of her life for which the father was absent. David S. v. State, 270 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2012).
Termination of parental rights to Indian children was appropriate because delaying the children's permanency until a parent's release from incarceration likely would have resulted in serious emotional harm given the children's emotional state, the parent's release date, and the parent's inability to care for the children immediately upon release. The testimony of the Office of Children's Services supervisor of family services was sufficient to support the finding. Thaddeus S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Noncompliance with case plan. —
The superior court did not clearly err by relying on the father’s non-compliance with his case plan when it found that a father had abandoned his child, causing the child to be a child in need of aid. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Child was in need of aid because the father’s action in waiting more than one year to arrange for the child’s care while he was incarcerated ultimately rendered the steps he did take inadequate. Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).
Superior court properly terminated a father’s parental rights after finding that the children were in need of aid due to abandonment because the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in his case plan; the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Further, the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the father’s failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations, and his failure to maintain visitation with his children caused the destruction of the parent-child relationship. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father's parental right did not violate his due process rights where the basis of termination was his abandonment of the child, which was evidenced by his failure to engage with his case plan and his plan for the child's placement with the paternal grandparents, and requiring him to prove that he could provide a safe home for the child was appropriate. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
When a father engaged in parenting, vocational, and religious instruction while incarcerated, it was on the father's own initiative rather than in response to any guidance from the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) about what the father needed to do to improve the chances of reunification. Therefore, termination of the father's parental rights was inappropriate because the OCS's minimal engagement with the father, combined with the lack of a relevant case plan, meant that the OCS did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Superior court did not err when it accepted the termination petition and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental because the trial occurred about 13 months after the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the child and it found that the mother had failed to participate in services before the adjudication hearing. It noted that, since the adjudication, the mother had been stopped in a truck littered with a “shocking” amount of drugs and related paraphernalia. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).
Requirements for adjudication of child in need of aid. —
A child may not be adjudicated a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] on the grounds that the child’s parent or caregiver is unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1996).
In termination of parental rights proceedings, trial court did not err in finding Indian child was a child in need of aid because neither 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e) nor state rules required courts to make “removal findings” before extending custody, but additional findings and determinations were needed before Office of Children’s Services’ custody could be extended. Danielle A. v. State, 215 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2009).
Children were in need of aid where the evidence showed that: (1) the mother suffered from depression and had attempted suicide on several occasions; (2) there was ongoing domestic violence between the mother and the father; and (3) the mother used drugs, including marijuana, methadone, and cocaine, and that one of the children tested positive for cocaine when he was born. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).
While the superior court properly rejected a master’s recommendation that there was no probable cause to believe that two of the children were children in need of aid because the matter was moot where the children were in the mother’s custody and the Office of Children’s Services no longer sought to be involved in the parent-child relationship, there was no error in the superior court’s decision that the master’s recommendation that the children be returned home was not effective until the court had reviewed it, however, the 23-day wait in this case between the master’s recommendation and the superior court’s order on review of it was unacceptable. Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).
Trial court did not clearly err in finding that a daughter was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10) where the evidence established that the father had a drug use problem that he attempted to hide from the Office of Children's Services, the daughter had special needs that the father did not understand or meet unless he was sober, and the father had stipulated that the daughter was a child in need under AS 47.10.011 's substance abuse subsection. Kent P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 5, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Gross parental misconduct not required. —
Argument that a superior court must find “gross parental misconduct” in order to conclude that a child has suffered mental injury is not supported by either this section’s legislative history or Alaska caselaw. Josephine B. v. State, 174 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2007), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2008).
Jurisdiction retained. —
Even if Alaska did not have jurisdiction as the children’s home state, the superior court would still retain jurisdiction under former AS 25.30.020(a)(2) because the boys were present in Alaska and in need of aid on the day that the state filed its petition for temporary custody. E.H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).
Child properly found in need of aid. —
Evidence provided by therapists and the child’s mother was sufficient to support a finding that the child was refusing care available by her father and on that basis was a child in need of aid. F.T. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).
The court’s findings that parents’ history of substance abuse, as well as their failure to visit their hospitalized child or to otherwise fulfill their parental obligations, constituted abandonment of the child, that the mother’s harmful conduct was likely to continue, and that reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate the parents and to reunify the family had been made, and that the child was therefore a child in need of aid, were warranted by the evidence. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997).
Father’s leaving the state without leaving any forwarding address and failure to contact his daughter for over one year was evidence of a disregard for his parental obligations, and supported a finding that he destroyed any chance of having developed a parent-child relationship. D.K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998).
Probable cause existed to believe that a child faced an imminent risk of substantial harm and was a child in need of aid based on evidence that he was a passenger in his father’s car in a drunk driving accident and on the histories of substance abuse, domestic violence, and repeated drunk driving convictions of his parents. In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1998).
The termination statute requires a determination that the children were CINA based on any of the factors listed in this section, and where the court based its CINA finding on three separate bases: neglect, domestic violence, and mental illness, the court did not err in determining that the children were CINA. A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).
Trial court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights over her children was affirmed, where the record clearly supported the conclusion that the mother caused the children to suffer harm in three ways: (1) mental injury, (2) sexual abuse, and (3) substantial risk of physical harm. V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 21, 2001), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2002), sub. op., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).
Order terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter was affirmed, where the record supported the trial court’s ruling under paragraph (10) that the daughter was at substantial risk of harm because of the mother’s chronic substance abuse problem. M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002).
Where the mother had a decade long history of abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, numerous arrests, and failures at treatment, and where one child’s problems included sexualized behavior, head banging, biting, fire setting, defecating in his pants, and violence towards animals, the mother’s children were properly adjudicated as children in need of aid, and when reasonable efforts at reunification had been exhausted, the mother’s parental rights were properly terminated. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
State supreme court upheld a trial court’s judgment that a child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father’s reckless use of firearms, including shooting the child’s mother when she was pregnant with the child, created a significant risk of mental injury to the child if continued. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Court found probable cause to believe that an infant was a child in need of aid under paragraphs (1) and (11) of this section, based upon risk posed to the infant by the mother’s inability to perceive danger to the child, her inability to retain information given to her on care for the child, her refusal to follow directions given to her on care for the child, her anger management problems that posed a risk to the child, and her refusal to accept medication or counseling for her depression. Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004).
Evidence that supported the termination of a father’s parental rights under AS 47.10.080(o) , e.g., the significant period of the father’s incarceration, the mother’s unavailability, and the unsuitability of the father’s placement proposals, supported a determination that two children were in need of aid under paragraph (2) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Trial court did not err by finding that the sons were children in need of aid under subsection (8) where the mother had dialed 911 and said she wanted to kill them, which resulted in their removal, and where the sons exhibited strong reactions including one son’s diagnosis of acute post-traumatic stress disorder. Kim B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 28, 2009) (memorandum decision).
Children were properly found to be in need of aid where the mother admitted to drinking while she was pregnant with one of the children and to testing positive for marijuana use following the child’s birth. Lucy J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2010).
Superior court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services had provided her with remedial and rehabilitative programs, although she was bonded with the child, she was unwilling to attend treatment programs or provide a time frame for completing treatment, and the child, who was five years age at the time, was thriving in his grandparents’ home. Simone B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 30, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services, and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency. It was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
In a case in which a father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an “Indian child” under the definition set out in the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Supreme Court, which had twice remanded the matter to the superior court, considered the evidence presented at the new evidentiary proceedings - and the superior court's credibility findings - and concluded that the superior court's finding that the daughter was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10) was not clearly erroneous. Leonid K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Superior court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her Indian daughter, for neglect and substance abuse, because the court did not clearly err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the child would likely have been seriously harmed if returned to her mother's care and that the mother's conduct was unlikely to change, despite the mother's recent short period of sobriety, as both expert and lay witnesses testified as to the mother's substance abuse issues. Ava T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, by declining to credit the testimony of the father's witnesses over the testimony of the witnesses for the children's services agency, in finding active but unsuccessful efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and in giving more weight to expert witness testimony than to testimony from the father's witnesses as to the likelihood of future harm to the child. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court had not violated a mother's due process rights in finding a child to be in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 (6) where the mother had means other than the child's testimony of rebutting the Office of Children's Services' allegations of the child's whereabouts on the night of a stabbing, given the child's age, her testimony would not likely have been found probative of whether she was placed at risk by intoxicated caregivers, and none of the findings relied on hearsay. Taryn M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Mother had not refuted the trial court's findings that she knowingly failed to provide the child needed medical treatment to alleviate her significant respiratory and dental problems, and thus the finding that the mother's actions placed the child in need of aid, for purposes of AS 47.10.011 , was proper, as was the termination of the mother's rights under AS 47.10.088 . Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a mother's use of intoxicants was addictive and habitual under AS 47.10.011 (10) where although she took Subutex as part of a medically assisted treatment program for addiction, she had failed to participate in required counseling, and she sought and took other prescription opioids during her pregnancy. Sally C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a child was in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (1) and had been abandoned under AS 47.10-013(a)(4) where although the father was relatively consistent in visitation, cleaned up his home, and participated in case plan meetings, he refused to take drug tests, participate in parental risk assessments and evaluations, or participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Findings that the child was in need of aid was supported by evidence that the mother suffered from mental illness that she refused to acknowledge or receive treatment for, the child had acute medical needs that the mother was unable to handle, reasonable efforts to help the mother had been made, and the mother had been given a reasonable amount of time, given the child's age, to remedy her issues. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
In a termination of parental rights action, the trial court did not err when it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was a child in need of aid, as the evidence showed that the child was exposed to marijuana and methamphetamine while in the care of the mother and her partner Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).
In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err by finding that the child was a child in need of aid based on a substantial risk of physical harm and her parents had neglected other children in the household. Alexander G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 15, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Child improperly found in need of aid. —
Superior court’s adjudication of seriously emotionally disturbed 10-year-old boy as a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] was reversed where separated father’s conduct objectively bespoke willingness to care for child and there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of father’s history of violence. F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993).
The court clearly erred where it adjudicated children “in need of aid” under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] under the following facts; (1) the mother was unable to provide her sons with enough “structure and consistency”; (2) she sometimes disciplined her sons by yelling at them; and (3) her awareness of possible dangerous places in the environment was not as great as that of the social workers observing her. N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
In the absence of evidence that, as a result of actions of a child’s mother, there was a substantial risk that the child would suffer harm or that the child suffered substantial neglect, and, since the mother was serving as the child’s de facto custodian, the court erred in finding that he was a child in need of aid. T.B. v. State, 922 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1996).
The phrase “substantial physical abuse or neglect” means “substantial physical abuse” or “substantial physical neglect,” and the court’s specific reliance on emotional neglect as the basis for finding a child in need of aid was erroneous. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Finding that the children were in need of aid was clearly erroneous, as there was no evidence that the children suffered a “mental injury” or a serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the children’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner, as the children’s behaviors may not have been ideal, but they did not demonstrate such an injury. Theresa L. v. State, 353 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2015).
Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and incarceration of the father because the father initiated efforts to visit the child, who was already in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS), as soon as the father learned of the father's possible paternity. Furthermore, the father had visitation during the subsequent incarceration as often as the OCS was able to provide it. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Order terminating the parents' rights had to be vacated because a therapist's background did not reflect the required expertise for the case since, although she held a master's degree in marriage and family therapy, there was no indication she could have been qualified as an expert for diagnosing complex mental injury to a child or opining on the cause of such an injury and without an opinion tying the parents to such an injury, the child in need of assistance finding, upon which the termination order was based, was deficient. Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).
Privilege against self-incrimination. —
See E. L. L. v. State, 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977)(decided prior to the 1977 amendment to AS 47.10.010 ).
Violation of former law relating to purchase of intoxicating liquors by minors. —
See Purdy v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 762, 16 Alaska 173 (D. Alaska 1956).
Termination based on abandonment proper.
Termination based on abandonment was supported by evidence that the father had not spoken to the child in over nine months, and made minimal progress toward his case plan. Victor B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Petition to terminate parental rights was affirmed because, while there was a seven month period where the Office of Children’s Service (OCS) did not make active efforts required by Indian Child Welfare Act, over the entire period where OCS was involved, their efforts were sufficiently active in this case so that any shortcomings during father’s brief and intermittent periods of incarceration did not negate those efforts. Vale T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 15, 2021).
Test for abandonment. —
The test for abandonment under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] is two-pronged: the superior court must find (1) that the parent’s conduct implied a conscious disregard for parental obligations; and (2) that the parent’s conscious disregard led to the destruction of the relationship between the parent and the parent’s children. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment under AS 47.10.013 because the record established that even though he was working, the father did not provide child support after he was released from jail, and he made only one contact with the child during a 13 month period while the child was in foster care. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).
The child’s therapist testified that the father’s absence from the child’s life, and subsequent inconsistent visitation aggravated the child’s severe anxiety, interfering with his day-to-day functioning. Two one-year periods without visitation, coupled with the absence of any other forms of communication or support, constituted abandonment by the father. Dan A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 13, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper on the basis of abandonment because, after being given support and counselling, the father lost his job, was discharged from counseling for non-compliance, was arrested twice for driving while intoxicated, and failed to communicate the setbacks to the State. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Father abandoned his daughter by failing to maintain regular visitation for more than six months, supporting termination under AS 47.10.013(a)(3) ; he had last visited the child seven and a half months before trial and had visited her only three times, all in a single month, during the 15 months between December 2013 and March 2015. Based on his incarceration and failure to attend substance abuse and batterers' classes, the conduct was likely to continue. Trevor M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 368 P.3d 607 (Alaska 2016).
Record supported the superior court's finding that the father abandoned the child for purposes of AS 47.10.011 (1) by failing to comply with several important aspects of his case plan related to ceasing substance abuse and mitigating instances of domestic violence, and he offered no justification for this failure; the superior court did not err in finding that the father caused the child to be a child in need of aid by virtue of his abandonment. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Best interests of child prevail over parental rights. —
Record supported trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child where the record showed that the child suffered emotional problems as the result of the instability of his home environment; child had spent the last 19 months in foster care, he could not afford to wait any longer for his father to be a parent, and he would suffer severe psychological harm if the father was granted custody and then dropped out of his life again, which was likely. Carl N. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 102 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2004).
Where a father was incarcerated for the first 20 months of his child’s life, then was in her life for only five months before disappearing to avoid incarceration on a probation violation, and where there was no evidence that he maintained any contact with her during his flight, a finding of abandonment and termination of his parental rights was proper, especially in light of the child’s young age and the proportion of her life for which the father was absent. David S. v. State, 270 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2012).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate due to the child’s need for permanency, the strong bond which the child had formed with a foster family, and — given that the child’s older sister was part of the foster family already — the importance of keeping siblings together. The court also noted the foster family’s willingness to support a continued relationship between the child and the mother. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Criminal record and history of violence. —
Child was in need of aid where the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions; he admitted at trial that his assault and domestic violence convictions all resulted from crimes against women he knew, and one assault occurred against the child’s mother on the day before the child’s birth. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).
Breakup of Indian family. —
Court properly found the child to be a child in need of aid because the State’s efforts intended to address the mental health and substance abuse problems of the child were active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of an Indian family under 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d). Kyle S. v. State, 309 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2013) (memorandum decision).
Father's parental rights to an Indian child were properly terminated because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as (1) OCS provided frequent supervised visits recommended by two experts, (2) multiple agencies provided hands-on, one-on-one, parenting education, and (3) OCS paid for and followed up on the father's counseling with a chosen therapist to address mental health issues and was not obligated to try another course of action when the father did not improve due to a lack of commitment to therapy. Tim B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 18, 2019).
Destruction of parent-child relationship. —
Destruction of the parent-child relationship must be brought about by the acts of the parent; and in order to constitute abandonment, the acts of the parent must be willful. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Videotaped statement of child admissible against father. —
The videotaped statement of a four-year-old girl alleging sexual abuse by her father exhibited the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible under Evid. R. 804(b)(5) in a civil proceeding against the father where the statements were spontaneous and natural, the girl used child-like terminology to describe graphic sexual behavior and tied these incidents to events that would be prominent in the mind of a small child, and the interviewers conducted themselves in a neutral fashion and did not extract her statements. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).
Child at risk of harm. —
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).
Father’s history of death threats, bullying, and intimidation in front of his children, combined with his insistence on isolating the family from any social services, placed the children at risk of continued injury and warranted a finding that they were children in need of aid under this section. Martha S. v. State, 268 P.3d 1066 (Alaska 2012).
Even accepting a father’s argument that he was unable to defend himself against sexual abuse allegations due to his concurrent defense to criminal charges, the evidence of neglect, sexual abuse and domestic violence against the father was more than sufficient to justify termination of his parental rights. Edward C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Although father made some effort to maintain a relationship with his daughter, his parenting efforts were inconsistent; he failed to provide either financial or emotional support, failed to follow his case plan, and exposed the child to possible harmful situations. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).
If a trial court finds that a parent sexually abused one child in the household, it can presume that the other children in the household are at substantial risk for sexual abuse; therefore, in a child in need of aid case, the statutory presumption applied to male children in the household if the trial court found that a father had sexually abused a female child. Rowan B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2014).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Trial court, which terminated a mother’s parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the children in need of aid statutes, did not err in finding that the evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother’s children would likely be seriously harmed if returned to the mother. Because the aggregated testimony of expert and lay witnesses supported the trial court’s finding that the mother likely would continue to relapse until she resolved her underlying mental health issues, the trial court’s conduct-not-likely-to-change finding was not clearly erroneous. Diana P. v. State, 355 P.3d 541 (Alaska 2015).
Evidence presented at trial supported findings that the parents' substance use harmed the child and that the continued custody of the child by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child; the parents stipulated at an earlier adjudication hearing that the child was a child in need of aid and the parents were not engaged in treatment. The court could have inferred that returning the child to the parents while they were homeless and addicted to multiple controlled substances would result in substantial harm. Rachelle H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 22, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Record clearly supported the superior court's findings that the son was a child in need of aid as the son was at substantial risk of harm if not given appropriate care and that the father was unlikely to give it because the father was apparently indifferent to his son's special needs; and the father was emotionally volatile and short tempered. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues, coupled with the mother’s lack of accountability, would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Reasonable efforts.—
In a case in which a mother challenged the termination of her parental rights to her child, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's relevant finding was not clearly erroneous and that the trial court correctly applied relevant law. The record supported the trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her child, but that OCS's efforts were hampered by the mother's repeated incarcerations and her conduct during the times she was not incarcerated. Sloane K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 14, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother and the children because when the caseworker did not have face-to-face meetings she held them with the mother over the phone, and there was sufficient evidence in the record for the superior court to conclude that the mother was not interested in having those meetings. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.
Office of Children Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to address issues identified in a doctor's report and to help the mother gain critical parenting skills because OCS followed through on recommendations in the neuropsychological report, especially as they pertained to the mother's learning difficulty; OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the mother's lack of willingness to participate in her plan and her level of cooperation. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.
There was no error in the superior court's reasonable efforts finding with respect to the Office of Children Services' failure to seek additional providers for a bonding study because the children were in need of aid due to the mother's inability to manage her fatigue and learn the skills she needed to safely parent both children together; the extent of the mother's parental bonds with her children was secondary to those main issues. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Furthermore, that the Alaska Office of Children’s Services made reasonable reunification efforts by facilitating substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting classes, and various forms of visitation. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Child subjected to neglect. —
Finding that a child is in need of aid because she suffered physical neglect does not require the state to show both that parents physically neglected child and that child was physically harmed by their neglect; former AS 47.10.010(a)(6) (now see paragraph (9) of this section) did not require a finding of actual harm. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 968 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1998).
There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in the child’s continuing mental health issues. 2020 Alas. LEXIS 45.
Effect of witnessing domestic abuse. —
Witnessing domestic violence is mentally harmful to children; fact that because a parent has never directed violence against his child does not mean that the child has not faced “a substantial risk of mental injury” under paragraph (8)(B)(i). Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).
Trial court did not err in finding that children were in need of aid because the record contained clear support for the finding that their mother had a tendency to enter into and remain in abusive relationships; the mother’s own testimony indicated that the children suffered from PTSD and required intensive therapy due to the domestic violence in her home. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 264 P.3d 831 (Alaska 2011).
Father’s rights properly terminated due to domestic violence. —
Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights where the father was reluctant to participate in his case plan and had failed to recognize or remedy his role in his abusive relationship with the children’s mother; a police officer’s testimony supported the finding that jealousy, control, and power, in other words, domestic violence, remained an issue for the father. Victor B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).
A child was a child in need of aid due to the father’s pattern of domestic violence against the child’s mother, including the most recent incident when he broke both of her arms, the many severe and violent incidents involving alcohol, and the father’s failure to follow through with treatment for his substance abuse. Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013).
Trial court's findings that termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the father exposed the child to domestic violence, causing her mental injury, was supported by evidence that the father had a well documented history of domestic violence, including two convictions, had made no changes in how he interacted with others, and failed to participate in any classes to help him with his violent behavior. Victor B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Substance abuser.—
Finding that the mother's habitual drug use substantially impaired her ability to parent and placed the child at substantial risk of harm, thus making the child a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (10), was amply supported by the record; the mother was convicted in 2007 after she drove under the influence of methamphetamine with the child as a passenger, and evidence of the mother's 2016 relapse was separately relevant to show that her drug use was addictive and that her ability to parent had been substantially impaired. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Admission of an officer's alleged hearsay statements constituted harmless error as the evidence was sufficient, without the officer's statements, to find that the children were in need of aid, and to terminate the father's parental rights based on his ongoing substance abuse issues because there was evidence of the father's positive drug tests and no-shows for testing; testimony by the mother regarding the father's past drug usage; testimony by a sister-in-law that she found tin foil with a burnt substance on it in the room in her home where the father was staying; and testimony by two different officers who conducted two separate traffic stops where they each suspected the father was under the influence of a controlled substance. Aaron B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Sedrvs., — P.3d — (Alaska July 17, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
There was no error in the termination of the father’s parental rights because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the father’s family. For the majority of the four years during which OCS had custody of the children, he continued to use marijuana and alcohol, refused to engage consistently in therapy, failed to internalize lessons and skills taught in parenting classes, and missed many classes and urinalysis appointments. Kevin H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 29, 2021).
Father’s incarceration, ongoing drug use, and criminal activity justify termination. —
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights and found his children were in need of aid where the father used cocaine and marijuana, and was arrested repeatedly on drug-related offenses. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Substance abuse. —
In a case in which a father challenged a trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights to four children, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence supported the trial court's findings and the trial court correctly applied relevant law. There was substantial support in the record reflecting the father's ongoing substance use and failed treatment programs, which the trial court reasoned indicated a habitual or addictive use of intoxicants, placing the children at a substantial risk of harm. Glenn L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 20, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Substance abuse and exposure to domestic violence. —
Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights by determining that his daughter was a child in need of aid. There was sufficient evidence in the record to find that the father had an addiction to prescription and illegal intoxicants; it appeared that many of the father’s legal problems and incarcerations related to his addiction, which resulted in substantial harm to his daughter. Seth D. v. State, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008).
In terminating a mother’s parental rights, a trial court did not err in concluding that the children were in need of aid because the mother had a long history of alcohol abuse and all three children suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and other serious mental health issues as a result of witnessing domestic violence. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2013) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the child had been exposed to conduct or conditions specified in this section because the mother did not dispute that she exposed the child to drug addicts, drug dealers, and domestic violence. As the mother refused to fulfill her case plan requirements, which included substance abuse treatment, the trial court did not err by finding she did not remedy her conduct in time for her son to be safely returned to her custody. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Trial court’s finding that the child was a child in need of aid was supported by evidence that the mother’s substance abuse prevented her from caring for the child. Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).
Child born with addiction. —
There was clear and convincing evidence that a child was in need of aid and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper; the child suffered substantial physical harm while withdrawing from the methadone addiction with which the child was born. Darcy F. v. State, 252 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2010).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother's conduct resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the son under AS 47.10.011 (10) where the in utero exposure to Subutex resulted in the son's withdrawal symptoms at birth that persisted for weeks. Sally C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Parent with mental illness. —
Parent’s failure to seek treatment for her mental illness constituted unwillingness to provide care, and supported the termination of her parental rights. R.J.M. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).
It was not error for the superior court to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on her personality disorder rather than her physical ailment, because termination was required under paragraph (11). R.G. v. State, 43 P.3d 145 (Alaska 2002)..
Son was a child in need of aid based on mental injury due to his exposure to domestic violence; the child’s problems were related to neglect, exposure to domestic violence, and pathogenic parenting, and he was diagonsed with Reactive Attachment Disorder, which the responsible social worker noted usually began with pathogenic parenting. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights due to abandonment was proper because the mother failed to exercise visitation, she had multiple mental health diagnoses, she had very limited insight and judgment, and her impairments were so severe that she was unlikely to be able to function independently, requiring lifelong wrap-around services in order to meet her own needs. Miranda R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 17, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Failure of parents to remedy conduct. —
Order terminating parents’ rights to their three children was proper because the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions that put their children at substantial risk of harm within a reasonable time; the parents began to participate in residential substance abuse treatment just three weeks before the trial to terminate their rights. Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009).
Trial court did not err when it found that the children were children in need of aid, because the children suffered mental injury due to the parents’ lack of supervision and failure to meet the children’s mental health and counseling needs, including inappropriate and intimidating corporal punishment. William S. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 15, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, an Indian child who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).
Father's failure-to-remedy challenge failed where he conceded that he had yet to complete substantial portions of his case plan, even though at the time of the termination hearing more than two years had passed since the child's removal. Moreover, he provided no excuse for having failed to complete such tasks in the two years provided, and his argument that he had substantially remedied any alleged harm to the child because he no longer associated with a drug user at the time of trial did nothing to dispel the legitimate concerns that the father had not changed his behaviors so as to place the child's interests first. Dillon K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 27, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Failure to remedy conditions. —
Superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in her home that placed her children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; the mother’s sobriety was new in her life, she continued to be romantically involved with a man who had been convicted of child sexual assault, and the mother failed to recognize her children’s special needs. Sherry R. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
Superior court properly found that a father’s history of incarceration and substance abuse, as well as his pending incarceration, put his children in need of aid under subsections (2) and (10), and that the father had failed within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed his children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury under AS 47.10.088 . Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).
Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to remedy conduct that put their children at substantial risk under AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(B) because the father failed to achieve the goals of his case plan and stated that he did not intend to seek further alcohol abuse treatment because it was not important. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).
Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because sufficient evidence showed that his drinking impaired his ability to parent and caused a substantial risk of harm to the children; his continuing alcohol problems supported the finding that he failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk. Stephen H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the mother failed to remedy the conduct and conditions that caused the children to be children in need of aid because the parents' history showed a repeated pattern of substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence; the mother did not understand the extent of the children's needs or have the skills necessary to protect them from future harm; the mother never internalized or understood the ways in which her behavior adversely affected the children; and, by the time of trial, the mother still had not completed substance abuse treatment or a long period of sobriety. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Order terminating the mother's parental rights to her two children was affirmed as she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children in need of aid because she was unable to cease her use of marijuana for well over a year after the first child's removal; she continued to regularly smoke marijuana when she was pregnant with the second child, even though she was informed of the risks posed by prenatal marijuana exposure; although the mother eventually became clean, she began smoking marijuana again several months after the children were returned to her care; and, after her relapse, the condition of the family's home and the hygiene of the children deteriorated. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).
It was not clear error to find a father did not remedy conduct making his children in need of aid because (1) the father did not engage in treatment recommended by his assessment, (2) he used drugs in the month preceding the termination of parental rights trial, and (3) her did not timely obtain a psychological assessment. Justin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 15, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid because the father's release from prison remedied the condition that placed the children in need of aid; because the father 's “unavailability” was not relevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, it was error to consider it. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Failure to maintain contact or comply with other requirements. —
Child was in need of aid where the father failed to maintain any sort of contact or visitation with the child for eight months, failed to comply with the urinalysis testing program, and did not complete a state-approved domestic violence intervention program. Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010).
Son was a child in need of aid based on abandonment where the parents failed to correspond with the child and visited only sporadically; argument by father that they were too poor to be able to visit more often was unconvincing where the father and mother moved away from the child with no clear benefit to the child or the parents, and the Alaska Office of Children’s Services offered to assist the parents with travel expenses. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).
Child was in need of aid where the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Evidence supported superior court’s finding that children were in need of aid due to abandonment, domestic violence, and substance abuse because the parent failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the children in need of aid and the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the family. The evidence showed that despite OCS’s efforts, the parent visited the children only three times during the 30 months they were in OCS custody preceding the trial. Albert S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 12, 2014) (memorandum decision).
No due process violations. —
Order adjudicating a father’s children in need of aid was proper because the father was not denied due process; he had notice that the State was seeking adjudication findings, he had an opportunity to be heard on adjudication, and he was not denied the opportunity to deliver a closing argument. Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 264 P.3d 842 (Alaska 2011).
Superior court properly adjudicated a mother's child as in need of aid because, even assuming that the court violated the mother's due process rights, the error was harmless where she raised only a theoretical possibility of prejudice inasmuch as she cited, but did not apply, the relevant due process test, did not explain what "inferences" the court allegedly drew against her or how those inferences affected the court's adjudication or removal decision, or what information in the court's summary of findings led the court to discount her expert's testimony or make any alleged inferences against her, and the court's general comments did not implicate the mother's rights to notice and an opportunity to respond to specific evidence. Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).
No right to jury trial. —
Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 7, 11, and 16 do not provide a right to a jury trial in child-in-need-of-aid proceedings. Alyssa B. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 123 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2005).
Appellate review of child in need of aid determination. —
Supreme court will only overturn a trial court’s finding that a child is in need of aid if it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. L.P. v. State, 838 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1992).
Because either the finding that a child was in need of aid due to the father's incarceration or the father's mental illness adequately supported the termination decision, and the father did not challenge the trial court's child in need of aid finding under subsection (11), the court of appeals did not reach his point on appeal concerning the court's use of the mother's adjudication stipulation under subsection (2). Jasper R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 24, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Because a mother in a termination of parental rights case did not contest the superior court's finding that the mother's children were in need of aid based on the mother's substance abuse, the appellate court declined to consider the alternative findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and risk of exposure to domestic violence by the mother's paramour, as those issues were rendered moot. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Parent’s appeal of adjudication deemed moot after state’s dismissal. —
In arguing that the adjudication of a father’s children to be in need of aid was not moot, the father’s argument that, even if the adjudication no longer affected him, its potential for collateral consequences was sufficient, did not prevent a finding that the appeal was moot after the state voluntarily moved to dismiss the case at disposition. Peter A. v. State, 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006).
Applied in
A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska 2000); A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000); C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015); Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).
Quoted in
M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001); Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006); Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015); Jenny S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 4, 2015); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017).
Stated in
Wilson W. v. State, 185 P.3d 94 (Alaska 2008); Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014); In re Adoption of E.H., 431 P.3d 1190 (Alaska 2018); Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).
Cited in
V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002); S.B. v. State, 61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002); State v. M.L.L., 61 P.3d 43 (Alaska 2002); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003); Pravat P. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 249 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2011); Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011); Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013); Sherry R. v. State, 332 P.3d 1268 (Alaska 2014); Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015); Ray R. v. State, 386 P.3d 1225 (Alaska 2016); Caitlyn E. v. State, 399 P.3d 646 (Alaska 2017); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018); Mariah B. v. Dep't to Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 499 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2021).
Collateral references. —
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.
Sec. 47.10.013. Abandonment.
-
For purposes of this chapter, the court may find abandonment of a child if a parent or guardian has shown a conscious disregard of parental responsibilities toward the child by failing to provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact, or provide normal supervision, considering the child’s age and need for care by an adult. Abandonment of a child also includes instances when the parent or guardian, without justifiable cause,
- left the child with another person without provision for the child’s support and without meaningful communication with the child for a period of three months;
- has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child;
- failed for a period of at least six months to maintain regular visitation with the child;
- failed to participate in a suitable plan or program designed to reunite the parent or guardian with the child;
- left the child without affording means of identifying the child and the child’s parent or guardian;
- was absent from the home for a period of time that created a substantial risk of serious harm to a child left in the home;
- failed to respond to notice of child protective proceedings; or
- was unwilling to provide care, support, or supervision for the child.
- For purposes of (a) of this section, a parent or guardian who is a victim of domestic violence, or who has a child in the parent’s or guardian’s care who is the victim of domestic violence, is considered to have justifiable cause to take an action or to fail to take an action that would otherwise be considered to be abandonment of a child under (a) of this section if the action or failure to act is necessary to protect the parent or guardian, or a child in the care of the parent or guardian, from further acts of domestic violence. However, a parent or guardian who initially had justifiable cause to act or fail to act as described in this subsection may be considered to have abandoned the child without justifiable cause for purposes of (a) of this section if the parent or guardian does not take reasonable steps to reunify with or provide care for the abandoned child after becoming secure from further acts of domestic violence or after providing that another child in the care of the parent or guardian is secure from further acts of domestic violence.
-
A parent who is immune from prosecution under AS
11.81.500
and chooses to surrender an infant shall surrender the infant in the manner described in this subsection. Surrendering the infant in the manner described in this subsection constitutes abandonment for purposes of this chapter. An infant’s parent is considered to have abandoned the infant safely, and, notwithstanding AS
25.20.030
and AS
47.10.120
, the parent’s legal duty to support the infant is extinguished if
-
the parent, without expressing an intent to return for the infant, leaves the infant in the physical custody of a person who is a
- person the parent reasonably believes would provide for the health and safety of the infant and who would act appropriately to care for the infant;
- peace officer, community health aide, physician, or hospital employee; or
- person who is employed by or is a volunteer for a fire department or emergency medical service, if the person is acting within the scope of the person’s fire department or emergency medical service duties; and
- there is no evidence the infant has been physically injured before abandonment.
-
the parent, without expressing an intent to return for the infant, leaves the infant in the physical custody of a person who is a
-
A person to whom an infant is surrendered in the manner described in (c)(1)(B) or (C) of this section shall
- act appropriately to care for the infant;
- inform the parent that the parent may, but is not required to, answer any questions regarding the name, identity, and medical history of the infant and parents of the infant unless the parent chooses to contact the department under (3) of this subsection;
- ask the parent if the parent wishes to relinquish the parent’s parental rights and release the infant for adoption; if the answer is affirmative, the person shall contact the department so that the parent can discuss that option with the department;
- immediately notify the nearest office of the department that the infant has been surrendered in the manner described in (c) of this section.
- An individual, agency, facility, or entity that receives an infant abandoned safely under (c) of this section is not liable for civil damages for failure to discharge the duties listed in (d) of this section.
- A record regarding the surrender of an infant under (c) of this section is confidential and not subject to public inspection or copying under AS 40.25.100 — 40.25.220 .
History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 1 SLA 2008)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, added subsections (c) through (f).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Little contact with child over prolonged period. —
State supreme court upheld a trial court’s judgment that a child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
Termination of parental rights was appropriate when evidence showed that a great part of the son’s emotional disturbance was attributable to neglect, the instability of caregivers, and violence in the father’s shifting households, as well as poor role modeling in the home; father also failed to maintain contact with his daughter, although he had sought custody of her in the past during periods when he was out of prison. Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005).
Two one-year-long periods without visitation, coupled with the absence of any other forms of communication or support, constituted abandonment by the father. The child’s therapist testified that the father’s absence from the child’s life and subsequent inconsistent visitation aggravated the child’s severe anxiety, interfering with his day-to-day functioning. Dan A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 13, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err by finding the child in need of aid due to abandonment because the father had failed to participate in a case plan as he was out of contact with the Office of Children's Services from February to September 2016 and again from September 2016 to May 2017; and, between the end of the trial home visit in October 2015 and May 2017, the only arguable progress that the father made on his case plan was his self-reported lack of contact with the mother and his family contact with the child. Alvin R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 24, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Finding of abandonment. —
Child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment because the record established that even though he was working, the father did not provide child support after he was released from jail, and he made only one contact with the child during a 13 month period while the child was in foster care. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).
Father’s inconsistent behavior, sudden lengthy absences, and failure to follow his case plan constituted abandonment. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).
A father’s parental rights were terminated because he abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the requirement of the Office of Children’s Services that the father visit with the children individually was reasonable, and his failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations. Further, the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in his case plan; the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father's parental right did not violate his due process rights where the basis of termination was his abandonment of the child, which was evidenced by his failure to engage with his case plan and his plan for the child's placement with the paternal grandparents, and requiring him to prove that he could provide a safe home for the child was appropriate. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
It was not clear error to find a father abandoned his Indian child because (1) the father did not regularly visit or meaningfully participate in a case plan requiring drug tests and visits, (2) the drug testing was reasonable due to his substance abuse history, presence of other children in the home who tested positive for illegal substances, and failure to show the father's religion or work schedule prevented participating in testing, and (3) the father did not show his work schedule prevented attending visits. Steve H. v. State, 444 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2019).
Although the superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid, since its findings concerning “unavailability” were irrelevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, because “unavailability” could be relevant to abandonment, the matter was remanded to the superior court to reconsider its findings in relation to Office of Children's Services' abandonment argument and petition. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Failure to participate in a suitable plan. —
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a child was in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (1) and had been abandoned under AS 47.10-013(a)(4) where although the father was relatively consistent in visitation, cleaned up his home, and participated in case plan meetings, he refused to take drug tests, participate in parental risk assessments and evaluations, or participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Failure to take steps to obtain visitation. —
Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment because the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).
No effort to see child for over one year after birth. —
Where the father made no efforts to establish a relationship with his baby daughter for over a year after her birth, one year was not a reasonable time to remedy the effects of his abandonment under former AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B)(ii) [now AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(B) ]. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
“Failed to participate in a suitable plan.” —
In determining what “failed to participate” means within the context of paragraph (a)(4), while this statutory provision does not necessarily require a parent to follow his or her reunification plan to the letter, it does require more than minimal participation. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
By failing to even minimally participate in her case plan for over six months, the mother’s conduct fell within the definition of “abandonment” stated in paragraph (a)(4). A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
Court did not err in terminating a father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment where he failed to comply with his case plan and refused to provide basic contact information so that he could be notified about events in the case and services that might be available; he had not had contact with the children for six years. Wilson W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his child. The father failed to cooperate with the reasonable services that the OCS provided. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Father’s failure to comply with a case plan designed to assist him in becoming able to take care of his child was properly held to be abandonment. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, but was merely giving lip-service to the providers and was going through the motions. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination proper. —
Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper on the basis of abandonment because, after he had an opportunity to receive counselling and support from the state, the father lost his job, was discharged from counseling for non-compliance, was arrested twice for driving while intoxicated, and failed to communicate these setbacks to the State. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).
Father abandoned his daughter by failing to maintain regular visitation for more than six months, supporting termination under AS 47.10.013(a)(3) ; he had last visited the child seven and a half months before trial and had visited her only three times, all in a single month, during the 15 months between December 2013 and March 2015. Based on his incarceration and failure to attend substance abuse and batterers' classes, the conduct was likely to continue. Trevor M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 368 P.3d 607 (Alaska 2016).
Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Termination held improper. —
Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and incarceration of the father because the father initiated efforts to visit the child, who was already in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS), as soon as he learned of his possible paternity. Furthermore, the father had visitation during the subsequent incarceration as often as the OCS was able to provide it. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Quoted in
A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska 2000); C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).
Cited in
M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002); Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010); Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013).
Sec. 47.10.014. Neglect.
For purposes of this chapter, the court may find neglect of a child if the parent, guardian, or custodian fails to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attention, or other care and control necessary for the child’s physical and mental health and development, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so.
History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Neglect not found.
Termination of a father's parental rights was inappropriate because it was clear error for the superior court to find that the child was in need of aid on the grounds of neglect because there was no basis in the record for a finding that the father, who was incarcerated, failed to provide support that the father was financially able to provide. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Neglect found. —
Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).
Trial court did not err by finding the child to be a child in need of aid based on neglect because for some time after the father was incarcerated he refused to provide names of relatives who might be placements, he unlawfully left the halfway house and kidnapped the child from her foster parents, and placed her in a dangerous situation during a police confrontation. Darryl W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 14, 2019) (memorandum decision).
There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in her continuing mental health issues. Kendra H. v. State (Alaska 2000) (memorandum decision).
Quoted in
Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).
Cited in
Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010); Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015).
Sec. 47.10.015. Physical harm.
For the purposes of this chapter, the court may find physical harm to a child or substantial risk of physical harm to a child if
- the child was the victim of an act described in AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.250 , 11.41.300 , 11.41.410 — 11.41.455 , or AS 11.51.100 and the physical harm occurred as a result of conduct by or conditions created by a parent, guardian, or custodian; or
- a negligent act or omission by a parent, guardian, or custodian creates a substantial risk of injury to the child.
History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Rowan B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2014).
Sec. 47.10.019. Limitations on determinations.
Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, the court may not find a minor to be a child in need of aid under this chapter solely on the basis that the child’s family is poor, lacks adequate housing, or exhibits a lifestyle that is different from the generally accepted lifestyle standard of the community where the family lives. However, this section may not be construed to prevent a court from finding that a child is in need of aid if the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011 — 47.10.015 .
History. (§ 18 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the enactment of this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Housing. —
Abandonment finding was supported in part by evidence that the parent refused to reveal his address; the superior court focused not on the quality of the housing but on the parent’s secretiveness about it. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).
Applied in
Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).
Quoted in
A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
Cited in
C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).
Sec. 47.10.020. Investigation and petition.
-
Whenever circumstances subject a child to the jurisdiction of the court under AS
47.10.005
—
47.10.142
, the court shall appoint a competent person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and report for the information of the court to determine whether the best interests of the child require that further action be taken. The court shall make the appointment on its own motion or at the request of a person or agency having knowledge of the child’s circumstances. If, under this subsection, the court appoints a person or agency to make a preliminary inquiry and to report to it, or if the department is conducting an investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect, the court may issue any orders necessary to aid the person, the agency, or the department in its investigation or in making the preliminary inquiry and report. Upon receipt of the report under this subsection, the court may
- close the matter without a court hearing;
- determine whether the best interests of the child require that further action be taken; or
- authorize the person or agency having knowledge of the facts of the case to file with the court a petition setting out the facts.
-
The petition and all subsequent pleadings shall be styled as follows: “In the matter of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., a child under 18 years of age.” The petition may be executed upon the petitioner’s information and belief and must be verified. It must include the following information:
- the name, address, and occupation of the petitioner, together with the petitioner’s relationship to the child, and the petitioner’s interest in the matter;
- the name, age, and address of the child;
- a brief statement of the facts that bring the child within this chapter;
- the names and addresses of the child’s parents;
- the tribal affiliation, if known, of the child;
- the name and address of the child’s guardian or of the person having control or custody of the child.
- If the petitioner does not know a fact required in this section, the petitioner shall so state in the petition.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
Nothing in this section requires the department to obtain authorization from the court before
- conducting an investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect; or
- filing a petition.
History. (§ 5 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am §§ 7, 8 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 98 SLA 1995; am §§ 18, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 19, 20 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 7, 8 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) added the second sentence, in the third sentence added the language beginning “or if the department” to the end of the sentence, and inserted “under this subsection” in the last sentence; and added subsection (e).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
No actionable duty in tort. —
In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
Stated in
Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Superior Court, 462 P.3d 1000 (Alaska 2020).
Collateral references. —
42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, §§ 16-25
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 49 et seq.
43 C.J.S., Infants, § 12 et seq.
Sec. 47.10.030. Summons and custody of minor.
-
After a petition is filed and after further investigation that the court directs, if the person having custody or control of the minor has not appeared voluntarily, the court shall issue a summons that
- recites briefly the substance of the petition;
- clearly states that at the hearing it is possible that parental rights and responsibilities may be terminated forever and that the minor may at the hearing be committed to the department for possible adoption; and
- directs the person having custody or control of the minor to appear personally in court with the minor at the place and at the time set forth in the summons.
- In all cases under this chapter, the child, each parent, the tribe, foster parent or other out-of-home care provider, guardian, and guardian ad litem of the child and, subject to (d) and (e) of this section, each grandparent of the child shall be given notice adequate to give actual notice of the proceedings and the possibility of termination of parental rights and responsibilities, taking into account education and language differences that are known or reasonably ascertainable by the petitioner or the department. The notice of the hearing must contain all names by which the child has been identified. Notice shall be given in the manner appropriate under rules of civil procedure for the service of process in a civil action under Alaska law or in any manner the court by order directs. Proof of the giving of the notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard. The court may also subpoena the parent of the child, or any other person whose testimony may be necessary at the hearing. A subpoena or other process may be served by a person authorized by law to make the service, and, where personal service cannot be made, the court may direct that service of process be in a manner appropriate under rules of civil procedure for the service of process in a civil action under Alaska law or in any manner the court directs.
- If the minor is in such condition or surroundings that the minor’s welfare requires the immediate assumption of custody by the court, the court may order, by endorsement upon the summons, that the officer serving the summons shall at once take the minor into custody and make the temporary placement of the minor that the court directs.
-
Except as provided in (e) of this section, the department shall give advance written notice of all court hearings in a child’s case to a grandparent of the child if
- the grandparent has contacted the department, provided evidence acceptable to the department of being the child’s grandparent, requested notice about the hearings in the child’s case, and provided the department with a current mailing address; or
- the department is aware that the child has a grandparent and the grandparent’s mailing address is on file with the department.
-
Notwithstanding (d) of this section, the department is not required to give advance notice to a grandparent about hearings in a child’s case if the grandparent
- has been convicted of a crime in which the child was the victim; or
- is prohibited by a court order from having contact with the child.
History. (§ 6 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 110 SLA 1960; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 9 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 21 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 2 ch 43 SLA 2001)
Cross references. —
For effect of the 1998 amendments to subsection (b) on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 70, ch. 99, SLA 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) and Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971), cited below, were decided prior to the 1977 amendment to this section, which rewrote subsection (b).
The child and his parents must receive notice which would be deemed adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. These requirements suggest that Alaska civil and criminal rules should be looked to for techniques of service on children. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
Personal service upon the child is required. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
And it must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
One day’s notice was insufficient to afford a reasonable time to prepare. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
Grandparents had right to notice of CINA proceedings. —
Grandparents were entitled to judicial declaration that they had a right to notice of any child in need of aid (CINA) proceedings involving their grandchildren; grandparents were also entitled to a declaration that their right to notice was violated when they did not receive notice after amendments to CINA statutes requiring grandparent notice took effect. Jacob v. State, 177 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2008).
Failure to provide notice held harmless. —
Failure to provide a grandmother notice of permanency hearings was harmless error. It was unlikely that her presence would have changed the results of the hearings, and she was able to fully address the evidence later in her own proceedings. Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012).
Waiving defects in process. —
While some authorities hold that infants, even when represented by counsel, cannot waive defects in process and consent to jurisdiction over the person, such a rule unreasonably restricts the strategic choices open to a child represented by counsel. A no-waiver rule could be used as a delaying tactic by an unprepared prosecutor when process was not entirely correct. A child represented by competent counsel is about as fit as an adult to waive this sort of objection, which is usually beyond the ken of adult laymen as well as children. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
Defect in process was waived by child’s failure to raise it below. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
Order terminating parental rights vacated because of inadequate notice. —
Order terminating parental rights was vacated where the state, by merely publishing notice of the parental rights termination proceeding, failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1912(a), and subsections (a) and (b) of this section and the record did not establish actual notice so as to render that error harmless. In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1986).
Stated in
State v. Jacob, 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009).
Cited in
M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Sec. 47.10.040. Release of minor. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law as to a child in need of aid, see AS 47.10.080(c)(2); as to an alleged delinquent minor, see AS 47.12.080.]
Sec. 47.10.050. Appointment of guardian ad litem or attorney.
- Whenever in the course of proceedings instituted under this chapter it appears to the court that the welfare of a child will be promoted by the appointment of an attorney to represent the child, the court may make the appointment. If it appears to the court that the welfare of a child in the proceeding will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the court shall make the appointment. Appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney shall be made under the terms of AS 25.24.310 .
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
History. (§ 8 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 167 SLA 1975; am §§ 11, 12 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 22 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Cross references. —
For appointment of counsel, see CINA Rule 12; for guardians ad litem, see CINA Rule 11.
Administrative Code. —
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Under Rule of Children’s Procedure 12(c)(3), the presence of the guardian ad litem is required at a child hearing. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979) (See current Child in Need of Aid Rule 11(f)(3)(A).).
Failure to conduct hearing in presence of child’s counsel and guardian ad litem held harmless error. —
See In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Collateral references. —
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 74.
43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 44, 45.
Recognition of foreign guardian as next friend or guardian ad litem. 94 ALR2d 211.
Who is minor’s next of kin for guardianship purposes. 63 ALR3d 813.
Validity and efficacy of minor’s waiver of right to counsel — modern cases. 25 ALR4th 1072.
Sec. 47.10.060. Waiver of jurisdiction. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law as to an alleged delinquent minor, see AS 47.12.100.]
Sec. 47.10.070. Hearings.
- The court may conduct the hearing on the petition in an informal manner. The court shall give notice of the hearing to the department, and it may send a representative to the hearing. The court shall also transmit a copy of the petition to the department. The department shall send notice of the hearing to the persons for whom notice is required under AS 47.10.030(b) and to each grandparent of the child entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(d) . The department and the persons to whom the department must send notice of the hearing are entitled to be heard at the hearing. Except as provided in (c) of this section, and unless prohibited by federal or state law, court order, or court rule, a hearing is open to the public.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
Except as provided in (e) of this section, the following hearings in child-in-need-of-aid cases are closed to the public:
- the initial court hearing after the filing of a petition to commence the child-in-need-of-aid case;
- a hearing following the initial hearing in which a parent, child, or other party to the case is present but has not had an opportunity to obtain legal representation;
-
a hearing, or a part of a hearing, for which the court issues a written order finding that allowing the hearing, or part of the hearing, to be open to the public would reasonably be expected to
- stigmatize or be emotionally damaging to a child;
- inhibit a child’s testimony in that hearing;
- disclose matters otherwise required to be kept confidential by state or federal statute or regulation, court order, or court rule; or
- interfere with a criminal investigation or proceeding or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding; before ruling on a request under this subparagraph, the court shall give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the state or a municipal agency that is assigned to the criminal investigation or to the prosecuting attorney.
- If a hearing, or part of a hearing, in a child-in-need-of-aid case is not closed under (c) of this section, the court shall hear in camera any information offered regarding the location, or readily leading to the location, of a parent, child, or other party to the case who is a victim of domestic violence or whose safety or welfare may be endangered by public release of the information. Access to testimony heard in camera under this subsection is limited to the court and authorized court personnel.
- The grandparents of the child and an out-of-home care provider may attend hearings that are otherwise closed to the public under (c) of this section. However, the court shall limit the presence of these persons in a hearing closed to the public to the time during which the person’s testimony is being given if the court determines that the limitation is necessary under (c)(3) of this section.
- Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a person attending a hearing open to the public may not disclose a name, picture, or other information that would readily lead to the identification of a child who is the subject of the child-in-need-of-aid case. At the beginning of the hearing, the court shall issue an order specifying the restrictions necessary to comply with this subsection. If a person violates the order, the court may impose any appropriate sanction, including contempt and closure of any further hearings to the person.
History. (§ 10(1) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 49 SLA 1966; am § 53 ch 71 SLA 1972; am § 16 ch 57 SLA 1991; am §§ 19, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 23 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 3 ch 43 SLA 2001; am §§ 9, 10 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Cross references. —
For effect of the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 70, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the Temporary and Special Acts.
For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of Rule 3(c), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, permitting attendance of a grandparent or out-of-home care provider at a hearing, as authorized by the 2005 enactment of (e) of this section, see § 51, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of Rule 3(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, allowing general public attendance at a hearing, as authorized by the 2005 amendment of (a) of this section, see § 52, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) deleted the former last two sentences and added the present last sentence; and added subsections (c)-(f).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsection (a) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
Section 61(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of (a) and addition of (c) — (f) of this section “have the effect of changing Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, by allowing members of the public to attend court hearings except in certain circumstances.”
Under § 62(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the amendments to Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, that relate to the 2005 amendments of this section, apply “to hearings that are conducted on or after July 1, 2005.” Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments of and additions to this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”
Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendment of and addition to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.110 .
Cited in
In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975); M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Barry H. v. State, 404 P.3d 1231 (Alaska 2017).
Sec. 47.10.072. Access to hearing by victim. [Repealed, § 23 ch 57 SLA 1991.]
Sec. 47.10.075. Young adult advisory panels. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
Sec. 47.10.080. Judgments and orders.
- An adjudication hearing shall be completed within 120 days after a finding of probable cause is entered unless the court finds good cause to continue the hearing. When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. The court, at the conclusion of the hearing, as the circumstances of the case may require, shall find and enter a judgment that the child is or is not a child in need of aid.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
If the court finds that the child is a child in need of aid, the court shall
-
order the child committed to the department for placement in an appropriate setting for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event not to extend past the date the child becomes 19 years of age, except that the department, the child, or the child’s guardian ad litem may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
- one-year extensions of commitment that do not extend beyond the child’s 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the child; and
- additional one-year extensions of commitment past 19 years of age that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if the continued state custody is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it;
-
order the child released to a parent, adult family member, or guardian of the child or to another suitable person, and, in appropriate cases, order the parent, adult family member, guardian, or other person to provide medical or other care and treatment; if the court releases the child, it shall direct the department to supervise the care and treatment given to the child, but the court may dispense with the department’s supervision if the court finds that the adult to whom the child is released will adequately care for the child without supervision; the department’s supervision may not exceed two years or in any event extend past the date the child reaches 19 years of age, except that the department or the child’s guardian ad litem may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
- one-year extensions of supervision that do not extend beyond the child’s 19th birthday if the extensions are in the best interests of the child; and
- an additional one-year period of supervision past 19 years of age if the continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it; or
- order, under the grounds specified in (o) of this section or AS 47.10.088 , the termination of parental rights and responsibilities of one or both parents and commit the child to the custody of the department; the department shall report quarterly to the court and shall demonstrate in its report that the department is making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child.
-
order the child committed to the department for placement in an appropriate setting for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event not to extend past the date the child becomes 19 years of age, except that the department, the child, or the child’s guardian ad litem may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing
- An order issued under (c)(3) of this section authorizes the commissioner of health and social services or a designee or the guardian of the person of the child to consent to the adoption of the child.
- If the court finds that the minor is not a child in need of aid, it shall immediately order the minor released from the department’s custody and returned to the minor’s parents, guardian, or custodian, and dismiss the case.
- A child found to be a child in need of aid is a ward of the state while committed to the department or the department has the power to supervise the child’s actions. For an order made under (c)(1) of this section, the court shall hold a permanency hearing as required by (l) of this section and at least annually thereafter during the continuation of foster care to determine if continued placement, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the child. The department, the child, and the child’s parents, guardian, and guardian ad litem are entitled, when good cause is shown, to a permanency hearing on application. If the application is granted, the court shall afford these persons and their counsel reasonable advance notice and hold a permanency hearing where these persons and their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard. The persons entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(b) and the grandparents entitled to notice under AS 47.10.030(d) are entitled to notice of a permanency hearing under this subsection and are also entitled to be heard at the hearing. The child shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and to be heard at the permanency hearing. After the permanency hearing, the court shall make the written findings that are required under (l) of this section. The court shall review an order made under (c)(2) of this section at least annually to determine if continued supervision, as it is being provided, is in the best interest of the child; this review is not considered to be a permanency hearing and is not governed by the provisions of this subsection that relate to permanency hearings.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
A child or the child’s parents, guardian, or guardian ad litem, or attorney, acting on the child’s behalf, or the department may appeal a judgment or order, or the stay, modification, setting aside, revocation, or enlargement of a judgment or order issued by the court under this chapter. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a decision on the appeal shall be issued no later than 90 days after the latest of the following:
- the date oral argument, if any, is heard on the appeal; or
- 45 days after the last date oral argument could have been timely requested if oral argument was not requested.
- [Repealed, § 29 ch 63 SLA 1977.]
- [Repealed, § 69 ch 99 SLA 1998.]
-
Within 12 months after the date a child enters foster care as calculated under AS
47.10.088(f)
, the court shall hold a permanency hearing. The hearing and permanent plan developed in the hearing are governed by the following provisions:
- the persons entitled to be heard under AS 47.10.070 or under (f) of this section are also entitled to be heard at the hearing held under this subsection;
-
when establishing the permanent plan for the child, the court shall make appropriate written findings, including findings related to whether
- and when the child should be returned to the parent or guardian;
- the child should be placed for adoption or legal guardianship and whether a petition for termination of parental rights should be filed by the department; and
- there is a compelling reason that the most appropriate placement for the child is in another planned, permanent living arrangement and the department has recommended the arrangement under AS 47.14.100(o) ; the findings under this paragraph must include the steps that are necessary to achieve the new arrangement;
- if the court is unable to make a finding required under (2) of this subsection, the court shall hold another hearing within a reasonable period of time;
-
in addition to the findings required by (2) of this subsection, the court shall also make appropriate written findings related to
- whether the department has made the reasonable efforts required under AS 47.10.086 to offer appropriate family support services to remedy the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid under this chapter;
- whether the parent or guardian has made substantial progress to remedy the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid under this chapter;
-
if the permanent plan is for the child to remain in out-of- home care, whether
- the child’s out-of-home placement continues to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child; and
- the department is making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child; and
- whether the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanent plan for the child;
- the court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan at least annually until successful implementation of the plan; if the plan approved by the court changes after the hearing, the department shall promptly apply to the court for another permanency hearing, and the court shall conduct the hearing within 30 days after application by the department;
- if the court finds, under (4)(C)(ii) of this subsection, that the department is not making reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child, the court shall order the department to make reasonable efforts to find a permanent placement for the child unless the current placement is in the best interests of the child.
-
in a hearing to review the permanent plan under AS
47.10.111(c)
or
47.10.112(c)
, the court shall make written findings related to whether
- the person who filed the petition or proxy is entitled to placement preference under AS 47.14.100(e) or 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), whichever is applicable; and
- if 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) applies, the current placement is in compliance with or whether there is good cause to deviate from the placement preferences.
- [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
- [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
-
For purposes of terminating a parent’s parental rights under the standards in (c)(3) of this section, the court may determine that incarceration of the parent is sufficient grounds for determining that a child is a child in need of aid under AS
47.10.011
as a result of parental conduct and that the parental rights of the incarcerated parent should be terminated if the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
- the period of incarceration that the parent is scheduled to serve during the child’s minority is significant considering the child’s age and the child’s need for an adult’s care and supervision;
- there is not another parent willing and able to care for the child; and
- the incarcerated parent has failed to make adequate provisions for care of the child during the period of incarceration that will be during the child’s minority.
- If a child is removed from the parental home, the department shall provide reasonable visitation between the child and the child’s parents, guardian, and family. When determining what constitutes reasonable visitation with a family member, the department shall consider the nature and quality of the relationship that existed between the child and the family member before the child was committed to the custody of the department. The court may require the department to file a visitation plan with the court. The department may deny visitation to the parents, guardian, or family members if there is clear and convincing evidence that visits are not in the child’s best interests. If the department denies visitation to a parent or family member of a child, the department shall inform the parent or family member of a reason for the denial and of the parent’s or adult family member’s right to request a review hearing as an interested person. A parent, adult family member, or guardian who is denied visitation may request a review hearing. A non-party adult family member requesting a review hearing under this subsection is not eligible for publicly appointed legal counsel.
-
If the court orders a child committed to the department under (c) of this section and the department places the child in licensed foster care, the department shall
-
provide the foster parent with a copy of
- appropriate information held by the department regarding the child to the extent required by AS 47.12.310(b)(2)(H) ;
- all initial, updated, and revised case service plans for the child, court orders relating to the child, and the child’s medical, mental, and education reports prepared by or for the department, including reports compiled before the child was placed with the foster parent; and
- supplements to the plans, orders, and reports described in (B) of this paragraph;
-
require the foster parent to
- maintain and update records regarding medical, mental, educational, and behavioral services provided to the child;
- provide all records described in (A) of this paragraph to the department when the child leaves the foster home placement; and
- maintain the confidentiality of records regarding a child placed in the foster home except when disclosure of the records is allowed under regulations of the department or when disclosure is reasonably necessary to ensure continuation of care for the child through appropriate medical, mental, educational, and behavioral services.
-
provide the foster parent with a copy of
-
If the court orders a child committed to the department under (c) of this section, the court shall order the child’s parent or guardian to provide the department with
- the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all of the child’s medical providers;
- the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of mental health providers that have provided services to the child;
- the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of schools, preschools, or day care facilities that the child was attending before the child was committed to the department;
- a description of special needs of the child, if any; and
- the names and locations of relatives who may be willing to have the child placed in their home.
- The department may transfer a child, in the child’s best interests, from one placement setting to another, and the child, the child’s parents or guardian, the child’s foster parents or out-of-home caregiver, the child’s guardian ad litem, the child’s attorney, and the child’s tribe are entitled to advance notice of a nonemergency transfer. A party opposed to the proposed transfer may request a hearing and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer would be contrary to the best interests of the child for the court to deny the transfer. A foster parent or out-of-home caregiver who requests a nonemergency change in placement of the child shall provide the department with reasonable advance notice of the requested change. When the department transfers a child from one out-of-home placement to another, the department shall search for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or a family friend who meets the foster care licensing requirements established by the department. A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible.
- For a child who is placed in foster care, when the department finds that it is in the best interest of a child and that the foster family will not be placed in undue risk of harm, the department shall require foster parents to provide regular opportunities for visitation with the child by the parents of the child and encourage foster parents to serve as mentors for facilitating family reunification.
- A hearing conducted under this section is open to the public unless an exception provided in AS 47.10.070(c) applies to make the hearing closed to the public or unless prohibited by federal or state statute or regulation.
-
In addition to the extensions of state custody ordered by a court under (c)(1)(A) or (B) of this section, a court may grant in a hearing a resumption of state custody that does not extend beyond a person’s 21st birthday if the person
- consents to it;
-
was placed in out-of-home care by the department immediately before being released from state custody and the person was
- at least 18 years of age and released to the person’s own custody; or
-
at least 16 years of age and released to the
- person’s own custody after the disabilities of minority were removed under AS 09.55.590 ; or
- custody of a parent or guardian because the person refused out-of-home care;
-
is in need of out-of-home care
- to avoid personal harm;
- because of the person’s severe emotional disturbance, mental disability, physical disability, homelessness, or a combination of those conditions;
- because the person is completing an educational or vocational program; or
- to otherwise improve the person’s successful transition to independent living; and
- if requested by the department, agrees to reasonable terms for resuming state custody that may include matters relating to the person’s education, attainment of a job or life skills, or other terms found by the court to be reasonable and in the person’s best interest.
- The court shall recognize a presumption that maintenance of a sibling relationship, including with a sibling who is related by blood, marriage, or adoption through one parent, is in a child’s best interest.
- In any team-decision meeting the department holds to address the potential or actual transfer of a child from one placement setting to another, the department shall ask the participants for input regarding whether it is in the child’s best interest for the child to remain in the child’s current school for the remainder of the school term.
- If the department transfers a child from one placement setting to another and it is reasonable and in the child’s best educational interests, the department shall immediately, and in advance of the transfer if possible, coordinate with the school the child is attending to ensure the child is permitted to attend that school through the end of the school term if the child’s new placement is in the same municipality and connected by road to the school. If federal funds and school district transportation funds are not available to pay for the cost of transportation for the child, the department shall pay the costs of transporting the child to school. The department shall work with the family or agency where the child is placed to arrange for transportation. The department shall consult with the school district regarding the child’s best interests, but the school district may not override the department’s decision to allow a child to remain in the current school through the end of the school term.
History. (§ 10(2) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 2 ch 110 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 118 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 40 SLA 1967; am §§ 1 — 4 ch 27 SLA 1970; am §§ 12 — 15 ch 245 SLA 1970; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am §§ 6, 7 ch 1 SLA 1972; am §§ 1, 2 ch 125 SLA 1974; am §§ 14 — 18, 29 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 6 ch 86 SLA 1979; am §§ 4, 5 ch 117 SLA 1990; am § 8 ch 63 SLA 1991; am § 1 ch 72 SLA 1993; am § 11 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 30 ch 23 SLA 1995; am §§ 20 — 26, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 89 SLA 1996; am §§ 2, 3 ch 94 SLA 1997; am §§ 24 — 30, 69 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 20 ch 33 SLA 1999; am § 4 ch 43 SLA 2001; am § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 11 — 14 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 1, 2 ch 80 SLA 2010; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 59 SLA 2012; am § 8 ch 6 4SSLA 2016; am § 3 — 6 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am § 8 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Revisor’s notes. —
Effective August 11, 1996, former subsection (b) was amended by § 3, ch. 144, SLA 1996. See AS 47.12.120 for provisions that replaced former subsection (b) when that subsection was repealed by § 55, ch. 59, SLA 1996, effective September 10, 1996. Also, section 4, ch. 144, SLA 1996, effective August 11, 1996, added a section governing enforcement of restitution orders under former (b)(4) of this section. Under § 7, ch. 144, SLA 1996, that section was renumbered as AS 47.12.170 , effective September 10, 1996. In 1998, in subparagraph (q)(1)(A), “AS 47.12.310(b)(2)(H) ” was substituted for “AS 47.12.310(b)(8)” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of AS 47.12.310(b)(8).
In 2016, in subparagraph AS 47.10.080 ( l )(2)(C), a reference to “AS 47.14.100 (o)” was substituted for “AS 47.14.100(p) ” to reconcile the changes made to AS 47.14.100 in 2012.
Cross references. —
For purpose of enactment of subsection (o) as a response to judicial decisions, see § 1, ch. 89, SLA 1996 in the Temporary and Special Acts. For purpose and intent of 1998 amendments to this section, including the purpose of overriding certain court decisions, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of the 1998 amendments to this section on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see §§ 71-75, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For the effect of the 2001 amendments on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, and 19, see § 6, ch. 43, SLA 2001 in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of Rule 17.2(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, adding to the required findings a determination as to whether the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the child’s permanent placement, as required by the 2005 amendment of ( l ) of this section, see § 53, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the effect of the 2016 amendments to subsection ( l ) on Rule 17.2, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see sec. 15, ch. 7, SLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.
For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (s), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.
For children in custody or under supervision: needs and income, see 7 AAC 53, art. 3.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, repealed subsections (m) and (n).
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (c) inserted “not to extend” in the introductory language of paragraph (1) and substituted “adult family member” for “relative” in paragraph (2); added subparagraph ( l )(4)(D) and made related stylistic changes; in subsection (p) added the fifth sentence, inserted “, adult family member,” in the next-to-last sentence, and added the last sentence; and added subsections (t) and (u).
The 2010 amendment, effective January 1, 2011, in (c)(1), added “, the child,” following “except that the department”; in (c)(1)(B), substituted “additional one-year extensions of commitment” for “an additional one-year period of state custody”, added “that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday” following “past 19 years of age”; added (v).
The 2012 amendment, effective September 9, 2012, in ( l )(2)(C), added “there is a compelling reason that the most appropriate placement for” preceding “the child”, and substituted “is in another planned” for “should be placed in another planned”, and “and the department has recommended the arrangement under AS 47.14.100(p) ; the findings under this paragraph must include the steps that” for “and what steps”; in (v)(2), added the (v)(2)(A) and (v)(2)(B) designations, in (v)(2)(A), added “at least 18 years of age”, added (v)(2)(B); in (v)(3), added the (v)(3)(A) — (D) designations, added (v)(3)(B) and (v)(3)(C), in (v)(3)(D), deleted “enhance the person’s ability to continue the person’s education or training or” preceding “otherwise improve the person’s successful”; added (w).
The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added ( l )(6) [now ( l )(7)], and made a related change.
The second 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, in (c)(3), substituted “; the department shall report quarterly to the court and shall demonstrate in its report that the department is making reasonable efforts” for “, and the department shall report quarterly to the court on efforts being made”; added ( l )(4)(C)(ii), and made a stylistic and a related change, added ( l )(6); added the last sentence in (s); added (x) and (y).
The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (s), added the last two sentences.
Editor’s notes. —
Chapter 89, SLA 1996, which added subsection (o), provides at § 1 that “the purpose of this Act is to respond to the Alaska Supreme Court’s invitation in A.M. v. State of Alaska, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995) and Nada A. V. State of Alaska, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983) to create a statutory basis for making incarceration a factor that can be considered in termination proceedings concerning children in need of aid.”
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
Section 60(d), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of ( l ) of this section has the effect of amending Rule 17.2(f), Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by modifying the grounds for review of a permanent plan.
Section 61(a), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 addition of (u) of this section “has the effect of changing Rule 3, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by allowing members of the public to attend court hearings except in certain circumstances.”
Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendment of subsection (c) and addition of subsections (t) and (u) apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”
Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, subsections (t) and (u) of this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”
Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, paragraph (l)(7) applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017."
Legislative history reports. —
For governor’s transmittal letter concerning the 1998 amendments to this section by ch. 99, SLA 1998 (SCS CSHB 375(JUD)), see 1998 House Journal 2201.
Notes to Decisions
Analysis
I.General Consideration
Annotator’s notes. —
For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.120 .
Each category of children mandates differences regarding content of dispositional orders. —
Alaska’s pertinent statutory provisions and procedural rules distinguish between categories of children for purposes of administering Alaska children’s laws. Of controlling significance is that each class or category mandates distinct differences regarding the permissible content of any dispositional order the trial court can enter. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Notice of transfer. —
Maternal grandmother had the required notice of her grandchildren’s transfer of placement from her care because she had initiated the transfer. Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012).
Review of placement decision. —
The superior court has the authority to review the decision of the department to determine if the placement is in the best interest of the minor, but in reviewing a decision of the department, the superior court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the department; since the legislature has committed the decision of placement to the department’s discretion, the question for the court is whether the agency abused its discretion. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); State v. E.E., 912 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Extension of state’s pretrial custody of children. —
Extension of the state’s pretrial custody of children beyond the initial two-year period allowed by this section was not error given the father’s delay in objecting, the nearness of the trial date at the time of his objection, and his failure to show potential prejudice arising from continued state custody. R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Effect of denying petition for extension of custody. —
Where defendant proposed to return child in state custody to her natural mother and sought extension of state custody to accomplish this gradually, a native village council argued that denial of department’s petition for an extension of custody would not require the superior court then to return the child to her mother, but rather that under subsection (e) the court could release the child to the child’s parents under the tribal court adoption order; however, it was held that the superior court correctly concurred in the state’s position that, absent an extension, the child must be returned to her natural mother. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).
Extension of department custody held in best interest of child. —
Superior court did not abuse its discretion finding that an extension of custody of a child in need of aid by the department for an additional year, during which time the girl would be transitioned back into her mother’s custody, was in the child’s best interest. Work needed to be done for reunification efforts to succeed, and the superior court’s finding that it was not in the child’s best interests to be immediately returned to her mother was adequately supported by the record. Danielle A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2009) (memorandum decision).
Parental right to custody and control is not absolute. —
While a parent has a right to the care, custody and control of his or her children, this right is not absolute, and “courts have become increasingly aware of the rights of children.” The Alaska legislature has struck a balance between these potentially competing rights by requiring the state to prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence in parental rights termination cases. Once this burden of proof has been met, however, the statute mandates a termination. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).
Effect of visitation restriction. —
In a proceeding on child visitation, the trial court’s restriction on visitation by a father was not, in effect, a termination of his parental rights. Nelson v. Jones, 944 P.2d 476 (Alaska 1997), overruled in part, Angelica C. v. Jonathan C., 459 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2020).
Section not in conflict with Indian Child Welfare Act. —
The application of the clear and convincing standard to the findings that a child is in need of aid as a result of parental conduct and that the paternal conduct is likely to continue does not conflict with section 1912(f) (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Section 1912(f) looks to likely future harm to the child, requiring only a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of likely harm to the child with continued custody by the parent or Indian custodian. In contrast, this section is concerned with the present condition of the child and the likely future conduct of the parent and requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child is in need of aid as a result of parental conduct and that the parental conduct that placed the child in need of aid is likely to continue. The Alaska statute requires findings additional to that required by the ICWA, thus providing a level of protection to the parental rights beyond that provided by the ICWA, and is not preempted by the ICWA. In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1986).
Peremptory challenge procedure inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. —
While juvenile proceedings have some of the characteristics of both civil and criminal actions, they are basically different from both, and the words “civil or criminal” as used in AS 22.20.022 must be strictly construed. The trial judge was correct in holding that peremptory challenge procedure applied only to civil and criminal actions and not to juvenile proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Consolidation of proceedings. —
Delaying an adjudication hearing for two children and combining it with the termination trial was appropriate where the same evidence was to be presented at both proceedings, thereby justifying the finding of good cause to delay the adjudication and consolidate it with the termination trial. The mother failed to show that the continuance and consolidation deprived her of a substantial right or caused her serious prejudice. Denise L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Notions of benevolent protective policies cannot be used to validate departures from positive law relating to the adjudicative and dispositive phases of children’s proceedings. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Duty of incarcerated parent. —
Father’s burden under paragraph (o)(3) of this section was not relieved by the fact that his children were in the custody of the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services when he returned to jail; because none of the father’s proposed placements was facially “adequate,” the Division made more than reasonable efforts for family services, and the conditions for terminating his rights were met. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Review of custody orders. —
The new children’s law, as a result of the 1977 acts, provides for review of custody orders annually or more often if good cause is shown. In re J. M., 573 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1978).
Evidentiary hearing on adoption plan. —
Superior court did not err in approving an adoption plan without holding an evidentiary hearing because neither subsection ( l ) of this section nor Alaska CINA R. 17.2 explicitly required such a hearing. Owen M. v. State, 120 P.3d 201 (Alaska 2005).
Standard of review. —
The factual findings supporting the trial court’s determination that a minor is a child in need of aid will not be overturned on review unless clearly erroneous. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).
Superior court did not exceed its jurisdiction in requiring the Department of Health and Social Services to designate a parenting class and urinalysis center for the child’s father, and in ordering the department to encourage contacts between the child and her mother, where the department was merely ordered to implement its chosen programs and was not required to make any particular placement or post-disposition treatment decision. In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990).
No actionable duty in tort. —
In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section constitutes the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
Appellate jurisdiction. —
AS 22.05.010 places final appellate jurisdiction in all cases in the supreme court. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Applied in
In re Adoption of J.B.K., 865 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1993); In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012); Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).
Quoted in
In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992); N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996); Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003); In re Mark V., 324 P.3d 840 (Alaska 2014); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Stated in
In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1972); State v. Jacob, 214 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2009); Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012); Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017); In re Adoption of E.H., 431 P.3d 1190 (Alaska 2018); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Cited in
D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1981); S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1982); In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987); In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994); Perry v. Newkirk, 871 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1994); D.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996); A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1997); D.K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 956 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1998); C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998); S.S.M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000); Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003); Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003); Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005); Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005); Danielle A. v. State, 215 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2009); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Diego K. v. State, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).
II.Child in Need of Aid
A minor who has been adjudged a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid] cannot be institutionalized under the Children’s Code. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Where a runaway child is found to be a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], not a delinquent minor, no legal basis exists for his incarceration. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
Power of court under subsection (c). —
Under subsection (c) of this section, the court is empowered to order the minor committed to the Department of Health and Social Services or order the minor released to his parents, guardian, or some other suitable person. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
The Department of Health and Social Services does not possess the authority to institutionalize any minor, including one who has been declared a child in need of supervision [see now child in need of aid], who has been committed to its custody. It is unreasonable to construe Alaska children’s statutes in a manner which would result in the grant to the Department of Health and Social Services of broader powers of commitment than possessed by the trial court. In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
A child “in need of aid” appears to be the functional equivalent of a “dependent” child under AS 47.10.010 as it existed prior to its 1977 amendment. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Establishing CINA status. —
Abandonment is but one way of establishing CINA status for purposes of terminating parental rights because former AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) also applies when no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative is willing and able to provide care and inability to provide care does not require a showing that the parent-child relationship has been destroyed. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
“Best interests” standard. —
Given that both subparagraph (c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) and subsection (f) contain the “best interests” standard, it’s reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the standard to have the same meaning with respect to each type of continuation of custody, namely an extension under subparagraph (c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) beyond the term of the original order and an “extension” under subsection (f) beyond the first year of the order until its expiration. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).
The “continuing conditions of need” requirement for continued custody found in AS 47.10.083 should be viewed as an additional requirement beyond “best interests,” not as the equivalent thereof. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).
“Best interests” as used in AS 47.10.080(c)(1)(A) (now (c)(2)(A)) does not constitute a requirement that the state demonstrate the continuing existence of former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) conditions of need in order to obtain an extension of custody. Thus, the state may require an extension of custody in order to implement a plan for reuniting the family without causing emotional trauma to the child by virtue of a sudden change of circumstances. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).
One episode of neglect on the part of a parent does not signify a continuing pattern of gross disregard for the welfare of his children. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).
The discretion allotted a parent in the administration of punishment is not unlimited. Clearly it does not extend to punishment regularly causing the “substantial physical harm” which under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(C) determines that a child is in need of aid. In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1979).
Statutory provisions governing judgments and orders terminating parental rights have been changed. In order to terminate parental rights, the court must now find that the child is in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as the result of parental conduct proved by clear and convincing evidence and that the parental conduct is likely to continue to exist if there is no termination of parental rights, proved again by clear and convincing evidence, AS 47.10.080(c)(3) . In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Under former AS 47.10.010(a)(5) and subsection (a) and former subsection (c)(3)(D) of this section, in order to terminate parental rights, the superior court was required to find (1) that the child was a “dependent minor” and (2) that the parent had demonstrated by her conduct, proved by clear and convincing proof, that she was unfit to continue to exercise her parental rights and responsibilities. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
In order to terminate parental rights under this section, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) that there is a child in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as a result of parental conduct, and (2) that the parental conduct is likely to continue. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Authority to direct placement of minor. —
Once a court declares a minor a child in need of aid and commits the minor to the Department of Health and Social Services under subsection (c)(1), the department has the authority to direct the placement of the minor. The court can review the department’s decision to see if it constitutes an abuse of discretion, but it cannot make a specific placement order once legal custody has been granted to the department. In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986).
The Department of Health and Social Services is not required to file an additional petition for adjudication in order to change the physical placement of minors in its legal custody. In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986).
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the State with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the State had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Parent’s impulsive personality disorder not ground for termination of rights. —
Where after finding that child was in need of aid, trial judge found that the parent “is likely to continue to demonstrate a conscious disregard of the obligation owed by a parent to a child even after her release from incarceration because she suffers from an impulsive personality disorder,” such finding was insufficient to satisfy requirement of clear and convincing evidence that conduct leading to determination that child is in need of aid is likely since an impulsive personality disorder itself is not conduct and thus, not a ground for termination. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
The absence of a “psychological parent” bond cannot, standing alone, be equated to the destruction of a parent-child relationship and cannot be the sole legal determinant of a viable parent-child relationship in termination of parental rights cases. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Findings. —
A finding that the parental conduct is likely to continue must be made expressly on the record prior to ordering the termination of parental rights. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).
Findings sufficient. —
The record, which included evidence that children had serious social, physical and cognitive problems, were filthy, and lacked necessary medical care, and that the mother’s neglect was likely to continue, furnished sufficient evidence of neglect such that the supreme court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court erred in any of its findings of fact or in its ultimate conclusion that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
The court’s findings that parents’ history of substance abuse, as well as their failure to visit their hospitalized child or to otherwise fulfill their parental obligations, constituted abandonment of the child, that the mother’s harmful conduct was likely to continue, and that reasonable efforts had been made to rehabilitate the parents and to reunify the family had been made, and that the child was therefore a child in need of aid, were warranted by the evidence. O.R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997).
In a case involving an Indian child, findings that, despite assiduous remedial efforts by the Division of Family and Youth Services over a two-year period, the father’s continuing failure to stabilize his own life would almost certainly render him incapable of providing the child a safe and stable home were sufficient to justify termination of his parental rights. E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).
Evidence that supported the termination of a father’s parental rights under subsection (o) of this section, e.g., the significant period of the father’s incarceration, the mother’s unavailability, and the unsuitability of the father’s placement proposals, supported a determination that two children were in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (2). Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to show that removal of her three children from foster care with their paternal grandparents was contrary to the children's best interests where the father had moved in with the grandparents, his continued drinking endangered the children, and there was no evidence that the cultural or social differences between the children's home village and the new foster home with their maternal grandmother and aunt would have harmed the children. Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court properly recognized that to overrule the child services office's placement decision would be extraordinary and the superior court did not clearly err by finding that the office abused its discretion in its placement decision; the child had significant needs requiring full-time care, professional caregivers' perspectives were highly relevant, and the office failed to give them due weight in its placement decision. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Requirements of a permanency hearing fulfilled. —
Where the court held a hearing within twelve months of the girls’ entry into foster care and, as required by Alaska CINA R. 17.2(c) and (e), where the division filed a report including a proposed permanent plan of terminating parental rights and supporting facts, and the court made appropriate findings, the superior court fulfilled the requirements of a permanency hearing. N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).
Failure to hold annual review before termination trial not error. —
Where the mother’s counsel requested a continuance that resulted in delaying the termination hearing to a date more than twelve months from the permanency hearing, by delaying the termination trial, the mother in effect artificially manufactured the need for an annual review, and under these circumstances, the superior court did not err in failing to hold an annual review before the termination trial. N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).
Termination where developmentally disabled adult could not consent to continued custody. —
The mother of a developmentally disabled 20-year-old sought to have her daughter continue in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services after the office had arranged for a guardian and a place in an adult assisted living facility for the daughter. Because of the age of the daughter and her stipulated inability to give valid consent, the office could not continue to have custody of her and the mother’s claim was moot. Mia A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 25, 2012) (memorandum decision).
A rehabilitation program is not a common practice in the trial courts absent approval by a representative of the state. In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).
Family reunification efforts. —
Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services was not required to provide family reunification efforts where the conditions set forth in subsection (o) of this section were met; further, while a father was incarcerated, the Alaska Department of Corrections had primary responsibility for providing services to the father. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
In a termination of parental rights case, while superior court should have made its findings that the state could discontinue reasonable efforts to reunite the family at a permanency hearing, the error appeared harmless because the mother did not establish that she suffered any prejudice from superior court’s decision to make the findings in a written order prior to holding a permanency hearing. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Abandonment. —
For cases construing former language in subsection (c) providing for termination of parental rights and responsibilities when the child had been abandoned, see D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1973); In re B.J., 530 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1975); In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).
Termination of father’s parental rights was affirmed, where he had not made reasonable efforts to locate and communicate with his daughter and, at the time of the termination hearing, was incarcerated for assaulting his girlfriend. E.J.S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 754 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988).
Superior court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights on the basis of her abandonment of her child was supported by substantial evidence. —
See D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985).
Parental rights cannot be terminated for another’s misconduct. —
Trial court’s termination of father’s parental rights was erroneous where father could not have visited his children until he had established that he was their father and a period of approximately eighteen months elapsed before paternity of both children was established which resulted from the mother’s refusal, even under court order, to provide blood for testing purposes. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).
Incarceration of parent. —
While long-term incarceration of a parent can result in a child becoming a child in need of aid under an inability to provide care theory, such incarceration is not a sufficient basis to justify termination of parental rights under paragraph (c)(3) of this section. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).
Termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights pursuant to AS 47.10.088 and this section was inappropriate where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support termination. The father’s testimony indicated that he took steps to assure that the child had a safe home, away from the baby’s drug-addicted mother. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).
Foster parent intervention.
Foster parent intervention should be the rare exception rather than the rule but it is not precluded as a matter of law; the statute allows any party to request a hearing to prove that the Office of Children's Services' placement decision is not in the child's best interests. In applying the definition of “party” under the child in need of aid (CINA) rules, the phrase “any other person” includes foster parents when the court properly exercises its discretion to allow them to intervene. Foster parent intervention does not violate CINA statutes. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing foster parents to intervene for the limited purpose of challenging the decision to place the child with his paternal grandmother, as the foster parents said they had specific evidence about the placement that the court was not going to receive from any existing party; because the foster parents were identified as a pre-adoptive foster placement and attested to their desire to adopt the child, their claim did share a question of law or fact with the placement review, the child's best interests. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Court authority to set conditions on parent for placement of child in parental home. —
Court possessed authority to require parent to complete alcohol abuse program and maintain sobriety as a precondition to placement of the child in the parental home by the department under (c)(1) of this section. D.A.W. v. State, 699 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1985).
Trial court did not abuse discretion in failing to consider possibility of setting up plan for reestablishing family relationship between father and son. —
See In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).
Role of trial court in proceeding involving termination of parental rights. —
See In re (T.), 557 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1976).
Applicability of burden of proof. —
A burden of proof is not applicable to a dispositive hearing other than when termination of parental rights is involved. In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976). See also In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Determination of the standard to be applied by the court at the dispositive phase of a child hearing was not tantamount to establishing a burden of proof requirement. Such a requirement had been set forth in former subsection (c)(3)(D) [see now subsection (c)(3)]. No such requirement had been set forth in situations such as where termination of parental rights was not involved. In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976).
Standard of proof held constitutional. —
Allowing parental rights to be terminated based on a standard of proof less stringent than “beyond a reasonable doubt” does not violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Alaska Constitution. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Since in proceedings brought to terminate parental rights, the parent is neither charged with criminal behavior nor subject to incarceration as a direct consequence of the proceeding, there is nothing in the federal constitution that compels adoption of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in termination proceedings. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent’s substantial interest in his or her child custody rights. This evidentiary standard balances the competing interests involved in a proceeding brought to terminate parental rights, one of which is the right of a child to an adequate home. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
The due process clause did not require a standard of proof greater than clear and convincing evidence when the state sought to terminate parental rights because of unfitness under former subsection (c)(3)(D). In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Standard of proof under former subsection (c)(3)(D) calling for “clear and convincing” evidence of the natural mother’s unfitness for the care and custody of the child was held proper. In re Adoption of S., 543 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1975).
Protection provided by Indian Child Welfare Act. —
The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 — 1963, enacted in 1978, provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of parents in termination proceedings involving Indians and Native Alaskans than that provided in this section. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).
Orders terminating parental rights met statutory and rule of court requirements regarding findings of fact. —
See In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
Review of orders terminating parental rights. —
Orders made under subsection (c)(3) of this section are not entitled to automatic review, inasmuch as subsection (f) of this section specifies which orders are entitled to this review and orders under subsection (c)(3) of this section are not included within the list. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
All orders made pursuant to this section, including orders under subsection (c)(3) of this section, are to be reviewed upon application of an interested party if the party establishes good cause for the review, and if the child is still a ward of the court. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
As long as a child remains the ward of the court, under subsection (f) of this section his or her natural parents are entitled to a review of the order terminating their parental rights upon a showing of good cause for the hearing. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
Good cause could be established if the parents showed that it would be in the best interests of the child to resume living with them because they have sufficiently rehabilitated themselves so that they can provide proper guidance and care for the child. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
Where, when a mother applied for a hearing before the superior court, she indicated that as a result of a 14-month rehabilitation program she had overcome the problems that had led to the termination of her parental rights and also indicated that professional counselors, social workers and others would be able to establish that she was now capable of providing a warm and loving home for the child, this was a sufficient showing of good cause to entitle her to a review of the order terminating her parental rights if the child had not yet been adopted. Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1981).
Office of Children's Services is afforded an extremely high degree of discretion, and whether the office abused its discretion is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020).
Burden of proof under subsection (c)(3). —
Although subsection (c)(3) does not place the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there is a child in need of aid under former AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as a result of parental conduct and that the parental conduct is likely to continue on either party, the Supreme Court of Alaska has assigned the burden of proof to the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).
For reference to apparent conflict between subsection (c)(1) as it read prior to 1977 amendment and Children’s Rule 22(f), see footnote 30 in In re S. D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976).
Collateral references. —
Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights. 80 ALR3d 1141.
Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody. 38 ALR4th 756.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.
Sec. 47.10.081. Predisposition hearing reports.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
Before the disposition hearing of a child in need of aid, the department shall submit a predisposition report to aid the court in its selection of a disposition. This report must include, but is not limited to, the following:
- a statement of changes in the child’s or parent’s behavior, which will aid the court in determining that supervision of the family or placement is no longer necessary;
- if removal from the home is recommended, a description of the reasons the child cannot be protected or rehabilitated adequately in the home, including a description of any previous efforts to work with the parents and the child in the home and the parents’ attitude toward placement of the child;
- a description of the potential harm to the child that may result from removal from the home and any efforts that can be made to minimize such harm; and
- any further information that the court may request.
- The court shall inform the child, the child’s parents and the attorneys representing the parties and the guardian ad litem that the predisposition report will be available to them not less than 10 days before the disposition hearing.
- For purposes of this section, “parents” means the natural or adoptive parents, and any legal guardian, relative, or other adult person with whom the child has resided and who has acted as a parent in providing for the child for a continuous period of time before this action.
History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 17 ch 57 SLA 1991; am § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996)
Sec. 47.10.082. Health and safety of child and other considerations.
In making its dispositional order under AS 47.10.080(c) , the court shall keep the health and safety of the child as the court’s paramount concern and consider
- the best interests of the child;
- the ability of the state to take custody and to care for the child to protect the child’s best interests under AS 47.10.005 — 47.10.142 ; and
- the potential harm to the child caused by removal of the child from the home and family environment.
History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 27 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 31 ch 99 SLA 1998)
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Showing required to justify termination of parental rights. —
While best interests of the child become relevant at some point, there first must be a showing of parental conduct sufficient to justify termination. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
Applied in
E.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).
Quoted in
Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015).
Cited in
Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Sec. 47.10.083. Review of orders, requests for extensions.
In a review under AS 47.10.080(f) and in a hearing related to a request for extended commitment or extended supervision under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (2), the court shall, in addition to the requirements of those provisions and the requirements of court rules, determine whether a child continues to be a child in need of aid at the time of the review or hearing. The court may not continue or extend state custody or supervision of the child unless the court finds that the child continues to be a child in need of aid except that, if the child is no longer a child in need of aid, the court may establish a specific timetable for gradual reunification of the family and termination of state custody or supervision if the court makes a finding that immediate reunification would be detrimental to the child.
History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 3 ch 29 SLA 1990)
Legislative history reports. —
For legislative letter of intent in connection with the enactment of this section by § 3, ch. 29, SLA 1990 (SCS CSHB 175(Jud)), see 1990 Senate Journal 3431.
Notes to Decisions
The “continuing conditions of need” requirement for continued custody found in this section should be viewed as an additional requirement beyond “best interests” for extension of custody under AS 47.10.080(c)(1)(A) , not as the equivalent thereof. In re A.S., 740 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1987).
Dismissal. —
Superior court erred in dismissing a child in need of aid case based upon a perceived lack of jurisdiction. AS 47.10.083 required the superior court to act in the child's best interests and to consider whether immediately returning the child to her parents' custody would have been detrimental, which its comments made clear it believed was the case. State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018).
Applied in
A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).
Cited in
M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990); F.T. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).
Sec. 47.10.084. Legal custody, guardianship, and residual parental rights and responsibilities.
- When a child is committed under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) to the department, released under AS 47.10.080(c)(2) to the child’s parents, guardian, or other suitable person, or committed to the department or to a legally appointed guardian of the person of the child under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) , a relationship of legal custody exists. This relationship imposes on the department and its authorized agents or the parents, guardian, or other suitable person the responsibility of physical care and control of the child, the determination of where and with whom the child shall live, the right and duty to protect, nurture, train, and discipline the child, the duty of providing the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, and the right and responsibility to make decisions of financial significance concerning the child. These obligations are subject to any residual parental rights and responsibilities and rights and responsibilities of a guardian if one has been appointed. When a child is committed to the department and the department places the child with the child’s parent, the parent has the responsibility to provide and pay for food, shelter, education, and medical care for the child. When parental rights have been terminated, or there are no living parents and no guardian has been appointed, the responsibilities of legal custody include those in (b) and (c) of this section. The department or person having legal custody of the child may delegate any of the responsibilities under this section, except authority to consent to marriage, adoption, and military enlistment may not be delegated. For purposes of this chapter, a person in charge of a placement setting is an agent of the department.
- When a guardian is appointed for the child, the court shall specify in its order the rights and responsibilities of the guardian. The guardian may be removed only by court order. The rights and responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, having the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consenting to marriage, consenting to military enlistment, consenting to major medical treatment, obtaining representation for the child in legal actions, and making decisions of legal or financial significance concerning the child.
- When there has been transfer of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities. These residual rights and responsibilities of the parent include, but are not limited to, the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consent to adoption, consent to marriage, consent to military enlistment, consent to major medical treatment except in cases of emergency or cases falling under AS 25.20.025 , and the responsibility for support, except if by court order any residual right and responsibility has been delegated to a guardian under (b) of this section. In this subsection, “major medical treatment” includes the administration of medication used to treat a mental health disorder.
- When the child is placed in foster care, the foster parent has the right and responsibility to use a reasonable and prudent parent standard to make decisions relating to the child. The foster parent may make decisions under (a) or (b) of this section that include decisions relating to the child’s participation in age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate activities, including travel, sports, field trips, overnight activities, and extracurricular, enrichment, cultural, and social activities. The department shall provide foster parents with training regarding the reasonable and prudent parent standard. In this subsection, “reasonable and prudent parent standard” means a standard characterized by careful and sensible decisions to maintain the health, safety, and best interests of the child while encouraging the emotional and developmental growth of the child.
History. (§ 26 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 1 ch 73 SLA 1993; am § 28 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 32 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 15 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 9 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Cross references. —
For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (d), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For program administration: children with disabilities, see 4 AAC 52, art. 2.
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the last sentence in subsection (c).
The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (d).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to this section apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Department’s responsibility for medical costs. —
The department is responsible for the medical costs of children in its custody, whether the children are placed at home or in a foster home. In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).
The phrase “reasonable visitation” in subsection (c) does not imply an absolute right to visitation; this section should be read in conjunction with the rest of the chapter to allow parental visits to be barred when the visits are not in the best interests of the child. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).
Right to medicate child over the mother's objection. —
Standard in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst. applied to the Office of Children's Services' (OCS) request to medicate the child over the mother's objection, and OCS had a compelling interest to provide adequate medical care to the child in its custody. Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).
Construction of subsection (c) where parental rights no longer exist. —
Subsection (c) only allows parents who retain parental rights to veto adoption; it does not confer any new rights on parents. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).
Definition of Indian custodian not met. —
Termination of the father’s designation as an Indian custodian was appropriate because the father’s status as Indian custodian was based solely on the mother’s temporary transfer of physical care and custody to the father after termination of his parental rights. Because the mother possessed the authority to revoke the transfer at any time before the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody, and because the mother and OCS acted jointly to rescind the earlier transfer, the condition under which the father met the definition of Indian custodian no longer existed. Ted W. v. State, 204 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009).
The following procedures should be followed when visitation rights are denied prior to the termination of parental rights: first, the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services should have primary authority to set visitation based on the best interests of the child, since the division is in the best position to make this decision in the first instance; and secondly, either the guardian ad litem or the parents should be entitled to request an expedited evidentiary hearing of a denial of visitation, which would consist of an independent determination by the superior court that clear and convincing evidence showed that the child’s best interests were served by disallowing parental visitations. K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1984).
Effect of being foster parents on husband-wife evidentiary privilege. —
A foster child is a child of the foster parents for purposes of applying the exception to the husband-wife privilege set forth in Alaska Evidence Rule 505(a)(2)(D)(i); one foster parent cannot rely on the husband-wife privilege to refuse to testify against the other concerning evidence relating to an assault on the foster child. Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
De facto termination of natural parent’s visitation rights. —
Where the Department of Health and Social Services decided to allow minor children, who had been adjudicated as children in need of aid, to move from Alaska to Alabama with their foster care family, the state’s action constituted a de facto termination of a natural parent’s visitation rights; the natural father was unemployed and virtually penniless, the state would not provide airfare so that the father could visit his children on a regular basis, and the father would be limited to phone “visits” because of his lack of funds. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).
Department’s decision to place children in a foster home in Anchorage did not constitute a de facto termination of their mother’s parental rights of visitation, notwithstanding the mother’s contention that she did not have the financial means to travel from her home in Juneau to Anchorage. A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1989).
Limitation on visitation unjustified. —
Before a limitation on reasonable parental limitation is justified, the Department of Health and Social Services must present proof that the limitation is in the child’s best interests, and where no such evidence was presented, the case for restricting visitation with the incarcerated father was not made. In re D.P., 861 P.2d 1166 (Alaska 1993).
Father properly denied visitation after parental rights terminated. —
After terminating a father’s parental rights, a trial court did not err in refusing to reserve post-termination visitation because the father’s criminal record showed a pattern of violent behavior, especially toward women; the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions, including assaulting the child’s mother the night before the child was born. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, an Indian child who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).
Parental failure to maintain contact. —
Record did not show that a father’s visitation rights were de facto terminated under this section because the child was placed in a foster home. The father was out of contact with the state and his parole office even when he was out of jail, and the state made efforts to reunify the child with her parent for several years. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).
Standard of review of state action constituting de facto termination of natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation. —
The appropriate standard of review for state decisions which essentially terminate a natural parent’s right of reasonable visitation under subsection (c) is an independent determination of whether the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental visitation is in the child’s best interest. D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1986).
Applied in
In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1986); In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012); Dapo v. State, 454 P.3d 171 (Alaska 2019).
Stated in
C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018); Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Siyuq K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 9, 2020).
Cited in
M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); In re A.B., 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990); B.S. v. State (In re C.A.S.), 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409 (Alaska 1996); Yelena R. v. George R., 326 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2014).
Collateral references. —
Governmental tort liability for social service agency’s negligence in placement, or supervision after placement, of children. 90 ALR3d 1214.
Sec. 47.10.085. Medical treatment by religious means.
In a case in which the minor’s status as a child in need of aid is sought to be based on the need for medical care, the court may, upon consideration of the health of the minor and the fact, if it is a fact, that the minor is being provided treatment by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by an accredited practitioner of the church or denomination, dismiss the proceedings and thereby close the matter. This may be done, in the interests of justice and religious freedom, on the court’s own motion or upon the application of a party to the proceedings, at any stage of the proceedings after information is given to the court under AS 47.10.020(a) .
History. (§ 8 ch 1 SLA 1972; am § 19 ch 63 SLA 1977)
Cross references. —
For a related provision, see AS 47.17.020(d) .
Administrative Code. —
For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
M.O.W v. State, 645 P.2d 1229 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Collateral references. —
Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered. 21 ALR5th 248.
Sec. 47.10.086. Reasonable efforts.
-
Except as provided in (b), (c), and (g) of this section, the department shall make timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the child and to the parents or guardian of the child that are designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to enable the safe return of the child to the family home, when appropriate, if the child is in an out-of-home placement. The department’s duty to make reasonable efforts under this subsection includes the duty to
- identify family support services that will assist the parent or guardian in remedying the conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid;
- actively offer the parent or guardian, and refer the parent or guardian to, the services identified under (1) of this subsection; the department shall refer the parent or guardian to, and distribute to the parent or guardian information on, community-based family support services whenever community- based services are available and desired by the parent or guardian; the information may include the use of a power of attorney under AS 13.26.066 to select an individual to care for the child temporarily; and
- document the department’s actions that are taken under (1) and (2) of this subsection.
- If the court makes a finding at a hearing conducted under AS 47.10.080(l) that a parent or guardian has not sufficiently remedied the parent’s or guardian’s conduct or the conditions in the home despite reasonable efforts made by the department in accordance with this section, the court may conclude that continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not in the best interests of the child. The department shall then make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanent plan and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
-
The court may determine that reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not required if the court has found by clear and convincing evidence that
- the parent or guardian has subjected the child to circumstances that pose a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety; these circumstances include abandonment, sexual abuse, torture, chronic mental injury, or chronic physical harm;
-
the parent or guardian has
- committed homicide under AS 11.41.100 — 11.41.130 of a parent of the child or of a child;
- aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited under AS 11.16 or AS 11.31 to commit a homicide described in (A) of this paragraph;
- committed an assault that is a felony under AS 11.41.200 — 11.41.220 and results in serious physical injury to a child; or
- committed the conduct described in (A) — (C) of this paragraph that violated a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to an offense described in (A) — (C) of this paragraph;
- the parent or guardian has, during the 12 months preceding the permanency hearing, failed to comply with a court order to participate in family support services;
- the department has conducted a reasonably diligent search over a time period of at least three months for an unidentified or absent parent and has failed to identify and locate the parent;
- the parent or guardian is the sole caregiver of the child and the parent or guardian has a mental illness or mental deficiency of such nature and duration that, according to the statement of a psychologist or physician, the parent or guardian will be incapable of caring for the child without placing the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury even if the department were to provide family support services to the parent or guardian for 12 months;
- the parent or guardian has previously been convicted of a crime involving a child in this state or in another jurisdiction and, after the conviction, the child was returned to the custody of the parent or guardian and later removed because of an additional substantiated report of physical or sexual abuse by the parent or guardian;
- a child has suffered substantial physical harm as the result of abusive or neglectful conduct by the parent or guardian or by a person known by the parent or guardian and the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the person was abusing the child;
- the parental rights of the parent have been terminated with respect to another child because of child abuse or neglect, the parent has not remedied the conditions or conduct that led to the termination of parental rights, and the parent has demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm;
- the child has been removed from the child’s home on at least two previous occasions, family support services were offered or provided to the parent or guardian at those times, and the parent or guardian has demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm;
- the parent or guardian is incarcerated and is unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, considering the child’s age and need for care by an adult; or
-
the parent or guardian
- has sexually abused the child or another child of the parent or guardian; or
- is registered or required to register as a sex offender or child kidnapper under AS 12.63.
-
If the court determines under (b) or (c) of this section that reasonable efforts under (a) of this section are not required to be provided,
- the court shall hold a permanency hearing for the child within 30 days after the determination; and
- the department shall make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.
- The department may develop and implement an alternative permanency plan for the child while the department is also making reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s family under (a) of this section.
- In making determinations and reasonable efforts under this section, the primary consideration is the child’s best interests.
- The department is not required to make reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section if the department took emergency custody of an infant under AS 47.10.142 after the infant was abandoned safely within the meaning of AS 47.10.013(c) .
- The department shall engage a child who is 14 years of age or older in the development or revision of a case plan, permanency goal, or alternative permanency plan for the child. The department shall also allow the child to select not more than two adults to participate in the development or revision of the plan in addition to the child’s foster parents or department employees who are supervising the care of the child. The department may reject an adult selected by the child if the department has good cause to believe that the adult will not act in the best interests of the child. If the department rejects an adult, the child may select another adult. The child may designate one of the adults to be the child’s advisor, and the advisor may advocate for the child.
History. (§ 33 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 2006; am §§ 4, 5 ch 1 SLA 2008; am § 38 ch 43 SLA 2013; am § 5 ch 28 SLA 2016; am § 10 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Revisor's notes. —
In 2016, in paragraph (a)(2) "AS 13.26.066 " was substituted for "AS 13.26.023" in two places to reflect the renumbering of that section.
Cross references. —
For purpose and intent in enacting this section, including the purpose of overriding certain court decisions, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For effect of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 76, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
For effect of the 2006 amendment of (c) of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 11, ch. 20, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts.
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 43, SLA 2013 (SB 22), see 2013 Senate Journal 38 — 39.
For provision relating to applicability of subsection (h), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, substituted “clear and convincing evidence” for “a preponderance of the evidence” in the introductory language of subsection (c).
The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, substituted “(b), (c), and (g)” for “(b) and (c)” in the first sentence of subsection (a), and added subsection (g).
The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (c)(11), and made a related change.
The 2016 amendment, effective September 20, 2016, in (a)(2), inserted “, and distribute to the parent or guardian information on,” preceding “community-based family” and inserted “the information may include the use of a power of attorney under AS 13.26.023 to select an individual to care for the child temporarily;” at the end of the paragraph.
The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, added (h).
Editor's notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
Under sec. 12, ch. 20, SLA 2006, the 2006 amendment of (c) of this section applies “to a child in need of aid proceeding that is pending before the court, that is on appeal to the court, or for which the time for appeal to the court has not yet passed on or after May 4, 2006.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Terminating parental rights. —
In order to terminate parental rights, in addition to finding that the child is a child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 and that the parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that place the child at risk, AS 47.10.088 requires the department to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the department has complied with the provisions of this section concerning reasonable efforts to provide family support services designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to return the child to the family home. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska), op. withdrawn, — P.2d — (Alaska 2000), sub. op., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000) (Decided before 2006 amendment of subsection (a).)
Where the state presented overwhelming evidence of the mother’s repeated failure to care appropriately for her children, and her decade long lack of success in substance abuse treatment for abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, and where a psychologist testified it was unlikely the mother would ever be capable of parenting, reasonable efforts at family reunification were exhausted, and termination of the mother’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).
A child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid. The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse, and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services, and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency. It was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because, although the children went through nine different foster placements in the three months after OCS assumed custody, the changes in placement resulted not from OCS ineptitude but from the children's acute behavioral issues; OCS repeatedly referred both parents to rehabilitative services, including counseling, shelters, mental health and substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes; and much of the parents' difficulty in making progress in their rehabilitative efforts was due to their missed calls, meetings, assessments, and drug tests. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; the record indicated that it was not OCS’s failure but the father’s refusal to acknowledge his mental health issues that ultimately prevented the success of OCS’s reunification efforts because OCS referred the father for a psychological assessment in every case plan it developed. Darwin B. v. State (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; in light of the father’s history of non-cooperation, OCS’s consistent reunification efforts for approximately 25 months were more than sufficient to remedy its early failure to make reasonable efforts. Darwin B. v. State (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) on the whole made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children because the OCS referred the mother to and paid for her participation in psychological evaluations, domestic violence evaluations, domestic violence classes, substance abuse evaluations, therapy, and the Resource Center for Parents and Children reunification program; the OCS offered visitation to the parents after the trial home visit ended; the OCS provided the mother with food, clothing, transportation, and some assistance obtaining public housing; and the OCS continued to provide services until the end of the case. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because she had a more than 15-year history of opioid addiction, and she admitted that she was an addict; the Office of Children's Services had been involved with her older children; and she was unable to provide a stable home within a reasonable time. Alison L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts toward reunification because OCS's immediate focus on the father's substance abuse issues was understandable as parental substance abuse was one of the reasons the child was adjudged to be a child in need of aid when taken from the father's home; and the case worker did not err in failing to refer the father for some kind of mental health evaluation as his cognitive issues appeared to be consistent with what was known about his drug use, and he never told OCS that his cognitive issues were mental-health-related. Warren S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 25, 2021) (memorandum decision).
“Reasonable efforts.” —
The department made reasonable efforts under subsection (a) where the department had no contact information for the father’s family or friends, making it difficult to locate him, and the case worker completed an affidavit of diligent inquiry, noting that her efforts to locate the father included checking phone books, utility applications, permanent fund dividend applications, and criminal records. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
Father’s sentence to six years of incarceration qualified as a significant period of his children’s minority within the meaning of paragraph (c)(10) of this section; thus, a court was authorized to dispense with the requirement that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services provide family support services under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) . Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
In a parental rights termination case, the state made reasonable efforts to reunite the father and the child where the state notified him in writing of the permanency hearing, the social worker returned his calls, gave him information regarding the child and the foster parents, mailed him documents relating to the child, offered him the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in an administrative review hearing (which he declined), and set up a case plan.Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
When a father engaged in parenting, vocational, and religious instruction while incarcerated, it was on the father's own initiative rather than in response to any guidance from the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) about what the father needed to do to improve the chances of reunification. Therefore, termination of the father's parental rights was inappropriate because the OCS's minimal engagement with the father, combined with the lack of a relevant case plan, meant that the OCS did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018).
Termination of father’s parental right to twins under AS 47.10.088 was proper where the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to ensure that children could be returned to the father as required by CINA R. 18(c)(2)(A) and this section; efforts by the OCS to reunite the children with the father were held reasonable in light of the lack of interest the father showed when he was first released from jail and moved to another state, and when he failed to visit the children or to complete parenting and anger management classes provided to him. Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).
While failure of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to provide mental health referral to a father throughout the history of his case fell short of exemplary, OCS nonetheless satisfied the “active efforts” requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq., based upon its overall handling of the case, because the father’s own actions would have frustrated the success of any OCS services, and the father received a number of referrals for services, including multiple substance abuse treatment programs and parenting classes. Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).
In a termination of parental rights case, while superior court should have made its findings that the state could discontinue reasonable efforts to reunite the family at a permanency hearing, the error appeared harmless because the mother did not establish that she suffered any prejudice from superior court’s decision to make the findings in a written order prior to holding a permanency hearing. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
In a termination of parental rights case, further efforts to provide family support to the mother would no longer be in the best interests of the children because the office of children’s services had made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, there was clear and convincing evidence that they were children in need of aid, and the mother was unable to accept the state’s offers of assistance and was incapable of caring for the children. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
In a termination of parental right case, the State made reasonable efforts at reunification because, although reasonable efforts might not have been made up through the date of the commencement of the termination trial, the court continued the trial for several months and required the State to make reasonable efforts and give the father an opportunity to successfully work on his case plan. The court ordered the State to refer the father to domestic violence intervention programs and alcohol treatment, which the State immediately did. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the mother and the children was supported by evidence that the office of children’s services arranged transportation and visitation, helped the mother relocate, made referrals for the mother to attend therapy, and provided parenting classes. Jordan J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family by referring the mother to substance abuse assessments, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and domestic violence counseling, and providing transportation assistance, arranging family visits, and attempting to locate the mother when OCS lost contact with her. Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015).
In a parental rights termination case, the superior court's finding that the Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify a mother with her son was not clearly erroneous. The record supported a conclusion that the greatest obstacle to the mother's success was her failure to take advantage of what services she was offered. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).
In a parental rights termination case, the superior court did not clearly err in its finding that the Office of Children's Services' efforts, though ultimately unsuccessful, were designed to facilitate the child's return to his mother's care. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, a superior court did not improperly lower the burden on the Office of Children's Services to make reasonable efforts because such efforts did not have to be deemed reasonable before a termination trial; moreover, waiting to review the reasonableness of OCS efforts until the termination trial did not allow OCS to evade its responsibility to provide objectively reasonable efforts. Moreover, OCS did not err in determining that a decreased level of communication was reasonable given the circumstances of a mother's move to Oregon. Moira M. v. State, 370 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2016).
Office of Children's Services (OCS) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the father and child where, in addition to the mother's conduct, the father's abandonment had caused the child to be a child in need of aid, given the father's resistance to any involvement with OCS, the plan to engage the father with simple tasks and activities first and then increase involvement was reasonable, and the father refused to participate in the case plan in any way other than visitation. Louis W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2016) (memorandum decision).
It was no error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's father because (1) the father was incarcerated and nothing showed the father tried to contact OCS or OCS did not respond to the father's efforts, (2) infrequent contacts by OCS did not make OCS's efforts unreasonable, (3) it was not plain error to hold OCS did what OCS could to recommend services, (4) it was reasonable to first focus such efforts on the child's non-incarcerated mother, and (5) the efforts included Department of Corrections services. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family where it offered several services, and family therapy and trial home visits were inappropriate given the credible testimony that the risk of exposure to the domestic partner remained too high for the child's well being. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter because it improperly excused the failure of the Office of Children's Services to demonstrate reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family; the trial court relied exclusively on its conviction that further efforts would be pointless, and it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that a basis under subsection (c) applied. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).
If the trial court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that one of the enumerated bases in subsection (c) applies, there is no room in the statutory framework to excuse reasonable efforts on alternative bases; nor would a decision to forego required reasonable efforts in expectation of their futility comport with the parallel Indian Child Welfare Act holdings. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).
Subsection (c) does not exist to absolve the failure of the Office of Children's Services to execute its responsibilities in routine interventions; it is intended to operate as a safety valve, permitting courts to excuse, in the best interests of the child, remedial efforts if extraordinary circumstances or the parent's egregious conduct would render those efforts pro forma or, more importantly, endanger the child's welfare. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).
Superior court did not err in finding that the services provided by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) amounted to reasonable efforts for purposes of AS 47.10.086(a) , despite the fact that there might have been a lapse in efforts; the evidence showed the mother did not truly desire to commence treatment, OCS did not fail its reasonable efforts obligation by failing to provide her documentation for admission to her preferred treatment program, plus OCS otherwise provided many services over approximately 20 months. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her daughter because, although visitation fell short of what was required, the evidence did show that the mother had consistent in-person visitation with the child for the first seven months' of OCS custody, twice-weekly phone calls after the child's move to South Carolina, and some in-person visits during that time; visitation was only part of the reasonable efforts analysis; and the mother did not challenge the superior court's findings about OCS's considerable and persistent efforts over the course of three years to address her substance abuse and mental health problems. Chloe T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 23, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts by providing a mother transportation, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral funding for case management services, a peer navigator, referrals to parenting classes and substance abuse assessments, weekly supervised visits, and referrals for housing at a local shelter and residential treatment center. The mother failed to tell the OCS about transportation difficulties, did not use cab vouchers, and was able, at times, to use other sources for help. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts given a father's incarceration. OCS repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the father through the telephone number the father provided, through the father's attorney, and through the Texas Department of Corrections; secured some services for the father when the father was not incarcerated; and attempted to arrange telephonic visitation with the children and to provide case management services. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Evidence supported the superior court's findings that Alaska Office of Children's Services offered the parents and the children a number of services designed to reunite them as a family, but the father was ultimately unable or unwilling to significantly shift the beliefs that stood in the way of his effective parenting. While the office’s efforts were not perfect, the efforts were nonetheless timely and reasonable, and quite extensive as to both the parents and the children. Clarice M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 29, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not err when it determined that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, as its findings that OCS had gone over and above to try to get the mother in treatment but the mother failed to engage and complete either a substance abuse or a mental health assessment supported the trial court's findings. Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court erred in terminating parents’ parental rights to their two Native American children because there was insufficient evidence to sustain an active efforts finding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act under a clear and convincing evidence standard; the Office of Children’s Services failed to create documentation and provide the witness testimony necessary to support what efforts it and the Tribe did make to reunify the parents and their children. Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).
In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father because, in addition to incorporating his probation requirements in the case plan, the OCS maintained contact with him and his probation officer and encouraged him to initiate and maintain contact with his children by writing letters until he could progress to more contact with them; he wrote to the children only once in 15 months; and it was his responsibility to demonstrate true interest in reunification. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its active efforts obligation under the Child in Need of Aid statute where the father did not point to any evidence that a psychological evaluation would have enabled him to resolve the substance abuse and parenting problems that led OCS to take custody of the children. Rather, the record suggested what prevented the father from moving forward was his unwillingness to engage with the services provided. The OCS made repeated attempts to engage the father in his case, providing transportation assistance, family visitation, and referrals for substance abuse treatment and domestic violence counseling. The father demonstrated a consistent unwillingness to participate in these services. Bradley S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 2, 2020) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because the mother abandoned the twins by failing to keep in touch, disappearing, and visiting only erratically; the mother did not challenge the child in need of aid abandonment finding, the substance of which diminished OCS's ability to engage her; and the mother was aware of her case plans, but she took no steps to meet the goals they established. Alison L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his son as the caseworker testified that she contacted the father a number of times from April 2019 to June 2020 in an attempt to get him to engage with the case plan, but he rejected every overture; and the father refused to get in contact with members of the team of doctors and therapists that cared for his son so that he could learn how to care for his son. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).
There was no error in the termination of the father’s parental rights because the superior court did not err when it determined that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) provided appropriate services to the father. The services OCS provided were aimed at promoting bonding and attachment between the father and his daughters to allow him to be safely reunited with them. Kevin H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 29, 2021).
Superior court did not err in finding the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite a mother with her sons because the mother was not given a formal diagnosis of a specific mental health disability; OCS referred the mother to substance abuse treatment programs and a domestic violence assessment after determining her substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect of the sons, not her anxiety or impulsiveness, were the conditions that put the sons in need of aid. Angie W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 16, 2022).
Child at risk of harm. —
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Efforts by the state to preserve the family relationships. —
Where a child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment, and where the record established that the father had failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, the record also established that the government had made the required active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, because for four years, the state offered the father substance abuse evaluation and treatment and made numerous attempts to place the child with her mother’s tribe and the father and his family, but were unable to do so, particularly due to the father’s repeated drug problems and incarceration. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided: (1) in-person reviews of the requirements of the case plan; (2) referrals for substance abuse assessments and substance abuse treatment; (3) drug testing; (4) parenting classes; (5) domestic violence education; and (6) consistent visitation, beginning immediately after the first child was taken into emergency custody. As to the father, given his incarceration, the OCS’s efforts to provide the father with family support services when he was not in prison, and the father’s failure to make any changes necessary to achieve reunification, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the OCS’s reunification efforts in their entirety were reasonable despite its failure to provide visitation in prison. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the father where the OCS had provided referrals for the father to multiple agencies and services, arranged for housing and travel assistance, food donations and laundry cards, conducted home visits, and tried to help the father get a job; the OCS also developed case plans that detailed child-protection issues and services to remedy those issues; the OCS referred the children to a variety of mental health services and educational services; however, the OCS’s decision not to offer family therapy with the father and mother was appropriate since the child was not at a point where family therapy with the parents was appropriate. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).
Based on a father’s lack of effort to comply with the terms of his case plan and his refusal to provide basic contact information so that he could be notified about events in the case and services that might be available to the family, a trial court did not err in finding that active, but unsuccessful, efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Wilson W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, made reasonable efforts to reunify a family by: developing case plans addressing the mother’s substance abuse, parenting capacity, and mental health issues; referring the mother for substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and urinalyses; and providing the mother with visitation with her son and a trial home visit. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children’s Services had a duty to provide services to help the mother remedy the conduct or conditions that endangered the children, which involved her substance abuse and domestic violence. Professionals did not identify the mother’s physical condition as factor in helping alleviate the endangering conduct or conditions, nor was she diagnosed as bipolar, although she told people she had been. Nora M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 5, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Efforts of the office of children’s services were timely and reasonable, as OCS arranged for drug testing, referred the mother for psychological evaluation and counseling, provided a bus pass, attempted a home visit, and visited the mother in jail to continue services and general case evaluations. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).
In a termination of parental rights case, the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active, but unsuccessful efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family; even if the OCS had begun the education component of the case plan earlier, there was no evidence that these efforts would have been productive. The OCS initially referred the father for substance abuse assessments and treatment and tried to work with the father during his incarceration; the OCS later offered the father the opportunity to take classes to help educate him about the child’s special needs, as well as chances to demonstrate that the father’s conduct was improving. Dirk H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 25, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services had provided her with remedial and rehabilitative programs, although she was bonded with the child, she was unwilling to attend treatment programs or provide a time frame for completing treatment, and the child, who was five years age at the time, was thriving in his grandparents’ home. Simone B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 30, 2015) (memorandum decision).
In a parental rights termination case, the superior court’s finding that the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunify a mother with her son was not clearly erroneous. The record supported a conclusion that the greatest obstacle to the mother’s success was her failure to take advantage of the services she was offered. Kate W. v. Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs. (Alaska May 4, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her child because OCS provided family support services to the parent and child designed to promote reunification, including substance abuse assessments, parenting classes, and offers of help with housing and employment before the mother dropped out of contact; and it was well within OCS's discretion to prioritize the mother's substance abuse problems over her homelessness. Abigail C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 13, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court erred in terminating parents' parental rights to their two Native American children because there was insufficient evidence to sustain an active efforts finding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act under a clear and convincing evidence standard; the Office of Children's Services failed to create documentation and provide the witness testimony necessary to support what efforts it and the Tribe did make to reunify the parents and their children. Bill S. v. State, 436 P.3d 976 (Alaska 2019).
Lack of parental cooperation. —
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper where the record showed that it was not the OCS’s failures that caused the mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems to remain untreated but rather the mother’s lack of willingness to maintain contact with her caseworkers, to candidly report her health status to service providers, and to engage in services when they were offered. Amanda K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 2, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Office of Child Services caseworkers made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with the father, connect him with services, and facilitate the establishment of a relationship between him and his daughter. Given his exposure of the child to harm during unsupervised visits at the father’s home, requiring OCS supervised visits, and then terminating those visits due to the father’s behavior, was proper. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).
Although OCS petitioned to terminate a parent’s rights soon after a child was born, there was substantial information to support a determination that reasonable efforts to facilitate the relationship were made, including supervised visitation, attempts to hold planning meetings with the father and to obtain a psychological evaluation to help determine what approaches would be helpful to improve the father’s parenting skills. The father was inconsistent regarding visitation, and failed to attend the meetings or undergo the evaluation. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).
Mother suggested that the Office of Children’s Service’s duty to refer a client to services required the office to make an appointment with the provider, but the reunification services requirement is met by providing information and referrals regarding the services; the office referred the mother to numerous providers, and she failed to meaningfully participate with the office’s efforts to engage her in services. Nora M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 5, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Mother had abused cocaine and other substances since the age of seventeen, and had access to multiple treatment programs over the course of her life, most of which she did not complete. In several instances she did not stay in touch with her caseworker so as to be able to learn what remedial opportunities were available. There was no reason to believe this long-time pattern of behavior by the mother would change, despite the efforts of the department. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).
In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to enable the child to return home to the mother but that she refused to engage consistently with the recommended mental health services; she failed to attend the sessions required in order to make comprehensive treatment recommendations; regardless of the quality of her assessments, she never entered the recommended outpatient program, and by the time of the termination trial she had not entered any inpatient program; and, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, she testified that she did not have a substance abuse problem. Sandy M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 16, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children; the mother did not engage with the case plan and did not receive the benefit of the therapies OCS made available to her, plus OCS obtained a court order compelling her to complete a psychological examination, which OCS was not compelled to do, and given that the mother repeatedly refused to allow OCS to assess her needs, her claim that OCS should have provided specific services to suit those needs was without merit. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
It was not clear error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made timel and, reasonable reunification efforts because (1) OCS provided case plans, supervised visitation, and referrals for treatment and financial assistance, (2) the father's whereabouts were unknown for much of the case, (3) the father would not get a psychological assessment or communicate an inability to obtain a later evaluation, (4) OCS's failure to provide an evaluation and visitation lapses while the father was in prison was not fatal to finding reasonable efforts, and (5) the father's disappearance and unwillingness to participate in services where he relocated made OCS's efforts reasonable under the circumstances. Justin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 15, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Failure to remedy parental issues after reasonable effort. —
The state provided services to address a father’s personality disorder and substance abuse, which constituted “reasonable efforts” under this section. Jake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 31, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Efforts by state declined by parent. —
State made multiple offers of assistance to father to facilitate contact with his child, which he declined. The state’s efforts were reasonably calibrated to the interest in parenting shown by the father. Jeff A.C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 27, 2005), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005), sub. op., 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005) (memorandum decision).
Applied in
A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000); A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014).
Quoted in
C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001); Kyle S. v. State, 309 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2013).
Stated in
Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).
Cited in
N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001); S.H. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002); Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004); Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011); Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).
Sec. 47.10.087. Placement in secure residential psychiatric treatment centers.
-
The court may authorize the department to place a child who is in the custody of the department under AS
47.10.080(c)(1)
or (3) or
47.10.142
in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that
- the child is gravely disabled or is suffering from mental illness and, as a result, is likely to cause serious harm to the child or to another person;
- there is no reasonably available, appropriate, and less restrictive alternative for the child’s treatment or that less restrictive alternatives have been tried and have failed; and
- there is reason to believe that the child’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
- A court shall review a placement made under this section at least once every 90 days. The court may authorize the department to continue the placement of the child in a secure residential psychiatric treatment center if the court finds, based on the testimony of a mental health professional, that the conditions or symptoms that resulted in the initial order have not ameliorated to such an extent that the child’s needs can be met in a less restrictive setting and that the child’s mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment or would deteriorate if untreated.
- The department shall transfer a child from a secure residential psychiatric treatment center to another appropriate placement if the mental health professional responsible for the child’s treatment determines that the child would no longer benefit from the course of treatment or that the child’s treatment needs could be met in a less restrictive setting. The department shall notify the child, the child’s parents or guardian, and the child’s guardian ad litem of a determination and transfer made under this subsection.
- In this section, “likely to cause serious harm” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 .
History. (§ 7 ch 107 SLA 1998)
Administrative Code. —
For residential psychiatric treatment centers, see 7 AAC 50, art. 9.
Notes to Decisions
Quoted in
In re April S., 467 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2020).
Stated in
Kiva O. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2018).
Cited in
Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020).
Sec. 47.10.088. Involuntary termination of parental rights and responsibilities.
-
Except as provided in AS
47.10.080(o)
, the rights and responsibilities of the parent regarding the child may be terminated for purposes of freeing a child for adoption or other permanent placement if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
- the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011 ;
-
the parent
- has not remedied the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child at substantial risk of harm; or
- has failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child in substantial risk so that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; and
- the department has complied with the provisions of AS 47.10.086 concerning reasonable efforts.
-
In making a determination under (a)(2) of this section, the court may consider any fact relating to the best interests of the child, including
- the likelihood of returning the child to the parent within a reasonable time based on the child’s age or needs;
- the amount of effort by the parent to remedy the conduct or the conditions in the home;
- the harm caused to the child;
- the likelihood that the harmful conduct will continue; and
- the history of conduct by or conditions created by the parent.
- In a proceeding under this chapter involving termination of the parental right of a parent, the court shall consider the best interests of the child.
-
Except as provided in (e) of this section, the department shall petition for termination of a parent’s rights to a child, without making further reasonable efforts, when a child is under the jurisdiction of the court under AS
47.10.010
and
47.10.011
, and
- the child has been in foster care for at least 15 of the most recent 22 months;
- the court has determined that the child is abandoned under AS 47.10.013 and the child is younger than six years of age;
- the court has made a finding under AS 47.10.086(b) or a determination under AS 47.10.086(c) that the best interests of the child do not require further reasonable efforts by the department;
- a parent has made three or more attempts within a 15-month period to remedy the parent’s conduct or conditions in the home without lasting change; or
- a parent has made no effort to remedy the parent’s conduct or the conditions in the home by the time of the permanency hearing under AS 47.10.080(l) .
-
If one or more of the conditions listed in (d) of this section are present, the department shall petition for termination of the parental rights to a child unless the department
- has documented a compelling reason for determining that filing the petition would not be in the best interests of the child; a compelling reason under this paragraph may include care by a relative for the child; or
- is required to make reasonable efforts under AS 47.10.086 and the department has not provided to the parent, consistent with the time period in the department’s case plan, the family support services that the department has determined are necessary for the safe return of the child to the home.
-
A child is considered to have entered foster care under this chapter on the earlier of
- the date of the first judicial finding of child abuse or neglect; or
- 60 days after the date of removal of the child from the child’s home under this chapter.
- This section does not preclude the department from filing a petition to terminate the parental rights and responsibilities to a child for other reasons, or at an earlier time than those specified in (d) of this section, if the department determines that filing a petition is in the best interests of the child.
- The court may order the termination of parental rights and responsibilities of one or both parents under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) and commit the child to the custody of the department. The rights of one parent may be terminated without affecting the rights of the other parent.
- The department shall concurrently identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified person or family for an adoption whenever a petition to terminate a parent’s rights to a child is filed. Before identifying a placement of the child in an adoptive home, the department shall attempt to locate all living adult family members of the child and, if an adult family member expresses an interest in adopting the child, investigate the adult family member’s ability to care for the child. The department shall provide to all adult family members of the child located by the department written notice of the adult family members’ rights under this chapter and of the procedures necessary to gain custody of the child, but the department’s obligation to provide written notice under this subsection does not apply to a parent of the child whose parental rights are being or have been terminated or to an adult family member who is known by the department to be ineligible for a foster care license under AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32. If an adult family member of the child requests that the department approve the adult family member for an adoption, the department shall approve the request unless there is good cause not to approve the adoption. If the court issues an order to terminate under (j) of this section, the department shall report within 30 days on the efforts being made to recruit a permanent placement for the child if a permanent placement was not approved at the time of the trial under (j) of this section. The report must document recruitment efforts made for the child.
- No later than six months after the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights is filed, the court before which the petition is pending shall hold a trial on the petition unless the court finds that good cause is shown for a continuance. When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court shall take into consideration the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. The court shall make written findings when granting a continuance.
- The court shall issue an order on the petition to terminate within 90 days after the last day of the trial on the petition to terminate parental rights.
History. (§ 33 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 16 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 2, 3 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 52 ch 40 SLA 2008)
Cross references. —
For effect of subsections (j) and (k) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 77, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For intent and purpose of the enactment of this section, including overriding certain cases concerning termination of parental rights, see § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
For effect of the 2006 amendment of (a) and (b) of this section on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 11, ch. 20, SLA 2006, in the 2006 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the second through fourth sentences in subsection (i).
The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, made designation changes within subsection (a), deleted “by a preponderance of the evidence that” at the beginning of present paragraph (a)(3), and made related changes.
The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “AS 47.32 and regulations adopted under AS 47.32” for “AS 47.35.019 or 47.35.021” in the third sentence of subsection (i).
Editor’s notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that this section applies to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
Under sec. 12, ch. 20, SLA 2006, the 2006 amendments of (a) and (b) of this section apply “to a child in need of aid proceeding that is pending before the court, that is on appeal to the court, or for which the time for appeal to the court has not yet passed on or after May 4, 2006.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
Some of the cases set out below were decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.010 . However, note that under § 1, ch. 99, SLA 1998, one legislative purpose in the enactment of this section was to “override the court decisions in the following cases:
“(A) Matter of J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996), In Re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996), and F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993), concerning the standards to adjudicate a child in need of aid when a parent or caregiver is willing, but unable, to provide essential care for a child;
“(B) A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), and Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1983), concerning the standards to terminate parental rights when a parent is incarcerated;
“(C) R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997), concerning the type of neglect necessary to adjudicate a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.”
Procedure. —
In order to terminate parental rights, in addition to finding that the child is a child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.011 and that the parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that place the child at risk, this section requires the department to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the department has complied with the provisions of AS 47.10.086 concerning reasonable efforts to provide family support services designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to return the child to the family home. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 1 P.3d 677 (Alaska), op. withdrawn, — P.2d — (Alaska 2000), sub. op., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
In reaching its termination decision, the superior court was not required to revisit its earlier placement decision and its termination order superseded all earlier placement orders. The mother could have challenged those placement decisions by requesting superior court review, and could then have petitioned the appellate court for review of the superior court’s ruling, however, because the mother failed to seek timely review, the superior court’s termination order rendered earlier issues of placement moot. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
Failure to remedy conditions which place the child in need of aid. —
Order terminating the mother's parental rights to her two children was affirmed as she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children in need of aid because she was unable to cease her use of marijuana for well over a year after the first child's removal; she continued to regularly smoke marijuana when she was pregnant with the second child, even though she was informed of the risks posed by prenatal marijuana exposure; although the mother eventually became clean, she began smoking marijuana again several months after the children were returned to her care; and, after her relapse, the condition of the family's home and the hygiene of the children deteriorated. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court properly terminated a mother's parental rights to her children because she failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed her children at substantial risk of harm, her continued custody of the children would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to them, and termination was in the best interests of the children, where, while the mother had completed one treatment program, she had been unsuccessful in six prior attempts at other programs, and admitted that she was not ready to take the children, the foster parents were willing to adopt the children, the children's tribe had approved the foster parents as the adoptive placement, and the current placement would enhance the children's lives. Cyra J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 8, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not clearly err by finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time because it was not clear that she had exhibited an ability to implement the necessary skills to safely care for her children. There was considerable evidence that the mother "shuts down" after extended periods of parenting, and her inattentiveness could result in physical injury to the children. Charles S. v. State, 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time where consideration of the children's status as an Indian child was not required when making a failure-to-remedy finding, the mother admitted that she was not yet ready for the children to be returned to her care, she had continued to engage in significant domestic violence and substance abuse, and the children needed permanence and stability. Jean B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 7, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights was proper as the mother had not remedied the conduct or conditions that caused her children to be in need of aid because her admitted substance abuse had left her unable to raise her children and led to her failure to protect them from her husband’s abuse; and she had done virtually nothing to address her substance abuse and mental health trauma. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid because the father's release from prison remedied the condition that placed the children in need of aid; because the father 's “unavailability” was not relevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, it was error to consider it. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Subsection (a)(2) does use the specific article “the” when referring to “the conduct or conditions” that were not remedied, and that subsection's conduct and conditions language must be understood to refer back to the conduct and conditions in AS subsection (a)(1); therefore, the conditions to be remedied must be those the court found the children were subjected to and that rendered them in need of aid. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Because the mother's substance abuse and abusive relationships continued to pose a danger to her children, the superior court did not err by finding that she failed to remedy her conduct. Vera S. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 9, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not err by terminating the mother's parental rights based on failure to remedy the conduct or conditions under AS 47.10.088(a)(2)(A) because she did not seek treatment for her addiction, she did not stop using illegal substances, she did not secure a safe home, and there was ongoing domestic violence in her home. Violet W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 18, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had not recognized the impact of substance abuse on her parenting and on her children and, correspondingly, that the safety risk persisted and had not been remedied; testimony at the first trial revealed that the mother minimized her substance abuse and denied that it affected the children. Pamiuqtuuq C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 2, 2022).
Superior court did not err when it accepted the termination petition and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental because the trial occurred about 13 months after the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the child and it found that the mother had failed to participate in services before the adjudication hearing. It noted that, since the adjudication, the mother had been stopped in a truck littered with a “shocking” amount of drugs and related paraphernalia. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).
Counsel not ineffective for failing to request continuance. —
In a termination of parental rights case, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a continuance because there were several tactical reasons why counsel might have decided not to ask for a continuance, including the mother's recent drug relapse and her risk of relapsing again due to her refusal to enter residential treatment; a delay could have produced additional evidence that the children were improving in their foster placement; and a continuance of four months, even assuming the superior court granted it, would have been of little tactical use because the testimony at trial indicated that the mother needed nine months to a year before the children could safely be placed with her. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Jury trial not required. —
In state’s petition to terminate mother’s parental rights, because the Alaska Constitution only preserves a jury trial for legal causes of action, not those that are equitable in nature, and child protection cases are historically treated as matters of equity in Alaska, there was no due process right to a jury trial in children in need of aid proceedings. Alyssa B. v. State, 165 P.3d 605 (Alaska 2007).
Standard for CINA placement. —
In this case no adoption proceeding had been initiated, and on remand the superior court was to consider the grandmother to have asked the Office of Children’s Services to place the children with her for child in need of assistance purposes, not as having asked for approval of her adoption of the children. Irma E. v. State, 312 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013).
Termination hearing in parent’s absence. —
Mother’s due process rights were not violated when termination hearing was conducted in her absence and over her objection where the delay was caused by the mother’s numerous motions to dismiss the case and disqualify the judge and the trial court found that the mother was deliberately avoiding trial, constituting extraordinary circumstances such that it was not improper for the trial court to proceed without her participation. Alyssa B. v. State, 165 P.3d 605 (Alaska 2007).
Continuance properly denied. —
Court’s refusal to continue a termination of parental rights case pending an appeal of a father’s criminal convictions for physical and sexual abuse of the children was proper; there was a statutory time limit, and the children’s interest in permanency weighed heavily against delaying the proceeding for years while the father pursued an appeal. Although the father should not have been penalized for asserting his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at the adjudication or termination proceeding, the superior court had to balance this privilege against the children’s interest in a timely resolution of the proceedings when considering the continuation request. Rowan B. v. State, 361 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2015).
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father's motion to continue a termination of parental rights trial until the father's release from custody to demonstrate sobriety because (1) it did not appear even a short delay would let the father allay concerns that he would again relapse or other concerns, so denying a continuance did not seriously prejudice the father, and (2) the children's interest in permanency had to be considered. Remy K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2017) (memorandum decision).
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a father a termination trial continuance because the father showed no serious prejudice by showing the father could timely remedy conduct causing the father's child to be in need of aid, as (1) a short continuance did not provide enough time for needed services, and (2) a long continuance was not in the child's best interests. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Compliance with Indian Child Welfare Act. —
Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights to his child where children’s services proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made the active efforts required to prevent the breakup of the family; social workers met with the father to discuss his case plan, offered him a mental health evaluation at the jail, and brought the child to the jail for visits. Roland L. v. State, 206 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2009).
Freeing the child for adoption or other permanent placement. —
It was unclear whether the superior court terminated the mother’s parental rights for the purposes of freeing the child for adoption or other permanent placement, as required under subsection (a), and while the superior court noted that the child had an interest in having a stable, permanent family arrangement, at the time of the termination proceedings DFYS was attempting to unite the child and her biological father. A.B. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
Where a mother regained custody of her child, an order terminating the father’s parental rights freed the child for “other permanent placement” with a non-terminated parent. Victor B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Best interests of the child. —
Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where termination was in the child’s best interests because the child did not know the father, and at nearly two years old, she was of an age at which it was important not to disrupt the bonding that had occurred between her and her foster parents. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Father’s inability to maintain sobriety outside jail and his repeated incarcerations indicated that he was not a reliable parent, and a temporary placement would not satisfy the children’s immediate need for permanency and stability; given the ages of the children and their need for a stable home, a permanent placement was in their best interests, pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was in his children’s best interests where the father’s inability to demonstrate that he could maintain sobriety outside jail and his repeated incarcerations indicated that he was not a reliable parent. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Superior court did not err in considering the lack of adoptive placement options as part of its best interests analysis where it followed from the case law allowing consideration of favorable present placements. Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).
Superior court did not err in considering the mother’s determination to change as part of the best interests analysis where the mother’s ability to stay sober and her determination to remain so were relevant factors to consider under AS 47.10.088(c) . Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).
Superior court did not err in considering the mother-child bond as part of its best interests analysis where consideration of that bond was relevant, and the possible open adoption options made the likelihood of continued involvement after termination slim at best. Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).
Termination of mother’s rights was in daughter’s best interests based on testimony that if she were returned to her mother, she would not develop in a healthy way because of stress and she would be at risk for additional physical and emotional abuse. Tessa M. v. State, 182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008).
Trial court did not err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests because the parents could not provide a more stable home than the home the children already had or that would be provided in the system. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).
Terminating parental rights was in the child’s best interests because termination would prevent the child from suffering the harm inflicted upon her siblings, the girl’s primary bond was with her foster parents, the girl had been in foster care for more than 80 percent of her life, and there was no evidence that further delay would result in significant changes. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).
Given the court’s findings regarding permanency, the child’s special needs, and the mother’s history of substance abuse relapse, her argument that she should have more time to attempt reunification efforts was counter to the child’s best interests, and termination of her parental rights was proper. Adina B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 15, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests because the evidence showed her drug and alcohol abuse was likely to continue and therefore likely to endanger the children if they were in her custody. The children were living in a safe and loving preadoptive home and had been in the Office of Children’s Services’ custody for 29 months, a significant portion of their lives. Thea G. v. State, 291 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2013).
Trial court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because termination was in the child’s best interests; the trial court properly took into account factors such as the child’s need for permanency, his bond with the the family he had lived with since his birth, and the likelihood that the mother would not be ready to provide full-time care for the child within a reasonable period of time. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).
Superior court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest because it gave the possibility of a guardianship appropriate consideration; the mother’s substance abuse history and the children’s needs for permanence and stability outweighed the possibility that the mother might one day resolve her substance abuse issues, such that termination was better for the children than a guardianship. Jenny S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 4, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that termination of the mother’s rights was in the children's best interests; although the mother claimed that separating her from the children was harmful to all of them, the mother’s best interests were not aligned with those of the children, the fact that one child was not yet in a definitive adoptive home did not preclude a finding that termination was in her best interest, and the children were making significant progress in foster care and the mother had a lack of progress. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
Statute only provides that the court may consider any of the enumerated best interest factors, it does not create a duty for the court to do so; the fact that the court did not expressly cite these factors was not grounds for reversing the superior court's finding, plus although the superior court did not expressly mention the factors listed in the statute, it did make factual findings relevant to several of these factors, which were supported by the record. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as there was not a reasonable likelihood of returning the child to a parent within a reasonable time based on the child's age. Tyler K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (memorandum decision).
It was in the best interest of the children to terminate their mother's parental rights because the trial court was not required to first decide whether a guardianship or adopting was in the children's best interest instead; it was important for the children to be legally free from the mother, which could have only been achieved through termination. Fiona P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2017) (memorandum decision).
There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to make its best interests determination in a termination of parental rights case because the record reflected that the mother had struggled with narcotics abuse since 2009, that she acted erratically while caring for her children, she failed to take advantage of services provided, and she had neglected her children. Fiona P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 22, 2017) (memorandum decision.
It was not clear error to conclude termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because (1) a finding that it was likely the father's problematic conduct would continue and very unlikely the children could be reunited with the father within a reasonable time was supported and not clearly erroneous, and (2) the record supported findings that the children were doing well in current placements and continuing to attempt reunification would seriously delay permanency. Remy K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err when it found that terminating a mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the mother's children because the court found that the mother was unable to provide for the children's basic needs and that the children had special needs requiring special attention. The children were young and needed stability and a parent who was present for them as opposed to dealing with their own issues, while the children's foster home was a potentially permanent home. Bonnie M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the evidence showed that the parents had neglected and traumatized the children; that neither parent had yet demonstrated the necessary skills to care for the children; and that the children were improving in foster care after having suffered, both physically and emotionally, in the care of their parents. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Mother could not meet her child's extensive needs, had not demonstrated any change in behavior since the case began, and she failed to act on recommendations that the child receive dental and medical surgery, exacerbating an already medically fragile condition; the finding that termination was in the child's best interests under AS 47.10.088(b) was proper. Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Finding that termination was in the child's best interests was not clear error where despite her genuine love for the child, the mother was unable to separate from the domestic partner or recognize the extent of the child's problems, and the maternal grandmother provided the child with safety and stability. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the children had improved in foster care; the caseworker testified that termination would be in the children's best interests; the mother's severe and untreated substance abuse continued to pose a risk of harm to her children; and, in contrast to the mother's situation, the foster parent had the ability to provide a stable, loving home with family support. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests as the child needed permanency; it was unlikely that the mother would remedy the conduct that made him a child in need of aid; and the Office of Children's Services had identified a possible adoptive placement. Abigail C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 13, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err by finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests as its decision to focus on the child's need for stability and the evidence that the father would not be able to provide that stability for a significant amount of time was not clearly erroneous. Alvin R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 24, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in determining that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that terminating a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because OCS presented testimony from caseworkers and documented the father's criminal history, incarceration, and history of substance abuse and failed treatment; OCS did not solely rely on an expert's testimony to prove that termination was in the child's best interests. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err by terminating a father's parental rights before ensuring that the child would have a permanent home because it was the termination of the father's parental rights that transformed the obligation of the Office of Children's Services to care for the child into a legal duty to find adoptive placements for her; the requirement that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests is a state law requirement, not an Indian Child Welfare Act requirement. Alfred J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Sufficient evidence supported termination of a father's parental rights to the father's Indian child because (1) the father's abandonment of the child and failure to remedy the father's conduct created a risk of harm to the child, (2) the father left the child in the child's mother's custody knowing the mother abused substances, and (3) termination was in the child's best interests based on the father's conduct, especially when the child was in foster care three times in the first four years of life. Steve H. v. State, 444 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests or otherwise err in its consideration of a possible guardianship because it considered the evidence and the children's specific needs and implicitly considered guardianship as an option in its termination order; the superior court wrote detailed factual findings regarding the Office of Children's Services' long history with the children. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests because it made clear that terminating parental rights was for the purpose of establishing a permanent placement. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).
It was not clear error to find terminating a father's parental rights was in his Indian children's best interests because his history of crime and incarceration, his time left to serve, the time required after release to show parental fitness, and his lack of a strong bond with the children showed the children could not return to him within a reasonable time; he had over three years left to serve, he needed at least a year after release to show sobriety, stability, and parenting skills, and he was unlikely to change his behavior, as he did not accept responsibility for his conduct Donald L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 30, 2019) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in citing the “the totality of the circumstances” in its determination that terminating a father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because it did consider specific, statutorily enumerated factors; it explained that, given the multiple prior family interventions by state agencies and the father's minimal engagement with his case plan, there was a high likelihood his harmful conduct would continue if the children were returned to him. Walker E. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 480 P.3d 598 (Alaska 2021).
Superior court did not err in finding that it was in the son's best interests that the father's parental rights be terminated because, emphasizing the enormous amount of energy and attentiveness it took to care for the child due to his special needs, the superior court predicted that the child would likely sustain serious emotional or physical damage if placed in the father's care. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).
The superior did not clearly err in finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where it gave great weight to two factors: the amount of effort the father had expended to remedy the conduct that brought the child into the custody of the Office of Children's Services and the history of his similar conduct. Alexander G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 15, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate due to the child’s need for permanency, the strong bond which the child had formed with a foster family, and — given that the child’s older sister was part of the foster family already — the importance of keeping siblings together. The court also noted the foster family’s willingness to support a continued relationship between the child and the mother. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Best interests of child prevail over parental rights. —
Record supported trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child where the record showed that the child suffered emotional problems as the result of the instability of his home environment; child had spent the last 19 months in foster care, he could not afford to wait any longer for his father to be a parent, and he would suffer severe psychological harm if the father was granted custody and then dropped out of his life again, which was likely. Carl N. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 102 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2004).
Father had ongoing problems with addiction to prescription and illicit drugs, and while he may have been devoted to his daughter and may have believed he had a bond with her, ample evidence supported the trial court’s best-interest determination to terminate father’s parental rights. Seth D. v. State, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008).
The court is not specifically obligated to enter findings articulating its consideration of a parent’s desire to continue parenting his children as a component of its best interests analysis. The factors outlined in this section are nonexclusive, and there is no requirement that superior courts “accord a particular weight to any given factor.” All of the statutory factors indicated that the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of his children. Doe v. State, 272 P.3d 1014 (Alaska 2012).
In a termination of parental rights case, because a continuance of a few months would not have addressed the court’s concerns regarding the likelihood that the mother would relapse, the denial of the continuance did not seriously prejudice the mother’s ability to make her case at trial. In light of the mother’s pattern of relapse following treatment, the superior court had a strong basis to conclude that a few months of additional time would not have been sufficient for the mother to show that she had truly remedied her conduct. Hannah B. v. State, 289 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2012).
Trial court did not err in terminating parents’ rights to their four children because termination was in the children’s best interest under AS 47.10.088(c) ; the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical harm if returned to the parents’ custody as there was no progress on the part of either parent in obtaining parenting skills, and their past history of substance abuse and domestic violence was likely to recur. Christopher C. v. State, 303 P.3d 465 (Alaska 2013).
Young children have unique needs for permanency and bonding. At the time of termination, the child was only eight months old. He had spent his entire life in his grandmother’s care and had developed a strong bond with his grandmother and his older sister. It was in his best interests to remain with the grandmother, and the best interests of the child, not the parent, are paramount. Mother had not bonded with her son and had continued her long-time abuse of cocaine both during and after the pregnancy. Amy M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013).
Termination of parental rights due to abandonment. —
In proceeding to terminate parental rights, although trial judge orally stated that he considered involuntary incarceration to constitute abandonment, where written findings of fact, submitted by state and signed by court, referred to parent’s voluntary absence from October of 1980 to June of 1981 as the relevant conscious disregard of parental obligations, there was no reversible error. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
Where the father abandoned his son for three years and lost contact with all those involved in his son’s Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding, this abandonment finding justified termination without visitation notwithstanding any of the father’s arguments regarding the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), because his alleged learning disability had no bearing on the abandonment issue and he did not argue that the state’s efforts in contacting him were unreasonable under the ADA. C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
A child was a child in need of aid because the child’s father, who was incarcerated in another state and had little contact with the child for 10 years, had abandoned the child, and because the child’s mother created conditions which caused the child to need aid. The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services had satisfied its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the father, and it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. G.C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment where he failed to express any intent to parent the child, he declined the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in a conference regarding the child, and he did not request any visitation until eight months after learning of the child’s existence. Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
Father failed to meet his affirmative duty to show a genuine interest in the child and his minimal efforts to communicate were merely token efforts. He did not request any visitation with the child until roughly eight months after learning of her existence; while complying generally with his case plan, he failed to complete any of the requirements specific to the child, such as learning about her medical needs or spending time with her to form a bond; and his visits with the child were erratic and short. Jeff A.C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 27, 2005), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005), sub. op., 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005) (memorandum decision).
Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not clearly err when it determined that the child was a child in need of aid by relying on the father’s non-compliance with his case plan to find that he had abandoned his child. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Superior court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because the father abandoned his children by failing to participate in visitation; the requirement of the Office of Children’s Services that the father visit with the children individually was reasonable, and his failure to request individual visitation evidenced a willful disregard for parental obligations. Further, the father’s participation in the case plan was no more than minimal, because although he took some preliminary steps toward completing his case plan, he failed to adequately address his ongoing mental health issues or to undertake any parenting counseling. Jay W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father’s parental rights to a child on the ground of abandonment was appropriate because the father, who was incarcerated, had not remedied the abandonment within a reasonable time. The limitations imposed by the father’s incarceration were largely due to the father’s own conduct, the father’s recent change in attitude toward parenting the child did not outweigh a history of disinterest, and the child’s best interests were served by termination. Dane T. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 23, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Although the superior court clearly erred when it found that a father had failed to remedy the conditions placing his children in need of aid, since its findings concerning “unavailability” were irrelevant to whether the father was released from incarceration, because “unavailability” could be relevant to abandonment, the matter was remanded to the superior court to reconsider its findings in relation to Office of Children's Services' abandonment argument and petition. Ted S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Failure to remedy conditions which place the child in need of aid. —
Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not clearly err when it concluded that the father failed to remedy the conditions that placed his child in need of aid. The Office of Children’s Services tried to convince him to participate in a parenting assessment and a psychological evaluation to help him begin to address his child’s needs, but the father refused to participate in any psychological evaluation. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Superior court properly found that a mother did not timely remedy the conduct or conditions that made her son a child in need of aid because the mother failed to timely remedy her persistent and active interference with the son’s treatment as a child with special needs; the mother’s active undermining of the professionals who aimed to provide much-needed therapeutic care to the son demonstrated a significant lack of insight into what was required to parent a special needs child; the mother further failed to take appropriate action to treat her substance abuse issues. Sherry R. v. State, 332 P.3d 1268 (Alaska 2014).
Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because substantial evidence supported its finding that the mother failed to remedy the conditions that put the child at risk; the evidence showed that the mother had history of misusing medication, relapsed, continuing mental conditions, and resistance to treatment and other help. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).
Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, as the mother did not recognize the existence or extent of the child’s special needs, while the foster family demonstrated the ability to provide the support, love, and care the child needed. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).
Finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at substantial risk of harm was supported by evidence that the mother left the children with a sex offender who showed the children pornography and she failed to intervent when the children fought, indicating a lack of understanding about her parental role in supervising the children. Jordan J. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 29, 2015).
Termination of the father’s parental rights was proper because he failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time in light of his recurring substance abuse, and his problematic treatment history; the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family support services; and termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests as she needed permanency, and it was not in her best interests to wait for the father to make further strides toward permanent sobriety, especially in light of his resistance to treatment during all but the final months of the proceedings. Blake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 28, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Mother made sincere and significant attempts to remedy her conduct, and this factor weighed in her favor, but the evidence of her substance abuse history, relapses, and failure to maintain sobriety was undisputed; when determining whether the mother remedied her conduct, the superior court was not required to give more weight to any particular factor, many of the factors did not support her position, and the superior court did not clearly err in relying on her substantial history of severe addiction and finding that she had not remedied her conduct. Nola L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 3, 2016) (memorandum decision).
It was not clear error to find a mother did not remedy untreated mental illness, placing the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm, because (1) the mother was inconsistent in engaging with a case plan’s recommended services, including medication management, parenting classes, and individual ther- apy, as the mother did not attend therapy, did not complete a parenting course, and stopped taking med- ication, (2) the mother’s financial and transportation limits did not excuse noncompliance, and, (3) when the mother engaged with the case plan, the child had been in the Office of Children’s Services custody for over a year. Emma D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 15, 2016) (memorandum decision) .
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct that made the children in need of aid; the superior court found the children to be in need of aid under the abandonment provisions, and the findings were supported, given the mother's repeated refusals to participate in supervised visits and her departure from the state, along with the failure to return when the children’s services office bought plane tickets for her, and thus a willful disregard for parental obligations was shown. Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016).
Finding that the mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time was not error where the evidence showed that bipolar disorder was the mother's most serious obstacle to parenting, it remained largely unaddressed, and because of it she continued to pose a risk of injury to her children. Joy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 14, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the father's parental rights based the father's failure to remedy the conditions that placed the child at substantial risk of harm in a reasonable amount of time was supported by evidence the child had been in the custody of the Office of Children's Services for 18 months at the time of trial, and the father failed to abide by the recommendations of his substance abuse assessor, failed to complete parenting classes, and dropped out of contact with the child for months at a time. Tyler K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the mother failed to remedy the conduct and conditions that caused the children to be children in need of aid because the parents' history showed a repeated pattern of substance abuse, incarceration, and domestic violence; the mother did not understand the extent of the children's needs or have the skills necessary to protect them from future harm; the mother never internalized or understood the ways in which her behavior adversely affected the children; and, by the time of trial, the mother still had not completed substance abuse treatment or a long period of sobriety. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights to a child was appropriate because, although the father argued that he cleaned up the family home, obtained a commercial driver's license and a job, and passed drug tests during the pendency of the case, the superior court did not clearly err in finding that he did not remedy his mental health issues that were the root cause of his inability to safely parent the child and placed the child in substantial risk of continued physical harm and continuing mental injury. Matthew H. v. State, 397 P.3d 279 (Alaska 2017).
Finding that a mother had not remedied the conduct or conditions that endangered her son was not clear error where her behavior showed that she did not recognize the risk of harm that her domestic partner posed to the child's mental and physical well-being. Emily S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 2, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on her failure to remedy her substance abuse within a reasonable time because the mother frequently submitted positive urinalyses (UA) samples or failed to report for UAs at all; her substance abuse continued throughout the case; and the children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother's or the grandmother's care. Haley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not violate the parents' due process rights by relying on prior conduct, as such was clearly connected to the current issues with the parents' conduct and its effect on the child, plus given their stipulation that the child was in need of aid, nothing prevented the superior court from considering the parents' entire history of conduct in determining whether to terminate their rights under AS 47.10.088 . Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that terminating the parents' rights was in the child's best interests under AS 47.10.088 , given that parental efforts at rehabilitation were low, harmful conduct was likely to continue, and the likelihood of reunification in a reasonable time, based on the child approaching her teenage years, was slim. Wyatt W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 17, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Terminating parental rights was in the child's best interests given the father's failures to take measures necessary to protect the child from the mother, and the child had thrived in foster care. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in finding that the father failed to remedy the conditions that placed the child at a substantial risk of harm where he failed to take any steps to keep the child safe from the abusive mother. Michael A.P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 31, 2018) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights due to risk of harm to child. —
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the father admitted that his son was a child in need of aid based on physical harm, the father did not remedy the conduct that placed his son at substantial risk of harm, and the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to provide the father with family services, including assisting him in obtaining counseling and obtaining a parenting assessment. Doug Y. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 243 P.3d 217 (Alaska 2010).
Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had a history of relationships involving repeated incidents of domestic violence, and the mother’s intellectual functioning was likely to contribute to her difficulty in avoiding unsafe partners, thereby putting her children at risk. Cara G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 29, 2012) (memorandum decision).
In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the child had been exposed to conduct or conditions specified in AS 47.10.011 because the mother did not dispute that she exposed the child to drug addicts, drug dealers, and domestic violence. As the mother refused to fulfill her case plan requirements, which included substance abuse treatment, the trial court did not err by finding she did not remedy her conduct that endangered her son. Julia D. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 18, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Trial court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because, based on the mother’s untreated substance abuse and underlying emotional issues, as well as the child’s option for permanency with the family he had lived with since birth, the trial court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that allowing the mother’s custody of the child likely would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid because they were at risk of further sexual abuse if returned to the father since he failed to address allegations that one of the children had been molested by a grandfather; moreover, the father had not remedied his conduct or the conditions at home because he did not develop an understanding of the importance of protecting his daughter or the risk due to the grandfather’s presence. The family had been provided with services designed to enable the safe return of the children, but termination was in the best interest of the children. Justin C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2015) (memorandum decision).
Trial court, which terminated a mother’s parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the children in need of aid statutes, did not err in finding that the evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother’s children would likely be seriously harmed if returned to the mother. Because the aggregated testimony of expert and lay witnesses supported the trial court’s finding that the mother likely would continue to relapse until she resolved her underlying mental health issues, the trial court’s conduct-not-likely-to-change finding was not clearly erroneous. Diana P. v. State, 355 P.3d 541 (Alaska 2015).
In terminating a father's parental rights, the superior court properly considered both the father's history of substance abuse and his current conduct in determining that the father had failed to remedy the conduct placing his daughter at risk of harm. Ray R. v. State, 386 P.3d 1225 (Alaska 2016).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues, coupled with the mother’s lack of accountability, would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Economic condition of parents. —
Record did not support claim that the decision to terminate parental rights was based on or caused by economic hardship. The trial court considered a number of appropriate factors in the face of overwhelming evidence that it would be best for the children if the parental rights were terminated. Dustin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 1, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Reasonable efforts. —
Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the State made reasonable efforts to assist the father where it drew up a suitable case plan, including parenting classes and drug monitoring. The State also made reasonable efforts to provide the father with visitation until it became clear that the visitation was harmful to the child. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where the State arranged visitation between the father and his children during the new incarceration until the superior court ordered otherwise; although father received substance abuse treatment and parenting classes from the department of corrections, the court determined he was unlikely to recover sufficiently to successfully care for his children. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
In a parental rights termination case, the state made reasonable efforts to reunite the father and the child where the state notified him in writing of the permanency hearing, the social worker returned his calls, gave him information regarding the child and the foster parents, mailed him documents relating to the child, offered him the opportunity to speak with the foster mother and participate in an administrative review hearing (which he declined), and set up a case plan.Jeff A.C. v. State, 117 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2005).
Trial court did not err by finding that mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time because even though she had been in compliance with case plan since November 2007, at the time of trial she still faced significant obstacles to successful reunification such as the sons’ lack of attachment to their mother, her inability to show empathy for what her sons had experienced, and the likelihood that she would act aggressively when under stress and abuse or neglect her sons. Kim B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 28, 2009) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided: (1) in-person reviews of the requirements of the case plan; (2) referrals for substance abuse assessments and substance abuse treatment; (3) drug testing; (4) parenting classes; (5) domestic violence education; and (6) consistent visitation, beginning immediately after the first child was taken into emergency custody. As to the father, the court held that given his incarceration, the OCS’s efforts to provide the father with family support services when he was not in prison, and the father’s failure to make any changes necessary to achieve reunification, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the OCS’s reunification efforts in their entirety were reasonable despite its failure to provide visitation in prison. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper where the record showed that it was not the OCS’s failures that caused the mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems to remain untreated but rather the mother’s lack of willingness to maintain contact with her caseworkers, to candidly report her health status to service providers, and to engage in services when they were offered. Amanda K. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 2, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper, even though there were some deficiencies in the State’s reunification efforts, because the mother did not follow her case plan, often missed scheduled appointments, and showed up to visitations with a hangover and smelling “like booze.” Janelle A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 25, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights was proper where the Office of Children’s Services made active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(d), AS 47.10.088(a)(3) , and return of the children to the mother’s care would likely result in serious damage to the children, AS 47.10.088(a)(2) . Iris R. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 5, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was proper where the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had made active efforts to help him progress with his case plan in the face of his reluctance to communicate with OCS; although the trial court continued the termination trial for 10 months to give him another chance to make necessary changes, in the intervening period he stopped taking drug tests and did not inform OCS of his living arrangements. Roy S. v. State, 278 P.3d 886 (Alaska 2012).
In a termination of parental rights case, social services was not required to actively pursue placement with the father’s relatives as part of its active efforts to prevent the termination of the father’s parental rights because the social worker had looked into placement with the father’s parents but there were concerns about their ability to meet the child’s special needs. Finally, the father did nothing more than suggest placement with his “sisters,” but they were unsuitable as placements because they were “known to have sex offenders in the home.” Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012).
Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 because the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS), made undeniably excellent efforts to prevent the break of the family; OCS participated in monthly status hearings, there were weekly case-planning meetings and mediation, and OCS social workers met regularly to brainstorm different approaches that could work with the mother. Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014).
Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family by referring the mother to substance abuse assessments, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and domestic violence counseling, and providing transportation assistance, arranging family visits, and attempting to locate the mother when OCS lost contact with her. Sylvia L. v. State, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015).
A father's parental rights to his son were properly terminated because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; the record indicated that it was not OCS's failure but the father's refusal to acknowledge his mental health issues that ultimately prevented the success of OCS's reunification efforts because OCS referred the father for a psychological assessment in every case plan it developed. Darwin B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 4, 2017) (memorandum decision).
It was no error to find the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's father because (1) the father was incarcerated and nothing showed the father tried to contact OCS or OCS did not respond to the father's efforts, (2) infrequent contacts by OCS did not make OCS's efforts unreasonable, (3) it was not plain error to hold OCS did what OCS could to recommend services, (4) it was reasonable to first focus such efforts on the child's non-incarcerated mother, and (5) the efforts included Department of Corrections services. Jack C. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family because, although the children went through nine different foster placements in the three months after OCS assumed custody, the changes in placement resulted not from OCS ineptitude but from the children's acute behavioral issues; OCS repeatedly referred both parents to rehabilitative services, including counseling, shelters, mental health and substance abuse assessments, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes; and much of the parents' difficulty in making progress in their rehabilitative efforts was due to their missed calls, meetings, assessments, and drug tests. Bernadette K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska June 21, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide family support services where it provided the father with referrals to therapists, a psychiatrist and others, the social worker continued communicating with the father even though she feared for her safety, and the father substantially refused to work with the OCS or see a psychiatrist. Linus L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 9, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her daughter because it improperly excused the failure of the Office of Children's Services to demonstrate reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family; the trial court relied exclusively on its conviction that further efforts would be pointless, and it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that a basis under subsection (c) applied. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).
Trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) failed to carry its burden of demonstrating it had provided reasonable efforts was not clearly erroneous because the trial court had clear support from OCS's own witnesses and internal review, as well as credible expert testimony, for its finding. Kylie L. v. State, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017).
In a termination of parental rights case, the superior court did not err in concluding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) on the whole made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and her children because the OCS referred the mother to and paid for her participation in psychological evaluations, domestic violence evaluations, domestic violence classes, substance abuse evaluations, therapy, and the Resource Center for Parents and Children reunification program; the OCS offered visitation to the parents after the trial home visit ended; the OCS provided the mother with food, clothing, transportation, and some assistance obtaining public housing; and the OCS continued to provide services until the end of the case. Keira H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 13, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts by providing a mother transportation, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral funding for case management services, a peer navigator, referrals to parenting classes and substance abuse assessments, weekly supervised visits, and referrals for housing at a local shelter and residential treatment center. The mother failed to tell the OCS about transportation difficulties, did not use cab vouchers, and was able, at times, to use other sources for help. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable reunification efforts given a father's incarceration. OCS repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the father through the telephone number the father provided, through the father's attorney, and through the Texas Department of Corrections; secured some services for the father when the father was not incarcerated; and attempted to arrange telephonic visitation with the children and to provide case management services. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that the Office of Children Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother and the children because when the caseworker did not have face-to-face meetings she held them with the mother over the phone, and there was sufficient evidence in the record for the superior court to conclude that the mother was not interested in having those meetings. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to address issues identified in a doctor's report and to help the mother gain critical parenting skills because OCS followed through on recommendations in the neuropsychological report, especially as they pertained to the mother's learning difficulty; OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the mother's lack of willingness to participate in her plan and her level of cooperation. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).
There was no error in the superior court's reasonable efforts finding with respect to the Office of Children Services' failure to seek additional providers for a bonding study because the children were in need of aid due to the mother's inability to manage her fatigue and learn the skills she needed to safely parent both children together; the extent of the mother's parental bonds with her children was secondary to those main issues. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the Office of Children's Services (OCS) satisfied the requirement that it make reasonable efforts to reunify the family as the initial communication failure in 2012 and the alleged lack of encouragement during the trial home visit involved, at most, discrete and limited failures in OCS's very long-running involvement with the family; and there was conflicting evidence regarding OCS's reasonable efforts as, from the trial court's perspective, the father's willingness to engage with his younger children's OCS case showed not that OCS failed to work as hard in the current case, but rather that the father did not care enough about his older children to make the same effort. Ronan F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 10, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Office of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his son as the caseworker testified that she contacted the father a number of times from April 2019 to June 2020 in an attempt to get him to engage with the case plan, but he rejected every overture; and the father refused to get in contact with members of the team of doctors and therapists that cared for his son so that he could learn how to care for his son. Duke S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 14, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the father's parental rights was proper as the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts toward reunification because OCS's immediate focus on the father's substance abuse issues was understandable as parental substance abuse was one of the reasons the child was adjudged to be a child in need of aid when taken from the father's home; and the case worker did not err in failing to refer the father for some kind of mental health evaluation as his cognitive issues appeared to be consistent with what was known about his drug use, and he never told OCS that his cognitive issues were mental-health-related. Warren S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 25, 2021) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not err in finding the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite a mother with her sons because the mother was not given a formal diagnosis of a specific mental health disability; OCS referred the mother to substance abuse treatment programs and a domestic violence assessment after determining her substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect of the sons, not her anxiety or impulsiveness, were the conditions that put the sons in need of aid. Angie W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 16, 2022).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Furthermore, that the Alaska Office of Children’s Services made reasonable reunification efforts by facilitating substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting classes, and various forms of visitation. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Superior court did not err when it terminated the mother’s parental rights after finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to reunify the family because OCS actively helped the mother to apply for housing and had no reason to prioritize her “possible” mental health issues when there was no evidence that such issues led to the child’s removal. Nera S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 9, 2022).
Reasonable time. —
Trial court did not err in terminating a mother’s parental rights because reasonable and active efforts were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; those efforts were unsuccessful because of the mother’s substance abuse, and return of the child was likely to result in serious emotional and/or physical damage to the child. Darcy F. v. State, 252 P.3d 992 (Alaska 2010).
Termination of parental rights was proper where, although the superior court found that the parents had made some positive changes, due to the overwhelmingly lengthy history of dysfunction, the changes did not rise to the level of remedying the conduct and conditions within a reasonable time. Ralph H. v. State, 255 P.3d 1003 (Alaska 2011).
Termination of parental rights of mother to her tenth child was proper where she had lost rights to her nine other children due to her ongoing addiction to crack cocaine, and her related conduct which put the children at risk, and which continued after the birth of this child despite repeated offers to the mother of help and treatment. Under the circumstances termination in little over a year after the child was put into foster care did not violate the mother’s right to reasonable efforts supporting the family. Patience P. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 11, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because (1) the time was viewed from the child's perspective, (2) the termination trial occurred 22 months after the son's placement, and (3) the son's need for permanency was shown. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because the father's claims that the father should have had more time since termination would not cause the son's placement with the father's sister any sooner, and not terminating parental rights would give the father an incentive to follow a case plan failed as nothing showed more time was reasonable from the son's perspective. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Father had a reasonable amount of time to remedy conditions placing the father's son at risk before termination because the father's claims that the father should have had more time after the father's release since the father had no access to requisite programs in prison failed as the father did not follow the father's case plan after the father's release. Jerome F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Mother was given a reasonable amount of time, about a year and a half, given the child's young age, to remedy her issues. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
In a case terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights in the Families with Infants and Toddlers Court (FIT Court), the supreme court concluded that it was error to adhere to the FIT Court's preset timeline rather than making an individualized assessment of whether the parents had a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that placed the children in substantial risk based on the facts of their children's cases because the court acknowledged that a few more months might have made a difference for the mother. To the extent the 12-months-to-permanency timeline was interpreted as lacking the flexibility to account for individual circumstances, it contravened the statutory command of this statute. Edna L. v. State, 477 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2020).
In a case terminating the mother's and the father's parental rights in the Families with Infants and Toddlers Court (FIT Court), in light of the ambiguities and potential for serious misunderstanding in the way the 12-months-to-permanency goal in the FIT Court was presented to the parents, the record did not support their knowing and voluntary waiver of a child in need of aid process that adequately took into account their individual circumstances. Edna L. v. State, 477 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2020).
One year not reasonable time to remedy conduct. —
Where the father made no efforts to establish a relationship with his baby daughter for over a year after her birth, one year was not a reasonable time to remedy the effects of his abandonment under item (a)(1)(B)(ii) [now (a)(2)(B)]. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
Passage of time as factor to consider. —
Office of Children’s Services’ second petition to terminate the father’s parental rights was not barred by res judicata because it raised new material facts; the passage of time alone could have significant consequences if a young child’s developmental needs were not being met, and the superior court properly considered new evidence regarding the mother’s circumstances. Kent V. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 233 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2010).
Child adjusted to foster home. —
It was in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights where the child was thriving, happy, and well-adjusted at her foster parents’ home and had bonded with her foster family, so that removing her from the only family she has ever known would likely cause her irreparable harm. M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
Where two of mother’s children had been sexually abused, all of the children had aggression behaviors, and mother had a flat relationship with children, court properly terminated the mother’s rights as taking the children out of their more stable foster homes would likely cause them additional setbacks and emotional trauma. V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).
Special needs child. —
Where a father appealed a superior court’s termination of his parental rights, the superior court did not err when it concluded that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The child had special needs that the father simply did not seem to understand. Sherman B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 8, 2014) (memorandum decision).
Indian Child Welfare Act —
Father’s parental rights were properly terminated because a doctor qualified as an expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act; courts had not required that the expert exhibit familiarity with the Alaska Native culture when the basis for termination did not implicate cultural bias, there was no contrary evidence in the record that the doctor disregarded, and the doctor’s testimony was not vague and generalized. The doctor’s testimony directly supported the conclusion that unless the father made progress in recommended services, his conduct was unlikely to change; also, the report at a minimum supported an inference that the childrenwould have suffered harm if returned to his care. Kent K. v. Dep't of Health Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs. (Alaska Feb. 3, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Lack of parental bond. —
Termination of father’s parental rights was in child’s best interests where the child’s bond with his foster parents, with whom he had been placed almost his entire life, and his bond with his half-brother, weighed against reunification with his father. The father’s failure to contact the Office of Children’s Services for six months after moving to Anchorage and his failure to drive to Fairbanks to take advantage of additional visitation was further evidence that the father did not have a strong parent-child bond with his child. Dale H. v. State, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010).
Incarceration of parent. —
Father’s incarceration could not serve as the proper basis for a finding of destruction of the parent-child relationship without substantial evidence that father’s disregard of his parental responsibilities led to the destruction of his parent-child relationship. A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
While long-term incarceration of a parent can result in a child becoming a child in need of aid under an inability to provide care theory, such incarceration is not a sufficient basis to justify termination of parental rights under AS 47.10.080(c)(3) . A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Where a Native American mother of twins suffered from a serious and long-term addiction to cocaine and the father of the twins was incarcerated at time of their birth and then absconded from custody, based on the totality of the circumstances, the parental rights of both parents were properly terminated. T.F. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).
The parental rights of a father were properly terminated following his conviction and sentence for sexually assaulting and attempting to assault his minor children, where the length of his sentence made efforts to reunite the family unnecessary. Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2003).
Father’s sentence to six years of incarceration qualified as a significant period of his children’s minority within the meaning of AS 47.10.086(c)(10) ; thus, a court was authorized to dispense with the requirement that the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services provide family support services under paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights where, although he provided the State with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed, and the State had made “more than reasonable efforts” to consider the father’s stated preferences, none of the father’s placement options was adequate. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights pursuant to AS 47.10.080 and this section was inappropriate where the superior court failed to make findings that were sufficiently specific to support termination. The father’s testimony indicated that he took steps to assure that the child had a safe home, away from the baby’s drug-addicted mother. Samuel H. v. State, 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).
In a termination of parental rights case, social services satisfied its duty to make active efforts. Because the father was incarcerated, a social worker communicated with him and facilitated the exchange of letters and pictures between him and the child, and they developed a case plan for the father and kept him informed. Josh L. v. State, 276 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2012).
Termination of a father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest because, due the father’s incarceration, he would not be able to parent the child until she was well into her teen years; the child needed stability and permanence. Claudio P. v. State, 309 P.3d 860 (Alaska 2013).
Termination of parental rights due to multiple deficiencies in parent’s parenting ability. —
Findings of abandonment and failure to remedy were supported by evidence that the parent failed to comply with several important aspects of his case plan, including undergoing a psychological assessment, providing verification of housing and employment, and gaining an understanding of the child’s developmental needs and abilities; the Office of Children’s Services presented reasonable justifications for requiring the evaluation, including troubling conduct with his other children. Sherman B. v. State, 310 P.3d 943 (Alaska 2013).
Termination of only the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests because the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) presented evidence of the father’s personality disorders, substance abuse, and criminal history; the OCS presented testimony that the child’s behavior and trauma were attributed to the father; and the OCS presented substantial undisputed evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was needed to protect the child from his father, that the father was an unfit parent and caused serious harm to the child, and that termination of the mother’s rights could be psychologically harmful to the child, but her continued involvement could benefit the child’s therapeutic plan. Jamie H. v. State, 336 P.3d 1253 (Alaska 2014).
Termination of the parents’ rights was upheld as the parents failed to address their substance abuse issue, conduct that placed the children at substantial risk harm, and termination was in the best interest of the children, one of whom needed constant, stable care and access to medical treatment to recover from a serious illness. Payton S. v. State, 349 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2015).
Terminating the mother’s parental rights to one child was in that child's best interests where the mother’s continuing mental illness and failure to supervise and protect the child subjected her to substantial harm, and she repeatedly failed to correct her behavior despite multiple chances and assistance. Denise L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights due to parental conduct. —
Parent’s constitutional right to due process was not violated by allowing, in a civil proceeding that could have resulted in the termination of parental rights, the admission of his daughter’s videotaped statement alleging sexual abuse without affording the parent an opportunity to cross-examine his daughter, given that uncorroborated hearsay evidence will not satisfy the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for the termination of parental rights. In re A.S.W., 834 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1992).
Trial court’s termination of father’s parental rights was erroneous where father could not have visited his children until he had established that he was their father and a period of approximately eighteen months elapsed before paternity of both children was established which resulted from the mother’s refusal, even under court order, to provide blood for testing purposes. In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1993).
In order to terminate parental rights under AS 47.10.080 , a court must find by clear and convincing evidence (1) that there is a child in need of aid under [former provisions of AS 47.10.010 ] as a result of parental conduct, and (2) that the parental conduct causing the child to be in need of aid is likely to continue. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
The record, which included evidence that children had serious social, physical and cognitive problems, were filthy, and lacked necessary medical care, and that the mother’s neglect was likely to continue, furnished sufficient evidence of neglect such that the supreme court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court erred in any of its findings of fact or in its ultimate conclusion that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated. In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994), overruled, N.A. v. State (In re S.A.), 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
Trial court did not err in terminating a father’s rights where evidence showed that on two occasions the children were found in downtown Juneau exposed to dangerous and unsanitary conditions while with him and that his neglect was due to his alcoholism which was likely to continue and further that the state had taken active remedial measures to rehabilitate the father. J.P.W. v. State (In re J.W.), 921 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1996).
Where the evidence before the superior court demonstrated the mother’s failure to provide her daughter with daily care and this neglect stemmed in part from the mother’s continued substance abuse, there was an ample evidentiary basis for adjudicating the daughter as a child in need of aid. D.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996).
Parental rights were properly terminated where evidence supported that mother continued to abuse drugs, had neglected her other children, and was at risk for neglecting the child who was the subject of the proceeding. J.H. v. State, 30 P.3d 79 (Alaska 2001).
Where the father failed to complete the individualized anger management, parenting, or substance abuse treatment programs his case plan required, and did not follow through with any of the program’s individual recommendations for treatment, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children in substantial risk of harm, or that returning them to his custody would place them at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights. Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).
Where the father was an untreated sex offender who was assessed as having a “high” risk of recidivism, the father posed a significant and particularized threat of further sexual abuse; further, his children had already been severely traumatized by his conduct; therefore, the trial court properly found that returning the father’s children to his custody would place them at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights. Jack C. v. State, 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).
Where the state presented overwhelming evidence of the mother’s repeated failure to care appropriately for her children, and her decade long lack of success in substance abuse treatment for abuse of cocaine and methamphetamine, and where a psychologist testified it was unlikely the mother would ever be capable of parenting, reasonable efforts at family reunification were exhausted, and termination of the mother’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence. Erica A. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
Superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in her home that placed her children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; the mother’s sobriety was new in her life, she continued to be romantically involved with a man who had been convicted of child sexual assault, and the mother failed to recognize her children’s special needs. Sherry R. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father’s reckless use of firearms, including shooting the child’s mother when she was pregnant with the child, created a significant risk of future physical harm to the child. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Court properly found a child to be in need of aid and terminated a father’s parental rights where the father admitted to disciplinary problems and confrontations while in prison. When that testimony was taken together with the testimony of the child’s mother and the social worker that the father threatened them while he was in custody, the evidence was clear and convincing that the father did not remedy his behavior and did not make sufficient progress. Martin N. v. State, 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Where a father’s addiction to substances, including alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana, resulted in repeated incarcerations, and he had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, his frequent and prolonged absences impaired his ability to parent and were harmful to his children; thus, a trial court did not err in finding that the children remained in substantial risk of harm pursuant to item (a)(1)(B)(i) [now (a)(2)(A)] of this section. Stanley B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 9, 2004), modified, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Court properly terminated an incarcerated father’s parental rights because he failed to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that placed the child at substantial risk of harm where his repeated incarcerations and substance abuse placed his children at substantial risk of harm, the father had never completed a substance abuse treatment program, and he was not likely to recover without serious treatment. Stanley B. v. State, 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
Trial court properly terminated father’s parental rights to his son and daughter pursuant to this section because there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that the children were children in need of aid based on the conditions enumerated in AS 47.10.011 , that the father was responsible for a “mental injury” to the son and that he failed to maintain contact with his daughter for several years. Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005).
Order terminating parents’ rights to their child was upheld where the parents, who had a history of substance abuse, mental problems, and criminal activity, did not remedy the conditions in the home that threatened the child’s safety, as required by subsection (a)(1)(B) [now (a)(2)]. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).
Termination of father’s right to twins was proper under this section where the Office of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to ensure that the children could be returned to the father as required by CINA R. 18(c)(2)(A) and AS 47.10.086 , the children were in need of aid as provided in AS 47.10.011 (8), and father failed to remedy the conditions that caused them to be in need of aid. Winston J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 134 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2006).
Findings were sufficient to support a conclusion that a father’s youngest child was a child in need of aid where the evidence showed that there was a substantial risk of injury if the child returned home; the father’s previous lack of cooperation and the exhaustion of resources mitigated the failure of Office of Children Services to refer the father to service providers in a case plan. Burke P. v. State, 162 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2007).
Mother failed to sufficiently remedy conduct or conditions that placed her children at risk, under this section and Alaska CINA R. 18(c)(1), where the mother failed to comply with her case plan, including cooperating with drug testing. Reports of harm continued after a trial home visit began, and, after the trial home visit ended, the mother visited with her children only sporadically and moved without informing the department. Maisy W. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 175 P.3d 1263 (Alaska 2008).
Superior court properly found that a father’s history of incarceration and substance abuse, as well as his pending incarceration, put his children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (2) and (10), and that the father had failed within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed his children at substantial risk of physical or mental injury under this section. Thomas H. v. State, 184 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2008).
Mother’s parental rights were properly terminated under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) because mother failed to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time and returning daughter to her mother would place her at substantial risk of further emotional and physical harm; trial court found that daughter was severly emotionally damaged, she endured emotional and physical abuse, and that mother had either failed to protect her daughter or contributed to the daughter’s harm, or both. Tessa M. v. State, 182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008).
Superior court’s conclusion that best interests of the children would be served by terminating father’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous and was warranted by this section because the children continued to be in need of aid, father failed to complete anger management and parenting classes, and father had not remedied conditions that placed his children at risk of substantial harm, including sudden and long absences between visits and unrealistic beliefs of his children’s behavioral and emotional problems. Paul G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 6, 2008) (memorandum decision).
Termination of mother’s parental rights to her daughters was proper because adequate findings supported superior court’s conclusion that they were children in need of aid and superior court did not err in authorizing the office of children’s services to discontinue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Superior court did not err in concluding that girls were children in need of aid because there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support superior court’s finding that the girls had been subjected to neglect due to their mother’s failure to provide them with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development. Audrey H. v. State, 188 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2008).
Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to remedy conduct that put their children at substantial risk under subsection (a)(2)(B) because the father failed to achieve the goals of his case plan and stated that he did not intend to seek further alcohol abuse treatment because it was not important. Jacob W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 3, 2008) (memorandum decision).
Father had not remedied his conduct and termination of his parental rights was proper where he did not start to participate fully in counseling until after his son had been in foster care for over seven months, he never completed any of the substance abuse or anger management programs despite being required to do so by court orders and his case plan, and at a counseling appointment the father threatened the life of a social worker who was the bearer of unwelcome news and then stopped attending treatment. Jeremy S. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not err by finding that the mother failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that led to removal of her children where she (1) did not adequately address her mental health problems and failed to engage in consistent treatment; (2) failed to fully integrate what she learned about domestic violence and the trial court questioned whether she had permanently ended her relationship with the father; and (3) failed to address her substance abuse, as she failed to regularly attend 12-step meetings, maintain regular conduct with a sponsor, or surround herself with individuals leading a lifestyle conductive to sobriety. She continued to minimize and even deny her drug use and abuse in her testimony. Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010).
Sufficient evidence supported termination of father’s parental rights where, although he attended a program on family violence intervention, he otherwise failed to comply with requirements set by the court, and continued to exhibit behavior which was potentially harmful to the child or others, including threatening a social worker, and failure to accept responsibility for his own actions. Ralph H. v. State, 246 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2011).
Termination of mother’s parental rights was proper where she did not remedy the drug and alcohol abuse that placed the children at substantial risk of harm; she admitted to drinking while she was pregnant with one of the children and to testing positive for marijuana use following the child’s birth. Lucy J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2010).
Father’s rights were properly terminated where he failed to remedy the conditions that placed the child in need of aid; although there were periods of time when his contacts with the child improved, the periods did not overcome the evidence that he was unable to maintain regular contact, provide reasonable support, or normal supervision for the child. Sherman B. v. State, 290 P.3d 421 (Alaska 2012).
Trial court did not err in finding that termination of a mother’s parental rights was in her child’s best interest because it considered the mother’s long and cyclical history of engaging in treatment and then relapsing, her failure to follow through with mental health treatment and medication compliance, her failure to comply with her case plan, and her failure to separate herself from her abusive boyfriend. Judith R. v. State, 289 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2012).
Court properly terminated a father’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment because the father voluntarily left Alaska, and made no attempt to see his son for more than a year, even though he knew that social services was working to help reunite him with the child. A social worker offered to help the father have the no-contact order in his criminal case modified to allow supervised visits with the child even while the criminal case was pending, but the father did not follow up on her offer. Paul M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 20, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Mother had not refuted the trial court's findings that she knowingly failed to provide the child needed medical treatment to alleviate her significant respiratory and dental problems, and thus the finding that the mother's actions placed the child in need of aid, for purposes of AS 47.10.011 , was proper, as was the termination of the mother's rights under AS 47.10.088 . Kelly C. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's daughter, who received treatment for sexualized and aggressive behavior, was appropriate because the superior court reasonably concluded that the father failed to remedy the harmful conduct or conditions, that visitation was not in the child's best interest, that the father had failed to comply with substance abuse testing and delayed a critical sex offender risk assessment, and that it would cause serious emotional damage to return the child to the father's home. Bob S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017).
There was sufficient support in the record to find that a mother failed to provide adequate medical attention and other care and control necessary for her children's physical and mental health, and thus, the superior court did not clearly err when it found the children in need of aid due to neglect; the mother failed to provide her son proper medical attention when she declined to take him to therapy, and the neglect of the daughter played a strong role in her continuing mental health issues. Kendra H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska May 13, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights not clearly erroneous.—
Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a father was not meaningfully engaging in a case plan, by declining to credit the testimony of the father's witnesses over the testimony of the witnesses for the children's services agency, in finding active but unsuccessful efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and in giving more weight to expert witness testimony than to testimony from the father's witnesses as to the likelihood of future harm to the child. Nicholas H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 6, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Substance abuse. —
Termination of mother’s parental rights was supported by evidence that the child was a child in need of aid due to mother’s substance abuse. The mother did not remedy her substance abuse issues in a reasonable time, and there was no evidence the mother would change her behavior upon release from incarceration; once released it would take two years for her prove sobriety and stability. Casey K. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 311 P.3d 637 (Alaska 2013).
Because a mother in a termination of parental rights case did not contest the superior court's finding that the mother's children were in need of aid based on the mother's substance abuse, the appellate court declined to consider the alternative findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and risk of exposure to domestic violence by the mother's paramour, as those issues were rendered moot. Violet C. v. State, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019).
Superior court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that the child was at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse because he admitted to smoking drugs while the child was in the house, he testified that others he associated with had used drugs in his home and he blamed the child's positive drug test on them, and the child's hair follicle tested positive for amphetamine, cocaine, and methamphetamine while she was in the father's care and control. Steve K. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 18, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Because this statute did not require the Office of Children's Services to wait 15 months before filing a petition, the court did not err by holding a termination trial based on a petition filed less than 15 months after the children were removed from their home as the mother had made no progress in addressing her substance abuse and was not willing to accept accountability; and the father refused to take any accountability for his behaviors and had not been open to working on the conditions causing his children to be in need of aid. Josiah M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).
Superior court did not clearly err in finding that a mother had failed to remedy the conduct that caused her child to be in need of aid, having balanced the mother’s efforts to address her substance abuse with her unsuccessful attempts to maintain sobriety. In finding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the superior court took into account factors including the child’s need for permanency and the low likelihood of return to the mother’s care within the foreseeable future. Karine W. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Mar. 16, 2022).
Termination of a mother’s parental rights was appropriate because the evidence supported the superior court’s findings that the mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues would place the mother’s child at substantial risk of harm if returned to the mother’s care. Rihanna N. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 8, 2021).
Criminal record and history of violence. —
Termination of parental rights was proper where the father had at least eight violence-related criminal convictions; he admitted at trial that his assault and domestic violence convictions all resulted from crimes against women he knew, and one assault occurred against the child’s mother on the day before the child’s birth. Miles L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 20, 2010) (memorandum decision).
Trial court did not err under AS 47.10.088(a)(2) in determining that a mother failed to remedy the conditions that placed her children at risk of harm; her four months of outpatient treatment were insufficient to remedy her long history of alcohol abuse. After participating in Alcoholics Anonymous for over four months, she could not recite a single one of the program’s 12 steps. Sarah G. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 3, 2013) (memorandum decision).
Failure of parents to remedy conduct. —
Order terminating parents’ rights to their three children was proper where the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions that put their children at substantial risk of harm within a reasonable time; the parents began to participate in residential substance abuse treatment just three weeks before the trial to terminate their rights. Sandy B. v. State, 216 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2009).
Trial court did not err in terminating Indian parents’ rights on the basis of neglect because the evidence established that the children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by the parents that had subjected the children to neglect, including evidence that the father used drugs and the parents permitted others to use drugs in their home, that the children missed almost 80 days of school in one academic year because the parents overslept, that the parents missed visits with the children after the children were taken into state custody, and that the children suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody. Neal M. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 214 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2009).
Where a child was properly found to be in need of aid due to her father’s abandonment, the record also established that the father had failed to remedy harmful conduct or conditions where he had failed to undergo required substance abuse assessment and treatment, which was needed before he could resume visitation with the child, and there was a strong bond between the child and her foster family. Jon S. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 212 P.3d 756 (Alaska 2009).
Because the children required permanence and stability that the father could not offer, and because the evidence suggested that he would not be able to provide permanence and stability within any reasonable time period, terminating the father’s parental rights was proper. The father repeatedly showed a poor attitude and failed to cooperate in efforts to assist him. Pravat P. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 249 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2011).
Trial court properly terminated a father’s parental rights because sufficient evidence showed that his drinking impaired his ability to parent and caused a substantial risk of harm to the children; his continuing alcohol problems supported the finding that he failed to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk. Stephen H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 30, 2011) (memorandum decision).
Court properly terminated a mother’s parental rights because the mother had a history of relationships involving repeated incidents of domestic violence, and the mother’s intellectual functioning was likely to contribute to her difficulty in avoiding unsafe partners, thereby putting her children at risk. Lance H. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a father’s parental rights to his child was proper where father failed to remedy his conduct within a reasonable time; there was substantial evidence that the father could not fulfill the child’s urgent needs resulting from reactive attachment disorder and PTSD, which were a direct result of the father’s behaviors. Jake B. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 31, 2012) (memorandum decision).
Termination of parental rights was proper because the children were children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (8) and (11); they suffered mental injury due to parents’ lack of supervision and failure to meet children’s mental health and counseling needs, including inappropriate and intimidating corporal punishment. Termination was in the children’s best interest. William S. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 15, 2014) (memorandum decision).
In light of the father’s history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence, despite completing multiple treatment programs, the superior court did not clearly err in its finding that the father had not learned from his treatment. Sid G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 6, 2016) (memorandum decision).
Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the superior court did not clearly err in finding that the mother failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct that placed the children at risk as the Alaska Office of Children's Services worked with the mother over the course of nearly two years, the mother tried to engage in treatment and address substance abuse and mental health issues but was unsuccessful and repeatedly relapsed, and the mother was repeatedly incarcerated and struggled with homelessness. Bonnie M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska June 7, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on her failure to remedy her conduct within a reasonable time and was in the children's best interests because the mother had barely begun to work on her case plan by the trial date despite months of efforts by the Office of Children's Services to engage her; she was released from jail in July 2016, but she had not yet scheduled a substance abuse assessment by the time of trial in early November 2016; and the superior court did not err in finding that the mother's long history of substance abuse was inhibiting her ability to parent, and in not believing her claims that she would do whatever it took to remedy her conduct. Jane A. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 25, 2017) (memorandum decision).
Timely compliance with case plan. —
Mother failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the child at risk in a timely manner, as she failed to start working her case plan until months after the child was taken from her when she was arrested. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).
Designating relative as primary caretaker not a remedy for unacceptable parenting. —
If parents have not remedied the conduct that poses an active threat to a child’s safety, merely designating a relative as primary caretaker does not “remedy” the conduct and therefore does not satisfy subsection (a)(1)(B)(ii) [now (a)(2)(B)]. Debbie G. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 132 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2006).
Termination of parental rights reversed. —
Termination of father’s parental rights was reversed where the state did not produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that placement of the children with the father was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children and did not make active efforts to reunify the father with his children. C.J. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001).
Trial court clearly erred by finding that the father failed to remedy his conduct in a reasonable time, and therefore the termination of his parental rights was reversed, because he remedied his substance abuse issues, as he had successfully completed inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment programs, the Office of Children's Services no longer required him to complete urinalysis testing, and he had remained sober for two years. The father was also actively engaged in therapy, parenting classes, and visitation with his children. Charles S. v. State, 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019).
Consideration of alternative grounds. —
Where a case was remanded to determine whether children should be adjudicated children in need of aid (CINA) due to the father’s inability to provide for them, once it complied with that direction, the trial court’s additional consideration of other grounds for CINA jurisdiction was not inconsistent with the mandate. A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1997).
Absence of meaningful alternative placement. —
Presence or absence of meaningful alternative placements could be considered by court in deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, but it was not a decisive factor where there was evidence at termination hearing that the children would need more time in therapeutic foster homes before they were ready for adoption and that the children would benefit from such an environment. Paul G. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 6, 2008) (memorandum decision).
Applied in
A.H. v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000); A.J. v. State, 62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003); Simone H. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 320 P.3d 284 (Alaska 2014).
Quoted in
M.J.S. v. State, 39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002); Native Village of Tununak v. State, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); Mariah B. v. Dep't to Health & Soc. Servs., Off. of Children's Servs., 499 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2021).
Stated in
N.A. v. Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001); S.H. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002); In re Adoption of Bernard A., 77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003); Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).
Cited in
V.S.B. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 21, 2001); Brynna B. v. State, 88 P.3d 527 (Alaska 2004); Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006); In re Adoption of Xavier K., 268 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2012); Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012); Chloe O. v. State, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013); Philip J. v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 314 P.3d 518 (Alaska 2013); Duke S. v. State, 433 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2018); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); Louisa M. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 12, 2020).
Collateral references. —
Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights. 92 ALR5th 379.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Constitutional issues. 110 ALR5th 579.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — General considerations. 113 ALR5th 349.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel. 118 ALR5th 561.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 ALR5th 351.
Parents’ mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 ALR5th 385.
Sec. 47.10.089. Voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and responsibilities.
- When a child is committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (3) or released under AS 47.10.080(c)(2) , the rights of a parent with respect to the child, including parental rights to control the child, to withhold consent to an adoption, or to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption, may be voluntarily relinquished to the department and the relationship of parent and child terminated in a proceeding as provided under this section.
- A voluntary relinquishment must be in writing and signed by a parent, regardless of the age of the parent, in the presence of a representative of the department or in the presence of a court of competent jurisdiction with the knowledge and approval of the department. A copy of the signed relinquishment shall be given to the parent.
- A voluntary relinquishment may be withdrawn within 10 days after it is signed. The relinquishment is invalid unless the relinquishment contains the right of withdrawal as specified under this subsection.
- A parent may retain privileges with respect to the child, including the ability to have future contact, communication, and visitation with the child in a voluntary relinquishment executed under this section. A retained privilege must be in writing and stated with specificity.
- Not less than 10 days after a voluntary relinquishment is signed, the court shall enter an order terminating parental rights if the court determines that termination of parental rights under the terms of the relinquishment is in the child’s best interest. If a parent has retained one or more privileges under (d) of this section, the court shall incorporate the retained privileges in the termination order with a recommendation that the retained privileges be incorporated in an adoption or legal guardianship decree.
- A voluntary relinquishment may not be withdrawn and a termination order may not be vacated on the ground that a retained privilege has been withheld from the relinquishing parent or that the relinquishing parent has been unable, for any reason, to act on a retained privilege, except as provided in Rule 60(b), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.
- After a termination order is entered, a person who has voluntarily relinquished parental rights under this section may request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to seek enforcement or modification of or to vacate a privilege retained in the termination order. The court may modify, enforce, or vacate the retained privilege if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.
- After a termination order is entered and before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree, a person who voluntarily relinquished parental rights to a child under this section may request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to vacate the termination order and reinstate parental rights relating to that child. A court shall vacate a termination order if the person shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that reinstatement of parental rights is in the best interest of the child and that the person is rehabilitated and capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child.
- A person who relinquished parental rights is entitled to the appointment of an attorney if a hearing is requested under (g), (h), or (j) of this section to the same extent as if the parent’s rights had not been terminated in a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding.
- After a termination order is entered and before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree, a prospective adoptive parent or a guardian of a child who is the subject of the adoption or guardianship decree may request, after providing notice as specified under this subsection, that the court decline to incorporate a privilege retained in a termination order and recommended for incorporation in an adoption or guardianship decree under (e) of this section. The request made under this subsection may only be considered by the court after providing at least 20 days’ notice by certified mail to the last known address of the person who has voluntarily relinquished parental rights to the child. The notice under this subsection must describe the request and explain that the recipient of the notice may submit a written statement under penalty of perjury to the court that the recipient either agrees with or opposes the request. The notice must also include the deadline for submitting the statement and the mailing address of the court. The court may decline to incorporate a retained privilege if the person who retained the privilege agrees with the request or if the court finds that it is in the child’s best interest.
History. (§ 17 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Cross references. —
For the text of the amendment of Rule 18(d)(1), Child in Need of Aid Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with this section, see § 54, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of the amendment of Rule 9(g), Alaska Adoption Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with (h) of this section relating to voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see § 57, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of the amendment of Rule 13(a), Alaska Adoption Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with (e) of this section relating to the content of the court decree and findings supporting a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see § 58, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 60(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rules 9 and 13, Alaska Adoption Rules, by requiring retained privileges to be set out in the relinquishment form and order and by providing additional procedures related to the relinquishment. Section 60(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rule 13, Alaska Adoption Rules, by authorizing review hearings for voluntary relinquishments. Section 60(e), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 enactment of this section has the effect of amending Rule 18, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by providing that a relinquishment be in writing, allowing for the withdrawal of the relinquishment, allowing for the retention of certain privileges, and authorizing a review hearing before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree.
Notes to Decisions
Denial of review hearing on termination of parental rights held proper. —
Denial of a mother’s request for a review hearing to rescind the termination of her parental rights was appropriate under subsection (h) because the mother repeatedly tested positive for cocaine and opiates, failed to complete rehabilitation programs, and failed to overcome her substance abuse problem despite a few recent short-term positive steps. Lara S. v. State, 209 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2009).
Application to reinstatement hearing. —
Standards in this section were applicable to hearings on the reinstatement of parental rights. Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Withdrawal of relinquishment. —
It was reasonable for the superior court to conclude that the failure of the adoptive placement did not entitle a mother to be permitted to withdraw her relinquishment based solely on a best interests determination because the relinquishment expressly acknowledged that the adoption could fail as a result of a negative home study or the grandmother's inability to care for the child; the relinquishment was unconditional, and only retained a privilege to be notified if the adoption fell through. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).
Late notice of withdrawal. —
Even assuming the superior court had the discretion to accept a mother's late notice to withdraw a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, its refusal to do so was not an abuse of discretion because its findings comported with the statute and the relinquishment's language. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).
Reinstatement of parental rights. — Because the disputed factual findings supporting the best interests determination were not material or not clearly erroneous, the decision granting a mother reinstatement of her parental rights had to be affirmed; the superior court made findings about the child's age, his attachment to caregivers, his opportunities to maintain visitation with those to whom he was bonded, the safety, security, and stability of the mother's home, and the necessity of moving the child from his placement. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).
Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because it was not clearly erroneous to find that the mother and her sister were similarly situated with respect to their bonds with the child, who had lived with the sister; over two years passed between the initial reinstatement order and the superior court's supplemental findings, and the superior court most heavily weighed the child's emotional well-being, namely his ability to maintain all familial bonds. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).
Superior court properly reinstated a mother's parental rights because there was some support in the record for its finding that the child wanted to live with the mother; the superior court was entitled to, and did, discount the credibility of both a clinical psychologist and the caseworker. State v. Dara S., 458 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2020).
Standing. —
Supreme court did not consider a mother's argument that termination of her parental rights was not in the child's best interests because by filing the relinquishment the mother voluntarily removed herself from child in need of aid proceedings relating to the child; unless and until the mother was able to resume participation in the proceedings by withdrawing or voiding her relinquishment, she had no standing to bring such a challenge. Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).
Cited in
Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008).
Sec. 47.10.090. Court records.
- The court shall make and keep records of all cases brought before it.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
- Within 30 days after the date of a child’s 18th birthday or, if the court retains jurisdiction of a child past the child’s 18th birthday, within 30 days after the date on which the court releases jurisdiction over the child, the court shall order all the court’s official records pertaining to that child in a proceeding under this chapter sealed. A person may not use these sealed records unless authorized by order of the court upon a finding of good cause.
- The name or picture of a child under the jurisdiction of the court may not be made public in connection with the child’s status as a child in need of aid unless authorized by order of the court or unless to implement the permanency plan for a child after all parental rights of custody have been terminated. This subsection does not prohibit the release of aggregate information for statistical or other informational purposes if the identity of any particular person is not revealed by the release.
- The court’s official records under this chapter may be inspected only with the court’s permission and only by persons having a legitimate interest in them. A foster parent is considered to have a legitimate interest in those portions of the court’s records relating to a child who is placed by the department with the foster parent or who the department proposes for placement with the foster parent.
History. (§ 10(3)(4) art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 124 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 90 SLA 1975; am § 20 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 4 ch 130 SLA 1988; am § 56 ch 50 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 98 SLA 1994; am § 12 ch 113 SLA 1994; am §§ 29 — 31, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 34 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 18, 19 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Cross references. —
For similar provisions related to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.300 .
For effect of the 1998 amendment to subsection (e) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 78, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts.
For the text of the amendment of Rule 22(c), Child in Need of Aid Rules, setting out a conforming court rule change consistent with the 2005 amendment of (d) of this section, see § 55, ch. 64, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted reference to “child” for reference to “minor” throughout subsections (c) and (d); in subsection (c) substituted “unless authorized by order of the court upon a finding of good cause” for “for any purpose except that the court may order their use for good cause shown” at the end of the subsection; and in subsection (d) added the language beginning “or unless” to the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 61(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendment of (d) of this section has “the effect of changing Rule 22, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, by allowing the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to a child, including a child’s name or picture to be made public in certain circumstances.”
Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments of (c) and (d) of this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”
Notes to Decisions
Purpose for enacting subsection (a). —
Reading this section together with other sections of the laws relating to children’s proceedings leads one to believe that subsection (a) was enacted principally for the purpose of protecting the child against the possible adverse effects an unauthorized revelation of his social record would have. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).
There is no indication that subsection (a) was intended to authorize the granting of testimonial use immunity to parents. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).
The supreme court could not say with certainty that this section would be construed to forbid the use, in a subsequent criminal action against a parent, of testimony that the parent gave at a children’s proceeding. In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975).
Confidentiality policy. —
The policy of confidentiality in Child in Need of Aid proceedings is not absolute. The court has discretion to disclose records in CINA proceedings under subsection (a) [as that subsection read before its amendment by § 12, ch. 113 SLA 1994]. Clifton v. State, 758 P.2d 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
Cited in
C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).
Sec. 47.10.092. Disclosure to certain public officials and employees.
- Notwithstanding AS 47.10.090 and 47.10.093 , a parent or legal guardian of a child subject to a proceeding under AS 47.10.005 — 47.10.142 may disclose confidential or privileged information about the child or the child’s family, including information that has been lawfully obtained from agency or court files, to the governor, the lieutenant governor, a legislator, the ombudsman appointed under AS 24.55, the attorney general, and the commissioner of health and social services, administration, or public safety, or an employee of these persons, for review or use in their official capacities. The Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration shall disclose additional confidential or privileged information, excluding privileged attorney-client information, and make copies of documents available for inspection about the child or the child’s family to these state officials or employees for review or use in their official capacities upon request of the official or employee and submission of satisfactory evidence that a parent or legal guardian of the child has requested the state official’s assistance in the case as part of the official’s duties. A person to whom disclosure is made under this section may not disclose confidential or privileged information about the child or the child’s family to a person not authorized to receive it.
- The disclosure right under (a) of this section is in addition to, and not in derogation of, the rights of a parent or legal guardian of a minor.
- The obligations under (a) of this section remain in effect throughout the period that the child is in the custody of the department, including after the parent’s parental rights have been terminated with respect to the child, unless the child’s parent or legal guardian who made the disclosure under (a) of this section subsequently files a notice with the Department of Health and Social Services that the assistance of the state official or employee is no longer requested.
- The Department of Health and Social Services shall notify an official identified under (a) of this section of the opportunity for a parent to file a grievance under AS 47.10.098 when the official is denied access to all or part of a requested record.
- Each department shall respond to a request made by an official identified under (a) of this section within five working days after receiving the request, or by a later date specified in the request, by providing access to all or part of the information requested or by providing the specific citation to a federal or state law that prohibits disclosure of all or part of the information requested.
- A person who discloses confidential or privileged information in violation of (a) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
History. (§ 2 ch 98 SLA 1994; am § 50 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 64 SLA 1997; am § 35 ch 99 SLA 1998; am §§ 20, 21 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 4 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 4 ch 38 SLA 2008)
Revisor’s notes. —
Subsections (c) and (d) were enacted as (d) and (e) and relettered in 2005, at which time former subsection (c) was relettered as subsection (e). Subsection (e) was enacted as (f) and relettered in 2006, at which time former (e) was relettered as (f).
Cross references. —
For effect of the 1998 amendment to subsection (a) on the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see § 78, ch. 99, SLA 1998 in the 1998 Temporary and Special Acts. For similar provisions related to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.320 .
Administrative Code. —
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) made a stylistic change in the first sentence and, in the second sentence, substituted “Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration” for “department” and inserted “, excluding privileged attorney-client information,”; and added subsections (d) and (e) [now (c) and (d)].
The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, added subsection (f) [now (e)].
The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, substituted “discloses confidential or privileged information in violation of (a)” for “violates a provision” in subsection (f).
Editor’s notes. —
In connection with the 1998 amendment to subsection (a), § 81, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “TRANSITIONAL PROVISION; DISCLOSURE OF AGENCY RECORDS. (a) The Department of Health and Social Services may disclose information and make copies of documents available to state officials or employees as authorized under AS 47.10.092(a) , as amended by sec. 35 of this Act, based on an appropriate request that was received before, on, or after September 14, 1998.
“(b) The Department of Health and Social Services, a parent, or a legal guardian may disclose information as authorized under AS 47.10.092(a) , as amended by sec. 35 of this Act, regardless of when the information came into the possession or knowledge of the department, parent, or legal guardian and regardless of when the conduct or situation described in the information occurred.”
Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”
Notes to Decisions
Applied in
B.S. v. State (In re C.A.S.), 882 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1994).
Sec. 47.10.093. Disclosure of agency records.
- Except as permitted in AS 47.10.092 , (b) — (g) and (i) — (l) of this section, and AS 47.17.030(g) , all information and social records pertaining to a child who is subject to this chapter or AS 47.17 prepared by or in the possession of a federal, state, or municipal agency or employee in the discharge of the agency’s or employee’s official duty are privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone without a court order.
-
A state or municipal agency or employee shall disclose appropriate confidential information regarding a case to
- a guardian ad litem appointed by the court;
- a person or an agency requested by the department or the child’s legal custodian to provide consultation or services for a child who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 as necessary to enable the provision of the consultation or services;
- an out-of-home care provider as necessary to enable the out-of-home care provider to provide appropriate care to the child, to protect the safety of the child, and to protect the safety and property of family members and visitors of the out-of-home care provider;
- a school official as necessary to enable the school to provide appropriate counseling and support services to a child who is the subject of the case, to protect the safety of the child, and to protect the safety of school students and staff;
- a governmental agency as necessary to obtain that agency’s assistance for the department in its investigation or to obtain physical custody of a child;
- a law enforcement agency of this state or another jurisdiction as necessary for the protection of any child or for actions by that agency to protect the public safety;
- a member of a multidisciplinary child protection team created under AS 47.14.300 as necessary for the performance of the member’s duties;
- the state medical examiner under AS 12.65 as necessary for the performance of the duties of the state medical examiner;
- a person who has made a report of harm as required by AS 47.17.020 to inform the person that the investigation was completed and of action taken to protect the child who was the subject of the report;
- the child support services agency established in AS 25.27.010 as necessary to establish and collect child support for a child who is a child in need of aid under this chapter;
- a parent, guardian, or caregiver of a child or an entity responsible for ensuring the safety of children as necessary to protect the safety of a child;
- a review panel, including a variance committee established under AS 47.05.360 , established by the department for the purpose of reviewing the actions taken by the department in a specific case;
- the University of Alaska under the Alaska higher education savings program for children established under AS 47.14.400 , but only to the extent that the information is necessary to support the program and only if the information released is maintained as a confidential record by the University of Alaska;
- a child placement agency licensed under AS 47.32 as necessary to provide services for a child who is the subject of the case;
- a state or municipal agency of this state or another jurisdiction that is responsible for delinquent minors, as may be necessary for the administration of services, protection, rehabilitation, or supervision of a child or for actions by the agency to protect the public safety; however, a court may review an objection made to a disclosure under this paragraph; the person objecting to the disclosure bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure is not in the child’s best interest; and
- a sibling of a child who is the subject of the case to allow the siblings to contact each other if it is in the best interests of the child to maintain contact; in this paragraph, “sibling” means an adult or minor who is related to the child who is the subject of the case by blood, adoption, or marriage as a child of one or both of the parents of the child who is the subject of the case; a sibling who is adopted by a person other than the parent of the child who is the subject of the case remains a sibling of the child.
- A state or municipal law enforcement agency shall disclose information regarding a case that is needed by the person or agency charged with making a preliminary investigation for the information of the court under AS 47.10.020 .
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
- The department may release to a person with a legitimate interest confidential information relating to children not subject to the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 .
- The department and affected law enforcement agencies shall work with school districts and private schools to develop procedures for the disclosure of confidential information to a school official under (b)(4) of this section. The procedures must provide a method for informing the principal or the principal’s designee of the school that the student attends as soon as it is reasonably practicable.
- [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996.]
-
The commissioner of health and social services or the commissioner’s designee or the commissioner of administration or the commissioner’s designee, as appropriate, may disclose to the public, upon request, confidential information, as set out in (j) of this section, when
- the parent or guardian of a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17 has made a public disclosure concerning the department’s involvement with the family;
- the alleged perpetrator named in one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17 has been charged with a crime concerning the alleged abuse or neglect; or
- abuse or neglect has resulted in the fatality or near fatality of a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17.
-
The department may publicly disclose information pertaining to a child or an alleged perpetrator named in a report of harm described under (i) of this section, or pertaining to a household member of the child or the alleged perpetrator, if the information relates to a determination, if any, made by the department regarding the nature and validity of a report of harm under AS 47.17 or to the department’s activities arising from the department’s investigation of the report. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee
- shall withhold disclosure of the child’s name, picture, or other information that would readily lead to the identification of the child if the department determines that the disclosure would be contrary to the best interests of the child, the child’s siblings, or other children in the child’s household; or
- after consultation with a prosecuting attorney, shall withhold disclosure of information that would reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal investigation or proceeding or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial in a criminal proceeding.
- Except for a disclosure made under (i) of this section, a person to whom disclosure is made under this section may not disclose confidential information about the child or the child’s family to a person not authorized to receive it.
- The Department of Health and Social Services and the Department of Administration shall adopt regulations to implement and interpret the duties of the respective department under this section, including regulations governing the release of confidential information and identifying a sufficient legitimate interest under (f) of this section.
- A person may not bring an action for damages against the state, the commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee based on the disclosure or nondisclosure of information under (i) of this section except for civil damages resulting from gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct.
- A person who discloses confidential information in violation of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
- In this section, “school” means a public or private elementary or secondary school.
History. (§ 13 ch 113 SLA 1994; am §§ 1, 2 ch 32 SLA 1995; am §§ 32 — 34, 55 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 4 ch 94 SLA 1997; am § 36 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 69 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 31 ch 99 SLA 2004; am §§ 22 — 27 ch 64 SLA 2005; am §§ 5, 6 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 2 ch 58 SLA 2007; am § 1 ch 38 SLA 2012; am § 15 ch 69 SLA 2018; am §§ 11, 12 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Revisor’s notes. —
A reference to “AS 47.10.092 ” was inserted in (a) of this section in 1994 to harmonize the amendments to AS 47.10 made by ch. 98, SLA 1994, and ch. 113, SLA 1994.
Subsections (g) and former (h) were enacted as (h) and (i), respectively. Relettered in 1995, at which time former subsection (g) was relettered as (i) and the internal reference in (a) was conformed.
In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in (b) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.
Subsections (i) — (m) were enacted as (k) — (o) and relettered in 2005, at which time former subsections (i) and (j) were relettered as subsections (n) and (o) and internal references in subsections (a), (i), (j), (k), and (m) were conformed.
In 2007, in (b)(13) of this section, “AS 47.14.400 ” was substituted for “AS 47.05.400” to reflect the 2007 renumbering on enactment of AS 47.05.400.
Cross references. —
For similar provisions relating to delinquent minors, see AS 47.12.310 .
For provision relating to applicability of paragraph (b)(16), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For privacy of client records: child protection services, see 7 AAC 54, art. 1.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, deleted “or to a citizen review board or local review panel for permanency planning authorized by AS 47.14.200 or 47.14.220 ” from the end of paragraph (b)(1).
The 2004 amendment, effective June 26, 2004, substituted “(b)(4)” for “(b)(3)” in the first sentence of subsection (g).
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in subsection (a) substituted “permitted” for “specified,” updated subsection references, and substituted “child” for “minor”; in subsection (b) added paragraphs (11) and (12) and otherwise rewrote the subsection; rewrote subsection (c); in subsection (f) inserted “confidential”, substituted “children” for “minors”, and deleted the last sentence; in subsection (g) inserted “confidential” and made stylistic changes; and added subsections (k) — (o) [now (i) — (m)].
The 2006 amendment, effective May 4, 2006, substituted “one or more reports” for “a report” in paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2), substituted “abuse or neglect” for “a report of harm under AS 47.17” and “a child who is the subject of one or more reports of harm under AS 47.17” for “that child” in paragraph (i)(3), and rewrote subsection (j).
The 2007 amendment, effective October 15, 2007, added paragraph (b)(13), and made related changes.
The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, added (b)(14) and (b)(15).
The first 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (a), substituted “in AS 47.10.092 , (b) — (g) and (i) — ( l ) of this section, and AS 47.17.030(g) ,” for “in AS 47.10.092 and in (b) — (g) and (i) — ( l ) of this section,”; added (b)(16), and made related changes.
The second 2018 amendment, effective July 25, 2018, in (b)(12), inserted “including a variance committee established under AS 47.05.360 ,” following “a review panel”.
Editor’s notes. —
Section 61(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, provides that the 2005 amendments of this section have “the effect of changing Rule 22, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules of Procedure, by allowing the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to a child, including a child’s name or picture to be made public in certain circumstances.”
Under § 62(b), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section apply “to all proceedings and hearings conducted on or after July 1, 2005.”
Under § 62(c), ch. 64, SLA 2005, the 2005 amendments to this section “apply to all information, records, and files created on or after July 1, 2005; however, if a file contains information and records that were created before July 1, 2005, that information and those records retain the confidentiality that they had under the law on June 30, 2005.”
Opinions of attorney general. —
For discussion of the question of the public release of law enforcement records related to juveniles as affected by this section, see 1994 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1 (November 25, 1994).
Sec. 47.10.095. Arrest of a minor. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.200.]
Sec. 47.10.097. Fingerprinting of minors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.210.]
Sec. 47.10.098. Grievance procedure.
-
The department shall develop, in regulation, a grievance procedure for a parent to file a complaint based on
- the application of a department policy or procedure under this chapter;
- compliance with this chapter or a regulation adopted under this chapter; or
- an act or failure to act by the department under this chapter.
- The department shall prepare and distribute to each parent of a child who is under the jurisdiction of the department a written copy of the grievance procedure developed under (a) of this section.
History. (§ 28 ch 64 SLA 2005)
Administrative Code. —
For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54.245 — 7 AAC 54.260.
For grievance procedure, see 7 AAC 54, art. 2.
Sec. 47.10.100. Retention of jurisdiction over child.
- The court retains jurisdiction over the case and may at any time stay execution, modify, set aside, revoke, or enlarge a judgment or order, or grant a new hearing, in the exercise of its power of protection over the child and for the child’s best interest, for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event extend past the day the child reaches 19 years of age, unless sooner discharged by the court, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. An application for any of these purposes may be made by the parent, guardian, or custodian acting in behalf of the child, or the court may, on its own motion, and after reasonable notice to interested parties and the appropriate department, take action that it considers appropriate.
- If the court determines at a hearing authorized by (a) of this section that the department has complied with the requirements for release of a child under AS 47.14.100(q) and that it is in the best interests of the child to be released to the child’s own custody, or to the care or custody of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, it shall enter an order to that effect and the child is discharged from the control of the department.
- If a child is adjudicated a child in need of aid before the child’s 18th birthday, the court may retain jurisdiction over the child after the child’s 18th birthday for the purpose of supervising the child, but the court’s jurisdiction over the minor under this chapter never extends beyond the child’s 19th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it. The department may retain jurisdiction over a child if the child has been placed in the custody or under the supervision of the department before the child’s 18th birthday, except that the department may apply for and the court may grant an additional one-year period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it.
History. (§ 11 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am §§ 16, 17 ch 245 SLA 1970; am § 21 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 35, 36 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 59 SLA 2012)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2012 amendment, effective September 9, 2012, substituted “child” for “minor”, or similar, throughout; in (a), substituted “child reaches 19 years of age” for “minor becomes 19”, inserted “custody or” preceding “supervision” in two places, added “years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday” following “supervision past 19”; in (b), inserted “the department has complied with the requirements for release of a child under AS 47.14.100(q) and that” following “(a) of this section that”; in (c), twice substituted “period of custody or supervision past 19 years of age and additional one-year periods of custody that do not extend beyond the person’s 21st birthday if continued custody or supervision” for “period of supervision past age 19 if continued supervision”, deleted “between the child’s 18th and 19th birthdays for the purpose of supervising the child,” following “The department may retain jurisdiction over a child”.
Notes to Decisions
Annotator’s notes. —
For cases involving delinquency proceedings under former provisions of this section, see AS 47.12.160 .
Family placement disallowed. —
Trial court did not err in upholding the office of children’s services’ decision not to place the child with her great-grandmother, as the great-grandmother’s home was unsafe and she was unable to provide the necessary care for the child’s special needs. Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015).
Quoted in
In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987); Dara S. v. State, 426 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2018).
Stated in
Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019).
Cited in
State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018).
Collateral references. —
Right of parent to regain custody of child after temporary conditional relinquishment of custody. 35 ALR4th 61.
Sec. 47.10.110. Appointment of guardian or custodian.
When, in the course of a proceeding under this chapter, it appears to the court that the welfare of a minor will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian or custodian of the minor’s person, the court may make the appointment. The court shall have a summons issued and served upon the parents of the minor, if they can be found, in a manner and within a time before the hearing that the court considers reasonable. The court may determine whether the father, mother, another suitable person, or the department shall have the custody and control of the minor. If the minor is of sufficient age and intelligence to state desires, the court shall consider them.
History. (§ 12 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 22 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 37 ch 59 SLA 1996)
Notes to Decisions
Relation to pre-existing CINA action. —
When there exists an ongoing child in need of aid (CINA) proceeding, any attempts to appoint a guardian, whether filed pursuant to this section or AS 13.26.101 et seq., must be considered and treated, in all respects, as part of the original CINA case. Father’s right to disqualify a judge was not reinvigorated by the act of raising a guardianship issue in a CINA case, and his participation in the original case without objection to the trial judge waived his right to make a subsequent challenge. Terry S. v. State, 168 P.3d 489 (Alaska 2007).
Termination of parental rights. —
Superior court did not clearly err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests or otherwise err in its consideration of a possible guardianship because it considered the evidence and the children's specific needs and implicitly considered guardianship as an option in its termination order; the superior court wrote detailed factual findings regarding the Office of Children's Services' long history with the children. Dena M. v. State, 442 P.3d 755 (Alaska 2019).
Stated in
C.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
Collateral references. —
39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 19 et seq.
39 C.J.S., Guardian and Ward, §§ 28-35.
Right of infant to select his own guardian. 85 ALR2d 921.
Sec. 47.10.111. Petition for adoption or guardianship of a child in state custody.
- Except as provided under AS 13.26.137(b)(2) and AS 25.23.030(d)(2) , if a person seeks adoption or appointment as legal guardian of a child in state custody under this chapter, the court shall hear the adoption or guardianship proceedings as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child. A person may initiate proceedings for the adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under this chapter by filing with the court a petition
- If a person files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under (a) of this section before the court approves adoption or legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l)(2) , the court shall hold the petition in abeyance until after the court has approved adoption or legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) .
- If a person files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the child is not placed with the person who files the petition at the time the person files the petition, the department shall, not more than 60 days after the petition is filed, submit a permanent plan to the court. The court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) not more than 90 days after the petition is filed.
- A person who files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section does not become a party to the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings. A person who files a petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section may only participate in proceedings under this chapter that concern the person’s petition.
- A parent who has consented to adoption under AS 25.23.060 , who has relinquished parental rights under AS 47.10.089 , or whose parental rights have been terminated under AS 47.10.080(o) or 47.10.088 , is not a party to the adoption or guardianship proceedings under this section.
- Except as provided in this section, the requirements of AS 25.23 apply to a petition for adoption filed under this section, and the requirements of AS 13.26.101 — 13.26.186 apply to a petition for legal guardianship filed under this section.
History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)
Revisor's notes. —
In 2016, cross references to renumbered sections in subsections (a) and (f) were conformed.
Cross references. —
For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.
Effective dates. —
Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect on January 1, 2017.
Editor's notes. —
Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''
Sec. 47.10.112. Proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship.
-
A person seeking the immediate permanent placement of a child in state custody under this chapter may file a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of the child. The court shall hear proceedings related to the proxy as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child. In the case of an Indian child, a proxy for a formal petition for
- adoption preserves the placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) with respect to the person who files the proxy; and
- legal guardianship preserves the placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. 1915(b) with respect to the person who files the proxy.
- A proxy filed under this section does not initiate proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship. A person seeking to adopt a child in state custody must file a petition for adoption as required under AS 25.23. A person seeking to be appointed legal guardian of a child in state custody must file a petition for appointment as required under AS 13.26.101 — 13.26.186 .
- If a person files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the child is not placed with the person who files the proxy at the time the person files the proxy, the department shall, not more than 60 days after the proxy is filed, submit a permanent plan to the court. The court shall hold a hearing to review the permanent plan for the child under AS 47.10.080(l) not more than 90 days after the proxy is filed.
- A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child under this section does not become a party to the child-in- need-of-aid proceedings. A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship may only participate in proceedings under this chapter that concern the person’s proxy.
- A person who files a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship of a child is not entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at public expense.
- A person who receives a proxy for a formal petition for adoption or legal guardianship shall file the proxy with the court.
- The department may adopt regulations to implement this section.
-
In this section,
-
“extended family member”
- means a person who is at least 18 years of age and who is the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, sibling, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, niece, nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent; or
- in the case of an Indian child, has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
-
“proxy for a formal petition” or “proxy” means
- a request by a person who is interested in immediate permanent placement and adoption or legal guardianship of a child, and is an extended family member, member of an Indian child’s tribe, or other Indian family member, made at any court hearing or conveyed to the department by telephone, mail, facsimile, electronic mail, or in person;
- in the case of an Indian child, a request made to the department on behalf of a person described in (A) of this paragraph by
- a proxy for a formal petition, as established by the department by regulation.
-
“extended family member”
- the Indian child’s biological parent, individually or through counsel; or
(ii) the Indian child’s tribe, a tribe in which the Indian child is eligible for enrollment, or a tribe in which the Indian child’s biological parent is a member; or
History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)
Revisor's notes. —
In 2016, in subsection (b) "AS 13.26.101 — 13.26.186 '' was substituted for "AS 13.26.030 — 13.26.085'' to reflect the renumbering of those sections.
Cross references. —
For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.
Effective dates. —
Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect January 1, 2017.
Editor's notes. —
Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''
Sec. 47.10.113. Civil custody proceedings.
- Except as provided in AS 25.24.150(a) , a court shall hear a request to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter as part of the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings relating to the child.
- A person who files a request for an order to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter is not entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at public expense under this section.
- Except as provided in this section, the requirements of AS 25.24.010 — 25.24.180 apply to a request under this section to make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with a minor child in state custody under this chapter.
History. (§ 9 ch 6 4SSLA 2016)
Cross references. —
For provision providing legislative findings and intent, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.
Effective dates. —
Section 9, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, which enacted this section, took effect January 1, 2017.
Editor's notes. —
Under sec. 18, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016, this section applies "to proceedings for adoption or legal guardianship of a child in state custody under AS 47.10 filed on or after January 1, 2017.''
Notes to Decisions
Quoted in
Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).
Sec. 47.10.115. Permanent fund dividend.
- The department shall annually apply for a permanent fund dividend and retain in trust under AS 43.23.015(e) for the benefit of the child the dividend and accrued interest on the dividend if the child is in the custody of the department when the application is due.
-
The department shall distribute the proceeds of a trust under this section
-
to the child when the child
- has reached 21 years of age; or
- is no longer in the custody of the department and has reached at least 18 years of age or is emancipated; or
- when
-
to the child when the child
- [Repealed, § 14 ch 7 4SSLA 2016.]
ordered to do so by the court in the best interest of the child.
History. (§ 7 ch 20 SLA 2006; am § 30 ch 53 SLA 2008; am §§ 7, 14 ch 7 4SSLA 2016)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, rewrote (b); repealed (c).
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
In re Tea ex rel. A.T., 278 P.3d 1262 (Alaska 2012).
Sec. 47.10.120. Support of child.
- When a child in need of aid is committed under this chapter, the court or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 shall, after giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, require that the parent pay to the department in a manner that the court or the child support services agency directs a sum to cover in full or in part the maintenance and care of the child. The support obligation shall be calculated under Rule 90.3(i) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.
- If a parent wilfully fails or refuses to pay the sum fixed, the parent may be proceeded against as provided by law in cases of family desertion and nonsupport.
- The sum collected from a parent under this section shall be directly credited to the general fund of the state.
- [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]
History. (§ 13 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 31 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 141 SLA 1959; am § 23 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 88, 89 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991; am § 38 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 38 SLA 2008)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, inserted “or the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” and “or the child support services agency” in the first sentence of subsection (a), and substituted “require” for “adjudge” in that sentence.
Notes to Decisions
Support of minor until 19 years old. —
This section imposes a duty of support on the parents of an institutionalized “delinquent minor” and under AS 47.10.080 (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1), and (c)(2) and AS 47.10.100(a) and (c) an institutionalized delinquent is a “minor” until the delinquent becomes 19. In re S.C.Y., 736 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1987) (decided under former provisions of AS 47.10.080 and 47.10.100 ).
Cited in
In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991).
Sec. 47.10.130. Detention. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.240.]
Sec. 47.10.140. Temporary detention and detention hearing. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.250.]
Sec. 47.10.141. Runaway and missing minors.
- Upon receiving a written, telephonic, or other request to locate a minor evading the minor’s legal custodian or to locate a minor otherwise missing, a law enforcement agency shall make reasonable efforts to locate the minor and shall immediately complete a missing person’s report containing information necessary for the identification of the minor. As soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after completing the report, the agency shall transmit the report for entry into the Alaska Public Safety Information Network and the National Crime Information Center computer system. The report shall also be submitted to the missing persons information clearinghouse under AS 18.65.620 . As soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after the agency learns that the minor has been located, it shall request that the Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation remove the information from the computer systems.
-
A peace officer shall take into protective custody a minor described in (a) of this section if the minor is not otherwise subject to arrest or detention. Unless (c) of this section applies, when a peace officer takes a minor into protective custody under this subsection,
-
the peace officer shall
- return the minor to the minor’s parent or guardian at the parent’s or guardian’s residence if the residence is in the same community where the minor was found and if the minor’s parent or guardian consents to the return, except that the officer may not use this option if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has experienced physical or sexual abuse in the parent’s or guardian’s household;
- take the minor to a nearby location agreed to by the minor’s parent or guardian if the parent or guardian does not consent to return of the minor under (A) of this paragraph and the officer does not have reasonable cause to believe that the minor has experienced physical or sexual abuse in the parent’s or guardian’s household; or
-
if disposition of the minor is not made under (A) or (B) of this paragraph, take the minor to
- an office specified by the Department of Health and Social Services;
- a program for runaway minors licensed by the department under AS 47.10.310 ;
- a shelter for runaways that has a permit from the department under AS 47.32 that agrees to shelter the minor;
- a facility or contract agency of the department; or
- another suitable location and promptly notify the department if an office specified by the department, a licensed program for runaway minors, a shelter for runaways that will accept the minor, or a facility or contract agency of the department does not exist in the community;
- if the peace officer plans to take the minor to an office, program, shelter, or facility under (1)(C) of this subsection, the peace officer shall give the highest priority to taking the minor to an office, program, shelter, or facility that is semi-secure;
- a minor under protective custody may not be housed in a jail or other detention facility but may be housed in a semi-secure portion of an office, program, shelter, or other facility under (1)(C) of this subsection;
-
the peace officer, immediately upon taking a minor into protective custody, shall
- advise the minor of available mediation services and of the right to social services under AS 47.10.142(b) ; and
- if the identity of the minor’s parent or guardian is known, advise the minor’s parent or guardian that the minor has been taken into protective custody and that counseling services for the minor’s parent or guardian and the minor’s household may be available under AS 47.10.142(b) .
-
the peace officer shall
- A minor may be taken into emergency protective custody by a peace officer and placed into temporary detention in a juvenile detention facility in the local community if there has been an order issued by a court under (j) of this section. A minor detained under this subsection shall be brought before a court on the day the minor is detained, or if that is not possible, within 24 hours after the detention for a hearing to determine the most appropriate placement in the best interests of the minor. A minor taken into emergency protective custody under this subsection may not be detained for more than 24 hours, except as provided under (j) of this section. Emergency protective custody may not include placement of a minor in an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area, nor may an order for protective custody be enforced against a minor who is residing in a licensed program for runaway minors, as defined in AS 47.10.390 .
- If, after investigation of a report of a missing minor, a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that the minor is involuntarily absent from the custody of a custodial parent or guardian, the department shall notify the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the disappearance and shall provide the bureau with a description of the minor. The description of the minor must include, if known, the minor’s full name, date and place of birth, parent’s names, and mother’s maiden name. If the Department of Public Safety has reason to believe that the minor, whether born in this state or not, has been enrolled in a specific school or school district in the state, the department shall also notify the last known school or school district attended in the state by the missing minor of the disappearance. When a person who was listed as a missing minor is found, the Department of Public Safety shall notify the Bureau of Vital Statistics and any school or school district previously informed of the person’s disappearance.
- In the absence of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, an office, program, shelter, or facility, or an employee of an office, program, shelter, or facility, to which a minor is taken by a peace officer for semi-secure custody is not subject to civil or criminal liability based on the minor’s leaving the office, program, shelter, or facility without permission unless the office, program, shelter, or facility is not in compliance with the department’s regulations that set standards for semi-security and the lack of compliance was a material factor in the minor’s being able to leave without permission.
- If a child, without permission, leaves the semi-secure portion of an office, program, shelter, or facility to which the child was taken by a peace officer under (b)(1)(C) of this section, the office, program, shelter, or facility shall immediately notify the department and the nearest law enforcement agency of the identity of the child and the child’s absence. If the same child is again taken into protective custody under (b) of this section and the peace officer knows that the child has previously been reported under this subsection as missing from a semi-secure placement, the peace officer, in addition to taking the appropriate action under (b) of this section, shall report the circumstances and the identity of the child to the department. Within 48 hours after receiving this report, the department shall determine whether to file a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 . If the department decides not to file a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid, the department shall, within seven state working days after receiving the report from the peace officer under this subsection, send to the child’s parents or guardian, as applicable, written notice of its determination not to proceed with the petition, including the reasons on which the determination was based. If the department is unable to obtain a reasonably reliable address for a parent or guardian, the department shall keep a copy of the notice on file and, notwithstanding AS 47.10.093 , release the notice to the child’s parent or guardian on request of the parent or guardian. If the department files a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid, the court shall proceed under AS 47.10.142(d) .
-
If the department files a petition alleging the child is a child in need of aid under AS
47.10.011
(5) because the child is habitually absent from home or refuses available care, the child’s parent or guardian shall attend each hearing held during the child-in-need-of-aid proceedings unless the court excuses the parent or guardian from attendance for good cause. If the child is found to be a child in need of aid, the court may order that the
- child participate in treatment;
- parent or guardian personally participate in treatment reasonably available in the parent or guardian’s community as specified in a plan set out in the court order; and
- child and the parent or guardian comply with other conditions set out in the court order.
- If the court orders a minor’s parent or guardian to participate in the treatment under (g) of this section, the court may also order the parent or guardian to use available insurance or another resource to cover the treatment, or to pay for the treatment if other coverage is unavailable.
- If the parent or guardian fails to attend a hearing as required by the court under (g) of this section, the hearing shall proceed without the presence of the parent.
-
The court shall issue a written order if the court determines that a minor shall be placed in a juvenile detention facility as a result of violating a court order issued under AS
47.10.080(c)(1)
or
47.10.142(f)
. An order issued under this subsection
- must include a finding of probable cause that the minor is a runaway in wilful violation of a court order and identify the court order the minor has violated;
- must specify the factual basis for determining that there is reasonable cause to believe that the minor has violated a court order;
- must describe how the minor’s current situation poses a severe and imminent risk to the minor’s life or safety;
- must include findings of fact to support a determination that there is not an appropriate, less restrictive alternative to placing the minor in a juvenile detention facility available, with due consideration to the best interests of the minor;
- must include a plan for the minor’s release from the juvenile detention facility in the least amount of time necessary, not to exceed seven days unless otherwise specified by the court; and
- may not be renewed or extended.
-
In this section,
- “law enforcement agency” has the meaning given in AS 12.36.090 ;
- “semi-secure” means operated according to standards that may be established by the department in regulations that are designed to require a level of security that will reasonably ensure that, if a minor leaves without permission, the minor’s act of leaving will be immediately noticed;
- “temporary secure juvenile holding area” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 .
History. (§ 2 ch 42 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 72 SLA 1988; am §§ 1, 2 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 4 ch 202 SLA 1990; am § 13 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 39, 40 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 3 — 6 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 8 SLA 1997; am §§ 37, 38 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 20 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 15 — 17 ch 16 SLA 2021)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 1996, subsection (b) was rewritten to reconcile amendments made by § 39, ch. 59, SLA 1996 and § 3, ch. 120, SLA 1996. Subsections (e)-(i) were enacted as (f)-(j), respectively, and relettered in 1996, at which time former (e) was relettered as (j) and internal references in subsections (f), (h), and (i) were conformed.
Subsection (j) was enacted as (k). Relettered in 2021, at which time former subsection (j) was relettered as subsection (k).
Cross references. —
For records of missing children, see AS 18.50.315 .
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in item (b)(1)(C)(iii).
The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, in (c), in the first sentence substituted “juvenile detention facility” for “juvenile detention home” and “(k) [now (j)] of this section” for “a finding of probable cause that (1) the minor is a runaway in willful violation of a valid court order issued under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) , 47.10.142(f) , AS 47.12.120(b)(1) or (3), or 47.12.250 (d), (2) the minor’s current situation poses a severe and imminent risk to the minor’s life or safety, and (3) no reasonable placement alternative exists within the community”, in the third sentence substituted “(k) [now (j)] of this section” for “AS 47.12.250 ” at the end, in the fourth sentence, substituted “an adult correctional facility, an adult jail, or a temporary secure juvenile holding area” for “a jail or a secure facility other than a juvenile detention home”; added (j)(3); added (k) [now (j)].
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999); Estate of Logusak v. City of Togiak, 185 P.3d 103 (Alaska 2008).
Sec. 47.10.142. Emergency custody and temporary placement hearing.
-
The Department of Health and Social Services may take emergency custody of a child upon discovering any of the following circumstances:
- the child has been abandoned as abandonment is described in AS 47.10.013 ;
- the child has been neglected by the child’s parents or guardian, as “neglect” is described in AS 47.10.014 , and the department determines that immediate removal from the child’s surroundings is necessary to protect the child’s life or provide immediate necessary medical attention;
- the child has been subjected to physical harm by a person responsible for the child’s welfare, and the department determines that immediate removal from the child’s surroundings is necessary to protect the child’s life or that immediate medical attention is necessary; or
- the child or a sibling has been sexually abused under circumstances listed in AS 47.10.011 (7).
- The department shall offer available counseling services to the person having legal custody of a minor described in AS 47.10.141 and to the members of the minor’s household if it determines that counseling services would be appropriate in the situation. If, after assessing the situation, offering available counseling services to the legal custodian and the minor’s household, and furnishing appropriate social services to the minor, the department considers it necessary, the department may take emergency custody of the minor.
- When a child is taken into custody under (a) or (b) of this section or when the department is notified of a child’s presence in either a program for runaway children under AS 47.10.300 — 47.10.390 or a shelter for runaway children under AS 47.10.392 — 47.10.399 , the department shall immediately, and in no event more than 24 hours later unless prevented by lack of communication facilities, notify the parents or the person or persons having custody of the child. If the department determines that continued custody is necessary to protect the child, the department shall notify the court of the emergency custody by filing, within 24 hours after custody was assumed, a petition alleging that the child is a child in need of aid. If the department releases the child within 24 hours after taking the child into custody and does not file a child in need of aid petition, the department shall, within 24 hours after releasing the child, file with the court a report explaining why the child was taken into custody, why the child was released, and to whom the child was released.
- The court shall immediately, and in no event more than 48 hours after being notified unless prevented by lack of transportation, hold a temporary custody hearing at which the child, if the child’s health permits, and the child’s parents or guardian, if they can be found, shall be permitted to be present. If present at the hearing, a parent or guardian of the child may request a continuance of the hearing for the purpose of preparing a response to the allegation that the child is a child in need of aid. The court may grant the request on a showing of good cause for why the parent or guardian is not prepared to respond to the allegation. During a continuance, the child remains in the temporary legal custody of the department, except as otherwise provided in this subsection. At the first hearing under this subsection, regardless of whether a continuance is granted, the court shall make a preliminary determination of whether continued placement in the home of the child’s parent or guardian would be contrary to the welfare of the child. If a court determines that continued placement in the home of the child’s parent or guardian would not be contrary to the welfare of the child, the court shall return the authority to place the child to the child’s parent or guardian pending a temporary custody hearing under (e) of this section.
- When the temporary custody hearing is held, the court shall determine whether probable cause exists for believing the child to be a child in need of aid, as defined in AS 47.10.990 . If the court finds that probable cause exists, it shall order the child committed to the department for temporary placement, or order the child returned to the custody of the child’s parents or guardian, subject to the department’s supervision of the child’s care and treatment. The court shall inform the child, and the child’s parents or guardian if they can be found, of the reasons for finding probable cause, authorizing the child’s temporary placement, and, if applicable, finding that continued placement in the home of the child’s parents or guardian would be contrary to the welfare of the child. If the court finds no probable cause, it shall order the child returned to the custody of the child’s parents or guardian.
- When a minor is committed to the department for temporary placement under (e) of this section, the court order shall specify the terms, conditions, and duration of placement. If the court orders the minor returned to the custody of the minor’s parents or guardian under (e) of this section after a hearing held on a petition filed under AS 47.10.141(f) , the court shall specify the terms and conditions that must be followed by the minor and the minor’s parents or guardian. The court shall require the minor to remain in the placement provided by the department and shall clearly state in the order the consequences of violating the order, including detention under AS 47.10.141(c) .
- [Repealed, § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003.]
- Within 12 months after a child is committed to the department under this section, the court shall review the placement plan and actual placement of the child under AS 47.10.080(l) .
- When the department takes emergency custody of a child under this section or a court orders a child committed to the department for temporary placement under this section, the department shall, to the extent feasible and consistent with the best interests of the child, place the child according to the criteria specified under AS 47.14.100(e) . A supervisor at the department shall certify in writing in the case file whether the department has searched for an appropriate placement with an adult family member or family friend. If the department has not complied with the search requirements under this subsection, the supervisor shall work to ensure that the department completes the search in the shortest time feasible if it is consistent with the best interests of the child.
History. (§ 3 ch 100 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 24 ch 63 SLA 1977; am § 2 ch 104 SLA 1982; am §§ 6, 7 ch 39 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 6 ch 117 SLA 1990; am §§ 14, 15 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 41, 42 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 7 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 5 ch 94 SLA 1997; am §§ 39 — 41 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 45 SLA 2000; am § 74 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 1, 2 ch 117 SLA 2004; am § 8 ch 7 4SSLA 2016; am § 13 ch 15 SLA 2018)
Revisor's notes. —
In 1996, in subsection (f), “AS 47.10.141(f) ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.141(g) ” to reflect the 1996 relettering of AS 47.10.141(g) .
Cross references. —
For court rules governing emergency custody and temporary custody hearings, see CINA Rules 6 and 10.
For the effect of the 2000 amendment of (d) of this section on Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rules, see sec. 4, ch. 45, SLA 2000 in the 2000 Temporary and Special Acts.
For provision relating to applicability of the 2018 amendment to subsection (i), see sec. 22(a), ch. 15, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For administration, see 7 AAC 50, art. 2.
For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2003 amendment, effective June 3, 2003, repealed subsection (g).
The 2004 amendment, effective June 30, 2004, rewrote subsections (d) and (e), relating to temporary custody and placement hearings.
The 2016 amendment, effective October 24, 2016, added (i).
The 2018 amendment, effective September 5, 2018, in (i) added the last two sentences.
Editor's notes. —
Section 79(b), ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides that the 1998 amendments to subsections (a), (c), and (h) apply to “(1) a case or proceeding that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998;
“(2) an action taken under AS 47.10, AS 47.12, AS 47.17, or AS 47.35 on or after September 14, 1998; and
“(3) a motion that is filed with the court on or after September 14, 1998 in a case or proceeding that was pending in the court before September 14, 1998.”
Subsection (c) of § 79, ch. 99, SLA 1998 provides as follows: “The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude consideration of evidence of conduct or omission of a person that brings a child under the jurisdiction of AS 47.10 or AS 47.12.”
Section 5, ch. 45, SLA 2000 provides that the 2000 amendment to subsection (d) applies to “circumstances in which emergency custody of a child is taken by the state on or after August 9, 2000.”
Section 3, ch. 117, SLA 2004, provides that the 2004 amendment of (d) and (e) of this section applies “to emergency custody and temporary placement hearings under [this chapter] conducted on or after June 30, 2004.”
AS 47.35 was repealed in 2005.
Notes to Decisions
Probable cause. —
In children in need of aid proceedings, probable cause is established where reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person’s belief that the child is in need of aid. In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1998).
No actionable duty in tort. —
In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to the grandparents under AS 47.10.960 ; the grandchild was a child being served and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that this section was the basis of an actionable duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
Dismissal of case. —
In a case in which the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of a mother’s child after receiving reports that the mother’s conduct had placed the child at risk of harm, the superior court did not err by releasing the child from OCS custody and dismissing the case when OCS declined to pursue it. Clementine F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 375 P.3d 39 (Alaska 2016)
Quoted in
D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985); In re E.A.O., 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991); 909 P.2d 360; Amy S. v. State, 440 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2019).
Stated in
Charlotte L. v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 26, 2018); Cora G. v. State, 461 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2020); Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Superior Court, 462 P.3d 1000 (Alaska 2020).
Cited in
State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); R.C. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 760 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1988); Pam R. v. State, 185 P.3d 67 (Alaska 2008); Jennifer L. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 357 P.3d 110 (Alaska 2015); State, Dep't. of Health & Social Servs. v. Michelle P., 411 P.3d 576 (Alaska 2018); Sabrina V. v. State, 442 P.3d 717 (Alaska 2019); Schwier v. Schwier, 446 P.3d 354 (Alaska 2019); Annette H. v. State, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019).
Collateral references. —
Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody. 38 ALR4th 756.
Secs. 47.10.150 — 47.10.180. General power, duty, and authority of the department. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.010 — 47.14.050.]
Sec. 47.10.190. Detention of minors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.240(a).]
Sec. 47.10.200. Releasing juveniles after commitment. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.260.]
Sec. 47.10.210. Youth counsellors. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.270.]
Sec. 47.10.220. Grants-in-aid. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.10.980 and 47.12.980.]
Secs. 47.10.230 — 47.10.260. Care of children. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.100 — 47.14.130.]
Sec. 47.10.265. Youth courts. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.12.400.]
Sec. 47.10.270. [Renumbered as AS 47.10.970.]
Sec. 47.10.280. Purpose of chapter. [Repealed, § 1 ch 152 SLA 1976. For current similar provisions, see AS 47.05.060.]
Sec. 47.10.290. [Renumbered as AS 47.10.990.]
Article 2. Programs for Runaway Minors.
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
Sec. 47.10.300. Powers and duties of the department.
The department shall
- review, inspect, and approve or disapprove for licensing proposed or established programs for runaway minors to ensure the health and safety of minors in the program;
- maintain a register of licensed programs for runaway minors;
- award nonprofit corporations or municipalities grants for the establishment or operation of licensed programs for runaway minors;
- adopt regulations for the administration of AS 47.10.300 — 47.10.390 , including regulations providing for the coordination of services to be provided by licensed programs for runaway minors and by the department.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 35 ch 126 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 107 SLA 1998)
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.
For services related to the decision to place a child, see 7 AAC 56, art. 4.
Collateral references. —
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 36.
Sec. 47.10.310. Licensing of programs for runaway minors.
- A person may not operate a program for runaway minors in the state without a license issued under this section. A person who violates this subsection is guilty of a violation.
-
The department may license a program for runaway minors under AS
47.10.300
—
47.10.390
only if the program
- is operated by a corporation or a municipality; and
- meets the requirements of (c) of this section.
-
A program for runaway minors shall
- explain to a minor who seeks assistance from the program the legal rights and responsibilities of runaway minors and the services and assistance provided for runaway minors by the program and by the state or local municipality;
- upon admission of a minor to the program, attempt to determine why the minor is a runaway and what services may be necessary or appropriate for reuniting the minor with the minor’s family;
- provide or help arrange for the provision of services necessary to promote the health and welfare of a minor in the program and, if appropriate, members of the minor’s family; services may include, but are not limited to, the provision of food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and individual, group, or family counseling;
-
within one state working day after admission of a minor to the program inform the department of a minor in the program
- who claims to be the victim of child abuse or neglect, as defined in AS 47.17.290 ;
- whom an employee of the program has cause to believe has been a victim of child abuse or neglect; or
- whom an employee of the program has reason to believe is evading the supervision of the department, the person to whom the department has entrusted supervision, or the minor’s legal guardian;
- be operated with the goal of reuniting runaway minors with their families, except in cases in which reunification is clearly contrary to the best interest of the minor; and
- maintain adequate staffing and accommodations to ensure physical security and to provide crisis services to minors residing in a facility operated by the program; a program that, as determined by the department, regularly receives state money in an amount that exceeds one-fourth of the program’s costs shall maintain semi-secure portions of its facilities in a proportion that meets regulations established by the department; residents under 18 years of age shall be segregated from residents who are 18 years of age or older.
- A program for runaway minors may provide services for the protection of the health and welfare of a person under 21 years of age who is in need of the services and who is without a place of shelter in which supervision and care of the person are available.
- A program for runaway minors that operates a licensed residential shelter in the state shall provide a shelter with a capacity designated in the license issued under AS 47.10.300 — 47.10.390 .
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 17 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 8 ch 120 SLA 1996; am § 9 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 2010)
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2010 amendment, effective August 2, 2010, added (e).
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Sec. 47.10.320. Residence in runaway minor program facilities.
A runaway minor may maintain residency for a period not exceeding 45 days at a facility operated as part of a licensed program for runaway minors. The minor may maintain residency without the consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor, except that if the court has ordered the minor committed to the custody of the department, written consent of the department is required. The residency may be extended for an additional period of 45 days with the written consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor. A minor may not maintain residency beyond the 90th day following admission to a licensed program for runaway minors without the written consent of the person or agency having custody of the minor and the written consent of the department.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
Sec. 47.10.330. Notice to minor’s legal custodian.
- [Repealed, § 24 ch 33 SLA 1994.]
- The director of a program for runaway minors shall promptly notify a minor’s legal custodian if the minor is released from the program into the custody of a person other than the legal custodian or a person representing the legal custodian.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 24 ch 33 SLA 1994)
Sec. 47.10.340. Confidentiality of records.
Records of a licensed program for runaway minors that identify a minor who has been admitted to or has sought assistance from the program are confidential and are not subject to inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 — 40.25.120 , unless
- after being informed of the minor’s right to privacy, the minor consents in writing to the disclosure of the records;
- the records are relevant to an investigation or proceeding involving child abuse or neglect or a child in need of aid petition; or
- disclosure of the records is necessary to protect the life or health of the minor.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 — 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Sec. 47.10.350. Immunity from liability.
- The officers, directors, and employees of a licensed program for runaway minors are not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission in admitting a minor to the program.
- This section does not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of recklessness or intentional misconduct.
- The officers, directors, and employees of a licensed program for runaway minors are not criminally liable under AS 11.51.130(a)(4) for assisting a minor in the program.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 18 ch 33 SLA 1994)
Sec. 47.10.360. Municipal powers.
Authority to establish and operate a licensed program for runaway minors is granted to municipalities that do not otherwise have that authority.
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988)
Sec. 47.10.390. Definitions.
- “licensed program for runaway minors” means a residential or nonresidential program licensed by the department under AS 47.10.310 ;
-
“runaway minor” means a person under 18 years of age who
- is habitually absent from home; or
- refuses to accept available care;
- “semi-secure” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.141(k) .
History. (§ 4 ch 144 SLA 1988; am § 43 ch 59 SLA 1996; am § 9 ch 120 SLA 1996)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 1996, in paragraph (3), “AS 47.10.141(j) ” was substituted for “AS 47.10.141(e) ” to reflect the 1996 relettering of AS 47.10.141(e) .
In 2021, in paragraph (3), “ AS 47.10.141(k) ” was substituted for “ AS 47.10.141(j) ” to reflect the 2021 relettering of AS 47.10.141(j) .
Article 3. Shelters for Runaway Minors.
Cross references. —
For statement of legislative intent in connection with the enactment of this article, see § 1(a), ch. 33, SLA 1994 in the Temporary and Special Acts.
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
Sec. 47.10.392. Certificate required.
A private residence may not be held out publicly as a shelter for runaway minors unless the residence
- is designated a shelter for runaways by a corporation that is licensed to make the designation under AS 47.32; and
- has a valid permit from the department signifying that designation.
History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 10 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 21 ch 57 SLA 2005)
Administrative Code. —
For specializations, see 7 AAC 50, art. 7.
For administration, see 7 AAC 56, art. 2.
For services related to the decision to place a child, see 7 AAC 56, art. 4.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraph (1).
Sec. 47.10.394. Operation of shelters.
-
A shelter for runaways may not shelter a runaway minor for more than seven days unless the department determines that
- the minor is the subject of exceptional circumstances; or
- another appropriate setting is not available for the minor.
-
The provider of a shelter for runaways shall promptly, but within one state working day, inform the department of a runaway minor in the shelter
- who claims to be the victim of child abuse or neglect;
- whom the provider has reasonable cause to suspect has been a victim of child abuse or neglect; or
- whom the provider has reason to believe is evading the supervision of the department, the person to whom the department has entrusted supervision, or the minor’s legal guardian.
- In this section, “child abuse or neglect” has the meaning given in AS 47.17.290 .
History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 10 ch 120 SLA 1996; am §§ 57, 58 ch 3 SLA 2017)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted “, as defined in AS 47.17.290 ” at the end of (b)(1); added (c).
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Sec. 47.10.396. Confidentiality of records.
If the department requires record keeping by a shelter for runaways or by a corporation that is licensed to designate shelters for runaways, records of the shelter and the corporation that identify a runaway minor who has been sheltered in a shelter for runaways or has sought assistance from a shelter for runaways are confidential and are not subject to inspection or copying under AS 40.25.110 — 40.25.120 unless
- after being informed of the minor’s right to privacy, the minor consents in writing to the disclosure of the records;
- the records are relevant to an investigation or proceeding involving child abuse or neglect or a child in need of aid petition; or
- disclosure of the records is necessary to protect the life or health of the minor.
History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 71 ch 41 SLA 2009)
Revisor’s notes. —
In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 — 40.25.120 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.120.
Effect of amendments. —
The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in the introductory language twice deleted “nonprofit” preceding “corporation”.
Notes to Decisions
Cited in
R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
Sec. 47.10.398. Immunity from liability.
- A person in a shelter for runaways, or in a home for which an application to be designated a shelter for runaways is being considered by a corporation licensed for that purpose by the department, that is operated in a manner that is consistent with AS 47.10.392 — 47.10.399 and regulations adopted under those sections is not criminally liable under AS 11.51.130(a)(4) .
-
Except as provided in (c) of this section, the provider of a shelter for runaways, or of a home for which an application to be designated a shelter for runaways is being considered by a corporation approved for that purpose by the department, that is operated in a manner that is consistent with AS
47.10.392
—
47.10.399
and regulations adopted under those sections and the members of the provider’s household, other than a runaway minor, are not liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission
- in admitting or refusing to admit a runaway minor to the shelter or home; or
- by a runaway minor who is sheltered in the shelter or home.
- The provisions of (b) of this section do not preclude liability for civil damages as a result of recklessness or intentional misconduct.
History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am §§ 11, 12 ch 107 SLA 1998)
Sec. 47.10.399. Definitions.
- “runaway minor” has the meaning given in AS 47.10.390 ;
-
“shelter for runaways” or “shelter for runaway minors” means a private residence whose legal occupant agrees to shelter, with or without compensation, a runaway minor accepted into the residence by the legal occupant and that
- is not simultaneously licensed under AS 47.10.310 as a program for runaway minors;
- has been designated a shelter for runaways by a corporation licensed for that purpose under AS 47.32; and
- has a permit issued by the department under AS 47.32.
History. (§ 19 ch 33 SLA 1994; am § 13 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 22 ch 57 SLA 2005)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in subparagraphs (2)(B) and (2)(C).
Secs. 47.10.400 — 47.10.490. Citizens’ review panel for permanency planning. [Repealed, § 55 ch 59 SLA 1996. For current law, see AS 47.14.200 — 47.14.299.]
Article 4. General Provisions.
Sec. 47.10.960. Civil liability.
- Failure to comply with a provision of this title does not constitute a basis for civil liability for damages.
- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a civil action for common law negligence or an action under AS 09.55.580 on behalf of a child who is injured or dies while in the custody of the state.
History. (§ 42 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 29 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 6 ch 38 SLA 2008)
Effect of amendments. —
The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, rewrote this section.
The 2008 amendment, effective May 23, 2008, added subsection (b).
Notes to Decisions
Action against state not available. —
In grandparents’ suit against the state, alleging negligence in relation to their grandchild’s child-in-need-of-aid proceeding, the state owed no actionable duty to grandparents under this section; the grandchild was a child being served, and the grandparents were precluded from contending in a tort suit that former AS 47.14.240 was the basis of such a duty. McGrew v. State, 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
No special duty of care created. —
Father’s claims that a social worker failed to comply with Child in Need of Aid (CINA) procedures were not actionable because AS 47.10.960 precluded the father from relying on CINA statutes to prove that the social worker or her supervisor owed him any special duty of care. Smith v. Stafford, 189 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2008).
Sec. 47.10.970. Appropriations.
Funds to carry out this chapter shall be provided for in the general appropriation Act of the legislature.
History. (§ 1 art IV ch 145 SLA 1957)
Revisor’s notes. —
Formerly AS 47.10.270 . Renumbered in 1990.
Administrative Code. —
For child foster care payments, see 7 AAC 53, art. 1.
Sec. 47.10.980. Grants-in-aid.
The department may accept grants-in-aid from the federal government or private foundations and may accept other gifts consistent with the purposes of this chapter.
History. (§ 44 ch 59 SLA 1996)
Sec. 47.10.990. Definitions.
In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,
-
“adult family member” means a person who is 18 years of age or older and who is
- related to the child as the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling;
- the child’s sibling’s legal guardian or parent; or
- in the case of an Indian child, an extended family member as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
- “care” means to provide for the physical, mental, and social needs of the child;
-
“child” means a person who is
- under 18 years of age;
- 19 years of age if that person was under 18 years of age at the time that a proceeding under this chapter was commenced; and
- under 21 years of age if that person is committed to the custody of the department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) or (v);
- “child in need of aid” means a child found to be within the jurisdiction of the court under AS 47.10.010 and 47.10.011 ;
- “commissioner” means the commissioner of health and social services;
- “court” means the superior court of the state;
- “custodian” means a natural person 18 years of age or older to whom a parent or guardian has transferred temporary physical care, custody, and control of the child for a period of time;
- “department” means the Department of Health and Social Services;
- “domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990 ;
-
“family member” means a person of any age who is
- related to the child as the child’s grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling;
- the child’s sibling’s legal guardian or parent; or
- in the case of an Indian child, an extended family member as defined in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
- “family support services” means the services and activities provided to children and their families, including those provided by the community, a church, or other service organization, both to prevent removal of a child from the parental home and to facilitate the child’s safe return to the family; “family support services” may include counseling, substance abuse treatment, mental health services, assistance to address domestic violence, visitation with family members, parenting classes, in-home services, temporary child care services, and transportation;
- “foster care” means care provided by a person or household under a foster home license required under AS 47.32;
- “gravely disabled” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
- “guardian” means a natural person who is legally appointed guardian of the child by the court;
- “hazardous volatile material or substance” has the meaning given in AS 47.37.270 ;
- “Indian child” has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
- “Indian child’s tribe” has the meaning given in 25 U.S.C. 1903;
- “infant” means a child who is less than 21 days of age;
- “intoxicant” means a substance that temporarily diminishes a person’s control over mental or physical powers, including alcohol, controlled substances under AS 11.71, and a hazardous volatile material or substance misused by inhaling its vapors;
- “juvenile detention facility ” has the meaning given in AS 47.12.990 ;
- “mental health professional” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 , except that, if the child is placed in another state by the department, “mental health professional” also includes a professional listed in the definition of “mental health professional” in AS 47.30.915 who is not licensed to practice by a board of this state but is licensed by a corresponding licensing authority to practice in the state in which the child is placed;
- “mental illness” has the meaning given in AS 47.30.915 ;
- “mental injury” has the meaning given in AS 47.17.290 ;
- “near fatality” means physical injury or other harm, as certified by a physician, caused by an act or omission that created a substantial risk of death;
- “out-of-home care provider” means a foster parent or relative other than a parent with whom the child is placed;
- “parent” means the biological or adoptive parent of the child;
-
“permanency hearing” means a hearing
- designed to reach a decision in a case concerning the permanent placement of a child under AS 47.10; and
- at which the direction of the case involving the child is determined;
- “physical injury” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
- “reasonable efforts” means, with respect to family support services required under AS 47.10.086 , consistent attempts made during a reasonable time period and time-limited services;
- “reasonable time” means a period of time that serves the best interests of the child, taking in account the affected child’s age, emotional and developmental needs, and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments;
- “secure residential psychiatric treatment center” has the meaning given “residential psychiatric treatment center” in AS 47.32.900 ;
- “serious physical injury” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
- “sexual abuse” means the conduct described in AS 11.41.410 — 11.41.460 ; conduct constituting “sexual exploitation” as defined in AS 47.17.290 , and conduct prohibited by AS 11.66.100 — 11.66.150 ;
- “support” has the meaning given in AS 11.51.120(b) .
History. (§ 1 art I ch 145 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 110 SLA 1967; am §§ 5, 6 ch 27 SLA 1970; am §§ 27 — 28 ch 63 SLA 1977; am §§ 91, 92 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 18 ch 57 SLA 1991; am § 7 ch 72 SLA 1993; am § 15 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 52 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 45 ch 59 SLA 1996; am §§ 43 — 45, 69 ch 99 SLA 1998; am § 14 ch 107 SLA 1998; am §§ 23, 24 ch 57 SLA 2005; am §§ 30, 31 ch 64 SLA 2005; am § 6 ch 1 SLA 2008; am § 3 ch 80 SLA 2010; am §§ 10 — 12 ch 6 4SSLA 2016 ch 6 4SSLA 2016; am § 18 ch 16 SLA 2021)
Revisor’s notes. —
Formerly AS 47.20.290 . Renumbered in 1990. Reorganized in 1984 to alphabetize the terms defined and again in 1986, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2005, 2008, and 2016 to maintain alphabetical order. Section 15, ch. 113, SLA 1994 added a new paragraph (13) that was not set out because it duplicated a definition of “victim” enacted in 1991 and repealed in 1996.
Cross references. —
For provision providing legislative findings and intent for the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 1, ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.
For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 6, 4SSLA 2016 (HB 374) which added the 2016 amendments to this section, see 2016 House Journal 974 — 976.
Effect of amendments. —
The first 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, in paragraph (16) [now (19)] added the language beginning “, except that” to the end of the paragraph and added paragraphs (28) — (31) [now (1), (10), (22), and (23) respectively].
The second 2005 amendment, effective July 2, 2005, updated a section reference in paragraphs (10) [now (12)] and (24) [now (29)] and inserted “ ‘residential psychiatric treatment center’ ” in paragraph (24) [now (29)].
The 2008 amendment, effective May 11, 2008, added paragraph (32)