Revisor’s notes. —

The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1985 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982, and in 1985, 1990, 2002, 2012, and 2019 to make other, minor word changes.

Collateral references. —

Powell and Rohan, Powell on Real Property (Matthew Bender).

Real Estate Tax Digest (Matthew Bender).

Lawrence D. Cherkis, Collier Real Estate Transactions and the Bankruptcy Code (Matthew Bender).

Patrick J. Rohan, Real Estate Financing — Text, Forms, Tax Analysis (Matthew Bender).

Karl B. Holtschue, Purchase and Sale of Real Property (Matthew Bender).

Backman and Thomas, A Practical Guide to Disputes Between Adjoining Landowners — Easements (Matthew Bender).

Steven A. Cozen, Insuring Real Property (Matthew Bender).

Thomas V. Glynn, Federal Taxes Affecting Real Estate (Matthew Bender).

Chapter 03. Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.

Notes to Decisions

Refund of excess rent paid when housing deteriorated. —

The legislature prospectively recognized the theory that tenants are entitled to a refund of rent actually paid in excess of the reasonable rental value of housing units in deteriorated condition in the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Zeller v. Poor, 577 P.2d 695 (Alaska 1978).

Stated in

Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).

Collateral references. —

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 1 et seq.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 1 et seq.

Patrick J. Rohan, Current Leasing Law and Techniques: Forms (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Purposes and Rules of Construction.

Sec. 34.03.010. Purpose and construction.

  1. This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
  2. The underlying purposes and policies of this chapter are to
    1. simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing the rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant;
    2. encourage landlord and tenant to maintain and improve the quality of housing; and
    3. make uniform the law among those states that enact it.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

This chapter constitutes a basic reform of landlord-tenant law, according tenants previously unrecognized rights by recognizing the contractual nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Harmonizing with forcible entry and detainer statutes. —

As a matter of statutory construction, this chapter should be harmonized with the forcible entry and detainer statutes. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Forcible entry and detainer procedures may be used where not conflicting. See McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Preemption by federal law. —

Because federal law and its imposition of the duty of maintenance on the homebuyer under a home ownership opportunity program directly conflicts with the Landlord Tenant Act’s imposition of that duty on the landlord, the state legislation could not control this aspect of a mutual help and occupancy agreement, and the trial court erred in ruling that the duty of maintenance lay with the housing authority. Interior Regional Hous. Auth. v. James, 989 P.2d 145 (Alaska 1999).

Defenses. —

Defenses available under this chapter may be asserted in forcible entry and detainer proceedings. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

If this chapter’s defenses were not available in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, litigants would be faced with a situation in which the plaintiff, by choosing the statutory section under which to proceed, could limit the tenant’s right to assert defenses. This would clearly defeat this chapter’s express purpose to “. . . simplify, clarify, modernize and revise the law governing the rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant.” McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Resort to forcible entry and detainer action. —

Landlord’s conduct, in accepting late rental payments with knowledge of the tenants’ defaults, did not bar resort to the institution of a forcible entry and detainer action. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Cited in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000); DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007); Wooten v. Hinton, 202 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2009); Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009); Kinnan v. Sitka Counseling, 349 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2015).

Article 2. Rental Agreements.

Sec. 34.03.020. Terms and conditions of rental agreement.

  1. The landlord and tenant may include in a rental agreement clauses and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or by law, including rent, terms of agreement, and other provisions governing the rights and obligations of the parties.
  2. In the absence of agreement, the tenant shall pay as rent the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit.
  3. Rent shall be payable without demand or notice at the time and place agreed upon by the parties.  Unless otherwise agreed, rent is payable at the dwelling unit. Unless otherwise agreed, rent is payable at the beginning of any term of one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly installments.  Unless otherwise agreed, rent shall be uniformly apportionable from day to day and shall be paid on the date the periodic tenancy begins and payable on or before the same date of each and every month thereafter until the tenancy terminates.
  4. Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the tenancy shall be week to week in the case of a tenant who pays weekly rent, and in all other cases month to month.
  5. If required by the landlord, the landlord and the tenant shall include within the rental agreement, incorporate by reference in the rental agreement, or add as a separate attachment to the rental agreement a premises condition statement, setting out the condition of the premises, including fixtures but excluding reference to any of the other contents of the premises, and, if applicable, a contents inventory itemizing or describing all of the furnishings and other contents of the premises and specifying the condition of each of them. In the premises condition statement and contents inventory, the landlord and tenant shall describe the premises and its contents at the commencement of the term of the period of the occupancy covered by the rental agreement. When signed by the landlord and tenant, the premises condition statement and contents inventory completed under this subsection become part of the rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 13 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 1 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the 2014 changes to (e) of this section made in that act “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Notes to Decisions

Month-to-month tenancies constitute a special class, not necessarily governed by all provisions of this chapter. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Term “rental agreement” not used in connection with month-to-month tenancies. —

While “rental agreement” is defined in AS 34.03.360 as “all agreements . . . embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit . . .,” the term “rental agreement” is not used in this chapter in connection with month-to-month tenancies. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Subsection (d) fixes a month-to-month tenancy, in absence of agreement by the parties to a different term in the rental agreement, if rent is paid on a monthly basis. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Applied in

Vozar v. Francis, 579 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618 (Alaska 2010).

Collateral references. —

Tenant’s agreement to indemnify landlord against all claims as including losses resulting from landlord’s negligence. 4 ALR4th 798.

Applicability of exculpatory clause in lease to lessee’s damages resulting from defective original design or construction. 30 ALR4th 971.

Waiver or estoppel as to notice requirement for exercising option to renew or extend lease. 32 ALR4th 452.

Sufficiency as to parties giving or receiving notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 34 ALR4th 857.

Death of lessee as terminating of lease. 42 ALR4th 963.

Express or implied restriction on lessee’s use of residential property for business purposes. 46 ALR4th 496.

Sec. 34.03.030. Effect of unsigned or undelivered rental agreement.

  1. If the landlord does not sign and deliver a written rental agreement signed and delivered to the landlord by the tenant, acceptance of rent without reservation by the landlord gives the rental agreement the same effect as if it had been signed and delivered by the landlord.
  2. If the tenant does not sign and deliver a written rental agreement signed and delivered to the tenant by the landlord, acceptance of possession and payment of rent without reservation gives the rental agreement the same effect as if it had been signed and delivered by the tenant.
  3. If a rental agreement given effect by the operation of this section provides for a term longer than one year, it is effective only for one year.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Sec. 34.03.040. Prohibited provisions in rental agreements.

  1. A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant or landlord
    1. agrees to waive or to forego rights or remedies under this chapter;
    2. authorizes a person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of the rental agreement;
    3. agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord or tenant arising under the law or to indemnify the landlord or tenant for that liability or the costs connected with it;
    4. agrees to pay the landlord’s attorney fees.
  2. A provision prohibited by (a) or (c) of this section included in a rental agreement is unenforceable.  If a landlord or tenant wilfully uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by the person to be prohibited, the other party may recover the amount of actual damages.
  3. A rental agreement between a mobile home park operator and a mobile home park tenant may not
    1. deny a tenant of a mobile home park the right to sell the tenant’s mobile home within the park or require the resident or tenant to remove the mobile home from the park solely on the basis of the sale of the mobile home, nor may the mobile home park operator make a rule or regulation to the same effect, except that, within 30 days of written notice by the tenant of intent to sell the mobile home to a specified buyer, the operator or owner of the mobile home park may refuse to allow a sale for the following reasons:
      1. the mobile home is in violation of laws or ordinances relating to health, safety or welfare;
      2. the proposed buyer refuses to assume the same terms as are in the existing rental agreement; or
      3. the proposed buyer does not have sufficient financial responsibility;
    2. require a tenant to provide permanent improvements that become a part of the real property of the mobile home park owner or operator as a condition of tenancy in the mobile home park; however, the rental agreement may require the tenant to maintain existing conditions in the park;
    3. require payment of any type of vendor or transfer fee either by a tenant in the mobile home park desiring to sell the tenant’s mobile home to another party or by any party desiring to purchase a mobile home from a tenant in the park as a condition of tenancy; however, this paragraph does not prevent the owner or operator from applying normal park standards to prospective tenants before granting or denying tenancy or from charging a reasonable vendor or transfer fee for services actually performed if the tenant is notified in writing of the amount of those charges before agreeing to move into the park; or
    4. require the prospective tenant to pay a fee to enter the mobile home park or a tenant to pay a fee to transfer the tenant’s mobile home to another location outside the park; however, this paragraph does not prevent the owner or operator from charging a reasonable fee for services actually performed and if the tenant is notified in writing of the amount of those charges before agreeing to move into the park.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 1, 2 ch 138 SLA 1976)

Notes to Decisions

Right to sue landlord. —

The legislature, in enacting this chapter, has granted to each tenant in the state the right to sue his landlord for violations specified in the act. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Because of the explicit nonwaiver provisions of this section the right to sue under this chapter cannot be prospectively bargained away in a collective bargaining agreement which provides for arbitration. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 34.03.050. Separation of rents and obligations to maintain property forbidden.

A rental agreement, assignment, conveyance, trust deed, or security instrument may not permit the receipt of rent free of the obligation to comply with AS 34.03.100(a) .

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Sec. 34.03.060. Sublease and assignment.

  1. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the tenant may not sublet the premises or assign the rental agreement to another without the landlord’s consent.
  2. The tenant’s right to sublease the premises or assign the rental agreement to another shall be conditioned on obtaining the landlord’s consent, which may be withheld only upon the grounds specified in (d) of this section; no further restrictions on sublease or assignment are enforceable.
  3. When the rental agreement requires the landlord’s consent for sublease or assignment, the tenant may secure one or more persons who are willing to occupy the premises. Each prospective occupant shall make a written offer signed and delivered by the prospective occupant to the landlord, containing the following information on the prospective occupant:
    1. name, age, and present address;
    2. marital status;
    3. occupation, place of employment, and name and address of employer;
    4. number of all other persons who would normally reside with the prospective occupant;
    5. two credit references, or responsible persons who will confirm the financial responsibility of the prospective occupant; and
    6. names and addresses of all landlords of the prospective occupant during the prior three years.
  4. Within 14 days after the written offer has been delivered to the landlord, the landlord may refuse consent to a sublease or assignment by a written rejection signed and delivered by the landlord to the tenant, containing one or more of the following reasonable grounds for rejecting the prospective occupant:
    1. insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility;
    2. number of persons in the household;
    3. number of persons under 18 years of age in the household;
    4. unwillingness of the prospective occupant to assume the same terms as are included in the existing rental agreement;
    5. proposed maintenance of pets;
    6. proposed commercial activity; or
    7. written information signed by a previous landlord, which shall accompany the rejection, setting out abuses of other premises occupied by the prospective occupant.
  5. In the event the written rejection fails to contain one or more grounds permitted by (d) of this section for rejecting the prospective occupant, the tenant may consider the landlord’s consent given, or at the tenant’s option may terminate the rental agreement by a written notice given without unnecessary delay to the landlord at least 30 days before the termination date specified in the notice.
  6. If the landlord does not deliver a written rejection signed by the landlord to the tenant within 14 days after a written offer has been delivered to the landlord by the tenant, the landlord’s consent to the sublease or assignment shall be conclusively presumed.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Assignment without consent is voidable. —

Prohibitions against assignment are a valued right in that they enable the lessor to retain a desirable tenant in possession and give a degree of control over the type of individual or entity which may follow him. An assignment made without the consent of the lessor is voidable at the option of the lessor. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Landlord may waive rights. —

Prohibition against assignment clauses are primarily for the benefit of the lessor and can be waived by him. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

One way by which the lessor can waive a covenant forbidding assignment is by accepting rent from the assignee and permitting the assignee to remain in possession. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Forfeitures for breach by assignment. —

Although forfeitures for breach by assignment have been approved if authorized by the language in the lease, forfeitures are not favored and never enforced in equity unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no denial. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Permitting people with a house trailer to reside on the premises for about 3 months without charging rent is not an act of subletting the premises. Vozar v. Francis, 579 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978).

Collateral references. —

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 887 et seq.

When lessor may withhold consent under unqualified provision in least prohibiting assignment or subletting of leased premises without lessor’s consent. 21 ALR4th 188.

Sublessee’s rights with respect to primary lessee’s option to renew lease. 39 ALR4th 824.

Respective rights in excess rent when landlord relets at higher rent during lessee’s term. 50 ALR4th 403.

Article 3. Landlord Obligations.

Sec. 34.03.070. Security deposits and prepaid rent.

  1. Except as provided in (h) of this section, a landlord may not demand or receive prepaid rent or a security deposit, however denominated, in an amount or value in excess of two months’ periodic rent. This section does not apply to rental units where the rent exceeds $2,000 a month.
  2. Upon termination of the tenancy, property or money held by the landlord as prepaid rent or as a security deposit may be applied to the payment of accrued rent and the amount of damages that the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant’s noncompliance with AS 34.03.120 . The accrued rent and damages must be itemized by the landlord in a written notice mailed to the tenant’s last known address within the time limit prescribed by (g) of this section, together with the amount due the tenant. In this subsection, “damages”
    1. means deterioration of the premises and, if applicable, of the contents of the premises;
    2. does not include deterioration
      1. that is the result of normal wear and tear;
      2. caused by the landlord’s failure to prepare for expected conditions or by the landlord’s failure to comply with an obligation of the landlord imposed by this chapter.
  3. All money paid to the landlord by the tenant as prepaid rent or as a security deposit in a lease or rental agreement shall be promptly deposited by the landlord, wherever practicable, in a trust account in a bank, savings and loan association, or licensed escrow agent, and the landlord shall provide to the tenant the terms and conditions under which the prepaid rent or security deposit or portions of them may be withheld by the landlord. Nothing in this chapter prohibits the landlord from commingling prepaid rents and security deposits in a single financial account; however, the landlord shall separately account for prepaid rent and security deposits received from each tenant. The landlord may not commingle prepaid rent and security deposits with other funds. The landlord may not use money held for one tenant in a trust account to
    1. refund the security deposit of another tenant;
    2. apply to the payment of another tenant’s accrued rent;
    3. apply to damages suffered by the landlord because of another tenant’s noncompliance with AS 34.03.120 .
  4. If the landlord wilfully fails to comply with (b) of this section, the tenant may recover an amount not to exceed twice the actual amount withheld.
  5. This section does not preclude a landlord or tenant from recovering other damages to which either may be entitled under this chapter.
  6. The holder of the landlord’s interest in the premises at the time of the termination of the tenancy is bound by this section.
  7. If the landlord or tenant gives notice that complies with AS 34.03.290 , the landlord shall mail the written notice and refund required by (b) of this section within 14 days after the tenancy is terminated and possession is delivered by the tenant, except the landlord shall have 30 days after the tenancy is terminated to mail the refund if costs are deducted for damages that the landlord has suffered because of the tenant’s noncompliance with AS 34.03.120 . If the tenant does not give notice that complies with AS 34.03.290 , the landlord shall mail the written notice and refund required by (b) of this section within 30 days after the tenancy is terminated, possession is delivered by the tenant, or the landlord becomes aware that the dwelling unit is abandoned. If the landlord does not know the mailing address of the tenant, but knows or has reason to know how to contact the tenant to give the notice required by (b) of this section, the landlord shall make a reasonable effort to deliver the notice and refund to the tenant.
  8. Notwithstanding the limitation on the amount of prepaid rent or security deposit in (a) of this section, a landlord may demand or receive an additional security deposit from a tenant who has a pet on the premises that is not a service animal. The additional security deposit
    1. may not exceed the periodic rent for one month; and
    2. shall be accounted for separately from prepaid rent or a security deposit received under (a) of this section and may be applied only to the amount of damages that are directly related to the pet of the tenant.
  9. In this section,
    1. “normal wear and tear” means deterioration that occurs from the intended use of the rental unit and without negligence, carelessness, accident, misuse, or abuse of the premises or contents by the tenant, members of the household of the tenant, or the invitees or guests of the tenant;
    2. “service animal” means an animal that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks that are directly related to and for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 1, 2 ch 20 SLA 1982; am §§ 14, 15 ch 121 SLA 1994; am §§ 2 — 6 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the 2014 changes to (a) — (c) and (g) made in that act and subsections (h) and (i), added by that act, “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Notes to Decisions

This section regulates only a landlord’s ability to deduct damages and unpaid rent from a tenant’s security deposit, and is not an instruction to a reviewing court as to how to measure the damages the landlord and tenant owe each other; the superior court was under no obligation to demand from the landlord an itemized list of the specific physical harms to her property that the tenant allegedly caused, nor was it barred from reducing the tenant’s damage award by inadequacies in landlord’s notice or itemization of damages. Fyffe v. Wright, 93 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Burton v. Fountainhead Dev., Inc., 393 P.3d 387 (Alaska 2017).

Meaning of subsection (f). —

Subsection (f) is susceptible to the interpretation that the “landlord” responsible to make a refund under subsection (b) does not have to be the one who received the deposit, but can include the one who holds the landlord’s interest at the time of termination of a tenant’s lease. Alaska Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise, 120 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).

Apartment owner who sold the premises and took a second mortgage on them was the “landlord” and liable for tenants’ security deposits, even though he never received them from the purchaser, where he had failed to “terminate” the tenancies of the tenants by giving them notice of his nonjudicial foreclosure. Alaska Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise, 120 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).

Quoted in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000).

Collateral references. —

Landlord-tenant security deposit legislation. 63 ALR4th 901.

Sec. 34.03.080. Disclosure.

  1. The landlord or a person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on behalf of the landlord shall disclose to the tenant in writing at or before the commencement of the tenancy the name and address of
    1. the person authorized to manage the premises; and
    2. an owner of the premises or a person authorized to act for and on behalf of the owner for the purpose of service of process and for the purpose of receiving and receipting for notices and demands.
  2. The information required to be furnished by this section shall be kept current and this section extends to and is enforceable against any successor landlord, owner, or manager.
  3. A person who fails to comply with (a) of this section becomes an agent of each person who is a landlord for the purpose of
    1. service of process and receiving and receipting for notices and demands; and
    2. performing the obligations of the landlord under this chapter and under the rental agreement and expending or making available for the purpose all rent collected from the premises.
  4. A mobile home park operator shall disclose fully in writing all capital improvements that will be required to be made by the tenant including but not limited to skirting or utility hook-ups, before entering into a rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 3 ch 138 SLA 1976)

Sec. 34.03.090. Landlord to supply possession of the dwelling unit.

  1. At the commencement of the term the landlord shall deliver possession of the premises to the tenant in compliance with the rental agreement and AS 34.03.100 . The landlord may, after serving a notice to quit under AS 09.45.100 09.45.105 to a person who is wrongfully in possession,
    1. bring an action for possession against any person wrongfully in possession; and
    2. recover the damages provided in AS 34.03.290 .
  2. The tenant shall acknowledge or verify by the tenant’s signature the accuracy of the premises condition statement and contents inventory prepared under AS 34.03.020(e) . The premises condition statement and contents inventory
    1. may be used by the landlord or tenant as the basis
      1. to determine whether prepaid rent or a security deposit shall be applied to the payment of damages to the premises when authorized by AS 34.03.070(b) ; and
      2. to compute the recovery of other damages to which the parties may be entitled under this chapter; and
    2. is, in an action initiated by a party to recover damages or to obtain other relief to which a party may be entitled under this chapter, presumptive evidence of the condition of the premises and its contents at the commencement of the term of the period of occupancy covered by the rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 16, 17 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 7 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the 2014 changes to (b) of this section made in that act “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Sec. 34.03.100. Landlord to maintain fit premises.

  1. The landlord shall
    1. make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
    2. keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;
    3. maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, kitchen, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord;
    4. provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal;
    5. supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water and heat at all times, insofar as energy conditions permit, except where
      1. the building that includes the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection; or
      2. the premises do not have a well or water provided by a direct public utility connection and the rental agreement specifically states that the duty of the landlord to supply running water or hot water to the premises is waived by the tenant;
    6. if requested by the tenant, provide and maintain locks and furnish keys reasonably adequate to ensure safety to the tenant’s person and property; and
    7. provide smoke detection devices and carbon monoxide detection devices as required under AS 18.70.095 .
  2. A landlord of a single family residence located in an undeveloped rural area or located where public sewer or water service has never been connected is not liable for a breach of (a)(3) or (5) of this section if the dwelling unit at the beginning of the rental agreement did not have running water, hot water, sewage, or sanitary facilities from a private system.
  3. The landlord and tenant of a one- or two-family residence may agree in writing that the tenant perform the landlord’s duties specified in (a)(4), (5), (6), and (7) of this section. A tenant may agree to perform the duties specified in (a)(3) of this section in rental units where the rent exceeds $2,000 a month. They may also agree in writing that the tenant perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, and remodeling, but the tenant may not agree to maintain elevators in good and safe working order. Agreements are allowed under this subsection only if the transaction is entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord.
  4. The landlord and tenant of a dwelling unit other than a single family residence may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling only if
    1. the agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord and is set out in a separate writing signed by the parties and supported by adequate consideration; and
    2. the agreement does not diminish or affect the obligation of the landlord to other tenants in the premises.
  5. The landlord may not treat performance of a separate agreement described in (d) of this section as a condition to an obligation or performance of a rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 3, 4 ch 129 SLA 1988; am § 18 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 7 ch 60 SLA 2004; am § 8 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Cross references. —

For landlord’s duty to provide smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, see AS 18.70.095 .

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the 2014 changes to (a) of this section made in that act “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Notes to Decisions

Landlord tort immunity obsolete. —

The traditional common law rule of landlord tort immunity cannot be squared with the policies which inspired the passing of this act. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).

Expansion of landlord duty. —

The landlord’s duty of care was expanded to align Alaska with other jurisdictions, thus rejecting the traditional common law rule of landlord immunity, as it would be inconsistent with a landlord’s continuing duty to repair premises imposed under this chapter to exempt from tort liability a landlord who fails in this duty. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).

Landlord liability limited. —

Rejection of the general rule of landlord immunity does not make landlords liable as insurers; their duty is to use reasonable care to discover and remedy conditions which present an unreasonable risk of harm under the circumstances. Nor does it mean that questions as to whether a dangerous condition existed in an area occupied solely by the tenant or in a common area, or whether the condition was apparent or hidden are irrelevant, as these are circumstances which must be accounted for in customary negligence analysis. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).

Landlord liability for latent defect. —

Finding in favor of the landlord in the tenant’s action after she fell and sustained a back injury was proper because the jurors could have found that the contractor bore some responsibility for the condition of the stairs. Alternatively, reasonable jurors could have concluded that the contractor was not negligent. Heynen v. Fairbanks, 293 P.3d 470 (Alaska 2013).

Duty is arbitrable. —

The duty to maintain fit premises under a collective bargaining agreement providing for bush housing is one for which a contract remedy is available and is thus arbitrable. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Obligation to remove snow and ice in common areas. —

The primary obligation to remove snow and ice in common areas falls upon the landlord; on leased premises, this duty is the tenant’s. Coburn v. Burton, 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).

Summary judgment in favor of the government was reversed on an Army apartment resident’s Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USCS § 1346, negligence claim because the relevant question under 28 USCS § 2674 was whether a private landlord would owe tenants a duty to keep common areas free of snow and ice (which it would under subsection (a)(2) of this section), not whether a municipality would be liable. Bolt v. United States, 509 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. Alaska 2007).

Paragraph (d)(1) does not establish or apportion duties; it governs landlords’ attempts to shift duties such as the maintenance of common areas to tenants. Coburn v. Burton, 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).

Evidence. —

Superior court erred in not allowing landlord to adduce otherwise competent evidence, including a paragraph of the lease, tending to show that the area of concern was not a “common area” but rather an area “occupied and used” by the tenant. Coburn v. Burton, 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).

Light maintenance aspect of tenant duties. —

The tenant’s duty pertains to activities such as cleaning, ice and snow removal, and other light maintenance activities pertaining to the safety of the premises which do not involve an alteration of the premises, whereas the landlord’s duty relates to the physical state of the premises; this distinction is suggested by the phrase “as the condition of the premises permit” in section AS 34.03.120(a)(1) , which refers to the inherent physical qualities of the premises. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).

Applied in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000).

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009); Yong Kang v. Mullins, 420 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2018); Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000); DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007); Punches v. McCarrey Glen Apts., LLC, 480 P.3d 612 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation requiring compliance with housing standards before rent increase or possession by new tenant. 20 ALR4th 1246.

Strict liability of landlord for injury or death of tenant or third person caused by defect in premises leased for residential use. 48 ALR4th 638.

Violation of statute or ordinance requiring landlord to furnish specified facilities or services as ground of liability for injury resulting from tenant’s attempt to deal with deficiency. 63 ALR4th 883.

Sec. 34.03.110. Limitation of liability.

  1. Unless otherwise agreed, a landlord who conveys premises that include a dwelling unit subject to a rental agreement in a good faith sale to a bona fide purchaser is relieved of liability under the rental agreement and this chapter as to events occurring subsequent to written notice to the tenant of the conveyance. However,
    1. the landlord remains liable to the tenant for the property and money to which the tenant is entitled under AS 34.03.070 , unless the property and money are specifically assigned to and accepted by the purchaser; and
    2. the provisions of
      1. a premises condition statement prepared under AS 34.03.020(e) between the landlord and the tenant remains valid as between the purchaser and the tenant until a new premises condition statement is entered into between the purchaser and the tenant; and
      2. a contents inventory prepared under AS 34.03.020(e) between the landlord and the tenant remains valid as between the purchaser and the tenant for the contents remaining on the premises after the conveyance of the premises until a new contents inventory is entered into between the purchaser and the tenant.
  2. Unless otherwise agreed, a manager of premises that include a dwelling unit is relieved of liability under the rental agreement and this chapter as to events occurring after written notice to the tenant of the termination of the person’s management.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 19 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Apartment owner who sold the premises and took a second mortgage on them was the “landlord” and liable for tenants’ security deposits, even though he never received them from the purchaser, where he had failed to “terminate” the tenancies of the tenants by giving them notice of his nonjudicial foreclosure. Alaska Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise, 120 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).

Sec. 34.03.115. [Renumbered as AS 34.05.025.]

Article 4. Tenant Obligations.

Sec. 34.03.120. Tenant obligations.

  1. The tenant
    1. shall keep that part of the premises occupied and used by the tenant as clean and safe as the condition of the premises permit;
    2. shall dispose all ashes, rubbish, garbage, and other waste from the dwelling unit in a clean and safe manner;
    3. shall keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant as clean as their condition permits;
    4. shall use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, kitchen, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, in the premises;
    5. may not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair, or remove a part of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do so;
    6. may not unreasonably disturb, or permit others on the premises with the tenant’s consent to unreasonably disturb, a neighbor’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises;
    7. shall maintain smoke detection devices and carbon monoxide detection devices as required under AS 18.70.095 ;
    8. may not, except in an emergency when the landlord cannot be contacted after reasonable effort to do so, change the locks on doors of the premises without first securing the written agreement of the landlord and, immediately after changing the locks, providing the landlord a set of keys to all doors for which locks have been changed; in an emergency, the tenant may change the locks and shall, within five days, provide the landlord a set of keys to all doors for which locks have been changed and written notice of the change;
    9. may not unreasonably engage in conduct, or permit others on the premises to engage in conduct, that results in the imposition of a fee under a municipal ordinance adopted under AS 29.35.125 ; and
    10. may not allow the number of individuals occupying the premises to exceed the number allowed by applicable law, by a covenant limiting the landlord’s use of the premises, or the rental agreement.
  2. The tenant may not knowingly engage at the premises in prostitution, an illegal activity involving a place of prostitution, an illegal activity involving alcoholic beverages, an illegal activity involving gambling or promoting gambling, an illegal activity involving a controlled substance, or an illegal activity involving an imitation controlled substance, or knowingly permit others in the premises to engage in one or more of those activities at the rental premises.
  3. When terminating the tenancy, the tenant shall leave the premises in substantially the same condition, except for normal wear and tear, as the condition of the premises at the beginning of the tenancy, including, in the landlord’s discretion, professionally cleaning the carpets if the carpets were professionally cleaned immediately before the tenancy began. In this subsection, “normal wear and tear” has the meaning given in AS 34.03.070 .

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 5 ch 129 SLA 1988; am §§ 20, 21 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 3 ch 111 SLA 2002; am § 8 ch 60 SLA 2004; am §§ 9, 10 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Cross references. —

For tenant’s duties related to smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, see AS 18.70.095 .

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the 2014 changes to (a) of this section made in that act, and subsection (c), added by the act, “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Notes to Decisions

Light maintenance aspect of tenant duties. —

The tenant’s duty pertains to activities such as cleaning, ice and snow removal, and other light maintenance activities pertaining to the safety of the premises which do not involve an alteration of the premises, whereas the landlord’s duty relates to the physical state of the premises; this distinction is suggested by the phrase “as the condition of the premises permit” in paragraph (a)(1), which refers to the inherent physical qualities of the premises. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).

Obligation to remove snow and ice in common areas. —

The primary obligation to remove snow and ice in common areas falls upon the landlord; on leased premises, this duty is the tenant’s. Coburn v. Burton, 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).

Cleanup within 10 days of notice of noncompliance. —

Where the tenants cleaned up the premises within 10 days from the date they were served with notice of noncompliance with the rental agreement, the rental agreement could not be terminated for that reason. Vozar v. Francis, 579 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978).

Evidence. —

Superior court erred in not allowing landlord to adduce otherwise competent evidence, including a paragraph of the lease, tending to show that the area of concern was not a “common area” but rather an area “occupied and used” by the tenant. Coburn v. Burton, 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).

Stated in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000).

Cited in

Fyffe v. Wright, 93 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2004).

Collateral references. —

Time within which tenant’s right to remove trade fixtures must be exercised. 109 ALR5th 421.

Sec. 34.03.130. Rules and regulations.

  1. A landlord may adopt rules and regulations, which shall be posted prominently on the premises, concerning the tenant’s use and occupancy of the premises.  A rule or regulation is enforceable against the tenant only if
    1. its purpose is to promote the convenience, safety, health, or welfare of the tenants in the premises, preserve the landlord’s property from abusive use, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities held out for the tenants generally;
    2. it is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted;
    3. it applies to all tenants in the premises in a fair manner;
    4. it is sufficiently explicit in its prohibition, direction, or limitation of the tenant’s conduct to fairly inform the tenant of what the tenant must or must not do to comply;
    5. it is not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord; and
    6. the tenant has notice of it at the time the tenant enters into the rental agreement.
  2. A rule or regulation adopted after the tenant enters into the rental agreement is enforceable against the tenant if reasonable notice of its adoption is given to the tenant and it does not work a substantial modification of the rental agreement.
  3. A mobile home park operator may determine by rule or regulation the style or quality of the equipment, including but not limited to underskirting and tie-downs, to be purchased by the tenant from the vendor of the tenant’s choice; however, the operator may not require that the equipment be purchased from the operator.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 4 ch 138 SLA 1976)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Osness v. Dimond Estates, 615 P.2d 605 (Alaska 1980).

Sec. 34.03.140. Access.

  1. The tenant may not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the premises, make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, supply necessary or agreed services, remove personal property belonging to the landlord that is not covered by a written rental agreement, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors.
  2. The landlord may enter the dwelling unit without the consent of the tenant in the case of emergency.
  3. A landlord may not abuse the right of access or use it to harass the tenant.  Except in case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, the landlord shall give the tenant at least 24 hours notice of intention to enter and may enter only at reasonable times and with the tenant’s consent.
  4. The landlord does not have a right of access to the dwelling unit
    1. except
      1. as permitted by this section;
      2. by court order; or
      3. as permitted by AS 34.03.230(b) ; or
    2. unless the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 22, 23 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Taylor v. Gill Street Inv., 743 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1987); Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).

Quoted in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 34.03.150. Tenant to use and occupy.

Unless otherwise agreed, the tenant shall occupy the dwelling unit only as a dwelling unit. The rental agreement shall require that the tenant notify the landlord of an anticipated extended absence from the premises in excess of seven days; however, the notice shall be given as soon as reasonably possible after the tenant knows the absence will exceed seven days.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Article 5. Tenant Remedies.

Sec. 34.03.160. Noncompliance by the landlord: General.

  1. Except as provided in this chapter, if there is a material noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or a noncompliance with AS 34.03.100 materially affecting health and safety, the tenant may deliver a written notice to the landlord specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and specifying that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than 20 days after receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied in 10 days, and the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice subject to the provisions of this section.  If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise, and the landlord remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement will not terminate.  In the absence of due care by the landlord, if substantially the same act or omission that constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six months, the tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon at least 10 days written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement.  The tenant may not terminate for a condition caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of the tenant’s family, or other person on the premises with the tenant’s consent.
  2. Except as provided in this chapter, the tenant may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or AS 34.03.100 , 34.03.210 , or 34.03.280 .
  3. The remedy provided in (b) of this section is in addition to a right of the tenant under (a) of this section.
  4. If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent or security deposits recoverable by the tenant under AS 34.03.070 .

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000); Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Stated in

McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983); DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007); Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.03.170. Failure to deliver possession.

  1. If the landlord fails to deliver possession of the dwelling unit to the tenant as provided in AS 34.03.090 , rent abates until possession is delivered and the tenant may
    1. upon at least 10 days written notice to the landlord terminate the rental agreement and upon termination the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security deposits; or
    2. demand performance of the rental agreement by the landlord and if the tenant elects, maintain an action for possession of the dwelling unit against the landlord and any person wrongfully in possession and recover the damages sustained.
  2. If a person’s failure to deliver possession is wilful and not in good faith, an aggrieved tenant may recover from that person an amount not to exceed one and one-half times the actual damages.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007); Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.03.180. Wrongful failure to supply heat, water, hot water or essential services.

  1. If, contrary to the rental agreement or AS 34.03.100 , the landlord deliberately or negligently fails to supply running water, hot water, heat, sanitary facilities, or other essential services, the tenant may give written notice to the landlord specifying the breach and may immediately
    1. procure reasonable amounts of hot water, running water, heat, sanitary facilities, and essential services during the period of the landlord’s noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent;
    2. recover damages based on the diminution in the fair rental value of the dwelling unit; or
    3. procure reasonable substitute housing during the period of the landlord’s noncompliance, in which case the tenant is excused from paying rent for the period of the landlord’s noncompliance and, in addition, may recover the amount by which the actual and reasonable cost exceeds rent.
  2. A tenant who proceeds under this section may not proceed under AS 34.03.160 as to that breach.
  3. Rights do not arise under this section until the tenant has given written notice to the landlord.  Rights do not arise under this section if the condition was caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of the tenant’s family, or other person on the premises with the tenant’s consent.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990, “or ” was substituted for “of ” preceding “AS 34.03.100 ” in (a) of this section to correct a manifest error in ch. 10, SLA 1974.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983); Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000); DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976); Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 34.03.190. Landlord’s noncompliance as defense to action for possession or rent.

  1. In an action for possession based upon nonpayment of the rent or in an action for rent when the tenant is in possession, the tenant may counterclaim for any amount recoverable under the rental agreement or this chapter. If a counterclaim is made, the court shall determine whether the defense is supported by the evidence and, if so, may order that
    1. the periodic rent is to be reduced to reflect the diminution in value of the dwelling unit during the period of noncompliance;
    2. the action be continued for a reasonable time to enable the landlord to cure the violation;
    3. the tenant pay into court all or part of the rent accrued and thereafter accruing; if the violations have not been cured within six months, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant and either refund to the defendant all money deposited or use the money for the purpose of making the dwelling fit for human habitation; if the violations have been cured, the court shall determine the amount due to each party; the party to whom a net amount is owed shall be paid first from the money paid into the court, and the balance by the other party; if no rent remains due after application of this section, judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the action for possession;
    4. the tenant vacate the dwelling during the making of necessary repairs, when the repairs cannot be made without vacation of the premises, the tenant to be reinstated upon completion of the repairs.
  2. In an action for rent where the tenant is not in possession, the tenant may counterclaim as provided in (a) of this section but the tenant is not required to pay rent into court.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Right to full and fair litigation. —

Regardless of the outcome of the forcible entry and detainer action and the determinations made by the judge, a tenant should have the right to a full and fair litigation of his or her damages claims; the tenant should be free to litigate these claims anew in a separate action before a jury. Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).

Stated in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.03.200. Fire or casualty damage.

  1. If the dwelling unit or premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or casualty to the extent that enjoyment of the dwelling unit is substantially impaired, the tenant shall
    1. immediately vacate the premises and notify the landlord of the intention to terminate the rental agreement, in which case the rental agreement terminates as of the date of vacating; or
    2. if continued occupancy is lawful, vacate the part of the dwelling unit rendered unusable by the fire or casualty, in which case the tenant’s liability for rent is reduced in proportion to the diminution in the fair rental value of the dwelling unit.
  2. If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security deposits recoverable under AS 34.03.070 .  Accounting for rent in the event of termination or apportionment shall occur as of the date of the casualty.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.03.210. Tenant’s remedies for landlord’s unlawful ouster, exclusion, or diminution of service.

If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from the premises or wilfully diminishes services to the tenant by interrupting or causing the interruption of electric, gas, water, sanitary, or other essential service to the tenant, the tenant may recover possession or terminate the rental agreement and, in either case, recover an amount not to exceed one and one-half times the actual damages. If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security deposits recoverable by the tenant under AS 34.03.070 .

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Simple eviction failed to support retaliatory eviction claim. —

Court declined to expose a landlord to the enhanced remedies of this section on a retaliatory eviction claim simply for evicting a tenant who was undisputedly not current on rent, absent notice that the tenant had a statutory right to reduced rent (e.g., per AS 34.03.200(a)(2) ) or was entitled to reduced rent if the tenant made repairs or obtained substitute housing (e.g., per AS 34.03.180(a) ). DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Article 6. Landlord Remedies.

Sec. 34.03.220. Noncompliance with rental agreement; failure to pay rent.

  1. Except as provided in this chapter,
    1. if the tenant or someone in the tenant’s control deliberately inflicts substantial damage to the premises in breach of AS 34.03.120(a)(5) or the tenant engages in or permits another to engage in prostitution or another illegal activity at the premises in breach of AS 34.03.120(b) , the landlord may deliver a written notice to quit to the tenant under AS 09.45.100 09.45.105 specifying the act or activity constituting the breach and specifying that the rental agreement will terminate on a date that is not less than 24 hours or more than five days after service of the notice; for purposes of this paragraph, damage to premises is “substantial” if the loss, destruction, or defacement of property attributable to the deliberate infliction of damage to the premises exceeds $400;
    2. if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement, or if there is noncompliance with AS 34.03.120 , other than deliberate infliction of substantial damage to the premises or other than noncompliance as to a utility service for which the provisions of (e) of this section apply, materially affecting health and safety, the landlord may deliver a written notice to quit to the tenant under AS 09.45.100 09.45.110 specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and specifying that the rental agreement will terminate on a date not less than 10 days after service of the notice; if the breach is not remedied, the rental agreement terminates as provided in the notice subject to the provisions of this section; if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement will not terminate; in the absence of due care by the tenant, if substantially the same act or omission that constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least five days’ written notice to quit specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement.
  2. If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent in full within seven days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and the intention to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that period of time, the tenancy terminates unless the landlord agrees to allow the tenant to remain in occupancy, and the landlord may terminate the rental agreement and immediately recover possession of the rental unit. Only one written notice of default need be given the tenant by the landlord as to any one default. A landlord who has given written notice to the tenant under this subsection may accept a partial payment of the rent due under the rental agreement and extend the date for the eviction accordingly.
  3. Except as provided in this chapter, the landlord may recover actual damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or AS 34.03.120 .
  4. An order of abatement entered by a court under AS 09.50.170 terminates a rental agreement on the premises subject to the order of abatement.
  5. If a public utility providing electricity, natural gas, or water to the premises occupied by the tenant discontinues the service to the premises due to the failure of the tenant to pay for the utility service, the landlord may deliver a written notice to quit to the tenant advising that, notwithstanding (a) of this section, the tenancy will terminate five days after the landlord’s service of the notice. If, within three days from the service of the notice, the tenant reinstates the discontinued service and repays the landlord for any amounts paid by the landlord to reinstate service, and if damage did not occur to the rental unit as a result of the discontinuance of service, the rental agreement will not terminate. However, in the absence of due care by the tenant, if substantially the same act or omission that constituted a prior noncompliance under this subsection for which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least three days’ written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement.
  6. A person whose use of premises is based solely on rights acquired by a tenant, and who has not individually acquired the rights of a tenant under this chapter, does not acquire rights under this chapter as a result of being present on the premises.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am §§ 24 — 26 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 11 ch 27 SLA 2014)

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 13, ch. 27, SLA 2014 provides that the changes to (a) of this section made in that act “apply to a residential rental agreement for a period beginning on or after September 15, 2014.”

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Conduct materially affecting health and safety of others. —

Where instances of conduct which seriously threaten the health and safety of others, who must live in extremely close proximity to the offending party, have left their indelible imprint on the atmosphere of the neighborhood, such occurrences disturb the peace and harmony of a neighborhood to a degree and in a manner that is “material,” and not “remediable” under the language of subsection (a) of this section. Osness v. Dimond Estates, 615 P.2d 605 (Alaska 1980); Taylor v. Gill Street Inv., 743 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1987).

Ten-day period dates from receipt of notice. —

The period of 10 days in which to cure breaches in the rental agreement should be 10 days after receipt of the notice and not from the date of the notice. Vozar v. Francis, 579 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978) (decided prior to 1994 amendment revising the duration of the grace period for curing breaches).

Where the tenants cleaned up the premises within 10 days from the date they were served with notice of noncompliance with the rental agreement, the rental agreement could not be terminated for that reason. Vozar v. Francis, 579 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978).

Notice of termination. —

Deficiency in notice of termination was held immaterial where specified violations of rental agreement are of irremediable character. Taylor v. Gill Street Inv., 743 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1987).

Standing. —

A purchaser of a building had standing to enforce compliance with a preexisting lease when the seller had not reserved leasehold rights. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

II.Forfeiture

Forfeitures for breach not favored. —

Although forfeitures for breach by assignment have been approved if authorized by the language in the lease, forfeitures are not favored and never enforced in equity unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no denial. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

In determining whether forfeiture is required, the trial court is vested with broad discretion. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

The factor which has often been of greatest importance to the court in determining whether a forfeiture should be ordered is the financial loss suffered by the parties. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Strict compliance not previously required. —

It is a well-settled principle of law that where a landlord has led the tenant to believe that strict performance of a covenant will not be required, the landlord cannot thereafter demand forfeiture of the lease without first giving the tenant notice that strict compliance with the terms of the lease will be demanded in the future. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Collateral references. —

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or of notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent — modern cases. 31 ALR4th 1254.

Sec. 34.03.225. Limitations on mobile home park operator’s right to terminate.

  1. A mobile home park operator may evict a mobile home or a mobile home park dweller or tenant only for one of the following reasons:
    1. the mobile home dweller or tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent owed;
    2. the mobile home dweller or tenant has been convicted of violating a federal or state law or local ordinance, and that violation is continuing and is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of other dwellers or tenants in the mobile home park;
    3. the mobile home dweller or tenant has violated a provision, enforceable under AS 34.03.130 , of the rental agreement or lease signed by both parties and not prohibited by law including rent and the terms of agreement; and
    4. a change in the use of the land comprising the mobile home park, or the portion of it on which the mobile home to be evicted is located; however, all dwellers or tenants so affected by a change in land use shall be given at least 270 days’ notice, or longer if a longer notice period is provided in a valid lease or required by a municipality; a dweller or tenant so affected by a change in land use shall be given a quit date not earlier than May 1 and not later than October 15; a municipality may establish a mobile home relocation fund and require that a dweller or tenant so affected by a change in land use be given a longer notice period or compensated from the fund for the cost of disconnecting, relocating, and reestablishing the dweller’s or tenant’s mobile home.
  2. A mobile home park operator may not evict a mobile home or a mobile home park dweller or tenant because of the age of the mobile home, except that a mobile home or a mobile home park dweller or tenant may be evicted if, when the mobile home was admitted to the mobile home park, a regulation of the mobile home park limiting the age of a mobile home in the mobile home park was in effect, the mobile home is sold after the age limitation has been exceeded, and the owner or tenant of the mobile home has failed to bring the unit into compliance with the life safety requirements of 24 C.F.R. Part 3280.  This does not prohibit eviction for violation of a provision enforceable under AS 34.03.130 that requires that a mobile home be in a fit and habitable condition.
  3. When, under (a) of this section, a mobile home park owner is required to give notice to evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home park dweller or tenant, provision of notice to quit under AS 09.45.100 09.45.105 satisfies the requirement of notice.

History. (§ 5 ch 138 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 1982; am §§ 1, 2 ch 13 SLA 1986; am § 27 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 1 ch 35 SLA 2002)

Legislative history reports. —

For report on § 5, ch. 138, SLA 1976 (SCS CSHB 829 am S [re-engrossed]), see 1976 Senate Journal, p. 1368.

Notes to Decisions

Change in use of land. —

A sufficient “change in the use of the land” occurred to qualify under this section where, following eviction of tenants’ mobile home, park operators used the space for parking construction vehicles and, later, as rental property for parking by travel trailers and recreational vehicles. Sharpe v. Trail, 902 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1995).

There was no showing that park operators acted in bad faith in ordering the eviction of tenant’s mobile home for the purpose of changing the use of the land where it was established that, following the eviction, there was, in fact, a change in the use; evidence that the operators wanted to evict tenants because they found the mobile home unsightly did not, standing alone, support an inference that the operators acted in bad faith. Sharpe v. Trail, 902 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1995).

Construction of paragraph (3) as it existed prior to 1982 amendment. —

See Osness v. Dimond Estates, 615 P.2d 605 (Alaska 1980).

Sec. 34.03.230. Remedies for absence, nonuse and abandonment.

  1. When the rental agreement requires the tenant to give notice to the landlord of an anticipated extended absence in excess of seven days as required in AS 34.03.150 and the tenant wilfully fails to do so, the landlord may recover an amount not to exceed one and one-half times the actual damages.
  2. During an absence of the tenant in excess of seven days, the landlord may enter the dwelling unit at times reasonably necessary as provided in AS 34.03.140 . The landlord may reenter the dwelling unit and, if there is evidence that the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit, unless the landlord and tenant have made a specific agreement to the contrary, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement.
  3. If the tenant abandons the dwelling unit, the landlord shall make reasonable efforts to rent it at a fair rental value.  If the landlord rents the dwelling unit for a term beginning before the expiration of the rental agreement, the agreement is considered terminated on the date the new tenancy begins. The rental agreement is considered terminated by the landlord on the date the landlord has notice of the abandonment if the landlord fails to use reasonable efforts to rent the dwelling unit at a fair rental value or if the landlord accepts the abandonment as a surrender.  If the tenancy is from month to month, or week to week, the term of the rental agreement for purposes of this section shall be considered a month or a week, as the case may be.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 28 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 34.03.240. Waiver of landlord’s right to terminate.

Acceptance of rent with knowledge of a default by the tenant or acceptance of performance by the tenant that varies from the terms of the rental agreement or rules or regulations subsequently adopted by the landlord constitutes a waiver of the right of the landlord to terminate the rental agreement for that breach, unless otherwise agreed after the breach has occurred.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Section is limitation on remedies of landlord. —

Rather than giving a right or remedy to the tenant, this section acts as a limitation upon the remedies of the landlord. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Rights which may be waived. —

This section should be so interpreted that waiver of the “right to terminate” a rental agreement refers to rights which arise as a consequence of a breach, and does not concern rights of termination which exist regardless of whether or not a tenant breached a condition of the agreement. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Right to terminate month-to-month agreement not waived. —

Since a landlord always has the right to terminate the month-to-month rental agreement with the tenant, even without cause, by giving a month’s notice, he does not waive this right by accepting the late rental payment. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Collateral references. —

Lessor’s retention of past-due rental payments as precluding termination of lease and dispossession of lessee for nonpayment of rent. 39 ALR4th 1204.

Sec. 34.03.250. Landlord liens; distraint for rent abolished.

  1. A lien or security interest on behalf of the landlord in the tenant’s household goods is not enforceable unless perfected before March 19, 1974.
  2. Distraint for rent is abolished.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Sengul v. CMS Franklin, 265 P.3d 320 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 34.03.260. Disposition of abandoned property.

  1. Except as otherwise agreed, if, upon termination of a tenancy including but not limited to a termination after expiration of a lease or by surrender or abandonment of the premises, a tenant has left personal property upon the premises, and the landlord reasonably believes that the tenant has abandoned this personal property, the landlord may
    1. give notice to the tenant demanding that the property be removed within the dates set out in the notice but not less than 15 days after delivery or mailing of the notice, and that if the property is not removed within the time specified, the property may be sold; if the property is not removed within the time specified in the notice, the landlord may sell the property at a public sale; the landlord may dispose of perishable commodities in any manner the landlord considers fit;
    2. if the tenant has left personal property that is reasonably determined by the landlord to be valueless or of such little value that the cost of storing and conducting a public sale would probably exceed the amount that would be realized from the sale, the landlord may notify the tenant that the property be removed within the date specified in the notice but not less than 15 days after delivery or mailing of the notice, and that if the property is not removed within the time specified, the landlord intends to destroy or otherwise dispose of the property; if the property is not removed within the time specified in the notice, the landlord may destroy or otherwise dispose of the property; in the notice, the landlord shall indicate an election to sell certain items of the tenant’s personal property at public sale and to destroy or otherwise dispose of the remainder.
  2. After notice as provided in (a) of this section, the landlord shall store all personal property of the tenant in a place of safekeeping and shall exercise reasonable care of the property, but is not responsible to the tenant for loss not caused by the landlord’s deliberate or negligent act.  The landlord may elect to store the property on the premises previously demised, in which event the storage cost may not exceed the fair rental value of the premises.  If the tenant’s property is removed to a commercial storage company, the storage cost shall include the actual charge for the storage and removal from the premises to the place of storage.
  3. After landlord’s notice under (a) of this section, or otherwise, if the tenant makes timely response in writing of an intention to remove the personal property from the premises and does not do so within the time specified in the landlord’s notice or within 15 days of the delivery or mailing of the tenant’s written response whichever is later, it shall be conclusively presumed that the tenant has abandoned the property.  If the tenant removes the property after notice, the landlord is entitled to the cost of storage for the period the property has remained in the landlord’s safekeeping.
  4. The landlord is not liable in damages in an action by a tenant claiming loss by reason of the landlord’s storage, destruction, or disposition of property under this section. A landlord who deliberately or negligently violates the provisions of this section is liable for actual damages and penal damages of an amount not to exceed actual damages.
  5. A public sale authorized under this section shall be conducted under AS 09.35.140 .  The landlord may dispose of any property upon which no bid is made at the public sale.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 29 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

AS 34.03.260(a) did not apply to a divorce decree enforcement case where the husband failed to explain why the wife should have been considered his tenant for purposes of the requirement that he store her belongings for a reasonable period of time. Perez v. Alhiwage, — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 10, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Determination of abandonment. —

Property apparently left at deceased’s home by his girlfriend or her associates was correctly determined to be abandoned property under this section where the deceased’s estranged wife was found to be the legal owner of the home. Richardson v. Estate of Berthelot, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 16, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Offset of damage award. —

Superior court did not err in offsetting the amount awarded to tenant for loss of personal belongings against back rent owed to the landlord, nor did it err in awarding penal damages in an amount less than the actual damages. Fyffe v. Wright, 93 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Burton v. Fountainhead Dev., Inc., 393 P.3d 387 (Alaska 2017).

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 34.03.270. Remedy after termination.

If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord may have a claim for possession and for rent and a separate claim for actual damages for breach of the rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Landlord could bring action for forcible entry and detainer seeking restitution of trailer space from tenants. —

See McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

McDowell v. Lenarduzzi, 546 P.2d 1315 (Alaska 1976).

Sec. 34.03.280. Recovery of possession limited.

A landlord may not recover or take possession of the dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including wilful diminution of services to the tenant by interrupting or causing the interruption of electricity, gas, water, sanitary, or other essential services to the tenant, except in case of abandonment, surrender, circumstances beyond the control of the landlord due to energy conditions, or as permitted in this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.03.285. Service of process upon tenant.

In an action for possession under this chapter, the summons and complaint shall be served under the provisions of Rule No. 85 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. A continuance may not be granted plaintiff or defendant except for good cause shown.

History. (§ 2 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 09.45.496(a). Renumbered in 1983.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Taylor v. Gill Street Inv., 743 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1987).

Stated in

Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979).

Article 7. Periodic Tenancy, Holdover, and Abuse of Access.

Sec. 34.03.290. Periodic tenancy and holdover.

  1. While rent is current, the landlord or the tenant may terminate a week to week tenancy by a written notice given to the other at least 14 days before the termination date specified in the notice.
  2. The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month to month tenancy by a written notice given to the other at least 30 days before the rental due date specified in the notice.
  3. If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord’s consent after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or after its termination under (a) or (b) of this section, the landlord may, after serving a notice to quit to the tenant under AS 09.45.100 09.45.105 , bring an action for possession and if the tenant’s holdover is wilful and not in good faith the landlord, in addition, may recover an amount not to exceed one and one-half times the actual damages. If the landlord consents to the tenant’s continued occupancy, AS 34.03.020 applies.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 30 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Chapter to be harmonized with forcible entry and detainer statutes. —

As a matter of statutory construction, this chapter should be harmonized with the forcible entry and detainer statutes. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Forcible entry and detainer procedures may be used where not conflicting. —

Because this chapter does not explicitly set forth a procedure for bringing an “action for possession,” forcible entry and detainer procedures may be used where they do not conflict with this chapter. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Landlord could bring action for forcible entry and detainer seeking restitution of trailer space from tenants. —

See McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Stated in

Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979); Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983); Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005); Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618 (Alaska 2010).

II.Month-To-Month Tenancy

This chapter treats month-to-month tenancies separately from arrangements involving longer fixed terms. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Month-to-month tenancies constitute a special class, not necessarily governed by all provisions of the uniform act. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Term “rental agreement” not used in connection with month-to-month tenancies. —

While “rental agreement” is defined in AS 34.03.360 as “all agreements . . . embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit . . .,” the term “rental agreement” is not used in the uniform act in connection with month-to-month tenancies. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

AS 34.03.240 does not preclude termination of month-to-month tenancy. —

The provisions of AS 34.03.240 , dealing with the waiver of a landlord’s right to terminate, do not preclude a landlord, who has accepted late rental payments, from terminating a month-to-month tenancy. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Month-to-month tenancies are traditionally terminable at will for any reason; the entire thrust of the arrangement is to allow either party to end it on short notice without incurring any additional liabilities. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Sec. 34.03.300. Landlord and tenant remedies for abuse of access.

  1. If the tenant refuses to allow lawful access, the landlord may obtain injunctive relief to compel access or terminate the rental agreement.  In either case, the landlord may recover an amount not to exceed the actual damages or one month’s periodic rent, whichever is greater. If the landlord terminates the rental agreement, the landlord shall give written notice to the tenant at least 10 days before the date specified in the notice.
  2. If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful but which have the effect of unreasonably harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct or terminate the rental agreement.  In either case, the tenant may recover an amount not to exceed the actual damages or one month’s periodic rent, whichever is greater, court costs and reasonable attorney fees. If the tenant terminates the rental agreement, the tenant shall give written notice to the landlord at least 10 days before the date specified in the notice.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Chilton-Wren v. Olds, 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).

Cited in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Article 8. Retaliatory Action.

Sec. 34.03.310. Retaliatory conduct prohibited.

  1. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, a landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession after the tenant has
    1. complained to the landlord of a violation of AS 34.03.100 ;
    2. sought to enforce rights and remedies granted the tenant under this chapter;
    3. organized or become a member of a tenant’s union or similar organization; or
    4. complained to a governmental agency responsible for enforcement of governmental housing, wage, price, or rent controls.
  2. If the landlord acts in violation of (a) of this section, the tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in AS 34.03.210 and has a defense in an action against the tenant for possession.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, after serving a notice to quit to the tenant under AS 09.45.100 09.45.105 , a landlord may bring an action for possession if
    1. the tenant is in default in rent;
    2. compliance with the applicable building or housing code requires alteration, remodeling, or demolition that would effectively deprive the tenant of use of the dwelling unit;
    3. the tenant is committing waste or a nuisance, or is using the dwelling unit for an illegal purpose or for other than living or dwelling purposes in violation of the rental agreement;
    4. the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling unit for personal purposes;
    5. the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling unit for the purpose of substantially altering, remodeling, or demolishing the premises;
    6. the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling unit for the purpose of immediately terminating for at least six months use of the dwelling unit as a dwelling unit; or
    7. the landlord has in good faith contracted to sell the property, and the contract of sale contains a representation by the purchaser corresponding to (4), (5) or (6) of this subsection.
  4. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the landlord may increase the rent if the landlord
    1. has become liable for a substantial increase in property taxes, or a substantial increase in other maintenance or operating costs not associated with compliance with the complaint or request, not less than four months before the demand for an increase in rent; and the increase in rent bears a reasonable relationship to the net increase in taxes or costs;
    2. has completed a capital improvement of the dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part and the increase in rent does not exceed the amount that may be claimed for federal income tax purposes as a straight-line depreciation of the improvement, prorated among the dwelling units benefited by the improvement;
    3. can establish by competent evidence that the rent now demanded of the tenant does not exceed the rent charged other tenants of similar dwelling units in the building or, in the case of a single-family residence or if there is no similar dwelling unit in the building, does not exceed the fair rental value of the dwelling unit.
  5. Maintenance of the action under (c) of this section does not release the landlord from liability under AS 34.03.160(b) .

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 31 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Purpose. —

This section is designed to prevent retaliation by the landlord for tenant’s conduct which might be deemed harmful to the landlord. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

The retaliatory conduct with which this section is concerned is clearly conduct which is undertaken in retaliation for actions by the tenant. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

No claim for retaliation allowed. —

Directed verdict in favor of landlord was proper where the landlord did not violate the anti-retaliation provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act by evicting a tenant after he demanded personal injury compensation following an on-premises slip and fall. A claim for personal injury damages was not based upon a right or remedy granted under the Act. Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Prior oral notice is not sufficient to excuse a tenant from being “in default in rent” for purposes of this section if the tenant claims that defects or conditions render his apartment uninhabitable. DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Forcible entry and detainer action. —

Landlord’s instituting forcible entry and detainer proceedings did not constitute retaliatory conduct. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Article 9. General Provisions.

Sec. 34.03.320. Obligation of good faith.

Every duty under this chapter and every act that must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. The aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate damages.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Good faith shown in eviction for change in use of land. —

There was no showing that park operators acted in bad faith in ordering the eviction of tenant’s mobile home for the purpose of changing the use of the land where it was established that, following the eviction, there was, in fact, a change in the use; evidence that the operators wanted to evict tenants because they found the mobile home unsightly did not, standing alone, support an inference that the operators acted in bad faith. Sharpe v. Trail, 902 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1995).

Quoted in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.03.330. Application and exclusions.

  1. This chapter applies to and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit in this state.
  2. Unless created to avoid the application of this chapter, the following arrangements are not governed by this chapter:
    1. residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar services;
    2. occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to the interest of a purchaser;
    3. occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization;
    4. transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, lodgings, or other transient facility;
    5. occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is conditioned upon employment substantially for services, maintenance, or repair to the premises;
    6. occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative;
    7. occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for agricultural purposes;
    8. occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used as part of a transitional or supportive housing program that is sponsored or operated by a public corporation or by a nonprofit corporation and that provides shelter and related support services intended to improve the occupant’s opportunity to obtain permanent housing.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 32 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Notes to Decisions

Validity of conditional contract of sale. —

The contingency of the approval of a loan assumption did not prevent an agreement to purchase from qualifying as a “contract of sale” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2) and, until the parties were told that the purchaser’s application to approve the loan had been rejected, the parties were not subject to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Brigdon v. Lamb, 929 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1997).

Quoted in

Helfrich v. Valdez Motel Corp., 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.03.335. Proof of certain property damage claims.

In an action initiated by a party to recover damages or to obtain other relief to which a party may be entitled under this chapter, a premises condition statement and contents inventory prepared under AS 34.03.020(e) is presumptive evidence of the condition of the premises and its contents at the commencement of the term of the period of occupancy covered by the rental agreement between the parties. Unless its authenticity is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence by the party against whom the statement and contents inventory is offered, the statement and contents inventory may be offered by a party, without additional supporting evidence, as the basis on which to compute the recovery of damages to which the party may be entitled under this chapter.

History. (§ 33 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Sec. 34.03.340. Service of process.

If a landlord is not a resident of this state or is a corporation not authorized to do business in this state and engages in any conduct in this state governed by this chapter, or engages in a transaction subject to this chapter, the landlord may designate an agent upon whom service of process may be made in this state. The agent shall be a resident of this state or a corporation authorized to do business in this state. The agent shall be the same person designated under AS 34.03.080 . The designation shall be in writing and filed with the commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development. If no designation is made and filed or if process cannot be served in this state upon the designated agent, process may be served upon the commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development, but the service upon the commissioner is not effective unless the plaintiff or petitioner immediately mails a copy of the process and pleadings by certified or registered mail to the defendant or respondent at the last ascertainable address of the defendant or respondent. An affidavit of compliance with this section shall be filed with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction on or before the return day for the process, if any, or within any further time allowed by the court.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of commerce and economic development” was changed to “commissioner of community and economic development” in accordance with § 88, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in this section, “commissioner of community and economic development” was changed to “commissioner of commerce, community, and economic development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Sec. 34.03.345. Mediation and binding arbitration.

  1. A landlord and a tenant may agree to mediate disputes between them as to an obligation of either of them arising out of the rental agreement. If the landlord and tenant agree to mediate disputes, they shall include the scope of the agreement within the executed rental agreement, incorporate a reference to that agreement within the rental agreement, or add the text of the agreement as a separate attachment to the rental agreement.
  2. A landlord and a tenant may agree to binding arbitration of the disputes between them as to an obligation of either of them arising out of the rental agreement. If the landlord and tenant agree to binding arbitration, they shall include the scope of the agreement within the executed rental agreement, incorporate a reference to that agreement within the rental agreement, or add the text of the agreement as a separate attachment to the rental agreement.

History. (§ 34 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Sec. 34.03.350. Attorney fees.

Attorney fees shall be allowed to the prevailing party in any proceeding arising out of this chapter or a rental agreement.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Eligibility for award. —

Tenant properly pointed out that the award of attorney fees was governed by AS 34.03.350 , not Alaska R. Civ. P. 82; where tenant had proceeded, at least in part, pro se, the award of attorney fees was unavailable, and the superior court’s error in applying the wrong provision was harmless. Fyffe v. Wright, 93 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Burton v. Fountainhead Dev., Inc., 393 P.3d 387 (Alaska 2017).

Full reasonable fees. —

This section should be read as providing for an award of full reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005).

Abuse of discretion. —

Where the reasons given did not adequately explain why awarding less than 15 percent of the fees the landlord incurred in a lawsuit for possession satisfied the full, reasonable standard under the circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion. Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005).

Cited in

Sullivan v. Subramanian, 2 P.3d 66 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 34.03.360. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “abandonment” means that the tenant has left the dwelling unit and the tenant’s personal belongings in it and has been absent for a continuous period of seven days or longer without giving notice under AS 34.03.150 and has defaulted in the payment of rent;
  2. “building and housing codes” include any law, ordinance, or governmental regulation concerning fitness for habitation, or the construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use, or appearance of a premise or dwelling unit;
  3. “dwelling unit” means a structure or a part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household, and includes mobile homes, and if located in a mobile home park, the lot or space upon which a mobile home is placed;
  4. “fair rental value” means the average rental rate in the community for available dwelling units of similar size and features;
  5. “good faith” means honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction concerned;
  6. “illegal activity involving alcoholic beverages” means a person’s delivery of an alcoholic beverage in violation of AS 04.11.010(b) in an area where the results of a local option election have, under AS 04.11.491 , prohibited the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board from issuing, renewing, or transferring a liquor license or permit under AS 04;
  7. “illegal activity involving a controlled substance” means a violation of AS 11.71.010(a) , 11.71.021 , 11.71.030(a)(2) or (9), or 11.71.040(a)(1) , (2), or (5);
  8. “illegal activity involving gambling or promoting gambling” means a violation of
    1. AS 11.66.200 , other than a social game as that term is defined by AS 11.66.280 (10); and
    2. AS 11.66.210 or 11.66.220 ;
  9. “illegal activity involving an imitation controlled substance” means a violation of AS 11.73.010 11.73.030 ;
  10. “illegal activity involving a place of prostitution” means a violation of AS 11.66.120(a)(1) or 11.66.130(a)(2)(A) or (D);
  11. “landlord” means the owner, lessor, or sublessor of the dwelling unit or the building of which it is a part, and it also means a manager of the premises who fails to disclose as required by AS 34.03.080 ;
  12. “mobile home” has the meaning given to “manufactured home” in AS 45.29.102 ;
  13. “organization” includes a corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal entity;
  14. “owner” means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested all or part of the legal title to property or all or part of the beneficial ownership of property and a right to present use of the premises; the term includes a mortgagee in possession;
  15. “premises” means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances in it and grounds, areas, and facilities held out for the use of tenants generally or whose use is promised to the tenant;
  16. “prepaid rent” means that amount of money demanded by the landlord at the initiation of the tenancy for the purpose of ensuring that rent will be paid, but does not include the first month’s rent or money received as security for damage;
  17. “prostitution” means an act in violation of AS 11.66.100 ;
  18. “rent” means the uniform periodic payment due the landlord, however denominated;
  19. “rental agreement” means all agreements, written or oral, and valid rules and regulations adopted under AS 34.03.130 embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit and premises;
  20. “sanitary facility” means a flush toilet and proper drainage for all toilets, sinks, basins, bathtubs, and showers;
  21. “single family residence” means a structure maintained and used as a single dwelling unit;
  22. “tenant” means a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others;
  23. “undeveloped rural area” means an area where public sewer or water services are not available.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974; am § 62 ch 21 SLA 1991; am §§ 35, 37 ch 121 SLA 1994; am § 67 ch 101 SLA 1995; am § 24 ch 64 SLA 2012; am § 160 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 65 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am § 121 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Revisor’s notes. —

The paragraphs added by ch. 121, SLA 1994 and ch. 64, SLA 2012 were renumbered to maintain the alphabetical order of the terms defined.

In 2016, in (8)(A) of this section, “AS 11.66.280 (10)” was substituted for “AS 11.66.280 (9)” to reflect the 2016 renumbering of AS 11.66.280(9).

Cross references. —

For a saving clause relating to interpretation of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 31, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

For severability of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 32, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 12, 2016, in (7), substituted “11.71.030(a)(1), (2), or (4) - (8)” for “11.71.020(a), 11.71.030(a)(1) or (2)”.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (10), substituted “11.66.130(a)(2)(A) or (D)” for “11.66.130(a)(1) or (4)”.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, substituted “11.71.021, 11.71.030(a)(2) or (9)” for “11.71.030(a)(1), (2), or (4) — (8)” in (7).

Notes to Decisions

Good faith in eviction for change of use of land. —

There was no showing that park operators acted in bad faith in ordering the eviction of tenant’s mobile home for the purpose of changing the use of the land where it was established that, following the eviction, there was, in fact, a change in the use; evidence that the operators wanted to evict tenants because they found the mobile home unsightly did not, standing alone, support an inference that the operators acted in bad faith. Sharpe v. Trail, 902 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1995).

“Landlord” failing to “terminate” tenancies. —

Apartment owner who sold the premises and took a second mortgage on them was the “landlord” and liable for tenants’ security deposits, even though he never received them from the purchaser, where he had failed to “terminate” the tenancies of the tenants by giving them notice of his nonjudicial foreclosure. Alaska Teamster-Employer Pension Trust v. Wise, 120 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).

Term “rental agreement” not used in connection with month-to-month tenancies. —

While “rental agreement” is defined in this section as “all agreements . . . embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit . . .,” the term “rental agreement” is not used in the uniform act in connection with month-to-month tenancies. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

AS 34.03.020(d) fixes a month-to-month tenancy, in absence of agreement by the parties to a different term in the rental agreement, if rent is paid on a monthly basis. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

Smith v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 629 P.2d 543 (Alaska 1981).

Cited in

Amyot v. Luchini, 932 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 34.03.370. Applicability.

After March 19, 1974, this chapter applies to any rental agreement, lease, or tenancy entered into, extended, or renewed by the payment of rent on or subsequent to that date.

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Sec. 34.03.380. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.”

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

DeNardo v. Corneloup, 163 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2007).

Chapter 05. Rental of Agricultural, Personal, and Nonresidential Property.

Article 1. Agricultural Property.

Secs. 34.05.010 — 34.05.020. [Repealed, § 4 ch 10 SLA 1974.]

Sec. 34.05.025. Agricultural tenants.

A tenant whose lease or occupancy is for agricultural purposes and who breaches the rental agreement, or continues in possession of the premises at the expiration of the time limited in or contrary to a condition or covenant in the lease or agreement under which the tenant holds, shall be provided with a written notice specifying the breach and demanding the tenant quit the premises at least 30 days before commencement of an action for the recovery of the property. The tenant shall have free access to the premises to cultivate and harvest crops or produce planted by the tenant before the service of the notice of the breach and demand to quit the premises.

History. (§ 2 ch 10 SLA 1974)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 09.45.496(b). Renumbered as AS 34.03.115 in 1983. Renumbered again in 1985.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979).

Collateral references. —

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, §§ 194 et seq., 414.

52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 225.

52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 768-770.

52B C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 1343.

Article 2. Personal Property.

Sec. 34.05.030. Obtaining rental equipment with intent to defraud. [Repealed, § 21 ch 166 SLA 1978.]

Sec. 34.05.040. Failure to return rental equipment.

A person in possession of equipment under an agreement in writing that requires the person to return the equipment to a particular place or at a particular time who refuses or wilfully neglects to return it to the place and at the time specified in the agreement in writing, or who secretes, converts, sells, or attempts to sell the equipment or any part of it is, upon conviction, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both.

History. (§ 1 ch 81 SLA 1966)

Collateral references. —

50 Am. Jur. 2d, Larceny, § 86 et seq.

52B C.J.S., Larceny, § 47.

Sec. 34.05.050. Definitions.

In AS 34.05.040 ,

  1. “equipment” means any tools, machinery, implements, or appliances used for any type of purpose or service;
  2. “wilfully neglects” means omits, fails, or forebears, with a conscious purpose to injure, or without regard for the rights of the owner, or with indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or not.

History. (§ 1 ch 81 SLA 1966)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1985 to alphabetize the defined terms.

Article 3. Illegal Activities in Premises Not Subject to Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.

Sec. 34.05.100. Tenant responsibilities in premises not subject to AS 34.03.

  1. In rented premises other than premises to which the provisions of AS 34.03 apply, the tenant may not knowingly engage at the premises in prostitution, an illegal activity involving a place of prostitution, an illegal activity involving alcoholic beverages, an illegal activity involving gambling or promoting gambling, an illegal activity involving a controlled substance, or an illegal activity involving an imitation controlled substance, or knowingly permit others in the premises to engage in one or more of those activities at the rental premises.
  2. If there is noncompliance with (a) of this section, a person may seek relief under AS 09.50.170 09.50.240 .
  3. An order of abatement entered by a court under AS 09.50.210 against premises under this section terminates a rental agreement on the premises subject to the order of abatement.
  4. In this section,
    1. “illegal activity involving alcoholic beverages,” “illegal activity involving a controlled substance,” “illegal activity involving an imitation controlled substance,” “illegal activity involving gambling or promoting gambling,” “illegal activity involving a place of prostitution,” and “prostitution” have the meanings given in AS 34.03.360 ;
    2. “premises” means a structure or the structure of which it is a part, and facilities and appurtenances in it, and grounds, areas, and facilities held out for the use of persons entitled to possession under an agreement that relates to its use.

History. (§ 36 ch 121 SLA 1994)

Chapter 06. Emergency Residential Rent Regulation and Control.

[Repealed, § 3 ch 128 SLA 1974 as amended by § 7 ch 108 SLA 1975.]

Chapter 07. Horizontal Property Regimes Act.

Editor’s notes. —

AS 34.08.010 provides that this chapter does not apply to common interest communities created after January 1, 1986.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

State v. Bering Strait Regional Educ. Attendance Area Sch. Dist., 658 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

15B Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, § 1 et seq.

Rohan and Reskin, Condominium Law and Practice: Forms (Matthew Bender).

Patrick J. Rohan, Home Owner Associations and Planned Unit Developments — Law and Practice: Forms (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Formation of Horizontal Property Regimes.

Sec. 34.07.010. This chapter applicable only if declaration executed and recorded.

  1. This chapter is applicable only to property, the sole owner or all of the owners of which submit it to the horizontal property regime by executing and recording a declaration under (c) of this section and AS 34.07.020 .
  2. A declaration or any amendment to the declaration is not valid unless recorded.
  3. The declaration shall be recorded in the recording district in which the property is located.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 25 ch 208 SLA 1975)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Carroll v. El Dorado Estates Div. No. Two Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1984); O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988); Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Sec. 34.07.020. Contents of declaration.

The declaration must contain

  1. a description of the land on which the building and improvement are or are to be located;
  2. a description of the building, stating the number of stories and basements, the number of apartments and the principal materials of which it is or is to be constructed;
  3. the apartment number of each apartment, and a statement of its location, approximate area, number of rooms, and immediate common areas to which it has access, and any other data necessary for its proper identification;
  4. a description of the common areas and facilities;
  5. a description of the limited common areas and facilities, if any, stating to which apartment their use is reserved;
  6. the value of the property and of each apartment, and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appertaining to each apartment and its owner for all purposes, including voting;
  7. a statement of the purposes for which the building and each of the apartments are intended and restricted as to their use;
  8. the name of a person to receive service of process in the cases provided for in this chapter, together with the address of the person’s residence or place of business, which shall be within the city or recording district in which the building is located;
  9. a provision as to the percentage of votes by the apartment owners that determines whether or not to rebuild, repair, restore, or sell the property in the event of the damage or the destruction of all or a part of the property;
  10. a provision authorizing and establishing procedures for the subdividing or combining of an apartment or apartments, common areas and facilities or limited common areas and facilities, through the use of a metes and bounds description or otherwise;
  11. a provision requiring the adoption of bylaws for the administration of the property or for other purposes not inconsistent with this chapter that may include that the property be administered by a board of directors elected from among the apartment owners, or by a manager, or by a managing agent, or otherwise, and the procedures for the adoption and amendment of the bylaws;
  12. any further details in connection with the property that the person executing the declaration may consider desirable to set out consistent with this chapter;
  13. the method by which the declaration may be amended, consistent with this chapter, except that not less than 60 percent of the apartment owners may consent to any amendment; and
  14. a reference to the file number and recording information for the floor plans of the building affected that are required to be filed and recorded simultaneously with the declaration under AS 34.07.030 .

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 8 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988).

Sec. 34.07.030. Filing and recording of survey map and floor plans with verified statement.

There shall be filed and recorded simultaneously with the recording of the declaration in the recording district in which the property is located

  1. a survey map of the surface of the land submitted under the provisions of this chapter showing the location of the building on it;
  2. a set of the floor plans of the building showing the layout, apartment numbers and dimensions of the apartments in sufficient detail to identify and locate each apartment with certainty, stating the name of the building or that it has no name, and bearing the verified statement of a registered architect or registered professional engineer certifying that it is an accurate copy of portions of the plans of the building as filed with and approved by the governmental entity having jurisdiction over the approval or issuance of permits for the construction of the building, or a statement that no approval or permit is required.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 9 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.07.040. Amendment to declaration in place of verified statement by architect or engineer regarding floor plans.

  1. If the floor plans do not include a verified statement by a registered architect or registered professional engineer that the plans fully and accurately depict the layout, apartment numbers, and dimensions of the apartments as built, there shall be recorded before the first conveyance of an apartment an amendment to the declaration to which shall be attached a verified statement of a registered architect certifying that the plans previously filed and recorded or being filed and recorded simultaneously with the amendment fully and accurately depict the layout, apartment number, and dimensions of the apartments as built.
  2. The plans must each contain a reference to the date of recording of the declaration and the volume, page, and receiving number of the recorded declaration.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 10 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.07.050. Form of floor plans.

The recording office shall prescribe the style, size, form, and quality of floor plans filed and recorded under AS 34.07.030 .

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 11 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.07.060. Survey map and floor plans subject to state and local laws.

The survey map and floor plans are subject to the provisions of state and local laws relating to plats, planning and plans, subdivisions, and zoning, if the laws are not inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter and if the building is or is to be located on land that is not owned in common.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.070. Recording of instruments affecting horizontal property regimes.

The declaration, an amendment to it, or any instrument by which the property may be removed from this chapter and every instrument affecting the property or an apartment may be recorded.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 2. Apartment Ownership and Conveyancing.

Sec. 34.07.080. Apartment classified as real property.

Each apartment, together with its undivided interest in the common areas and facilities is not considered an intangible or a security or any interest therein but for all purposes constitutes and is classified as real property under the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.090. Apartment ownership and possession.

Each apartment owner shall have exclusive ownership and possession of the owner’s apartment, but any apartment may be owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety or may be commonly owned by more than one person.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Collateral references. —

Right of condominium association’s management or governing body to inspect individual units. 41 ALR4th 730.

Sec. 34.07.100. Separation of apartment ownership from common areas and facilities ownership prohibited.

The percentage of the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities may not be separated from the apartment to which it appertains even though the interest is not expressly mentioned or described in the conveyance or other instrument.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.110. Release or partial release from encumbrance affecting apartment with first conveyance; partial waiver of lien claims.

  1. At the time of the first conveyance of each apartment, every mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or other encumbrance affecting the apartment, including the percentage of undivided interest of the apartment in the common areas and facilities, shall be paid and satisfied of record, or the apartment being conveyed and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall be released by a recorded partial release.
  2. A partial waiver of lien claims created under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 (mechanics liens) on unsold apartments may be obtained by following the procedures specified in AS 34.35.119 .

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 18 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Sec. 34.07.120. Liability of grantee for unpaid common expenses at time of conveyance.

In a voluntary conveyance the grantee of an apartment is jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the latter for the grantor’s share of the common expenses up to the time of the grantor’s conveyance, without prejudice to the grantee’s right to recover from the grantor the amounts paid on the assessments by the grantee.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Collateral references. —

Liability of owner of unit in condominium, recreational development, time-share property, or the like for assessment in support of common facilities levied against and unpaid by prior owner. 39 ALR4th 114.

Sec. 34.07.130. Person obtaining possession upon foreclosure of apartment not liable for common expenses.

If a mortgagee of a recorded mortgage or a trustee of a recorded deed of trust or other purchaser of an apartment obtains possession of the apartment as a result of foreclosure of the mortgage or deed of trust, the possessor, and successors and assigns of the possessor are not liable for the share of the common expenses or assessments by the association of apartment owners chargeable to the apartment that became due before possession. This unpaid share of common expenses or assessments is a common expense collectable from all of the apartment owners including the possessor and successors and assigns of the possessor.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.140. Grantee entitled to statement of unpaid assessments.

A grantee is entitled to a statement from the manager or board of directors setting out the amount of the unpaid assessments against the grantor. The grantee is not liable for, nor is the apartment conveyed subject to a lien for, any unpaid assessments against the grantor in excess of the amount in the statement.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.150. Contents of apartment deed.

An apartment deed must include

  1. a description of the land as provided in AS 34.07.020 , or the post office address of the property, and in either case, the date of recording of the declaration and its volume, page, and receiving number;
  2. the apartment number of the apartment in the declaration and any other data necessary for its proper identification;
  3. a statement of the use for which the apartment is intended and any restrictions on its use;
  4. the percentage of undivided interest appertaining to the apartment, the common areas and facilities and limited common areas and facilities appertaining to it, if any; and
  5. any further details that the grantor and grantee may set out consistent with the declaration and with this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 3. Common Areas and Facilities Owned With Apartments.

Sec. 34.07.160. Common areas and facilities ownership.

  1. Each apartment owner has the common right to a share, with other apartment owners, in the common areas and facilities.
  2. Each apartment owner is entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities in the percentage expressed in the declaration.  The percentage is computed by taking as a basis the value of the apartment in relation to the value of the property.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.170. Nonexclusive easement to use common areas and facilities.

Each apartment owner has a nonexclusive easement for, and may use the common areas and facilities in accordance with the purpose for which they were intended without hindering or encroaching upon the lawful right of the other apartment owners.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Notes to Decisions

Owners lack easement to install rooftop antenna. —

Condominium unit owners did not have an express easement to install a television antenna under this section, where the assessed repair costs of roof damage caused by an antenna installation could reasonably have been considered to be an encroachment upon or hinderance of each unit owner’s lawful right to have a good roof as a common area. O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988).

Collateral references. —

What constitutes, and remedies for, misuse of easement. 111 ALR5th 313.

Sec. 34.07.180. Alteration of common areas and facilities ownership.

  1. The percentage of the undivided interest of each apartment owner in the common areas and facilities as expressed in the declaration may not be altered except in accordance with procedures set out in the bylaws and by amending the declaration.
  2. The bylaws must provide for a periodic reappraisal of the apartments and the common areas and facilities together with a recomputation, if required, of the percentage of the undivided interest of each apartment owner in the common areas and facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.190. Partition of common areas and facilities ownership prohibited.

  1. The common areas and facilities shall remain undivided and an apartment owner or other person may not bring an action for partition or division of any part, unless the property has been removed from the provisions of this chapter under AS 34.07.300 34.07.340 .  Any covenant to the contrary is void.
  2. Nothing in this chapter limits the right of partition by a husband and wife owning as tenants by the entirety or by the owners in common of one or more of the apartments as to the ownership of the apartment or apartments.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.200. Maintenance, repair, and replacement of common areas and facilities.

  1. The necessary work of maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common areas and facilities and the making of an addition or improvement may be carried out only as provided in this chapter and in the bylaws.
  2. The association of apartment owners has the irrevocable right, to be exercised by the manager or board of directors, to have access to each apartment from time to time during reasonable hours as may be necessary for
    1. the maintenance, repair, or replacement of any of the common areas and facilities in it, or accessible from it; or
    2. making emergency repairs in the apartment necessary to prevent damage to the common areas and facilities or to another apartment.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.210. Waiver of liability for share of common expenses prohibited.

Waiver by an apartment owner of the use or enjoyment of any of the common areas and facilities or abandonment of the apartment does not exempt the owner from liability for contribution towards the common expenses of common areas or facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.220. Collection of unpaid common expenses from apartment owner.

A sum assessed by the association of apartment owners but unpaid for the share of the common expenses chargeable to any apartment may be enforced by the manager or board of directors acting on behalf of the apartment owners, upon first obtaining the approval of a majority of all apartment owners, in the following manner:

  1. 10 days’ notice shall be given the delinquent apartment owner stating that unless the assessment is paid within 10 days any or all utility services will be immediately severed and shall remain severed until the assessment is paid; or
  2. by the lawful method of enforcement as may be provided in the declaration or bylaws.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.230. Unpaid common expense is lien on apartment; order of lien priority.

A sum assessed by the association of apartment owners but unpaid for the share of the common expenses chargeable to an apartment constitutes a lien on the apartment prior to all other liens except

  1. tax liens on the apartment in favor of an assessing unit or special district; and
  2. sums unpaid on deeds of trust or mortgages of record.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.240. Common expense lien foreclosure.

  1. A common expense lien under AS 34.07.230 may be foreclosed in a civil action brought by the manager or board of directors, acting on behalf of the apartment owners, in the same manner as a lien on, or mortgage of or a deed or trust of real property.
  2. In the event of foreclosure, the apartment owner shall be required to pay a reasonable rental for the apartment, if provided for in the bylaws, and the plaintiff in the foreclosure may appoint a receiver to collect it.
  3. The manager or board of directors, acting on behalf of the apartment owners may, unless prohibited by the declaration, bid in the apartment at the foreclosure sale, and may acquire and hold, lease, mortgage, and convey the apartment.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.250. Action to recover a judgment for unpaid common expenses does not waive lien.

An action to recover a judgment for unpaid common expenses is maintainable without foreclosing or waiving the lien securing it.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.260. Causes of action relating to common areas and facilities.

  1. Without limiting the rights of an apartment owner, a cause of action may be brought by the manager or board of directors, in either case in the discretion of the board of directors, on behalf of two or more apartment owners, as their respective interests may appear, with respect to a cause of action relating to the common areas and facilities of more than one apartment.
  2. A cause of action relating to the common areas and facilities for damages arising out of tortious conduct may be maintained only against the association of apartment owners and a judgment lien or other charge is a common expense.  The judgment lien or charge is removed from an apartment and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities upon payment by the respective owner of the proportionate share based on the percentage of undivided interest owned by that owner.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Collateral references. —

Personal liability of owner of condominium unit to one sustaining personal injury or property damage by condition of common areas. 39 ALR4th 98.

Association’s liability to unit owner for injuries caused by third person’s criminal conduct. 59 ALR4th 489.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 ALR4th 165.

Sec. 34.07.270. Service of process on two or more apartment owners.

Service of process on two or more apartment owners in an action relating to the common areas and facilities of more than one apartment may be made on the person designated in the declaration to receive service of process.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.280. Receipts and expenditures records to be kept.

  1. The manager or board of directors shall keep detailed and accurate records in chronological order of the receipts and expenditures affecting the common areas and facilities, specifying and itemizing the maintenance and repair expenses of the common areas and facilities and any other expenses incurred.
  2. All books and records shall be kept in accordance with good accounting procedures.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963; am § 1 ch 85 SLA 1994)

Sec. 34.07.290. Examination by apartment owner of receipts and expenditures.

The receipts and expenditures records and vouchers authorizing payment for maintenance and repair of common areas and facilities required to be kept by AS 34.07.280 shall be available for examination by an apartment owner at convenient hours of weekdays.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 4. Damage or Destruction of Property.

Sec. 34.07.300. Determination to be made by apartment owners if property destroyed.

If within 60 days of damage or destruction of all or part of the property it is not determined by a majority of all apartment owners to repair, reconstruct, or rebuild in accordance with the original plan, or by a unanimous vote of all apartment owners to do otherwise, then

  1. the property shall be owned in common by the apartment owners;
  2. the undivided interest in the property owned in common that appertains to each apartment owner shall be the percentage of undivided interest previously owned by that owner in the common areas and facilities; and
  3. mortgages, deeds of trust, or liens affecting any of the apartments are transferred in accordance with the existing priorities to the percentage of the undivided interest of the apartment owner in the property.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.310. Action for partition if apartment owners fail to act.

An action for partition may be started by an apartment owner if the apartment owners fail to act under AS 34.07.300 after the damage to or destruction of the property.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.320. Distribution of funds from partition sale.

  1. The net proceeds of a sale of the property conducted in an action for partition started under AS 34.07.310 shall be considered as one fund.
  2. The fund shall be divided into separate shares, one for each apartment owner in a percentage equal to the percentage of undivided interest that the owner has in the property.
  3. After first paying out of the respective share of each apartment owner, all mortgages, deeds of trust, and liens on the undivided interest in the property owned by the apartment owner, the balance remaining in each share shall be distributed to each apartment owner respectively.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 5. Removal of Property From the Horizontal Property Regime.

Sec. 34.07.330. Removal of property from the provisions of this chapter.

All of the apartment owners may remove a property from the provisions of this chapter by a recorded instrument to that effect if the mortgagees, trustees, and holders of all liens affecting any of the apartments consent or agree, in either case by a recorded instrument, that their mortgages, deeds of trust, and liens are transferred to the percentage of the undivided interest of the apartment owner in the property under AS 34.07.340 .

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.340. Ownership of property upon removal from the provisions of this chapter.

  1. Upon removal of the property from the provisions of this chapter, the property is owned in common by the apartment owners.
  2. The undivided interest in the property owned in common that appertains to each apartment owner is the percentage of the undivided interest previously owned by the owners in the common areas and facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.350. Removal of property does not bar subsequent resubmission under this chapter.

The removal of property under AS 34.07.330 34.07.340 does not bar the subsequent resubmission of the property to the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 6. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 34.07.360. Strict compliance with bylaws by apartment owner necessary.

Each apartment owner shall comply strictly with the bylaws and with the adopted administrative regulations, as either may be lawfully amended from time to time, and with the covenants, conditions, and restrictions set out in the declaration or in the deed to the apartment. Failure to comply with any of the foregoing is ground for an action to recover sums due for damages or injunctive relief, or both, maintainable by the manager or board of directors on behalf of the association of apartment owners or by a particularly aggrieved apartment owner.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Carroll v. El Dorado Estates Div. No. Two Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1984); Dunlap v. Bavarian Village Condominium Ass'n, 780 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1989).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of statutes, or of condominium association’s bylaws or regulations, restricting number of units that may be owned by single individual or entity. 39 ALR4th 88.

Validity and enforceability of condominium owner’s covenant to pay dues or fees to sports or recreational facility. 39 ALR4th 129.

Sec. 34.07.370. Unanimous consent of all apartment owners needed for certain work on individual apartment.

An apartment owner may not do work that will jeopardize the soundness or safety of the property, reduce its value, or impair any easement or hereditament without the unanimous consent of all of the other apartment owners being first obtained.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.380. Common profits and expenses shared by apartment owners.

The common profits of the property shall be distributed among and the common expenses shall be charged to the apartment owners according to the percentage of the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.390. Persons subject to this chapter.

  1. An apartment owner, a tenant, or their employees, or any other person that may in any manner use the property or any part of it under this chapter are subject to the provisions of this chapter, and to the declaration and bylaws of the association of apartment owners adopted under this chapter.
  2. An agreement, decision, and determination made by the association of apartment owners under this chapter, the declaration, or the bylaws and in accordance with the voting percentages established under this chapter, declaration, or the bylaws is binding on all apartment owners.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.400. Insurance of property.

  1. A manager or board of directors, if required by the declaration, bylaws, or by a majority of the apartment owners, or if requested by a mortgagee or trustee having a mortgage or a deed of trust of record covering an apartment, shall obtain insurance for the property against loss or damage by fire and other hazards under the terms and amounts required or requested.
  2. The insurance coverage shall be written on the property in the name of the manager or of the board of directors of the association of apartment owners, as trustee for each of the apartment owners in the percentages established by the declaration.
  3. Premiums for insurance coverage secured under (a) of this section are a common expense.
  4. Provision for insurance under this section does not prejudice the right of an apartment owner to insure the owner’s apartment or the personal contents in it.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.410. Liens against property, apartments, common areas, and facilities.

  1. After the recording of the declaration as provided in this chapter, and while the property remains subject to this chapter, a lien may not arise or be effective against the property.  During this period, liens or encumbrances may arise or be created only against each apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to the apartment in the same manner and under the same conditions as liens or encumbrances may arise or be created upon or against any other separate parcel of real property subject to individual ownership. However, labor performed or materials furnished with the consent of or at the request of the owner of any apartment, or the owner’s agent, contractor, or subcontractor, may not be the basis for the filing of a lien against any other apartment or any other property of any other apartment owner not expressly consenting to or requesting the same. However, express consent is considered given by an apartment owner in the case of emergency repairs.
  2. Labor performed or materials furnished for the common areas and facilities, if authorized as provided in this chapter, or by the declaration or bylaws, or by the association of apartment owners, the manager, or the board of directors, is considered performed or furnished with the express consent of each apartment owner and may be the basis for the filing of a lien against each of the apartments and is subject to the provisions of AS 34.07.420 .

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.420. Removal of lien against two or more apartments.

  1. If a lien against two or more apartments becomes effective, the apartment owners of the separate apartments may remove their apartments and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to the apartments from the lien by payment of the fractional or proportional amounts attributable to each of the apartments affected.  The individual payments are computed by reference to the percentage appearing on the declaration.
  2. After payment, discharge, or satisfaction of the lien, the apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to it are free and clear of the liens paid, satisfied, or discharged.  The partial payment, satisfaction, or discharge does not prevent the lienor from proceeding to enforce the lienor’s rights against any apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to it not paid, satisfied, or discharged.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.430. Assessment and taxation of apartments.

  1. An apartment and its undivided interest in the common areas and facilities are a parcel and it is subject to separate assessments and taxation by each assessing unit for all types of taxes authorized by law including special ad valorem levies and special assessments.  A building, property, or any of the common areas and facilities may not be a security or a parcel for any purpose.
  2. Nothing in this chapter detracts from or limits the powers and duties of any assessing or taxing unit or official otherwise granted or imposed by law or regulation.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Sec. 34.07.440. Interpretation of local ordinances, resolutions, or zoning laws.

Local ordinances, resolutions, or laws relating to zoning shall be construed to treat like structures, lots, or parcels in like manner regardless of whether or not the ownership is divided by sale of apartments under this chapter rather than by lease of apartments.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Article 7. General Provisions.

Sec. 34.07.450. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “apartment” means a part of the property intended for any type of independent use, including one or more rooms or enclosed spaces located on one or more floors, or part or parts of the floors, in a building, regardless of whether or not it is destined for a residence, an office, the operation of any industry or business, or for any other use not prohibited by law, and that has a direct exit to a public street or highway, or to a common area leading to the street or highway; and the boundaries of an apartment are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and doors thereof, and the apartment includes both the portions of the building so described and the airspace so encompassed; and interpreting declarations, deeds, and plans, the existing physical boundaries of the apartment as originally constructed or as reconstructed in substantial accordance with the original plans shall be conclusively presumed to be its boundaries rather than the metes and bounds expressed or depicted in the declaration, deed, or plan, regardless of settling or lateral movement of the building and regardless of minor variance between boundaries shown in the declaration, deed, or plan and those of apartments in the building;
  2. “apartment number” means the number, letter, or a combination of them, designating the apartment in the recorded declaration;
  3. “apartment owner” means the person or persons owning an apartment in fee simple absolute or qualified, or by way of a periodic estate, or in any other manner in which real property may be owned in this state, together with an undivided interest in a like estate of the common areas and facilities in the percentage specified and established in the recorded declaration;
  4. “association of apartment owners” means all of the apartment owners acting as a group in accordance with the bylaws and with the recorded declaration;
  5. “building” means a building, containing two or more apartments, or two or more buildings each containing two or more apartments, and comprising a part of the property;
  6. “common areas and facilities” unless otherwise provided in the recorded declaration includes
    1. the land on which the building is located;
    2. the foundations, columns, girders, beams, supports, main walls, roofs, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairs, stairways, fire escapes, and entrances and exits of the building;
    3. the basements, yards, gardens, parking areas, and storage spaces;
    4. the premises for the lodging of janitors or persons in charge of the property;
    5. the installations of central services such as power, light, gas, hot and cold water, heating, refrigeration, air conditioning, and incinerating;
    6. the elevators, tanks, pumps, motors, fans, compressors, ducts, and in general all apparatus and installations existing for common use;
    7. the community and commercial facilities as provided for in the recorded declaration;
    8. all other parts of the property necessary or convenient to its existence, maintenance, and safety, or normally in common use;
  7. “common expenses” includes
    1. all sums lawfully assessed against the apartment owners by the association of apartment owners;
    2. expenses of administration, maintenance, repair, or replacement of the common areas and facilities;
    3. expenses agreed upon as common expenses by the association of apartment owners;
    4. expenses declared common expenses by the provisions of this chapter, or by the recorded declaration, or by the bylaws;
  8. “common profits” means the balance of all income, rents, profits, and revenues from the common areas and facilities remaining after the deduction of the common expenses;
  9. “declaration” means the instrument by which the property is submitted to provisions of this chapter and as it may be, from time to time amended;
  10. “land” means the material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance, and includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards, subject to limitations upon the use of airspace imposed, and rights in the use of the airspace granted by the laws of the state or of the United States;
  11. “limited common areas and facilities” includes those common areas and facilities designated in the recorded declaration, as reserved for use of certain apartment or apartments to the exclusion of the other apartments;
  12. “majority” or “majority of apartment owners” means the apartment owners with 51 percent or more of the votes in accordance with the percentages assigned in the recorded declaration to the apartments for voting purposes;
  13. “property” means the land, the building, all its improvements and structures, all owned in fee simple absolute or qualified or by way of a periodic estate, or in any other manner in which real property may be owned in the state, and all easements, rights, and appurtenances belonging to it, none of which shall be considered as a security or security interest, and all articles of personalty intended for use in connection with it, that have been or are intended to be submitted to this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1990 to alphabetize the defined terms.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Randle v. Bay Watch Condo. Ass'n, 488 P.3d 970 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 34.07.460. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Horizontal Property Regimes Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 44 SLA 1963)

Chapter 08. Common Interest Ownership.

Collateral references. —

15B Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Co-operative Apartments, § 1 et seq.

Patrick J. Rohan, Home Owner Associations and Planned Unit Developments — Law and Practice: Forms (Matthew Bender).

Patrick J. Rohan, Cooperative Housing Law and Practice: Forms (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Applicability.

Sec. 34.08.010. Applicability generally.

Except as provided in AS 34.08.030 , this chapter applies to each common interest community created within the state after January 1, 1986. The provisions of AS 10.15 and AS 34.07 do not apply to common interest communities created after January 1, 1986.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Galipeau v. Bixby, 476 P.3d 1129 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

Weilbacher v. Ring, 296 P.3d 32 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 34.08.020. Applicability to small cooperatives. [Repealed, § 10 ch 61 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 34.08.030. Applicability to limited expense liability planned communities.

If a planned community created after January 1, 1986, is not subject to any development rights and provides, in its declaration, that the annual average common expense liability of all units restricted to residential purposes, exclusive of optional user fees and any insurance premiums paid by the association, may not exceed $100, as adjusted under AS 34.08.820 , the planned community is subject only to AS 34.08.720 34.08.740 unless the declaration provides that the entire chapter is applicable.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 2 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Taffe v. First Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 450 P.3d 239 (Alaska 2019); Galipeau v. Bixby, 476 P.3d 1129 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 34.08.035. Prohibited subdivisions.

A declarant may not subdivide real property under single ownership into two or more common interest communities to avoid the application of this chapter.

History. (§ 3 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.08.040. Applicability to preexisting common interest communities.

Except as provided in AS 34.08.050 , the provisions of AS 34.08.110 , 34.08.120 , 34.08.290 , 34.08.320(a)(1) — (6) and (11) — (16), 34.08.420 , 34.08.470 , 34.08.490 , 34.08.510 , 34.08.590 , 34.08.670 , 34.08.720 , 34.08.730 , 34.08.740 , and 34.08.990 , to the extent necessary in construing any of those sections, apply to all common interest communities created in the state before January 1, 1986, except that the sections apply only with respect to events and circumstances occurring after January 1, 1986, and do not invalidate existing provisions of the declaration, bylaws, or plats or plans of the common interest communities.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 4 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 9, ch. 61, SLA 1986 provides that “in a condominium or cooperative created after January 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1986, the provisions of AS 34.08.040 apply to events and occurrences concerning the condominium or cooperative occurring after September 1, 1986.”

Sec. 34.08.050. Applicability to small preexisting cooperatives and planned communities.

If a cooperative or planned community created within the state before January 1, 1986 contains no more than 12 units and is not subject to any development rights, it is subject only to AS 34.08.720 34.08.740 , unless the declaration is amended in conformity with law and with the procedures and requirements of the declaration to take advantage of the provisions of AS 34.08.060 , in which case all the sections enumerated in AS 34.08.040 apply to the cooperative or planned community.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.060. Amendments to governing instruments.

  1. In amendments to the declaration, bylaws, or plats and plans of a common interest community created before January 1, 1986,
    1. if the result accomplished by the amendment was permitted by law prior to this chapter, the amendment may be made either in accordance with the former law, in which case that law applies to that amendment, or it may be made under this chapter; and
    2. if the result accomplished by the amendment is permitted by this chapter and was not permitted by law before January 1, 1986, the amendment may be made under this chapter.
  2. An amendment to the declaration, bylaws, or plats and plans authorized by this chapter must be adopted in conformity with law and with the procedures and requirements specified by the declaration, bylaws, or plats and plans.  If an amendment grants a person any right, power, or privilege permitted by this chapter, each correlative obligation, liability, and restriction in this chapter also applies to the person.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.070. Applicability to nonresidential common interest communities.

  1. With the exception of AS 34.08.720 34.08.740 , this chapter does not apply to a common interest community in which each unit is restricted exclusively to nonresidential use unless the declaration provides that the chapter does apply to the common interest community.
  2. This chapter applies to a common interest community containing some units that are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use and other units that are not restricted exclusively to nonresidential use only if the declaration provides that the chapter applies to the common interest community or the real estate comprising the units that may be used for residential purposes would be a common interest community in the absence of the units that may not be used for residential purposes.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.080. Applicability to out-of-state common interest communities.

This chapter does not apply to a common interest community or unit located outside the state, but AS 34.08.520 34.08.580 apply to a contract for the disposition of a common interest community or unit that is signed in the state by a party unless the disposition is exempt under AS 34.08.510(b) .

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Article 2. Creation, Alteration, and Termination of Common Interest Communities.

Sec. 34.08.090. Creation of common interest communities.

  1. A common interest community may be created under this chapter only by recording a declaration executed in the same manner as a deed and, in a cooperative, by conveying the real estate subject to the declaration to the association.  The declaration must be recorded, and a plat or plan that is part of the declaration filed and recorded, in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is located and must be indexed in the grantee’s index in the name of the common interest community and the association and in the grantor’s index in the name of each person executing the declaration.
  2. In a condominium, a declaration or an amendment to a declaration that adds a unit may not be recorded, and a plat or plan that is part of the declaration may not be filed or recorded, unless the structural components and mechanical systems of each building containing or comprising a unit of the condominium are completed substantially in accordance with the plans, as evidenced by a certificate of completion recorded with the declaration or amendment to the declaration and executed by
    1. an independent registered engineer, architect, or land surveyor;
    2. an appraiser with the designation of senior residential appraiser, senior real property appraiser, or senior real estate analyst of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers;
    3. a residential member, or member of the appraisal institute, of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers; or
    4. an individual with a designation established by regulation of the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation for fee appraisers who certify the completion of construction.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 12 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, 187 P.3d 1096 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 34.08.100. Unit boundaries.

Except as provided by the declaration

  1. if walls, floors, or ceilings are designated as boundaries of a unit, the lath, furring, wallboard, plasterboard, plaster, paneling, tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring, and other materials constituting a part of the finished surfaces of the walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of the unit, and all other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of the common elements;
  2. if a chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit, bearing wall, bearing column, or other fixture lies partially within and partially outside the designated boundaries of a unit, the portion serving only the unit is a limited common element allocated solely to the unit, and any portion serving more than one unit or a portion of the common elements is a part of the common elements;
  3. subject to (2) of this section, spaces, interior partitions, and other fixtures and improvements within the boundaries of a unit are a part of the unit;
  4. shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches, decks, balconies, patios, and each exterior door and window or other fixture designed to serve a single unit that is located outside the boundaries of the unit, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to the unit.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.110. Construction and validity of declaration and bylaws.

  1. Each provision of the declaration and bylaws is severable.
  2. The rule against perpetuities does not defeat any provision of the declaration, bylaws, rules, or regulations adopted under AS 34.08.320(a)(1) .
  3. In a conflict between the provisions of the declaration and the bylaws, the declaration prevails unless the declaration is inconsistent with this chapter.
  4. Title to a unit and common elements is not rendered unmarketable or otherwise affected by reason of an insubstantial failure of the declaration to comply with this chapter.  Whether a substantial failure impairs marketability is not affected by this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.120. Description of units.

A description of a unit that sets out the name of the common interest community, the recording data for the declaration, the recording district in which the common interest community is located, and the identifying number of the unit, is a legally sufficient description of the unit and all rights, obligations, and interests appurtenant to the unit that were created by the declaration or bylaws.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.130. Contents of declaration.

  1. The declaration must contain
    1. the names of the common interest community and the association and a statement that the common interest community is either a condominium, cooperative, or planned community;
    2. the name of each recording district in which a part of the common interest community is situated;
    3. a legally sufficient description of the real estate included in the common interest community;
    4. a statement of the maximum number of units that the declarant reserves the right to create;
    5. in a condominium or planned community, a description of the boundaries of each unit created by the declaration, including the identifying number of the unit, or in a cooperative, a description, which may be by plats or plans, of each unit created by the declaration, including the identifying number of the unit, its size or number of rooms, and its location within a building if it is within a building containing more than one unit;
    6. a description of any limited common elements, other than those specified in AS 34.08.100 (2) and (4) or 34.08.170 (b)(10) and, in a planned community, any real estate that is or must become common elements;
    7. a description of any real estate, except real estate subject to development rights, that may be allocated subsequently as limited common elements, other than limited common elements specified in AS 34.08.100 (2) and (4), together with a statement that the designated real estate may be allocated;
    8. a description of any development rights or other special declarant rights reserved by the declarant, together with a legally sufficient description of the real estate to which each of the rights applies, and a time limit within which each of the rights must be exercised;
    9. if a development right may be exercised with respect to different parcels of real estate at different times, a statement to that effect together with
      1. either a statement fixing the boundaries of the portions and regulating the order in which the portions may be subjected to the exercise of each development right or a statement that assurances are not made with regard to matters under this paragraph; and
      2. a statement as to whether, if a development right is exercised in a portion of the real estate subject to the development right, the development right must be exercised in all or in any other portion of the remainder of that real estate;
    10. any other condition or limitation under which the rights described in (8) of this subsection may be exercised or will lapse;
    11. an allocation to each unit of the allocated interests in the manner described in AS 34.08.150 ;
    12. any restrictions
      1. on use, occupancy, and alienation of the units, and
      2. on the amount for which a unit may be sold or on the amount that may be received by a unit owner on sale, condemnation, or casualty loss to the unit or to the common interest community, or on termination of the common interest community;
    13. the recording data for recorded easements and licenses appurtenant to or included in the common interest community or to which any portion of the common interest community is or may become subject by virtue of a reservation in the declaration; and
    14. each matter required by AS 34.08.140 , 34.08.150 , 34.08.160 , 34.08.170 , 34.08.230 , 34.08.240 and 34.08.330(d) .
  2. A declaration may contain other matters the declarant considers appropriate.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, 187 P.3d 1096 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 34.08.140. Leasehold common interest communities.

  1. If the expiration or termination of a lease or a memorandum of the lease will terminate the common interest community or reduce its size, the lease or a memorandum of the lease must be recorded.  In a condominium or planned community, the lessor of each lease described in this subsection shall sign the declaration.  The declaration must state
    1. the recording data for the lease or a summary of the complete lease;
    2. the date on which the lease is scheduled to expire;
    3. a legally sufficient description of the real estate subject to the lease;
    4. any right of the unit owners to redeem the reversion and the manner in which the rights may be exercised, or a statement that the unit owners do not have a right to redeem the reversion;
    5. any right of the unit owners to remove any improvements within a reasonable time after the expiration or termination of the lease, or a statement that the unit owners do not have the right to remove improvements after the expiration or termination of the lease; and
    6. any right of the unit owners to renew the lease and the conditions of the renewal, or a statement that the unit owners do not have the right to renew the lease.
  2. After the declaration for a leasehold condominium or leasehold planned community is recorded, and a plat or plan that is part of the declaration is filed and recorded, neither the lessor nor the successor in interest of the lessor may terminate the leasehold interest of a unit owner who makes timely payment of a unit owner’s share of the rent and otherwise complies with the covenants that, if violated, would entitle the lessor to terminate the lease.  The leasehold interest of a unit owner in a condominium or planned community is not affected by the failure of any other person to pay rent or fulfill a covenant.
  3. The acquisition of the leasehold interest of a unit owner by the owner of the reversion or remainder does not merge the leasehold and fee simple interests unless the leasehold interests of all unit owners subject to that reversion or remainder are acquired.
  4. If the expiration or termination of a lease decreases the number of units in a common interest community, the allocated interests must be reallocated under AS 34.08.740(a) as if the units had been taken by eminent domain.  The reallocation must be confirmed by an amendment to the declaration prepared, executed, and recorded by the association of unit owners; a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment must be filed and recorded with the amendment.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am §§ 13, 14 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.150. Allocation of allocated interests.

  1. The declaration must allocate
    1. to each unit in a condominium, a fraction or percentage of undivided interests in the common elements and in the common expenses of the association and a portion of the votes in the association;
    2. to each unit in a cooperative, an ownership interest in the association, a fraction or percentage of the common expenses of the association and a portion of the votes in the association; and
    3. to each unit in a planned community, a fraction or percentage of the common expenses of the association and a portion of the votes in the association.
  2. The declaration must state the formulas used to establish allocations of interests.  The allocations may not discriminate in favor of units owned by the declarant or an affiliate of the declarant.
  3. If a unit may be added to or withdrawn from the common interest community, the declaration must state the formulas to be used to reallocate the allocated interests among the units included in the common interest community after the addition or withdrawal.
  4. The declaration may provide (1) that different allocations of votes shall be made to the units on particular matters specified in the declaration; (2) for cumulative voting only for the purpose of electing members of the executive board; and (3) for class voting on specified issues affecting the class if necessary to protect valid interests of the class.  A declarant may not utilize cumulative or class voting for the purpose of evading any limitation imposed on declarants by this chapter nor may units constitute a class because they are owned by a declarant.
  5. Except for minor variations due to rounding, the sum of the common expense liabilities and, in a condominium, the sum of the undivided interests in the common elements allocated at any time to all the units must each equal one if stated as a fraction or 100 percent if stated as a percentage.  In the event of discrepancy between an allocated interest and the result derived from application of the pertinent formula, the allocated interest prevails.
  6. In a condominium, the common elements are not subject to partition, and any purported conveyance, encumbrance, judicial sale, or other voluntary or involuntary transfer of an undivided interest in the common elements made without the unit to which that interest is allocated is void.
  7. In a cooperative, any purported conveyance, encumbrance, judicial sale, or other voluntary or involuntary transfer of an ownership interest in the association made without the possessory interest in the unit to which that interest is related is void.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.160. Limited common elements.

  1. Except for the limited common elements described in AS 34.08.100 (2) and (4), the declaration must specify to which unit or units each limited common element is allocated.  An allocation may not be altered without the consent of the unit owners whose units are affected.
  2. Except as the declaration otherwise provides, a limited common element may be reallocated by an amendment to the declaration executed by the unit owners between or among whose units the reallocation is made.  The persons executing the amendment shall provide a copy of the amendment to the association, which shall record the amendment and file and record a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment. The amendment must be recorded, and an accompanying plat or plan filed and recorded, in the names of the parties and the common interest community.
  3. A common element not previously allocated as a limited common element may be allocated as a limited common element only under provisions in the declaration adopted under AS 34.08.130(a)(7) .  The allocation must be made by an amendment to the declaration.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 15 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.170. Plats and plans.

  1. Plats and plans are a part of the declaration and are required for all common interest communities except cooperatives. Separate plats and plans are not required by this chapter if the information required by this section is contained in either a plat or plan.  Each plat and plan must be clear and legible and contain a certification that the plat or plan contains the information required by this section.
  2. Each plat must show
    1. the name and a survey or general schematic map of the entire common interest community;
    2. the location and dimensions of the real estate not subject to development rights or subject only to the development right to withdraw, and the location and dimensions of each existing improvement within the real estate;
    3. a legally sufficient description of the real estate subject to development rights, labeled to identify the rights applicable to each parcel;
    4. the extent of each encroachment by or upon a portion of the common interest community;
    5. to the extent feasible, a legally sufficient description of each easement serving or burdening a portion of the common interest community;
    6. the location and dimensions of any vertical unit boundaries not shown or projected on plans filed and recorded under (d) of this section and the identifying number of the unit;
    7. the location with reference to an established datum of any horizontal unit boundaries not shown or projected on plans filed and recorded under (d) of this section and the identifying number of the unit;
    8. a legally sufficient description of any real estate in which the unit owners will own only an estate for years, labeled as “leasehold real estate”;
    9. the distance between noncontiguous parcels of real estate comprising the common interest community;
    10. the location and dimensions of limited common elements, including porches, decks, balconies, and patios, other than parking spaces and the other limited common elements described in AS 34.08.100 (2) and (4);
    11. in the case of real estate not subject to development rights, all other matters customarily shown on land surveys.
  3. A plat may also show the intended location and dimensions of a contemplated improvement to be constructed within the common interest community.  A contemplated improvement shown must be labeled either “MUST BE BUILT” or “NEED NOT BE BUILT.”
  4. To the extent not shown or projected on the plats, plans of the units must show or project
    1. the location and dimensions of the vertical boundaries of each unit, and the identifying number of the unit;
    2. any horizontal unit boundaries, with reference to an established datum, and the identifying number of the unit; and
    3. each unit in which the declarant has reserved the right to create additional units or common elements, identified appropriately.
  5. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, the horizontal boundaries of part of a unit located outside a building have the same elevation as the horizontal boundaries of the inside part and need not be depicted on the plats and plans.
  6. Upon the exercise of a development right, the declarant shall either file and record new plats and plans necessary to conform to the requirements of (a), (b), and (d) of this section, or file and record new certifications of plats and plans previously filed and recorded if the plats and plans otherwise conform to the requirements of (a), (b), and (d) of this section.
  7. A certification of a plat or plan required by this section or AS 34.08.090(b) shall be made by an independent registered surveyor, architect, or engineer.
  8. The state recorder shall prescribe the style, size, form, and quality of plats and plans filed and recorded under this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am §§ 16 — 18 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, 187 P.3d 1096 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 34.08.180. Exercise of development rights.

  1. To exercise a development right reserved under AS 34.08.130(a)(8) , a declarant shall prepare, execute, and record an amendment to the declaration, file and record a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment, and, in a condominium or planned community, comply with AS 34.08.170 . The declarant is the unit owner of the units created under the amendment. The amendment to the declaration must assign an identifying number to each new unit created, and, except in the case of subdivision or conversion of units described in (b) of this section, reallocate the allocated interests among all units. The amendment must describe common elements and any limited common elements created under the amendment and, in the case of limited common elements, designate the unit to which each is allocated to the extent required by AS 34.08.160 .
  2. A development right may be reserved within any real estate added to the common interest community if the amendment adding the real estate includes the matters required by AS 34.08.130 or 34.08.140 , and, in a condominium or planned community, if the plats and plans include the matters required by AS 34.08.170 .  This provision does not extend the time limit on the exercise of development rights imposed by the declaration under AS 34.08.130(a)(8) .
  3. Whenever a declarant exercises a development right to subdivide or convert a unit previously created into additional units, common elements, or both,
    1. if the declarant converts the unit entirely to common elements, the amendment to the declaration must reallocate all the allocated interests of the unit among the other units as if that unit had been taken by eminent domain; and
    2. if the declarant subdivides the unit into two or more units, whether or not any part of the unit is converted into common elements, the amendment to the declaration must reallocate all the allocated interests of the unit among the units created by the subdivision in any reasonable manner prescribed by the declarant.
  4. If the declaration under AS 34.08.130(a)(8) provides that all or a portion of the real estate is subject to a right of withdrawal:
    1. if all of the real estate is subject to withdrawal and the declaration does not describe separate portions of real estate subject to the right, none of the real estate may be withdrawn after a unit has been conveyed to a purchaser; and
    2. if a portion is subject to withdrawal, it may not be withdrawn after a unit in the portion has been conveyed to a purchaser.
  5. A declarant may terminate development rights by an amendment to the declaration.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 19 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.190. Alterations of units.

Subject to the provisions of the declaration and other provisions of law, a unit owner (1) may make an improvement or alteration to the unit that does not impair the structural integrity or mechanical systems or lessen the support of a portion of the common interest community; (2) may not change the appearance of the common elements or the exterior appearance of a unit or any portion of the common interest community without permission of the association; (3) after acquiring an adjoining unit or an adjoining part of an adjoining unit, may remove or alter an intervening partition or create apertures in the partition even if the partition in whole or in part is a common element, if the removal or alteration does not impair the structural integrity or mechanical systems or lessen the support of a portion of the common interest community and is completed according to applicable codes and in a skillful and workmanlike manner. Removal of partitions or creation of apertures under this paragraph is not an alteration of boundaries.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.200. Relocation of boundaries between adjoining units.

  1. Subject to the provisions of the declaration and other provisions of law, the boundaries between adjoining units may be relocated by an amendment to the declaration upon application to the association by the owners of the units.  If the owners of the adjoining units have specified a reallocation between their units of their allocated interests, the application must state the proposed reallocations.  Unless the executive board determines within 30 days that the reallocations are unreasonable, the association shall prepare an amendment that identifies the units involved and states the reallocations.  The amendment must be executed by those unit owners, contain words of conveyance between them, and, on recording, be indexed in the name of the grantor, the grantee, and the association.
  2. The association
    1. in a condominium or planned community shall prepare, file, and record plats or plans necessary to show the altered boundaries between adjoining units, and their dimensions and identifying numbers; and
    2. in a cooperative shall prepare and record amendments to the declaration, and file and record a plat or plan necessary to show or describe the altered boundaries between adjoining units and their dimensions and identifying numbers.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 20 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.210. Subdivision of units.

  1. If the declaration expressly permits it, a unit may be subdivided into two or more units.  Upon application of a unit owner to subdivide a unit, the association shall, subject to the provisions of the declaration and other provisions of law, prepare, execute, and record an amendment to the declaration subdividing the unit, including in a condominium or planned community filing and recording a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment.
  2. The amendment to the declaration must be executed by the owner of the unit to be subdivided, assign an identifying number to each unit created, and reallocate the allocated interests formerly allocated to the subdivided unit to the new units in any reasonable manner prescribed by the owner of the subdivided unit.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 21 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.220. Easement for encroachments.

If a unit or common element encroaches on another unit or common element, a valid easement for the encroachment exists. The easement does not relieve a unit owner of liability in case of wilful misconduct nor relieve a declarant or any other person of liability for failure to adhere to any plats and plans or, in a cooperative, to any representation in the public offering statement.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.230. Use for sales purposes.

  1. A declarant may maintain sales offices, management offices, and models in units or on common elements in the common interest community only if the declaration permits it and specifies the rights of a declarant with regard to their number, size, location, and relocation.  In a cooperative or condominium, a sales office, management office, or model not designated a unit by the declaration is a common element.  A declarant who ceases to be a unit owner ceases to have any rights under this section unless the unit is removed promptly from the common interest community under a right to remove reserved in the declaration.  A declarant may maintain signs on the common elements advertising the common interest community subject to any limitations in the declaration.
  2. Rights granted under this section are subject to state law and to municipal ordinance.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.240. Easement rights.

  1. Subject to the provisions of the declaration, a declarant has an easement through the common elements as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of discharging the declarant’s obligations or exercising special declarant rights, whether arising under this chapter or reserved in the declaration.
  2. In a planned community, subject to the provisions of AS 34.08.320(a)(6) and 34.08.430 , a unit owner has an easement
    1. in the common elements for purposes of access to their units; and
    2. to use the common elements and all real estate that must become common elements for all other purposes.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Collateral references. —

What constitutes, and remedies for, misuse of easement. 111 ALR5th 313.

Sec. 34.08.250. Amendment of declaration.

  1. Except for amendments that may be executed by a declarant under AS 34.08.170(b) or 34.08.180 , by the association under AS 34.08.140(d) , 34.08.160(c) , 34.08.200(a) , 34.08.210 , or 34.08.740 , or by certain unit owners under AS 34.08.160(b) , 34.08.200(a) , 34.08.210 (b), or 34.08.260(b) , and except as limited by (d) or required by (f) of this section, a declaration, including any required plats and plans, may be amended only by vote or agreement of unit owners of units comprising either at least 67 percent of the allocated interests in the association or a larger percentage specified in the declaration. A declaration may not specify a smaller number unless all of the units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use.
  2. An action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted by the association under this section may not be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded.
  3. Each amendment to the declaration must be recorded, and a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment filed and recorded, in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is located and the amendment is effective only upon recording.  An amendment, except an amendment under AS 34.08.200(a) , must be indexed in the name of the common interest community and the association and in the name of the parties executing the amendment.
  4. Except to the extent expressly permitted or required in this chapter, an amendment may not create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change the boundaries of a unit, the allocated interests of a unit, or the uses to which a unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners.
  5. An amendment to the declaration required by this chapter to be recorded by the association must be prepared, executed, recorded, and certified on behalf of the association by an officer of the association designated for that purpose or, in the absence of designation, by the president of the association.
  6. The time limits specified in a declaration described under AS 34.08.130(a)(8) may be extended and additional development rights created if persons entitled to cast at least 80 percent of the votes in the association, including 80 percent of the votes allocated to units not owned by the declarant, agree to the extension or additional development rights. The agreement is effective 30 days after an amendment to the declaration reflecting the terms of the agreement is recorded unless all persons holding special declarant rights affected by the amendment or security interests in those rights
    1. record a written objection within the 30-day period, in which case, the amendment is void; or
    2. consent in writing when the amendment is recorded, in which case, the amendment is effective when recorded.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 22 ch 161 SLA 1988; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 29 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.08.255. Amendment of a declaration where fewer than 50 percent of unit owners approve.

  1. If a declaration requires owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association in a single class voting structure or unit owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in more than one class in a voting structure with more than one class to vote in favor of an amendment in order to amend a declaration, the association or a unit owner may petition the superior court for the judicial district in which the common interest community is located for an order reducing the percentage of the affirmative votes necessary for the adoption of the amendment.  The petition shall describe the efforts that have been made to solicit the approval of the unit owners in the association in the manner required by the declaration, the number of affirmative and negative votes actually received, the number of percentage of affirmative votes required to adopt the amendment under the declaration, and any other matter the petitioner considers relevant to the determination of the court.  The petition must include as exhibits to the petition a copy of
    1. the governing documents;
    2. a complete text of the amendments;
    3. a copy of each notice and the solicitation materials used in the solicitation of the approval of the amendment by the unit owners;
    4. an explanation of the reason for the amendment;
    5. other documentation relevant to the determination by the court.
  2. When the petition is filed with the superior court, the court shall set the matter for hearing and issue an ex parte order setting out the manner in which notice shall be given to the unit owners in the association.
  3. The court may, but is not required to, grant the petition if it finds that
    1. the petitioner has given not less than 15 days’ written notice of the court hearing to
      1. each unit owner in the association;
      2. a mortgagee of a mortgage or beneficiary of a deed of trust that is entitled to notice under the provisions of the declaration; and
      3. the municipality in which the common interest community is located if it is entitled to notice under the declaration;
    2. the balloting on the proposed amendment was conducted under each of the applicable provisions of the declaration, bylaws, and rules or regulations of the association;
    3. a reasonably diligent effort was made to permit each eligible unit owner to vote on the proposed amendment;
    4. in a common interest community with a single class voting structure, unit owners with more than 50 percent of the votes voted in favor of the amendment;
    5. in a voting structure with more than one class and where the declaration requires a majority of more than one class to vote in favor of the amendment, unit owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in each class required by the declaration to vote in favor of the amendment did vote in favor of the amendment;
    6. the amendment is reasonable; and
    7. granting the petition is appropriate considering the circumstances.
  4. If the court makes the findings required in (c) of this section, an order issued under this section may
    1. confirm the amendment as being validly approved on the basis of the affirmative votes actually received during the balloting period; or
    2. dispense with a requirement relating to quorums or to the percentage of votes needed for approval of an amendment under the governing documents.
  5. A court may not approve an amendment to a declaration under this section that
    1. would change the provision in a declaration requiring the approval of unit owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in more than one class to vote in favor of an amendment unless more than 50 percent of the unit owners in each affected class of unit owners approve the amendment;
    2. would eliminate a special right, preference, or privilege designated in the declaration as belonging to the declarant without the approval of the declarant; or
    3. would impair the security interest of a mortgagee of a mortgage or the beneficiary of a deed of trust without the approval of the percentage of the mortgagees and beneficiaries specified in the declaration if the declaration requires the approval of a specified percentage of the mortgagees and beneficiaries.
  6. An amendment to the declaration approved under this section is not effective until the order of the court and the amendment have been recorded in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is located.  The amendment may be acknowledged by, and the court order and amendment may be recorded by, an individual designated in the declaration or by the association and, if no one is designated for that purpose, by the president of the association.  On the recording of the amendment and the court order, the declaration, as amended under this section, has the same force and effect as if the amendment were adopted in compliance with the declaration.
  7. Within a reasonable time after the recording of the amendment under (f) of this section, the association shall mail a copy of the amendment to each unit owner in the association together with a statement that the amendment has been recorded.

History. (§ 5 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.08.260. Termination of common interest community.

  1. Unless all units are taken by eminent domain, or unless there has been a foreclosure of a security interest that has priority over the declaration against an entire cooperative, a common interest community may be terminated only by agreement of unit owners of units comprising either at least 80 percent of the votes in the association or any larger percentage specified in the declaration.  The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if all of the units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential uses.
  2. An agreement to terminate must be evidenced by the execution of a termination agreement or ratification of an agreement to terminate, in the same manner as a deed is executed by the required number of unit owners.  The termination agreement must specify a date after which the agreement will be void unless it is recorded before that date.  A termination agreement and each ratification of the termination agreement must be recorded in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is situated.  A termination agreement is effective only upon recording.
  3. If a condominium or planned community contains only units having horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, a termination agreement may provide that all of the common elements and units of the common interest community must be sold following termination.  If, under the agreement, any real estate in the common interest community is to be sold following termination, the termination agreement must set out the minimum terms of the sale.
  4. If a condominium or planned community contains a unit not having horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, a termination agreement may provide for sale of the common elements, but it may not require that the unit be sold following termination unless the declaration as originally recorded provided otherwise or unless all unit owners consent to the sale.
  5. The association, on behalf of the unit owners, may contract for the sale of real estate in a common interest community, but the contract is not binding on the unit owners until approved under (a) and (b) of this section.  If real estate is to be sold following termination, title to the real estate, upon termination, vests in the association as trustee for the holders of all interests in the units. The association has at that time all powers necessary and appropriate to effect the sale.  Until the sale has been concluded and the proceeds of the sale distributed, the association continues in existence with all powers it had before termination.  Proceeds of the sale must be distributed to unit owners and lien holders as their interests may appear under (h), (i), and (j) of this section.  Unless otherwise specified in the termination agreement, as long as the association holds title to the real estate, each unit owner and the successor in interest of each unit owner has an exclusive right to occupancy of the portion of the real estate that formerly constituted the unit.  During the period of that occupancy, each unit owner and the successors in interest of each unit owner remain liable for all assessments and other obligations imposed on unit owners by this chapter or the declaration.
  6. In a condominium or planned community, if the real estate constituting the common interest community is not to be sold following termination, title to the common elements and, in a common interest community containing only units having horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, title to all the real estate in the common interest community, vests in the unit owners upon termination as tenants in common in proportion to their respective interests under (j) of this section, and liens on the units shift accordingly.  While the tenancy in common exists, each unit owner and the successors in interest of each unit owner have an exclusive right to occupancy of the portion of the real estate that formerly constituted the unit.
  7. Following termination of the common interest community, the proceeds of any sale of real estate, together with the assets of the association, are held by the association as trustee for unit owners and holders of liens on the units as their interests may appear.
  8. Following termination of a condominium or planned community, a creditor of the association holding a lien on the units that was reduced to judgment and recorded before termination, may enforce the lien in the same manner as any other lien holder. Each other creditor of the association shall be treated as if the creditor had perfected a lien on the units immediately before termination.
  9. In a cooperative, the declaration may provide that each creditor of the association has priority over the interests of unit owners and creditors of unit owners.  In that event, following termination, a creditor of the association holding a lien on the cooperative that was reduced to judgment and recorded before termination may enforce the lien in the same manner as a lien holder, and each other creditor of the association shall be treated as if the creditor had perfected a lien against the cooperative immediately before termination.  Unless the declaration provides that all creditors of the association have that priority (1) the lien of each creditor of the association that was perfected against the association before termination becomes, upon termination, a lien against the interest of each unit owner in the unit as of the date the lien was perfected; (2) any other creditor of the association shall be treated upon termination as if the creditor had perfected a lien against the interest of each unit owner immediately before termination; (3) the amount of the lien of an association’s creditor described in (1) and (2) of this subsection against the interest of each unit owner must be proportionate to the ratio which the common expense liability of each unit bears to the common expense liability of all of the units; (4) the lien of each creditor of each unit owner that was perfected before termination continues as a lien against the unit as of the date the lien was perfected; and (5) the assets of the association must be distributed to each unit owner and each lien holder as their interests may appear in the order described in this section.  Creditors of the association are not entitled to payment from a unit owner in excess of the amount of the creditor’s lien against the interest of the unit owner.
  10. The respective interests of each unit owner referred to in (e) — (i) of this section are as follows:
    1. except as provided in (2) of this subsection, the respective interest of each unit owner is the fair market value of the unit, allocated interests, and any limited common elements immediately before the termination, as determined by one or more independent appraisers selected by the association; the decision of the independent appraisers must be distributed to the unit owners and becomes final unless disapproved within 30 days after distribution by unit owners of units comprising 25 percent of the allocated interests in the association; the proportion of each unit owner’s interest to that of all unit owners is determined by dividing the fair market value of the unit and its allocated interests by the total fair market value of all units and their allocated interests;
    2. if a unit or a limited common element is destroyed to the extent that an appraisal of the fair market value of the unit or the limited common interest before destruction cannot be made, the interests of all unit owners are,
      1. in a condominium, their respective common element interests immediately before the termination;
      2. in a cooperative, their respective ownership interests immediately before the termination; and
      3. in a planned community, their respective common expense liabilities immediately before the termination.
  11. In a condominium or planned community, except as provided in (l) of this section, foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against the entire common interest community does not, of itself, terminate the common interest community, and foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against a portion of the common interest community, other than withdrawable real estate, does not withdraw the portion from the common interest community. Foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against withdrawable real estate does not withdraw, of itself, the real estate from the common interest community, but the person taking title to the real estate may require from the association, upon request, an amendment excluding the real estate from the common interest community.
  12. In a condominium or planned community, if a lien or encumbrance against a portion of the real estate comprising the common interest community has priority over the declaration and the lien or encumbrance has not been partially released, the parties foreclosing the lien or encumbrance, upon foreclosure, may record an instrument excluding the real estate subject to the lien or encumbrance from the common interest community.
  13. A declaration that specifies a termination date but that does not contain a provision for the extension of the termination date may be extended
    1. by the approval of the unit owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association;
    2. by the approval of the unit owners having the percentage of votes as specified in the declaration for an amendment to the declaration; or
    3. if the approval of unit owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association is required to amend the declaration, under AS 34.08.255 .
  14. An amendment to a declaration under (m) of this section becomes effective when it has been recorded in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is located.
  15. A single extension of the terms of a declaration made under this section may not exceed the initial term of the declaration or 20 years, whichever is less.  More than one extension of the term may occur under this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 6 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.08.270. Rights of secured lenders.

  1. A financial institution, including a commercial bank, mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union and mortgage company when acting as an ordinary money lender, whether secured or not, and providing financing for a common interest community subject to the provisions of this chapter or to a declarant, unit owner, or purchaser for that person’s interest subject to the provisions of this chapter, is not liable under this chapter to a person for an act, omission, warranty, product or structural defect, obligation, breach of contract or other duty arising from common interest community financing.
  2. For purposes of this section, “acting as an ordinary money lender” means a non-negligent action including, but not limited to, property inspections, review of public offering statements, approval of declarations, plats and construction plans and requiring proof of compliance with laws or codes to protect a lender’s security interest or otherwise assure the proper use of or repayment of its loan.  A lender does not act as an ordinary money lender when it is an affiliate of the declarant or possesses a direct equity interest other than an interest foreclosed upon in the promotion, development, and sale of a common interest.
  3. A declaration may require that all or a specified number or percentage of the lenders who hold security interests encumbering the units approve specified actions of the unit owners or the association as a condition to the effectiveness of the action, but a requirement for approval does not operate to
    1. deny or delegate control over the general administrative affairs of the association by the unit owners or the executive board;
    2. prevent the association or the executive board from commencing, intervening in, or settling any litigation or proceeding; or
    3. prevent an insurance trustee or the association from receiving and distributing insurance proceeds except under AS 34.08.440 .

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.280. Master associations.

  1. If the declaration provides that a power described in AS 34.08.320 is to be exercised by or may be delegated to a profit or nonprofit corporation that exercises those or other powers on behalf of one or more common interest communities or for the benefit of the unit owners of one or more common interest communities, each provision of this chapter applicable to a unit owners’ association applies to the corporation, except as modified by this section.
  2. Unless it is acting in the capacity of an association described in AS 34.08.310 , a master association may exercise the powers set out in AS 34.08.320(a)(2) only to the extent expressly permitted in the declarations of common interest communities that are part of the master association or expressly described in the delegation of power from the common interest communities to the master association.
  3. If the declaration of a common interest community provides that the executive board may delegate certain powers to a master association, the members of the executive board of the common interest community are not liable for an act or omission of the master association with respect to the delegated powers following the delegation.
  4. The rights and responsibilities of unit owners with respect to the unit owners’ association under AS 34.08.330 , 34.08.390 , 34.08.400 , 34.08.410 , and 34.08.430 apply in the conduct of the affairs of a master association only to persons who elect the board of a master association, whether or not those persons are otherwise unit owners within the meaning of this chapter.
  5. If a master association is also an association described in AS 34.08.310 , the certificate of incorporation or other instrument creating the master association and each declaration of a common interest community that had assigned powers by the declaration or that has delegated powers to the master association, may provide that the executive board of the master association must be elected after the period of declarant control in one of the following ways:
    1. each unit owner of all common interest communities subject to the master association may elect all members of the executive board of the master association;
    2. the members of the executive boards of all common interest communities subject to the master association may elect the members of the executive board of the master association;
    3. the unit owners of each common interest community subject to the master association may elect specified members of the executive board of the master association;
    4. the members of the executive board of each common interest community subject to the master association may elect specified members of the executive board of the master association.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.290. Merger or consolidation of common interest communities.

  1. Any two or more common interest communities of the same form of ownership, by agreement of the unit owners under (b) of this section, may be merged or consolidated into a single common interest community.  On the merger or consolidation, unless the agreement otherwise provides, the resulting common interest community is the legal successor, for all purposes, of the preexisting common interest communities, and the operations and activities of each association of the preexisting common interest communities are merged or consolidated into a single association that holds all powers, rights, obligations, assets, and liabilities of all preexisting associations.
  2. An agreement of two or more common interest communities to merge or consolidate under (a) of this section must be evidenced by an agreement prepared, executed, recorded, and certified by the president of the association of each of the preexisting common interest communities following approval by owners of units comprising the percentage of votes in each common interest community required to terminate the common interest community.  The agreement must be recorded in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is located and is not effective until recorded.
  3. Each merger or consolidation agreement must provide for the reallocation of the allocated interests in the new association among the units of the resultant common interest community either (1) by stating the reallocations or the formulas upon which they are based or (2) by stating the percentage of overall allocated interests of the new common interest community that are allocated to all of the units comprising each of the preexisting common interest communities, and providing that the portion of the percentages allocated to each unit formerly comprising a part of the preexisting common interest community must be equal to the percentages of allocated interests allocated to the unit by the declaration of the preexisting common interest community.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.300. Addition of unspecified real estate.

In a planned community, if the right is originally reserved in the declaration, the declarant, in addition to any other development right, may amend the declaration at any time during as many years as are specified in the declaration for adding additional real estate to the planned community without describing the location of the real estate in the original declaration. The amount of real estate added to the planned community under this section may not exceed 10 percent of the real estate described in AS 34.08.130(a)(3) and the declarant may not in any event increase the number of units in the planned community beyond the number stated in the original declaration under AS 34.08.130(a)(4) .

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Article 3. Management of the Common Interest Community.

Collateral references. —

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 ALR4th 165.

Sec. 34.08.310. Organization of unit owners’ association.

An association of unit owners must be organized no later than the date on which the first unit in the common interest community is conveyed. The membership of the association at all times consists exclusively of all unit owners or, following termination of the common interest community, of all former unit owners entitled to distributions of proceeds under AS 34.08.260 or their heirs, successors, or assigns. The association must be organized as a profit or nonprofit corporation, trust, or partnership.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.320. Powers of unit owners’ association.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section and subject to the provisions of the declaration, the association may
    1. adopt and amend bylaws and rules and regulations;
    2. adopt and amend budgets for revenues, expenditures, and reserves and collect assessments for common expenses from unit owners;
    3. hire and discharge managing agents and other employees, agents, and independent contractors;
    4. institute, defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings or seek injunctive relief for violations of its declaration, bylaws, or rules in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting the common interest community;
    5. make contracts and incur liabilities;
    6. regulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification of common elements;
    7. cause additional improvements to be made as a part of the common elements;
    8. acquire, hold, encumber, and convey in its own name any right, title, or interest to real estate or personal property, except that
      1. common elements in a condominium or planned community may be conveyed or subjected to a security interest only under AS 34.08.430 ; and
      2. part of a cooperative may be conveyed or all or part of a cooperative may be subjected to a security interest only under AS 34.08.430 ;
    9. grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions through or over the common elements;
    10. impose and receive a payment, fee, or charge for the use, rental, or operation of the common elements, other than limited common elements described in AS 34.08.100 (2) and (4), and for services provided to unit owners;
    11. impose a reasonable charge for late payment of assessments and, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, levy a reasonable fine for a violation of the declaration, bylaws, rules, and regulations of the association;
    12. impose a reasonable charge for the preparation and recording of an amendment to the declaration, the filing and recording of a plat or plan that accompanies an amendment, resale certificate required by AS 34.08.590 , or a statement of unpaid assessments;
    13. provide for the indemnification of its officers and executive board and maintain directors’ and officers’ liability insurance;
    14. assign its right to future income, including the right to receive common expense assessments, but only to the extent the declaration expressly permits the assignment;
    15. exercise any other powers conferred by the declaration or bylaws;
    16. exercise any other power that may be exercised in the state by a legal entity of the same type as the association; and
    17. exercise any other power necessary and proper for the governance and operation of the association.
  2. The declaration may not impose limitations on the power of the association to deal with the declarant that are more restrictive than the limitations imposed on the power of the association to deal with other persons.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 23 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Assessment is an unmatured debt. —

When the announcement of an assessment predates the due date, the assessment is best viewed as an unmatured obligation, a debt for which the sum is certain though the time for payment is deferred. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Typically an association board will adopt a budget for planned expenses, enact an assessment to meet these expenses, and set a deadline for payment; the assessment exists even though it might not be immediately payable. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Contracts to pay for assessments. —

Where an estate representative contracted to sell a condominium unit to the buyer and agreed to pay any assessments due at closing, the estate breached the contract when it failed to pay the assessment. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Applied in

Stadnicky v. Southpark Terrace Homeowner's Ass'n, 939 P.2d 403 (Alaska 1997).

Collateral references. —

Right of condominium association’s management or governing body to inspect individual units. 41 ALR4th 730.

Sec. 34.08.330. Executive board members and officers.

  1. Except as provided in the declaration, the bylaws, (b) of this section, or other provisions of this chapter, the executive board may act in all instances on behalf of the association. In the performance of their duties, the officers and members of the executive board are required to exercise the care required of fiduciaries of the unit owners.
  2. The executive board may not act on behalf of the association to amend the declaration, to terminate the common interest community, or to elect members of the executive board or determine the qualifications, powers and duties, or terms of office of executive board members, but the executive board may fill vacancies in its membership for the unexpired portion of a term.
  3. Within 30 days after adoption of a proposed budget for the common interest community, the executive board shall provide a summary of the budget to each unit owner, and shall set a date for a meeting of the unit owners to consider ratification of the budget not less than 14 nor more than 30 days after mailing of the summary.  Unless at that meeting a majority of all unit owners or any larger vote specified in the declaration reject the budget, the budget is ratified, whether or not a quorum is present.  If the proposed budget is rejected, the periodic budget last ratified by the unit owners continues until the unit owners ratify a budget proposed by the executive board.
  4. Subject to (e) of this section, the declaration may provide for a period of declarant control of the association, during which a declarant or persons designated by the declarant may appoint and remove the officers and members of the executive board.  Regardless of the period provided in the declaration, a period of declarant control terminates no later than the earlier of: (1) 60 days after conveyance of 75 percent of the units that may be created to unit owners other than a declarant; (2) two years after all declarants have ceased to offer units for sale in the ordinary course of business; or (3) two years after any right to add new units was last exercised.  A declarant may voluntarily surrender the right to appoint and remove officers and members of the executive board before termination of the periods established in this subsection, but in that event the declarant may require, for the duration of the period of declarant control, that specified actions of the association or executive board, as described in a recorded instrument executed by the declarant, be approved by the declarant before they become effective.
  5. Not later than 60 days after conveyance of 25 percent of the units that may be created to unit owners other than a declarant, at least one member and not less than 25 percent of the members of the executive board must be elected by unit owners other than the declarant.  Not later than 60 days after conveyance of 50 percent of the units that may be created to unit owners other than a declarant, not less than 331/3 percent of the members of the executive board must be elected by unit owners other than the declarant.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in AS 34.08.280(e) , not later than the termination of any period of declarant control, the unit owners shall elect an executive board. The executive board consists of at least three members, except that if there are fewer than 12 units in the common interest community, the declaration may provide for an executive board with one or two members.  At least a majority of the members of the executive board must be unit owners.  The executive board shall elect the officers.  The executive board members and officers take office upon election.
  7. Notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary, following notice under AS 34.08.390 , the unit owners, by a two-thirds vote of all persons present and entitled to vote at a meeting of the unit owners at which a quorum is present, may remove a member of the executive board with or without cause, other than a member appointed by the declarant.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1999).

Cited in

Weilbacher v. Ring, 296 P.3d 32 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 34.08.340. Transfer of association control.

  1. Before or not more than 60 days after the termination of declarant control, the declarant shall relinquish control of the common interest community and the unit owners shall accept control.  At the same time, the declarant shall deliver to the common interest community all property of the unit owners and of the common interest community held or controlled by the declarant including, but not limited to
    1. the original or a photocopy of the recorded declaration and each amendment to the declaration; if a photocopy is provided, it shall be certified by affidavit of the declarant, or an officer or agent of the declarant, as being a complete copy of the actual recorded declaration;
    2. a certified copy of the common interest community articles of incorporation, trust or partnership agreement;
    3. a copy of the bylaws;
    4. the minute books, including all minutes, and other books and records of the common interest community;
    5. the rules and regulations that have been adopted;
    6. resignations of officers and members of the executive board who are required to resign because the declarant is required to relinquish control of the common interest community;
    7. the financial records, including financial statements of the common interest community, and source documents since the incorporation of the common interest community through the date of turnover;
    8. common interest community funds or control of the funds of the common interest community;
    9. all tangible personal property that is property of the common interest community, represented by the declarant to be the property of the association or ostensibly the property of the association and an inventory of the property;
    10. a copy of the plans and specifications utilized in the construction or remodeling of improvements and the supplying of equipment to the common interest community and in the construction and installation of all mechanical components serving the improvements and the site, with a certificate in affidavit form of the declarant or an architect or engineer authorized to practice in the state that the plans and specifications represent, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the actual plans and specifications utilized in the construction and improvement of the common interest community property and for the construction and installation of the mechanical components serving the improvements;
    11. insurance policies;
    12. copies of any certificates of occupancy that may have been issued for the common interest community property;
    13. any other permits issued by governmental bodies applicable to the common interest community property in force or issued within one year before the date the unit owners other than the declarant take control of the common interest community;
    14. all written warranties of the contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, and manufacturers, if any, that are still effective;
    15. a roster of unit owners and their addresses and telephone numbers, if known, as shown on the declarant’s records;
    16. leases of the common elements and other leases to which the association is a party;
    17. employment contracts or service contracts in which the common interest community is one of the contracting parties or service contracts in which the common interest community or the unit owners have an obligation or responsibility, directly or indirectly, to pay some or all of the fee or charge of the person performing the service;
    18. all other contracts to which the common interest community is a party.
  2. The records shall be reviewed by an independent certified public accountant.  The minimum report required is a review in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards as defined by regulation by the Board of Public Accountancy.  The accountant performing the review shall examine to the extent necessary supporting documents and records, including the cash disbursements and related paid invoices to determine if expenditures were for the common interest community purposes and the billings, cash receipts, and related records to determine that the declarant was charged and paid the proper amounts of assessments.
  3. Before the transfer of control from the declarant to the association, an inspection of the common areas and limited common areas subject to the association’s control shall be completed by
    1. an independent registered engineer, architect, or land surveyor;
    2. an appraiser with the designation of senior residential appraiser, senior real property appraiser, or senior real estate analyst of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers;
    3. a residential member, or member of the appraisal institute, of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers; or
    4. an individual with a designation established by regulation of the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation for fee appraisers who certify the completion of construction.
  4. A report shall be prepared indicating the incomplete work and repairs needed and the method of completing the work and making the repairs.  The transfer of control to the association shall be based upon the declarant’s obligation to complete all repairs and finish all incomplete work within a reasonable time after transfer of control under representations in the public offering statement.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990, in (c)(3) of this section after the first occurrence of “member”, a comma was inserted and after the second occurrence of “member” a comma was deleted and “of the” was added to correct a manifest error in ch. 95, SLA 1985.

Sec. 34.08.350. Transfer of special declarant rights.

  1. A special declarant right created or reserved under this chapter may be transferred only by an instrument evidencing the transfer that has been recorded in each recording district in which any portion of the common interest community is located. The instrument is not effective unless executed by the transferee.
  2. Upon transfer of any special declarant right, the liability of a transferor declarant is as follows:
    1. a transferor is not relieved of an obligation or liability arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty obligations imposed by this chapter; lack of privity does not deprive a unit owner of standing to maintain an action to enforce an obligation of the transferor;
    2. if a successor to a special declarant right is an affiliate of a declarant, the transferor is jointly and severally liable with the successor for an obligation or liability of the successor relating to the common interest community;
    3. if a transferor retains a special declarant right but transfers other special declarant rights to a successor who is not an affiliate of the declarant, the transferor is liable for an obligation or liability imposed on a declarant by this chapter or by the declaration relating to the retained special declarant right and arising after the transfer;
    4. a transferor is not liable for any act or omission or any breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the exercise of a special declarant right by a successor declarant who is not an affiliate of the transferor.
  3. Unless otherwise provided in a mortgage instrument, deed of trust, or other agreement creating a security interest, on the foreclosure of a security interest, sale by a trustee under an agreement creating a security interest, tax sale, judicial sale, or sale under Bankruptcy Act or receivership proceedings of a unit owned by a declarant or of real estate in a common interest community subject to development rights, the person acquiring title to the property being foreclosed or sold, but only upon the request of the person, succeeds either (1) to the special declarant rights related to the property held by the declarant, or (2) only to any rights reserved in the declaration under AS 34.08.230 and held by that declarant to maintain models, sales offices, and signs.  The judgment or instrument conveying title must provide for transfer of only the special declarant rights requested.
  4. Upon foreclosure of a security interest, sale by a trustee under an agreement creating a security interest, tax sale, judicial sale, or sale under Bankruptcy Act or receivership proceedings, of the interests in a common interest community owned by a declarant
    1. the declarant ceases to have special declarant rights, and
    2. the period of declarant control terminates unless the judgment or instrument conveying title provides for transfer of the special declarant rights held by the declarant to a successor declarant.
  5. The liabilities and obligations of a person who succeeds to special declarant rights are as follows:
    1. a successor to any special declarant right who is an affiliate of a declarant is subject to the obligations and liabilities imposed on the transferor by this chapter or by the declaration;
    2. a successor to any special declarant right, other than a successor described in (3) or (4) of this subsection or a successor who is an affiliate of a declarant, is subject to the obligations and liabilities imposed by this chapter or the declaration
      1. on a declarant that relate to the successor’s exercise or nonexercise of special declarant rights; or
      2. on the transferor, other than
        1. misrepresentations by a previous declarant;
        2. warranty obligations on improvements made by a previous declarant or made before the common interest community was created;
        3. breach of a fiduciary obligation by a previous declarant or the appointees of a previous declarant to the executive board; or
        4. a liability or obligation imposed on the transferor as a result of the acts or omissions of the transferor after the transfer;
    3. a successor to a right reserved in the declaration only to maintain models, sales offices, and signs may not exercise any other special declarant right and is not subject to liability or obligation as a declarant except the obligation to provide a public offering statement and liability arising as a result of the statement;
    4. a successor to the special declarant rights held by a transferor who succeeded to the rights under a deed or other instrument of conveyance in lieu of foreclosure or under a judgment or instrument conveying title under (c) of this section may declare in a recorded instrument, including one conveying title under (c) of this section
      1. an intention to hold the rights solely for transfer to another person; or
      2. an intention to hold the rights for transfer to another person after making, finishing, or completing improvements in conformity with the declaration, consistent with the public offering statement, plans, and overall development scheme of the common interest community for purposes of preserving or improving the common interest community.
  6. Until transferring the special declarant rights to a person acquiring title to a unit or real estate subject to the development rights owned by the successor, or until recording an instrument permitting exercise of all those rights, the successor may not exercise any of the rights other than those specified in (e)(4)(B) of this section and the right held by the transferor of the successor to control the executive board under AS 34.08.330(d) for the duration of any period of declarant control and an attempted exercise of rights is void.
  7. So long as a successor declarant may not exercise special declarant rights under (e) of this section, and for purposes of (e)(4)(B) of this section so long as the successor declarant transfers within the time period specified in (h) of this section the rights to a subsequent successor declarant who will assume liability for the improvements made by the successor declarant, the successor declarant is not subject to liability or obligation as a declarant other than liability for acts and omissions under AS 34.08.330(d) .
  8. If a lender fails to transfer special declarant rights to a successor declarant within one year of the date of recording an instrument under (e)(4)(B) of this section, then the lender becomes subject to the obligations and liabilities imposed by this chapter or the declaration as specified in (e)(2) of this section.
  9. Nothing in this section subjects a successor to a special declarant right to a claim against or other obligation of a transferor declarant, other than a claim or obligation arising under this chapter or the declaration.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.360. Termination of contracts and leases of declarant.

  1. If entered into before the executive board elected by the unit owners under AS 34.08.330(f) takes office (1) a management contract, employment contract, or lease of recreational or parking areas or facilities; (2) a contract or lease between the association and a declarant or an affiliate of a declarant; or (3) a contract or lease that is not bona fide or was unconscionable to the unit owners at the time entered into under the circumstances then prevailing may be terminated without penalty by the association at any time after the executive board elected by the unit owners under AS 34.08.330(f) takes office upon not less than 90 days’ notice to the other party.
  2. This section does not apply to
    1. a lease if a termination of the lease would terminate the common interest community or reduce its size, unless the real estate subject to the lease was included in the common interest community for the purpose of avoiding the right of the association to terminate a lease under this section; or
    2. a proprietary lease.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.370. Bylaws.

  1. The bylaws of the association must provide
    1. for the number of the members of the executive board and for the titles of the officers of the association;
    2. for the election by the executive board of a president, treasurer, secretary, and other officers of the association specified by the bylaws;
    3. for the qualifications, powers and duties, terms of office, and manner of electing and removing executive board members and officers and filling vacancies;
    4. which, if any, of its powers the executive board or officers may delegate to other persons or to a managing agent;
    5. which of its officers may prepare, execute, certify, and record amendments to the declaration on behalf of the association; and
    6. for a method of amending the bylaws.
  2. Subject to the provisions of the declaration, the bylaws may provide for any other matters the association considers necessary and appropriate.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of statutes, or of condominium association’s bylaws or regulations, restricting number of units that may be owned by single individual or entity. 39 ALR4th 88.

Sec. 34.08.380. Upkeep of common interest community.

  1. Except to the extent provided by the declaration, by (b) of this section, or by AS 34.08.440(h) , the association is responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements, and each unit owner is responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of the unit.  Each unit owner shall afford to the association, the other unit owners, and to their agents or employees, access through the unit that is reasonably necessary for maintenance and repair of the unit.  If damage is inflicted on the common elements or on any unit through which access is taken, the unit owner responsible for the damage, or the association if it is responsible, is liable for the prompt repair of the damage.
  2. In addition to the liability that a declarant as a unit owner has under this chapter, a declarant is solely liable for the expenses in connection with real estate subject to development rights.  No other unit owner and no other portion of the common interest community is subject to a claim for payment of expenses in connection with development rights.  Unless the declaration provides otherwise, the income and proceeds from real estate subject to development rights inures to the declarant.
  3. In a planned community, when all development rights have expired with respect to real estate, the declarant remains liable for the expenses of the real estate unless, upon expiration, the declaration provides that the real estate becomes common elements or units.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.390. Meetings.

A meeting of the association must be held at least once each year. A special meeting of the association may be called by the president, by a majority of the members of the executive board, or by unit owners comprising either 20 percent or a lower percentage specified in the bylaws of the votes in the association. Not less than 10 nor more than 60 days in advance of a meeting, the secretary or other officer specified in the bylaws shall cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to the mailing address of each unit or to the mailing address designated in writing by the unit owner. The notice of a meeting must state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda, including the general nature of a proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws, budget changes, and a proposal to remove an officer or member of the executive board.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.400. Quorums.

  1. Unless the bylaws provide otherwise, a quorum is present throughout a meeting of the association if persons entitled to cast 20 percent of the votes that may be cast for election of the executive board are present in person or by proxy at the beginning of the meeting.
  2. Unless the bylaws specify a larger percentage, a quorum is considered present throughout a meeting of the executive board if persons entitled to cast 50 percent of the votes on the board are present at the beginning of the meeting.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.410. Voting and proxies.

  1. If only one of several owners of a unit is present at a meeting of the association, the owner present is entitled to cast all the votes allocated to the unit.  If more than one of the owners are present, the votes allocated to the unit may be cast only in accordance with the agreement of a majority in interest of the owners, unless the declaration expressly provides otherwise. There is majority agreement if any one of the owners casts the votes allocated to the unit without protest being made promptly to the person presiding over the meeting by another owner of the unit.
  2. Votes allocated to a unit may be cast under a proxy duly executed by a unit owner.  If a unit is owned by more than one person, each owner of the unit may vote or register protest to the casting of votes by the other owners of the unit through a duly executed proxy.  A unit owner may revoke a proxy given under this section only by actual notice of revocation to the person presiding over a meeting of the association.  A proxy is void if it is not dated or purports to be revocable without notice.  A proxy terminates one year after its date, unless it specifies a shorter term.
  3. If the declaration requires that votes on specified matters affecting the common interest community be cast by lessees rather than unit owners of leased units (1) the provisions of (a) and (b) of this section apply to lessees as if they were unit owners; (2) unit owners who have leased their units to other persons may not cast votes on the specified matters; and (3) lessees are entitled to notice of meetings, access to records, and other rights respecting the matters as if they were unit owners.  Unit owners must also be given notice under AS 34.08.390 , of all meetings at which lessees are entitled to vote.
  4. Votes allocated to a unit owned by the association may not be cast.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.420. Tort and contract liability.

Neither the association nor any unit owner except the declarant is liable for the torts of the declarant in connection with any part of the common interest community that the declarant has the responsibility to maintain. An action alleging a wrong done by the association must be brought against the association and not against a unit owner. If the wrong occurred during a period of declarant control and the association gives the declarant reasonable notice of and an opportunity to defend against the action, the declarant who then controlled the association is liable to the association or to a unit owner for (1) tort losses not covered by insurance suffered by the association or the unit owner, and (2) each cost that the association would not have incurred but for a breach of contract or other wrongful act or omission. If the declarant is liable to the association under this section, the declarant is liable for the expenses of litigation incurred by the association. A statute of limitation affecting the right of action of the association under this section is tolled until the period of declarant control terminates. A unit owner is not precluded from maintaining an action under this section because the person is a unit owner or a member or officer of the association. A lien resulting from a judgment against the association is governed by AS 34.08.480 .

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Collateral references. —

Personal liability of owner of condominium unit to one sustaining personal injury or property damage by conditions of common areas. 39 ALR4th 98.

Association’s liability to unit owner for injuries caused by third person’s criminal conduct. 59 ALR4th 489.

Sec. 34.08.430. Conveyance or encumbrance of common elements.

  1. In a condominium or planned community, portions of the common elements may be conveyed or subjected to a security interest by the association if persons entitled to cast at least 80 percent of the votes in the association, including 80 percent of the votes allocated to units not owned by a declarant, or any larger percentage the declaration specifies, agree to the action, but each owner of a unit to which a limited common element is allocated must agree in order to convey the limited common element or subject it to a security interest.  The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if each of the units is restricted exclusively to nonresidential uses. The proceeds of the sale and proceeds of a loan secured by encumbering a common area are an asset of the association.
  2. Part of a cooperative may be conveyed and all or part of a cooperative may be subjected to a security interest by the association if persons entitled to cast at least 80 percent of the votes in the association, including 80 percent of the votes allocated to units not owned by a declarant, or any larger percentage the declaration specifies, agree to the action, but, if fewer than all of the units or limited common elements are to be conveyed or subjected to a security interest, then each unit owner of the units to which the limited common elements are allocated must agree in order to convey the units or limited common elements or subject them to a security interest.  The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if each of the units is restricted exclusively to nonresidential uses.  The proceeds of the sale and proceeds of a loan secured by encumbering a common area are an asset of the association.  A purported conveyance or other voluntary transfer of an entire cooperative, unless made under AS 34.08.260 , is void.
  3. An agreement to convey common elements in a condominium or planned community or to subject the common elements to a security interest and an agreement to convey any part of a cooperative or subject the cooperative to a security interest must be evidenced by the execution of an agreement, or ratifications of the agreement, in the same manner as a deed by the requisite number of unit owners. The agreement must specify a date after which the agreement will be void unless recorded before the date.  The agreement and each ratification of the agreement must be recorded in each recording district in which a portion of the common interest community is situated and is effective only upon recording.
  4. The association on behalf of the unit owners may contract to convey an interest in common interest community under (a) of this section, but the contract is not enforceable against the association until approved under (a) — (c) of this section. After approval under (a) — (c) of this section, the association has the powers necessary and appropriate to effect the conveyance or encumbrance, including the power to execute a deed or other instrument.
  5. Unless made under this section, a purported conveyance, encumbrance, judicial sale, or other voluntary transfer of common elements or of any other part of a cooperative is void.
  6. A conveyance or encumbrance of common elements or of a cooperative under this section does not deprive a unit of its rights of access and support.
  7. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, a conveyance or encumbrance of common elements under this section does not affect the priority or validity of preexisting encumbrances.
  8. In a cooperative, the association may acquire, hold, encumber, or convey a proprietary lease without complying with this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.440. Insurance.

  1. Commencing not later than the first conveyance of a unit to a person other than a declarant, the association shall maintain, to the extent reasonably available,
    1. property insurance on the common elements and, in a planned community, on property that must become common elements, insuring against all risks of direct physical loss commonly insured against or, in the case of conversion property, against fire and extended coverage perils, and the total amount of insurance after application of any deductibles must be not less than 100 percent of the actual cash value of the insured property at the time the insurance is purchased and at each renewal date, exclusive of land, excavations, foundations, and other items normally excluded from property policies; and
    2. liability insurance, including medical payments insurance, in an amount determined by the executive board but not less than an amount specified in the declaration, covering all occurrences commonly insured against for death, bodily injury, and property damage arising out of or in connection with the use, ownership, or maintenance of the common elements and, in cooperatives, of each unit.
  2. In the case of a building that is part of a cooperative or that contains a unit having horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, the insurance maintained under (a)(1) of this section, to the extent reasonably available, must include the unit, but need not include improvements and betterments installed by a unit owner.
  3. If the insurance described in (a) and (b) of this section is not reasonably available, the association promptly shall cause notice of the fact to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to each unit owner.  The declaration may require the association to carry other insurance, and the association in any event may carry other insurance it considers appropriate to protect the association or the unit owners.
  4. Insurance policies carried under (a) and (b) of this section must provide that
    1. each unit owner is an insured person under the policy with respect to liability arising out of interest of the unit owner in the common elements or membership in the association;
    2. the insurer waives the right to subrogation under the policy against a unit owner or member of the household of a unit owner;
    3. an act or omission by a unit owner, unless acting within the scope of the unit owner’s authority on behalf of the association, will not void the policy or be a condition to recovery under the policy; and
    4. if, at the time of a loss under the policy, there is other insurance in the name of a unit owner covering the same risk covered by the policy, the policy of the association provides primary insurance.
  5. A loss covered by the property policy under (a)(1) and (b) of this section must be adjusted with the association, but the insurance proceeds for the loss are payable to an insurance trustee designated for the purpose or to the association and not to a holder of a security interest.  The insurance trustee or the association shall hold insurance proceeds in trust for the association, unit owners, and lien holders as their interests may appear. Subject to the provisions of (h) of this section, the proceeds must be disbursed first for the repair or restoration of the damaged property, and the association, unit owners, and lien holders are not entitled to receive payment of a portion of the proceeds unless there is a surplus of proceeds after the property has been completely repaired or restored or unless the common interest community is terminated.
  6. An insurance policy issued to the association does not prevent a unit owner from obtaining insurance for the benefit of the unit owner.
  7. An insurer that has issued an insurance policy under this section shall issue certificates or memoranda of insurance to the association and, upon written request, to a unit owner or holder of a security interest.  The insurer issuing the policy may not cancel or refuse to renew it until 30 days after notice of the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal has been mailed to the association, each unit owner, and each holder of a security interest to whom a certificate or memorandum of insurance has been issued at their last known addresses.
  8. A portion of the common interest community for which insurance is required under this section that is damaged or destroyed must be repaired or replaced promptly by the association unless: the common interest community is terminated and  AS 34.08.260 applies; repairs or replacement would be illegal under a state statute or municipal ordinance governing health or safety; or 80 percent of the unit owners, including each owner of a unit or assigned limited common element that will not be rebuilt, vote not to rebuild.  The cost of repair or replacement in excess of insurance proceeds and reserves is a common expense.  If the entire common interest community is not repaired or replaced, (1) the insurance proceeds attributable to the damaged common elements must be used to restore the damaged area to a condition compatible with the remainder of the common interest community, and (2) except to the extent that other persons will be distributees, (A) the insurance proceeds attributable to a unit and limited common elements that are not rebuilt must be distributed to the owner of the unit and the owner of the unit to which the limited common elements were allocated, or to lien holders, as their interests may appear, and (B) the remainder of the proceeds must be distributed to each unit owner or lien holder, as their interests may appear, as follows: (i) in a condominium, in proportion to the common element interest of all the units and (ii) in a cooperative or planned community, in proportion to the common expense liabilities of all the units.  If the unit owners vote not to rebuild a unit, the allocated interests of the unit are reallocated upon the vote as if the unit had been condemned under  AS 34.08.740(a) , and the association promptly shall prepare, execute, and record an amendment to the declaration reflecting the reallocations, and file and record a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment.
  9. The provisions of this section may be varied or waived in a common interest community if all of the units are restricted to nonresidential use.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 24 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.450. Surplus funds.

Unless otherwise provided in the declaration, surplus funds of the association remaining after payment of or provision for common expenses and prepayment of reserves must be paid to the unit owners in proportion to common expense liabilities or credited to them to reduce future common expense assessments.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Reserves. —

Superior court did not err when it found that leftover funds in the owners' account were reserves and were set aside to pay for road maintenance, a service to benefit the owners because every single witness testified about how the purpose of the extra funds the bank account was to pay for future road maintenance, heavy duty road maintenance. Black v. Whitestone Estates Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, 446 P.3d 786 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 34.08.460. Assessments for common expenses.

  1. Until the association makes a common expense assessment, the declarant shall pay all common expenses. After an assessment has been made by the association, assessments must be made at least annually, based on a budget adopted at least annually by the association.
  2. Except for assessments under (c) — (e) of this section, all common expenses must be assessed against each unit in accordance with the allocations set out in the declaration under AS 34.08.150(a) and (b).  A past due common expense assessment or an installment of the assessment bears interest at the rate established by the association not exceeding 18 percent per year.
  3. To the extent required by the declaration
    1. a common expense associated with the maintenance, repair, or replacement of a limited common element must be assessed against each unit to which that limited common element is assigned, equally, or in proportion provided by the declaration;
    2. a common expense or portion of the common expense benefiting fewer than all of the units must be assessed exclusively against the units benefited;
    3. the costs of insurance must be assessed in proportion to risk; and
    4. the costs of utilities that can be determined must be assessed in proportion to usage and if the costs of utilities cannot be determined, the cost of nondeterminable utilities shall be shared as a common expense.
  4. An assessment to pay a judgment against the association may be made only against the units in the common interest community at the time the judgment was entered, in proportion to their common expense liabilities.
  5. If a common expense is caused by the misconduct of a unit owner, the association may assess that expense exclusively against the unit.
  6. If common expense liabilities are reallocated, common expense assessments and any installment of the assessment not yet due must be recalculated in accordance with the reallocated common expense liabilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Contracts to pay for assessments. —

Where an estate representative contracted to sell a condominium unit to the buyer and agreed to pay any assessments due at closing, the estate breached the contract when it failed to pay the assessment; the estate’s payment of the assessment would not result in the buyer’s unjust enrichment. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Sec. 34.08.470. Lien for assessments.

  1. The association has a lien on a unit for an assessment levied against the unit or fines imposed against its unit owner from the time the assessment or fine becomes due.  Unless the declaration otherwise provides, fees, charges, late charges, fines, and interest charged under  AS 34.08.320(a)(10) — (12) are enforceable as assessments under this section.  If an assessment is payable in installments, the full amount of the assessment is a lien from the time the first installment becomes due.
  2. A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit except (1) a lien and encumbrance recorded before the recordation of the declaration and, in a cooperative, a lien and encumbrance which the association creates, assumes, or takes subject to; (2) a first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent, or, in a cooperative, the first security interest encumbering only the interest of the unit owner and perfected before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent; and (3) a lien for real estate taxes and other governmental assessments or charges against the unit or cooperative.  A lien under this section is also prior to all security interests described in (2) of this subsection if the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by the association under  AS 34.08.460(a) would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the six months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien.  This subsection does not affect the priority of a mechanic’s or materialman’s lien, or the priority of a lien for other assessments made by the association.  A lien under this section is not subject to the provisions of  AS 09.38.010 .
  3. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, if two or more associations have liens for assessments created at any time on the same property, each lien has equal priority.
  4. The recording of the declaration constitutes record notice and perfection of the lien.  Further recording of a claim of lien for assessment under this section is not required.
  5. A lien for an unpaid assessment is extinguished unless proceedings to enforce the lien are instituted within three years after the full amount of the assessment becomes due.
  6. This section does not prohibit an action to recover sums for which (a) of this section creates a lien or prohibit an association from taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
  7. A judgment or decree in an action brought under this section is enforceable by execution under  AS 09.35.010 .
  8. The association upon written request shall furnish to a unit owner a statement setting out the amount of unpaid assessments against the unit.  If the interest of the unit owner is real estate, the statement must be in recordable form.  The statement must be furnished within 10 business days after receipt of the request and is binding on the association, the executive board, and each unit owner.
  9. In a cooperative, upon nonpayment of an assessment on a unit, a unit owner may be evicted in the same manner as provided by law in the case of an unlawful holdover by a commercial tenant, and the lien may be foreclosed under this section.
  10. The association’s lien may be foreclosed under this subsection as follows:
    1. in a condominium or planned community, the lien of the association must be foreclosed as a lien is foreclosed under  AS 34.35.005 ;
    2. in a cooperative whose unit owners’ interests in the units are real estate, the lien of the association must be foreclosed as a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate is foreclosed or as a lien is foreclosed under  AS 34.35.005 ; or
    3. in a cooperative whose unit owners’ interests in the units are personal property, the lien of the association must be foreclosed as a security interest under  AS 45.29.
  11. In a cooperative, if the interest of the unit owner in a unit is real estate,
    1. the association, upon nonpayment of an assessment and compliance with this subsection, may sell the unit at a public sale or by private negotiation, and at any time and place; each aspect of the sale, including the method, advertising, time, place, and terms must be reasonable; the association shall give reasonable written notice to the unit owner and a lessee of the unit owner of the time and place of the public sale or, if a private sale is intended, of the intention of entering into a contract to sell and of the time after which a private disposition may be made; the same notice must also be sent to any other person who has a recorded interest in the unit that would be cut off by the sale, but only if the recorded interest was on record seven weeks before the date specified in the notice as the date of a public sale or seven weeks before the date specified in the notice as the date after which a private sale may be made; the notices required by this subsection may be sent to any address reasonable in the circumstances; sale may not be held until five weeks after the sending of the notice; the association may buy at a public sale and, if the sale is conducted by a fiduciary or other person not related to the association, at a private sale;
    2. unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency in a foreclosure sale under  AS 09.45.170 ;
    3. the proceeds of a foreclosure sale must be applied in the following order:
      1. the reasonable expenses of sale;
      2. the reasonable expenses of securing possession before sale including holding, maintaining, and preparing the unit for sale, payment of taxes and other governmental charges, premiums on hazard and liability insurance;
      3. satisfaction of the lien of the association;
      4. satisfaction in the order of priority of a subordinate claim of record; and
      5. remittance of any excess to the unit owner;
    4. a good faith purchaser for value acquires the unit free of the association’s debt that gave rise to the lien under which the foreclosure sale occurred and any subordinate interest, even though the association or other person conducting the sale failed to comply with the requirements of this section; the person conducting the sale shall execute a conveyance to the purchaser sufficient to convey the unit and stating that it is executed after a foreclosure of the association’s lien by power of sale and that person conducting the sale was empowered to make the sale; signature and title or authority of the person signing the conveyance as grantor and a recital of the facts of nonpayment of the assessment and of the giving of the notices required by this subsection are sufficient proof of the facts recited and of the authority of the person to sign; further proof of authority is not required even if the association is named as grantee in the conveyance;
    5. at any time before the association has disposed of a unit in a cooperative or entered into a contract for its disposition under the power of sale, the unit owner or the holder of a subordinate security interest may cure the default of the unit owner and prevent sale or other disposition by tendering the performance due under the security agreement, including an amount due because of exercise of a right to accelerate, plus the reasonable expenses of proceeding to foreclosure incurred to the time of tender.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 7 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 45.29” was substituted for “AS 45.09” in accordance with § 35, ch. 113, SLA 2000.

Notes to Decisions

Assessments are due prior to lien attachment. —

Assessment does not become valid only when it attaches as a lien. Debts can exist before they are due, and condominium assessments can be effective before they must be paid. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Assessment omitted from statement. —

Superior court did not err when it included a special assessment and associated late fees in a condominium association's judgment because the association's failure to list the assessment in the statement did not void the owners' obligation to pay it; the condominium owner had actual knowledge of the assessment when the association sent him a statement omitting it and conceded at oral argument that its omission did not prejudice him. Black v. Whitestone Estates Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, 446 P.3d 786 (Alaska 2019).

Unmatured obligation. —

When the announcement of an assessment predates the due date, the assessment is best viewed as an unmatured obligation, a debt for which the sum is certain though the time for payment is deferred. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Assessments are effective before due date. —

Typical sequence by which an association adopts, announces, and collects assessments implies that an assessment will be effective before it is due, and almost certainly before the association could attach a lien against a unit to compel payment. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Contracts to pay for assessments. —

Where an estate representative contracted to sell a condominium unit to the buyer and agreed to pay any assessments due at closing, the estate breached the contract when it failed to pay the assessment. Soules v. Ramstack, 95 P.3d 933 (Alaska 2004).

Sec. 34.08.480. Other liens.

  1. In a condominium or planned community,
    1. except as provided in (2) of this subsection, a recorded judgment for money against the association is not a lien on the common elements, but is a lien in favor of the judgment lien holder against the units in the common interest community at the time the judgment was entered and no other property of a unit owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association;
    2. if the association has granted a security interest in the common elements to a creditor of the association under AS 34.08.430 , the holder of the security interest shall exercise its right against the common elements before its judgment lien on a unit may be enforced;
    3. whether perfected before or after the creation of the common interest community, if a lien, other than a deed of trust or mortgage including a judgment lien or lien attributable to work performed or materials supplied before creation of the common interest community, becomes effective against two or more units, the unit owner of an affected unit may pay to the lien holder the amount of the lien attributable to the unit, and the lien holder, upon receipt of payment, shall promptly deliver a release of the lien covering the unit; the amount of the payment must be proportionate to the ratio that the unit owner’s common expense liability bears to the common expense liabilities of all unit owners whose units are subject to the lien; after payment, the association may not assess or have a lien against the unit owner’s unit for any portion of the common expenses incurred in connection with the lien;
    4. a judgment against the association must be indexed in the name of the common interest community and the association and, when so indexed, is notice of the lien against the units.
  2. In a cooperative,
    1. if the association receives notice of an impending foreclosure on all or a portion of the association’s real estate, the association shall promptly transmit a copy of the notice to each unit owner of a unit located within the real estate to be foreclosed; a failure of the association to transmit the notice does not affect the validity of the foreclosure;
    2. whether or not the property of a unit owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association, other property of a unit owner is not subject to the claims.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.490. Association records.

  1. The association shall keep financial records sufficiently detailed to enable the association to comply with AS 34.08.590 .  Financial and other records must be made reasonably available for examination by a unit owner and an authorized agent of a unit owner.
  2. A professional manager, managing agent, accountant, or other person with whom the association has contracted for services shall return all association records within five days of the termination of the contract.  If the association records are not returned within five days, the association may sue for their return and for damages.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.500. Association as trustee.

If a third person deals with the association in the capacity of the association as a trustee, the existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the association may be assumed without inquiry. A third person is not bound to inquire whether the association has power to act as trustee or is properly exercising trust powers. A third person, without actual knowledge that the association is exceeding or improperly exercising its powers, is fully protected in dealing with the association as if it possessed and properly exercised the powers it purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the association in its capacity as trustee.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Article 4. Protection of Purchasers.

Collateral references. —

Validity and enforceability of condominium owner’s covenant to pay dues or fees to sports or recreational facility. 39 ALR4th 129.

Sec. 34.08.510. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of AS 34.08.510 34.08.700 apply to all units subject to this chapter, except as provided in (b) of this section or as modified or waived by agreement of purchasers of units in a common interest community in which each unit is restricted to nonresidential use.
  2. A public offering statement and a resale certificate are not required to be prepared or delivered on
    1. a gratuitous disposition of a unit;
    2. a disposition under a court order;
    3. a disposition by a governmental agency;
    4. a disposition by foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure;
    5. a disposition to a dealer;
    6. a disposition that may be canceled at any time and for any reason by the purchaser without penalty;
    7. a disposition of a unit in a planned community in which the declaration limits the maximum annual assessment of a unit to not more than $300, as adjusted under AS 34.08.820 , if
      1. the declarant has a reasonable and good faith belief that the maximum stated assessment will be sufficient to pay the expenses of the planned community;
      2. the declaration cannot be amended to increase the assessment during the period of declarant control without the consent of all unit owners; and
      3. the planned community is not subject to development rights; or
    8. a disposition of property by a nonprofit development corporation if that corporation is eligible for assistance from the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation organized under 42 U.S.C. 8101 — 42 U.S.C. 8107 (Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act) for neighborhood housing services, neighborhood revitalization, and economic development projects in a community.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 104 SLA 1990)

Sec. 34.08.520. Liability for public offering statement requirements.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, a declarant, before offering an interest in a unit to the public, shall prepare a public offering statement conforming to the requirements of AS 34.08.530 , 34.08.540 , 34.08.550 , and 34.08.560 .
  2. A declarant may transfer responsibility for preparation of all or a part of the public offering statement to a successor declarant or to a dealer who intends to offer units in the common interest community.  On the transfer of responsibility, the transferor shall provide the transferee with information necessary to enable the transferee to fulfill the requirements of (a) of this section.
  3. A declarant or dealer who offers a unit to a purchaser shall deliver a public offering statement, or a preliminary version of the public offering statement that reasonably reflects the contents of the public offering statement that is subsequently delivered to a purchaser, in the manner required by AS 34.08.580 (a). The person who prepared all or a part of the public offering statement is liable under AS 34.08.580 and 34.08.670 for any false or misleading statement set out in the statement or for any omission of a material fact from the statement with respect to the portion of the public offering statement that the person prepared. If a declarant did not prepare any part of a public offering statement, the declarant is not liable for a false or misleading statement set out in the statement or for an omission of a material fact from the statement unless the declarant had actual knowledge of the statement or omission or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the statement or omission.
  4. If a unit is part of a common interest community and is part of a real estate regime where a public offering statement is required under the laws of the state before the unit is offered for sale, a single public offering statement conforming to the requirements of AS 34.08.530 , 34.08.540 , 34.08.550 , and 34.08.560 may be prepared and delivered in lieu of providing two or more public offering statements.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 1 ch 120 SLA 2002)

Sec. 34.08.530. Public offering statements generally.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, a public offering statement must fully and accurately contain or disclose
    1. the name and principal address of the declarant and of the common interest community and indicate whether the common interest community is a condominium, cooperative, or planned community;
    2. a general description of the common interest community, including, in a building constructed for residential purposes with horizontal boundaries, the area of the interior surface of floors available for residential purposes and, to the extent possible, the types, number, and declarant’s schedule for the commencement and completion of construction of buildings and amenities that the declarant anticipates including in the common interest community;
    3. the number of units in the common interest community;
    4. copies and a brief narrative description of the significant features of the declaration, other than plats and plans, and
      1. any recorded covenants, conditions, restrictions, and reservations affecting the common interest community;
      2. the bylaws and any rules or regulations of the association;
      3. copies of any contracts and leases to be signed by purchasers at closing; and
      4. a brief narrative description of any contracts or leases that will or may be subject to cancellation by the association under AS 34.08.360 ;
    5. any current balance sheet and a projected budget for the association, either within or as an exhibit to the public offering statement, for one year after the date of the first conveyance to a purchaser, and the current budget of the association, the name of the person who prepared the budget, and a statement of the budget’s assumptions concerning occupancy, assumptions concerning the calculation of the amount of reserves certified by a certified architect or engineer, and inflation factors, including, without limitation,
      1. a statement of the amount included in the budget as a reserve for repairs and replacement including the estimated cost of repair or replacement cost and the estimated useful life of the asset to be repaired or replaced;
      2. a statement of any other reserves;
      3. the projected common expense assessment by category of expenditures for the association; and
      4. the projected monthly common expense assessment for each type of unit;
    6. any services not reflected in the budget that the declarant provides, or expenses that the declarant pays and that the declarant expects may become a common expense of the association at a subsequent time and the projected common expense assessment attributable to each of those services or expenses for the association and for each type of unit;
    7. any initial or special fee due from the purchaser at closing, together with a description of the purpose and method of calculating the fee;
    8. a description of liens, defects, or encumbrances on or affecting the title to the common interest community;
    9. a description of financing offered or arranged by the declarant;
    10. the terms and significant limitations of warranties provided by the declarant, including statutory warranties and limitations on the enforcement of the warranties or on damages;
    11. a statement that
      1. within 15 days after receipt of a public offering statement or a preliminary version of the public offering statement that reasonably reflects the contents of the public offering statement that is subsequently delivered to a purchaser, a purchaser, before conveyance, may cancel any contract for purchase of a unit from a declarant;
      2. if a declarant fails to provide a public offering statement to a purchaser before conveying a unit, the purchaser may recover from the declarant up to 10 percent of the sales price of the unit plus 10 percent of the share, proportionate to the common expense liability of the unit, of any indebtedness of the association secured by security interests encumbering the common interest community; and
      3. a purchaser who receives the public offering statement, or a preliminary version of the public offering statement that reasonably reflects the contents of the public offering statement that is subsequently delivered to a purchaser, more than 15 days before signing a contract cannot cancel the contract;
    12. a statement of any unsatisfied judgments or pending suits against the association, and the status of any pending suits material to the common interest community of which a declarant has actual knowledge;
    13. a statement that a deposit made in connection with the purchase of a unit will be held in an escrow account until closing and will be returned to the purchaser if the purchaser cancels the contract under AS 34.08.580 , together with the name and address of the escrow agent;
    14. any restraints on alienation of any portion of the common interest community and any restrictions
      1. on use, occupancy, and alienation of the unit; and
      2. on the amount for which a unit may be sold or on the amount that may be received by a unit owner on sale, condemnation, or casualty loss to the unit or to the common interest community, or on termination of the common interest community;
    15. a description of the insurance coverage provided for the benefit of unit owners;
    16. current or expected fees or charges to be paid by a unit owner for the use of the common elements and other facilities related to the common interest community;
    17. the extent to which financial arrangements have been provided for completion of improvements that the declarant is obligated to build under AS 34.08.690 ;
    18. a brief narrative description of zoning and other land use requirements affecting the common interest community;
    19. each unusual and material circumstance, feature, or characteristic of the common interest community and the units; and
    20. in a cooperative,
      1. whether each unit owner will be entitled, for federal, state, and local income tax purposes, to a pass-through of deductions for payments made by the association for real estate taxes and interest paid the holder of a security interest encumbering the cooperative; and
      2. a statement as to the effect on each unit owner if the association fails to pay real estate taxes or payments due the holder of a security interest encumbering the cooperative.
  2. If a common interest community composed of not more than 12 units is not subject to any development rights and power is not reserved to a declarant to make the common interest community part of a larger common interest community, group of common interest communities, or other real estate, a public offering statement may but need not include the information required by (a)(9), (10) and (15) — (19) of this section and the narrative descriptions of documents required by (a)(4) of this section.
  3. A declarant promptly shall amend the public offering statement to report any material change in the information required by this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 2 ch 120 SLA 2002)

Sec. 34.08.540. Common interest communities subject to development rights.

If the declaration provides that a common interest community is subject to development rights, the public offering statement must disclose, in addition to the information required by AS 34.08.530 ,

  1. the maximum number of units, and the maximum number of units per acre, that may be created;
  2. a statement of the number or the percentage of the units that may be created that will be restricted exclusively to residential use, or a statement that representations have not been made regarding use restrictions;
  3. if any of the units that may be built within real estate subject to development rights are not to be restricted exclusively to residential use, a statement, with respect to each portion of the real estate, of the maximum percentage of the real estate areas, and the maximum percentage of the floor areas of all units that may be created that are not restricted exclusively to residential use;
  4. a brief narrative description of the development rights reserved by a declarant and of any conditions relating to or limitations upon the exercise of development rights;
  5. a statement of the maximum extent to which the allocated interests of each unit may be changed by the exercise of a development right described in (3) of this section;
  6. a statement of the extent to which a building or other improvement that may be erected under a development right in any part of the common interest community will be compatible with existing buildings and improvements in the common interest community in terms of architectural style, quality of construction, and size, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard;
  7. a general description of each other improvement that may be made and limited common elements that may be created within a part of the common interest community under a development right reserved by the declarant, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard;
  8. a statement of any limitations as to the location of any building or other improvement that may be made within a part of the common interest community under a development right reserved by the declarant, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard;
  9. a statement that the limited common elements created under a development right reserved by the declarant will be of the same general type and size as the limited common elements within other parts of the common interest community, or a statement of the type and size planned, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard;
  10. a statement that the proportion of limited common elements to units created under a development right reserved by the declarant will be approximately equal to the proportion existing within other parts of the common interest community, or a statement of any other assurances in that regard, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard;
  11. a statement that each restriction in the declaration affecting use, occupancy, and alienation of a unit will apply to each unit created under a development right reserved by the declarant, or a statement of a differentiation that may be made as to the units, or a statement that assurances have not been made in that regard; and
  12. a statement of the extent to which an assurance made under this section applies or does not apply if a development right is not exercised by the declarant.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.550. Time shares.

If the declaration provides that ownership or occupancy of a unit is or may be in time shares, the public offering statement must disclose, in addition to the information required by AS 34.08.530 ,

  1. the number and identity of units in which time shares may be created;
  2. the total number of time shares that may be created;
  3. the minimum duration of any time shares that may be created;
  4. the extent to which the creation of time shares will or may affect the enforceability of the lien of the association for assessments under AS 34.08.470 ;
  5. any restraint on the power of the purchaser of the time-share unit to transfer the interest in the time-share unit;
  6. whether the time-share unit is included in an exchange program, the present cost and a good faith estimate of the future cost to the purchaser from the exchange program; and
  7. whether the purchaser is required to become a member of the exchange program.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.560. Common interest communities containing conversion property.

  1. The public offering statement of a common interest community containing conversion property must contain, in addition to the information required by AS 34.08.530 ,
    1. a statement by the declarant, based on a report prepared by a registered architect or engineer, describing the present condition of all structural components and mechanical and electrical installations material to the use and enjoyment of the property;
    2. a statement by the declarant of the expected useful life of each item reported on in (1) of this subsection or a statement that representations have not been made in that regard; and
    3. a list of any outstanding notices of uncured violations of building code or other municipal regulations, together with the estimated cost of curing the violations.
  2. This section applies only to property that contains a unit that may be occupied for residential use.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.570. Common interest community securities.

If an interest in a common interest community is currently registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, a declarant satisfies each requirement relating to the preparation of a public offering statement of this chapter if the declarant delivers to the purchaser a copy of the public offering statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. An interest in a common interest community is not subject to the registration requirements of AS 45.56.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 8 ch 65 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, substituted “AS 45.56” for “AS 45.55” at the end.

Sec. 34.08.580. Purchaser’s right to cancel.

  1. A person required to deliver a public offering statement under AS 34.08.520(c) shall provide each purchaser with a copy of the public offering statement and each amendment to the statement, or a preliminary version of the public offering statement that reasonably reflects the contents of the public offering statement that is subsequently delivered to a purchaser, before conveyance of the unit, and not later than the date of a contract of sale. If a purchaser is not given the public offering statement, or a preliminary version of the public offering statement that reasonably reflects the contents of the public offering statement that is subsequently delivered to a purchaser, more than 15 days before execution of a contract for the purchase of a unit, the purchaser, before conveyance, may cancel the contract within 15 days of receipt of the public offering statement or preliminary version of the public offering statement.
  2. A purchaser who wishes to cancel a contract under (a) of this section may cancel the contract by hand delivering notice of the cancellation to the offeror or by mailing notice of the cancellation by prepaid United States mail to the offeror or to the agent for service of process of the offeror. Cancellation is without penalty and each payment made by the purchaser before cancellation must be refunded promptly to the purchaser.
  3. If a person required to deliver a public offering statement under AS 34.08.520(c) fails to provide a purchaser to whom a unit has been conveyed with the public offering statement and each amendment to the statement under (a) of this section, the purchaser, in addition to any right to damages or other relief, is entitled to receive from the person an amount equal to 10 percent of the sale price of the unit, plus 10 percent of the share, proportionate to the common expense liability, of an indebtedness of the association secured by security interests encumbering the common interest community.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 120 SLA 2002)

Sec. 34.08.590. Resales of units.

  1. Except for a sale in which delivery of a public offering statement is required, or unless the sale is exempt under AS 34.08.510(b) , a unit owner shall furnish to a purchaser before execution of a contract for sale of a unit or before conveyance a copy of the declaration, as amended, the bylaws, the rules or regulations of the association, and a certificate containing a statement disclosing
    1. the effect on the proposed disposition of a right of first refusal or other restraint on the free alienability of the unit;
    2. the amount of the monthly common expense assessment and any unpaid common expense or special assessment currently due and payable from the selling unit owner;
    3. any other fee payable by unit owners;
    4. any capital expenditures in excess of $3,000 approved by the executive board for the current and two next succeeding fiscal years;
    5. the amount of reserves for capital expenditures and of any portions of the reserves designated by the association for a specified project;
    6. the most recent regularly prepared balance sheet and income and expense statement, if any, of the association;
    7. the current operating budget of the association;
    8. any unsatisfied judgment against the association and the status of any pending suit in which the association is a defendant or plaintiff;
    9. any insurance coverage provided for the benefit of unit owners;
    10. whether the executive board has knowledge that any alterations or improvements to the unit or to the limited common elements assigned to the unit violate any provision of the declaration;
    11. whether the executive board has knowledge of any violation of a health or safety, fire, or building code or other law, ordinance, or regulation with respect to the unit, the limited common elements assigned to the unit, or any other portion of the common interest community;
    12. a statement of the remaining term of a leasehold estate affecting the common interest community and the provisions governing an extension or renewal of the lease;
    13. a statement of any restrictions in the declaration affecting the amount that may be received by a unit owner upon sale, condemnation, casualty loss to the unit or the common interest community, or termination of the common interest community; and
    14. in a cooperative, an accountant’s statement, if any was prepared, as to the deductibility for federal income tax purposes by the unit owner of real estate taxes and interest paid by the association.
  2. The association, within 10 days after a written request by a unit owner and the payment of a reasonable fee, shall furnish a certificate containing the information necessary to enable the unit owner to comply with this section.  A unit owner providing a certificate under (a) of this section is not liable to the purchaser for erroneous information provided by the association and included in the certificate.
  3. A purchaser is not liable for an unpaid assessment or fee greater than the amount set out in the certificate prepared by the association.  A unit owner is not liable to a purchaser for the failure or delay of the association to provide the certificate in a timely manner, but the purchase contract is voidable by the purchaser until the certificate has been provided and for five days after the certificate was provided or until conveyance, whichever occurs first.
  4. A unit owner in a planned community that was created before January 1, 1986, is not exempt under AS 34.08.050 , and does not collect assessments as a planned community and has not formed an association or elected officers or an executive board may comply with (a) and (b) of this section by furnishing the purchaser of the unit an affidavit in recordable form
    1. stating that assessments are not collected, the last date assessments were collected, if known, the amount of the last assessment, if known, and the reason assessments ceased;
    2. stating that an association has not been formed or that no officers or executive board exists; and
    3. providing the purchaser a copy of
      1. the recorded declaration, if any, and any amendment to the declaration;
      2. bylaws, rules, and regulations of the association, if any; and
      3. a brief narrative description of
        1. the real estate comprising the planned community; and
        2. obligations to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, and improvements of the real estate described in the declaration.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 8 ch 61 SLA 1986)

Collateral references. —

Liability of owner of unit in condominium, recreational development, time-share property, or the like for assessment in support of common facilities levied against and unpaid by prior owner. 39 ALR4th 114.

Sec. 34.08.600. Escrow of deposits.

A deposit made in connection with the purchase or reservation of a unit from a person required to deliver a public offering statement under AS 34.08.520(c) must be placed in escrow and held either in this state or in the state where the unit is located in an account designated solely for that purpose by a licensed title insurance company, an attorney, a licensed real estate broker, an independent bonded escrow company, or an institution whose accounts are insured by a governmental agency or instrumentality until

  1. delivered to the declarant at closing;
  2. delivered to the declarant because of the purchaser’s default under a contract to purchase the unit; or
  3. refunded to the purchaser.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.610. Release of liens.

  1. In a sale of a unit where delivery of a public offering statement is required under AS 34.08.520(c) , a seller before conveying a unit shall record and furnish to the purchaser a release of each lien, except a lien on real estate that a declarant has the right to withdraw from the common interest community, that the purchaser does not expressly agree to take subject to or assume and that encumbers
    1. in a condominium, the unit and its common element interest; or
    2. in a cooperative or planned community, the unit and any limited common elements assigned to the unit.
  2. Before conveying real estate to the association, the declarant shall have the real estate released from
    1. each lien the foreclosure of which would deprive unit owners of a right of access to or easement of support of their units; and
    2. each other lien on the real estate unless the public offering statement describes certain real estate that may be conveyed subject to liens in specified amounts.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.620. Conversion property.

  1. A declarant of a common interest community containing conversion property, and any dealer who intends to offer units in a common interest community containing conversion units, shall give each residential tenant and each residential subtenant in possession of a portion of conversion property notice of the conversion and provide each person with the public offering statement no later than 180 days before the tenant and any subtenant in possession are required to vacate.  If the conversion property consists of a mobile home park, notice of the conversion and delivery of a public offering statement shall be provided no later than one year before the tenant and any subtenant in possession are required to vacate. The notice must set out generally the rights of tenants and subtenants under this section and shall be hand delivered to the tenant or subtenant in possession or mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the tenant and subtenant at the address of the unit or any other mailing address provided by a tenant.  The failure to give notice as required by this section is a defense to an action for possession and the terms of the tenancy may not be altered during the notice period provided by this subsection.  A tenant or subtenant may not be required to vacate upon less than 180 days’ notice and a tenant and a subtenant in possession in a mobile home park may not be required to vacate upon less than one year’s notice except for one of the following reasons:
    1. the tenant or subtenant has defaulted in the payment of rent owed;
    2. the tenant or subtenant has been convicted of violating a federal or state law or local ordinance, and that violation is continuing and is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of other dwellers or tenants in the mobile home park; and
    3. the tenant or subtenant has violated a provision, enforceable under AS 34.03.130 , of the rental agreement or lease signed by both parties and not prohibited by law including rent and the terms of agreement.
  2. For 90 days after delivery or mailing of the notice described in (a) of this section, the person required to give the notice shall offer to convey each unit or proposed unit occupied for residential use to the tenant who leases or rents the unit. If a tenant fails to purchase the unit during the 90-day period, the offeror shall extend a right of first refusal to the tenant who is leasing or renting the unit at the time of the conversion.  The offeror may not offer to dispose of an interest in the unit at a price or on terms more favorable to the offeree than the price or terms offered to the tenant while the tenant is in possession.  The tenant must exercise the right of first refusal within 90 days from the receipt of the offer and must provide the offeror a valid letter of intent or a preliminary loan commitment from a bank or mortgage lending institution within 30 days of receipt of the offer. This subsection does not apply to a unit in conversion property if the unit will be restricted exclusively to nonresidential use or if the boundaries of the converted unit do not substantially conform to the dimensions of the residential unit before conversion.
  3. If a seller, in violation of (b) of this section, conveys a unit for value to a purchaser who has no knowledge of the violation, the recording of the deed conveying the unit or, in a cooperative, the conveyance of the unit, extinguishes any right a tenant may have under (b) of this section to purchase the unit if the deed states that the seller has complied with (b) of this section, but the conveyance does not affect the right of a tenant to recover damages from the seller for a violation of (b) of this section.
  4. If a notice of conversion specifies a date by which a unit or proposed unit must be vacated and otherwise complies with the provisions of AS 09.45.060 09.45.160 , the notice also constitutes a notice to quit.
  5. Nothing in this section permits termination of a lease by a declarant in violation of its terms.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 13 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.08.630. Express warranties of quality.

  1. An express warranty made by a seller to a purchaser of a unit, if relied upon by the purchaser, is created as follows:
    1. any affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the unit, its use, or rights appurtenant to the unit, area improvements to the common interest community that would directly benefit the unit, or the right to use or have the benefit of facilities not located in the common interest community, creates an express warranty that the unit and related rights and uses will conform to the affirmation or promise;
    2. a model or description of the physical characteristics of the common interest community, including plans and specifications of or for improvements, creates an express warranty that the common interest community will conform to the model or description;
    3. a description of the quantity or extent of the real estate comprising the common interest community, including plats of surveys, creates an express warranty that the common interest community will conform to the description, subject to customary tolerances; and
    4. a provision that a purchaser may put a unit only to a specified use is an express warranty that the specified use is lawful.
  2. Formal words such as “warranty” or “guarantee” and the specific intention to make a warranty are not necessary to create an express warranty of quality, but a statement purporting to be merely an opinion or commendation of the real estate or its value does not create a warranty.
  3. A conveyance of a unit transfers to the purchaser each express warranty of quality made by a previous seller.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.640. Implied warranties of quality.

  1. A declarant and a dealer warrant that a unit will be in at least as good condition at the earlier of the time of the conveyance or delivery of possession as it was at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
  2. A declarant and a dealer impliedly warrant that a unit and the common elements in the common interest community are suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any improvements made or contracted for by the declarant or dealer, or made by any person before the creation of the common interest community, will be
    1. free from defective materials; and
    2. constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound engineering and construction standards, and in a skillful and workmanlike manner.
  3. A declarant and a dealer warrant to a purchaser of a unit that may be used for residential use that an existing use, continuation of which is contemplated by the parties, does not violate applicable law at the earlier of the time of conveyance or delivery of possession.
  4. Warranties imposed by this section may be excluded or modified under AS 34.08.650 .
  5. For purposes of this section, improvements made or contracted for by an affiliate of a declarant are made or contracted for by the declarant.
  6. A conveyance of a unit transfers to the purchaser all of the declarant’s implied warranties of quality.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.650. Exclusion or modification of implied warranties of quality.

  1. Except as limited by (b) of this section with respect to a purchaser of a unit that may be used for residential use, implied warranties of quality
    1. may be excluded or modified by written agreement of the parties; and
    2. are excluded by a written expression of disclaimer such as “as is,” “with all faults,” or other language that in common understanding calls the attention of the purchaser to the exclusion of warranties.
  2. With respect to a purchaser of a unit that may be occupied for residential use, a general disclaimer of implied warranties of quality is not effective, but a declarant and a dealer may disclaim liability in an instrument signed by the purchaser for a specified defect or specified failure to comply with applicable law, if the defect or failure entered into and became a part of the basis of the bargain.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.660. Statute of limitations for warranties.

  1. A judicial proceeding for breach of an obligation arising under AS 34.08.630 or 34.08.640 must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues, but the parties may agree to reduce the period of limitation to not less than two years.  If the unit may be occupied for residential use, an agreement to reduce the period of limitation must be evidenced by a separate instrument executed by the purchaser.
  2. Subject to (c) of this section, a cause of action for breach of warranty of quality, regardless of the purchaser’s lack of knowledge of the breach, accrues
    1. as to a unit, at the time the purchaser to whom the warranty is first made enters into possession if a possessory interest was conveyed or at the time of acceptance of the instrument of conveyance if a nonpossessory interest was conveyed; and
    2. as to each common element, at the time the common element is completed or, if later, as to
      1. a common element that may be added to the common interest community or a portion of the common interest community, at the time the first unit is conveyed to a bona fide purchaser; or
      2. a common element within any other portion of the common interest community, at the time the first unit is conveyed to a bona fide purchaser.
  3. If a warranty of quality explicitly extends to future performance or duration of an improvement or component of the common interest community, the cause of action accrues at the time the breach is discovered or at the end of the warranty period, whichever is earlier.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990, in (a) of this section, “AS 34.08.650 or this section” was deleted and “AS 34.08.630 or 34.08.640 ” was inserted to correct a manifest error in ch. 95, SLA 1985.

Sec. 34.08.670. Effect of violations on rights of action.

If a declarant or any other person subject to this chapter fails to comply with a provision of this chapter or with a provision of the declaration or bylaws, a person or class of persons adversely affected by the failure to comply has a claim for appropriate relief. Punitive damages may be awarded for a wilful failure to comply with this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Common interest community. —

Statute concerning common interest ownership was not applicable when the owners of an adjacent lot sued a property owner after the owner without prior approval cut down trees on the owner's lot that were protected by the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) because the subdivision was not a common interest community in that the CCRs did not satisfy the definitional requirement for a common interest community. Accordingly, the owners did not have a basis for a punitive damages award. Galipeau v. Bixby, 476 P.3d 1129 (Alaska 2020).

Attorney's fees. —

Superior court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the attorney's fees of a condominium association were reasonable because the condominium owners' litigation conduct provided an adequate basis for its determination; because the owners maintained a punitive damages claim until the close of trial, it would have been reasonable for the association to assume that there was more at stake than its contract claims. Black v. Whitestone Estates Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, 446 P.3d 786 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 34.08.680. Labeling of promotional material.

Promotional material may not be displayed or delivered to a prospective purchaser that describes or portrays an improvement that is not in existence unless the description or portrayal of the improvement in the promotional material is conspicuously labeled or identified either as “MUST BE BUILT” or as “NEED NOT BE BUILT.”

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.690. Declarant’s obligation to complete and restore.

  1. Except for an improvement labeled “NEED NOT BE BUILT,” the declarant shall complete each improvement depicted on a site plan or other graphic representation, including any plats or plans prepared under AS 34.08.180 , whether or not the site plan or other graphic representation is contained in the public offering statement or in promotional material distributed by or for the declarant.
  2. The declarant is liable for the prompt repair and restoration, to a condition compatible with the remainder of the common interest community, of a portion of the common interest community affected by the exercise of rights reserved under or created by AS 34.08.180 , 34.08.190 , 34.08.200 , 34.08.210 , 34.08.230 , or 34.08.240 .

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.700. Substantial completion of units.

In the sale of a unit for which delivery of a public offering statement is required, a contract of sale may be executed, but an interest in the unit may not be conveyed until the declaration is recorded, a plat or plan that accompanies the declaration is filed and recorded, and the unit is substantially completed as evidenced by issuance of a certificate of occupancy authorized by law or by a recorded certificate of substantial completion executed by

  1. an independent registered engineer, architect, or land surveyor;
  2. an appraiser with the designation of senior residential appraiser, senior real property appraiser, or senior real estate analyst of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers;
  3. a residential member, or member of the appraisal institute, of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers; or
  4. an individual with a designation established by regulation of the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation for fee appraisers who certify the completion of construction.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 25 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Article 5. General Provisions.

Sec. 34.08.710. Variation by agreement.

Except as expressly provided in this chapter the provisions of this chapter may not be varied by agreement and rights conferred by this chapter may not be waived. A declarant may not act under a power of attorney or use any other device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of this chapter or a declaration recorded under it.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.720. Separate titles and taxation.

  1. In a cooperative, the interest of a unit owner in a unit and its allocated interests is real estate for all purposes, except that the real estate constituting the cooperative shall be assessed and taxed as a whole and the interest of a unit owner may not be separately taxed.
  2. In a condominium or planned community,
    1. if there is a unit owner other than a declarant, each unit that has been created, together with its interest in the common elements, constitutes for all purposes a separate parcel of real estate;
    2. if there is a unit owner other than a declarant, each unit shall be separately taxed and assessed, and a separate tax or assessment may not be rendered against any common elements for which a declarant has reserved no development rights.
  3. Any portion of the common elements for which the declarant has reserved a development right shall be separately taxed and assessed against the declarant and the declarant alone is liable for payment of the taxes.
  4. If there is no unit owner other than a declarant, the real estate comprising the common interest community may be taxed and assessed in any manner provided by law.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Application. —

A city could tax an owner for his condominium unit and for the limited common element attached to his unit under this section because as a limited common element the land under and around the owner’s condominium unit formed a part of his interest in the common elements. Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, 187 P.3d 1096 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 34.08.730. Applicability of local ordinances, regulations, and building codes.

  1. A building code may not impose a requirement upon a structure in a common interest community that the building code would not impose upon a physically identical development under a different form of ownership.
  2. A zoning, subdivision, or other real estate use law, ordinance, or regulation may not prohibit the condominium or cooperative form of ownership or impose a requirement upon a condominium or cooperative that it would not impose upon a physically identical development under a different form of ownership.
  3. Except as provided in (a) and (b) of this section, the provisions of this chapter do not invalidate or modify a provision of a building code, zoning, subdivision, or other real estate use law, ordinance, or regulation governing the use of real estate.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.740. Eminent domain.

  1. If a unit is acquired by eminent domain or part of a unit is acquired by eminent domain leaving the unit owner with a remnant that may not practically or lawfully be used for any purpose permitted by the declaration, the award must include compensation to the unit owner for that unit and its allocated interests, whether or not any common elements are acquired. Upon acquisition, unless the decree otherwise provides, the allocated interests of the unit are automatically reallocated to the remaining units in proportion to the respective allocated interests of those units before the taking, and the association shall promptly prepare, execute, and record an amendment to the declaration reflecting the reallocations, and file and record a plat or plan that accompanies the amendment. A remnant of a unit remaining after part of a unit is taken under this subsection is a common element from that time.
  2. Except as provided in (a) of this section, if part of a unit is acquired by eminent domain, the award must compensate the unit owner for the reduction in value of the unit and its interest in the common elements, whether or not any common elements are acquired.  Upon acquisition, unless the decree provides otherwise,
    1. the allocated interests of the unit are reduced either in proportion to the reduction in the size of the unit or on the basis specified in the declaration; and
    2. the portion of the allocated interests divested from the partially acquired unit are automatically reallocated to the unit and to the remaining units in proportion to the respective allocated interests of the units before the taking, with the partially-acquired unit participating in the reallocation on the basis of its reduced allocated interests.
  3. If part of the common elements is acquired by eminent domain, the portion of the award attributable to the common elements taken must be paid to the association. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, any portion of the award attributable to the acquisition of a limited common element must be equally divided among the owners of the units to which that limited common element was allocated at the time of acquisition.
  4. The court decree must be recorded in each recording district in which any portion of the common interest community is located.
  5. On a condemnation of a unit or common area, an award or decree must include a reasonable amount to cover the cost of reallocating the allocatable interests of the unit owners.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 26 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.08.750. Supplemental general principles of law applicable.

The principles of law and equity, including the law of corporations and unincorporated associations, the law of real property, and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, eminent domain, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, receivership, substantial performance, or other validating or invalidating cause supplement the provisions of this chapter except to the extent inconsistent with this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Reasonableness standard. —

Although this section appears to allow the importation of the business judgment rule into the law of condominium associations, the Alaska Supreme Court favors a standard that includes reasonableness. Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1999).

Sec. 34.08.760. Construction against implicit repeal.

This chapter is a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter and a part of the chapter may not be construed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if that construction can reasonably be avoided.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.770. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed so as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of the chapter among states enacting it.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.780. Severability.

If a provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.790. Unconscionable agreement or term of contract.

  1. Upon finding as a matter of law that a contract or contract clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made, a court may refuse to enforce the contract, may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or may limit the application of the unconscionable clause in order to avoid an unconscionable result.
  2. Whenever it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or a contract clause is or may be unconscionable, the parties, in order to aid the court in making the determination, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to (1) the commercial setting of the negotiations; (2) whether a party has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of another party reasonably to protect personal interests by reason of physical or mental infirmity, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of the agreement, or similar factors; (3) the effect and purpose of the contract or clause; and (4) any gross disparity, if a sale, at the time of contracting, between the amount charged for the property and the value of the property measured by the price at which similar property was readily obtainable in similar transactions.  A disparity between the contract price and the value of the property measured by the price at which similar property was readily obtainable in similar transactions does not, of itself, render the contract unconscionable.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.800. Obligation of good faith.

A contract or duty governed by this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.810. Remedies to be liberally administered.

  1. The remedies provided by this chapter shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party is put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. Consequential, special, or punitive damages may not be awarded except as specifically provided in this chapter or by other rule of law.
  2. A right or obligation declared by this chapter is enforceable by judicial proceeding.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.820. Adjustment of dollar amounts.

  1. The dollar amounts specified in AS 34.08.030 and 34.08.510(b)(7) change under (b) and (c) of this section, according to and to the extent of changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: U.S. City Average, All Items 1967 equal 100, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, (the “Index”).  The Index for December, 1979, which was 230, is the Reference Base Index.
  2. The dollar amounts specified in AS 34.08.030 and 34.08.510(b)(7) and any amount stated in the declaration pursuant to those sections change on July 1 of each year if the percentage of change, calculated to the nearest whole percentage point, between the Index at the end of the preceding year and the Reference Base Index is 10 percent or more, except that
    1. the portion of the percentage change in the Index in excess of a multiple of 10 percent shall be disregarded and the dollar amounts shall change only in multiples of 10 percent of the amounts appearing in this chapter on January 1, 1986;
    2. the dollar amounts may not change if the amounts required by this section are those currently in effect under this chapter as a result of an earlier application of this section; and
    3. in no event may the dollar amounts be reduced below the amounts appearing in this chapter on January 1, 1986.
  3. If the Index is revised after December 1979, the percentage of change under this section shall be calculated on the basis of the revised Index.  If the revision of the Index changes the Reference Base Index, a revised Reference Base Index must be determined by multiplying the Reference Base Index then applicable by the rebasing factor furnished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  If the Index is superseded, the index referred to in this section is the one represented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as reflecting most accurately changes in the purchasing power of the dollar for consumers.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.830. Transfer of unit in a cooperative.

If a unit in a cooperative is owned by a unit owner or is sold, conveyed, voluntarily or involuntarily encumbered, or otherwise transferred by the unit owner, the interest in the unit that is owned, sold, conveyed, encumbered, or otherwise transferred is the right to possession of the unit under a proprietary lease, coupled with the allocated interests of the unit, and the association’s interest in the unit is not affected by the transfer.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.08.990. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “affiliate of a declarant”
    1. means a person who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a declarant;
    2. as used in this paragraph, a person “controls” a declarant if the person
      1. is a general partner, officer, director, or employer of the declarant;
      2. directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or more subsidiaries, owns, controls, holds with power to vote, or holds proxies representing more than 20 percent of the voting interest in the declarant;
      3. controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the declarant; or
      4. has contributed more than 20 percent of the capital of the declarant;
    3. as used in this paragraph, a person “is controlled by” a declarant if the declarant
      1. is a general partner, officer, director, or employer of the person;
      2. directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or more subsidiaries, owns, controls, holds with power to vote, or holds proxies representing, more than 20 percent of the voting interest in the person;
      3. controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the person; or
      4. has contributed more than 20 percent of the capital of the person;
    4. as used in this paragraph, “control” does not exist if the powers described in this paragraph are held solely as security for an obligation and are not exercised;
  2. “allocated interests” means the following interests allocated to each unit:
    1. in a condominium, the undivided interest in the common elements, the common expense liability, and votes in the association;
    2. in a cooperative, the common expense liability and the ownership interest and votes in the association; and
    3. in a planned community, the common expense liability and votes in the association;
  3. “association” or “unit owners’ association” means the unit owners’ association organized under AS 34.08.310 ;
  4. “common elements” means
    1. in a condominium or cooperative, each portion of the common interest community other than a unit; and
    2. in a planned community, the real estate within a planned community owned or leased by the association, other than a unit;
  5. “common expense liability” means the liability for common expenses allocated to each unit under AS 34.08.150 ;
  6. “common expenses” means expenditures made by, or financial liabilities of, the association, together with any allocations to reserves;
  7. “common interest community” means real estate with respect to which a person, by virtue of ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement of other real estate described in a declaration;
  8. “condominium” means a common interest community in which
    1. portions of the real estate are designated for separate ownership;
    2. the remainder of the real estate is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those portions; and
    3. the undivided interests in the common elements are vested in the unit owners;
  9. “conversion property” means real estate that before creation of the common interest community, was occupied wholly or partially by persons other than purchasers and persons who occupy with the consent of purchasers;
  10. “cooperative” means a common interest community in which the real estate is owned by an association, each of whose members is entitled by virtue of an ownership interest in the association to exclusive possession of a unit;
  11. “dealer” means a person who owns either six or more units in a common interest community or 50 percent or more of the units in a common interest community;
  12. “declarant” means a person or a group of persons acting in concert who
    1. as part of a common promotional plan, offers to dispose of its interest in a unit not previously disposed of; or
    2. reserves or succeeds to a special declarant right;
  13. “declaration”
    1. means an instrument, however described, that creates a common interest community; and
    2. includes amendments to a declaration;
  14. “development right” means a right or a combination of rights reserved by a declarant in the declaration to
    1. add real estate to a common interest community;
    2. create units, common elements, or limited common elements within a common interest community;
    3. subdivide units or convert units into common elements; or
    4. withdraw real estate from a common interest community;
  15. “dispose” or “disposition”
    1. means a voluntary transfer to a purchaser of any legal or equitable interest in a unit;
    2. does not include the transfer or release of a security interest;
  16. “executive board” means the body designated in the declaration to act on behalf of the association;
  17. “identifying number” means a symbol or address that identifies only one unit in a common interest community;
  18. “leasehold common interest community” means a common interest community in which all or a portion of the real estate is subject to a lease that, on its expiration or termination, will terminate the common interest community or reduce its size;
  19. “limited common element” means the portion of the common elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more but fewer than all of the units by the declaration or by operation of AS 34.08.100 (2) or (4);
  20. “master association” means an organization described in AS 34.08.280 whether or not it is also an association described in AS 34.08.310 ;
  21. “offering”
    1. means an advertisement, inducement, solicitation, or attempt to encourage a person to acquire an interest in a unit, other than as security for an obligation;
    2. does not include an advertisement in a newspaper or other periodical of general circulation, or in any other broadcast medium to the general public describing a common interest community not located in the state if the advertisement states that an offering may be made only in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the common interest community is located;
  22. “ownership of a unit” does not include a leasehold interest, including renewal options, of less than 40 years in a unit;
  23. “person” means
    1. an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, government subdivision or agency, or other legal or commercial entity;
    2. in the case of a land trust, the beneficiary of the land trust and not the land trust or its trustee;
  24. “planned community” means a common interest community that is not a condominium or a cooperative although a condominium or cooperative may be part of a planned community;
  25. “proprietary lease” means the agreement with the association under which a member is entitled to exclusive possession of a unit in a cooperative;
  26. “purchaser” means a person, other than a declarant or a dealer, who by means of a voluntary transfer acquires a legal or equitable interest in a unit other than
    1. a leasehold interest, including renewal options, of less than 40 years; or
    2. as security for an obligation;
  27. “real estate”
    1. means a leasehold or other estate or interest in, over, or under land, including structures, fixtures, and other improvements and interests that by custom, usage, or law pass with a conveyance of land though not described in the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance;
    2. includes parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces that may be filled with air or water;
  28. “residential purposes” means use for dwelling or recreational purposes, or both;
  29. “security interest”
    1. means an interest in real estate or personal property, created by contract or conveyance, that secures payment or performance of an obligation;
    2. includes a lien created by a mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, security deed, contract for deed, land sales contract, lease intended as security, assignment of lease or rents intended as security, pledge of an ownership interest in an association, and any other consensual lien or title retention contract intended as security for an obligation;
  30. “special declarant rights” means the right reserved for the benefit of a declarant to
    1. complete improvements indicated on plats and plans filed and recorded with the declaration or, in a cooperative, to complete improvements described in the public offering statement under AS 34.08.530(a)(2) ;
    2. exercise a development right;
    3. maintain sales offices, management offices, signs advertising the common interest community, and models;
    4. use easements through the common elements for the purpose of making improvements within the common interest community or within real estate that may be added to the common interest community;
    5. make the common interest community subject to a master association;
    6. merge or consolidate a common interest community with another common interest community of the same form of ownership; or
    7. appoint or remove an officer of the association or a master association or an executive board member during a period of declarant control;
  31. “time share” means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during five or more separated time periods over a period of at least five years, including renewal options, whether or not coupled with an estate or interest in a common interest community or a specified portion of a common interest community;
  32. “unit” means a physical portion of the common interest community designated for separate ownership or occupancy, the boundaries of which are described under AS 34.08.130(a)(5) ;
  33. “unit owner”
    1. means
      1. a declarant;
      2. a person who owns a unit;
      3. a person who leases a unit in a leasehold common interest community whose lease expires simultaneously with any lease that on its expiration or termination will remove the unit from the common interest community;
    2. does not include a person having an interest in a unit solely as security for an obligation;
    3. includes
      1. in a condominium or planned community, the declarant as the owner of any unit created by the declaration;
      2. in a cooperative, the declarant as the owner of any unit to which allocated interests have been allocated until that unit has been conveyed to another person.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 27 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2012, paragraph (5) was renumbered as (6) and paragraph (6) was renumbered as (5) to maintain alphabetical order.

Notes to Decisions

“Limited common element.” —

Recorded plans, declaration, and owner’s testimony that he could exclude others from using the land supported the conclusion that land associated with owner’s condominium unit was a limited common element appurtenant to owner’s condominium unit under subsection (19). Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, 187 P.3d 1096 (Alaska 2008).

Common interest community. —

Statute concerning common interest ownership was not applicable when the owners of an adjacent lot sued a property owner after the owner without prior approval cut down trees on the owner's lot that were protected by the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) because the subdivision was not a common interest community in that the CCRs did not satisfy the definitional requirement for a common interest community. Accordingly, the owners did not have a basis for a punitive damages award. Galipeau v. Bixby, 476 P.3d 1129 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc., 278 P.3d 1267 (Alaska 2012).

Cited in

Black v. Whitestone Estates Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, 446 P.3d 786 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 34.08.995. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Chapter 10. Land Registration Law.

Secs. 34.10.010 — 34.10.160. Administration, registration, enforcement. [Repealed, § 20 ch 182 SLA 1978.]

Sec. 34.10.170. [Renumbered as AS 38.05.875.]

Secs. 34.10.180 — 34.10.240. Redemption. [Repealed, § 20 ch 182 SLA 1978.]

Chapter 15. Conveyances.

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to recording of conveyances, see AS 40.17. For rules for construing real estate descriptions, see AS 09.25.040 .

Collateral references. —

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments, § 1 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, § 1 et seq.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 1 et seq.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, § 1 et seq.

54A Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 1 et seq.

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Property, § 1 et seq.

2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, §§ 90-121.

21 C.J.S., Covenants, §§ 14-15.

264 C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 1-7.

31 C.J.S., Estates, §§ 11, 12.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser, § 1 et seq.

Rule denying recovery of property to one who conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable where the claim which motivated the conveyance was never established. 6 ALR4th 862.

Estate created by deed to persons described as husband and wife but not legally married. 9 ALR4th 1189.

Which of conflicting descriptions in deeds or mortgages of fractional quantity of interest intended to be conveyed prevails. 12 ALR4th 795.

Article 1. Form and Effect.

Sec. 34.15.010. Manner of executing conveyances.

  1. A conveyance of land, or of an estate or interest in land, may be made by deed, signed and sealed by the person from whom the estate or interest is intended to pass, who is of lawful age, or by the lawful agent or attorney of the person, and acknowledged or proved, and recorded as directed in this chapter, without any other act or ceremony whatever.
  2. In a deed or conveyance of the family home or homestead by a married man or a married woman, the husband and wife shall join in the deed or conveyance.
  3. The requirement that a spouse of a married person join in a deed or conveyance of the family home or homestead does not create a proprietary right, title, or interest in the spouse not otherwise vested in the spouse.
  4. Failure of the spouse to join in the deed or conveyance does not affect the validity of the deed or conveyance, unless the spouse appears on the title.  The deed or conveyance is sufficient in law to convey the legal title to the premises described in it from the grantor to the grantee when the deed or conveyance is otherwise sufficient, and
    1. no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district in which the land is located within one year from the date of recording of the deed or conveyance by the spouse who failed to join in the deed or conveyance to have the deed or conveyance set aside, altered, changed, or reformed; or
    2. the spouse whose interest in the property is affected does not record, within one year in the office of the recorder for the recording district where the property is situated, a notice of an interest in the property.

History. (§ 22-3-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 145 SLA 1953)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in paragraph (d)(2) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Construction of deeds. —

A deed must be construed according to its legal construction, effect, and operation apparent on its face, or with the aid of any such evidence as is admissible by the rules of law to explain it. Valdez Bank v. Von Gunther, 3 Alaska 657 (D. Alaska 1909).

Family home or homestead. —

“Family home or homestead” refers to a home in which the family resides and does not apply to a vacant property. Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).

Reformation of deeds. —

Courts of equity will reform deeds made to carry into effect contracts and agreements, according to their original intentions, notwithstanding any defect in the execution of the instrument adopted. Valdez Bank v. Von Gunther, 3 Alaska 657 (D. Alaska 1909).

Improper execution and recording. —

An instrument in writing, signed by the parties, may serve as one step in the conveyance of real estate, although it is neither witnessed, acknowledged, or recorded. Such an instrument, containing apt words to convey, when made, signed, and delivered to the grantee, and followed by acts constituting estoppel, becomes sufficient, as between grantor and grantee, to convey the legal title. Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904).

As between the parties themselves, a conveyance is good without record. Wooldridge v. Williams, 5 Alaska 149 (D. Alaska 1914).

A document purporting to be a deed conveying land, unwitnessed and unrecorded, is ineffective as a conveyance under this section and AS 34.15.150 , although it is valid as a contract to convey. Whitehead v. Foxhill, 105 F. Supp. 966, 13 Alaska 726 (D. Alaska 1952).

Legal description. —

Under Alaska law, the street address contained in a deed of trust sufficiently identified the real property to create a valid secured interest in that property because the legal description for the property could be ascertained through an address search for the property on the website for the Municipality of Anchorage. In re Moore, — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Jan. 15, 2014).

Deed of trust properly vacated. —

Deceased husband’s surviving spouse properly vacated a deed of trust the husband granted to the husband’s girlfriend on the family home because the spouse’s interest in the home survived the husband’s death, and the spouse moved to vacate the deed of trust within one year of the date of recording. Richardson v. Estate of Berthelot, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 16, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Action may not be maintained on defectively executed lease. —

Where a statute requires a lease for a term of years to be under seal, witnessed, acknowledged, or recorded, to be valid, an action of covenant, on a lease not executed with these formalities, cannot be maintained, though the lessees enter under the lease. Rolando v. Zesch, 7 Alaska 437 (D. Alaska 1926).

Homestead interest. —

A homestead interest under this section is not a restriction on alienation and only as it regards rights to occupancy will it be treated as such. Dunk v. United States, 17 Alaska 698 (S.D. Fla. 1958).

The homestead right was created to protect the family from total loss of its abode due to judgments and executions on unsatisfied debts. It was not enacted, as this section clearly states, to create any new right, title or interest other than the right of occupancy in property used as a homestead by members of the family. Dunk v. United States, 17 Alaska 698 (S.D. Fla. 1958).

Where plaintiff has proved no proprietary right, title or interest in property, under this section the plaintiff’s homestead interest is what is commonly referred to as a “worrying asset” during coverture. Thus plaintiff has a right to occupy the homestead during coverture regardless of third party’s title to the property, but plaintiff obtains no right, title or interest in the property by this occupancy. Dunk v. United States, 17 Alaska 698 (S.D. Fla. 1958).

Where no right, title or interest is created in a spouse other than what was vested in that spouse already, homestead rights in husband’s property do not survive the divorce. Dunk v. United States, 17 Alaska 698 (S.D. Fla. 1958).

Objection that a first mortgage was invalid on the ground that the mortgage was not signed by the husband of the mortgagor, a prerequisite under this section to the validity of a conveyance of property which includes the homestead, is not available to a third person, but only to the possessor of the homestead right. Arnold v. Kelsey, 114 F. Supp. 650, 14 Alaska 387 (D. Alaska 1953).

A bona fide purchaser for value without actual or constructive notice of a homestead may take free of any adverse claim based upon such an interest. Dunk v. United States, 17 Alaska 698 (S.D. Fla. 1958).

Because a vacant property sold by a wife was no longer the family residence, it did not constitute a home or homestead and this section did not protect any interest of the husband’s in the property. Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 295 P.3d 374 (Alaska 2013); Hooks v. Alaska United States Fed. Credit Union, 413 P.3d 1192 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215 (Alaska 2005); Dixon v. Dixon, 407 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2017).

Sec. 34.15.015. Use of recorded master form.

If reference is made in a document to a recorded master form, a copy of the form, or so much of it as is incorporated by reference, must be provided to each party to the transaction by the party that furnished the document.

History. (§ 28 ch 161 SLA 1988)

Sec. 34.15.020. Conveyance by nonresident married woman. [Repealed, § 103 ch 127 SLA 1974.]

Sec. 34.15.030. Form of warranty deed.

  1. A warranty deed for the conveyance of land may be substantially in the following form, without express covenants:
  2. A deed substantially in the form set forth in (a) of this section, when otherwise duly executed, is considered a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee and the heirs and assigns of the grantee, with the following covenants by the grantor: (1) that at the time of the making and delivery of the deed the grantor is lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple to the premises described, and has the right and power to convey the premises; (2) that at the time of making and delivery of the deed the premises are free from encumbrances; and (3) that the grantor warrants the quiet and peaceable possession of the premises, and will defend the title to the premises against all persons claiming the premises.  The covenants are binding upon a grantor and the heirs and personal representative of a grantor as if written in the deed.

“The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residence) for and in consideration of (here insert consideration) in hand paid, conveys and warrants to (here insert the grantee’s name or names) the following described real estate (here insert description), located in the State of Alaska.

“Dated this . . . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . ., 2. . . . . .”

History. (§ 1 ch 10 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “2...” was substituted for “19..” in accordance with sec. 105, ch. 21, SLA 2000.

Notes to Decisions

Legislative intent. —

This section was taken verbatim from the laws of the state of Washington, and is presumed adopted with interpretation placed on it by supreme court of Washington prior to adoption. See Domer v. Sleeper, 533 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1975).

Encumbrance defined. —

See Domer v. Sleeper, 533 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1975).

An “unknown” or “hidden” building code violation does not constitute an encumbrance within the intendment of subsection (b)(2). Domer v. Sleeper, 533 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1975).

When used in a deed, the words “subject to” are generally regarded as terms of qualification, not contract. They serve to put a purchaser on notice that he is receiving less than a fee simple. There is nothing in their use which connotes a reservation or retention of property rights. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

The words “subject to and excepting from” as used in a warranty deed and as gleaned from the expressed intent of the parties were interpreted not as a reservation of a right to control in the seller, but merely as words of qualification to put the purchaser on notice that he would be taking the property subject to a lease. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980).

Quoted in

AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro, 219 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.15.040. Form of quitclaim deed.

  1. A quitclaim deed may be substantially in the following form:
  2. A deed substantially in the form set out in (a) of this section, when otherwise duly executed, is considered a sufficient conveyance, release and quitclaim to the grantee and the heirs and assigns of the grantee, in fee of all the existing legal and equitable rights of the grantor in the premises described in the deed.

“The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residence), for and in consideration of (here insert consideration) conveys and quitclaims to (here insert grantee’s name or names) all interest which I (we) have, if any, in the following described real estate (here insert description), located in the State of Alaska.

“Dated this . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . . ., 2. . . . . .”

History. (§ 2 ch 10 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “2...” was substituted for “19..” in accordance with sec. 105, ch. 21, SLA 2000.

Notes to Decisions

The use of the word of conveyance “quitclaim” is not necessary to cause a deed to be in substantially the form provided in subsection (a) of this section. The words of conveyance “grant” and “convey” are sufficient. Amick v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 453 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1969), overruled, Wickwire v. City & Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976).

The right to recover damages for condemnation is not an interest in real property which passes to the grantee under a quitclaim deed. That right remains with the owner of the property at the time of the taking. Wickwire v. City & Borough of Juneau, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976).

Deed conveys interest though oral conditions not fulfilled. —

An unrecorded quitclaim deed, which on its face conformed to the form requirements of subsection (a), operated to convey the grantor’s interest in certain real property to his grantee, although the grantor allegedly attached oral conditions to the delivery of the deed which were not fulfilled. Bennis v. Alexander, 574 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1978).

Quoted in

Baker v. Ryan Air, Inc., 345 P.3d 101 (Alaska 2015); Dixon v. Dixon, 407 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2017).

Sec. 34.15.050. Effect of quitclaim.

A deed of quitclaim and release for the form in common use is sufficient to pass all the real estate which the grantor can convey by a deed of bargain and sale.

History. (§ 22-3-2 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Designation as quitclaim deed. —

A quitclaim deed is designated, not alone by its terms, but also from the adequacy of the consideration and other circumstances showing the intention of the parties. First Nat'l Bank v. Timmins, 4 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1910).

Interest taken. —

The grantee in a quitclaim deed takes only the interest of his grantor in the premises. Lindblom v. Rocks, 146 F. 660, 2 Alaska Fed. 527 (9th Cir. Alaska 1906); Tjosevig v. Donohoe, 262 F. 911, 4 Alaska Fed. 865 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 587, 40 S. Ct. 396, 64 L. Ed. 730, 4 Alaska Fed. 893 (U.S. 1920).

A quitclaim deed purports to pass only the interest of the vendor in and to his property, while a bargain and sale deed admittedly passes the property itself. First Nat'l Bank v. Timmins, 4 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1910).

Grantee is not a bona fide purchaser for value. —

Where the expressed consideration is nominal and not paid, a grantee accepting a quitclaim deed with full knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed is not a bona fide purchaser for value nor a “subsequent innocent purchaser . . . in good faith for a valuable consideration,” such as is described in former AS 34.15.290 (now AS 40.17.080 ), and the outstanding deed would not be void as to such a purchaser. Crossly v. Campion Mining Co., 1 Alaska 391 (D. Alaska 1901).

He is a purchaser with notice. Lindblom v. Rocks, 146 F. 660, 2 Alaska Fed. 527 (9th Cir. Alaska 1906).

Grantee takes subject to reasonably discoverable defects in title. —

A quitclaim deed will pass the interest in the property of the vendor, subject to any and all defects in his title thereto, which are discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence in making proper examinations and inquiries. First Nat'l Bank v. Timmins, 4 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1910).

Grantee has constructive notice of prior outstanding equities. —

A vendee taking a quitclaim deed to real estate receives such property with constructive notice of prior outstanding equities. First Nat'l Bank v. Timmins, 4 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1910).

Quitclaim deed conveys undisturbed interest. —

Since a quitclaim deed conveys all the existing legal and equitable rights of the seller in the property described in the deed, there was no obligation to convey a patent deed to a buyer in order to assign an undisturbed, unencumbered interest in state land. Ellingstad v. Department of Natural Resources, 979 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1999).

Quoted in

Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., 432 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1967); Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 295 P.3d 374 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro, 219 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.15.060. Passage of fee.

The term “heirs” or other words of inheritance are not necessary to create or convey an estate in fee simple.

History. (§ 22-3-3 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904).

Sec. 34.15.070. Passage of grantor’s entire estate.

  1. A conveyance of real estate passes all the real estate of the grantor, unless the intent to pass a less estate appears by express terms or is necessarily implied in the terms of the grant.
  2. A conveyance by a tenant for life or years purporting to grant a greater estate than the tenant possesses or can convey does not work a forfeiture of the estate, but passes to the grantee all the estate that the tenant can convey.

History. (§§ 22-3-3, 22-3-4 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904); City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, 373 P.3d 473 (Alaska 2016).

Sec. 34.15.075. Receipt of after-acquired title or interest.

  1. In addition to any estate passed by the grantor under AS 34.15.070 , whenever a person purports by a warranty deed, or, for Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act real property, a quitclaim deed, to grant real property in fee or in fee simple to a grantee and subsequently acquires title to, or an interest in, the real property, the subsequently acquired title or interest passes by operation of law to the grantee or the grantee’s successors.
  2. In this section, “Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act real property” means real property that, at some point in that real property’s chain of title, was conveyed by the federal government under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act) to a corporation established under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.

History. (§ 2 ch 21 SLA 2002; am § 41 ch 56 SLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For statement of legislative purpose regarding the 2002 enactment of this section, see § 1, ch. 21, SLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 3, ch. 21, SLA 2002 provides that “[t]o the extent constitutionally permissible, [AS 34.15.075 enacted by] this Act applies to a title or interest that is acquired after the execution of a warranty or quitclaim deed if the title or interest is acquired on or after May 18, 2002, whether or not the warranty or quitclaim deed is executed before, on, or after May 18, 2002.”

Opinions of attorney general. —

Legislation which enacted AS 34.15.075 sought to affect conveyances of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act real property by quitclaim deed, in some cases changing the common law rule that estoppel by deed does not apply when a conveyance is made by quitclaim deed. While the purpose of the legislation was to clear title related to subsurface use of the property when it is conveyed by quitclaim deed by village corporations, it raised concerns regarding retroactive application and equal protection. 2002 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 3.

Sec. 34.15.080. Covenants not implied.

No covenant is implied in a conveyance of real estate, whether the conveyance contains special covenants or not.

History. (§ 22-3-5 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

When a seller “conveys and warrants” property to a buyer, the seller’s duty to defend the buyer’s title to the premises is implied. Absent this or substantially similar language, no covenant is implied in a conveyance of real estate. Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444 (Alaska 1985).

Applied in

James v. McCombs, 936 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 34.15.090. Covenant not implied in mortgage.

A mortgage may not be construed as implying a covenant for the payment of the sum intended to be secured by the mortgage. When there is no express covenant for payment contained in the mortgage, and no bond or other separate instrument to secure payment is given, the remedies of the mortgagee are confined to the land mentioned in the mortgage.

History. (§ 22-3-6 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.15.100. Conveyance of lands held adversely.

A grant or conveyance of land or interest in land is not void because at the time of the execution the land is in the actual possession of another claiming adversely.

History. (§ 22-3-7 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Vendee may rely on public records. —

It would be impossible for one who was not present on the ground to pay valuable consideration in good faith for real property in reliance upon the public records if his title could be overthrown by proof of vague squatter occupancy of land, general rumors, reports, surmises or general assertions as to ownership or title to lands where the deed is not timely of record. Nordling v. Carlson, 265 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. Alaska 1958).

Sec. 34.15.105. Transfer fee covenants prohibited.

  1. A document that conveys real estate may not include a provision that requires a subsequent grantee or grantor to pay a transfer fee to convey the real estate, except a document that conveys real estate may include a provision that requires a transfer fee if the fee is
    1. a loan assumption fee or similar fee charged by a person holding a lien on the property; or
    2. a fee or commission paid to a licensed real estate broker for brokerage services.
  2. In this section, “transfer fee” does not include
    1. a tax, assessment, fee, or charge imposed by a governmental authority;
    2. a recording fee;
    3. a fee payable to a nonprofit, mandatory homeowners’ association, condominium association, or cooperative under an applicable declaration or covenant; or
    4. a fee payable to an organization described in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) (Internal Revenue Code) used exclusively for cultural, educational, charitable, recreational, environmental, conservation, or similar activities that benefit the real estate conveyed.
  3. A provision that violates this section is void.

History. (§ 3 ch 39 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.15.110. Conveyances construed as creating tenancy in common.

  1. A conveyance or devise of land or an interest in land made to two or more persons, other than to executors and trustees, as such, shall be construed to create a tenancy in common in the estate, except as provided in (b) of this section and AS 34.77.100 .
  2. A husband and wife who acquire title in real property hold the estate as tenants by the entirety, except as provided by AS 34.77.100 or unless it is expressly declared otherwise in the conveyance or devise. The conveyance shall recite the marital status of the parties acquiring title to the real property.

History. (§ 22-3-8 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 211 SLA 1970; am § 9 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

The references to “AS 34.77.100 ” in subsections (a) and (b) were substituted for “AS 34.75.100” in 1998 to reflect the 1998 renumbering of the section.

Notes to Decisions

History of section. —

See Carver v. Gilbert, 387 P.2d 928 (Alaska 1963).

Presumption parties intended to share proportionally. —

The initial presumption is that each of two parties owned an equal undivided share in property deeded to both. If, however, it is shown that the parties contributed unequally to the equity in the property, a presumption arises that they intended to share the property in proportion to their respective contributions. D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94 (Alaska 1994).

Intention of cohabiting parties controls. —

Where parties cohabit, the court must also examine the intent of the parties with respect to the ownership of the property. If an intent to hold the property in a particular proportion or to determine the proportion by a particular method can be discovered, this intent controls over the regular rules of cotenancy. D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94 (Alaska 1994).

Quoted in

Dimond v. Kelly, 629 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1981).

Cited in

Windel v. Mat-Su Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 305 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 34.15.120. Remedy of tenant in common.

A tenant in common may maintain an action against a cotenant for receiving more than the fair share of the rents and profits of the estates owned by them in common.

History. (§ 22-1-6 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

“An action” means any action suited to the situation and circumstances of an aggrieved cotenant. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

Common-law rights enlarged. —

The effect of this statute is to enlarge the common-law rights of a cotenant to an estate as against another cotenant, and to give him a remedy to enforce the new rights conferred. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

Section defines wrong and provides remedy. —

This section in express words defines a wrong which one cotenant may suffer at the hands of another cotenant, and provides a remedy for the redress of the wrong. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

The wrong consists in one of two or more cotenants receiving more than his just proportion of the profits of the estate owned by him and his cotenant or cotenants in common; the remedy provided for the cotenant aggrieved by the wrong is to maintain an action. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

At common law cotenant of mining claim could not have accounting of profits. —

By the common law a cotenant of a mining claim is given the right to mine and operate the claim subject to the right of the other cotenants to use and mine the claim at the same time; but a cotenant who does not exercise the right to use the claim in this manner is not invested with the power to call upon the working cotenant for an accounting of the profits he may make in operating the claim. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

Remedy. —

This section gives relief to any tenant in common who has not received his just proportion of the rents and profits of the estate owned in common as against his cotenant who has received more than his just proportion of the profits derived from the estate. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

Section confers right to profits proportionate to interest in land. —

It is inconceivable that the law should put in the aggrieved cotenant’s hand the remedy of this section, unless it meant to confer upon him the right, which necessarily goes with the remedy, to have a share in the profits proportionate to the quantity of his interest in the land. Johnson v. Berger, 3 Alaska 151 (D. Alaska 1906).

Cotenant cannot be limited to interest in royalty in lease. —

Under the laws of Alaska a cotenant or co-owner conducting mining operations independently of his cotenant or co-owner is accountable to such cotenant or co-owner for profits made in the operation. It follows, therefore, that one cotenant cannot limit the other to an interest in the royalty provided for in the lease. Pilgrim v. Grant, 9 Alaska 17 (D. Alaska 1936), modified, 95 F.2d 562, 9 Alaska 241 (9th Cir. Alaska 1938).

A cotenant may lease his own rights but not the rights of his cotenants. Starns v. Humphries, 189 F.2d 357, 13 Alaska 258 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Only amount over just proportion must be accounted for. —

One tenant cannot be held to account to another for more than the share received by him above that which he is proportionately entitled to. Cascaden v. Dunbar, 191 F. 471, 3 Alaska Fed. 703 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911).

Proof required. —

It is not necessary for a tenant in common to allege or prove either an ouster or exclusion in order to maintain his right under this section to have an accounting for profits made. Pilgrim v. Grant, 9 Alaska 17 (D. Alaska 1936), modified, 95 F.2d 562, 9 Alaska 241 (9th Cir. Alaska 1938).

Trial may proceed although one cotenant not served. —

In a suit between cotenants of a mining claim, the court did not err in proceeding with the trial of the case although one cotenant had not been served with process and was not before the court, since the controversy between the parties was determined without prejudice to the rights of the omitted cotenant, or any other person. Grant v. Pilgrim, 95 F.2d 562, 9 Alaska 241 (9th Cir. Alaska 1938).

Sec. 34.15.130. Joint tenancy abolished.

Joint tenancy, with the exception of interests in personalty and tenancy by the entirety, is abolished. Except as provided in AS 34.15.110(b) and AS 34.77.100 , persons having an undivided interest in real property are considered tenants in common.

History. (§ 22-1-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 211 SLA 1970; am § 10 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

The reference to “AS 34.77.100 ” was substituted for “AS 34.75.100” in 1998 to reflect the 1998 renumbering of the section.

Notes to Decisions

History of section. —

See Carver v. Gilbert, 387 P.2d 928 (Alaska 1963).

This section appears to have been drawn from the Oregon law. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960). See Binswanger v. Henninger, 1 Alaska 509 (D. Alaska 1902).

Personal property which a husband and wife jointly possess and use is presumed to be held in tenancy by the entirety. Faulk v. Estate of Haskins, 714 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1986).

Effect of section. —

This section abolishes joint tenancies in land for persons who are not married. It does not abolish joint tenancies in personal property, nor does it abolish tenancies by the entirety in real or personal property. Faulk v. Estate of Haskins, 714 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1986).

Findings of proportionate share of joint venture. —

Native corporations were entitled to recover a proportionate share of an Exxon claim from a joint venture created to obtain land from the federal government; if the Exxon claim arose before the corporations withdrew from the venture, the claim was a venture asset subject to distribution under the withdrawal agreement, and if the Exxon claim accrued after the corporations withdrew, then the parties held the assets as tenants in common under this section until the partition. Afognak Joint Venture v. Old Harbor Native Corp., 151 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2007).

Cited in

Windel v. Mat-Su Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 305 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 34.15.140. Tenancy by the entirety.

  1. The right to hold an estate in land as tenants by the entirety, with the right of survivorship, is recognized.
  2. [Repealed, § 91 ch 6 SLA 1984.]
  3. The right of a spouse to convey to self and the other spouse as tenants by the entirety, or as tenants in common, is confirmed.

History. (§ 22-1-6 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 29 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 63 SLA 1970; am § 6 ch 62 SLA 1982; am § 91 ch 6 SLA 1984)

Cross references. —

For homestead exemption rights of tenants by entirety, see AS 09.38.010(b) ; for rights of creditors to seek partition of tenancy by entirety, see AS 09.38.100 .

Notes to Decisions

History of section. —

See Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960).

Income from tenancy. —

Although a tenancy by the entirety itself may be indivisible, the income therefrom is divisible. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960).

Consideration is not necessary for deed from husband to himself and wife. —

A deed by a husband transferring property to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety does not require a monetary consideration and under this section may be purely voluntary. Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960).

Sec. 34.15.145. Solar easement.

  1. An easement obtained for the purpose of protecting the exposure of property to the direct rays of the sun must be created in writing and is subject to the recording requirements for other conveyances of real property.
  2. An instrument creating a solar easement must include, but is not limited to,
    1. the vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees, at which the solar easement extends over the real property subject to the solar easement;
    2. any terms or conditions under which the solar easement is granted or under which it will be terminated;
    3. any provisions for compensation of the owner of the property benefiting from the solar easement in the event of interference with the enjoyment of the solar easement, or compensation of the owner of the property subject to the solar easement for maintaining the solar easement.

History. (§ 7 ch 83 SLA 1980)

Collateral references. —

Landowner’s rights against interference with sunlight desired for purposes of solar energy. 29 ALR4th 349.

What constitutes, and remedies for, misuse of easement. 111 ALR5th 313.

Article 2. Acknowledgment and Proof.

Sec. 34.15.150. Execution of conveyances.

  1. A conveyance executed in the state of land or an interest in land in the state shall be acknowledged before a person authorized to take acknowledgments in AS 09.63.010 or proved in accordance with AS 34.15.210 or 34.15.220 .  The officer taking an acknowledgment shall endorse on it a certificate of the acknowledgment of the conveyance and the date of making the acknowledgment.
  2. A conveyance executed before March 12, 1953, in due form but without two witnesses is validated, shall be received in evidence in all courts of the state, and is evidence of the title to the land or interest in land against the grantor and the heirs and assigns of the grantor.

History. (§ 22-3-9 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 29 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 1966; am § 2 ch 37 SLA 1981)

Cross references. —

For acknowledgment as requirement for recording, see AS 40.17.030(b) ; for forms of acknowledgment, see AS 09.63.100 .

Notes to Decisions

Legislative history of subsection (a). —

See Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

The purpose of acknowledgment is usually to allow an instrument to be recorded or to be introduced into evidence without further proof of execution. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Acknowledgment mandatory. —

Acknowledgment, which had previously been permissive, was made mandatory in 1953, replacing a requirement that deeds and conveyances be signed by two witnesses. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Formal execution is not required for validity between parties. —

It is well established that, in the absence of statutory requirement, acknowledgments are not essential to the validity of an instrument as between the immediate parties and their privies. This rule is particularly applicable in cases where a deed is relied upon as creating an estoppel. James v. Nelson, 90 F.2d 910, 9 Alaska 117 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 721, 58 S. Ct. 41, 82 L. Ed. 556, 9 Alaska 235 (U.S. 1937).

The purpose of requiring that the execution of deeds be attested by witnesses was to entitle the conveyance to be recorded, and while compliance therewith was essential to registration, a failure to comply did not affect the common-law rule that a deed signed, sealed, and delivered is good as between the parties. Eadie v. Chambers, 172 F. 73, 3 Alaska Fed. 396 (9th Cir. Alaska 1909), rev'd, 224 U.S. 564, 32 S. Ct. 597, 56 L. Ed. 885, 3 Alaska Fed. 855 (U.S. 1912).

Signed instrument not witnessed, acknowledged, or recorded. —

An instrument in writing, signed by the parties, may serve as one step in the conveyance of real estate, although it is neither witnessed, acknowledged, nor recorded. Such an instrument, containing apt words to convey, when made, signed, and delivered to the grantee, and followed by acts constituting estoppel, becomes sufficient, as between grantor and grantee, to convey the legal title. Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904); James v. Nelson, 90 F.2d 910, 9 Alaska 117 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 721, 58 S. Ct. 41, 82 L. Ed. 556, 9 Alaska 235 (U.S. 1937).

Witnesses, acknowledgment, and record add nothing to the agreement between the parties. They are formalities required by the law, and become prima facie evidence only of the final conclusion of the contract. Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904); James v. Nelson, 90 F.2d 910, 9 Alaska 117 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 721, 58 S. Ct. 41, 82 L. Ed. 556, 9 Alaska 235 (U.S. 1937).

Presumption. —

The fact that an instrument has been acknowledged before a notary creates a presumption that the signatures are genuine. Huskins v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 394 P.2d 668 (Alaska 1964).

Defective deed. —

A document which purports to be a deed conveying land, unwitnessed and unrecorded, is ineffective as a conveyance under this section and AS 34.15.010 , although it is valid as a contract to convey. Whitehead v. Foxhill, 105 F. Supp. 966, 13 Alaska 726 (D. Alaska 1952).

Although a deed may by reason of defective execution fail to pass legal title, it may operate to vest an equitable title in the grantee. Parks v. Parks, 6 Alaska 426 (D. Alaska 1921).

A lease is a conveyance. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

The statutory definition of “conveyance” in former AS 34.15.350 (now AS 40.17.900 ) is sufficiently broad to include a lease. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

This section applies to a lease for a term of years. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Noncompliance with acknowledgment statute. —

A lease is not void as between the parties to it by reason of noncompliance with the acknowledgment statute. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Failure to comply with the mandatory acknowledgment requirement of subsection (a) of this section, while affecting recordation and admissibility, does not have the effect of making the conveyance void as between the parties. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Failure to comply with the acknowledgment requirement does not make an instrument invalid as between the parties to it, but rather only precludes its recordation and thus its effectiveness as against third persons. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

Under former AS 34.15.260 an unacknowledged conveyance could not be recorded and could not be read in evidence without further proof of the conveyance. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972).

But action may not be maintained on defectively executed lease. —

Where a statute requires a lease for a term of years to be under seal, witnessed, acknowledged, or recorded, to be valid, an action of covenant, on a lease not executed with these formalities, cannot be maintained, though the lessees enter under the lease. Rolando v. Zesch, 7 Alaska 437 (D. Alaska 1926).

Cited in

Waskey v. Chambers, 224 U.S. 564, 32 S. Ct. 597, 56 L. Ed. 885, 3 Alaska Fed. 855 (U.S. 1912).

Sec. 34.15.160. Conveyances executed outside the state.

If a conveyance is executed in a state, territory, or district of the United States, the conveyance may be executed according to the laws of that state, territory, or district, and the execution of the conveyance may be acknowledged under AS 09.63.050 09.63.130 .

History. (§ 22-3-10 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 12 SLA 1966; am § 3 ch 37 SLA 1981)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Alaska Exploration Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 152 F. 145, 2 Alaska Fed. 746 (9th Cir. Alaska 1907).

Cited in

Voss v. Brooks, 907 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1995).

Sec. 34.15.170. Certificate of acknowledgment. [Repealed, § 6 ch 37 SLA 1981.]

Sec. 34.15.180. Execution and acknowledgment of conveyance in foreign country.

If a conveyance is executed in a foreign country it may be executed according to the laws of that country and the execution of it acknowledged under AS 09.63.050 09.63.130 .

History. (§ 22-3-12 ACLA 1949; am § 18 ch 70 SLA 1964; am § 4 ch 12 SLA 1966; am § 4 ch 37 SLA 1981)

Secs. 34.15.190 — 34.15.200. Acknowledgment by married person; officer’s knowledge of grantor’s identity. [Repealed, § 6 ch 37 SLA 1981. For current law see AS 09.63.]

Sec. 34.15.210. Proof by subscribing witness.

  1. Proof of the execution of a conveyance may be made before an officer authorized to take acknowledgment of conveyances, and shall be made by a subscribing witness, who shall state the witness’ own place of residence and that the witness knows the person described in and executing the conveyance.
  2. This proof may not be taken unless the officer is personally acquainted with the subscribing witness or has satisfactory evidence that the person is the subscribing witness to the instrument.

History. (§ 22-3-16 ACLA 1949; am § 5 ch 12 SLA 1966)

Notes to Decisions

Notary must certify as to identity of subscribing witness. —

Where there is no certificate by the notary that he is acquainted with subscribing witness or that he had any evidence that such person was the subscribing witness, the recordation of the instrument is not authorized. Nelson v. Lord, 4 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1910).

Cited in

Morency v. Floyd, 2 Alaska 194 (D. Alaska 1904).

Sec. 34.15.220. Proof of conveyance by handwriting.

When a grantor is dead, out of the state, or refuses to acknowledge the conveyance, and all the subscribing witnesses to the conveyance are also dead or reside out of the state, the conveyance may be proved before the superior court, by proving the handwriting of the grantor and of a subscribing witness to it.

History. (§ 22-3-17 ACLA 1949; am § 6 ch 12 SLA 1966)

Sec. 34.15.230. Subpoena of witness.

An officer authorized to take an acknowledgment or proof of conveyance may issue a subpoena requiring a witness to a conveyance to appear and testify before the officer regarding the execution, upon the application of a grantee, or of a person claiming under the grantee, verified by the oath of the applicant, setting out that

  1. the grantor is dead, out of the state, or refuses to acknowledge the conveyance;
  2. a witness to the conveyance refuses to appear and testify regarding the execution of the conveyance; and
  3. the conveyance cannot be proved without the evidence of the witness.

History. (§ 22-3-18 ACLA 1949; am § 7 ch 12 SLA 1966)

Sec. 34.15.240. Penalty for refusal to appear or testify.

A person served with a subpoena described in AS 34.15.230 who, without reasonable cause, refuses or neglects to appear, or upon appearing refuses to answer upon oath regarding the execution of a deed, shall forfeit to the injured party $100, and may also be committed to jail for a contempt by the officer who issues the subpoena, to remain in jail until the person submits to answer on oath as required.

History. (§ 22-3-19 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.15.250. Endorsement by officer.

An officer taking the proof of a conveyance shall certify it, sign it, and in the certificate shall set out the things required by this chapter to be done, known, or proved, together with the names of the witnesses examined before the officer, their places of residence, and the substance of the evidence given by them.

History. (§ 22-3-20 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Certificate must recite officer’s knowledge of identity of subscribing witness. —

Since AS 34.15.210 requires the notary to know and be acquainted with the subscribing witness, it follows that this section, in terms, requires the certificate to contain a recital of that knowledge. Nelson v. Lord, 4 Alaska 174 (D. Alaska 1910).

Quoted in

Alaska Exploration Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 152 F. 145, 2 Alaska Fed. 746 (9th Cir. Alaska 1907).

Article 3. Recording.

Secs. 34.15.260 — 34.15.340. Recording. [Repealed, § 43 ch 161 SLA 1988. For current law, see AS 40.17.]

Sec. 34.15.343. [Renumbered as AS 40.17.035.]

Secs. 34.15.345, 34.15.350. Recording. [Repealed, § 43 ch 161 SLA 1988. For current law, see AS 40.17.]

Chapter 17. Conservation and Public Recreational Use Easements.

Article 1. Uniform Conservation Easement Act.

Sec. 34.17.010. Creation, conveyance, acceptance, and duration.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 , a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.
  2. A right or duty in favor of or against a holder and a right in favor of a person having a third-party right of enforcement may not arise under a conservation easement before the conservation easement is accepted by the holder and the acceptance is recorded.
  3. Except as provided in AS 34.17.020(b) , a conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the instrument creating the conservation easement provides a limitation on duration.
  4. An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation easement is created is not impaired by the conservation easement unless the owner of the interest is a party to or consents to the conservation easement.
  5. The state or a municipality may not establish a conservation easement on property by eminent domain.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, under § 5, ch. 116, SLA 2008 “AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 34.17.020. Judicial actions.

  1. An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought by
    1. an owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement;
    2. a holder of the easement;
    3. a person having a third-party right of enforcement; or
    4. a person authorized by other law.
  2. AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 do not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a conservation easement under the principles of law and equity.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, under § 5, ch. 116, SLA 2008 “AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 34.17.030. Validity.

A conservation easement is valid even though

  1. it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
  2. it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
  3. it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
  4. it imposes a negative burden;
  5. it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or upon the holder;
  6. the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
  7. there is no privity of estate or of contract.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Sec. 34.17.040. Applicability.

  1. AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 apply to an interest created on or after May 31, 1989 that complies with AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 , whether designated as a conservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise.
  2. AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 apply to an interest created before May 31, 1989 if the interest would have been enforceable if it had been created after May 31, 1989 unless the retroactive application contravenes the constitution or laws of the state or the United States.
  3. AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 do not invalidate an interest, whether designated as a conservation or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise, that is enforceable under the law of the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, under § 5, ch. 116, SLA 2008 “AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Sec. 34.17.050. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws with respect to the subject of the chapter among states enacting it.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Sec. 34.17.055. Tort immunity from personal injuries or death arising out of the use of land subject to a conservation easement.

  1. In addition to the immunity provided by AS 09.65.200 , an owner of land, a portion of which is subject to a conservation easement that is 50 feet or less in width, that has been granted to and accepted by the state or a municipality, and that provides public access for recreational purposes on the land subject to the conservation easement is not liable in tort, except for an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct, for damages to a person who uses the easement to enter onto or remain on the land if
    1. the person had no responsibility to compensate the owner for the person’s use of the easement or the land; and
    2. the damages arise out of the person’s use of the easement for recreational purposes on the land.
  2. The immunity under (a) of this section extends to the grantee of the conservation easement providing public access to the land for recreational purposes.

History. (§ 4 ch 94 SLA 1999)

Collateral references. —

What constitutes, and remedies for, misuse of easement. 111 ALR5th 313.

Sec. 34.17.060. Definitions.

In AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 ,

  1. “conservation easement” means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations to retain or protect natural, scenic, or open space values of real property, ensure its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open space use, protect natural resources, maintain or enhance air or water quality, or preserve the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property;
  2. “holder” means
    1. a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the laws of the state or the United States; or
    2. a nonprofit corporation, charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust exempted from taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) and empowered to retain or protect the natural, scenic, or open space values of real property, ensure the availability of real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open space use, protect natural resources, maintain or enhance air or water quality, or preserve the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property;
  3. “third-party right of enforcement” means a right provided in a conservation easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental body, nonprofit corporation, charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust that is not a holder.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2008, under § 5, ch. 116, SLA 2008 “AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 ” was substituted for “this chapter”.

Article 2. Public Recreational Use Easements.

Sec. 34.17.100. Public recreational use easements.

  1. A public recreational use easement may be created for the purposes of AS 09.65.202 by recording the grant of the easement in the recorder’s office for the recording district where the land affected by the easement is located. The grant of the public recreational use easement must
    1. be on a form provided by the Department of Natural Resources;
    2. identify the land affected;
    3. set out restrictions, conditions, or reservations affecting the easement, including terms addressing duration or termination of the easement, if any; and
    4. state that the purpose of the easement is to make the land available for public recreational activity.
  2. The easement granted under (a) of this section may be a conservation easement under AS 34.17.010 34.17.060 (Uniform Conservation Easement Act).

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 2008)

Chapter 20. Mortgages and Trust Deeds.

Article 1. Mortgages.

Collateral references. —

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, §§ 345, 346, 360 et seq.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §§ 45 et seq., 117, 149 et seq.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §§ 248-253, 473-480.

76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 8–20.

Debts included in provision of mortgage purporting to cover all future and existing debts (“Dragnet Clause”) — modern status. 3 ALR4th 690.

Which of conflicting descriptions in deeds or mortgages of fractional quantity of interest intended to be conveyed prevails. 12 ALR4th 795.

Right of mortgagee, who acquires title to mortgaged premises in satisfaction of mortgage, to recover, under fire insurance policy covering him as “mortgagee,” for loss or injury to property thereafter damages or destroyed by fire. 19 ALR4th 778.

What transfers justify acceleration under “due-on-sale” clause of real-estate mortgage. 22 ALR4th 1266.

Mortgagee-lender’s duty, in disbursing funds, to protect mortgagor against outstanding or potential mechanics’ liens against the mortgaged property. 30 ALR4th 134.

Validity and effect of “wraparound” mortgages whereby purchaser incorporates into agreed payments to grantor latter's obligation on initial mortgage. 36 ALR4th 144.

Duty of mortgagee of real property with respect to obtaining or maintenance of fire or other casualty insurance for protection of mortgagor. 42 ALR4th 188.

Validity and enforceability of due-on-sale real-estate mortgage provisions. 61 ALR4th 1070.

Effect of Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 ( 12 USCS §§ 2801- 2809) on enforcement of state disclosure and antiredlining statutes against federal financial institutions. 57 ALR Fed. 322.

Right of debtor to “de-acceleration” of residential mortgage indebtedness under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 ( 11 USCS § 1322(b)). 67 ALR Fed. 217.

Sec. 34.20.010. Recording assignment of mortgage.

The recording of the assignment of a mortgage is not in itself considered notice of the assignment to the mortgagor or the heirs or personal representatives of the mortgagor, so as to invalidate a payment made by one or more of them to the mortgagee.

History. (§ 22-3-28 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.20.020. Discharge of mortgage by entry in margin of record. [Repealed, § 43 ch 161 SLA 1988.]

Sec. 34.20.030. Recording of discharge upon certificate of mortgagee.

A mortgage may be discharged upon the record of the mortgage by the recorder who has custody of the record when there is presented to the recorder a certificate executed by the mortgagee or the personal representatives or assigns of the mortgagee, acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner prescribed in AS 34.15 to entitle conveyances to be recorded, specifying that the mortgage is paid or otherwise satisfied or discharged.

History. (§ 22-3-30 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.20.040. Recording certificate.

A certificate of discharge provided for in AS 34.20.030 and the proof or acknowledgment of the certificate shall be recorded at full length. A reference shall be made to the book and page containing the record of the certificate or the serial number of the record of the certificate in the entry of the discharge of the mortgage made by the recorder upon the record of the discharge.

History. (§ 22-3-31 ACLA 1949; am § 38 ch 35 SLA 2003)

Sec. 34.20.050. Penalty for failure to discharge mortgage or execute certificate.

If a mortgagee, or personal representatives, successors in interest or assigns of the mortgagee, after full performance of the condition of the mortgage, whether before or after a breach, for 10 days after being so requested in writing, and after tender of the reasonable charges, neglects or refuses to discharge the mortgage, or to execute and acknowledge a certificate of discharge or release of the mortgage, the mortgagee is liable to the mortgagor, the heirs, successors in interest, representatives or assigns of the mortgagor, in the sum of $300 damages, and also for all damages occasioned by the neglect or refusal.

History. (§ 22-3-32 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

Damages recoverable for real estate mortgagee’s refusal to discharge mortgage or give partial release therefrom. 8 ALR4th 853.

Vendor and purchaser — recovery for increased mortgage interest costs where vendor fails or refuses to convey. 28 ALR4th 1078.

Sec. 34.20.060. Definition.

In AS 34.20.010 34.20.060 , “conveyance” includes every instrument in writing by which an estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to real property is affected, except a will.

History. (§ 22-3-21 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1955))

Article 2. Deeds of Trust.

Sec. 34.20.070. Sale by trustee.

  1. If a deed of trust is executed conveying real property located in the state to a trustee as security for the payment of an indebtedness and the deed provides that in case of default or noncompliance with the terms of the trust, the trustee may sell the property for condition broken, the trustee, in addition to the right of foreclosure and sale, may execute the trust by sale of the property, upon the conditions and in the manner set forth in the deed of trust, without first securing a decree of foreclosure and order of sale from the court, if the trustee has complied with the notice requirements of (b) of this section. If the deed of trust is foreclosed judicially or the note secured by the deed of trust is sued on and a judgment is obtained by the beneficiary, the beneficiary may not exercise the nonjudicial remedies described in this section.
  2. Not less than 30 days after the default and not less than 90 days before the sale, the trustee shall record in the office of the recorder of the recording district in which the trust property is located a notice of default setting out (1) the name of the trustor, (2) the book and page where the trust deed is recorded or the serial number assigned to the trust deed by the recorder, (3) a description of the trust property, including the property’s street address if there is a street address for the property, (4) a statement that a breach of the obligation for which the deed of trust is security has occurred, (5) the nature of the breach, (6) the sum owing on the obligation, (7) the election by the trustee to sell the property to satisfy the obligation, (8) the date, time, and place of the sale, and (9) the statement described in (e) of this section describing conditions for curing the default. An inaccuracy in the street address may not be used to set aside a sale if the legal description is correct. At any time before the sale date stated in the notice of default or to which the sale is postponed under AS 34.20.080(e) , if the default has arisen by failure to make payments required by the trust deed, the default may be cured and sale under this section terminated by payment of the sum then in default, other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, and attorney and other foreclosure fees and costs actually incurred by the beneficiary and trustee due to the default. If, under the same trust deed, notice of default under this subsection has been recorded two or more times previously and the default has been cured under this subsection, the trustee may elect to refuse payment and continue the sale.
  3. Within 10 days after recording the notice of default, the trustee shall mail a copy of the notice by certified mail to the last known address of each of the following persons or their legal representatives: (1) the trustor in the trust deed; (2) the successor in interest to the trustor whose interest appears of record or of whose interest the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice, or who is in actual physical possession of the property; (3) any other person actually in physical possession of the property; (4) any person having a lien or interest subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the trust deed, where the lien or interest appears of record or where the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice of the lien or interest, except as provided in (f) of this section. The notice may be delivered personally instead of by mail.
  4. If the State of Alaska is a subsequent party, the trustee, in addition to the notice of default, shall give the state a supplemental notice of any state lien existing as of the date of filing the notice of default. This notice must set out, with such particularity as reasonably available information will permit, the nature of the state’s lien, including the name and address, if known, of the person whose liability created the lien, the amount shown on the lien document, the department of the state government involved, the recording district, and the book and page on which the lien was recorded or the serial number assigned to the lien by the recorder.
  5. The statement required by (b)(9) of this section must state that, if the default has arisen by failure to make payments required by the trust deed, the default may be cured and the sale under this section terminated if
    1. payment of the sum then in default, other than the principal that would not then be due if default had not occurred, and attorney and other foreclosure fees and costs actually incurred by the beneficiary and trustee due to the default is made at any time before the sale date stated in the notice of default or to which the sale is postponed; and
    2. when notice of default under (b) of this section has been recorded two or more times previously under the same trust deed and the default has been cured under (b) of this section, the trustee does not elect to refuse payment and continue the sale.
  6. In (c)(4) of this section, if the existence of a lien or nonpossessory interest can only be inferred from an inspection of the real property, the person holding the lien or nonpossessory interest is not entitled to notice under (c) of this section unless the lien or nonpossessory interest appears of record or a written notice of the lien or nonpossessory interest has been given to the beneficiary or trustee before the recording of the notice of default.
  7. If the trustee delivers notice personally under (c) of this section to the property or to an occupant of the property, the trustee may, notwithstanding (c) of this section, deliver the notice up to 20 days after the notice of default is recorded. If there is not a structure on the property and a person is not present on the property at the time of delivery, the trustee may place the notice on the property, or as close as practicable to the property if
    1. there is not a practical road access to the property; or
    2. access to the property is restricted by gates or other barriers.
  8. If the trustee or other person who delivered notice under (g) of this section signs an affidavit for the delivery, the affidavit is prima facie evidence that the trustee complied with (g) of this section. After one year from the delivery, as evidenced by the affidavit, the trustee is conclusively presumed to have complied with (g) of this section unless, within one year from the delivery, an action has been filed in court to contest the foreclosure based on failing to comply with (g) of this section.
  9. If a person who is entitled to receive notice by mail under (c) of this section is known by the beneficiary or trustee to be deceased, the trustee may satisfy the notice requirements of (c) of this section by mailing the notice to the last known address of the deceased person and to the personal representative of the deceased person if the beneficiary or trustee knows that a personal representative has been appointed for the deceased person.
  10. If a person who is entitled to receive notice by mail under (c) of this section is known by the beneficiary or trustee to be deceased but the trustee and the beneficiary do not know that a personal representative has been appointed for the deceased person, the trustee may satisfy the notice requirements of (c) of this section by
    1. mailing the notice to the heirs and devisees of the deceased person
      1. whose names and addresses are known to the beneficiary or trustee; or
      2. who have recorded a notice of their interest in the property; and
    2. publishing and posting the notice of the foreclosure as provided by law for the sale of real property on execution, except that the notice must be titled “To the Heirs or Devisees of (insert the name of the deceased person)” and include in the body of the notice a list of the names of the persons who are known by the beneficiary or trustee to be the heirs and devisees of the deceased person.
  11. If notice is given as required by (i) and (j) of this section, an heir or devisee of the deceased person may not challenge the foreclosure on the ground that the heir or devisee did not receive notice of the sale, unless the heir or devisee challenges the foreclosure on this ground within 90 days after the sale.
  12. A person may bring an action in court to enjoin a foreclosure on real property only if the person is
    1. the trustor of the deed of trust under which the real property was foreclosed;
    2. a guarantor of the obligation that the real property is securing;
    3. a person who has an interest in the real property that has been recorded;
    4. a person who has a recorded lien against the real property;
    5. an heir to the real property;
    6. a devisee of the real property; or
    7. the attorney general acting under other legal authority.
  13. If a person brings an action under (l) of this section to stop a sale of real property, and if the sale is being brought because of a default in the performance of a nonmonetary obligation required by the deed of trust that the real property is securing, the court may impose on the person the conditions that the court determines are appropriate to protect the beneficiary.
  14. In this section, “devisee,” “heir,” and “personal representative” have the meanings given in AS 13.06.050 .

History. (§ 22-5-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 116 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 122 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 50 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 176 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 44 SLA 1988; am § 3 ch 58 SLA 1993; am §§ 39, 40 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 4 — 6 ch 62 SLA 2010)

Cross references. —

For applicability of the 1988 amendment to (a) of this section, see sec. 3, ch. 44, SLA 1988 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Alaska Housing Finance Corporation's (AHFC) foreclosure process violated a mortgagor's due process rights under the Alaska Constitution because the process gave the mortgagor no pre-deprivation chance to be heard, as (1) an AS 34.20.070(b) default notice gave no such opportunity, (2) abilities to cure and talk to a customer service representative did not suffice, (3) a trustee's duties were no chance to be heard, (4) a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act notice gave no chance to state objections to a decision-maker able to rectify errors, (5) the mortgagor's post-deprivation ability to sue was inadequate, and (6) prejudice was presumed from a complete hearing denial. Anderson v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 462 P.3d 19 (Alaska 2020).

If a trustee chooses not to sell property but to foreclose, then he may proceed under AS 09.45.170 . Suber v. Alaska State Bond Comm., 414 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1966).

Effect of grossly overstating amount due. —

Where the amount due is grossly overstated or so excessive that it might deter bidders, it will render the foreclosure sale invalid. Semlek v. National Bank, 458 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1969).

Foreclosure costs in reinstatement quote. —

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a mortgagee in a mortgagor’s action claiming that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote violated the mortgagor’s right to cure because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in the reinstatement quote did not violate this section. Albrecht v. Alaska Tr., LLC, 286 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2012).

Superior court erred in granting a borrower’s motion for summary judgment because, in returning a beneficiary of a deed of trust to its status quo ante when a borrower reinstated after a default, Alaska Trustee could statutorily include all reasonable costs incurred pursuing a foreclosure regardless of whether the deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs, and the Unfair Trade Practices Act did not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. Alaska Tr., LLC v. Bachmeier, 332 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2014).

Remedy of setting aside sale. —

While noncompliance with the statutory provisions regarding foreclosure by the power under a mortgage or trust deed is not to be favored, the remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which reach unjust extremes. Semlek v. National Bank, 458 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1969).

Gross inadequacy of the sale price alone is not always a sufficient reason to set aside a foreclosure sale. Baskurt v. Beal, 101 P.3d 1041 (Alaska 2004).

Trial court did not err when it set aside a foreclosure sale of two parcels, both on the basis of inadequate price, where the foreclosure purchase price was less than 15 percent of the sale price; and because the sale was part of a sale in bulk rather than selling only one parcel, the trustee had failed in her duty to act reasonably to protect the debtor’s interests. Baskurt v. Beal, 101 P.3d 1041 (Alaska 2004).

Constitutionality of applying 1976 amendment to pre-existing deed of trust. —

Application of the 1976 amendment to this section, which among other things added the second and third sentences of subsection (b), to deeds of trust executed before but foreclosed after the amendment became effective is not prohibited by the contract clause of the federal constitution. Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 585 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1978).

There is no violation of the contract clause by the application to pre-existing deeds of trust of the 1976 amendment, changing the law regarding payments required to terminate a nonjudicial deed of trust sale. An obligor on a note must still pay the principal and interest and, in case of default, the beneficiary is still entitled to foreclosure and to his costs. The beneficiary is deprived of his right to insist on payment of the entire debt as a condition to stopping the nonjudicial foreclosure process where the overdue amount is brought current and costs are paid. However, the defaulting obligor may bring his payments current and stop the nonjudicial foreclosure as a matter of right only twice; the third time the beneficiary may insist on payment in full. This modification does not reduce the value of a beneficiary’s note or the security ensuring payment in any perceptible way. Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 585 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1978).

The 1976 amendment does no more than codify a form of relief from forfeiture which courts have often exercised. Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 585 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1978).

Implied duty of beneficiary. —

The right of an obligor to call a halt to a nonjudicial foreclosure by paying costs and by bringing his payments current carries with it an implied duty on the part of the beneficiary to accept a tender of the sum in default and to seasonably advise the obligor on request of the amount in default. Hagberg v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 585 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1978).

Creditor may ignore security and sue on underlying debt. —

A secured creditor initially may ignore the security and sue for a personal judgment on the underlying debt, absent an agreement to the contrary. Once the creditor obtains a personal judgment which is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the creditor may judicially or nonjudicially foreclose the security. Moening v. Alaska Mut. Bank, 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988).

Where the terms of a note and deed of trust did not limit the secured creditors to the remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure of their security, the creditors’ subsequent claim for judicial foreclosure of that security was not precluded by the judgment in a prior suit on the note. Conrad v. Counsellors Inv. Co., 751 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1988).

Scope of right of equitable redemption. —

Right of equitable redemption on a deed of trust extends beyond the obligor to every other person who has an interest in, or legal or equitable lien upon, the mortgaged premises; therefore, the right of cure granted by subsection (b) of this section should extend to those persons; however, this equitable right would not extend to mere occupants or possessors lacking any claim to the property. Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Recovery of deficiency judgment under federal law. —

Where owners of rental properties received a disaster relief loan from the Small Business Administration which loan was secured by deeds of trust on three parcels of property, the deeds providing that federal law will govern, that the parties waive any local immunity, and that the trustor shall be liable and agrees to pay any deficiency, the SBA should be permitted to recover the deficiency despite AS 34.20.100 , which prohibits recovery of deficiency judgments after summary foreclosure pursuant to a power of sale under a deed of trust. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 1648, 56 L. Ed. 2d 85 (U.S. 1978).

Under 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(4), deficiency judgments are authorized when the loan is secured by a deed of trust. Examination of the statute and its legislative history demonstrates that Congress, with respect to Small Business Administration loan transactions, intended the term “mortgage” to be used in its broader, generic sense. Moreover, the differences in foreclosure methods between a mortgage and a deed of trust under Alaska law do not exist nationwide. A consistent application of the statute in all jurisdictions is necessary to effectuate the underlying congressional goals. This requires that the SBA be allowed to recover deficiencies whenever federal law applies and there has been a default on a loan secured by real property. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 1648, 56 L. Ed. 2d 85 (U.S. 1978).

Physical inspection of property before sale. —

The trust deed notice statute contemplates physical inspection of the property before the sale by the trustee or beneficiary. The statute requires the trustee to check the record and visit the property for a determination of whether there is another person occupying or in possession of the property. In order to insure that all interested parties, including those without recorded interests, have notice of the foreclosure, the trustee or beneficiary should inspect the property. Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

The term “last known address,” referred to in subsection (c), is that address most likely to give the affected party notice; a trustee is obligated to exercise due diligence to determine that address. Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1986), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 151 P.3d 428 (Alaska 2006), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 2006 Alas. LEXIS 168 (Alaska Nov. 3, 2006).

Reinstatement amount. —

Homeowner was not entitled to a declaration that foreclosure fees should not be included in a reinstatement amount. AS 34.20.070 defers to the terms and conditions contained in the deed of trust; the costs incident to foreclosure were properly included within the sum in default based on the express terms of the deed of trust. Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC, 287 P.3d 87 (Alaska 2012).

Duty to provide cure amount. —

In a case where a junior lienholder contended that she possessed a claim in property due to a property settlement with a former live-in lover, there was no failure to preserve the right to cure a default based on a failure to tender the cure amount or seek a stay of the foreclosure sale; senior lienholder only provided the amount due on the morning of the sale. Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Sale valid. —

Holder of a first deed of trust did not violate subsection (b) of this section or AS 34.20.080 by halting a foreclosure sale to allow two prospective bidders time to obtain cash or cashier’s checks in order to comply with the terms of the sale under a deed of trust, even though the offset bid was the only one received when the sale reconvened. Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose, Inc. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 116 P.3d 592 (Alaska 2005).

Bank's alleged violations of the foreclosure statute did not make the foreclosure sale inherently unfair and unreasonable where the borrower did not allege that he was unaware of his right to cure or that he had attempted to request the reinstatement amount. Wendt v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 487 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2021).

Junior lienholder was not entitled to void a foreclosure sale because there was no procedural defect in the sale. The junior lienholder received all of the required notice, and the sale price for the property was not so grossly inadequate as to warrant setting aside the sale, particularly as there was no indication of fraud. Thomas v. Joseph P. Casteel Trust, 496 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2021).

Where the buyers failed to make payment on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, the superior court properly granted summary judgment for the sellers, who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, and issued a judgment for possession of the property; the record supported no genuine issue of material fact about the foreclosure sale’s compliance with relevant law. The title company satisfied its foreclosure-related notice requirements under AS 34.20.070 , because it recorded the notice of default in the recorder’s office; and mailed the notice by certified mail to the trustor, successors in interests, and other occupants. Tangwall v. Buscher, — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 13, 2022), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2022) (memorandum decision).

Junior lienholder purchasing from senior lienholder. —

A junior lienholder loses its security interest as a result of a senior lienholder’s foreclosure and sale, even where the junior is the purchaser at the sale. Adams v. FedAlaska Fed. Credit Union, 757 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 1988).

Quoted in

Bauman v. Day, 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).

Stated in

McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210 (Alaska 1978); In re Moore, — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Jan. 15, 2014).

Cited in

Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983); Smith v. Shortall, 732 P.2d 548 (Alaska 1987); Madden v. Alaska Mortg. Group, 54 P.3d 265 (Alaska 2002); Hooks v. Alaska United States Fed. Credit Union, 413 P.3d 1192 (Alaska 2018); Cox v. Estate of Cooper, 426 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2018); Blas v. Bank of Am., N.A., Vikas2019 Alas. LEXIS 187Vikas (October 9, 2019).

Collateral references. —

54A Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 1 et seq.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §§ 1, 15-18, 119-125, 711, 712.

Right of trustee of land having interest therein to purchase on his own behalf in association with foreclosure by third-party lienor, in absence of express trust provision. 30 ALR4th 732.

Sec. 34.20.080. Sale at public auction.

  1. The sale authorized in AS 34.20.070 shall be made under the terms and conditions and in the manner set out in the deed of trust. The proceeds from a sale shall be placed in a trust account until they are disbursed. However, the sale shall be made
    1. at public auction held at the front door of a courthouse of the superior court in the judicial district where the property is located, unless the deed of trust specifically provides that the sale shall be held in a different place, except that a trustee may also accept bids by telephone, the Internet, and electronic mail if the trustee has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the bidding methods using the telephone, the Internet, or electronic mail are fair, accessible, and designed to result in money that is immediately available for disbursement; and
    2. after public notice of the time and place of the sale has been given in the manner provided by law for the sale of real property on execution.
  2. The attorney for the trustee or another agent of the trustee may conduct the sale and act in the sale as the auctioneer for the trustee. The trustee may set reasonable rules and conditions for the conduct of the sale. Sale shall be made to the highest and best bidder. The beneficiary under the trust deed may bid at the trustee’s sale. Except as provided by (g) of this section, the trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a deed to the property sold.
  3. The deed must recite the date and the book and page of the recording of default, and the mailing or delivery of the copies of the notice of default, the true consideration for the conveyance, the time and place of the publication of notice of sale, and the time, place, and manner of sale, and refer to the deed of trust by reference to the page, volume, and place of record or to the place of record and the serial number assigned to the deed of trust by the recorder.
  4. After the sale an affidavit of mailing the notice of default and an affidavit of publication of the notice of sale shall be recorded in the mortgage records of the recording district where the property is located.
  5. The trustee may postpone sale of all or any portion of the property by delivering to the person conducting the sale a written and signed request for the postponement to a stated date and hour. The person conducting the sale shall publicly announce the postponement to the stated date and hour at the time and place originally fixed for the sale. This procedure shall be followed in any succeeding postponement, but the foreclosure may not be postponed for more than 12 months unless a new notice of the sale is given under (a)(2) of this section. A sale may be postponed for up to 12 months from the sale date stated in the notice of default under AS 34.20.070(b) without providing a basis for challenging the validity of the foreclosure process because of the length of time the foreclosure has been pending.
  6. After delivery of a deed under (b) of this section, the trustee shall distribute any cash proceeds of the sale in the following order to
    1. the beneficiary of the deed of trust being foreclosed until the beneficiary is paid the full amount that is owed under the deed of trust to the beneficiary;
    2. the persons who held, at the time of the sale, recorded interests, except easements, in the property, that were subordinate to the foreclosed deed of trust; the distribution under this paragraph shall be made according to the priority of the recorded interest, and a recorded interest with a higher priority shall be satisfied before distribution is made to the recorded interest that is next lower in priority; however, if a person holds a recorded interest that is an assessment, the person is entitled only to the amount of the assessment that was due at the time of the sale; in this paragraph, “recorded interest” means an interest, including a lease, recorded under AS 40.17;
    3. the trustor in the trust deed if the trustor is still the owner of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, but, if the trustor is not still the owner of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, then to the trustor’s successor in interest whose interest appears of record at the time of the foreclosure sale.
  7. The trustee may withhold delivery of the deed under (b) of this section for up to 10 days after the sale. If, during the 10 days, the trustee determines that the sale should not have proceeded, the trustee may not issue the deed but shall
    1. inform the beneficiary, the otherwise successful bidder, and the trustor of the trust deed or the trustor’s successor in interest that the sale is rescinded; and
    2. return to the otherwise successful bidder money received from the otherwise successful bidder as a bid on the property; return of this money is the otherwise successful bidder’s only remedy if the trustee withholds delivery of the deed under (b) of this section.
  8. If a trustee rescinds a sale under (g) of this section and the obligation secured by the deed of trust remains in default, the trustee may, at the request of the beneficiary, reschedule the sale for a date that is not less than 45 days after the date of the rescinded sale. Not less than 30 days before the rescheduled sale date, the trustee shall
    1. mail notice of the rescheduled sale date by certified mail to the last known address of each of the persons identified by AS 34.20.070(c) ; and
    2. publish and post the notice of the rescheduled sale date as provided by law for the sale of real property on execution.
  9. Unless a sale is rescinded under (g) of this section, the sale completely terminates the rights of the trustor of the trust deed in the property.
  10. If a sale is rescinded under (g) of this section, the deed of trust foreclosed in the rescinded sale is restored to the validity and priority it would have had as though the sale had not occurred.

History. (§ 22-5-2 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 116 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 19 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 3 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 44 SLA 1977; am § 41 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 7 — 10 ch 62 SLA 2010)

Notes to Decisions

Effect of grossly overstating amount due. —

When the amount due is grossly overstated or so excessive that it might deter bidders, it will render the foreclosure sale invalid. Semlek v. National Bank, 458 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1969).

Remedy of setting aside sale. —

While noncompliance with the statutory provisions regarding foreclosure by the power under a mortgage or trust deed is not to be favored, the remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which reach unjust extremes. Semlek v. National Bank, 458 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1969).

A foreclosure sale under a deed of trust will be set aside only if the price received was inadequate and the sale was tainted with either fraud or unfairness. In re Alsop, 14 B.R. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982), disapproved, Butler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. Pa. 1988).

Recital of facts regarding mailing or delivery. —

AS 34.20.080(c) and 34.20.090(c) require a recital of facts specifying what the trustee has done regarding mailing or delivery. Where there is no such recital, purchasers at a public foreclosure sale are on inquiry notice of a potential voidable defect and cannot claim bona fide purchaser status or the protection of AS 34.20.090(c) . Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1986), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 151 P.3d 428 (Alaska 2006), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 2006 Alas. LEXIS 168 (Alaska Nov. 3, 2006).

Sale valid. —

Holder of a first deed of trust did not violate AS 34.20.070(b) or this section by halting a foreclosure sale to allow two prospective bidders time to obtain cash or cashier’s checks in order to comply with the terms of the sale under a deed of trust, even though the offset bid was the only one received when the sale reconvened. Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose, Inc. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 116 P.3d 592 (Alaska 2005).

Real property that was foreclosed on the day before debtor filed his Chapter 13 case was not part of bankruptcy estate because, under Alaska law, the deed of trust foreclosure sale transferred title to buyer when deed was executed and delivered by sale trustee, which was pre-petition. In re Macavilca (Bankr. D. Alaska Apr. 7, 2004).

Quoted in

Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC, 287 P.3d 87 (Alaska 2012).

Stated in

McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

United States v. Reeves, 349 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Alaska 1971); Ostrow v. Higgins, 722 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1986); Bauman v. Day, 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).

Collateral references. —

54A Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 483 et seq.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §§ 6, 339, 340, 646, 739 et seq.

59A C.J.S., Mortages, §§ 786-860.

What constitutes a “public sale”. 4 ALR2d 575.

Duty and liability of trustee under mortgage, deed of trust, or other trust instrument, to holders of bonds or other obligations secured thereby. 90 ALR2d 501.

Sec. 34.20.090. Title, interest, possessory rights, and redemption.

  1. The sale and conveyance transfers all title and interest that the party executing the deed of trust had in the property sold at the time of its execution, together with all title and interest that party may have acquired before the sale, and the party executing the deed of trust or the heirs or assigns of that party have no right or privilege to redeem the property, unless the deed of trust so declares.
  2. The purchaser at a sale and the heirs and assigns of the purchaser are, after the execution of a deed to the purchaser by the trustee, entitled to the possession of the premises described in the deed as against the party executing the deed of trust or any other person claiming by, through or under that party, after recording the deed of trust in the recording district where the property is located.
  3. A recital of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing or personal delivery of copies of notices of default in the deed executed under a power of sale is prima facie evidence of compliance with the requirements.  The recital is conclusive evidence of compliance with the requirements in favor of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for value and without notice.

History. (§ 22-5-3 ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 116 SLA 1957)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (b) of this section in 1988 under § 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

A foreclosure sale passes both title and possession to the purchaser, the execution of the deed of trust by the trustor having created only a lien. In re Alsop, 14 B.R. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982), disapproved, Butler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. Pa. 1988).

Foreclosure requires execution and delivery of trustee’s deed. —

Despite the amendment of this section, under AS 34.20.090 , execution and delivery of the trustee’s deed is still required to transfer legal and equitable title to the purchaser, and to vest that purchaser with the right of possession; what has changed, however, is that under this section, a foreclosure sale will divest and completely terminate the rights of the trustor of the deed of trust. In re Taffe, — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska July 15, 2013).

Foreclosure sale preceding bankruptcy filing. —

Real property that was foreclosed on the day before debtor filed his Chapter 13 case was not part of the bankruptcy estate because, under Alaska law, the deed of trust foreclosure sale transferred title to buyer when the deed was executed and delivered by the sale trustee, which was pre-petition. In re Macavilca, — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Apr. 7, 2004).

Encumbrances taken by purchaser. —

A purchaser at a deed of trust sale takes land subject only to those encumbrances created before execution of the trust deed, except where provided otherwise by statute. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970); Alaska Laborers Training Fund v. P & R Enters., 583 P.2d 825 (Alaska 1978); In re Alsop, 14 B.R. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982), disapproved, Butler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. Pa. 1988); Burnett, Waldock & Padgett Inv. v. C.B.S. Realty, 668 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1983).

Junior lienholder purchasing from senior lienholder. —

A junior lienholder loses its security interest as a result of a senior lienholder’s foreclosure and sale, even where the junior is the purchaser at the sale. Adams v. FedAlaska Fed. Credit Union, 757 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 1988).

When a junior lienholder who was found to have charged a debtor a usurious interest rate purchased the debtor's foreclosed property from a senior lienholder, the debtor's claim to title and possession of the property failed because the senior lienholder's foreclosure extinguished the debtor's claim. Bibi v. Elfrink, 408 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2017).

Knowledge of interests arising after execution of deed does not affect title. —

The title of a purchaser at a deed of trust sale is not affected by knowledge of adverse claims or interests arising after the execution of the trust deed; it is superior to them because it relates back to the time of the execution of the deed of trust. Alaska Laborers Training Fund v. P & R Enters., 583 P.2d 825 (Alaska 1978); In re Alsop, 14 B.R. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982), disapproved, Butler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. Pa. 1988).

A lis pendens which relates to an interest arising after the execution of the deed of trust will not affect the title obtained by a purchaser at a valid foreclosure sale. Alaska Laborers Training Fund v. P & R Enters., 583 P.2d 825 (Alaska 1978).

Recital of facts regarding mailing or delivery. —

AS 34.20.080(c) and 34.20.090(c) require a recital of facts specifying what the trustee has done regarding mailing or delivery. Where there is no such recital, purchasers at a public foreclosure sale are on inquiry notice of a potential voidable defect and cannot claim bona fide purchaser status or the protection of AS 34.20.090(c) . Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1986), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 151 P.3d 428 (Alaska 2006), limited, Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Ins., Inc., 2006 Alas. LEXIS 168 (Alaska Nov. 3, 2006).

Applied in

Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444 (Alaska 1985); Welcome v. Jennings, 780 P.2d 1039 (Alaska 1989); Bauman v. Day, 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).

Cited in

Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989); Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Collateral references. —

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 521 et seq., § 787 et seq.

Sufficiency of tender of payment to effect defaulting vendee’s redemption of rights in land purchased. 37 ALR4th 286.

Effect on subordinate lien of redemption by owner or assignee from sale under prior lien. 56 ALR4th 703.

Sec. 34.20.100. Deficiency judgment prohibited.

When a sale is made by a trustee under a deed of trust, as authorized by AS 34.20.070 34.20.130 , no other or further action or proceeding may be taken nor judgment entered against the maker or the surety or guarantor of the maker, on the obligation secured by the deed of trust for a deficiency.

History. (§ 22-5-4 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of section. —

The Alaska anti-deficiency statute, like the post-depression enactments of many other states, was aimed at relieving the plight of debtors whose obligations were secured by mortgages or other security interests in land. Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983).

Deficiency judgment prohibited only in special instance. —

This section prohibits a deficiency judgment only in the special instance where the trustee sells the property pursuant to the deed of trust without a court action on the obligation secured by the deed of trust. Suber v. Alaska State Bond Comm., 414 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1966).

Section not applicable to judicial foreclosure sales. —

This restriction on deficiency proceedings applies only to nonjudicial foreclosure sales and not to judicial foreclosure sales. Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983).

The phrase “other or further action or proceeding” as used in this section means a form of litigation or some type of in-court proceeding. Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983).

A motion to compel payment and reduce to judgment is precisely the type of “further action or proceeding” precluded by this statute. Smith v. Shortall, 732 P.2d 548 (Alaska 1987), overruled, Moening v. Alaska Mut. Bank, 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988).

Survival of obligation following sale. —

The loan obligation secured by a deed of trust is not completely extinguished as a matter of law at the time of a non-judicial foreclosure sale. This section contemplates the survival of a loan “obligation” following the sale, but precludes the lender from seeking any “deficiency” on this obligation either from the debtor or from the debtor’s guarantor. Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1992).

A mortgagee’s offset bid is an offset of the outstanding debt, so that the mortgagee essentially “spends” the amount bid of its total indebtedness in making its offset bid, leaving it with an outstanding indebtedness equal to the amount owing on the debt less than the amount bid. Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1992).

Recovery of fire insurance proceeds. —

First lienholder, which sold fire-damaged property at non-judicial foreclosure sale, was only entitled to recover an amount of fire insurance proceeds sufficient to satisfy the outstanding debt. Any remaining proceeds were to be passed on to junior lienholders and/or the mortgagor as their interests appear. Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1992).

Reformation of sales price. —

Where first lienholder’s bid at its non-judicial foreclosure sale was based on a mutual mistake as to the condition of the property which had been damaged by fire, the first lienholder was bargaining for an undamaged property and did not obtain the benefit of its bargain; therefore, reformation of the sales price was appropriate. Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1992).

Bankruptcy claim. —

Because creditor timely filed its claim against debtor, subsequent foreclosure of its secured claim did not preclude it from participating in distribution from bankruptcy estate on its unsecured claim; trustee did not identify any reason under Alaska law why claim was not valid as of petition date and therefore trustee's objection to creditor's unsecured claim under this section was without merit. In re Omni Enters., — B.R. —, 617 B.R. 334 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2020).

Retention of additional security pledged on obligation. —

The limitation of the creditor’s rights to pursue further legal action or process against his debtor for any deficiency in the obligation following a nonjudicial foreclosure of the property does not bar the retention of additional security specifically pledged on the obligation. Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983).

The retention of a bank account pledged as security does not involve a “further action or proceeding” within the meaning of this section, and is not prohibited thereby. Hull v. Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 658 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1983).

Recovery of deficiency judgment under federal law. —

Where owners of rental properties received a disaster relief loan from the Small Business Administration, which loan was secured by deeds of trust on three parcels of property, the deeds providing that federal law will govern, that the parties waive any local immunity, and that the trustor shall be liable and agrees to pay any deficiency, the SBA should be permitted to recover the deficiency despite AS 34.20.100 , which prohibits recovery of deficiency judgments after summary foreclosure pursuant to a power of sale under a deed of trust. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 1648, 56 L. Ed. 2d 85 (U.S. 1978).

Under 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(4), deficiency judgments are authorized when the loan is secured by a deed of trust. Examination of the statute and its legislative history demonstrates that Congress, with respect to Small Business Administration loan transactions, intended the term “mortgage” to be used in its broader, generic sense. Moreover, the differences in foreclosure methods between a mortgage and a deed of trust under Alaska law do not exist nationwide. A consistent application of the statute in all jurisdictions is necessary to effectuate the underlying congressional goals. This requires that the SBA be allowed to recover deficiencies whenever federal law applies and there has been a default on a loan secured by real property. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 1648, 56 L. Ed. 2d 85 (U.S. 1978).

Foreclosure of security after return of unsatisfied judgment. —

A secured creditor initially may ignore the security and sue for a personal judgment on the underlying debt, absent an agreement to the contrary. Once the creditor obtains a personal judgment which is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the creditor may judicially or nonjudicially foreclose the security. Moening v. Alaska Mut. Bank, 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988).

Where the terms of a note and deed of trust did not limit the secured creditors to the remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure of their security, the creditors’ subsequent claim for judicial foreclosure of that security was not precluded by the judgment in a prior suit on the note. Conrad v. Counsellors Inv. Co., 751 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1988).

Quoted in

Alaska Statebank v. Kirschbaum, 662 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1983).

Stated in

Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC, 287 P.3d 87 (Alaska 2012).

Sec. 34.20.110. Trust deeds recorded as mortgages.

For the purposes of record, a deed of trust, given to secure an indebtedness, shall be treated as a mortgage of real estate, and recorded in full in the book provided for mortgages of real property. The person who makes or executes the deed of trust shall be indexed as “mortgagor,” and the trustee and the beneficiary or cestui que trust, as the “mortgagees.”

History. (§ 22-5-5 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

A deed of trust is a mortgage in effect, being only a somewhat different device for accomplishing the same purpose, creating a security interest in land. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

A deed of trust does not move title out of the trustor. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

But only creates a lien. —

See Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The lien theory ought to be applied to deeds of trust as well as to mortgages in the ancient two-party form. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Trustor’s title transferred only by sale after default. —

The statutes require deeds of trust to be recorded like mortgages and provide that a sale under a deed of trust transfers the trustor’s title. From this it could be implied that the trustor’s title is not transferred by mere execution of a deed of trust but only by a sale after default. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Quoted in

Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 295 P.3d 374 (Alaska 2013).

Stated in

Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Cited in

Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Sec. 34.20.115. Procedure for reconveyance.

  1. Unless the beneficiary has requested that a title insurance company reconvey a trust deed before the title insurance company mails or delivers the notice under (b) of this section, a title insurance company shall comply with the requirements of this section before reconveying the trust deed.
  2. Not less than 30 days after payment in full of the obligation secured by a trust deed and receipt of satisfactory evidence of payment in full, a title insurance company shall
    1. mail, by certified mail with postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the beneficiary and the servicer, a notice of intent to reconvey; the notice shall be sent to the beneficiary’s address and the servicer’s address
      1. stated in the trust deed;
      2. stated in the last recorded assignment of the trust deed, if any;
      3. shown in a request for notice recorded under (g) of this section; and
      4. if any, personally known to the title insurance company; or
    2. hand deliver to the beneficiary and to the servicer a notice of intent to reconvey.
  3. The notice required by (b) of this section must be in substantially the following form and accompanied by a copy of the reconveyance to be recorded:
  4. After at least 90 days have elapsed after the mailing or delivery of the notice of intent to reconvey under (b) of this section, if a title insurance company has not received an objection to the reconveyance, the title insurance company may execute and record a reconveyance of the trust deed.
  5. The reconveyance authorized by (d) of this section must be acknowledged under AS 09.63 and be in substantially the following form
  6. A reconveyance of a trust deed, when executed and acknowledged in substantially the form prescribed in (e) of this section, may be recorded and, when recorded, constitutes a reconveyance of the trust deed identified in the reconveyance, regardless of any deficiency in the reconveyance procedure that is not disclosed in the recorded reconveyance, except for forgery of the title insurance company’s signature. The reconveyance of a trust deed under this section does not discharge a personal obligation that was secured by the trust deed at the time of its reconveyance.
  7. A person who wants to receive a copy of a notice given under (b) of this section after the deed of trust is recorded and before the reconveyance is recorded under (d) of this section may record a request for a copy of the notice in the office of the recorder in the judicial district in which a part of the real property is located. The request must be acknowledged, must state the name and address of the person requesting the copy of the notice, and must identify the deed of trust by stating the names of the parties to the deed of trust, the date of recordation, and the serial number or book and page numbers where the deed of trust is recorded.
  8. If, at any point during the procedure required by this section, the beneficiary requests the title insurance company to reconvey the trust deed, the title insurance company is not required to proceed with the rest of the procedure required by this section and may execute and record a reconveyance of the trust deed.
  9. Except as provided in (a) and (h) of this section, if a title insurance company reconveys a trust deed without having satisfactory evidence of payment in full required under (b) of this section or without providing the prior notice to the beneficiary and the servicer as required under this section, the title insurance company is liable to the beneficiary and to the heirs, successors in interest, representatives, and assigns of the beneficiary for all damages occasioned by the neglect or the wilful act, and the title insurance company is liable to the state for a penalty of $300.
  10. In this section,
    1. “beneficiary” means both the record owner of the beneficiary’s interest under a trust deed and a successor in interest;
    2. “satisfactory evidence of payment in full,” with regard to an obligation secured by a trust deed or an encumbrance on the property covered by the trust deed, means a payoff letter, or, along with reasonable documentary evidence that the check was intended to effect full payment,
      1. the original cancelled check; or
      2. a copy, including a voucher copy, of a check, payable to the beneficiary or a servicer;
    3. “servicer” means a person who handles, for a beneficiary of a trust deed, the receipt of the beneficiary’s payments under the trust deed;
    4. “title insurance company” means a title insurance company or a title insurance limited producer; in this paragraph, “title insurance company” and “title insurance limited producer” have the meanings given in  AS 21.66.480 .

NOTICE OF INTENT TO RECONVEY TO: (Beneficiary or servicer for beneficiary) FROM: (Title insurance company) DATE: Notice is hereby given to you as follows: (1) This notice concerns the trust deed described as follows: Trustor: Beneficiary: Recording information for the trust deed: Serial number: or Book number: Page number: Recording information for current assignment of trust deed: Serial number: or Book number: Page number: (2) The undersigned title insurance company claims to have fully paid or received satisfactory evidence of the payment in full of the obligation secured by the trust deed described above. (3) Unless, within 90 days following the date stated above, the undersigned has received, by certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to the address noted below, a notice stating that you have not received payment in full of all obligations secured by the trust deed or that you otherwise object to reconveyance of the trust deed, the undersigned will fully release and reconvey the trust deed under . AS 34.20.115 (4) A copy of the reconveyance or release of the trust deed is enclosed with this notice. (Title insurance company) (Address) (Telephone number)

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RECONVEYANCE OF TRUST DEED , a title insurance company authorized to transact business in Alaska, does, by this document, reconvey, without warranty, to the person or persons legally entitled to the trust property, the following trust property covered by a trust deed naming as trustor and as beneficiary, which was recorded on at serial number or at book and page : The following described property located in the Judicial District, State of Alaska: (Property description) The undersigned title insurance company certifies that (1) the undersigned title insurance company has fully paid or received satisfactory evidence of the payment in full of the obligation secured by the trust deed; (2) not less than 30 days following the payment in full of the trust deed, the undersigned hand delivered or mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the record beneficiary under the trust deed and the servicer for the record beneficiary, at the beneficiary’s and servicer’s record addresses, and to any address personally known to this title insurance company, a notice of intent to reconvey as required by ; and AS 34.20.115 (3) at least 90 days have elapsed after the mailing or delivery of the notice of intent to reconvey, and the undersigned title insurance company has not received an objection to the reconveyance. Dated (Title insurance company) (Acknowledgment).

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History. (§ 1 ch 113 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.20.120. Substitution of trustee.

  1. The trustee under a trust deed upon real property given to secure an obligation to pay money and conferring no duties upon the trustee other than the duties that are incidental to the exercise of the power of sale conferred in the deed may be substituted by recording in the mortgage records of the recording district in which the property is located a substitution executed and acknowledged by
    1. all the beneficiaries under the trust deed, or their successors in interest; or
    2. the attorneys for all of the beneficiaries or the attorneys for all of the beneficiaries’ successors in interest.
  2. The substitution must contain
    1. the date of execution of the trust deed;
    2. the names of the trustee, trustor, and beneficiary, and, if the substitution is executed by the attorney for the beneficiary or successor in interest to the beneficiary, the name, address, and Alaska Bar Association identification number of the attorney;
    3. the book and page where the trust deed is recorded or the serial number assigned to the trust deed by the recorder;
    4. the name of the new trustee; and
    5. an acknowledgment signed and acknowledged by the trustee named in the trust deed of a receipt of a copy of the substitution, or an affidavit of service of a copy of it.
  3. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee succeeds to all the powers, duties, authority, and title of the trustee named in the deed of trust.
  4. When a title insurance company authorized to do business by a certificate of authority granted under AS 21.66 has been purchased by, merged into, or consolidated with, or has transferred all or substantially all of its business assets to, another authorized title insurance company, the surviving or successor company, by operation of law, succeeds to the duties of the predecessor company granted to that predecessor as trustee in any trust deed described in (a) of this section.

History. (§ 22-5-6 ACLA 1949; added by § 4 ch 116 SLA 1957; am § 19 ch 70 SLA 1964; am § 1 ch 79 SLA 1977; am § 42 ch 35 SLA 2003; am §§ 11, 12 ch 62 SLA 2010)

Notes to Decisions

Substitution proper.—

Mortgage servicer that was a beneficiary under the trust deed and that appropriately executed and acknowledged the substitution satisfied the requirement of AS 34.20.120(a)(1) . Blas v. Bank of Am., N.A., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 12, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Sec. 34.20.125. Trustee bond required.

  1. Before performing the duties of a trustee under AS 34.20.070 and 34.20.080 , a person shall obtain a surety bond in the amount of $100,000 to protect the trustors and beneficiaries of trust deeds against fraud or defalcation by the trustee in the performance of the duties.
  2. The bond required by (a) of this section must be a bond that is terminable at any time by the surety by sending written notice by first class United States mail to the obligee and the principal at the address for each that is last known by the surety, and to the department. The bond terminates when 45 days have expired after the date the notice is mailed. The surety is not liable for an act or omission of the principal that occurs after the termination. The surety is not liable after the termination for more than the face amount of the bond, regardless of the number of claims made against the bond or the number of years the bond remains in force. A revision of the amount of the bond is not cumulative.
  3. If a bond terminates under (b) of this section, the person who obtained the bond under (a) of this section shall give notice of the bond’s termination to the department and may not act as a trustee until the person obtains another bond under (a) of this section.
  4. Each year, a trustee shall file evidence of the bond with the department. The department shall verify that the evidence is satisfactory to indicate the existence of the bond, keep an updated list of trustees who are bonded, and make the evidence and the list available to the public for inspection. The department may charge the trustee a reasonable fee for verifying the existence of the bond and maintaining the records required by this subsection.
  5. The bonding requirements of this section do not apply to
    1. a state agency, including the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation and the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority; or
    2. an attorney who is licensed to practice law in this state and is an active member of the Alaska Bar.
  6. In this section, “department” means the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development.

History. (§ 13 ch 62 SLA 2010)

Sec. 34.20.130. Recording assignment, subordination, or waiver.

  1. The following instruments may be recorded:
    1. an assignment of the beneficial interest under a deed of trust; or
    2. an instrument by which a deed of trust of real property is subordinated or waived as to priority.
  2. From the time it is filed for record, the instrument operates as constructive notice to all persons.

History. (§ 22-5-7 ACLA 1949; added by § 5 ch 116 SLA 1957)

Notes to Decisions

Subordination agreements affecting priorities of deeds of trust may be recorded. Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975).

Sec. 34.20.135. Definition.

In AS 34.20.070 34.20.130 , “real property” or “property” includes an interest in real property.

History. (§ 2 ch 19 SLA 1966)

Article 3. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 34.20.140. Recording memorandum extending lien.

Where the payment of an existing contract (a bill of exchange, promissory note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness) is secured by an instrument creating a lien upon real estate, payment on the contract does not extend the lien beyond its original or extended period as against subsequent purchasers, optionees, mortgagees, creditors, or persons acquiring a lien upon the real estate, unless

  1. a memorandum of the payment is recorded in the office of the recording district where the property is located;
  2. the memorandum is recorded before the end of the statutory time for bringing an action upon the existing contract and extensions as exhibited by the terms of the recorded instrument; and
  3. the memorandum is signed and acknowledged by the owner or the representative of the owner of the existing contract of indebtedness.

History. (§ 22-3-46 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 105 SLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Section makes statutes of limitations applicable to mortgages. —

The question of whether or not the lien of a mortgage expires by operation of law prior to the beginning of suit is governed by AS 09.10.040 and AS 09.10.050 , since this section provides in substance that the lien of a mortgage shall expire by operation of law unless prior to the expiration of the statutory time for bringing suit thereon a payment is made and a memorandum of such payment recorded in the recording district where the real estate is situated. Carklin v. Grigsby, 9 Alaska 378 (D. Alaska 1938).

Quoted in

Holta v. Certified Fin. Servs., 49 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2002).

Sec. 34.20.150. Maturity of lien.

  1. The date of maturity of an instrument creating a lien upon real property is considered to be 10 years from the date of the instrument, unless
    1. the period of the instrument is disclosed by the terms of the instrument; or
    2. another instrument extending the period of the first instrument or a memorandum of payment of the first instrument is recorded.
  2. When an existing recorded instrument is recorded before March 26, 1955, which creates a lien upon real property but which does not disclose the period of the instrument, another instrument extending the period of the first instrument, or a memorandum of payment of the first instrument may be recorded before January 1, 1956.

History. (§ 22-3-46 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 105 SLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Limitation period governing foreclosure action. —

The portion of Alaska’s Code of Civil Procedure which deals with limitation of actions does not contain any provision which specifically establishes a limitation period governing the foreclosure of either legal or equitable mortgages. Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1968).

In the absence of a controlling statute a foreclosure action is subject to the same period of limitations as the underlying debt. Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1968).

The six-year statute of limitations (AS 09.10.050 ), which governs the underlying obligation, is determinative of the period of time in which a party is required to commence an action to foreclose a purported equitable mortgage security. Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1968).

In a suit to foreclose a mortgage the six-year period of limitation is controlling and the ten-year period pertaining to actions upon sealed instruments is inapplicable. Dworkin v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1968).

Extending maturity date. —

Under AS 34.20.140 , when payment is made on a contract secured by a real estate lien, the payment will not extend the lien unless a memorandum of payment is recorded. Under AS 34.20.140 and AS 34.20.150(a)(2) , when an instrument such as a deed of trust creates a lien without specifying its maturity date, an instrument extending the earlier instrument will operate to extend the statutorily specified default maturity date only if the later instrument is recorded. Holta v. Certified Fin. Servs., 49 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2002).

The purpose of AS 34.20.150(a) is to provide subsequent purchasers with record knowledge and reasonable certainty regarding the vitality of liens recorded against the property. AS 34.20.150(a) attains this purpose by establishing a ten-year default maturity date and AS 34.20.150(a) allows no exception to the default date unless a different date is expressly stated in either the recorded lien itself under AS 34.20.150(a)(1) or some other recorded document that extends the lien under AS 34.20.150(a)(2) . Holta v. Certified Fin. Servs., 49 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2002).

Sec. 34.20.160. Notice of other remedies.

  1. When a lender uses a note as evidence of an obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, the note must affirmatively advise the mortgagor or trustor and any other party bound by the note if the mortgagee or beneficiary wants the option to bring suit directly on the note to collect an amount owing under the note without first foreclosing the mortgage or deed of trust. This option must be stated in writing within the note or as a separate document. If a note executed after May 24, 1988 fails to contain the notice specified in this section, the debt secured by the mortgage or deed of trust may be foreclosed under AS 09.45.170 09.45.220 or AS 34.20.070 34.20.135 .
  2. If the mortgagee or beneficiary wishes to collect an amount owing under the note without first foreclosing the mortgage or deed of trust, the following language is sufficient in the note:

The mortgagor or trustor (borrower) is personally obligated and fully liable for the amount due under the note. The mortgagee or beneficiary (lender) has the right to sue on the note and obtain a personal judgment against the mortgagor or trustor for satisfaction of the amount due under the note either before or after a judicial foreclosure of the mortgage or deed of trust under AS 09.45.170 09.45.220 .

History. (§ 2 ch 44 SLA 1988)

Chapter 22. Trusts.

Sec. 34.22.010. [Renumbered as AS 13.36.300.]

Chapter 25. Validation of Formal Defects.

Sec. 34.25.010. Validation of defective acknowledgments.

A defective and informal acknowledgment of a deed, contract, lease, power of attorney, mortgage, or other instrument for the conveyance of real property, or an interest in real property, or pertaining to a right, title, or interest in real property, made in good faith, whether the acknowledgment is taken by or before a clerk, deputy clerk, or judge of a federal, state, or territorial court of record, or a commissioner, notary public, or other person authorized to administer oaths, is validated and declared sufficient in law as to acknowledgment, if no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district in which the real property affected by the instrument is located within 10 years from the date of the instrument, or the acknowledgment, to have the instrument set aside, altered, changed, or reformed.

History. (§ 22-3-38 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1953)

Notes to Decisions

Applicability. —

Trial court’s application of the statute to cure the absence of a wife’s signature on both an easement and a re-recording was error; absence of a signature was not a defect in acknowledgement under this section. Windel v. Mat-Su Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 305 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2013).

Collateral references. —

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 162 et seq.

26A C.J.S., Deeds § 63 et seq.

Sec. 34.25.020. Adverse title not affected.

This chapter is not intended to interfere with vested rights in lands or premises, arising by adverse title, acquired in good faith since the date of the defective acknowledgments.

History. (§ 22-3-39 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.25.030. Validation of defective instruments and use as evidence.

  1. A deed, contract, lease, power of attorney, mortgage, or other instrument for the conveyance of real property or an interest in real property, or pertaining to a right, title, or interest in real property, heretofore or hereafter signed and delivered by a person in good faith, as grantor, lessor, mortgagor, or maker, is validated and is sufficient in law for the purpose for which the instrument was executed and delivered, although the instrument is otherwise defective as to form, if no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district in which the property is located within 10 years from the date of the instrument to have the instrument set aside, altered, changed, or reformed.
  2. The instrument so executed and delivered shall be received in evidence in all courts in the state and is evidence of the right, title, or interest to the real property described in the instrument against the grantors, lessors, mortgagors, or makers, and their heirs, successors, and assigns.

History. (§ 22-3-40 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 76 SLA 1953)

Notes to Decisions

A plat’s failure to dedicate the lands marked as streets for public use is not a defect in form that could be cured by subsection (a). State v. Fairbanks Lodge No. 1392, 633 P.2d 1378 (Alaska 1981).

The defects intended to be cured by this section were other and more vital than the mere omission of attesting witnesses. It was the intention to make valid as between the parties unsealed deeds, deeds which lacked one of the essential requisites of a common-law conveyance even as between the parties. Eadie v. Chambers, 172 F. 73, 3 Alaska Fed. 396 (9th Cir. Alaska 1909), rev'd, 224 U.S. 564, 32 S. Ct. 597, 56 L. Ed. 885, 3 Alaska Fed. 855 (U.S. 1912).

Applied in

United States v. Reeves, 349 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Alaska 1971).

Sec. 34.25.040. Deeds on judicial sales.

  1. A judicial sale of real property is valid and sufficient in law to sustain a deed based on the sale when
    1. the sale is heretofore or hereafter made in the state on execution to satisfy a judgment, order, or decree of a court in the state or is made under an order or decree of a court in the state;
    2. the money bid on the property is paid to the officer making the sale, or to the officer’s successor; and
    3. the sale is confirmed or acquiesced in by the court from which the execution issued or where the order or decree was entered.
  2. When no deed has been executed, a judicial sale that satisfies the conditions of (a) of this section entitles a purchaser at the sale to a deed.
  3. The deed, when executed and delivered, is sufficient to convey all the title of the judgment debtor or other person affected by the order or decree in the premises sold to the purchaser at the sale.
  4. All defects and irregularities in the proceedings or suit in which execution issues or in which the order or decree is entered, in the issuance of the execution, in obtaining the order or decree of the court, or in the manner of making or conducting the sale shall be disregarded if no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district where the real property affected by the deed is located within 10 years from the date of the deed, to have the deed set aside, altered, or otherwise changed or reformed.

History. (§ 22-3-41 ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 76 SLA 1953)

Notes to Decisions

Subsection (c) is in accord with substantial precedent. Gransbury v. United Bldg. Supply, 531 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1975).

Title acquired at execution sale. —

Under subsection (c), the purchaser at an execution sale acquires no better title than the judgment debtor had. Gransbury v. United Bldg. Supply, 531 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1975).

Purchaser of defective title. —

Where the title which the judgment debtor had at the time of the execution sale was defective due to the fraudulent conveyance, the purchaser at the execution sale therefore acquired a defective title, no better than that of the judgment debtor. Gransbury v. United Bldg. Supply, 531 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1975).

Sec. 34.25.050. Sale and deed of executor, administrator, and guardian validated.

  1. A sale of real property heretofore or hereafter made by an executor, administrator, or guardian is sufficient to sustain an executor’s, administrator’s, or guardian’s deed to the purchaser for the real property when
    1. made of the decedent’s, ward’s, or incompetent person’s real property in the state to a purchaser for a valuable consideration;
    2. the consideration is paid by the purchaser to the executor, administrator, or guardian, or the successor of the executor, administrator, or guardian, in good faith; and
    3. the sale is not set aside by the court, but is confirmed or acquiesced in by the court.
  2. If the deed is not given, a sale that satisfies the conditions of (a) of this section entitles the purchaser to the deed.
  3. The deed is sufficient to convey to the purchaser all the title that the decedent, ward, or incompetent had in the real property.
  4. All defects or irregularities in estate or court proceedings, in obtaining the order of the court for the sale, and in the making or conducting of the sale by the executor, administrator, or guardian shall be disregarded if no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district in which the real property affected by the deed is located within 10 years from the date of the deed, to have the deed set aside, altered or otherwise changed, or reformed.

History. (§ 22-3-42 ACLA 1949; am § 4 ch 76 SLA 1953)

Collateral references. —

31 Am. Jur. 2d, Executors and Administrators, § 725 et seq.

Sec. 34.25.055. Conveyances to or from trusts.

  1. A person, including a trustee, may convey real property to a trust whether or not a trustee of the trust is named as a grantee in the instrument of conveyance. A trustee of a trust may convey real property from a trust whether or not a trustee of the trust is named as a grantor in the instrument of conveyance.
  2. In a conveyance under (a) of this section, notice of the existence of the trust does not affect the status of a purchaser as a bona fide purchaser.
  3. Real property that is owned by a trust and that is purchased by a bona fide purchaser from a person in the person’s capacity as trustee of the trust is acquired free of any claim of the beneficiaries of the trust.
  4. Notwithstanding other provisions of law, a trust instrument may not change the effect of (c) of this section.
  5. In this section,
    1. “bona fide purchaser” means a person who purchases real property for value from a trust and who
      1. has not knowingly been a party to fraud or illegality affecting the interest of persons who are parties to the purchase transaction or beneficiaries of the trust;
      2. does not have notice of an adverse claim by a beneficiary of the trust; and
      3. has acted in good faith in the purchase transaction;
    2. “conveyance” means a conveyance made before, on, or after August 9, 2000;
    3. “purchaser” means a person who acquires real property by sale, lease, mortgage, pledge, or lien, or who otherwise deals with real property in a voluntary transaction other than by making a gift;
    4. “real property” includes an interest in real property;
    5. “value” means acquisition of property
      1. in return for a binding commitment to extend credit;
      2. as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a claim that existed before the giving of the security;
      3. by accepting delivery of the real property under a contract that is for the purchase of the real property and that existed before the delivery; or
      4. in return for other consideration sufficient to support a contract.

History. (§ 11 ch 40 SLA 2000)

Sec. 34.25.060. Record of the deed as evidence.

When the deed is executed and recorded in the deed records in the proper recording district, the record, certified by the recorder, is evidence in all courts, and has the same effect as the original.

History. (§ 22-3-43 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.25.070. Validation of sales and action to quiet title.

  1. A sale of real estate by an administrator or executor is confirmed and approved, notwithstanding irregularities or informalities in the proceedings before the sale, when
    1. the real estate is heretofore or hereafter sold under a license or order of a superior court in the state;
    2. the purchaser pays the purchase money for the real estate;
    3. the sale is made in good faith, in order to provide for payment of the claims against the estate;
    4. the executor or administrator fails or neglects to make or execute a deed conveying the real estate to the purchaser, or if from mistake or omission in the deed or defect in its execution the deed is inoperative; and
    5. five years have elapsed after the making of the sale.
  2. When these facts are shown in an action to quiet title to the real property against the heirs or their assignees of the deceased person whose property is sold, in the proper court for the suit, the court shall make its decree quieting title and compelling and ordering conveyances of the real estate to the purchaser or the heirs or assignees of the purchaser as if a valid contract to convey the real property were made by the deceased while living.
  3. An action may not be maintained by the heirs of the deceased, or their heirs or assignees, to dispossess the purchaser or the heirs or assignees of the purchaser, after the expiration of five years from the sale.

History. (§ 22-3-44 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.25.080. Tax deeds validated.

  1. A sale of real property is valid and sufficient in law to sustain a tax deed based on the sale when
    1. the sale is heretofore or hereafter made in the state in a proceeding to enforce a tax lien against real property;
    2. the money bid on the property is paid in good faith to the clerk, or the successor of the clerk, of the city conducting the sale; and
    3. the sale is confirmed or acquiesced in by the court ordering the sale.
  2. When no deed is executed, a sale that satisfies the conditions of (a) of this section entitles the purchaser to a deed.
  3. The deed, when executed, is sufficient to convey all of the right, title, or interest of the delinquent owner or a person in privity with the delinquent owner in the real property sold to the purchaser at the sale.
  4. All defects or irregularities in the delinquent tax roll, notices, presentations of delinquent tax roll to a court, proofs of notice, orders of sale, confirmation of sale or other proceedings before or in connection with the sale, in obtaining the order of the court for the sale, or in the making or conducting of the sale by the clerk of the city, or by another person authorized to make or conduct the sale, the lack of an order confirming the sale, and the lack of, or failure to issue, a certificate of sale and purchase, shall be disregarded if no suit is filed in a court of record in the judicial district in which the real property affected by the deed is located within 10 years from the date of the deed, to have the deed set aside, altered or otherwise changed, or reformed.

History. (§ 5 ch 76 SLA 1953)

Collateral references. —

Right of interested party receiving due notice of tax sale or of right to redeem to assert failure or insufficiency of notice to other interested party. 45 ALR4th 447.

Sec. 34.25.090. Definition.

In this chapter “conveyance” includes every instrument in writing by which an estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to real property is affected, except a will.

History. (§ 22-3-21 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1955)

Chapter 27. Modification or Abolition of Common Law Property Rules.

Article 1. Miscellaneous Common Law Rules Abolished.

Sec. 34.27.010. Rules against perpetuities modified. [Repealed, § 2 ch 82 SLA 1994. For comparable provisions, see AS 34.27.051 — 34.27.100.]

Sec. 34.27.020. Abolition of the common law rule in Shelley’s case.

If real property is granted or devised to a person and after the person’s death, to the person’s heirs or the heirs of the person’s body, however the grant or devise is expressed, an estate for life only vests in the person, and a remainder goes to the person’s heirs or the heirs of the person’s body as purchasers.

History. (§ 2 ch 51 SLA 1983)

Sec. 34.27.030. Abolition of the common law destructibility of contingent remainders.

A contingent remainder is not defeated by the termination of a precedent estate before the occurrence of the contingency that was to cause the remainder to take effect. If the contingency occurs later, the remainder takes effect in the same way as a springing or shifting executory interest.

History. (§ 2 ch 51 SLA 1983)

Article 2. Rules Against Perpetuities.

Sec. 34.27.050. Statutory rule against perpetuities. [Repealed, § 9 ch 17 SLA 2000.]

Sec. 34.27.051. Statutory rule against perpetuities.

  1. A general or nongeneral power of appointment not presently exercisable because of a condition precedent is invalid unless, within a period of 1,000 years after its creation, either the power is irrevocably exercised or the power terminates. For purposes of this subsection, the period in which the power must be exercised or the power terminated is computed from the time of creation of the original power of appointment under which a subsequent general power of appointment not presently exercisable or a subsequent nongeneral power of appointment not presently exercisable was created.
  2. If a nongeneral power of appointment is exercised to create a new presently exercisable general power of appointment, all property interests subject to that new presently exercisable general power of appointment are invalid unless, within 1,000 years after the creation of the new presently exercisable general power of appointment, the property interests that are subject to the new presently exercisable general power of appointment either vest or terminate.
  3. If a nongeneral power of appointment is exercised to create a new or successive nongeneral power of appointment or a new or successive testamentary general power of appointment, all property interests subject to the exercise of that new or successive nongeneral or testamentary general power of appointment are invalid unless, within 1,000 years from the time of creation of the original instrument or conveyance creating the original nongeneral power of appointment that is exercised to create a new or successive nongeneral or testamentary general power of appointment, the property interests that are subject to the new or successive nongeneral or testamentary general power of appointment either vest or terminate.

History. (§ 3 ch 17 SLA 2000; am §§ 1, 2 ch 17 SLA 2001)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 17, SLA 2001 provides that the 2001 amendments to subsections (b) and (c) of this section “are retroactive to April 22, 2000, and apply to a trust instrument or conveyance executed on or after that date upon the conditions set out in those subsections.”

Sec. 34.27.053. Savings provision.

A property interest that, under AS 34.27.051 , becomes invalid shall, upon the expiration of the 1,000-year period set out in AS 34.27.051 ,

  1. if income from the property interest is payable
    1. to one person, be distributed to the person to whom the income is then payable;
    2. to more than one person, be distributed to the persons to whom the income is then payable
      1. in the shares to which the persons are entitled to the income; or
      2. equally among all persons who are entitled to the income if shares are not specified;
  2. if income from the property interest is payable in the discretion of a trustee and is payable
    1. to one person, be distributed to the person then eligible to receive the income; or
    2. to more than one person, be distributed to the persons then eligible to receive the income
      1. in the shares to which the persons are entitled to the income; or
      2. equally among all persons who are entitled to the income if shares are not specified; or
  3. when there is no person then living to whom the property interest may be distributed under (1) or (2) of this section, be payable to one or more organizations described in 26 U.S.C. 2055(a) (Internal Revenue Code), or to one or more organizations described in any successor provision to 26 U.S.C. 2055(a), in the shares or proportions that the trustee or trustees then acting may determine.

History. (§ 3 ch 17 SLA 2000)

Secs. 34.27.055 — 34.27.065. When nonvested property interest or power of appointment created; reformation; exclusions from statutory rule against perpetuities. [Repealed, § 9 ch 17 SLA 2000.]

Sec. 34.27.070. Application.

  1. Except as extended by (b) of this section, the former provisions of AS 34.27.051 34.27.100 apply to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is created on or after January 1, 1996, and before April 2, 1997. For purposes of this subsection, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created by the exercise of a power of appointment is created when the power is irrevocably exercised or when a revocable exercise becomes irrevocable.
  2. If a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was created before January 1, 1996, and is determined in a judicial proceeding, commenced on or after that date, to violate this state’s rule against perpetuities as that rule existed before January 1, 1996, or if a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was created on or after January 1, 1996, but before April 2, 1997, and is determined in a judicial proceeding, commenced on or after that date, to violate this state’s rule against perpetuities as that rule existed, on or after January 1, 1996, and before April 2, 1997, a court, upon the petition of an interested person, may reform the disposition in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor’s manifested plan of distribution and is within the limits of the rule against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested property interest or power of appointment was created. For purposes of this subsection, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created by the exercise of a power of appointment is created when the power is irrevocably exercised or when a revocable exercise becomes irrevocable.
  3. The provisions of AS 34.27.051 apply to a trust instrument or conveyance executed on or after April 2, 1997, if the trust instrument or conveyance creates a contingent power of appointment or nonvested property interest subject to the exercise of a power of appointment that creates a new or successive power of appointment.

History. (§ 1 ch 82 SLA 1994; am §§ 4, 5 ch 17 SLA 2000)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 8, ch. 17, SLA 2000 provides that subsection (c) “is retroactive to April 2, 1997, and applies to a trust instrument or conveyance executed on or after that date upon the conditions set out in subsection (c).”

Sec. 34.27.075. Relationship to common law rule.

AS 34.27.051 34.27.100 supersede the rule of the common law known as the rule against perpetuities. The common law rule against perpetuities does not apply in this state.

History. (§ 1 ch 82 SLA 1994; am § 6 ch 17 SLA 2000)

Sec. 34.27.090. Short title and uniformity of application and construction. [Repealed, § 9 ch 17 SLA 2000.]

Sec. 34.27.100. Suspension of the power of alienation.

  1. A future interest or trust is void if, as to property subject to the future interest or trust,
    1. the future interest or trust suspends the power of alienation of the property, the suspension of the power of alienation is for a period of at least 30 years after the death of an individual alive at the time of the creation of the future interest or trust, and the suspension of the power of alienation occurs in the document creating the future interest or trust;
    2. the future interest or trust suspends the power of alienation of the property and the suspension of the power of alienation is for a period of at least 30 years after the death of an individual alive at the time of the creation of the future interest or trust as computed from the time of the termination of a settlor’s power to revoke the trust;
    3. the future interest or trust suspends the power of alienation of the property, the future interest or trust is created by the exercise of a presently exercisable general power of appointment, whether by will or otherwise, and the suspension of the power of alienation is for a period of at least 30 years after the death of an individual alive at the time of the creation of the future interest or trust as computed from the time of creation of the presently exercisable power of appointment; or
    4. the future interest or trust suspends the power of alienation of the property, the future interest or trust is created by the exercise of a nongeneral or testamentary general power of appointment, and the suspension of the power of alienation is for a period of at least 30 years after the death of an individual alive at the time of the creation of the future interest or trust as computed from the time of creation of the original instrument or conveyance creating the original power of appointment that was exercised to create a new or successive nongeneral or testamentary general power of appointment.
  2. For purposes of (a) of this section, the power of alienation
    1. is suspended if there is no person alive who, alone or in combination with others, can, as to property that is part of the future interest or trust, convey
      1. title to real property in fee; or
      2. complete ownership of personal property;
    2. is not suspended by a future interest or trust or by an equitable interest in a trust if
      1. the trustee of the trust has power, either express or implied, to sell the property; or
      2. at least one person alive at the time the trust was created has an unlimited power to terminate the trust.
  3. The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply to a transfer
    1. made outright or in trust for a charitable purpose;
    2. to a literary or charitable organization;
    3. to a veterans’ memorial organization; or
    4. to a cemetery corporation, society, or association.

History. (§ 7 ch 17 SLA 2000; am § 3 ch 17 SLA 2001)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 17, SLA 2001 provides that the 2001 amendments to subsection (a) of this section “are retroactive to April 22, 2000, and apply to a trust instrument or conveyance executed on or after that date upon the conditions set out in [that subsection].”

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Cox v. Floreske, 288 P.3d 1289 (Alaska 2012).

Chapter 35. Liens.

Article 1. Foreclosure.

Sec. 34.35.005. Action for foreclosure.

  1. When an action is required to enforce a lien provided for in this chapter and the action falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the district court, the action shall be started in the district court in the judicial district in which venue lies.  An action that exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the district court shall be started in the superior court in the judicial district in which venue lies. The procedure, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, is the same as in the trial of an action to secure property to hold it for the satisfaction of a lien against it.
  2. In an action to enforce a lien, the court shall allow as part of the costs all money paid for drawing the lien and for filing and recording the lien claim, and a reasonable attorney fee for the foreclosure of the lien.
  3. An action to enforce a lien created by AS 34.35.005 34.35.425 has preference upon the calendar of civil actions before the court and shall be tried without unnecessary delay.

History. (§ 26-9-3 ACLA 1949; am § 11 ch 17 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The Ninth Circuit has held that provisions for the award of costs and attorney’s fees only to lien claimants was constitutionally permissible. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Origin. —

This section was taken, without significant change, from the laws of Oregon. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

At the time this section was adopted for the Territory of Alaska, and subsequent thereto, the courts of Oregon had consistently held that the lien claimant carried the burden of both alleging and proving the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees he was entitled to on foreclosure. Absent these prerequisites, it was held that the claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. It further appears that the statutes were construed as granting some discretion in the courts in regard to the determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Purpose. —

The apparent purpose of this section is to facilitate enforcement by mechanics’ lienors of their rights by giving them an assurance of costs and attorney’s fees if they prevail in their foreclosure actions. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Applicability. —

Subsection (b) applies to liens provided for in AS 34.35.050 — AS 34.35.425 . Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

AS 34.35.110(b) applies only to mechanics’ lien provided for in AS 34.35.050 — AS 34.35.120 . Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Set off. —

In an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien, the plaintiff was not entitled to costs and an attorney’s fee because he only prevailed on one count of his complaint, and costs and attorney’s fees for his successful count were set off against those costs and attorney’s fees to which the defendant was entitled under AS 09.60.010 because of its successful defense against the other counts of the complaint. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Attorney fees. —

Full attorney’s fees should be awarded to successful lien claimants so long as the fees are reasonable. Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1986).

Subsection (b) authorizes an attorney’s fee award that includes fees incurred on appeal. Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1986).

The state supreme court should make the award of attorney’s fees where appellate disposition is completely dispositive of an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien and no further trial court proceedings are contemplated. Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1986).

AS 34.35.005 (b) provides for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees whenever a party is successful in enforcing a lien created by AS 34.35.005 —34.35.425. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Cited in

Gamble v. Northstore P'ship, 22 P.3d 457 (Alaska 2001); Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Brauneis, 141 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2006); Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662 (Alaska 2009).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 326 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.010. Joinder of claimants in lien statement.

Any number of persons who claim liens under AS 34.35.005 34.35.425 against the same property may join in one statement of lien. The consolidated statement of lien shall be verified by the oath of one or more of the claimants having knowledge of the facts.

History. (§ 26-9-2 ACLA 1949)

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 335 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.015. Joinder in foreclosure suit.

Any number of persons who claim liens against the same property may join in the same action, and when separate actions are commenced the court may consolidate them.

History. (§ 26-9-4 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.020. Sufficiency in lien notice or pleadings.

  1. A mistake in formality or lack of statement in the lien notice or the pleadings is not ground for dismissal or unnecessary delay in an action to foreclose a lien.
  2. Substantial compliance with the law relating to the contents of the lien notice is considered sufficient, if the notice satisfactorily shows the name of the claimant, the amount of the demand, the time of the employment, the property sought to be charged with the lien sufficient for identification, and the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property.
  3. The inclusion of nonlienable items in the amount of the claimant’s demand or error in the terms and conditions of the contract of employment, if there is a contract of employment, or other error in the lien notice, made in good faith, is not considered material, unless the error affects the substantial rights of the adverse party, acquired in good faith without notice.
  4. The lien notice and pleadings may be amended at any time before judgment.  If a material statement or averment is omitted or misstated, this is ground for a reasonable delay or continuance to enable opposing parties to meet the amendment, and a nonsuit or dismissal may not be entertained in the action except upon the merits of the cause.

History. (§ 26-9-5 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

The safe and proper rule of construction of mechanic’s lien statutes is that, while the remedial portions of the statutes should be liberally construed, with a view to avoid defeating the purpose of the statute, yet those parts upon which the right to the existence of a lien depends, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Mechanic’s lien statutes are to be liberally construed with a view to effect substantial justice. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

In regard to the property description, the yardstick is whether the notice sufficiently identifies the property sought to be charged. If this test is met, apparently no amendment would be necessary. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

A lien notice is sufficient if it will enable one familiar with the locality to identify with reasonable certainty the property on which the lien is intended to be claimed or to identify the premises as the only property corresponding with the description. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Nonlienable items not affecting substantial rights. —

The inclusion of nonlienable items in the amount of claimant’s demand, made in good faith, is not deemed material, unless substantial rights of the adverse party acquired in good faith without notice are affected. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962); Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

The inclusion of nonlienable items does not result in automatic imputation of bad faith. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

The inclusion of nonlienable items in an unsegregated notice of claim of lien does not automatically necessitate the voiding of claimant’s entire lien. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

Only if it is determined that nonalienable items were included in an unsegregated claim as a result of bad faith, or that substantial rights were affected by such error, would an entire claim be voidable and subject to dismissal. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

The magnitude of nonlienable items is not the appropriate test. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

If error is not material, amendment may be allowed at any time. —

“Other error” in the notice is not deemed material, unless such error shall affect the substantial rights of the adverse parties. If, then, the error is not material under this criterion, amendment of the lien notice and pleadings may be allowed at any time before judgment. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Amendment will not be allowed for error in substance. —

The courts do not permit amendment where the lien is fatally defective, as where it is defective in substance and not in form, or where, for some reason, the amendment sought would be in effect the filing of a new claim. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Amendment affecting third parties. —

An amendment will not be allowed after the time for filing so as to affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer, or intervening right of other third parties. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Enforcement of lien pro tanto. —

The fact that the lien claimant includes in his claim an item of his services for which the law gives him no lien will not defeat the lien if due to an honest mistake, and his lien in such a case may be enforced pro tanto if the true amount for which he is entitled to a lien may be segregated from the remainder. Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

No latitude concerning verification requirement. —

Generally, some latitude is permitted by statutes as to the form in which the oath or affirmation as to the truth of the contents of the lien claim may be administered, and substantial compliance with such form is often sufficient. However, there is a significant distinction between those portions of Alaska mechanics’ liens statutes which are remedial in nature, and those portions which articulate mandatory conditions precedent to the very creation and existence of the lien. It is the latter aspect of Alaska’s mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien statutory provisions which is at issue in a case concerning whether an affiant or claimant must swear to the truth of the contents of the claim. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

Corporate acknowledgments affixed to the claims of lien do not constitute substantial compliance with the verification requirement of AS 34.35.070(c)(5) under this section. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

Applied in

Fjeldahl v. Homer Coop. Ass'n, 11 Alaska 112 (D. Alaska 1946).

Quoted in

Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621 (D. Alaska 1939); Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 335 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.025. Parties to foreclosure.

In an action to foreclose a lien created by AS 34.35.005 34.35.425 , all persons personally liable and all lien holders whose claims have been recorded, and all other persons interested in the matter in controversy or the property sought to be charged with the lien may be made parties. Persons who are not parties are not bound by the proceedings.

History. (§ 26-9-6 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 335 et seq.

Liability of purchaser of real estate on mechanic’s lien based on goods or labor supplied to vendor but filed after title passed. 33 ALR4th 1017.

Sec. 34.35.030. Lien claim against different properties.

If a lien claim is filed for the same labor against two separate kinds of property owned or claimed by different persons, the court shall determine the liability of each kind of property and designate which shall be sold first to discharge the amount of the lien claim.

History. (§ 26-9-7 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.035. Several judgment for each claimant.

In an action to enforce a lien judgment shall be given in favor of each person having a lien for the amount due the person, and the court shall order property subject to the lien to be sold by the peace officer in the same manner that property is sold on execution, or in any manner that the court considers proper. The proceeds of the sale shall be apportioned to the payment of each judgment pro rata, if the amount is insufficient to pay them in full.

History. (§ 26-9-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.040. Order of priority and payment. [Repealed, § 19 ch 175 SLA 1978. For current law see AS 34.35.112.]

Sec. 34.35.045. Lienor’s action on contract.

Except as otherwise expressly provided, nothing in AS 34.35.005 34.35.425 may be construed to prevent a lienor under a contract from maintaining an action as if the lienor has no lien for the security of the debt and the bringing of this action does not prejudice rights under AS 34.35.005 34.35.425 .

History. (§ 26-9-11 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Liens provided by statute create a cumulative remedy, and a lienor has the right to proceed by way of his lien or by an action at law. Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935).

Action apart from lien. —

Where the lien fails, the claimant may nevertheless have a personal judgment against the defendant personally liable in the cause. Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935).

Cited in

Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987); Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989).

Article 2. Mechanics and Materialmen.

Sec. 34.35.050. Lien for labor or materials furnished.

A person has a lien, only to the extent provided under this chapter, to secure the payment of the contract price if the person

  1. performs labor upon real property at the request of the owner or the agent of the owner for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or improvement;
  2. is a trustee of an employee benefit trust for the benefit of individuals performing labor on the building or improvement and has a direct contract with the owner or the agent of the owner for direct payments into the trust;
  3. furnishes materials that are delivered to real property under a contract with the owner or the agent of the owner that are incorporated in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or improvement;
  4. furnishes equipment that is delivered to and used upon real property under a contract with the owner or the agent of the owner for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or improvement;
  5. performs services under a contract with the owner or the agent of the owner in connection with the preparation of plans, surveys, or architectural or engineering plans or drawings for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or improvement, whether or not actually implemented on that property; or
  6. is a general contractor.

History. (§ 26-1-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 20 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 14 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 57 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1967; am § 1 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases annotated below were decided under this section as it existed before the 1978 amendment.

Constitutionality of lien laws. —

See Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 210 (D. Alaska 1915).

Origin. —

The mechanic’s lien law of Alaska was adopted originally from the lien law of Oregon. Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914).

Alaska mechanic’s lien laws were derived from those of Oregon. Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967).

Purpose. —

The purpose of legislatures in enacting mechanic’s and materialman’s lien laws is for the protection of the mechanic, insuring to him the fruits of his labor and providing the materialman with a speedy and efficacious mode of collecting his pay for materials furnished. Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

It is the purpose of the lien law to secure priority of payment of the price and value of work performed and materials furnished in erecting and repairing a building or other structure. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

Exclusive remedy. —

The statutory mechanics’ lien scheme, of which the stop-payment statute is a part, constitutes a complete remedy that preempts common-law and equitable remedies. Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987).

Although the statutory mechanics’ lien scheme constitutes a complete remedy that preempts common law and equitable remedies, construction lenders are not shielded from liability for breach of contracts or tortious conduct. Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989).

Liberal construction. —

This article relating to mechanics’ liens should be liberally construed. Russell v. Hayner, 130 F. 90, 2 Alaska Fed. 271 (9th Cir. Alaska 1904); Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914). But see Goldstein v. Noble, 6 Alaska 282 (D. Alaska 1920).

The evident spirit and purpose of this article is to do substantial justice to all parties who may be affected by its provisions, and the courts should avoid unfriendly strictness and mere technicality. Russell v. Hayner, 130 F. 90, 2 Alaska Fed. 271 (9th Cir. Alaska 1904).

Mechanic’s lien statutes are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect substantial justice, and the fact that the lien claimant includes in his claim an item of his services for which the law gives him no lien will not defeat the lien if due to an honest mistake, and his lien in such a case may be enforced pro tanto if the true amount for which he is entitled to a lien may be segregated from the remainder. Pioneer Mining Co. v. Delamotte, 185 F. 752, 3 Alaska Fed. 564 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911).

Where the particular enactment deals fairly and equitably with both the owner and the lienor, the liberal interpretation seems to be the rule adopted; but where the statute seems to be unnecessarily severe upon one, and in favor of the other, resulting in manifest injustice, the courts have endeavored to relieve the severity, holding the party favored to a strict compliance with the statute. Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Parts upon which existence of lien depends should be strictly construed. —

The safe and proper rule of construction of mechanic’s lien statutes is that, while the remedial portions of these statutes should be liberally construed, with a view to avoid defeating the purpose of the statute, yet those parts upon which the right to the existence of a lien depend, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

They must be substantially complied with. —

A mechanic’s lien is purely of statutory creation, and can only be maintained by a substantial observance and compliance with the provisions of the statute. Whatever is made necessary to the existence of the lien must be performed, or the attempt to create it will be futile. A substantial adherence to the terms of the statute in the notice of the lien is indispensable. Russell v. Hayner, 130 F. 90, 2 Alaska Fed. 271 (9th Cir. Alaska 1904).

Thus, this section should be strictly construed. Rivers v. Pastro, 11 Alaska 491 (D. Alaska 1948).

Construction. —

A strained construction to bring a person within this section is not permissible. Rivers v. Pastro, 11 Alaska 491 (D. Alaska 1948).

This section and AS 34.35.070 must be read and construed together, and as applied to an original contractor, in computing the time from which he must file his claim of lien, they provide that he must file it within 90 days from the date of the completion of his contract or within 90 days from the date of the construction of the building, or any part of such construction, under the contract. Bloom v. McCluskey, 7 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1925).

Prior law construed. —

This section as it existed prior to 1978 prohibited the creation of a valid mechanic’s lien prior to the commencement of work on the site and the effectuation of visible improvements to the property. Torkko/Korman/Eng'rs v. Penland Ventures, 673 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983). See now paragraph (5), which allows liens for work done in the preparation of plans “whether or not [they were] actually implemented” .

Public property. —

This article is not, of its own terms, made applicable to public property. University of Alaska v. Simpson Bldg. Supply Co., 530 P.2d 1317 (Alaska 1975).

As to immunity of real property of University of Alaska from lien attachment or foreclosure, see University of Alaska v. Simpson Bldg. Supply Co., 530 P.2d 1317 (Alaska 1975).

Actual knowledge. —

The landowner must have actual knowledge of the construction before his interest can be subjected to a materialman’s lien. Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967).

If the materialman relies on both the credit of the purchaser and the security of the building, the materialman can assert a lien. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

Proof. —

Materialperson must demonstrate that materials furnished were generally incorporated into the building or project. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

No requirement that materialman see that every piece used in structure. —

In the foreclosure of a materialman’s lien, the materialman should not be required to watch the progress of a structure to see that every piece of material supplied by him was used therein, and if some of the material has been used elsewhere, it rests with the defendant to show that fact. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

A materialperson has a burden to show by a preponderance that its materials were generally used in a project, but it need not show that each and every item was incorporated. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

A mechanic’s lien will attach to property for an improvement not placed thereon if it has a physical or beneficial connection therewith and is essential to the convenient and comfortable use of the premises. Mitford v. Prior, 353 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965).

Lots in a subdivision are lienable for an engineer’s labor on the subdivision’s water and sewerage system. Mitford v. Prior, 353 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965).

Effect of agreement establishing partnership. —

For the purposes of this section, an agreement establishing a partnership or joint ventureship does not affect one party’s standing to file a lien against the other party’s land. Urban Dev. Co. v. Dekreon, 526 P.2d 325 (Alaska 1974).

“Contractor.” —

The meaning properly attaching to the word “contractor” as used in this section is one who has charge of the construction of the building, alteration, or repair by direction of or contract with the owner or his agent duly authorized to contract for him. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

A lien of a contractor may include an item for supervision and overhead. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962).

Labor for which lien is claimed must come within statute. —

While mechanic’s lien statutes are to be liberally construed, so that their purpose may not be frustrated, and with a view to effecting substantial justice, yet, unless the labor performed for which the lien is claimed is such as comes within the contemplation of the statute, there can be no valid lien. Noble v. Gustafson, 204 F. 69, 4 Alaska Fed. 84 (9th Cir. Alaska 1913).

Mechanic’s lien against a construction company was void where the lessor’s equipment was not used to perform lienable work on the property; the landscaper’s removal of dirt from the construction company’s property was not partial construction of the condominium foundations or any other improvement on the company’s property. Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662 (Alaska 2009).

Requirements for employer liability. —

To authorize a lien under the provisions of this section, there must be an employment by the owner of the building, or his authorized agent, and the employment of contractors by one who was occupying the land under a contract of purchase, does not constitute the employment contemplated by this section. Russell v. Hayner, 130 F. 90, 2 Alaska Fed. 271 (9th Cir. Alaska 1904).

If the person in charge is not in fact the agent of the owner, the interest of the owner shall, nevertheless, be liable for the improvement if it is constructed with his knowledge and he fails to post the required notice disclaiming responsibility. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

Person in charge is prima facie owner’s agent. —

This section, AS 34.35.055 and 34.35.065 , construed together, mean that the person in charge of the work shall prima facie be deemed to be the agent of the owner, and the property of the latter shall be charged with the lien under the express provisions of this section. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908). See AS 34.35.115 .

Lessee is not owner’s agent. —

A lessee, contracting for improvements upon the demised premises, does not, merely by virtue of his relation as lessee, contract as the agent of the lessor, so as to subject the property to mechanics’ liens therefor. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

Lien is limited to leasehold. —

If the work is done for a lessee of the property, liability is confined to the leasehold estate, if the owner had no knowledge of the construction of the improvement, or if, having such knowledge, he gave notice that he would not be responsible. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

Lease authorizing lessee to improve or improvements revert. —

It is the general rule that where a lease contains a provision authorizing the lessee to make improvements by deducting the cost thereof from the rent, or where part of the consideration of the lease is the making by the lessee of improvements which become a part of the realty, or that the improvements made by the lessee shall revert to the lessor, a mechanic’s lien may attach to the property for work done or materials furnished, pursuant to a contract with the lessee. Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914).

Attachment to building erected by lessee that is to revert to lessor. —

Where a lease provided that construction of a business building on the property by the lessee was a part of the consideration, but also provided that the building was to “attach to the said realty as a part thereof and become the property of lessor” upon the expiration or termination of the lease, as to a materialman’s lien, the building had become an integral part of the leasehold estate, and was not an item of personal property to be considered separately from the realty upon which it was constructed and the lessee’s interest in that realty. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962).

Breach of contract bars enforcement of lien for work performed. —

Where a contractor fails to perform a considerable part of the work required by his contract, his failure, regardless of his intentions, constitutes a bar to his enforcement of a lien for the work performed. Gillis v. Gillette, 184 F.2d 872, 13 Alaska 55 (9th Cir. Alaska 1950).

As where contract is wilfully abandoned before completion. —

See Gillis v. Gillette, 184 F.2d 872, 13 Alaska 55 (9th Cir. Alaska 1950).

Burden of proof on lien claimant to show compliance with statute. —

Where the allegations of the complaint in regard to the work done upon a claim and the character thereof were put in issue by the answer, the burden of the proof is on the lien claimant to show by legally sufficient evidence the accrual of the lien under the terms of the statute which creates it, as well as under the terms of the contract under which the work was done. Pioneer Mining Co. v. Delamotte, 185 F. 752, 3 Alaska Fed. 564 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911).

Bare statement that other projects were being completed by a construction company at the same time that a particular project’s modular units were being manufactured is insufficient, under the supreme court’s precedents, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the material furnished to the construction company was actually incorporated into the particular project. University of Alaska v. Simpson Bldg. Supply Co., 530 P.2d 1317 (Alaska 1975).

Recovery of wages by employee. —

A house builder’s employee cannot recover back wages directly against the home buyers under a theory that the employee was a third-party beneficiary to a contract between the builder and the buyer. State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980).

Manager’s supervision of construction on corporation tract. —

Where plaintiff worked as manager of a corporation operating a farm tract and his duties included supervision of construction of a building on the tract, under this section he was entitled to a lien in the amount of the “contract price” as defined at AS 34.35.120 (5), and under AS 34.35.095 he was entitled to a lien in the amount due him “according to the terms of the employment” because he met the definition of “individual” as set forth in AS 34.35.120 (10), but “contract price” in AS 34.35.120(5), or the amount due “according to the terms of the employment” in AS 34.35.095(c) , was not intended by the legislature to include the statutory penalty provided by AS 23.05.140(d) for nonpayment of wages on termination. Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Applied in

Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954); D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Quoted in

Irvine v. McDougal, 5 Alaska 220 (D. Alaska 1915); Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935); Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970); Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Cited in

Spalding v. Martin, 241 F. 372, 4 Alaska Fed. 549 (9th Cir. Alaska 1917); First Nat'l Bank v. Stout, 9 Alaska 400 (D. Alaska 1938).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 1 et seq.

Mortgagee-lender’s duty, in disbursing funds, to protect mortgagor against outstanding or potential mechanics’ liens against the mortgaged property. 30 ALR4th 134.

Sec. 34.35.055. Land subject to lien.

  1. The land upon which a building or other improvement described in AS 34.35.050 is constructed, together with a convenient space about the building or other improvement or so much as is required for the convenient use and occupation of it (to be determined by the judgment of the court at the time of the foreclosure of the lien), and the mine on which the work is performed or for which the material is furnished is also subject to the lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 if, at the time the work is started or the materials for the building or other improvements are first furnished, the land belongs to the person who causes the building or other improvement to be constructed, altered, or repaired.
  2. If the person owns less than a fee simple estate in the land, then only the interest of the person in it is subject to the lien.
  3. If the interest is a leasehold interest, and the holder forfeits the rights of the holder to it, the purchaser of the building or improvement and leasehold term, or so much of it as remains unexpired at a sale under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 is considered to be the assignee of the leasehold term, and may pay the lessor all arrears of rent or other money and costs due under the lease.
  4. If the lessor regains possession of the land and property, or obtains judgment for the possession of it before the commencement of the construction, alteration, or repair of the building or other improvement, the purchaser may only remove the building or other improvement within 30 days after the purchase, and the owner of the land shall receive the rent due payable out of the proceeds of the sale, according to the terms of the lease, down to the time of the removal.

History. (§ 26-1-2 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Legislative intent. —

The object of this section is to declare to what land the lien shall extend. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

The legislature intended to confer the right of lien upon every laborer or mechanic whose work tends to improve lands or mines. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

The purpose of extending a statutory lien to the land is that the value of the land is increased when a materialperson provides labor or material for a structure which is attached to the land. The lien should extend to the land, which is benefited by the materialperson. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

Complaint is defective unless it alleges labor went to improvement. —

The absence of an allegation that the labor went to the improvement of the owner’s lands or mines is of itself fatal to the complaint. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

And so is lien notice. —

A lien notice simply to the effect that materials were furnished and labor was done “in connection with the work done upon the claims” does not comply with the statute. Goldstein v. Noble, 6 Alaska 282 (D. Alaska 1920).

Additional buildings. —

A lien on a building for materials furnished cannot include another structure against which a lien is not filed, and into the construction, alteration, and repairs of which some or all of the materials were employed or used. Burr v. House, 3 Alaska 641 (D. Alaska 1909).

Charges upon reversion. —

The general rule is that a lessee cannot impose any charge upon the reversion or estate of the lessor thereof. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

The fact that the lessor acquiesces in the improvement by the lessee does not subject his reversion to the mechanics’ liens therefor. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

This section, AS 34.35.050 and AS 34.35.065 , construed together, mean that the person in charge of the work shall prima facie be deemed to be the agent of the owner, and the property of the latter shall be charged with the lien under the express provisions of AS 34.35.050 ; that, if the person in charge is not in fact such agent, the interest of the owner shall, nevertheless, be liable for the improvement if it is constructed with his knowledge, and he fails to post the required notice disclaiming responsibility; and that, if the work is done for a lessee of the property, liability is confined to the leasehold estate, if the owner had no knowledge of the construction of the improvement, or if, having such knowledge, he gave notice that he would not be responsible. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908). See AS 34.35.115 .

Modular units. —

To determine whether or not modular units are sufficiently attached to the land on which they are situated, the supreme court will look to the following elements: (1) physical annexation, (2) adaption to use with real property, (3) intention to annex to realty, (4) relationship of the claiming parties, (5) the relative difficulty of removal, (6) the nature of the article annexed, and (7) whether the fact of the annexation is open and apparent. Dannemiller v. AMFAC Distrib. Corp., 566 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1977).

Property to which lien attaches. —

Court rejected company’s argument that mechanic’s liens only attached to the specific location at which the hired machinery was used not to the entire coal mine site, and because the creditors did not identify the specific locations where their machinery was used, the entire coal mine lease site; AS 34.35.055(a) did not require so narrow an interpretation. Nerox Power Sys. v. M-B Contr. Co., 54 P.3d 791 (Alaska 2002).

Applied in

Torkko/Korman/Eng'rs v. Penland Ventures, 673 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Quoted in

Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Stated in

Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 38-46.

Sec. 34.35.060. Priorities.

  1. Except as provided in (c) of this section, an encumbrance which is properly recorded shall be preferred to a lien created under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 unless the claim of lien under AS 34.35.070 or notice of right to lien under AS 34.35.064 has been recorded before the encumbrance. The preference granted for a prior mortgage or deed of trust under this section applies without regard to when the sums are disbursed or whether the disbursements are required under the terms of a loan agreement.
  2. [Repealed, § 19 ch 175 SLA 1978.]
  3. A lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 in favor of an individual actually performing labor upon a building or other improvement in its original construction or of a trustee of an employee benefit trust for those individuals is preferred to a prior encumbrance upon the land on which the building or other improvement is constructed.
  4. In enforcing the lien, the building or other improvement may be sold separately from the land.  When sold separately, the purchaser may remove the building or other improvement within a reasonable time after the sale, not to exceed 30 days, upon the payment to the owner of the land of a reasonable rent for its use from the date of its purchase to the time of removal. If removal is prevented by legal proceedings, the 30 days does not begin to run until the final determination of the proceedings in the court of first resort, or in the appellate court if appeal is taken.

History. (§ 26-1-3 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 111 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 7 SLA 1955; am §§ 2, 3, 19 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Most of the cases annotated below were decided under this section as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment, which, among other things, rewrote subsection (a) and repealed subsection (b), which provided when a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 was preferred to a lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance which is unrecorded.

Legislative intent. —

The legislative intent is to limit the priority granted generally to situations where the construction preceded all other construction in and upon a given area of vacant or cleared land. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

In the case of “original construction,” the legislature intended to subordinate to some extent the principle of first in time, first in right, to a social interest in securing mechanics’ lienors. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Deed of trust. —

For purposes of this section, a deed of trust and a mortgage are not differentiated. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

This section protects the security of a mortgagee or beneficiary of a deed of trust against mechanics’ liens so long as his encumbrance attaches and is recorded before the mechanics’ lienor commences his labor or furnishes materials, except where “original construction” is performed. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

A beneficiary of a deed of trust whose interest attaches and who records before any alteration or repair begins or materials are furnished has priority over a mechanics’ lienor, except in the case of original construction under this section. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Notices of nonresponsibility. —

Mortgagees and beneficiaries of deeds of trust need not post notice of nonresponsibility, and if they do, the notices do not overcome the scheme of priorities established in this section. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

A mechanics’ lienor has priority over the beneficiary of a deed of trust in the case of original construction under subsection (c), regardless of whether the beneficiary of the deed of trust posts a notice of nonresponsibility. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The legislature, in subsection (c), provided that mechanics’ lienors performing original construction should have priority over earlier security interests. The scheme of priorities ordered by the legislature in the circumstances of original construction would be defeated if beneficiaries of deeds of trust could attain priority over mechanics’ lienors by posting notices of nonresponsibility. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Construction lenders can protect themselves from mechanics’ liens in several ways: They may require their contractors or borrowers to put up a cushion of perhaps a tenth of the loan to be disbursed by the construction lender before the loan funds are disbursed; they may make all payments directly to subcontractors and suppliers; they may make disbursements to the contractors only on production of receipts and lien waivers from the subcontractors and suppliers. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Prior encumbrancers who had loaned money on the security of bare land would not be substantially harmed if laborers and materialmen had priority when they made improvements, and construction lenders can protect themselves. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Priority under subsection (c). —

Under subsection (c) a subsequent mechanic’s lien is prior in right to a preexisting mortgage only if the work was “original construction.” Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Mining lien. —

More specific mining lien priority provisions found in AS 34.35.135 control over this section. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

A new addition to a building was not original construction within the intendment of subsection (c). Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

Where the addition was an addition to a preexisting building, and was of relatively small size, and could not be removed without greatly damaging the premises as they were before the addition was added, the mechanics’ liens were subordinate to the prior recorded deeds of trusts. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

“Original construction.” —

Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970) is the only case discussing “original construction,” a term unique to Alaska’s laws. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970) established no clear test for original construction, but stated such standard “must await decisional delineation.” Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

The supreme court in Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970) suggested as a guideline for determining “original construction” where the construction preceded all other construction in and upon a given area of vacant or cleared land. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Where a building was apparently a separate structure and not constructed as a part of a smaller existing building, and on the building permit issued by the Greater Anchorage Area Borough the construction was described as “new” as opposed to other boxes entitled “alteration,” “addition,” “repairs,” and “other,” although the building was designed architecturally to be connected to the existing peanut farm and to conform and blend with it architecturally, the federal district court concluded that the federal district building constituted “original construction.” Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

The lien of a secured party was not treated as an “interest in the land” for purposes of AS 34.35.065 , the notice of nonresponsibility section, since, if it were so treated, a secured party could attain priority over a mechanics’ lienor on original construction. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Discrepancy in amount of liens. —

Issue arising from a discrepancy in the amount of liens was not critical to determining the priority of such liens. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Market value fluctuation. —

The fluctuation of the market values of mortgage securities cannot alter the priorities between a lienor and mortgagor. Copper River Lumber Co. v. Clark, 3 Alaska 635 (D. Alaska 1909).

Federal tax lien. —

A mechanic’s lien, not perfected at the time a federal tax lien attaches, is inferior to the government lien. Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954).

As against the United States, a mechanic’s lien must be specific, and what is a specific lien is a federal question. Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954).

A lien is not specific until the lienor reduces it to possession. Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954).

“Specificity” requires that the lien be attached to certain property by reducing it to possession, on the theory that the United States has no claim against property no longer in the possession of the debtor. Until such possession, it remains a general lien. Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954).

Federal law controls when a lien of the United States is involved. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Subsection (c) not adopted by federal district court. —

In determining the content of federal common law in order to establish priority between a deed of trust assigned to and recorded by the Small Business Administration and a subsequent mechanic’s lien by alleged actions of furnishing labor and materials for an improvement to the property in question, the federal district court would not adopt subsection (c) of this section, which is a distinctly minority codification of mechanic’s lien laws and would grant nongovernment parties rights beyond the Federal Tax Lien Act. Thorpe Constr. Co. v. Irvin & Co., 367 F. Supp. 87 (D. Alaska 1973).

Lien is paramount. —

A mechanic has a lien upon the land paramount to all rights accruing after the commencement of his work. Copper River Lumber Co. v. Clark, 3 Alaska 635 (D. Alaska 1909).

Alteration or repair. —

Formerly, a lien for alteration or repair, as well as original construction, took precedence even of a prior mortgage. Wagner v. Shaw, 6 Alaska 647 (D. Alaska 1922). See First Nat'l Bank v. Vasey, 114 F. Supp. 913, 14 Alaska 414 (D. Alaska 1953).

Section is not intended to confiscate another’s security. —

Although the purpose of this section is to give a mechanic’s lien to the full extent of the claim upon the property improved, the legislature did not intend in accomplishing that result to confiscate security already belonging to another. Wagner v. Shaw, 6 Alaska 647 (D. Alaska 1922).

So prior recorded mortgage prevails as to land. —

A mechanic’s lien cannot attach to the land on which a prior mortgage, duly recorded, exists at the time the lumber was furnished for the building. Copper River Lumber Co. v. Clark, 3 Alaska 635 (D. Alaska 1909).

Section dissevers building subject to lien from land subject to prior mortgage. —

A lien is given, not on the materials as such, but on the buildings or improvements in the construction of which the materials are used. The operation of the statute, in case there is a prior mortgage of the land, is to dissever the improvements from the land or realty by giving a superior lien on such improvements and conferring on the purchaser the right to remove them. Copper River Lumber Co. v. Clark, 3 Alaska 635 (D. Alaska 1909).

Where all parties seek sale, severability of building is immaterial. —

Where all mortgagees and holders of materialmen’s liens pray that the property be sold to satisfy their liens, the question of severability of the building is not material. First Nat'l Bank v. Vasey, 114 F. Supp. 913, 14 Alaska 414 (D. Alaska 1953).

Applied in

Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, 84 F. Supp. 1, 12 Alaska 338 (D. Alaska 1949); Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989); Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (Alaska 2006).

Cited in

Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987); Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 263-270.

Liability of purchaser of real estate on mechanic’s lien based on goods or labor supplied to vendor but filed after title passed. 33 ALR4th 1017.

Sec. 34.35.062. Construction financing.

  1. A claimant to whom payment for the labor, material, service, or equipment furnished for a project is past due may give the lender a stop-lending notice.  The claimant shall at the same time give a copy of the notice to the owner and to each prime contractor with whom or through whom the claimant or the claimant’s debtor has contracted.  A stop-lending notice must
    1. instruct the lender to stop disbursing, advancing, or otherwise providing construction financing for the project;
    2. be verified by the claimant;
    3. state the claimant’s name, address, and telephone number;
    4. describe the labor, material, service, or equipment furnished by the claimant and state the name of the person to whom furnished;
    5. describe the real property improved by the labor, material, service, or equipment and state the name of the person the claimant believes to be the owner of the real property;
    6. state the amount due and unpaid to the claimant for the labor, material, service, or equipment.
  2. A stop-lending notice is binding upon a lender from the time the lender has received it and had a reasonable opportunity to act upon it until it expires or is revoked.  A notice expires on the 91st day after it is received by the lender unless the claimant has commenced an action on the claim that is the subject of the notice before that day and the lender has received written notification of the action.  A stop-lending notice may be revoked at any time in writing signed by the claimant.  Expiration or revocation of a notice extinguishes the liability of the lender to the claimant under (c) of this section.
  3. A lender who disburses, advances, or otherwise provides construction financing for a project after it is the subject of a stop-lending notice is liable to the claimant in an amount equal to the lowest of the following amounts:
    1. the amount of construction financing disbursed, advanced, or otherwise provided by the lender after receipt of the claimant’s stop-lending notice; if there are two or more stop-lending notices when the disbursement occurs, the lender’s liability to each claimant is based on the claimant’s ranking under AS 34.35.112 ;
    2. the amount owed to the claimant, including interest, costs, and attorney’s fees, for labor, material, service, or equipment furnished for the project by the claimant as established by a written agreement signed on or after the date of the stop-lending notice by the claimant, the owner and the prime contractor with whom or through whom the claimant or the claimant’s debtor has contracted or by a final judgment in an action in which the owner, the claimant, and the claimant’s debtor are named and, if necessary, served parties;
    3. 150 percent of the amount stated in the stop-lending notice.
  4. Within 10 days after receiving the written agreement or a certified copy of the judgment under (c)(2) of this section establishing the amount owed to a claimant from whom it has a binding stop-lending notice, a lender shall send to the claimant a verified statement showing, by date and amount, all construction financing provided by the lender for the project.  Except as provided in (e) of this section, the lender shall include with the statement payment in the amount of the lender’s liability to the claimant under (c) of this section.
  5. If there are two or more claimants to whom a lender is or may be liable under (c) of this section and the lender is uncertain as to the amount of its liability or possible liability to each, the lender may bring an action to require the claimants to interplead their claims.
  6. A draw against construction financing may be made only after certification of job progress is delivered to the lender by the owner.  The form of the certification may be prescribed by the lender and must include
    1. a statement of the progress of the project, including the percentage of completion of the project;
    2. the name, address, and telephone number of each prime contractor who has furnished labor, material, service, or equipment for the project;
    3. the amount owed by the owner to each listed prime contractor; and
    4. the portion of the draw that the owner will pay to each listed prime contractor.
  7. The owner shall use each draw as indicated in the certificates given by the owner to the lender under (f) of this section. The lender may not be required to verify the information in a certificate and is not liable for an error in a certificate.
  8. An owner who intentionally fails to apply construction financing proceeds as indicated by the certificate required under (f) of this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. The penalty provided under this subsection does not replace any other penalty that may be provided for by law for the same conduct.
  9. Within 10 days after being requested, a lender shall provide a person who has given the lender a stop-lending notice with a copy of
    1. each certificate received by the lender under (f) of this section; and
    2. a verified certificate stating the amount of construction financing proceeds committed by the lender for the project that have not been disbursed by the lender.
  10. The lender may not provide construction financing proceeds for payment of indebtedness of the owner that is not incurred for the project.

History. (§ 4 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Suppliers interest in undisbursed funds. —

Prior to the 1986 amendment, a stop-payment notice did not give a supplier an interest in undisbursed construction funds as the construction lender became directly liable to a supplier only if it had disbursed construction funds after receipt of a stop-payment notice. Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987).

Quoted in

Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989); Donnybrook Bldg. Supply v. Interior City Branch, First Nat'l Bank, 798 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1990).

Sec. 34.35.064. Notice of right to lien.

  1. Before furnishing labor, material, service, or equipment for a project, a person may give a notice of right to lien to the owner or owner’s agent. If the notice is given in accordance with this section, the owner has the burden of proof to show that the owner did not know of or consent to the furnishing of the labor, material, service, or equipment by the claimant in an action to foreclose the claimant’s lien on the property under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 .  Otherwise the claimant has the burden of proof to show that the owner knew of and consented to the furnishing of the labor, material, service, or equipment.  The notice of right to lien must be in writing, state that it is a notice of a right to assert a lien against real property for labor, materials, services, or equipment furnished in connection with a project, and contain
    1. a legal description sufficient for identification of the real property;
    2. the name of the owner;
    3. the name and address of the claimant;
    4. the name and address of the person with whom the claimant contracted;
    5. a general description of the labor, materials, services, or equipment provided or to be provided;
    6. a statement that the claimant may be entitled to record a claim of lien; and
    7. the following statement in type no smaller than that used in providing the information required by (1) — (6) of this subsection:
  2. Upon request from an owner, lender, or prime contractor, a claimant who has given a notice of right to lien under this section shall disclose to the requester within five days the most recent accounting of the amount due and unpaid to that claimant under the terms of the contract and a description of labor, materials, services, or equipment that the claimant reasonably anticipates furnishing.

WARNING: Unless provision is made for payment of sums that may be due to the undersigned, your above property may be subject to foreclosure to satisfy those sums even though you may pay a prime contractor or other person for the labor, material, service, or equipment furnished by the undersigned.

History. (§ 4 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 61 SLA 1979; am § 2 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 34.35.065. Notice of nonresponsibility.

  1. A building or improvement mentioned in AS 34.35.050 constructed with the knowledge of the owner of the land or the person having or claiming an interest in the land is considered to be constructed at the instance of the owner or person having or claiming the interest.
  2. The interest owned or claimed is subject to a lien recorded under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 , unless
    1. the owner or person having or claiming an interest in the land gives notice within three days after the owner or other person obtains knowledge of the construction, alteration, or repair that the owner or other person will not be responsible for it, by posting a notice to that effect in writing in some conspicuous place upon the land or upon the building or other improvement located on the land;
    2. the notice is signed by the owner or person having or claiming an interest in the land in the presence of two attesting witnesses or acknowledged by the owner or other person before a notary public;
    3. the posting of notice is attested to by a witness; and
    4. an attested or notarized copy of the notice is recorded with the recorder of the recording district in which the land, building, or other improvement is located within three days after the posting of the notice.

History. (§ 26-1-4 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 71 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (b) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The cases annotated below were decided before revision of much of this chapter in 1978 and 1979.

Alaska mechanic’s lien laws were derived from those of Oregon. Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967).

Section enacted for protection of owner. —

The notice of nonresponsibility section is designed to protect owners who do not instigate work done on the land, such as lessors whose lessees independently instigate the furnishing of labor or materials. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The landowner must have actual knowledge of the construction before his interest can be subjected to a materialman’s lien. Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967).

As yet undetermined in this jurisdiction is whether knowledge of intended construction would be sufficient to bring into operation the provisions of subsections (a) and (b). Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967).

Owner is protected if work is not done at his instance. —

The provisions of this section are for the benefit and protection of the owner in cases where the work is not done and the material is not furnished at his instance, or at the instance of his agent. Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914).

But he may not post notice if work is so done. —

It is not the intention of the law, nor is it the purport thereof, that when in fact the work is done, and the material is furnished at the owner’s instance, he may prevent a lien upon his property by posting the notice referred to in this section. Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914).

The words “at the instance” of the owner signify at the motion of; consent; at least, knowledge of. Cribb v. Caskey, 4 Alaska 250 (D. Alaska 1910).

Employment by owner of his agent is necessary. —

To bind the building under a mechanic’s lien for labor and materials furnished, there must be an employment by the owner of the building or his authorized agent. Cribb v. Caskey, 4 Alaska 250 (D. Alaska 1910).

Person in charge of work must be employed by owner to be statutory agent. —

To constitute the contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder, or other person having charge of the construction, alteration, or repair, in whole or in part, of any building, the statutory agent of the owner, such person must have been employed directly or indirectly at the instance of the owner, or his conventional agent. Cribb v. Caskey, 4 Alaska 250 (D. Alaska 1910).

But such person is prima facie owner’s agent. —

This section, AS 34.35.050 and 34.35.055 , construed together, mean that the person in charge of the work shall prima facie be deemed to be the agent of the owner, and the property of the latter shall be charged with the lien under the express provisions of AS 34.35.050 . Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908). See AS 34.35.115 .

And if he is not, knowledge and failure to post notice made owner liable. —

If the person in charge is not in fact such agent, the interest of the owner shall, nevertheless, be liable for the improvement if it is constructed with his knowledge and he fails to post notice disclaiming responsibility. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

Complaint must allege such knowledge. —

Allegation of a complaint fails to meet the requirement of this section that does not impute knowledge of the construction of any building or improvement. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

Knowledge of actual construction. —

Knowledge of the contract of employment and consent to its terms is not tantamount to knowledge of the actual construction of the improvement, even though the terms of the agreement may have contemplated its construction. Morris v. Marsh, 3 Alaska 140 (D. Alaska 1906).

Actual or positive knowledge is not required by this section. Labay v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 5 Alaska 134 (D. Alaska 1914).

Knowledge may be implied. —

Knowledge in a legal sense may be positive or implied. The implication of knowledge arises when the party to be charged is shown to have had knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would lead him by the exercise of due diligence to a knowledge of the principal fact. Labay v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 5 Alaska 134 (D. Alaska 1914).

Lien attaches to building constructed by lessee as part of leasehold. —

Where a lease provided that construction of a business building on the property by the lessee was a part of the consideration, but also provided that the building was to “attach to the said realty as a part thereof and become the property of lessor” upon the expiration or termination of the lease, as to a materialman’s lien, the building had become an integral part of the leasehold estate, and was not an item of personal property to be considered separately from the realty upon which it was constructed and the lessee’s interest in that realty. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962).

Lien is confined to leasehold if owner posts notice. —

If the work is done for a lessee of the property, liability is confined to the leasehold estate, if the owner had no knowledge of the construction of the improvement, or if, having such knowledge, he gave notice that he would not be responsible. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

Mortgagees and beneficiaries of deeds of trust are not required to post notices of nonresponsibility in order to protect a given statutory priority. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

“Person having or claiming an interest in the land.” —

A beneficiary of a deed of trust is not a “person having or claiming an interest in the land” within the intendment of this section. Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970).

The beneficiary of a deed of trust is not a “person having or claiming an interest in the land” for purposes of this section, so is not protected against superior mechanics’ liens by posting and recording notices of nonresponsibility. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Scheme of priorities not overcome by posting notices of nonresponsibility. —

Mortgagees and beneficiaries of deeds of trust need not post notices of nonresponsibility, and if they do, the notices do not overcome the scheme of priorities established in AS 34.35.060 . Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

A mechanics’ lienor has priority over the beneficiary of a deed of trust in the case of original construction under AS 34.35.060(c) regardless of whether the beneficiary of the deed of trust posts a notice of nonresponsibility. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The legislature, in AS 34.35.060(c) , provided that mechanics’ lienors performing original construction should have priority over earlier security interests. The scheme of priorities ordered by the legislature in the circumstances of original construction would be defeated if beneficiaries of deeds of trust could attain priority over mechanics’ lienors by posting notices of nonresponsibility. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The lien of a secured party was not treated as an “interest in the land” for purposes of this section, the notice of nonresponsibility section, since if it were so treated a secured party could attain priority over a mechanics’ lienor on original construction. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Sufficiency of posting of notice. —

See Turner v. Enstrom, 5 Alaska 118 (D. Alaska 1914).

Lienable work not performed. —

Mechanic’s lien against a construction company was void where the lessor’s equipment was not used to perform lienable work on the property; the landscaper’s removal of dirt from the construction company’s property was not partial construction of the condominium foundations or any other improvement on the company’s property. Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662 (Alaska 2009).

Applied in

Russell v. Hayner, 130 F. 90, 2 Alaska Fed. 271 (9th Cir. Alaska 1904); Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Quoted in

Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Stated in

Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Cited in

Spalding v. Martin, 241 F. 372, 4 Alaska Fed. 549 (9th Cir. Alaska 1917).

Collateral references. —

Sufficiency of notice under statute making notice by owner of nonresponsibility necessary to prevent mechanic’s lien. 85 ALR2d 949.

Sec. 34.35.067. Recording notice of right to lien.

A notice of right to lien may be recorded by a claimant at any time after the claimant enters into a contract for or first furnishes labor, material, service, or equipment in connection with a project. The notice shall be recorded in the same manner as specified for the recording of a claim of lien under AS 34.35.070 .

History. (§ 4 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 3 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.35.068. Time periods for claiming liens.

  1. If a notice of completion is not recorded by the owner as provided in AS 34.35.071 , a claim of lien shall be recorded not later than 120 days after the claimant
    1. completes the construction contract; or
    2. ceases to furnish labor, material, services, or equipment for the construction, alteration, or repair of the owner’s property.
  2. If a notice of completion is recorded by the owner as provided in AS 34.35.071 ,
    1. the following shall record a claim of lien or a notice of right to lien not later than 15 days after the notice of completion is recorded:
      1. a claimant who has received advance notification of the date that the notice of completion is recorded as provided in AS 34.35.071 (a)(2);
      2. a claimant who has not given a notice of right to lien as permitted in AS 34.35.064 ;
    2. the following shall record a claim of lien not later than the time specified in (a) of this section:
      1. a claimant who records a notice of right to lien before or within the period specified in (1) of this subsection;
      2. a claimant who has given a notice of right to lien but who has not received advance notice of the date that the notice of completion is recorded by the owner as provided in AS 34.35.071(a)(2) .
  3. A claim of lien is enforceable only if recorded by a claimant within the time specified in (a) or (b) of this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 61 SLA 1979; am § 1 ch 51 SLA 2010)

Editor’s notes. —

Under § 3, ch. 51, SLA 2010, the 2010 amendment of (a) of this section applies “to a lien for labor, material, service, or equipment if the labor, material, service, or equipment is furnished to a project . . . on or after September 7, 2010.”

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Most of the cases annotated below were decided under AS 34.35.070 as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment. Former subsection (b) of that section concerned the time period for claiming liens.

Bad faith. —

Real estate developer was not entitled to recover costs he incurred in removing the lien recorded by a construction company. Trial court found that the construction company did not act in bad faith by filing a lien, as the developer had problems accepting or paying bills to the construction company; the construction company was required to file the lien within 120 days of finishing work or the lien would not be enforceable. 3-D & Co. v. Tew's Excavating, Inc., 258 P.3d 819 (Alaska 2011), overruled in part, Burton v. Fountainhead Dev., Inc., 393 P.3d 387 (Alaska 2017).

Time for filing is mandatory. —

No liberal construction is permitted to be applied to the mandatory requirement that the claim of lien must be filed within the specified time, in order that it may become an actual lien, instead of a claim, and may charge the property with a special statutory liability. Irvine v. McDougall, 5 Alaska 300 (D. Alaska 1915), rev'd, 235 F. 888, 4 Alaska Fed. 430 (9th Cir. Alaska 1916).

A notice of lien must show that it was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Bloom v. McCluskey, 7 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1925).

A lien is not effective or valid until a written claim of lien has been filed for record with the recorder of the recording district in which the property is situated, within 90 days from completion of the service or delivery of supplies. Brooks v. R & M Consultants, 613 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1980).

Time for filing contractor’s lien may run from construction of part of building. —

This section and AS 34.35.050 must be read and construed together, and as applied to an original contractor, in computing the time from which he must file his claim of lien, they provide that he must file it within 90 days from the date of the completion of his contract or within 90 days from the date the construction of the building, or any part of such construction, under the contract. Bloom v. McCluskey, 7 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1925).

Lien for materials may be filed before building is completed. —

There is no prejudice to any substantial right of the owner of the building in the filing of a lien at any time after the material is furnished, and before the completion of the building, and a lien filed before the completion of the building is not filed prematurely. Arctic Lumber Co. v. Borden, 211 F. 50, 4 Alaska Fed. 151 (9th Cir. Alaska), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704, 35 S. Ct. 209, 59 L. Ed. 433, 4 Alaska Fed. 265 (U.S. 1914).

The fact that the cost of the last items furnished is small in comparison with the overall cost of a building does not defeat a lien, where it appears that the furnishing of the materials was done in good faith and in the normal course of business, and not for the purpose of extending the time to file a claim of lien. Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Lien for extra labor and materials must be filed 90 days after furnishing. —

A lien for extra labor and materials supplied under an agreement separate from the original contract is required to be filed within 90 days after cessation of the labor and the furnishing of the materials described in the claim of lien. Gillis v. Gillette, 184 F.2d 872, 13 Alaska 55 (9th Cir. Alaska 1950).

After filing, lien dates back to commencement of work. —

Although the exact time the lien arises is not spelled out, the clear import of this section is that after the mechanic’s claim is filed a lien arises which dates back to the commencement of the work and is to be given preference over any encumbrance or lien attaching after work commences. Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 15 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1954).

Initial recordation of mechanic’s lien claim constitutes inquiry notice of the lien to a subsequent purchaser; a mechanic’s lien claimant, in order to protect his lien, does not have to record a notice of lis pendens when he later files suit to foreclose the lien. First Nat'l Bank v. Dent, 683 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1984).

Lien claim held to have been timely filed. —

See Mitford v. Prior, 353 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965).

Quoted in

Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 34.35.069. Acknowledgment of right to lien. [Repealed, § 18 ch 102 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 34.35.070. Claim of lien.

  1. A claimant may record a claim of lien after entering into a contract for a project. A claim of lien may not be recorded later than the time specified under AS 34.35.068 .
  2. [Repealed, § 9 ch 61 SLA 1979.]
  3. The lien shall be verified by the oath of the claimant or another person having knowledge of the facts and state
    1. the real property subject to the lien, with a legal description sufficient for identification;
    2. the name of the owner;
    3. the name and address of the claimant;
    4. the name and address of the person with whom the claimant contracted;
    5. a general description of the labor, materials, services, or equipment furnished for the construction, alteration, or repair, and the contract price of the labor, materials, services, or equipment;
    6. the amount due to the claimant for the labor, materials, services, or equipment; and
    7. the date the last labor, materials, services, or equipment were furnished.
  4. [Repealed, § 19 ch 175 SLA 1978.]
  5. [Repealed, § 19 ch 175 SLA 1978.]
  6. A violation of the provisions of this section places the violator in the position of guarantor regarding another person who suffers damages that are proximately caused by the violation.

History. (§ 26-1-5 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 89 SLA 1974; am §§ 1, 2 ch 123 SLA 1977; am §§ 5, 6, 19 ch 175 SLA 1978; am §§ 3, 9 ch 61 SLA 1979; am § 4 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases annotated in the notes below were decided under this section as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment.

No lien exists until the claim of lien is filed as prescribed by this section. Irvine v. McDougall, 5 Alaska 300 (D. Alaska 1915), rev'd, 235 F. 888, 4 Alaska Fed. 430 (9th Cir. Alaska 1916).

Construction of introductory language of subsection (c) mandated. —

A construction of subsection (c)(5) as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment (now the introductory language of subsection (c)) which requires that the claim of lien be verified by the oath of the claimant or another person having knowledge of the facts as essential to the existence of the lien, is mandated. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

Policy considerations underlying verification requirement. —

The requirement of verification is reflective of the legislature’s awareness that a claim of lien adversely affects the title to the property and its alienability; that the claim of lien can have an injurious impact on the credit of the owner of the property which is subjected to the lien; and that the claim of lien can be used as a vehicle to coerce settlement from the owner of the property. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977); Brooks v. R & M Consultants, 613 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1980).

Reasonable basis exists for verification requirement. —

In light of the important policy considerations underlying the verification requirement, there exists a reasonable basis for the legislature’s determination that the significance of filing a lien claim be made clear to the lien claimant through the requirement of verification and the possibility of perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien claim. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977); Brooks v. R & M Consultants, 613 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1980).

And no latitude is permitted concerning such requirement. —

Generally, some latitude is permitted by statutes as to the form in which the oath or affirmation as to the truth of the contents of the lien claim may be administered, and substantial compliance with such form is often sufficient. However, there is a significant distinction between those portions of Alaska mechanics’ liens statutes which are remedial in nature, and those portions which articulate mandatory conditions precedent to the very creation and existence of the lien. It is the latter aspect of Alaska’s mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien statutory provisions which is at issue in a case concerning whether an affiant or claimant must swear to the truth of the contents of the claim. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

The operative, substantive requirement of subsection (c) is that the claim be verified; that the verification be “by oath of the claimant” simply describes the means or procedure to be followed in verifying the claim. Therefore, substantial compliance with the formal requirement of an oath is sufficient. Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wooldridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980).

Verification requirement substantially unchanged. —

Although Alaska’s mechanics’ and materialmen’s statutes have been substantially revised in recent years, the verification requirement of subsection (c) of this section has remained substantially unchanged. Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wooldridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980).

Claims of lien are not valid liens where there is failure to meet the verification requirements of subsection (c)(5) as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment [now the introductory language of subsection (c)]. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

No particular form of oath or affirmation is required by Alaska law, other than that when a notary certifies an oath or affirmation, the oath or affirmation must be made in the notary’s presence. Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wooldridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980).

What is verification. —

A verification is a sworn statement of the truth of the facts stated in the instrument which is verified. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

When a lien claimant, in the presence of a notary, affixes his signature to a written statement incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of lien, and the notary certifies this act, claimant has substantially complied with the requirement of an “oath.” Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wooldridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980).

A verification differs from an acknowledgment in that the latter is a method of authenticating an instrument by showing that it was the act of the person executing it. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

An acknowledgment is not sufficient to satisfy a mechanics’ lien statute which requires verification of the claim of lien by the claimant. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

Corporate acknowledgments affixed to the claims of lien do not constitute substantial compliance with the verification requirement of subsection (c)(5) of this section as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment (now the introductory language of subsection (c)) under AS 34.35.020 . H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).

Lien claim need not contain a statement that the labor and materials were furnished at the request of the owner. Cutting v. Bullerdick, 188 F.2d 837, 13 Alaska 269 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Statement of demand must be true. —

It is necessary that the statement of the lienors’ demand contained in the notices should be the true amount due, after making deductions for all just credits and offsets, but it is not necessary that such shall be expressly stated in the notices filed. Irvine v. McDougall, 4 Alaska 702 (D. Alaska 1913).

Inclusion of improper item voids lien. —

Where a lien claimant includes in his lien statement an item not embraced in the statutory lien, for labor, such as for expenses of transportation, he loses his lien. Bloom v. McCluskey, 7 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1925).

Unless mistake is honest and items may be separated. —

The fact that a lien claimant includes in his claim, through an honest mistake, a claim for services for which the statute gives him no lien, will not defeat the lien for other services within the statute also claimed, if the two can be separated. Irvine v. McDougal, 5 Alaska 220 (D. Alaska 1915), citing Pioneer Mining Co. v. Delamotte, 185 F. 752, 3 Alaska Fed. 564 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911).

Failure to include names of all owners does not invalidate notice. —

While this section requires that the notice of lien recorded shall contain the names of the owners, or reputed owners, of the ground upon which the lien is claimed, it is well established that failure to include all of the owners does not render the notice invalid, but that it may be enforced against the owners named. Turner v. Enstrom, 5 Alaska 118 (D. Alaska 1914).

The only effect of the omission of the name of any owner is to exempt his interest from the operation of the lien. Turner v. Enstrom, 5 Alaska 118 (D. Alaska 1914).

Nor does failure to include district where property is located void notice. —

It must appear somewhere in the complaint that the property sought to be charged with the lien is situated within the jurisdiction of the court, but it does not necessarily follow that the notices of lien are absolutely void simply because they do not contain the name of the mining district or political division in which the mining claim is situated. Irvine v. McDougall, 4 Alaska 702 (D. Alaska 1913).

To hold that notices of lien are absolutely void for the reason that they do not contain the name of the precinct in which a quartz mining claim is located, when the precinct is named in the complaint to which the several notices are attached as exhibits, would be a failure to give to the notices of lien the liberal construction to which they are entitled in order that the very purpose of the statute may not be defeated. Irvine v. McDougal, 5 Alaska 220 (D. Alaska 1915).

If description is otherwise sufficient. —

It is not absolutely necessary that the name of the state or territory, or of the legal subdivision thereof, wherein the premises to be charged are situated, be contained in the notice of lien, provided there is sufficient in the notice, taken in connection with all the circumstances and the place where the notice is filed or recorded, to apprise parties dealing with the property that a lien is claimed thereon. Irvine v. McDougall, 4 Alaska 702 (D. Alaska 1913).

Description of property sought to be charged with lien held sufficient. —

See Peca v. Huddleston, 5 Alaska 241 (D. Alaska 1915).

Complaint must show notice complies with this section. —

Since this section requires that the notice of lien filed with the recorder set up certain facts, where the plaintiff’s allegation as to the notice of the lien fails to show that the notice filed contains these statements, such statements would not even substantially comply with the statute, and hence the lien would not be created. Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Or notice should be pleaded verbatim. —

Not only should plaintiffs state the essential facts, as required by this section, but the better practice would be to plead the notice verbatim, or attach a copy thereof and make it a part of the complaint. Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Substantial compliance with the verification requirement is sufficient. Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

The form of oath followed by the words “subscribed and sworn to before me,” and the notary public’s signature, amounts in substance to a certificate by the notary that the claim of lien was verified by the oath of the claimant. Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Lack of claimant’s signature on line following form of oath held not to invalidate lien. —

See Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Rule for testing sufficiency of complaint is stricter than for testing notice itself. —

While mechanic’s lien statutes are to be liberally construed, with a view to effecting substantial justice, a different rule should be followed in determining the effect of the pleading in an action to foreclose a lien, especially where the pleading is questioned at an early stage of the action, from the rule to be followed in determining the sufficiency of a notice of lien, which the lienor cannot correct or amend after the time limited for filing has expired. The complaint in an action of this kind should state all the ultimate facts necessary to be established upon the trial. Irvine v. McDougall, 4 Alaska 702 (D. Alaska 1913).

Burden is on lien claimant to prove compliance with section. —

The claimant of a mechanic’s or laborer’s lien has the burden of proof to show by legally sufficient evidence the accrual of the lien under the terms of the statute which creates it as well as under the terms of the contract under which the work was done. Irvine v. McDougal, 5 Alaska 220 (D. Alaska 1915), citing Pioneer Mining Co. v. Delamotte, 185 F. 752, 3 Alaska Fed. 564 (9th Cir. Alaska 1911).

Cases to which verification requirement applicable. —

The decision in H.A.M.S. Co. vs. Electrical Contractors, 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977), requiring verification that the facts stated in lien claims are true, will be otherwise applicable only to the following cases: 1. Cases in which trial was commenced prior to May 6, 1977, but which have not been submitted to the trier of fact for decision; 2. Cases in which prior to submission to the trier of fact for decision there has been an express objection that the verification attached to a lien claim fails to meet the requirements of subsection (c)(5) as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment (now the introductory language of subsection (c)); 3. Cases in which the trial commences after the date of our opinion; and 4. Cases pending on direct appeal on the date of our opinion, in which objection was made in the trial court and thereafter asserted as an issue on appeal that the verification attached to a lien claim fails to meet the requirements of subsection (c)(5) as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment. H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors, 566 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1977).

Subsection (f) contains only the language of guarantee, not of direct liability. Industrial Power & Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1981).

Intent of subsection (f). —

If the legislature had meant subsection (f) to encompass claims in the nature of disparagement of title free from the defense of privilege, that intention would have been more directly expressed and language of guaranty would not have been utilized. Industrial Power & Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1981).

The term “guarantor” as used in the statute does not express the liability of a wrongdoer to his victim except in the special case where the victim is prevented from collecting a debt owed by another because of the wrongdoer’s act. Industrial Power & Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1981).

Applicability of subsection (f). —

With the repeal in 1978 of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the supreme court of Alaska recognizes that it is difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to imagine a situation to which subsection (f) would apply. Industrial Power & Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1981).

Construction of former subsections (b) and (d). —

See Frontier Rock & Sand v. Heritage Ventures, 607 P.2d 364 (Alaska 1980).

Quoted in

Johnson v. State, 577 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Torkko/Korman/Eng'rs v. Penland Ventures, 673 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 189-237.

Sec. 34.35.071. Notice of completion.

  1. The owner of real property that may be subject to a lien under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 may announce the date of completion of the project by
    1. recording a notice of completion after completion of the project in the office of the recorder of the district in which the real property is situated; and
    2. giving notice at least five days before the recording of the notice of completion to all claimants who have given a notice of right to lien or a stop-lending notice to the owner and the lender prior to 10 days before recording a notice of completion; the notice must include a copy of the notice of completion and a statement advising claimants that a notice of completion will be recorded not earlier than five days after the date of the notice.
  2. The notice of completion shall be signed and verified by the owner, and must state
    1. the date of completion of the building or other improvement;
    2. the name and address of the owner;
    3. the nature of the interest or estate of the owner;
    4. the legal description of the property sufficient for identification; and
    5. the name of the general contractor.
  3. [Repealed, § 9 ch 61 SLA 1979.]
  4. A notice of completion is not effective if recorded before completion.
  5. Labor, materials, services, or equipment furnished after a notice of completion is recorded to satisfy warranty obligations or to remedy defective or unsatisfactory construction, alterations, or repairs for which no additional consideration is owed to the person furnishing the additional labor, materials, services, or equipment does not result in lien liability under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 .
  6. After recording a common interest community declaration under AS 34.08, an owner may record a notice of completion under this section as to each unit after completion of the original construction of each unit of the common interest community.

History. (§ 7 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 9 ch 61 SLA 1979; am § 2 ch 95 SLA 1985; am § 5 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 34.35.072. Bond.

If the owner of the property sought to be charged with a claim of lien under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 , or a prime contractor or subcontractor disputes the correctness or validity of the claim of lien brought under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 , the owner or contractor may record either before or after the commencement of an action to enforce the claim of lien, in the office of the recorder in which district the claim of lien was recorded, a bond executed by a person authorized to issue surety bonds in this state under AS 21, a financial institution licensed under AS 06, or a national bank authorized under the federal banking laws, in the penal sum equal to one and one-half times the amount of the claim of lien, which bond shall guarantee the payment of the sum that the lien claimant has claimed, together with the lien claimant’s reasonable cost of suit in the action, if the claimant recovers on the claim of lien. If the owner records a bond under this section, the property described in the bond is freed from the effect of a claim of lien under AS 34.35.050 — 34.35.120 and an action brought to foreclose the claim of lien. The principal on the bond may be the owner of the property, the prime contractor, or a subcontractor who is affected by the claim of lien.

History. (§ 2 ch 89 SLA 1974; am § 8 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Sec. 34.35.074. Civil suits.

  1. A person injured by a violation of AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 may bring a civil action
    1. except as provided in AS 34.35.062(c) , for actual and consequential damages that are proximately caused by the violation plus costs, including reasonable attorney fees;
    2. to enjoin the violation, and if the person prevails, the person shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney fees.
  2. A claimant who gives a stop-lending notice or has a claim of lien recorded under AS 34.35.075 and who fails to promptly revoke the stop-lending notice or remove the claim of lien from the record upon receiving payment in full on the claim or discovering that the stop-lending notice or claim of lien is in error, unjust, premature, or excessive is liable for actual and consequential damages caused by giving the stop-lending notice or improperly recorded claim of lien plus costs, including reasonable attorney fees.

History. (§ 6 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Award allowed. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the equipment lessor was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees where it was not the prevailing party; the reduction of the construction company’s attorney’s fees was consistent with a determination that not all of the company’s legal fees were spent on the claim on which it prevailed. Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 34.35.075. Record and index of claim.

The recorder shall record the claim in a book kept for that purpose. The records shall be indexed as deeds and other conveyances are required by law to be indexed. The recorder is entitled to the same fees allowed by law for recording deeds and other instruments.

History. (§ 26-1-6 ACLA 1949)

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 192.

Sec. 34.35.080. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien provided for in AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 does not bind real property for more than six months after the claim of lien is recorded, unless an action is commenced in the proper court to enforce the lien within
    1. that time; or
    2. six months after recording of an extension notice in the same recording office within the original six-month period showing the recording date and the book and page or instrument number or serial number of the initial claim of lien, and the balance owing.
  2. [Repealed, § 18 ch 102 SLA 1986.]
  3. A lien whose duration is extended by commencement of an action under (a) of this section is void as against a person who, after the commencement of the action and without knowledge or actual notice of its pendency, acquires an interest in the subject property in good faith for valuable consideration, unless a notice of the pendency of the action has been duly filed for record before the time the person’s conveyance is duly filed for record.  Notice of the pendency of the action must conform to the requirements of AS 09.45.940 .

History. (§ 26-1-7 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 50 SLA 1955; am § 3 ch 123 SLA 1977; am §§ 7, 8, 18 ch 102 SLA 1986; am § 43 ch 35 SLA 2003)

Notes to Decisions

Protection of lien. —

A mechanic’s lien claimant, in order to protect his lien, does not have to record a notice of lis pendens when he later files suit to foreclose the lien; the initial recordation of the mechanic’s lien claim constitutes inquiry notice of the lien to a subsequent purchaser; and the lien claimant may amend his complaint to add, as a defendant in the action, the subsequent purchaser of the burdened real property under Civ. R. 25(c). First Nat'l Bank v. Dent, 683 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1984).

Applied in

Frontier Rock & Sand v. Heritage Ventures, 607 P.2d 364 (Alaska 1980).

Quoted in

State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980).

Cited in

Larson v. Benediktsson, 152 P.3d 1159 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 253.

Sec. 34.35.085. Lien for improving lot or street.

A person who, at the request of the owner of a lot in the state, grades, fills in, or improves the lot or the street in front of or adjoining the lot has a lien upon the lot for work done and materials furnished. The provisions of AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 for securing and enforcing the mechanic’s lien apply to the lien provided by this section.

History. (§ 26-1-8 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

A municipal corporation is a person under the provisions of this section. Town of Nome v. Lang, 1 Alaska 593 (D. Alaska 1902).

Sec. 34.35.090. Payment to contractor.

A payment by the owner of a building or structure to a prime contractor or subcontractor, made before 120 days from the completion of the building, is not valid to defeat or discharge a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 in favor of other claimants, unless the payment is distributed among the other claimants. If a payment is distributed in part only, then the payment is valid only to the extent it is distributed.

History. (§ 26-1-9 ACLA 1949; am § 9 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 2 ch 51 SLA 2010)

Editor’s notes. —

Under § 3, ch. 51, SLA 2010, the 2010 amendment of this section applies “to a lien for labor, material, service, or equipment if the labor, material, service, or equipment is furnished to a project . . . on or after September 7, 2010.”

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Frontier Rock & Sand v. Heritage Ventures, 607 P.2d 364 (Alaska 1980).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 307 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.095. Amount of lien.

  1. Except as provided in (c) of this section, a claimant may recover upon a lien recorded by the claimant only the amount due to the claimant according to the terms of the contract, after deducting all claims of other persons claiming through the claimant for work done and materials furnished.
  2. [Repealed, § 9 ch 61 SLA 1979.]
  3. An individual may recover upon a lien recorded by the individual only the amount due according to the terms of the employment.

History. (§ 26-1-10 ACLA 1949; am § 10 ch 175 SLA 1978; am §§ 4, 9 ch 61 SLA 1979)

Notes to Decisions

Insurance during working period may be lienable item. —

Cost of fire insurance to cover the premises during the working period was properly a lienable item where by the terms of the construction contract the contractor was to furnish all labor and materials, including subcontractor’s services, with the exception of plumbing and heating. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962).

As may subcontractor’s services if contractor is bound to furnish them. —

Provision of this section that a contractor is entitled to recover upon a lien filed by him only such amount as may be due to him according to the terms of his contract limits a contractor’s lien recovery to the amount called for by his contract, but would include subcontractor’s services if, by the terms of his contract, the contractor was responsible for the furnishing of such services. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962).

In absence of contract, limit of recovery is reasonable value of labor and material. —

By this section the maximum a contractor may establish as a lien cannot exceed the amount due to him under the terms of his contract, but there must be a contract with the person from whom the contract lien recovery is sought, or someone privy to him; otherwise the contractor’s lien recovery may be limited to the reasonable value of the labor and material furnished. Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962); Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

Manager’s supervision of construction on corporation tract. —

Where plaintiff worked as manager of a corporation operating a farm tract and his duties included supervision of construction of a building on the tract, under this section he was entitled to a lien in the amount of the “contract price” as defined at AS 34.35.120 (5), and under AS 34.35.095 he was entitled to a lien in the amount due him “according to the terms of the employment” because he met the definition of “individual” as set forth in AS 34.35.120 (10), but “contract price” in AS 34.35.120(5), or the amount due “according to the terms of the employment” in subsection (c), was not intended by the legislature to include the statutory penalty provided by AS 23.05.140(d) for nonpayment of wages on termination. Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Quoted in

Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 34.35.100. Action against contractor on lien.

  1. Where a lien is recorded under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 for work done or materials furnished to a prime contractor, the prime contractor shall defend an action at the expense of the prime contractor, and during the pendency of the action the owner may withhold from the prime contractor the amount of money for which the lien is recorded.
  2. If judgment is given against the owner or the property of the owner upon the liens, the owner may deduct from the amount due or to become due by the owner to the prime contractor the amount of the judgment and costs.
  3. If the amount of the judgment and costs exceeds the amount due by the owner to the prime contractor, or if the owner settles with that contractor in full, the owner may recover back from the prime contractor an amount paid by the owner in excess of the contract price, and for which the prime contractor was originally liable.

History. (§ 26-1-10 ACLA 1949; am §§ 11 — 13 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Sec. 34.35.105. Materials not subject to process.

When a mechanic, artisan, machinist, builder, lumber merchant, contractor, laborer, or other person furnishes or procures materials for use in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or other improvement, the materials are not subject to attachment, execution, or other legal process to enforce a debt due by the purchaser of the materials except a debt due for the purchase money thereof, so long as the materials have been or are about to be applied in good faith to the construction, alteration, or repair of the building or other improvement.

History. (§ 26-1-11 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.110. Actions to enforce liens.

  1. An action to enforce a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 shall be brought in the superior court.  The pleadings, process, practice, and procedure are the same as in other cases.  Each claimant is entitled to execution for the balance due after distribution. The clerk of the superior court, upon demand, shall issue the execution after the return of the officer making the execution showing the balance due.
  2. In an action under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 the court shall, upon entering judgment for the plaintiff, allow as a part of the costs all money paid for the filing and recording of the lien and a reasonable amount as attorney fees.  An action to enforce a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 has preference upon the calendar of civil actions of the court and shall be tried without unnecessary delay.
  3. In an action to enforce a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 all persons personally liable and all lienholders whose claims have been filed for record under AS 34.35.070 shall be made parties; all other persons interested in the matter in controversy or in the property sought to be charged with the lien may be made parties. However, those persons who are not made parties are not bound by the proceedings.  The proceedings upon the foreclosure of a lien created by AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 shall, as nearly as possible, conform to the proceedings of a foreclosure of a mortgage lien upon real property.

History. (§ 26-1-13 ACLA 1949; am § 14 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

There is no ground for saying that the allowance of reasonable attorney fees in the lien law is unconstitutional. Cascaden v. Wimbish, 161 F. 241, 3 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1908).

The Ninth Circuit has held that provision for the award of costs and attorney’s fees only to lien claimants was constitutionally permissible. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Origin. —

This section was taken, without significant change, from the laws of Oregon. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

At the time this section was adopted for the Territory of Alaska, and subsequent thereto, the courts of Oregon had consistently held that the lien claimant carried the burden of both alleging and proving the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees he was entitled to on foreclosure. Absent these prerequisites, it was held that the claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. It further appears that the statutes were construed as granting some discretion in the courts in regard to the determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

The apparent purpose of this section is to facilitate enforcement by mechanics’ lienors of their rights by giving them an assurance of costs and attorney’s fees if they prevail in their foreclosure actions. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970); Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1986).

Applicability. —

AS 34.35.005(b) applies to liens provided for in AS 34.35.050 34.35.425 . Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Subsection (b) of this section applies only to mechanics’ liens provided for in AS 34.35.050 — AS 34.35.120 . Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Constructive notice of lien. —

A bank given a deed of trust on property against which a mechanic’s lien is claimed does not have constructive notice of the lien unless the claimant has recorded a notice of lis pendens. First Nat'l Bank v. Dent, 683 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1984).

Provisions as to parties; state law generally applicable. —

The provisions of this section as to parties seem to be only a statement of the law applicable to all actions. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Grantee in deed recorded after foreclosure suit is commenced is not indispensable party. —

Where, when suit to foreclose a mechanic’s lien was commenced, the trial court had before it the record owner and the reputed owner, and had jurisdiction to proceed to hear and determine the questions presented as to the rights and obligations of the parties properly before it, the subsequent recording of a deed of the property to a minor, not served with process, could not divest the court of such jurisdiction as had already attached. Cutting v. Bullerdick, 188 F.2d 837, 13 Alaska 269 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Proper parties. —

All persons personally liable, all lienholders whose claims have been duly filed, and all other persons interested in the matter in controversy or in the property sought to be charged with the lien, may, under this section, be made parties. Jorgensen Co. v. Sheldon, 2 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1905).

Set off. —

In an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien, the plaintiff was not entitled to costs and an attorney’s fee because he only prevailed on one count of his complaint, and costs and attorney’s fees for his successful count were set off against those costs and attorney’s fees to which the defendant was entitled under AS 09.60.010 because of its successful defense against the other counts of the complaint. Brand v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).

Quoted in

Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 210 (D. Alaska 1915); Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 317 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.112. Payment of claimant’s liens.

  1. If more than one lien created under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 is claimed against property, the court in its judgment shall declare the rank of each lien or class of liens in the following order:
    1. all persons other than prime contractors or subcontractors with lien rights under AS 34.35.050 (1);
    2. the trustees of employment benefit trusts for persons described in (1) of this subsection;
    3. all materialmen and subcontractors;
    4. persons described in AS 34.35.050(5) and prime contractors, other than the general contractor;
    5. the general contractor.
  2. For purposes of AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 , if the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the property are insufficient to pay the lien claims of all persons who have recorded claims of lien, the
    1. liens of all individuals with lien rights under AS 34.35.050 (1) shall first be paid in full, or pro rata if the proceeds are insufficient to pay them in full;
    2. liens of trustees of employment benefit trusts for persons described in (1) of this subsection shall be paid in full or pro rata if the proceeds are insufficient to pay them in full;
    3. liens of materialmen and subcontractors shall be paid in full or pro rata if the proceeds are insufficient to pay them in full;
    4. liens of persons described in AS 34.35.050(5) and prime contractors other than the general contractor, shall be paid in full or pro rata if the remainder is insufficient to pay them in full; and
    5. lien of the general contractor shall be paid out of the balance.
  3. For purposes of AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 , if the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the property are sufficient to pay the lien claims of all persons who have recorded claims of lien, the balance shall be paid to the person who owned the property before the foreclosure sale.

History. (§ 15 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 5 ch 61 SLA 1979; am §§ 9, 10 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.35.114. Obligation of claimant and lender to provide information.

  1. A prime contractor, on request, shall provide the following information within five days to any person entitled to claim a lien through the prime contractor:
    1. a description of the real property being improved sufficient to identify the property;
    2. the name and address of the owner with whom the prime contractor contracted;
    3. the name and address of the lender providing construction financing; and
    4. whether there is a payment bond and, if so, the name of the surety.
  2. At the request of any person who may claim a lien through a claimant other than a prime contractor, the claimant shall provide, within five days, the name of the person who contracted for the furnishing by the claimant of the labor, materials, services, or equipment from which a lien claim may arise.
  3. A person who receives a stop-lending notice or notice of right to lien identifying a project for which the person is not the lender shall notify the claimant in writing within 10 days after receipt of the notice that the person is not the lender.
  4. A claimant shall, within 10 days after receipt of a request, provide an owner or lender to whom the claimant has given a stop-lending notice or notice of right to lien a written statement of the amount due to the claimant and unpaid.
  5. [Repealed, § 18 ch 102 SLA 1986.]

History. (§ 6 ch 61 SLA 1979; am §§ 11, 12, 18 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.35.115. Persons considered agent of owner.

Every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder, or other person having charge of the construction, alteration, or repair, in whole or in part, of a building or other improvement as provided in AS 34.35.050 and 34.35.085 , is considered to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 .

History. (§ 26-1-14 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Mitford v. Prior, 353 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. Alaska 1965).

Sec. 34.35.117. Waiver of lien rights.

  1. Except as provided under (b) of this section, a written waiver of lien or stop-lending notice of rights created under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 signed by a claimant requires no consideration and is valid and binding. A waiver permitted under this section may not relate to labor, materials, services, or equipment furnished after the date the waiver is signed by the claimant.
  2. An individual described in AS 34.35.120 (10) may not waive right to claim a lien under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 .  A waiver that purports to waive the lien rights of that individual or class of individuals is void.

History. (§ 15 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 13 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 34.35.118. Claimant liability. [Repealed, § 18 ch 102 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 34.35.119. Waiver of liens on unsold common interest community units.

  1. A lien created under AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 arising out of original construction that becomes subject to AS 34.07 or AS 34.08 before the first sale of a unit within a common interest community after commencement of construction shall be subject to the provisions of this section.
  2. Subject to (c) of this section, a claimant who claims a lien against an entire common interest community shall release that portion of the lien claim that relates to a particular unit within a common interest community selected by the owner of the unsold common interest community units after the claimant receives a partial payment of the lien claim that is equal to 115 percent of the amount determined
    1. if the common interest community has been established under AS 34.07 by
      1. dividing the surface area of the common areas and facilities attendant to the common interest community unit by the surface area of all common areas and facilities of the common interest community building; and
      2. multiplying the result obtained in (A) of this paragraph by the total amount of the claimant’s lien claim;
    2. by the allocated interest in the common expenses if the common interest community has been established under AS 34.08.
  3. A lien claimant is not required to waive a portion of the lien claim under this section unless the amount of indebtedness secured by a prior encumbrance against the common interest community building held by a construction lender is also reduced by an amount calculated in the same manner as provided in (b) of this section.

History. (§ 15 ch 175 SLA 1978; am § 3 ch 95 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.35.120. Definitions.

In AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 ,

  1. “building or other improvement,” includes a wharf, bridge, ditch, flume, tunnel, fence, well, land clearing, machinery, aqueduct to create hydraulic power, or for mining or other purposes, and all other structures and superstructures;
  2. “completion” means the cessation of the performance of labor or services or the furnishing of material or equipment on the building or other improvement to be constructed, altered, or repaired and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
    1. the occupation or use by the owner or an agent of the owner of the building or other improvement constructed, altered, or repaired accompanied by cessation of the furnishing of labor, services, material, or equipment on the building or improvement;
    2. the acceptance by the owner or an agent of the owner of the construction, alteration, or repair after labor, service, material, or equipment is furnished; or
    3. the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for a building by a municipality empowered to issue that certificate accompanied by cessation of the furnishing of labor, services, material, or equipment on the building or improvement;
  3. “construction, alteration, or repair”, includes partial construction, and all repairs done in and upon a building or other improvement;
  4. “construction financing” means money loaned or other credit extended to an owner secured by an encumbrance on real property to finance a project on that real property;
  5. “contract price” means the amount agreed upon by the contracting parties for furnishing services, labor, materials, or equipment covered by the contract, increased or diminished by the price of change orders, extras, or amounts attributable to altered specifications; if no price is agreed upon by the contracting parties, “contract price” means the reasonable value of all services, labor, materials, or equipment covered by the contract;
  6. “draws” means periodic disbursements of construction financing by a lender;
  7. “encumbrance” means a mortgage, deed of trust, or lien arising other than under  AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 ;
  8. “general contractor” means a person who is a prime contractor and who has the responsibility for supervising all other contractors furnishing labor, materials, services, or equipment in connection with the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or other improvement;
  9. “give notice” means to mail a notice required under  AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 by first-class mail and by using a form of mail requiring a signed receipt, or to deliver the notice and obtain a receipt signed by the person to whom it is directed or an agent of that person; a notice is effective when given or delivered to
    1. a lender at the address designated in the encumbrance securing that lender;
    2. an owner at the last known address of the owner;
    3. a prime contractor at the last known address of the prime contractor;
    4. a potential lien claimant at the address specified in a stop-lending notice or notice of right to lien or claim of lien;
  10. “individual” means a natural person who actually performs labor upon a building or other improvement as an employee of the owner or any contractor furnishing labor, materials, services, or equipment for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or other improvement;
  11. “lender” means any person providing construction financing;
  12. “materialman” means a person who furnishes materials used in the construction, alteration, or repair of the owner’s real property;
  13. “owner” means a person who owns real property or a possessory interest in real property and who enters into a contract, express or implied, for a project on that property;
  14. “potential lien claimant” or “claimant” means any person entitled to assert lien rights under  AS 34.35.050 34.35.120 ;
  15. “prime contractor” means a person who enters into a contract directly with an owner to furnish labor, materials, services, or equipment for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or other improvement on the owner’s real property;
  16. “project” means construction, alteration, or repair of an improvement on real property or work done to enhance the real property itself;
  17. “subcontractor” means a person who enters into a contract with a prime contractor to furnish labor, services, or equipment for the construction, alteration, or repair of a building or other improvement on the owner’s real property and does not include a materialman.

History. (§ 26-1-12 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 57 SLA 1959; am § 16 ch 175 SLA 1978; am §§ 7, 8 ch 61 SLA 1979; am §§ 14 — 17 ch 102 SLA 1986)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1985 and 1986 to alphabetize the defined terms.

Notes to Decisions

Employer penalty not included in “contract price”. —

Neither “contract price” in paragraph (5) of this section, nor the amount due “according to the terms of the employment” in AS 34.35.095(c) , were intended by the legislature to include the statutory penalty provided by AS 23.05.140(d) for nonpayment of wages on termination. Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

The term “individual,” as it is used in paragraph (10), means a natural person who is not acting as a contractor and who is employed by the owner of real property or employed by a contractor. Nystrom v. Buckhorn Homes, 778 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1989).

Quoted in

Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1970); Lakloey, Inc. v. Ballek, 211 P.3d 662 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Vaara v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 432 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1967); Donnybrook Bldg. Supply Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank, 736 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1987).

Article 3. Mines and Wells.

Sec. 34.35.125. Liens on mines and oil wells.

A person who, at the instance of the owner, performs work in, on, or about a mine, or mining claim, oil, gas, or other well, in opening up, developing, sinking, drilling, drifting, stoping, mucking, stripping, shoveling, mining, hoisting, firing, cooking, teaming, or performs any other class or kind of work necessary or convenient to the development, operation, working, or mining of the claim or well; or who performs work tending to or assisting in the development, extraction, separation, or reduction to a commercial value of the minerals; or who performs work on a water right, ditch, flume, pipe line, tramway, tram, road, or trail, used in connection with the opening up, or to facilitate the opening up, operation, or development of the claim or well, or the extraction of the minerals, has a lien on the mine or mining claim, oil, gas, or other claim or well as security for the payment of the work.

History. (§ 26-2-2 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of section. —

The purpose of this section is to provide a lien upon mines and mining property for laborers and miners doing work in, on, and about such property. McConnell v. Empire Tin Mining Co., 5 Alaska 506 (D. Alaska 1916).

Liberal construction. —

Statutes giving liens to laborers and mechanics are to be liberally construed. Southeastern Alaska Mining Corp. v. Zavodsky, 60 F.2d 24, 5 Alaska Fed. 672 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

A statute of this kind should not be so strictly construed as statutes in general, certainly not so strictly construed as to deprive the general terms of the statute of any meaning that they may have consistent with the purpose of the act. Fremming v. Southeastern Alaska Mining Co., 8 Alaska 309 (D. Alaska 1931).

Statutory liens cannot be extended by the courts to cases not provided for by the statute. Walbridge v. New York Alaska Gold Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 36 (D. Alaska 1928).

Parts of statute on which existence of lien depends must be strictly construed. —

The safe and proper rule of construction of mechanic’s lien statutes is that, while the remedial portions of these statutes should be liberally construed, with a view to avoid defeating the purpose of the statute, yet these parts upon which the right to the existence of the lien depend, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Statutes must be substantially complied with. —

This article providing for and authorizing foreclosure of mechanics’ liens should be liberally construed, but such liens, being of purely statutory creation, can be established only by a substantial compliance with the statute. Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Lien claimants must show they are in favored class. —

Lien claimants are required to bring themselves within the class which it is the design of the statute to favor. Southeastern Alaska Mining Corp. v. Zavodsky, 60 F.2d 24, 5 Alaska Fed. 672 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Caretaker or watchman. —

A person employed as caretaker or watchman of a mining claim, or of property thereon located, is among those permitted under this section to enforce a lien to secure payment of money due him. Southeastern Alaska Mining Corp. v. Zavodsky, 60 F.2d 24, 5 Alaska Fed. 672 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Superintendent or general manager. —

This statute does not give a lien to superintendents and general managers. It expressly limits it to laborers and miners. Walbridge v. New York Alaska Gold Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 36 (D. Alaska 1928).

The services that an individual who is a superintendent and general manager performs are more in the nature of an executive officer, and he is entirely on a different footing from a person who is compelled to earn his daily bread by honest toil. Walbridge v. New York Alaska Gold Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 36 (D. Alaska 1928).

Mining need not be in active progress. —

This article, in no part of it, makes it a condition to the assertion of a lien that mining shall be in active progress. Southeastern Alaska Mining Corp. v. Zavodsky, 60 F.2d 24, 5 Alaska Fed. 672 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

The development, operation, working, or mining of a mine or mining claim does not refer to work being done at any particular time, but refers equally well to any development, operation, working, or mining that might take place in the future, and the work of a watchman and caretaker may not only be convenient to such future development, operation, work, or mining, but may in many instances be necessary to it. Fremming v. Southeastern Alaska Mining Co., 8 Alaska 309 (D. Alaska 1931).

Laborer on oil well may have lien for work before or after oil is discovered. —

Under this article laborers upon an oil well on a placer mining location would be entitled to enforce a mechanic’s lien against the owner of the claim, whether the work is done either before or after the discovery of oil. Alaska Consol. Oil Fields v. Rains, 54 F.2d 868, 5 Alaska Fed. 602 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Interest in land being explored for oil may be subjected to lien. —

A person who has taken possession of government land for the purpose of developing oil and is proceeding diligently to explore the land has such an interest therein as could be subjected to a mechanic’s lien under the law authorizing liens upon mining claims. Alaska Consol. Oil Fields v. Rains, 54 F.2d 868, 5 Alaska Fed. 602 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Holder of oil prospecting permit held to be “owner.” —

When the legislature enacted its Mechanic’s Lien Law in favor of those working in or about oil wells, it intended to include in its definition of owner one who held a prospecting permit from the Secretary of the Interior under the Oil Leasing Act (41 Stat. 437). He is an owner of an interest in the land, and his interest therein is subject to a mechanic’s lien, without prejudice to the rights of the government. Alaska Consol. Oil Fields v. Rains, 54 F.2d 868, 5 Alaska Fed. 602 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Measure of value. —

Measure of the value of the work and services to a mine as defined by AS 34.35.125 and 34.35.140 is either a contract measure or, if there is no such measure or it is unworkable, the reasonable value of the work and services. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Work requires direct connection. —

While AS 34.35.125 includes as work “any other class or kind of work necessary or convenient to the development, operation, working, or mining of the claim or well,” this does not imply an absence of a direct connection to the development of the mine; rather, the phrase is better interpreted as incorporating into the definition of “work” those activities similar to the ones listed in AS 34.35.125 and subsequently incorporated into AS 34.35.140(a) but not specifically mentioned. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Work not within boundaries of mining claim may be included in lien. —

This section should not be construed so as to restrict the operation of a lien to work done by the plaintiff within the boundaries of two claims against which the lien was asserted, thereby denying the plaintiff’s lien for the value of his work done at an ore mill and on a ditch about two miles distant where the evidence showed that the ditch, the mill, and the mining claims constituted one and the same plant, under the supervision and common ownership of the defendant corporation, and that the work done by the plaintiff was for the purpose of developing and opening up of the mine or mining claims, and tended to and assisted in the separation or reduction to a commercial value or product of the minerals contained therein or extracted therefrom. McConnell v. Empire Tin Mining Co., 5 Alaska 506 (D. Alaska 1916).

Machinery used in operation of mine or well. —

Mining lien statutes extend to machinery used in the operation of the well, regardless of whether the machinery is affixed to and thus part of the well, or not. The fact that the party’s lien notice failed to specifically mention Rig No. 7 was not fatal; the notice claimed a lien against both the debtor’s well and the machinery used in the operation of the well. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Lien attaches only to property described in notice. —

Where the plaintiff does not in his notice filed in the recording office claim a lien upon the mining claims, his lien, if any, can be asserted only against the personal property which is described in his notice of claim of lien, if the work had actually been done upon such property or in the construction or repair thereof, or in the operation of those types of property, like machinery, which are operated. Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

Applied in

Spalding v. Martin, 241 F. 372, 4 Alaska Fed. 549 (9th Cir. Alaska 1917).

Cited in

All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

53A Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, §§ 383-387.

Mine tailings as real or personal property. 75 ALR4th 965.

Sec. 34.35.130. Lien on mill or machine.

A person who, at the instance of the owner, performs work or labor on, in, or about a mill or machine, either in the alteration or repair of it, or in the operation or working of it, while the mill or machine is used in or about a mine, or mining claim, oil, gas, or other claim or well, as a means of opening up, developing, or mining, or as a means of separating, extracting, or reducing minerals to commercial value, has a lien on the mill or machine, to secure the payment of the amount due for the work.

History. (§ 26-2-3 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Lien attaches only to property described in notice. —

Where the plaintiff does not in his notice filed in the recording office claim a lien upon the mining claims, his lien, if any, can be asserted only against the personal property which is described in his notice of claim of lien. Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

If such property is worked on or operated. —

Personal property is subject to lien if the work had actually been done upon the property or in the construction or repair thereof, or in the operation of those types of property, like machinery, which are operated. Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

Machinery used in operation of well or mine. —

Mining lien statutes extend to machinery used in the operation of the well, regardless of whether the machinery is affixed to and thus part of the well, or not. The fact that the party’s lien notice failed to specifically mention Rig No. 7 was not fatal; the notice claimed a lien against both the debtor’s well and the machinery used in the operation of the well. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Commercial success not required for valid lien. —

Under the lien statutes, it is not required that minerals be reduced to commercial value as a precondition to claiming a lien against a mill, machine, or drill; this would foreclose a lien for any type of exploratory drilling unless it culminated in a commercially successful well or mine, contrary to the remedial nature of the lien statutes. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Sec. 34.35.135. Priority.

A lien under AS 34.35.125 and 34.35.130 is a preferred lien, prior and superior to a mortgage, conditional sale agreement, attachment, claim, or demand, unless the mortgage, conditional sale agreement, attachment, claim, or demand is in writing and recorded in the recorder’s office of the recording district where the property is located before the work for which the lien is claimed is started. A sale, transfer, mortgage, assignment, or attachment made or filed for record after the work is started does not have the effect of postponing the lien.

History. (§ 26-2-4 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Construction with other law. —

More specific mining lien priority provisions found in this section control over the mechanic’s lien priority statute, AS 34.35.060 ; failure to record notice of claim also affected priority of claim. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Cited in

All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 263-267.

Sec. 34.35.140. Lien on dump or mass of mineral.

  1. A person who, at the instance of another who has the right of possession of a mine, or mining claim, oil or gas well, performs upon, in, or about the mine or well any of the kinds of work mentioned in AS 34.35.125 , or who performs any other kind of work in the production, piling up, or storing of a dump or mass of mineral, has a lien on the dump or mass, and the gold, gold dust, or other minerals contained in or extracted from it, to secure the amount due the laborer in the production of the minerals.
  2. The lien attaches to the dump or mass, and to the gold, gold dust, or other mineral, whether they are deposited on the ground in a mass, or dumped into bunkers or hoppers, or stored in tanks or reservoirs, or placed in sluice boxes at the mine, and attaches to the gold, gold dust, and other minerals so long as they are in one mass and can be identified as being produced by the labor of the lienor.
  3. The lien provided for in this section is prior and preferred over a deed, mortgage, bill of sale, attachment, or other claim whether given before or after the work for which the lien is claimed is started.

History. (§ 26-2-5 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

This section gives a lien for labor alone, and no lien can be had for amounts due for the use of a boiler or for a cable. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Measure of value. —

The measure of the value of the work and services to a mine as defined by AS 34.35.125 and this section is either a contract measure or, if there is no such measure or it is unworkable, the reasonable value of the work and services. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

No priming dump lien against natural gas remaining in wells.—

Although plaintiff had a valid, perfected lien against debtor's natural gas mine, including the natural gas remaining in place, it could not establish a priming dump lien in the natural gas remaining in the wells superior to a creditor's secured interests because it failed to show that a dump or mass existed. All American Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy LLC (In re Cook Inlet Energy LLC), — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Mar. 21, 2017).

Labor in developing and operating mine entitled to lien on dump. —

The labor performed in sinking a shaft, running tunnels, and developing a mine prior to the time the dump was actually being piled up contributes more or less towards producing the dump, and the object of this section seems to be to give to each one performing labor upon the mine, while the mine is being developed and operated, a lien upon the dump produced. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Supervisory labor falls within the spirit of the activities meant to be protected; however, it does not include the labor of off-site payroll clerks, expeditors, or other general employees of the company since the work that these people perform may to a certain extent be necessary to the development of the mine but their work is peripheral to the physical mine itself and more akin to the standard overhead costs that any business incurs. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Supervisory charges must be restricted for purposes of a dump lien pursuant to this section to on-site services, but what counts geographically as being “on-site” requires some limited flexibility; thus, supervisory work need not be performed on the property legally owned by the owner of the mine but may also include work performed on land that is adjacent to the site of the mine, especially where convenient for the development of the mine. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Because a corporation is considered a person under this section, equipment costs must be internalized into the labor that the corporation provides for purposes of a lien on a dump or mass of mineral. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Equipment costs that may be included within the amount due the laborer under subsection (a) of this section include those expenses for supplies, such as food and fuel, necessary to the maintenance of the worksite and not incorporated into the contracted-for project, since without the necessary supplies, neither the human workers nor the heavy equipment could function properly; the cost of supplies is therefore an integral part of the amount due the laborer under subsection (a) of this section and, as such, can be included in a dump lien, but the inclusion of supplies in a dump lien does not extend to materials, defined as those items and resources incorporated into the construction of the mine or well itself, or any surrounding buildings. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Limited to on-site activities. —

A dump lien pursuant to this section is limited to direct work on the mine. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

For purposes of a dump lien, the definition of “on-site” includes those locations in close geographic proximity to the project footprint, although the determination of whether “adjacent” or “nearby” activities can be considered part of the project must be made on a case-by-case basis and take into account whether the activity could have been carried out at an alternative site closer to the project; in order for a location or activity to be considered on-site it must be dedicated exclusively or nearly so to performance of the contract, and specifically exempted from the definition of “on-site” are activities at those locations which are governed by general business operations, even if the activities focus on construction of a particular project. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Standby work. —

Dump lien pursuant to this section can be obtained for standby work only where that work is anticipated by the employer; in order for standby charges to be lienable, they must work toward the future development of the mine, and standby charges, even where ordered by the employer, do not generate a lien where the standby charges are not contemplated in the plan for development and improvement of the mine. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Mineral dump lien in gas. —

A mineral dump lien may extend only to gas extracted from its natural reservoir; the lien may cover produced gas contained in a pipeline if certain conditions are met, and to obtain a dump lien laborers had to demonstrate that their work aided, broadly, in gas production. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

An LLC's drilling of gas wells created a dump under AS 34.35.140 . All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Answer to the certified question, whether oil and gas well operator created a dump each time it released gas into its pipelines, was left to the trier of fact, but gas in a pipeline could be considered a dump if adjacent to the mine or mining claim. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Produced gas has to be the product of the lienor's labor as defined in the dump and mine lien statutes. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

“Dump” and “tailings” distinguished. —

The term “dump” usually refers to the pile or mass of goldbearing earth or gravel hoisted from a mine, prior to the time that it has been washed and the gold and gold dust extracted therefrom, and the term “tailings” or “tailing pile” usually refers to the pile or mass of earth or gravel that has been washed or sluiced, and from which the gold and gold dust has been extracted. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Distinction, under former law, between “dump or mass” and material not piled up and set apart. —

See Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1914).

Items not included in lien. —

Recovery of the cost of materials is prohibited in a dump lien. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Entire cost of a lienor’s heavy machinery may not be included in a dump lien; pursuant to AS 34.35.160 , the party claiming the lien must provide an amount that it is claiming for the lien and, where there is an amount stipulated for damages in the contract between the two parties, that amount is used, but in the absence of an express contract, the claim must state the reasonable value of the work and services. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Inclusion of nonlienable items invalidates lien. —

Where lienable and nonlienable items are included in one contract for a specific sum, or are made the basis of a lump charge, so that it cannot be perceived, from the contract or account, what proportion is chargeable to each, the benefit of the Mechanic’s Lien Law is lost. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Unless items are separately stated. —

Where the claimant’s demand, made in good faith, consists of several different items separately charged, some of which are by law a lien upon the property, and others do not come within the scope of the statute, he may enforce his lien so far as given by law, and it is not vitiated because he has included therein nonlienable items. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

Sec. 34.35.145. Extent of liens.

Liens under AS 34.35.125 , 34.35.130 , and 34.35.140 are security for payment for the work performed within a period of nine months immediately before the cessation of the work. The liens bind all the right, title, and interest in the property mentioned of the person at whose instance or request or for whom the work is performed, to the full extent of the interest that the person has at the beginning of the work for which the lien is claimed, or subsequently acquired in the property, up to the time of the foreclosure of the lien.

History. (§ 26-2-6 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Collateral references. —

53A Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, § 383.

Sec. 34.35.150. Labor deemed performed at instance of owner, mortgagee, or lien claimant.

  1. When the work mentioned in AS 34.35.125 , 34.35.130 , and 34.35.140 is performed at the instance of a person, who has the right of possession under a written or oral lease, license, or authority, expressed or implied, bond, option or other contract of sale from the owner, executed by the owner’s authority, or who has possession with the knowledge of the owner, the work is considered to have been done at the instance of the owner, and at the instance of the mortgagee or lien claimant.
  2. The owner’s, mortgagee’s, or claimant’s interest in the property is subject to a lien filed in accordance with AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 , unless the owner, mortgagee, or claimant, within 10 days after obtaining knowledge of the work, gives notice of nonresponsibility for the work, by posting notices to that effect in three conspicuous places on the mine, mining claim, or on or near the oil, gas, or other well, or in one conspicuous place on the dredge, steam shovel, derrick, mill, or machine.  A mortgagee or other lien claimant must also give additional notice of the nature of the lien, the amount due on it, and refer to the volume and page where the claim of lien is recorded.
  3. The posting of notice is not required on a dragline, electric shovel, tractor, scraper, hoist, truck, or mobile equipment or machinery or personal property that is readily moved about from place to place or is required to be moved from place to place in the course of mining operations.

History. (§ 26-2-7 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Lien may not be extended to property of owner giving notice of nonresponsibility. —

No liberality of construction which should prevail when a lien has once attached can extend a lien to the owner’s interest where the statute says it shall not apply, if the owner gives notice to the effect prescribed. Alaska Homestake Mining Co. v. Krampitz, 276 F. 82, 5 Alaska Fed. 62 (9th Cir. Alaska 1921).

Failure to comply with section loses right to repossess property. —

Where supply company failed to comply with this section, any right to repossess their alleged property was abandoned and forever lost. Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Quoted in

Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621 (D. Alaska 1939).

Collateral references. —

Sufficiency of notice under statute making notice by owner of nonresponsibility necessary to prevent mechanic’s lien. 85 ALR2d 949.

Liability of purchaser of real estate on mechanic’s lien based on goods or labor supplied to vendor but filed after title passed. 33 ALR4th 1017.

Sec. 34.35.155. Liens not exclusive.

  1. Liens under AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 are not exclusive of one another.  The lien shall attach and may be claimed by the same labor upon the mine, mining claim, mill, or machine used in mining or working, and the dump or mass of mineral, gold, or gold dust, if the facts relative to the labor warrant.
  2. A lienor may claim a lien on one or more of the different classes of property subject to a lien for the same labor if
    1. the amount claimed against each class of property is separately stated;
    2. the property sought to be charged is described so that it can be identified; and
    3. the name of the owner or reputed owner is given.

History. (§ 26-2-8 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

There appear to be three classes of property upon which liens may be claimed: (1) The mining claim; (2) the machinery, mill, dredge, and like property; (3) the gravel, ore, rock, minerals, gold dust, and gold. Alaska Homestake Mining Co. v. Krampitz, 276 F. 82, 5 Alaska Fed. 62 (9th Cir. Alaska 1921).

Lien attaches only to property described in notice. —

Where the plaintiff does not in his notice filed in the recording office claim a lien upon the mining claims, his lien, if any, can be asserted only against the personal property which is described in his notice of claim of lien, if the work had actually been done upon such property or in the construction or repair thereof, or in the operation of those types of property, like machinery, which are operated. Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

Claim of lien may be made for the same labor on any one or all classes of property upon which liens may be claimed, but there must be a claim upon the class to be subjected before the lien can attach. Alaska Homestake Mining Co. v. Krampitz, 276 F. 82, 5 Alaska Fed. 62 (9th Cir. Alaska 1921).

Lien for labor. —

This section cannot be read as permitting only the “labor” portion of a mining lien to attach to more than one class of property. Such a narrow interpretation would diminish the scope of the liens granted for “work” under the mining lien statutes. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Substantial compliance. —

Liens at issue were not invalid for lack of compliance with paragraph (b)(1). Substantial compliance was all that was required. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621 (D. Alaska 1939).

Sec. 34.35.160. Claim of lien.

  1. A person who claims the benefit of AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 shall, within 90 days after the performance of the services or the cessation of the work mentioned in AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 , record the claim of lien in the recorder’s office of the recording district in which the mine or mining claim, or other property on which the lien is claimed is located or used.
  2. The claim of lien must contain
    1. a statement of the demand;
    2. the amount of the demand, after deducting all credits and offsets;
    3. the name of the person by whom the claimant was employed;
    4. a statement of the terms and conditions of the contract of employment;
    5. the date of starting and stopping the work;
    6. a description of the property on which the lien is claimed, sufficient for identification; and
    7. the name of the owner or reputed owner.
  3. The lien claim shall be verified by the oath of the lien claimant or someone on behalf of the lien claimant having personal knowledge of the facts.  If there is no express contract of employment, the claim must state the reasonable value of the work and services.

History. (§ 26-2-9 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Lien attaches only to property described in notice. —

Where the plaintiff does not in his notice filed in the recording office claim a lien upon the mining claims, his lien, if any, can be asserted only against the personal property which is described in his notice of claim of lien, if the work had actually been done upon such property or in the construction or repair thereof, or in the operation of those types of property, like machinery, which are operated. Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

Heavy machinery. —

Entire cost of a lienor’s heavy machinery may not be included in a dump lien under AS 34.35.140 ; the party claiming the lien must provide an amount that it is claiming for the lien and, where there is an amount stipulated for damages in the contract between the two parties, that amount is used, but in the absence of an express contract, the claim must state the reasonable value of the work and services. D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Description in claims held sufficient to identify property. —

See Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621 (D. Alaska 1939).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 189-191.

53A Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, §§ 383-387.

Sec. 34.35.165. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien under AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 does not bind a property for more than six months after notice of the lien is filed for record, unless suit is brought before the proper court to enforce the lien within that time, or if credit is given, with six months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien may not be continued in force for more than one year from the stopping of work by an agreement to give credit.

History. (§ 26-2-10 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

The six-month limitation is more than a statute of limitations and need not be pleaded. Fairbanks-Morse & Co. v. Alaska Palladium Co., 32 F.2d 233, 5 Alaska Fed. 417 (9th Cir. Alaska 1929).

Liens become void if steps to foreclose are not begun within period. —

Where suit to enforce labor liens was instituted within the statutory period, but the mortgagee of the property was not made a party thereto, and suit was likewise instituted within the statutory period to foreclose the mortgages, and the assignees of the lien claims were made parties thereto, but the assignees took no steps in either suit to foreclose their liens as against the mortgagee until after the six-month period had elapsed, the liens become null and void as against the mortgagee. Fairbanks-Morse & Co. v. Alaska Palladium Co., 32 F.2d 233, 5 Alaska Fed. 417 (9th Cir. Alaska 1929).

Sec. 34.35.170. Definitions.

  1. In AS 34.35.125 34.35.170 ,
    1. “dump” or “mass” means the mineral-bearing sands, gravel, earth, ore, stone, coal, oil, gas, other fluids or minerals extracted, hoisted, and raised from a mine or mining claim, while in mass at the mine or on the mining claim or adjacent to it, whether it is deposited in dumps or piles, or placed in hoppers, tanks, or reservoirs, or in sluice boxes or bunkers or other receptacles and whether partially or wholly reduced from its primary state or not;
    2. “mill” or “machine” includes a dredge, steam, internal combustion or electric shovel, dragline, tractor, scraper, hoist, engine and boiler, derrick, drill, roasting or reduction works, stamp, roller or other mill, concentrator, conveyor, elevator, or other machinery used in or about a mine in digging, hoisting, conveying, washing, or blocking out mineral contents, or reducing the mineral contents to a commercial value, while the mill or machine is used in connection with the operation of the mine, and is not a fixture and included in the term “mine” as defined in this section;
    3. “mine” or “mining claim” means a block or parcel of mining ground, consisting of a part of a mining location, a mining location, or two or more contiguous mining locations, or an oil, gas, or other well or claim, possessed and held under one ownership, or mined under one management and worked through a common shaft, tunnel, incline, pit, well, or other opening, or over one tram; and all valuable mineral deposits, including coal, oil, gas, or other fluid, and all lodes, veins, or rock in place containing minerals; and all shafts, tunnels, stopes, ways, and other openings, roads, appliances, machinery, timbering, and structure below the surface of the ground; and all structures, buildings, mills, and machines on the surface of the ground and affixed to the ground and used in the working, mining, and development; and all ditches, water rights, pipelines, roads, trams, flumes, and other appurtenances;
    4. “mineral” includes coal, oil, gas, and inorganic substances subject to location, appropriation, acquisition, or enjoyment under the laws of the United States or the state.
  2. When the phrase “different classes or kinds of property subject to lien” is used, it refers to mines as defined in this section as one class; mills and machines as another class; and the dump or mass as a third class.

History. (§ 26-2-1 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

“Dump” distinguished from “tailings”. —

The term “dump” usually refers to the pile or mass of goldbearing earth or gravel hoisted from a mine, prior to the time that it has been washed and the gold and gold dust extracted therefrom, and the term “tailings” or “tailing pile” usually refers to the pile or mass of earth or gravel that has been washed or sluiced, and from which the gold and gold dust has been extracted. Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913).

“Dump” or “mass” does not refer to natural gas remaining in place. —

Although plaintiff had a valid, perfected lien against debtor's natural gas mine, including the natural gas remaining in place, it could not establish a priming dump lien in the natural gas remaining in the wells superior to a creditor's secured interests because it failed to show that a dump or mass existed. All American Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy LLC (In re Cook Inlet Energy LLC), — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Mar. 21, 2017).

“Dump” or “mass” refers to minerals located in same place. —

The legislature intended by subsection (a)(1) of this section to refer only to sands, earth, ore, rock, and minerals which were either deposited in dumps or piles, placed in hoppers or tanks or in sluice boxes or bunkers, or other receptacles, located in the same place. Studdert v. Tanana Valley Gold Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 267 (D. Alaska 1931).

Mineral dump lien in gas. —

A mineral dump lien may extend only to gas extracted from its natural reservoir;, the lien may cover produced gas contained in a pipeline if certain conditions are met, and to obtain a dump lien laborers had to demonstrate that their work aided, broadly, in gas production. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Answer to the certified question, whether oil and gas well operator created a dump each time it released gas into its pipelines, was left to the trier of fact, but gas in a pipeline could be considered a dump if adjacent to the mine or mining claim. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Produced gas has to be the product of the lienor's labor, as defined in the dump and mine lien statutes. All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

And the definition cannot extend to gold, gold dust and amalgam removed to bank. —

The words “other receptacles” must be interpreted and construed as meaning receptacles of like character to hoppers, tanks, sluice boxes and bunkers, and can have no reference to gold, gold dust, and amalgam for 10 days removed from the place where it was produced and delivered into the hands of a third person, such as a bank. Studdert v. Tanana Valley Gold Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 267 (D. Alaska 1931).

Distinction, under former law, between “dump or mass” and material not piled up and set apart. —

See Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1914).

Machinery and other appliances used in mining operation do not become a part of the realty, but remain personal property and as such are liable for the unpaid wages of the laborers employed in the mine development. Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

A dredge is merely an article of machinery, or a machine used in the operation of mines or mining for extracting gold and other minerals from the ground or real estate. It is in no sense a part or parcel of the mine or mining ground, but is detached therefrom, and capable of being moved from place to place, either in its set-up or taken-down condition, whenever it is desirable or convenient for dredging purposes. Nordstrom v. Sivertsen-Johnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1914).

Water comes under the definition of “mineral”. —

Contention that water was not a mineral was unpersuasive when one considered that the purpose of an exploratory geothermal well is to access water as an energy resource; water under such circumstances is an “inorganic substance” within the definition of “mineral” found in (a)(4). Water in a geothermal well is an inorganic substance subject to acquisition under the laws of Alaska; the water in the geothermal well was a mineral within the context of the mining lien statutes. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

This article cannot be expanded to cover houses, beds, boats, or oil, even though the owners of the mine make no objections. Bergstrom v. Kugruk Mines, 10 Alaska 403 (D. Alaska 1944).

Mine under one ownership includes connected improvements and fixtures. —

For the purposes of the lien law, when mining property is held under one ownership, the claim and all improvements and fixtures used in connection with the working of the mine shall constitute one mine. Alaska Homestake Mining Co. v. Krampitz, 276 F. 82, 5 Alaska Fed. 62 (9th Cir. Alaska 1921).

“Mine”. —

Only machines which are fixtures are encompassed within the definition of “mine” and subject to a mining lien claimed against the mine. Rig No. 7 was not “affixed” to, and was not a fixture on, the well. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin. Corp. (In re Naknek Elec. Ass'n), 471 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Yeager v. Nutzotin Placer Co., 13 Alaska 136 (D. Alaska 1951).

Cited in

Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935); D.H. Blattner & Sons v. N.M. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).

Article 4. Improvement of Chattels.

Sec. 34.35.175. Improvement lien on personal property.

  1. A person who makes, alters, repairs, or labors upon an article of personal property at the request of the owner or lawful possessor has a lien on the property for the just and reasonable charges for the labor performed and material furnished.  The person may keep possession of the article until the charges are paid.
  2. If the charges are not paid within three months after the labor or materials, or both, are performed or furnished, the person having the lien may sell the article at public auction and apply the proceeds of the sale, first, to the payment of the expenses of sale, second, to the discharge of lien, and third, the balance to the owner of the article.
  3. The sale shall be held in the recording district where the article is left to be altered or repaired.
  4. Before the sale is made, notice of the sale shall be given to the debtor by registered letter directed to the last known place of residence of the debtor, if the residence is known, and also by posting notice of the sale in three public places in the recording district for 10 days before the day of sale. The notice must contain a particular description of the article to be sold, the name of the owner or reputed owner, the amount due on the lien, and the time and place of the sale.

History. (§ 26-3-1 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 4 SLA 2012)

Notes to Decisions

“Owner or lawful possessor.” —

Purchaser under a retail installment contract was an “owner or lawful possessor”. See Decker v. Aurora Motors, 409 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1966).

Mere excessiveness of an amount claimed does not void the lien if, (1) the lienor believes the amount is correct, and (2) the owner has not been prejudiced by the excessive demand. West v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, 628 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1981).

Collateral references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 52-56.

53 C.J.S., Liens, § 9.

Loss of garageman’s lien on repaired vehicle by owner’s use of vehicle. 74 ALR4th 90.

Sec. 34.35.180. Chattel lien; surrender of possession.

A person who expends labor, skill, or materials upon a chattel, at the request of its owner, reputed owner, or authorized agent of the owner, or lawful possessor of the chattel, has a lien upon the chattel for the contract price of the expenditure, or in the absence of a contract price, for the reasonable worth of the expenditure, for a period of six months from the expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that the possession of the chattel is surrendered to the owner or lawful possessor.

History. (§ 26-3-2 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Marine Constr. & Design Co. v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683 (Alaska 1967).

Sec. 34.35.185. Lien notice.

  1. The lien claimant shall, before delivery of the chattel to the owner or the authorized agent of the owner, record a lien notice in the office of the recorder of the recording district where the chattel is situated and in which the labor, skill, and materials are expended on the chattel.
  2. The notice must state the name of the claimant, the name of the owner, or reputed owner, a description of the chattel, sufficient for identification, upon which the claimant has expended labor, skill, and material, the amount for which the lien is claimed, and the date upon which the expenditure was completed. The notice shall be verified by the oath of the claimant, or by some one on behalf of the claimant, who has personal knowledge of the facts, and may be substantially in the following form:

, Claimant, v. Defendant Notice is hereby given that claims a lien upon (describe the property) for, and on account of labor, skill, and materials expended upon the (property); that the name of the owner, or reputed owner is, ; that the labor, skill, and materials were expended upon the property between the day of , and the day of , and the rendition of the labor, skill, and materials so expended by the claimant above named was closed on the day of ; that the amount claimant demands for labor, skill, and materials so expended is $; that no part of it has been paid except $, and there is now due and remaining unpaid on it, after deducting all just credits and offsets, the sum of $, in which amount a lien is claimed upon the property. State of Alaska Judicial District ss: Claimant I,, being first duly sworn, on oath say that I am named in the foregoing claim; that I have heard the claim read, know the contents of it, and believe it is true. Claimant Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of Name of Officer taking oath

Click to view

History. (§ 26-3-3 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Marine Constr. & Design Co. v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683 (Alaska 1967).

Sec. 34.35.190. Duty of recorder.

Upon the presentation of the notice to the recorder, the recorder shall record the notice and index it in a book or computer-readable medium kept for that purpose and called “Index of Liens upon Chattels.” The recorder is entitled to charge and receive from the person recording the notice of lien a fee provided for recording and indexing chattel mortgages.

History. (§ 26-3-4 ACLA 1949; am § 39 ch 30 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.195. Persons considered owner of chattel.

The following persons are considered the owner of a chattel, or the authorized agent of the owner, for the purpose of AS 34.35.175 34.35.215 :

  1. a person in possession of the chattel under an agreement to purchase it, whether the title to it is in the person or the vendor;
  2. a person in lawful possession of the chattel.

History. (§ 26-3-5 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Decker v. Aurora Motors, 409 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1966).

Cited in

Cavanah v. Martin, 590 P.2d 41 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 34.35.200. Priority.

A lien under AS 34.35.180 , when recorded in accordance with AS 34.35.185 , is superior to and preferred to

  1. a lien, mortgage, or encumbrance that attaches to the chattel after the starting of labor or services or the furnishing of the material mentioned in that section;
  2. a lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance that attaches before that time, when the person furnishing the material or performing the services did not have notice of the prior lien, mortgage, or encumbrance, or the prior lien, mortgage, or encumbrance was not recorded or filed in the manner provided by law.

History. (§ 26-3-5 ACLA 1949; am § 30 ch 71 SLA 1972)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.205. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien does not bind a property for more than six months after the lien is recorded, unless suit is brought in the superior court to enforce the lien within that time, or if credit is given, within six months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien may not be continued in force for more than one year from stopping of work or services, or after the material is furnished, by an agreement of the parties.
  3. The practice and procedure to enforce a lien shall be governed by the law applicable to the foreclosure of mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens.

History. (§ 26-3-6 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Marine Constr. & Design Co. v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683 (Alaska 1967).

Sec. 34.35.210. Release or discharge of lien.

A lien under AS 34.35.175 34.35.215 may be released and discharged by the lien claimant or the agent of the lien claimant by an entry upon the “Index of Liens upon Chattels.”

History. (§ 26-3-7 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.215. Penalty for refusal to discharge lien.

A person who refuses to discharge a lien after the lien is paid is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $500 and in addition is liable in damages to the person injured by the refusal in an amount equal to three times the damage sustained.

History. (§ 26-3-7 ACLA 1949)

Article 5. Transportation, Storage, and Agistment.

Sec. 34.35.220. Persons entitled to carrier, warehouse, and livestock liens.

The following persons have liens on personal property for their just and reasonable charges for the labor, care, and attention provided and the food furnished, and may retain possession of the property until the charges are paid:

  1. a person who is a common carrier, or who, at the request of the owner or lawful possessor of personal property, transports the property from one place to another;
  2. a person who safely keeps or stores personal property at the request of the owner or lawful possessor of the property; and
  3. a person who pastures or feeds livestock, or bestows labor, care, or attention on the livestock at the request of the owner or lawful possessor of the livestock.

History. (§ 26-4-1 ACLA 1949; am § 4 ch 44 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For towing and storage lien on motor vehicles, see AS 28.10.502 .

For applicability and savings provisions related to the 2009 amendment of this section, see §§ 115 and 116, ch. 44, SLA 2009.

Notes to Decisions

Mere excessiveness of an amount claimed does not void the lien if, (1) the lienor believes the amount is correct, and (2) the owner has not been prejudiced by the excessive demand. West v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, 628 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1981).

Quoted in

Benson v. Olson, 4 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1911).

Collateral references. —

14 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, §§ 494-499.

78 Am. Jur. 2d, Warehouses, §§ 68-77.

Sec. 34.35.225. Sale to enforce lien.

  1. If just and reasonable charges are not paid within three months after the care, attention, and labor is performed or food is furnished, the person having the lien may proceed to sell at public auction, as provided in AS 34.35.175 , the property mentioned in AS 34.35.220 , or a part of it, sufficient to pay the just and reasonable charges.
  2. Nothing in this section may be construed to authorize a person to sell more of the property than is sufficient to pay charges due the person on the property.
  3. A person who sells, loans, or otherwise disposes of property contrary to the provisions of AS 34.35.220 and this section without the consent of the owner of the property shall, for each offense, forfeit and pay to the owner a sum equal to the market value of the property, and 50 percent of the market value in addition as a penalty. In this subsection, “market value” means the price the property bears at the time the owner makes demand on the person for it.
  4. The remedies available under this section are in addition to any remedies available under AS 45.07.210 .

History. (§ 26-4-2 ACLA 1949; am §§ 5 — 7 ch 44 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For applicability and savings provisions related to the 2009 amendment of this section, see §§ 115 and 116, ch. 44, SLA 2009.

Article 6. Timber and Lumber.

Sec. 34.35.230. Construction.

The purpose of AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 is remedial to secure laborers, contractors, and subcontractors the amount due them for labor performed in producing, or furnishing lumber. AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 shall be liberally construed to effect this purpose.

History. (§ 26-5-18 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Article is construed strictly as far as it gives liens to those not in possession. —

The logger’s lien statute is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed insofar as it attempts to create a lien in favor of persons not in possession of the property upon which labor is performed. In re Craig Lumber Co., 6 Alaska 356 (D. Alaska 1921).

But is construed liberally to carry out legislature’s intent. —

Being a remedial statute, this article must be liberally construed so far as to effect the purpose and intent of the legislature. In re Craig Lumber Co., 6 Alaska 356 (D. Alaska 1921).

Sec. 34.35.235. Persons entitled to timber lien.

  1. The following persons shall have liens upon timber for the work done upon, or in obtaining or securing, or for services rendered in towing, transporting, hauling, or driving it:
    1. a person who performs labor upon, or who assists in obtaining or securing timber;
    2. the owner of a tugboat or towboat that tows or assists in towing timber from one place to another within the state;
    3. the owner of a team or a logging or traction engine that hauls or assists in hauling timber from one place to another within the state; and
    4. the owner of a logging road over which timber is transported and delivered.
  2. The lien attaches under (a) of this section whether the work or services are done, rendered, or performed at the instance of the owner of the timber or an agent of the owner.
  3. The cook and other laborers in and about the logging or wood camp, the teamsters transporting the timber, and the laborers on roads and trails, not including public roads or trails, used for the transportation of the timber are considered persons who assist in obtaining, securing, and delivering the timber mentioned in this section.

History. (§ 26-5-1 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Section is for benefit of laborers. —

The provision creating liens upon logs is intended to benefit persons who perform labor upon logs. In re Craig Lumber Co., 6 Alaska 356 (D. Alaska 1921).

So that fruits of labor are not lost. —

The lien is given to the person who does the work so that the fruits of his labor may not be lost by a sale by the party for whom the labor is done. In re Craig Lumber Co., 6 Alaska 356 (D. Alaska 1921).

But section is not restricted to natural persons. —

This section is general in its terms, and there is no language indicative of the intention to restrict the operation to natural persons only. McDonald-Weist Logging Co. v. Cobb, 278 F. 167, 5 Alaska Fed. 73 (9th Cir. Alaska 1921). But see In re Craig Lumber Co., 6 Alaska 356 (D. Alaska 1921).

Applied in

Benson v. Olson, 4 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1911).

Sec. 34.35.240. Lien claim.

  1. A person who claims a lien under  AS 34.35.235 within 60 days after the completion of the service or after the close of the work must record a claim with the recorder of the recording district in which the timber is cut.
  2. The claim must contain (1) a statement of the demand and the amount of the demand, after deducting as nearly as possible all just credits and offsets; (2) the name of the person by whom the claimant was employed; (3) a statement of the terms and conditions of the contract, or if there is no contract, the reasonable value of the service or work; and (4) a description of the property charged with the lien sufficient for identification with reasonable certainty. The claim shall be verified by the oath of the claimant or another who has knowledge of the facts.
  3. The claim must be substantially in the following form:

CLAIM OF LIEN Claimant, v. Notice is given by this claim that , residing at , State of Alaska, claims a lien upon a of , being about in quantity, which were cut in recording district, State of Alaska, and are now lying or being at , for labor performed and assistance provided in said ; that the name of the owner or reputed owner is ; that employed said to perform the labor and provide the assistance upon the following terms and conditions, to wit: — That agreed to pay the for labor and assistance ; that the contract has been faithfully performed and fully complied with on the part of , who performed labor and assisted in for the period of ; that the labor and assistance were so performed and provided upon between the day of , and 45 days have not elapsed since that time; that the amount of the claimant’s demand for the service is ; that no part of the claim has been paid except ; and there is now due and remaining unpaid on the claim, after deducting all just credits and offsets, the sum of , and that claims a lien in this amount upon the and also claims a lien on all the now owned by in the recording district to secure payment for the work and labor in obtaining or securing the saw logs, spars, piles, cordwood, fuelwood, shingle bolts, or other timber herein in this claim. (Signature) State of Alaska Judicial District ss. being first duly sworn on oath says that the undersigned is named in the foregoing claim of liens, has heard the claim read, knows the contents of the claim and believes the claim to be true. (Signature) Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of (Signature).

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History. (§ 26-5-4 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

The language of this section is mandatory. Benson v. Olson, 4 Alaska 349 (D. Alaska 1911).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, § 189 et seq.

Sec. 34.35.245. Landowner’s lien for timber.

A person who permits another to go upon the person’s land and cut timber has a lien upon the timber for the price agreed to be paid for the privilege, or for the price the privilege would reasonably be worth if there is no express agreement fixing the price.

History. (§ 26-5-2 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.250. Landowner’s lien claim.

  1. A person who claims a lien under AS 34.35.245 must record, within 90 days from the cutting of the timber, a claim with the recorder of the recording district in which the saw timber is cut.
  2. The claim must be in substance the same as provided in AS 34.35.240 and must be verified as provided in that section.

History. (§ 26-5-5 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.255. Priority.

  1. Liens under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 are preferred liens and are prior to other liens.  A sale or transfer of timber does not divest a lien on it under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 .
  2. As between liens under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 those for work and labor are preferred.
  3. As between liens for work claimed by several laborers on the same timber, the claim or claims for work done or performed on the identical timber proceeded against, to the extent that the timber can be identified, are preferred as against the general claim of liens for work recognized and provided for in AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 .
  4. The person performing the service or doing the work named in AS 34.35.235 is only entitled to the liens provided in AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 for services or work for six calendar months or a shorter period preceding the recording of the claim.
  5. The person granting the privilege mentioned in AS 34.35.245 is only entitled to the lien under that section for timber cut during the six months preceding the recording of the claim as provided in AS 34.35.240 .

History. (§ 26-5-3 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (d) and (e) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Lien is limited to wages earned in six months preceding filing. —

Under this section the right to a lien extends only to wages earned in the six months preceding the filing of the claims. In re Hayes, 127 F. Supp. 514, 15 Alaska 379 (D. Alaska 1955).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 263-267.

Priority between mechanics' liens and purchase-money mortgage. 73 ALR2d 1407.

Priority between mechanics' liens and advances made under previously executed mortgage. 80 ALR2d 179.

Sec. 34.35.260. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien under  AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 does not bind property for more than six months after notice of the lien is recorded, unless suit is brought to enforce the lien in the proper court within that time or if credit is given, within six months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien may not be continued in force for more than one year from the stopping of the work or by an agreement to give credit.

History. (§ 26-5-7 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Commencement of foreclosure action preserves lien as to parties to suit. —

In order to obtain a foreclosure of a lien an action must be commenced in the superior court. By commencing such an action within the time provided by statute the lien is preserved during the pendency of the action, but only those who are made parties to the action are bound by the decree of the court. Miners' & Merchants' Bank v. Riley Inv. Co., 6 Alaska 374 (D. Alaska 1921).

Sec. 34.35.265. Enforcement of lien against manufactured product.

  1. The lien provided for saw logs and shingle bolts is not released or lost by the manufacture of the saw logs or shingle bolts into lumber or shingles, and the lien may be enforced against the lumber and shingles manufactured from them.
  2. A lien may not be acquired upon or enforced against lumber or logs after the lumber or logs are used in the construction of a building or structure, or upon spars, piles, or other timber mentioned in AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 after they are put to the use for which they are intended.

History. (§ 26-5-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.270. Commissioner of public safety as receiver.

  1. The commissioner of public safety or a peace officer designated by the commissioner shall be the receiver, when one is appointed, and the superior court, upon a showing made, shall appoint the receiver, without notice.
  2. The receiver is entitled to fees which seem just to the court, and shall account for the fees in the same manner as other fees collected in an official capacity.
  3. When property subject to a lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 is in the custody of the receiver, a person who claims an interest in the property may deposit with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending a sum of money equal to the claim sued upon, together with $100 to cover costs and interest, unless the court makes an order fixing a different amount to cover the costs and interest, and may demand and receive the possession and custody of the property from the receiver immediately.

History. (§ 26-5-9 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.275. Bona fide purchasers.

The court shall conclusively presume that a party purchasing the property liened upon within the 60 days given to claimants to record their liens is not an innocent third party and is not a bona fide owner of the property, unless it appears that

  1. the purchaser has paid full value for the property; and
  2. the purchase money has been applied to the payment of the bona fide claims that are entitled to liens upon the property under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 according to the priorities established in those sections.

History. (§ 26-5-10 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.280. Enforceability.

  1. The following persons may demand that a lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 be enforced:
    1. a person who brings an action to enforce the lien; or
    2. a person who has a lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 , and who is made a party to an action to enforce a lien under those sections.
  2. The lien may be enforced against the whole, or a part of the lumber, when, during the six months preceding the recording of the lien,
    1. the person has performed labor on it;
    2. the person has assisted in securing or obtaining it; or
    3. it has been cut on the person’s land.
  3. The lien demand recorded must be for
    1. all the labor upon or all the assistance in obtaining or securing the lumber during the whole or a part of the six months mentioned in AS 34.35.260 ; or
    2. timber cut during the whole or a part of the six months mentioned above.
  4. The priority of the liens shall be determined under AS 34.35.255 where
    1. proceedings are started against a lot of lumber;
    2. some of the lienors claim liens against specific lumber to secure their claims for work and labor; and
    3. other lienors claim liens against the lumber generally to secure their claims for work and labor.

History. (§ 26-5-11 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (b) and (c) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.285. Contractor’s lien.

A person who, as a contractor, supplies lumber under a contract is entitled to the lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 to the amount due on the contract. However, the lien is subject and subsequent to the liens of the laborers under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 for the amounts due them for labor on the lumber.

History. (§ 26-5-12 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.290. Order of sale before judgment.

  1. The court or judge may in vacation, upon motion supported by affidavit showing that the property is liable to loss or destruction, order that property subject to a lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 be sold by the peace officer before judgment is rendered, as personal property is sold under execution.
  2. The proceeds of the sale shall be paid into court to be applied as provided in AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 .

History. (§ 26-5-13 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.295. Liability for injuring property or destroying identity.

  1. A person who eloigns, injures, or destroys or who makes difficult, uncertain, or impossible the identification of timber upon which there is a lien under AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 , without the express consent of the lienholder, is liable to the lienholder for the damages to the amount secured by the lien, together with costs and charges of drawing and recording the lien and reasonable attorney fees for the foreclosure of the lien.
  2. If these facts are shown to the court in the action to enforce the lien, the court shall enter a personal judgment for the amount of the damages in the action against the person, if the person is a party to the action, or the damages may be recovered in a civil action against the person.

History. (§ 26-5-14 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.300. Lien for manufacturing.

  1. A person who performs work or assists in manufacturing timber into lumber has a lien upon the lumber while it remains at the mill where it is manufactured, or in the possession or under the control of the manufacturer, whether the work is done at the instance of the owner of the logs or an agent of the owner, or a contractor or subcontractor of the owner.
  2. In this section “lumber” means logs or other timber sawed or split for use, including beams, joists, planks, bolts, shingles, rails, stays, hoops, and every article manufactured from timber.

History. (§ 26-5-15 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.305. Manufacturing lien claim.

  1. A person who desires to claim the benefit of AS 34.35.300 shall, within 60 days after the close of the service mentioned in that section, record with the recorder of the recording district where the lumber is manufactured, a notice of claim of lien.
  2. The notice must contain a statement of the demand and the amount of the demand in substance and form similar to that provided for in AS 34.35.240 .
  3. The provisions of AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 relative to the liens of persons performing labor upon, or assisting, obtaining, and securing timber apply in all respects, where applicable, to the liens of persons who perform work in manufacturing lumber, as set out in AS 34.35.300 .

History. (§ 26-5-16 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (a) and (b) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.310. Release upon filing bond.

  1. After a lien attaches to property mentioned in AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 , the owner of the property or a person on behalf of the owner may file with the clerk of the superior court in the judicial district in which the property is located a bond (1) in a sum double the amount claimed in the lien notice; (2) executed by two sureties who have the qualifications of bail upon arrest; (3) to be approved by the clerk of the court; (4) running to the claimant in the lien notice; and (5) conditioned for the payment of the damages, costs, charges, and disbursements recovered by the lien claimant against the owner, or found to be a lien upon the property described in the lien notice.
  2. The clerk shall issue to the owner or other person a certificate stating that the bond is substituted in place of the property and that the lien on the property is released and discharged.  A marginal entry of the release and substitution of bond shall be made in the lien docket in the office of the recorder where the lien statement is recorded.
  3. If the lien claimant establishes the lien by a suit to enforce it, the claimant is entitled to judgment or decree against the principal and sureties on the bond.
  4. Nothing in this section deprives a person of a defense that the person would have had if the bond had not been given.  The filing of the bond does not affect the time within which the foreclosure suit shall be started.

History. (§ 26-5-17 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.315. Definitions.

In AS 34.35.230 34.35.315 ,

  1. “lumber” includes timber, or lumber or shingles manufactured from it;
  2. “timber” includes saw logs, piles, spars, cordwood, fuelwood, shingle bolts, or other timber.

History. (§ 26-5-18 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1985 to alphabetize the defined terms.

Article 7. Fish Packers and Processors.

Sec. 34.35.320. Packer’s and processor’s lien.

  1. A person who contributes to the preparation of fish or aquatic animals for food, fish, meal, fertilizer, oil, or other article of commerce by furnishing material or labor for it has a lien for the value of the labor and material upon (1) the product or output of the cannery, saltery, or other plant or establishment, for which material or labor was furnished; and (2) the plant or establishment itself, including the houses, wharves, machinery, and equipment of the plant or establishment, for the value of labor and material.
  2. This provision may not be construed to give a lien to (1) an officer of a corporation or of an association for labor or material furnished by the officer to the corporation or association; (2) a superintendent, manager, foreman, contractor, or subcontractor in charge of a cannery, saltery, or other plant or establishment for labor or material that the person has furnished to the plant or establishment; or (3) the owner or lessor of a plant or the equipment of the plant for the use or rental of the plant or equipment.

History. (§ 26-6-1 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

The lien created by this section is analogous to the ordinary mechanic’s lien, and it attaches to both real and personal property for labor and material furnished in the production of fish products. United States-Alaska Packing Co. v. Luketa, 58 F.2d 944, 5 Alaska Fed. 648 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Section embraces all structures used in preparing fish. —

The all-embracing term “other plant or establishment,” expresses the intention of the law-making body to embrace not only canneries and salteries but every other type of structure used in any manner or to any extent in the preparation of fish or aquatic animals for food or other article of commerce. Fjeldahl v. Homer Coop. Ass'n, 11 Alaska 112 (D. Alaska 1946).

Such as wharf where fish are received and shipped without processing. —

Raw halibut in substantially the same condition as when received at the wharf by an association is, in a sense, a “product or output,” and the wharf is an “establishment” used in the preparation of fish for food. Fjeldahl v. Homer Coop. Ass'n, 11 Alaska 112 (D. Alaska 1946).

Applied in

Hansen v. Wrangel Narrows Packing Co., 8 Alaska 456 (D. Alaska 1933).

Collateral references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 52-56.

53 C.J.S., Liens, § 9.

Sec. 34.35.325. Time limit.

The person performing the service or doing the work or furnishing the material mentioned in AS 34.35.320 is only entitled to a lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 for service, work, or material furnished for the six months, or a shorter period, preceding the recording of a claim under AS 34.35.330 .

History. (§ 26-6-2 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.330. Lien claim.

  1. A person who claims the benefit of AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 shall, within 90 days after the completion of the work or the furnishing of material mentioned in AS 34.35.320 , record a claim of lien in the recorder’s office of the recording district where
    1. the product or output of the plant, cannery, saltery, or other establishment for which the material or labor is furnished is located; or
    2. the cannery, saltery, or other plant or establishment on which the lien is claimed is located.
  2. The claim of lien must contain a statement of
    1. the claimant’s demand and the amount of the demand after deducting credits and offsets;
    2. the name of the person by whom the claimant is employed or at whose request the material is furnished;
    3. the terms and conditions of the contract of employment or under which the material was furnished;
    4. a description of the property sufficient for identification on which the lien is claimed; and
    5. the name of the owner or reputed owner thereof.
  3. The lien claim shall be verified by the oath of the lien claimant or someone on behalf of the lien claimant who has knowledge of the facts.
  4. If there is no express contract of employment or for furnishing the material the claim shall state the reasonable value of the work, labor, or material.

History. (§ 26-6-3 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Section must be complied with. —

Since the claim of lien is wholly statutory, compliance with the statute is absolutely necessary as a basis for suit. Hansen v. Wrangel Narrows Packing Co., 8 Alaska 456 (D. Alaska 1933).

Its purpose is to give notice of nature of claims. —

The object of the lien statute is to acquaint and give notice to the party against whom the lien is filed as to all of whom are making such claims and the particulars of each claim, so that the party against whom such liens are filed may check and verify such claims and allow such as are just and true and correct or disallow such as are unjust or untrue; otherwise the party against whom liens are claimed would be at the mercy of any lien claimant. Hansen v. Wrangel Narrows Packing Co., 8 Alaska 456 (D. Alaska 1933).

So they must be separately stated in lien notice. —

This statute does not give the right to a lien based upon a general statement of a lump sum as due, where the facts show that the items, necessarily included to make up the lump sum, include the labor and materials furnished by others, unless the particulars required by the statute are stated in the lien notice. Hansen v. Wrangel Narrows Packing Co., 8 Alaska 456 (D. Alaska 1933).

And it is not sufficient to set out the claims in the complaint for the foreclosure of a lien based upon them. Hansen v. Wrangel Narrows Packing Co., 8 Alaska 456 (D. Alaska 1933).

Sec. 34.35.335. Extent of lien.

A lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 binds all the right, title, and interest of the person at whose instance or request or for whom the work is performed or material furnished, to the full extent of the interest that the person has at the commencement of the work or at the time the material is furnished, for which the lien is claimed, or subsequently acquired up to the time of foreclosure of the lien, in (1) all of the product or output of the cannery, saltery, or other plant or establishment for which the material or work was furnished; and (2) the plant or establishment itself, including the houses, wharves, machinery, and equipment.

History. (§ 26-6-4 ACLA 1949)

Collateral references. —

Priority as between mechanic's lien and purchase-money mortgage. 73 ALR2d 1407.

Priority between mechanics' liens and advances made under previously executed mortgage. 80 ALR2d 179.

Sec. 34.35.340. Priority.

  1. A lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 is preferred, prior, and superior to a mortgage, attachment, claim, or demand made or recorded in the recorder’s office of the recording district where the property subject to the lien is located after
    1. the commencement of the work for which the lien is claimed;
    2. the material is furnished for which the lien is claimed.
  2. A sale, transfer, mortgage, assignment, or attachment recorded after the commencement of the work or furnishing of the material does not postpone the lien.  A lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 is not prior or paramount to a valid prior lien for labor performed or material furnished in the construction, alteration, or repair of the houses, wharves, or other shore property.

History. (§ 26-6-4 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.345. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 does not bind the property for more than six months after the lien is recorded, unless suit is brought before the proper court within that time to enforce the lien or if credit is given, within six months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien does not continue in force for more than one year from the cessation of the work or the furnishing of the material, by an agreement to give credit.

History. (§ 26-6-5 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.350. Commissioner of public safety as receiver.

  1. The commissioner of public safety or a peace officer designated by the commissioner is the receiver, when one is appointed, and the superior court upon a showing made may appoint the receiver without notice.
  2. The receiver is entitled to the fees that seem just to the court and the receiver shall account for the fees collected under this subsection in the same manner other fees collected in an official capacity are accounted for.
  3. When property subject to a lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 is in the custody or about to be taken into the custody of the receiver, a person who claims an interest in the property may deposit with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending a sum of money equal to the value of the property, but not greater than the amount of the claims sued upon together with $100 to cover costs and interest, unless the court makes an order fixing a different amount to cover costs and interest, and may demand and receive the possession and custody of the property from the receiver immediately.

History. (§ 26-6-6 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.355. Bona fide purchasers.

The court shall conclusively presume that a party who purchases property on which a lien is claimed, within the time allowed for the filing of the lien, is not an innocent purchaser for value and is not a bona fide owner of the property subject to the lien, unless it appears that

  1. the purchaser paid the reasonable value of the property; and
  2. the purchase price for the property is applied to the payment of the bona fide claimants who are entitled to liens upon the property under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 .

History. (§ 26-6-7 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.360. Enforcement against whole or part of property.

  1. A person who brings a suit to enforce the lien, or a person having a lien, who is made a party to the action, may demand that the lien be enforced against the whole or a part of the property upon which the person performs labor or for which the person furnishes material.
  2. Where there are several lien claims against the same property or partly against the same property and partly against separate property, and it appears to the court that the property that may legally be held for the claims is insufficient to satisfy all the claims, the court shall, as nearly as practicable, determine what particular item of the property subject to the lien is the product in whole or in part of the labor or material furnished by each of the several claimants and for which each claims a lien, and shall give preference accordingly.

History. (§ 26-6-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.365. Property to be sold before judgment.

When it appears, during the term or in vacation, that the property is liable to loss or destruction, the court shall order it sold, free of the lien, by a peace officer, in the manner provided for the sale of personal property under execution, before judgment is rendered. The proceeds of sale shall be paid into court to be applied as directed in the judgment.

History. (§ 26-6-9 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.370. Liability for injuring property or destroying identity.

  1. A person who eloigns, injures, or destroys, or who makes difficult, uncertain, or impossible the identification of a property on which there is a lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 , without the written consent of the lienholder, is liable to the lienholder for the damages to the amount secured by the lien together with costs and charges of drawing and recording the lien and reasonable attorney fees for the foreclosure of the lien.
  2. If these facts are shown to the court in the suit to enforce the lien, the court shall enter a personal judgment for the amount of the damages in the action against the person, if the person is a party to the action, or the damages may be recovered in a civil action against the person.

History. (§ 26-6-10 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.375. Release upon filing bond.

  1. After a lien attaches upon property mentioned in AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 , the owner of the property or a person on behalf of the owner may file with the clerk of the superior court in the judicial district in which the property is located, a bond (1) in a sum double the amount claimed in the lien notice; (2) executed by two sureties who have the qualifications of bail upon arrest; (3) to be approved by the clerk of the court; (4) running to the claimant in the lien notice; and (5) conditioned for the payment of all damages, costs, charges, and disbursements recovered by the lien claimant against the owner, or found to be a lien upon or against the property described in the lien notice.
  2. The clerk shall issue to the owner a certificate stating that the bond is substituted in place of the property and that the lien on the property is released and discharged.  A marginal entry of the release and substitution of bond shall be made in the lien docket in the office of the recorder where the lien statement is recorded.
  3. If the lien claimant establishes the lien by a suit to enforce it, the lien claimant is entitled to judgment against the principal and sureties on the bond.
  4. Nothing in this section deprives a person of a defense that the person would have had if the bond had not been given.  The filing of the bond does not affect the time within which the foreclosure suit must be started.

History. (§ 26-6-11 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.380. Misdemeanor to remove lien property from state.

A person who removes or has removed from the state fish, fish products, or the products of an aquatic animal, or fishing appliances, upon which there is a lien or right of lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 , unless a bond under AS 34.35.375 is filed, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.

History. (§ 26-6-12 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.385. Embezzlement of lien property.

  1. A person who sells or otherwise disposes of fish or the products of fish or aquatic animals or other property upon which there is a lien under AS 34.35.320 34.35.390 is a trustee for the lien claimant of the consideration received or promised to be paid for the property and shall account to the lien claimant for it.
  2. If it appears, in a prosecution under this section, that the defendant has paid all claims of lien upon the property removed from the state or that the full value of the property has been distributed among the persons entitled to the lien, the defendant shall be discharged and further proceedings may not be brought against the defendant.
  3. A trustee who refuses or fails to account for the trust fund, or refuses or fails to apply it in payment of the lien claim is guilty of embezzlement, and upon conviction is punishable accordingly.

History. (§ 26-6-13 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.35.390. Written statements to employees.

  1. When a person employs another to work at a cannery, saltery, or other plant or establishment in this state for the catching or preparation of fish or aquatic animals for food, fish meal, fertilizer, oil, or other articles of commerce, and the plant or establishment, at the time of employment, is subject to a lien, mortgage, encumbrance, or the provisions of a transfer or conditional sale, or the employer is not the owner of the plant or establishment, or of the boats or fishing gear connected with it, the employer shall furnish to each employee at the time of employment, or in any event, not later than the time the employee is brought within the state boundaries, a written statement showing
    1. the name of the owner of the plant or establishment at or in connection with which the employee is to work;
    2. a general description of the plant or establishment as to buildings, boats, and other gear and material;
    3. whether any of the property is subject to a lien, mortgage, encumbrance, assignment, or conditional sale and, if so, the amount of it.
  2. In a prosecution under this section, the defendant may show in defense that the claims for labor of the employees to whom the statements were not furnished have been paid in full.  A defendant who does so shall be discharged.
  3. Failure to furnish a statement required by this section is a misdemeanor and a person who violates this section is punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months or by both.

History. (§ 26-6-14 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (b) was formerly (c) and subsection (c) was formerly (b); relettered in 2002.

Article 8. Fishermen’s Lien.

Sec. 34.35.391. Fishermen’s lien.

  1. A person who sells fish to a fish processor as defined in AS 16.10.296 , or to a primary fish buyer as defined in AS 16.10.296 , or to a cooperative corporation organized under AS 10.15, and receives a fish ticket or a record of purchase as described in AS 16.05.690 has a lien upon the property of the fish processor, primary fish buyer, or cooperative corporation for the value of the fish.
  2. A person who claims the benefit of this section shall, within 90 days of the date the fish are sold, record a claim of lien in the recorder’s office of the recording district where the fish were sold.
  3. The lien provided in this section is preferred, prior, and superior to a mortgage, attachment, claim, or demand made or recorded in the recording district in which the property is located after the date on which the fish are delivered to the buyer of the fish.

History. (§ 6 ch 94 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (b) and (c) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Recording notice. —

A secured party who has met the statutory requirements for perfecting a security interest in debtor’s fish inventory under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is not required to record notice of its interest in each of the local recording districts wherein the encumbered property may be found. In re Kemp Pacific Fisheries, Inc., 136 B.R. 268 (W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd, 952 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. Wash. 1991).

Collateral references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 52-56.

53 C.J.S. Liens, § 9.

Article 9. Watchmen.

Sec. 34.35.395. Watchman’s lien.

A person employed as watchman for real or personal property has a lien upon the property for the wages or salary earned as a watchman for the property.

History. (§ 26-7-1 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Southeastern Alaska Mining Corp. v. Zavodsky, 60 F.2d 24, 5 Alaska Fed. 672 (9th Cir. Alaska 1932).

Collateral references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 52-56.

53 C.J.S., Liens, § 9.

Sec. 34.35.400. Services or work covered by lien.

The person performing the services or doing the work named in AS 34.35.395 is only entitled to a lien under AS 34.35.395 34.35.425 for services or work for the nine months or a shorter period preceding the recording of the claim of lien under AS 34.35.405 .

History. (§ 26-7-2 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.405. Lien claim.

  1. A person who claims a lien under AS 34.35.395 34.35.425 shall, within 90 days after the completion of the services or the cessation of the labor, record a claim of lien in the recorder’s office of the recording district in which the property is located.
  2. The lien claim must contain a true statement of
    1. the demand and the amount of the demand after deducting all just credits and offsets;
    2. the name of the person by whom the claimant is employed and a statement of the terms and conditions of the contract of employment;
    3. a description of the property sufficient for identification on which the lien is claimed; and
    4. the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property.
  3. The lien claim shall be verified by the oath of the claimant or someone on behalf of the lien claimant who has personal knowledge of the facts.
  4. If there is no express contract of employment the claim must state the reasonable value of the work or services.

History. (§ 26-7-3 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.410. Recording and indexing claim.

  1. The recorder shall record the lien claim in a record book or computer-readable medium kept for that purpose. The record book shall be indexed.
  2. The recorder is entitled to receive the same fees allowed by law for recording deeds and other instruments.

History. (§ 26-7-4 ACLA 1949; am § 40 ch 30 SLA 1996)

Sec. 34.35.415. Duration of lien.

  1. A lien under AS 34.35.395 34.35.425 does not bind property for more than six months after the lien is recorded, unless suit is brought before the proper court to enforce the lien within that time or if credit is given, within nine months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien does not continue in force for more than one year from the stopping of the work or services by an agreement to give credit.

History. (§ 26-7-5 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.35.420. Extent of lien.

The lien provided in AS 34.35.395 34.35.425 binds all the right, title, and interest of the person at whose instance or request or for whom the work or services are performed, to the full extent of the interest that the person has at the commencement of the work or services for which the lien is claimed or that is subsequently acquired up to the time of the foreclosure of the lien, in the property where the work or services are performed.

History. (§ 26-7-6 ACLA 1949)

Collateral references. —

Priority as between mechanic's lien and purchase-money mortgage. 73 ALR2d 1407

Priority between mechanics' liens and advances made under previously executed mortgage. 80 ALR2d 179.

Sec. 34.35.425. Priority.

  1. A lien under  AS 34.35.395 34.35.425 is preferred, prior, and superior to a mortgage, attachment, claim, or demand made or recorded in the recorder’s office of the recording district in which the property is located, after the commencement of the work or services for which the lien is claimed.
  2. A sale, transfer, mortgage, assignment, or attachment recorded after the commencement of the work or services does not postpone the lien, except that the lien is of equal rank with other liens recorded or claimed against the property for work or services performed or furnished in the erection, construction, repair, or preservation of the property.

History. (§ 26-7-6 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Article 10. Attorneys.

Sec. 34.35.430. Attorney’s lien.

  1. An attorney has a lien for compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, as provided in this section
    1. first, upon the papers of the client that have come into the possession of the attorney in the course of the professional employment;
    2. second, upon money in the possession of the attorney belonging to the client;
    3. third, upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, from the giving of notice of the lien to that party;
    4. fourth, upon a judgment to the extent of the costs included in the judgment or, if there is a special agreement, to the extent of the compensation specially agreed on, from the giving of notice of the lien to the party against whom the judgment is given and filing the original with the clerk where the judgment is entered and docketed.
  2. The lien described in (a) of this section is superior to all subsequent liens except tax liens. The lien is a charge on the action, and the parties to the action may not extinguish or affect the attorney’s lien by any means, including settlement, other than by satisfying the underlying claim of the attorney for the fees and costs incurred in connection with the action. Nothing in this subsection precludes a party from contesting an attorney’s lien under applicable law.

History. (§ 26-8-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 149 SLA 2004)

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to the power of courts to make orders under AS 22.20.080 where an attorney claims a lien on money or papers under this section, see AS 22.20.090 .

Notes to Decisions

Origin. —

This section was taken from Oregon general laws and has remained unaltered by legislation in Alaska ever since. Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

No common-law attorney’s lien. —

There exists no common-law attorney’s lien in Alaska. Pitcher Const. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1963).

Sole statutory authority. —

The only provision of the laws of Alaska relative to an attorney’s lien is found in this section. Bacciglieri v. Ghezzi, 11 Alaska 93 (D. Alaska 1946).

Liberal construction. —

Attorney’s lien statutes are to be regarded as remedial and should be liberally construed in aid of the object sought by the legislature, which is to furnish security to attorneys for their efforts by giving them a lien upon the subject of the action. Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

Recordation and duration of lien. —

Unlike several other statutory lien provisions, this section, the attorney’s lien statute, does not provide for the recordation of the lien; even in instances where a statutory lien may be recorded against specific property, the lien remains a charge on such property only for a limited period of time, typically six months, unless a civil action to foreclose the lien is timely filed; the statutory lien, alone, cannot encumber the affected property indefinitely. Rodvik v. Meddleton (In re Rodvik), 367 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2007).

The attorney’s lien statute does not provide for the recordation of this type of lien, and the recorded notice of lien was invalid as a lien against debtor’s home. Rodvik v. Meddleton (In re Rodvik), 367 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2007).

An attorney’s lien can only attach to property of the client; here, the client was a constructive trustee and not the owner of the insurance claim when the lien was perfected. McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, 678 P.2d 1330 (Alaska 1984).

Child support. —

In a case in which an ex-wife’s attorney filed an attorney’s lien on money in the ex-husband’s possession that the attorney claimed was owed to his client, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney’s lien satisfied the requirements of subsection (a)(3) of this section. Because no order or statute required that the ex-husband pay the money to the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) directly, the money was not in CSSD’s hands, even constructively, and it was subject to the attorney’s lien. Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli, 385 P.3d 841 (Alaska 2016).

Time limits for perfection. —

This section does not specify any time limits in which the lien must be perfected. Sheehan v. Estate of Gamberg, 677 P.2d 254 (Alaska 1984).

Attorney lien priority in multiple-party cases. —

For the purposes of attorney lien priority under subsection (b) of this section, each judgment between each set of parties in a multiple-party case should be treated as if it arose in a separate action or proceeding. Falconer v. Adams, 20 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2001).

Plaintiff sued Defendant A and Defendant B because of a motor vehicle accident and obtained a verdict against Defendant A, but Defendant B was exonerated and awarded attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff’s attorney, who had a lien on plaintiff’s judgment against Defendant A, had priority to the judgment proceeds over Defendant B because Defendant B was not a party to plaintiff’s judgment against Defendant A and subsection (b) of this section did not apply to Defendant B. Falconer v. Adams, 20 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2001).

The first two subdivisions of this section are in the nature of retaining liens, and depend upon possession. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922).

Retention of a judgment cannot in and of itself be the basis of a retaining lien since the claimants only retain a copy of the judgment, with the original remaining on file with the superior court. In re Sea Catch, Inc., 36 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Enforceability of retaining lien. —

Subsection (a)(1) of this section only gives the attorney a retaining lien; the attorney may hold papers as security, but, unless the client initiates a contempt proceeding, he may not act to enforce the lien in a judicial proceeding. In re Sea Catch, Inc., 36 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Law firm’s arrangement to receive fees under a settlement agreement did nor preclude its ability to pursue an attorney’s lien against the settlement funds because the firm’s efforts created the property against which the lien was being asserted. Duffus v. Baker, — P.3d — (Alaska July 15, 2022).

Co-counsel’s retaining lien supported inter-pleader. —

Co-counsel’s lien for legal fees owed, asserted against client’s funds in possession of co-counsel, to which client also asserted a claim as a party to settlement, was sufficiently colorable to support interpleader. Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264 (Alaska 1999).

Delivery of papers on which lien held. —

In cases where the attorney did not himself terminate the relation, the client cannot compel his attorney, or former attorney, to deliver up papers or documents on which the attorney has a retaining lien, unless he pays the amount due the attorney, or furnishes adequate security for the payment of what may be due or subsequently found to be due him. Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).

Adequacy of security imposed as condition of making order under AS 22.20.080 when lien claimed under this section. —

In determining what constitutes adequate security for relinquishment, the trial court should consider a number of factors and set forth the basis for the decision. Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).

Factors to be weighed in determining what security, if any, should be required for release of files should include, among others (a) whether there was just cause for discharging the attorney; (b) whether the attorney initiated the withdrawal; (c) the client’s ability to provide security or to pay the fee; (d) the importance of the files to the client; (e) the ethical obligations of an attorney; (f) whether the fee is disputed, and, if so, the reasonable amount of any lien to be charged; (g) whether the amount due the attorney is contingent or fixed; (h) whether part of the sum due is for costs advanced by the attorney which may justify reimbursement before ordering release of the files. Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).

A trial court may exercise its discretion in determining whether it is just to require a client’s home to be encumbered as a condition for release of an attorney’s files under certain circumstances. However, only in an extreme case would the requirement of encumbering a home be justified. Under statute, the Alaska legislature has, with certain exceptions, exempted homesteads from judicial sale, evincing a policy in favor of preserving rights to a homestead. Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).

Perfection of liens against bankruptcy trustee. —

Without possession on the date of the filing of the petition of bankruptcy, a lien under subsection (a)(2) of this section does not exist and, therefore, is not perfected against the bankruptcy trustee with regard to prepetition services. In re Sea Catch, Inc., 36 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Eventual proceeds of suit as security. —

Where the adequacy of the lien is not contested, courts have provided for a lien against the eventual proceeds of a lawsuit as security for turning over files in an attorney’s possession. Miller v. Paul, 615 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1980).

The third and fourth subdivisions (now subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section) provide for the particular or charging liens. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922).

Although an attorney’s lien was valid, a judgment creditor cast doubt on the actual value of a law firm’s services rendered in an limited liability company (LLC) lawsuit; more evidence outside the assertions of the selling LLC member, such as fee agreements and billing records, was needed to establish the value of the legal services the firm provided because a portion of the settlement funds the firm claimed could be paid to the creditor if his charging order was valid. Duffus v. Baker, — P.3d — (Alaska July 15, 2022).

The object of the subdivision (3) (now subsection (a)(3) of this section) is to protect the adverse party in whose possession the money might be. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922); Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

There can be no general charging lien except as provided by this section. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922).

Charging liens only attach from time notice is given. —

In each of the particular or charging liens provided for in subdivisions (3) and (4) (now subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section), there must be notice given to the adverse party or judgment debtor, and the lien accrues only from the time of notice. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922).

The lien is not valid until the required notice has been given as required by subdivision (3) (now subsection (a)(3) of this section). Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

Which may be by serving attorney for adverse party. —

Service of the notice required by subdivision (3) (now subsection (a)(3) of this section) upon the attorney of record of the adverse party is sufficient. Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

And notice must be filed with clerk if there is no agreement. —

Where there is no special agreement for compensation, the lien can only take effect from time notice is given and filed with the clerk. In re Winston's Lien, 6 Alaska 482 (D. Alaska 1922).

Liens for bankruptcy-related services. —

Claimants have a valid attorney’s lien under subsection (a)(3) of this section as of the date of the filing of a debtor’s bankruptcy petition for prepetition services that directly relate to the action in question. In regard to post-petition fees, the claimants may file an application for administrative expenses pursuant to § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code and according to the applicable Bankruptcy Rules, with notice being given to the appropriate parties. In re Sea Catch, Inc., 36 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Postpetition transfers recoverable in bankruptcy. —

Although defendant law firm had an attorney’s lien, to the extent the firm knowingly distributed funds from its trust account that were claimed to have been misappropriated by the debtor while in a position of trust, and to the extent the transfers were postpetition, they were recoverable under 11 USC §§ 364, 327, 362(a)(4), and 550. Barstow v. Ingaldson Maasen & Fitzgerald, P.C. (In re Avery), 461 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2011).

Subdivision (3) applies to check drawn by defendant to plaintiff. —

The legislature has not seen fit to define the term money as used in this section or elsewhere. This is interpreted to mean that it was not intended to limit the word to any narrow or restricted sense such as coin, currency, or legal tender, and a check drawn by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, as the cash settlement portion of a settlement agreement which resulted in the termination of a lawsuit between the parties, constitutes money in the hands of the adverse party. Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960).

In lien foreclosures, federal courts give effect to state law. Federal courts recognize no common-law lien of an attorney, but give effect to the laws of the state in which they are held. Pitcher Const. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1963).

And cannot create right which section fails to create. —

The liberal construction required of the attorney’s lien statute by the supreme court in Phillips v. Jones, 355 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1960), cannot authorize the courts to create a right which the statute fails to create. Pitcher Const. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1963).

A federal court is not disposed to create a nonstatutory lien on the theory the Alaska legislature, in creating a statutory attorney’s lien, intended to preserve or create a nonstatutory lien. Pitcher Const. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1963).

Moneys paid to a bank as trustee, pursuant to a stipulation in which all parties joined, did not become moneys in the hands of an adverse party within the meaning of subdivision (3) (now subsection (a)(3) of this section). Pitcher Const. Co. v. United States, 322 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1963).

Rights of prevailing co-defendant who did not earlier settle. —

When some defendants settle a plaintiff’s claims against them, the plaintiff’s attorneys have a lien on settlement proceeds still in the attorney’s possession at the close of a trial against a defendant who does not settle. If the defendant who did not settle prevails at trial, it is not entitled to privity under subsection (b), because it was not a party to the pretrial settlement, and this section is properly interpreted to apply only to the parties actually involved in each settlement. Williams v. Utility Equip., 837 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1992).

Quoted in

Nodine v. Hannum, 1 Alaska 302 (D. Alaska 1901); McLaughlin v. Okumura, 223 P.3d 93 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Andrews v. Wade & De Young, Inc., 875 P.2d 89 (Alaska 1994); Baker v. Univ. of Alaska, 22 P.3d 440 (Alaska 2001).

Collateral references. —

7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 304 et seq.

7A C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 443 et seq.

Attorney’s charging lien as including services rendered or disbursements made in other than instant action or proceeding. 23 ALR4th 336.

Article 11. Wages.

Sec. 34.35.435. Lien for wages.

When a clerk, accountant, bookkeeper, waiter, waitress, cook, maid, porter, servant, employee, artisan, craftsman, factory operator, mill operator, mechanic, quarryman, common laborer, or farmhand labors or performs a service in an office, store, hotel, rooming house, boardinghouse, restaurant, cafe, shop, newspaper plant, factory, quarry, or mill, of any character, or upon a farm, under or by virtue of a contract or agreement, written or oral, with a person or employer, or an agent, receiver, or trustee of the person or employer, in order to secure the payment of the amount due or owing under the contract or agreement, written or oral, the employee has a first lien upon all products, machinery, tools, fixtures, appurtenances, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, wagons, carts, or things of value, of whatsoever character, that are created in whole or in part by the labor or that may be used or useful by the person or may be necessarily connected with the performance of the labor or service, which may be owned by the employer, or an agent, receiver, or trustee of the employer.

History. (§ 1 ch 79 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Liens have preferred status. —

This section declares that the liens created thereby shall be “first liens,” from which it may be inferred that the legislature intended to give them priority, although apt expressions usually employed to give liens a preferred status, such as “prior,” “preferred,” and “paramount,” were not used, nor were the liens that were to be relegated to a lower rank specified. B. M. Behrends Bank v. Satre, 109 F. Supp. 917, 14 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1953).

Employer penalty not included in wage lien. —

There is no basis for claiming that the penalty provision of AS 23.05.140(d) was intended to expand the amount of a lien established under this section, that being “the amount due or owing under the contract or agreement.” Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Assets susceptible to lien. —

Where plaintiff produced admissible evidence that he had managed a farm and worked on the construction of a building at the farm, both as a superintendent of the project and as a laborer, at least the equipment used by him and the building constructed for the farm operator were susceptible to a lien. Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Collateral references. —

56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, §§ 139-150.

Sec. 34.35.440. Fixing the lien.

  1. When a person or an agent, receiver, or trustee of the person, fails or refuses to make wage payments as prescribed by law or agreement between the parties, the employee who has performed the service shall make an account of service, showing the amount due the employee for the service, and present to the employer or an agent, receiver, or trustee of the employer one of the duplicate accounts within 30 days after the indebtedness accrues.
  2. Within 90 days after termination of the performance of services the claimant shall record with the recorder of the recording district in which the services were performed a lien notice verified by the claimant.
  3. The lien notice shall be indexed in a book or computer-readable medium kept for that purpose.
  4. The lien claim must contain a description of the property charged with the lien sufficient for identification, and shall be verified by the oath of the lien claimant or of some other person having knowledge of the facts.
  5. A compliance with the requirements in this section is necessary to fix and preserve the lien given under AS 34.35.435 34.35.445 .
  6. The liens of different persons of the same class have equal priority with each other.
  7. A person claiming the benefit of AS 34.35.435 34.35.445 has six months from the date of recording the lien within which to bring suit to foreclose the lien, or, if a credit is given, then six months after the expiration of the credit.
  8. A substantial compliance with this section is sufficient diligence to fix and secure the lien, except that a purchaser of products covered by the lien from the owner of the products acquires good title to them unless at the time of the purchase, the purchaser has actual or constructive notice of the claim of the lienholder upon the products.  The purchaser has constructive notice if the claim is recorded and indexed or if an action is on file.

History. (§ 2 ch 79 SLA 1949; am § 41 ch 30 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (b), (g), and (h) of this section in 1988 under sec. 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Failure to comply with section loses lien. —

Where claimants failed to comply with provisions of this section, and where defendant had no actual notice of claims before they were filed at the office of the recorder, claims were stripped of their lien characteristics, and became ordinary claims. Newby v. Harris, 129 F. Supp. 332, 15 Alaska 488 (D. Alaska 1955).

Applied in

Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

Klondike Indus. Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 34.35.445. Duration of lien.

  1. The lien created by AS 34.35.435 34.35.445 is not operative for more than six months after the lien is recorded and indexed, unless suit to enforce the lien is brought before the proper court within that time or if a credit is given, six months after the expiration of the credit.
  2. A lien does not continue in force for more than one year from the stopping of the work by an agreement to give credit.

History. (§ 3 ch 79 SLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Article 12. Hospitals, Physicians, and Nurses.

Sec. 34.35.450. Hospital’s, physician’s, and nurse’s lien.

  1. An operator of a hospital in the state, a licensed special nurse in a hospital in the state, or a physician who furnishes service to a person who has a traumatic injury has a lien upon any sum awarded to the injured person or the personal representative of the injured person by judgment or obtained by a settlement or compromise to the extent of the amount due the hospital, nurse, or physician for the reasonable value of the service furnished before the date of judgment, settlement, or compromise, together with costs and reasonable attorney fees that the court allows, incurred in the enforcement of the lien. AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 do not apply to a claim, right of action, or money accruing under AS 23.30 (Workers’ Compensation Act).
  2. When the person receiving hospitalization has a contract providing for indemnity or compensation for the sum incurred for hospitalization, the hospital has a lien upon the amount payable under the contract.  The party obligated to make reimbursement under the contract may pay the sum due under it directly to the hospital, and this payment is a full release of the party making the payment under the contract in the amount of the payment.

History. (§ 1 ch 75 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 135 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

Liens. —

Language of subsection (a) of this section clearly indicates that a patient does not have to personally owe the Alaska Tribal Health Consortium anything for it to have a right of discovery of the expenses it incurred in treating him. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for E.R., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).

Foreclosure of lien. —

Alaska Tribal Health Consortium could foreclose on its lien against the patient’s settlement where the language of this section would cover the sum that the insurer was contractually obligated to provide in the settlement. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for E.R., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).

Exclusive remedy. —

Where injured motorist received emergency and other medical services, she ostensibly assigned to medical provider her right to claims from third-parties for the reasonable value of the medical services; however the medical provider was not permitted to intervene in the injured motorist’s personal injury suit against the driver of the other vehicle. Alaska law prohibits the assignment of personal injury claims; AS 34.35.450 provides the medical provider’s exclusive remedy against the injured motorist. Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010).

Attorney’s fees. —

Reducing a lien by a pro rata share of attorney’s fees does not violate the right of recovery, but it influences the amount that can be recovered. The Alaska Tribal Health Consortium is required to pay the lawyers who implemented its right of recovery; as with subsection (a) of this section, the situation is analogous to the Consortium filing suit itself, making a full recovery, and then paying its attorneys their fees — the right of recovery is not hindered, but the attorneys must be paid for their work. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for E.R., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 9.

41 C.J.S., Hospitals, §§ 3, 22–25

70 C.J.S., Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Providers, § 165.

Sec. 34.35.455. Limitation on extent of lien.

Except as otherwise provided, a lien under AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 may not be allowed for hospitalization or the services of a physician or licensed special nurse furnished after a settlement is made by or on behalf of the person causing the injury unless the settlement is made within 20 days from the date of the injury. A lien is not allowed for necessary attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred by the injured person in securing a settlement, compromise, or judgment.

History. (§ 2 ch 75 SLA 1959; am § 2 ch 135 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

Attorney’s fees. —

Although this section is at best unclear, it most likely limits the health care provider’s rights, not the rights of the injured parties or their attorneys. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for E.R., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).

Sec. 34.35.460. Notice of lien.

  1. To perfect the lien described in AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 , the hospital or the owner or operator of the hospital, or the physician or licensed special nurse, shall, not later than 90 days after the date of injury, or in no event later than 90 days after the discharge of the injured person from the hospital or the provision of the physician’s services, file a notice of lien substantially in the form prescribed in AS 34.35.465 , containing a general description of the services rendered and a statement of the amount claimed, with a recorder’s office, and shall, after the 90-day period, before the date of judgment, settlement, or compromise, serve a copy of the notice of lien by registered mail, at the last known address, upon the person alleged to be responsible for causing the injury and from whom damages are claimed, and upon the insurance carrier that has insured against the liability, if the insurance carrier is known.
  2. A hospital or the owner or operator of a hospital, or a physician or licensed special nurse who files a notice of lien under (a) of this section for hospitalization or services provided to a recipient of medical assistance under AS 47 shall mail a copy of the notice of lien to the unit of the Department of Health and Social Services that administers medical assistance for needy persons under AS 47. The copy must be sent by certified mail no later than 30 days after the filing of the notice of lien under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 3 ch 75 SLA 1959; am § 3 ch 135 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 85 SLA 2000)

Notes to Decisions

Evidence of compliance with section. —

Hospital was under no obligation to present evidence that it had perfected its lien against patient, who was in default for payment for medical services, in the manner required by this section, unless the trial court notified the party otherwise and provided the hospital with an opportunity to present evidence that it complied with the statute. Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Brauneis, 141 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 34.35.465. Form of notice.

The form of notice required by AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 shall be substantially as follows:

NOTICE is hereby given that has rendered services for hospitalization, physician services, or special nurses’ services for , a person who was injured on the day of at in the state, and the (claimant) hereby claims a lien upon any money due or owing or any claim for compensation, damages, contribution, settlement, or judgment from alleged to have caused the injuries and any other person liable for the injury or obligated to compensate the injured person on account of the injuries; the hospitalization, physician services, or special nurses’ services were rendered to the injured person between the day of and : General Description of Services Rendered and Statement of Amount Due and that 90 days have not elapsed since that time; that the claimant’s demands for care and service is in the sum of $ and that no part of the demands has been paid, except $, and that there is now due and owing and remaining unpaid thereof, after deducting all credits and offsets, the sum of $, in which amount lien is hereby claimed. United States of America State of Alaska ss. Judicial District I, , being first duly sworn on oath say: That I am named in the foregoing claim of lien; that I have read the same and know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 2 Notary Public for Alaska

Click to view

History. (§ 4 ch 75 SLA 1959; am § 4 ch 135 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “2...” was substituted for “19..” in accordance with sec. 105, ch. 21, SLA 2000.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Brauneis, 141 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 34.35.470. Lien docket. [Repealed, § 7 ch 135 SLA 1996.]

Sec. 34.35.475. Settlement after notice.

  1. A person or insurer is liable to a hospital, physician, or nurse, in the amount that the hospital, physician, or nurse is entitled to receive, for 180 days after the date of a payment to the injured person, the heirs of the injured person, personal representatives, or the attorney of them, when the person or insurer
    1. receives a copy of notice of lien, or the lien is recorded as provided in AS 34.35.460 and 34.35.465 ;
    2. makes the payment after receipt of notice or the recording of the lien as compensation for the injury suffered; and
    3. does not pay the hospital, physician, or the licensed special nurse for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the injured person and claimed in the notice of lien, or so much of the value of the services as can be satisfied out of a judgment, settlement, or compromise, after paying the attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with it.
  2. The hospital, physician, or nurse has a cause of action, during the 180 days, against the person or insurer.

History. (§ 6 ch 75 SLA 1959; am § 5 ch 135 SLA 1996)

Notes to Decisions

Attorney’s fees. —

Absent other evidence of legislative intent, the silence or ambiguity of statutory provisions on the issue of apportioning attorney’s fees requires reference to equitable considerations; attorney’s fees are necessary to ensure there was not unjust enrichment. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for E.R., 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).

Exclusive remedy. —

Where injured motorist received emergency and other medical services, she ostensibly assigned to medical provider her right to claims from third parties for the reasonable value of the medical services; however the medical provider was not permitted to intervene in the injured motorist’s personal injury suit against the driver of the other vehicle. Alaska law prohibits the assignment of personal injury claims; therefore this section provides the medical provider’s exclusive remedy against the injured motorist. Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 34.35.480. Enforcement of lien.

  1. A lien under AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 may be foreclosed or enforced by an action brought by the claimant, a representative, or assignee within one year after the filing of the lien.
  2. In the action, upon entering a decree for the plaintiff, the court shall allow as part of the costs, all money paid for the filing and recording of the lien notice, together with a reasonable attorney fee.

History. (§ 7 ch 75 SLA 1975)

Notes to Decisions

Attorney’s fees following default judgment involving lien. —

Trial court erred in calculating attorney’s fees for a hospital in a default judgment pursuant to Alaska R. Civ. P. 82 where the trial court did not enter a decree for the hospital on a lien issue; even if this section had applied, the superior court would have been justified in denying the request because the hospital failed to file a properly-supported Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(c) motion; upon remand, the hospital was given a second chance to file a Rule 82(c) motion for attorney’s fees, either under Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(4) or this section. Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Brauneis, 141 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2006).

Cited in

Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010).

Sec. 34.35.481. Priority of liens.

A lien perfected by the Department of Health and Social Services under AS 47.05.075 has priority immediately after a lien perfected by a hospital, nurse, or physician under AS 34.35.450 34.35.480 .

History. (§ 2 ch 85 SLA 2000)

Sec. 34.35.482. Definition.

In AS 34.35.450 34.35.482 , “physician” means a person licensed as a chiropractor under AS 08.20 or a person licensed as a doctor of medicine under AS 08.64.

History. (§ 6 ch 135 SLA 1996)

Secs. 34.35.485 — 34.35.500. [Renumbered as AS 34.35.900 — 34.35.930.]

Article 13. Hotels and Boardinghouses.

Sec. 34.35.510. Hotel and boardinghouse operator’s liens.

The operator of a hotel or boardinghouse has a lien upon, and may retain, all baggage and other property lawfully in the possession of a guest for all proper charges owed by the guest to the hotel or boardinghouse operator. However, this section does not apply when the baggage or other property is not owned by the guest and the hotel or boardinghouse operator has actual notice of this fact.

History. (§ 2 ch 184 SLA 1968)

Collateral references. —

40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants, §§ 175-186.

43A C.J.S., Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places, §§ 28–31.

Sec. 34.35.520. Disposition of property to satisfy liens.

  1. If a lien under AS 34.35.510 is not satisfied within 60 days after the charges become due, the hotel or boardinghouse operator may proceed to sell the baggage or other property held under the lien at public auction.  Ten days before the sale the hotel or boardinghouse operator shall give notice of the time and place of sale by posting notice in three public places in the town or city where the hotel or boardinghouse is located and by mailing notice of the time and place to the owner of the baggage or other property at the place of residence as set out in the hotel or boardinghouse register. If the guest failed to register or to give sufficient address, the required notice shall be mailed to the guest at the city or town where the hotel or boardinghouse is located.  When the notice requirements of this section have been complied with, the sale of the baggage or other property is a perpetual bar to an action against the hotel or boardinghouse operator for recovery of baggage, property, or their value.
  2. After satisfaction of the lien and payment of all legal charges for storage and expenses incurred in selling the property, the remaining proceeds of the sale shall, within one year, be paid to the guest upon demand.

History. (§ 2 ch 184 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.35.530. Definitions.

In AS 34.35.510 34.35.530 ,

  1. “guest” includes every person who is a member of the family of, or dependent upon, a guest, boarder, or lodger in a hotel or boardinghouse;
  2. “hotel or boardinghouse” includes any building held out to the public to be an inn, motel, hotel, or public lodginghouse, or place where sleeping accommodations, whether with or without meals, are furnished for hire to transient guests;
  3. “operator” includes innkeeper, proprietor, keeper, owner, lessee, or manager of a hotel or boardinghouse.

History. (§ 2 ch 184 SLA 1968)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1985 to alphabetize the defined terms.

Article 14. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 34.35.900. Acknowledgment of satisfaction.

  1. When a lien is satisfied by payment, an acknowledgment of satisfaction suitable for recordation shall be delivered to all parties to the lien by the lien claimant. The acknowledgment of satisfaction shall be delivered immediately upon payment by tender of cash in satisfaction of the claim or within 10 days after payment when satisfaction is obtained in some other manner. A certificate of discharge of a lien for nonpayment of a state tax or license fee recorded under AS 43.10.042 shall be delivered within 15 days after tender of cash in satisfaction of the claim or within 30 days when satisfaction is obtained in some other manner. The acknowledgment must identify all parties to the lien and any property subject to the lien using the same name or description contained in the claim of record, if a claim was made, and the book and page of the official record containing the claim or the serial number assigned to the claim by the recorder.
  2. A lien claimant or assignee who, after payment in full of the lien claim and after written demand by a person liable upon the lien, fails without just cause for a period of 30 days to execute and file or record an acknowledgment of satisfaction in the recording district in which the claim of lien is filed or recorded is liable to the person making the demand or the grantees or heirs of that person for all damages that they may sustain by reason of that failure and shall also forfeit to them the sum of $100.

History. (§ 26-9-10 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 9 SLA 1978; am § 44 ch 35 SLA 2003)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 34.35.485 . Renumbered in 1985.

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (b) of this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Cross references. —

For satisfaction of judgments, see AS 09.30.300 and 09.30.310 .

Sec. 34.35.910. Employment considered continuous.

  1. The fact that a lien claimant is employed at different kinds of labor or at different rates of wages during the period of general employment is not considered an interruption of the continuity of employment.
  2. A temporary cessation of employment of the lien claimant under an understanding of resumption of employment within a reasonable time is not considered an interruption of the continuity of employment so as to cause the time to run within which the notice of the lien is required to be filed for record.

History. (§ 26-9-1 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 34.35.490. Renumbered in 1985.

Notes to Decisions

One lien notice sufficient if labor is continuous. —

As to labor performed under separate and distinct contracts, but upon the same improvement if the labor is continuous, or substantially so, the filing of a notice of lien after the entire work is completed is sufficient as to all the contracts. Read v. Luther Gold Dredging Co., 7 Alaska 348 (D. Alaska 1925).

Sec. 34.35.920. Waiver of lien.

Except as provided under AS 34.35.117 and 34.35.119 , an agreement by a person mentioned in AS 34.35.010 34.35.425 to waive the right to acquire a lien provided in AS 34.35.010 34.35.425 is invalid.

History. (§ 26-9-12 ACLA 1949; am § 17 ch 175 SLA 1978)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 34.35.495. Renumbered in 1985.

Sec. 34.35.930. Liberal construction of chapter.

The intent of this chapter is remedial and its provisions shall be liberally construed.

History. (§ 26-9-13 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 34.35.500. Renumbered in 1985.

Notes to Decisions

The safe and proper rule of construction of mechanic’s lien statutes is that, while the remedial portions of the statutes should be liberally construed, with a view to avoid defeating the purpose of the statute, yet these parts upon which the right to the existence of a lien depends, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. Sullens & Hoss, Inc. v. Farvour, 117 F. Supp. 535, 14 Alaska 492 (D. Alaska 1954).

Applied in

Fjeldahl v. Homer Coop. Ass'n, 11 Alaska 112 (D. Alaska 1946); Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 412 P.2d 496 (Alaska 1966).

Quoted in

Mitchell v. Beaver Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 566 (D. Alaska 1935); Gleason v. Diamond, 9 Alaska 621 (D. Alaska 1939); Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962); Moores v. Alaska Metal Bldgs., 448 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1968).

Cited in

All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska 2019).

Sec. 34.35.950. Nonconsensual common law liens.

  1. A nonconsensual common law lien is invalid unless the lien is authorized by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law.
  2. A person may not submit a nonconsensual common law lien under AS 40.17 to the recorder in order to record the lien unless the lien is accompanied by a specific order authorizing the recording of the lien issued by a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law. When a nonconsensual common law lien is submitted for recording under this subsection, the court order accompanying the lien shall be recorded with the lien.
  3. A person may not submit a nonconsensual common law lien under a law authorizing the filing of a lien against personal property in order to file the lien unless the lien is accompanied by a specific order authorizing the filing of the lien issued by a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law. When a nonconsensual common law lien is submitted for filing under this subsection, the court order accompanying the lien shall be filed with the lien.
  4. In this section,
    1. “filed” means the acceptance of a document by a department or person having responsibility for the receipt and filing of documents that may be filed and that are presented for filing in the place of filing designated by law, whether or not under applicable law the department or person is directed to file the document;
    2. “nonconsensual common law lien” means a lien on real or personal property that
      1. is not provided for by a specific state or federal statute or municipal ordinance;
      2. does not depend on the consent of the owner of the property affected for its existence; and
      3. is not an equitable, constructive, or other lien imposed by a court recognized under state or federal law;
    3. “record” means the acceptance of a document by the recorder that the recorder has determined is recordable under AS 40.17 and that is presented for recording in the place of recording designated for the recording district where affected property is located whether or not the place of recording is in that district and whether or not under applicable law the recorder is directed to record the document;
    4. “recorder” means the commissioner of natural resources or the person designated by the commissioner of natural resources to perform the duties set out in AS 40.17.

History. (§ 5 ch 20 SLA 1998; am § 7 ch 9 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective June 13, 2017, in (d)(2)(A), added “or municipal ordinance” at the end.

Opinions of attorney general. —

“Common law liens at law” and “claims of common law” which are filed in connection with lawsuits unrelated to the title or right to possession of real property are not legally effective for any purpose whatsoever. Such documents may not legally be recorded, and the recorder should not record these documents. March 24, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

Chapter 40. Fraudulent Transfers, Revocations, and Trusts.

Sec. 34.40.010. Invalidity generally.

Except as provided in AS 34.40.110 , a conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of an estate or interest in land, or in goods, or things in action, or of rents or profits issuing from them or a charge upon land, goods, or things in action, or upon the rents or profits from them, made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence of debt given, action commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded is void.

History. (§ 22-4-1 ACLA 1949; am § 7 ch 6 SLA 1997)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 9, ch. 6, SLA 1997 provides that the 1997 amendment to this section “does not apply to a trust unless the trust is created on or after April 2, 1997.”

Notes to Decisions

Common law. —

Under the common law, a transfer by an insolvent debtor to pay or to secure an antecedent debt has never been treated as a transfer to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, although it is self-evident that other creditors are necessarily hindered and delayed by such a transfer. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

At common law it was not illegal for a debtor to pay one of his creditors in full, even though he did not have enough left to pay his other creditors in full or even in part. Such a payment was not, and is not now, a fraudulent conveyance. The payment is merely the performance of an existing legal duty. Nor is it illegal for the debtor to transfer property as security for an existing debt; the value of the property in excess of the debt remains available to other creditors. The conveyance of property to a creditor in satisfaction of an existing debt is a fraudulent conveyance only in case its value is in excess of the debt and the purpose of the debtor is to keep that excess out of the hands of his other creditors. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Limitation period. —

Because an allegedly misappropriated corporate opportunity involved real property, the statute of limitations for actions to determine interests in real property applied to the misappropriation claim, but it did not apply to a conspiracy claim or to a fraudulent conveyance claim. Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 306 P.3d 1264 (Alaska 2013).

This section provides Alaska’s basic prohibition against transactions in fraud of creditors. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

And AS 34.40.090 complements this basic prohibition by providing that the existence of fraudulent intent is a question of fact. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

The court never presumes fraud. Matheson v. Patenaude, 8 Alaska 238 (D. Alaska 1930).

Under normal circumstances, fraud will not be presumed. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

And the burden of proof under this section is on the plaintiff. Matheson v. Patenaude, 8 Alaska 238 (D. Alaska 1930).

Fraud is established by preponderance of evidence; clear and convincing proof is not required. Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1986).

AS 09.25.060 qualifies the provisions of this section and AS 34.40.090 by erecting a prima facie presumption of fraud in cases where a sale of personal property is not “accompanied by the immediate delivery and the actual and continued possession” by the vendee. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Where the creditor offered a satisfactory explanation for his failure to take more overt steps in attempting to reestablish possession of a vessel, and where he further showed that the quitclaim deed delivered by the debtor was issued in exchange for valuable consideration, the trial court was unjustified in relying on the statutory presumption to invalidate as fraudulent the conveyance in question. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the validity of the transaction as a question of fact pursuant to this section and AS 34.40.090 . Accordingly, the court should have ruled on the issue whether, in the conveyance of the vessel to the creditor, there was an actual, as opposed to a presumed intent to hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

The badges of fraud here are as clearly apparent as they are multitudinous. The compelling ones in terms of long-recognized indicia of fraud are: (1) The consideration is inadequate. (2) The transfer of the property was in anticipation of a pending suit. (3) The transferor debtor was insolvent. (4) There was a failure to record the instrument within a reasonable length of time. (5) The conveyance was a transfer of all or substantially all the debtor’s property. (6) The retention of possession of the premises by the grantor from the date of the execution of the deed stands unexplained. (7) The transfer so completely depleted the assets of the debtor that his creditor, the plaintiff, has thereby been hindered and delayed in recovering any part of his judgment. (8) The relationship of the parties becomes an additional badge of fraud when there also appear other circumstances which of themselves incite distrust and suspicion. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

When a conveyance is alleged to have been made fraudulently, the court may consider whether the disparity between the true value and the price paid is so great as to shock the conscience and strike the understanding at once with the conviction that such transfer never could have been made in good faith. Gransbury v. United Bldg. Supply, 531 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1975).

Badges of fraud at most are only evidentiary facts tending to prove the ultimate fact, which is that fraud was intended. Matheson v. Patenaude, 8 Alaska 238 (D. Alaska 1930); Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Badges of fraud must be viewed within the context of each particular case, and, where their presence is satisfactorily accounted for, or where their existence is not inconsistent with a construction of the transaction as a valid one, they deserve to be accorded little weight. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

Where the totality of the circumstances surrounding a transaction has failed to indicate fraud, or where a strong showing of good faith in a transaction has been made, courts have frequently discounted the significance of badges of fraud as indicia of the character of the transaction. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Evidence of post-transfer events is clearly admissible to show intent at an earlier point in time, although the probative value of the evidence decreases as the elapsed time increases. Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1986).

Hasty and unexplained departure of seller after sale of lots as evidence that conveyance was fraudulent. —

See Gransbury v. United Bldg. Supply, 531 P.2d 1247 (Alaska 1975).

Decree only avoids conveyance as to creditor who is party. —

When fraud has been established as to one creditor, it has not the effect to vitiate the conveyance as to all other creditors. The decree in such a suit merely avoids the conveyance as to the plaintiff therein, and as to all the other creditors it remains as though no proceedings had been taken. Ellis v. Reed, 238 F. 341, 4 Alaska Fed. 495 (9th Cir. Alaska 1917).

To prove liability for participation in a fraudulent conveyance scheme, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an unlawful agreement; (2) the specific intent of each participant in the scheme to hinder, delay and defraud a creditor of one who participated in the scheme; (3) acts committed pursuant to the unlawful agreement; (4) damages caused by the acts committed pursuant to the unlawful agreement. Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1993).

Debtor-creditor relationship necessary. —

The acts condemned by this section are, by the terms of the statute, dependent upon the existence of debtor-creditor relationship. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

A contingent debt may be the basis of a debtor-creditor relationship under this section. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

Although the liability for a debt in the interim period before the collateral is sold at an execution sale is contingent in that it will only arise should the collateral sell for less than the amount owing, this fact does not preclude the present existence of a debt owed by the contingently liable party to the secured creditor. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

Distinction between transfer by contingent debtor and transfer by debtor anticipating suit. —

In the context of proving an intent to defraud creditors, there must be a distinction made between the transfer of property by a contingent debtor who, while aware of the possibility of owing a debt at some future time, reasonably concludes that that possibility will not arise, and the debtor who believes a suit is in the offing and who, in anticipation thereof, conveys property. The bona fide nature of the transfer in the former case is significantly less subject to suspicion than in the latter. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

A preferential transfer does not constitute a fraudulent conveyance. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

A preferential payment to one of several creditors by an insolvent debtor is not in itself an unlawful or fraudulent act. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

In the absence of bankruptcy laws or express statutory prohibition, an insolvent debtor may convey property to one creditor, even if it means that the debtor’s assets will thereby be depleted, and the claims of other creditors will be defeated. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Barring the applicability of bankruptcy laws or similar statutory provisions insuring equal distribution of an insolvent debtor’s assets among all general creditors, there is nothing improper or unlawful about a preference being given to one creditor, even if it means that other creditors will be precluded from recovery. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

A bona fide preference of one creditor over others will be upheld even where the debtor is or will be rendered insolvent, or where other creditors are threatening suit, or where the preferred creditor is aware of the debtor’s insolvency. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

For a list of cases upholding the right of a debtor to prefer one among his creditors, see Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

The rule against fraudulent conveyances may be availed of by a single creditor. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Effect of permitting single creditor to set aside preferential transfer. —

To allow a single creditor, acting in his own interest alone, to set aside a preferential transfer as one in fraud of creditors would amount to substituting that creditor as the person preferred in place of the creditor chosen by the debtor. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Conveyance of marital property in anticipation of divorce. —

Husband’s secret conveyance of his interest in a bar to his brother three days after receiving service of divorce papers was intended to defraud the wife of her fair share of a primary marital asset. Pattee v. Pattee, 744 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1987), overruled, Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1995). See also Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1986).

Transfer by husband of all assets to wife held not void under this section. —

See First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

Sufficient evidence of fraudulent transfer. —

The trial court found sufficient evidence of a fraudulent transfer to the company’s former president to sufficiently support equitable subordination of the deed of trust to the claims of the corporate creditors. Nerox Power Sys. v. M-B Contr. Co., 54 P.3d 791 (Alaska 2002).

Genuine issues of material fact. —

There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the landowner and his sister engaged in a fraudulent conveyance of property which was subject to an option to purchase in favor of a third party; there was an issue as to whether the transfer was made for inadequate consideration, whether it was undertaken while the landowner was in or approaching insolvency, and whether the landowner retained possession of the property. Shaffer v. Bellows, 260 P.3d 1064 (Alaska 2011).

Damages should only be used where Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act remedies are inadequate. If the fraudulent conveyance remedy, i.e., voiding the transfer as to the creditor, is adequate, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1993).

Applied in

Rollins v. Leibold, 512 P.2d 937 (Alaska 1973).

Quoted in

Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1984).

Collateral references. —

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 1 et seq.

37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 1 et seq.

Right of creditor to set aside transfer of property as fraudulent as affected by the fact that his claim is barred by statute of limitations. 14 ALR2d 598.

Purchase of annuity by debtor as fraud on creditors, 74 ALR6th 549.

Sec. 34.40.020. Invalidity as against purchasers.

A conveyance of an interest in land, or the rents or profits of it, or a charge upon land or upon the rents and profits thereof, that is made or created with the intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration of the land, rents, or profits, as against these purchasers, is void.

History. (§ 22-4-2 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Crossly v. Campion Mining Co., 1 Alaska 391 (D. Alaska 1901).

Sec. 34.40.030. Purchasers with notice.

A conveyance or charge is not considered fraudulent in favor of a subsequent purchaser who has actual or legal notice of it at the time of the purchase, unless it appears that the grantee in the conveyance, or person to be benefited by the charge, was privy to the fraud intended.

History. (§ 22-4-3 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Crossly v. Campion Mining Co., 1 Alaska 391 (D. Alaska 1901).

Cited in

Walker v. Fairbanks Inv. Co., 268 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. Alaska 1959).

Collateral references. —

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, § 123.

Sec. 34.40.040. Invalidating effect of provision for revocation, determination, or alteration.

A conveyance or charge of or upon an estate or interest in land containing a provision for the revocation, determination, or alteration of the estate or interest, or a part of it, at the will of the grantor, is void as against subsequent purchasers from the grantor for a valuable consideration of an estate or interest liable to be revoked or determined, although the estate or interest is not expressly revoked, determined, or altered by the grantor by virtue of the power reserved or expressed in a prior conveyance or charge.

History. (§ 22-4-4 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.40.050. Conveyance in exercise of power to revoke and reconvey.

Where a power to revoke a conveyance of land, or the rents and profits from it, and to reconvey the land or the rents and profits is given to a person other than the grantor in the conveyance, and the person subsequently conveys the land, rents, or profits to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, the subsequent conveyance is valid in the same manner and to the same extent as if the power of revocation were recited in it and the intent to revoke the former conveyance expressly declared.

History. (§ 22-4-5 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.40.060. Conveyance before accrual of right to execute power of revocation.

If a conveyance to a purchaser under either AS 34.40.040 or 34.40.050 is made before the person making the conveyance is entitled to execute the power of revocation, it nevertheless is valid from the time the power of revocation actually vests in the person, in the same manner and to the same extent as if then made.

History. (§ 22-4-6 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.40.070. Requirement of writing for grant or assignment of trust.

A grant or assignment of an existing trust in land, goods, or things in action, unless the grant or assignment is in writing, subscribed by the person making it, or a lawfully authorized agent of the person, is void.

History. (§ 22-4-7 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.40.080. Invalidity against heirs, successors, representatives, or assigns.

A conveyance, charge, instrument, or proceeding declared by law to be void as against the creditors, purchasers, or mortgagees is equally void as against the heirs, successors, personal representatives, or assigns of the creditors, purchasers, or mortgagees.

History. (§ 22-4-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.40.090. Fraudulent intent question of fact.

The question of fraudulent intent in a case arising under the provisions of this chapter is a question of fact, and not of law.

History. (§ 22-4-9 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

AS 34.40.010 provides Alaska’s basic prohibition against transactions in fraud of creditors. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

And this section complements that basic prohibition by providing that the existence of fraudulent intent is a question of fact. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

AS 09.25.060 qualifies the provisions of this section and AS 34.40.010 by erecting a prima facie presumption of fraud in cases where a sale of personal property is not “accompanied by the immediate delivery and the actual and continued possession” by the vendee. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Where the creditor offered a satisfactory explanation for his failure to take more overt steps in attempting to reestablish possession of a vessel, and where he further showed that the quitclaim deed delivered by the debtor was issued in exchange for valuable consideration, the trial court was unjustified in relying on the statutory presumption to invalidate as fraudulent the conveyance in question. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the validity of the transaction as a question of fact pursuant to this section and AS 34.40.010 . Accordingly, the court should have ruled on the issue whether, in the conveyance of the vessel to the creditor, there was an actual, as opposed to a presumed intent to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

Fraud is not presumed. —

Fraud, not shown by the evidence to have existed, will not be presumed. Courtnay v. Brenneman, 6 Alaska 233 (D. Alaska 1920).

Under normal circumstances, fraud will not be presumed. Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971).

The intent to defraud will not be presumed. Rather, it is a question of fact usually to be proved by circumstantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 (Alaska 1975).

General allegations of fraud must be supported by specific allegations. —

The general words of fraud and conspiracy can have no more force and effect towards rendering a mortgage void than the truth as disclosed by the specific allegations will warrant. Schwabacher Bros. Co. v. Palmer, 4 Alaska 75 (D. Alaska 1910).

Applied in

Matheson v. Patenaude, 8 Alaska 238 (D. Alaska 1930).

Sec. 34.40.100. When title of purchaser for value not affected.

The provisions of AS 34.40.010 and 34.40.070 34.40.130 may not be construed in any manner to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration unless it appears that the purchaser had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of the purchaser’s immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of the grantor.

History. (§ 22-4-10 ACLA 1949; am § 52 ch 21 SLA 1985)

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to purchasers from distributees of an estate, see AS 13.16.680 .

Collateral references. —

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, § 137 et seq.

Sec. 34.40.110. Restricting transfers of trust interests.

  1. A person who in writing transfers property in trust may provide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust, including a beneficiary who is the settlor of the trust, may not be either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee. Payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary does not include a beneficiary’s use or occupancy of real property or tangible personal property owned by the trust if the use or occupancy is in accordance with the trustee’s discretionary authority under the trust instrument. A provision in a trust instrument that provides the restrictions described in this subsection is considered to be a restriction that is a restriction on the transfer of the transferor’s beneficial interest in the trust and that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2) (Bankruptcy Code), as that paragraph reads on September 15, 2004, or as it may be amended in the future. In this subsection,
    1. “property” includes real property, personal property, and interests in real or personal property;
    2. “transfer” means any form of transfer, including deed, conveyance, or assignment.
  2. If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created or a person who subsequently becomes a creditor from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary’s interest in the trust, unless the creditor is a creditor of the settlor and
    1. the creditor establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the settlor’s transfer of property in trust was made with the intent to defraud that creditor, and a cause of action or claim for relief with respect to the fraudulent transfer complies with the requirements of (d) of this section; however, a settlor’s expressed intention to protect trust assets from a beneficiary’s potential future creditors is not evidence of an intent to defraud;
    2. the trust, except for an eligible individual retirement account trust, provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part of the trust without the consent of a person who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely affected by the exercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of the trust; in this paragraph, “revoke or terminate” does not include a power to veto a distribution from the trust, a testamentary or lifetime nongeneral power of appointment or similar power, or a right to receive a distribution of income or principal under (3)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of this subsection;
    3. the trust, except for an eligible individual retirement account trust, requires that all or a part of the trust’s income or principal, or both, must be distributed to the settlor; however, this paragraph does not apply to a settlor’s right to receive the following types of distributions, which remain subject to the restriction provided by (a) of this section until the distributions occur:
      1. income or principal from a charitable remainder annuity trust or charitable remainder unitrust; in this subparagraph, “charitable remainder annuity trust” and “charitable remainder unitrust” have the meanings given in 26 U.S.C. 664 (Internal Revenue Code) and as it may be amended;
      2. a percentage of the value of the trust each year as determined from time to time under the trust instrument, but not exceeding the amount that may be defined as income under AS 13.38 or under 26 U.S.C. 643(b) (Internal Revenue Code) and as it may be amended;
      3. the transferor’s potential or actual use of real property held under a qualified personal residence trust within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2702(c) (Internal Revenue Code) or as it may be amended in the future; or
      4. income or principal from a grantor retained annuity trust or grantor retained unitrust that is allowed under 26 U.S.C. 2702 (Internal Revenue Code) or as it may be amended in the future; or
    4. at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days of making a payment due under a child support judgment or order.
  3. The satisfaction of a claim under (b)(1) — (4) of this section is limited to that part of the trust for which a transfer restriction is not allowed under (b)(1) — (4) of this section, and an attachment or other order may not be made against the trustee with respect to a beneficiary’s interest in the trust or against property that is subject to a transfer restriction, except to the extent that a transfer restriction is determined not to be allowed under (b)(1) — (4) of this section.
  4. A cause of action or claim for relief with respect to a fraudulent transfer of a settlor’s assets under (b)(1) of this section is extinguished unless the action under (b)(1) of this section is brought by a creditor of the settlor who
    1. is a creditor of the settlor before the settlor’s assets are transferred to the trust, and the action under (b)(1) of this section is brought within the later of
      1. four years after the transfer is made; or
      2. one year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered by the creditor if the creditor
        1. can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the creditor asserted a specific claim against the settlor before the transfer; or
        2. files another action, other than an action under (b)(1) of this section, against the settlor that asserts a claim based on an act or omission of the settlor that occurred before the transfer, and the action described in this sub-subparagraph is filed within four years after the transfer; or
    2. becomes a creditor subsequent to the transfer into trust, and the action under (b)(1) of this section is brought within four years after the transfer is made.
  5. If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or another person from asserting any cause of action or claim for relief against a trustee of the trust or against others involved in the preparation or funding of the trust for conspiracy to commit fraudulent conveyance, aiding and abetting a fraudulent conveyance, or participation in the trust transaction. Preparation or funding of the trust includes the preparation and funding of a limited partnership or a limited liability company if interests in the limited partnership or limited liability company are subsequently transferred to the trust. The creditor and other person prevented from asserting a cause of action or claim for relief are limited to recourse against the trust assets and the settlor to the extent allowed under AS 34.40.010 .
  6. A transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section and enforceable under (b) of this section applies to a settlor who is also a beneficiary of the trust even if the settlor serves as a co-trustee or as an advisor to the trustee under AS 13.36.375 if the settlor does not have a trustee power over discretionary distributions.
  7. A transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section and enforceable under (b) of this section applies to a beneficiary who is not the settlor of the trust, whether or not the beneficiary serves as a sole trustee, a co-trustee, or an advisor to the trustee under AS 13.36.375 .
  8. A transfer restriction is allowed under (a) of this section and is enforceable under (b) of this section even if the settlor has the authority under the terms of the trust instrument to
    1. appoint a trustee, a trust protector under AS 13.36.370 , or an advisor under AS 13.36.375 ;
    2. remove a trustee or trust protector and appoint a replacement trustee or trust protector who is not a related or subordinate party; in this paragraph, “related or subordinate party” has the meaning given in 26 U.S.C. 672(c) (Internal Revenue Code); or
    3. remove an advisor and appoint a replacement advisor.
  9. A settlor whose beneficial interest in a trust is subject to a transfer restriction that is allowed under (a) of this section may not benefit from, direct a distribution of, or use trust property except as may be stated in the trust instrument. An agreement or understanding, express or implied, between the settlor and the trustee that attempts to grant or permit the retention of greater rights or authority than is stated in the trust instrument is void.
  10. A settlor who creates a trust that names the settlor as a beneficiary and whose beneficial interest is subject to a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section shall sign a sworn affidavit before the settlor transfers assets to the trust. The affidavit must state that
    1. the settlor has full right, title, and authority to transfer the assets to the trust;
    2. the transfer of the assets to the trust will not render the settlor insolvent;
    3. the settlor does not intend to defraud a creditor by transferring the assets to the trust;
    4. the settlor does not have any pending or threatened court actions against the settlor, except for those court actions identified by the settlor on an attachment to the affidavit;
    5. the settlor is not involved in any administrative proceedings, except for those administrative proceedings identified on an attachment to the affidavit;
    6. at the time of the transfer of the assets to the trust, the settlor is not currently in default of a child support obligation by more than 30 days;
    7. the settlor does not contemplate filing for relief under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. (Bankruptcy Code); and
    8. the assets being transferred to the trust were not derived from unlawful activities.
  11. Notwithstanding another provision of the law of this state, an action, including an action to enforce a judgment entered by a court or other body having adjudicative authority, may not be brought at law or in equity for an attachment or other provisional remedy against property of a trust subject to this section or to avoid a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject of this section unless the action is brought under (b)(1) of this section and within the limitations period of (d) of this section. A court of this state has exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under a cause of action or claim for relief that is based on a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject of this section.
  12. If a trust has a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, in the event of the divorce or dissolution of the marriage of a beneficiary of the trust, the beneficiary’s interest in the trust is not considered property subject to division under AS 25.24.160 or 25.24.230 or a part of a property division under AS 25.24.160 or 25.24.230 . Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties to the marriage, this subsection does not apply to a settlor’s interest in a self-settled trust with respect to assets transferred to the trust
    1. after the settlor’s marriage; or
    2. within 30 days before the settlor’s marriage unless the settlor gives written notice to the other party to the marriage of the transfer.
  13. If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer restriction prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created or a person who subsequently becomes a creditor from satisfying a claim out of the interest of a beneficiary, including a beneficiary who is the settlor of the trust, even if
    1. the beneficiary has the right to receive through the exercise of a person’s discretion, whether or not the exercise of the discretion is governed by a standard, a distribution of income, principal, or both principal and interest, from the trust; in this paragraph, “person” includes a trustee who is the settlor, unless the settlor is the beneficiary; or
    2. the settlor potentially will receive or actually receives income or principal to pay, in whole or in part, income taxes due on the income of the trust, if the potential or actual receipt of income or principal will be or is made under a provision in the trust instrument that expressly provides for the payment of the taxes and if the potential or actual receipt of income or principal would be the result of a trustee’s acting in the trustee’s discretion or under a mandatory direction in the trust instrument; a distribution to pay income taxes that is made under a discretionary or mandatory provision in a governing instrument under this paragraph may be made by direct payment to a taxing authority.
  14. In this section,
    1. “eligible individual retirement account trust” means an individual retirement account under 26 U.S.C. 408(a) or an individual retirement plan under 26 U.S.C. 408A(b) (Internal Revenue Code), as those sections read on September 13, 2006 or as they may be amended in the future, that is in the form of a trust, if a trust company or bank with its principal place of business in this state is the trustee or custodian;
    2. “settlor” means a person who transfers real property, personal property, or an interest in real or personal property, in trust.

History. (§ 22-4-13 ACLA 1949; am § 8 ch 6 SLA 1997; am §§ 20, 21 ch 105 SLA 1998; am §§ 2 — 6 ch 138 SLA 2003; am §§ 8 — 11 ch 82 SLA 2004; am §§ 12 — 14 ch 66 SLA 2006; am § 14 ch 7 SLA 2008; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 65 SLA 2010; am § 39 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, in the last sentence of subsection (e), “are” was substituted for “is” to correct a manifest error in ch. 105, SLA 1998. Subsection (e) was enacted as (f); relettered in 1998. Subsection (n) was enacted as (e), relettered as (f) in 1998, and relettered again in 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2010. Subsection (k) was enacted as ( l ) and relettered in 2004. Subsections (f) — (j) were enacted as (g) — (k) and relettered in 2003. Subsection ( l ) was enacted as (m) and relettered in 2006. Paragraph (n)(1) was enacted as ( l )(2); relettered in 2006 and again in 2010. Subsection (m) was enacted as (n); relettered in 2010.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 9, ch. 6, SLA 1997 provides that the 1997 amendment to this section “does not apply to a trust unless the trust is created on or after April 2, 1997.”

Under § 8(a), ch. 138, SLA 2003, the 2003 amendments to (a) - (d) of this section and the provisions of subsections (f) - (i) apply “to a trust regardless of whether the trust was created before, on, or after October 8, 2003.” Under § 8(b), ch. 138, SLA 2003, subsection (j) “applies to a trust only if the trust is created on or after October 8, 2003.”

Under § 12(c), ch. 82, SLA 2004, the 2004 amendments to (a), (b), and (e) of this section and the provisions of subsection (k) apply “to a trust created before, on, or after September 15, 2004.”

Notes to Decisions

Chattel mortgage allowing mortgagor to treat property as own is void. —

If a chattel mortgage is coupled with a condition or agreement that the mortgagor may treat the goods as if he were the owner of them, that is, may sell them at his option and receive the proceeds to his own use, such condition or agreement avoids the mortgage. In legal effect it is a sham, a nullity, a mere shadow of a mortgage, only calculated to ward off other creditors, and is a conveyance in trust for the benefit of the person making it, and therefore void as against creditors. In re Minkove, 6 Alaska 68 (D. Alaska 1918) (decided under former law).

Subsection (k) cannot prevent other state courts from applying their fraudulent transfer laws. —

Superior court properly dismissed an Alaskan trustee's complaint against various judgment creditors because, inter alia, Alaska's statutory restriction on fraudulent transfers regarding spendthrift trusts could not unilaterally deprive the Montana and bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction where the statute could not prevent the Montana courts from applying Montana fraudulent transfer law, and conflicted with federal law regarding jurisdiction over fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy case to the extent that it was impossible to comply simultaneously with both. Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018).

Bankruptcy. —

Chapter 7 trustee was not entitled to summary judgment in his action to recover transferred property under 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(e). Under AS 34.40.110(b)(1) , the debtor’s expressed intention to protect trust assets from his potential future creditors was not evidence of an intent to defraud, and the court declined to evaluate the debtor’s credibility from reading the deposition. Battley v. Mortensen (In re Mortensen), — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska Jan. 14, 2011).

Despite AS 34.40.110(b)(1) , the settlor’s expressed intention to protect assets placed into a self-settled trust from a beneficiary’s potential future creditors can be evidence of an intent to defraud under 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(e)(1). Battley v. Mortensen (Mortensen), — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska May 26, 2011).

Debtor was not afforded the protections provided by the Alaska Asset Protection Trust Act because she did not file an affidavit before a transfer of assets into the trust. In re Bertran, — B.R. — (Bankr. D. Alaska June 8, 2016).

Sec. 34.40.113. Discretionary interests in irrevocable trusts.

  1. This section applies to a creditor’s claim with respect to a discretionary interest in an irrevocable trust unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.
  2. A discretionary interest in an irrevocable trust is not a property interest or an enforceable right. It is an expectancy that a creditor of a beneficiary may not attach or otherwise reach.
  3. A creditor of a beneficiary may not force a distribution with regard to a discretionary interest in an irrevocable trust. A creditor may not compel a trustee to exercise the trustee’s discretion to make a distribution with regard to a discretionary interest in an irrevocable trust.
  4. Even if a beneficiary has an outstanding creditor, in the case of a discretionary interest in an irrevocable trust, a trustee who has the authority to pay income or principal to a beneficiary may pay it to a third party if the payment is for the benefit of the beneficiary. A trustee is not liable to a creditor for paying income or principal on behalf of the beneficiary.
  5. A creditor of a beneficiary may not maintain an action or a proceeding in court that interferes with the trustee’s discretion to apply income or principal on behalf of the beneficiary.
  6. A creditor of a beneficiary may not obtain an order of attachment or similar relief that would prevent a trustee from making a discretionary payment to a third party on behalf of the beneficiary.
  7. This section does not prevent a creditor from obtaining relief from a fraudulent transfer under AS 34.40.110 .
  8. In this section, a beneficiary’s entitlement to a distribution is within the discretion of a trustee, whether or not the trust instrument states the purposes for the distribution or uses “may,” “shall,” “sole and absolute,” “uncontrolled,” or similar words.
  9. In this section, “discretionary interest” means a beneficiary’s interest in an irrevocable trust if the beneficiary’s entitlement to a distribution is within the discretion of the trustee.

History. (§ 40 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Cross references. —

For the effect of (f) of this section on Rule 64, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, see sec. 47(a), ch. 45, SLA 2013.

Sec. 34.40.115. Subjecting appointed property to claims of donee’s creditor.

The property that a donee of a power of appointment is authorized to appoint is not subject to the claims of the creditors of the donee except to the extent that a donee of an inter vivos or testamentary power of appointment

  1. is permitted by the donor of the power to appoint the property to the donee, the creditors of the donee, the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee’s estate; and
  2. effectively exercises the power of appointment in favor of the donee, the creditors of the donee, the donee’s estate, or the creditors of the donee’s estate.

History. (§ 7 ch 138 SLA 2003)

Editor’s notes. —

Under § 8(a), ch. 138, SLA 2003, this section applies “to a trust regardless of whether the trust was created before, on, or after October 8, 2003.”

Sec. 34.40.118. Transfers of individual retirement accounts.

  1. Notwithstanding a provision in AS 09.38.017(d) , AS 34.40.110 , or another law to the contrary, a person may voluntarily transfer or assign the person’s interest in an individual retirement account if the person
    1. is the owner of or a participant in the individual retirement account; or
    2. acquired the interest as a result of the death of another individual.
  2. In this section, “individual retirement account” means an individual retirement account established under 26 U.S.C. 408 or a Roth IRA established under 26 U.S.C. 408A.

History. (§ 40 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Cross references. —

For applicability of this section, see sec. 48(d), ch. 45, SLA 2013 in the 2013 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 34.40.120. “Land” and “estate and interest in land” defined.

The term “land” as used in this chapter shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with “lands, tenements, and hereditaments,” and the term “estate and interest in land” shall be construed to embrace every interest, freehold, and chattel, legal and equitable, present and future, vested and contingent in land as defined in this section.

History. (§ 22-4-11 ACLA 1949; am § 40 ch 21 SLA 1991)

Collateral references. —

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, §§ 1-5.

Sec. 34.40.130. “Conveyance” defined.

The term “conveyance,” as used in this chapter, shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing except a last will and testament, of whatever form and by whatever name it may be known in law, by which an estate or interest in land is created, aliened, assigned, or surrendered.

History. (§ 22-4-12 ACLA 1949; am § 41 ch 21 SLA 1991)

Chapter 45. Unclaimed Property.

Opinions of attorney general. —

AS 34.45.010 34.45.080 provide a museum with the ability to dispose of unclaimed objects in the museum collection. AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 allow the state to sell, destroy, or otherwise dispose of abandoned personal property. Feb. 27, 1996, Op. Att’y Gen.

Article 1. Consignees and Bailees.

Revisor’s notes. —

Pursuant to § 3, ch. 24, SLA 1966, in AS 34.45.010 34.45.090 “district magistrate” was changed to “district judge” and “deputy magistrate” was changed to “magistrate”.

Sec. 34.45.010. Record of consignee or bailee.

When personal property is consigned to or deposited with a forwarding merchant, wharf, warehouse, or tavern keeper, or the keeper of a depot for the reception and storage of trunks, baggage, merchandise, or other personal property, the consignee or bailee shall immediately record a description of the property, and the date of receipt, in a book kept by the consignee or bailee.

History. (§ 22-7-1 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.45.020. Consignee’s or bailee’s notice to owner.

If the property is not left with the consignee or bailee for the purpose of being forwarded, disposed of, or kept according to directions received by the consignee or bailee, at or before the time of the reception of the property, and if the name and residence of the owner of the property is known to the person having possession of the property, the consignee or bailee shall immediately notify the owner, by letter directed to the owner and deposited in the post office, of the reception of the property.

History. (§ 22-7-2 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.45.030. Sale.

If property held by a person described in AS 34.45.010 is not claimed and taken away within one year after the time it is received, the person having possession of the property may sell the property in the manner provided in AS 34.45.010 34.45.080 , except that property described in AS 34.45.110 34.45.260 shall be reported to the Department of Revenue under AS 34.45.280 and is subject to AS 34.45.290 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 22-7-3 ACLA 1949; am § 9 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Collateral references. —

13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, § 470.

78 Am. Jur. 2d, Warehouses, § 172.

8 C.J.S., Bailments, §§ 9, 25-31, 33-38.

93 C.J.S., Warehousemen and Safe Depositaries, §§ 94, 97, 98.

Sec. 34.45.040. Presale inventory and notice.

  1. Before the property is sold, the person in possession of it shall request the district judge or magistrate in the judicial district where the property is located to inventory the property.
  2. Upon the request the district judge or magistrate or a person, other than the holder of the property or the holder’s agent, appointed by the district judge or magistrate, shall attend and, in the presence of the holder, or the holder’s agent, shall open, examine, and inventory the property.  The inventory must be in duplicate, one copy of which shall be filed with the district judge or magistrate and one copy retained by the holder of the property.
  3. After the property is inventoried, the holder, or the holder’s agent, may give notice of an intention to sell it in the following manner:
    1. if the name and residence of the owner of the property is known, by serving the notice upon the owner either personally, or at the owner’s place of residence or business, or by registered mail;
    2. if the name and residence of the owner of the property is unknown to the holder, then the holder may serve the notice by publication once a week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published in the area nearest to where the property is held.
  4. The notice must contain (1) a reasonably correct description of the property; (2) the name and residence of the owner, if known; (3) the name and residence of the holder; (4) the amount of the charges accrued and costs incurred; and (5) a statement that the holder on a certain date, that shall be specified and may not be less than three weeks after the day on which the notice is served or, if published, on which the notice is first published, will apply to the district judge or magistrate for an order to sell the property to satisfy all charges and costs that have accrued or been incurred to that date.

History. (§ 22-7-4 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.45.050. Order of sale.

  1. If the owner or person entitled to the possession of the property, before the date specified in the notice, fails to redeem it as provided in AS 34.45.060 , the district judge or magistrate, upon verified proof that the service or publication is filed with the court, shall enter an order directing the sale of the property at public auction on a date not less than 10 days after the order to satisfy all charges and costs.
  2. The holder or the holder’s agent shall give public notice of sale by posting, within five miles of the place of sale, in three public places, a notice that the property will be sold at public auction. The notice must also contain a reasonably correct description of the property, the name and residence of the owner if known, the name and residence of the holder, and the time and place of sale.

History. (§ 22-7-5 ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 4 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.45.060. Sale at public auction.

  1. The peace officer shall sell the property at public auction to the highest bidder in the manner provided for the sale of personal property on execution.
  2. The sale of the property conveys good title superior to all liens, encumbrances, and mortgages, and without right of redemption; but the owner or mortgagee, at any time before the sale, may redeem the property by claiming it and paying all charges of the holder against it and all costs incurred or accrued under AS 34.45.010 34.45.080 up to and including the date on which the owner or mortgagee redeems it.
  3. The proceeds from the sale shall be applied in payment, first, of all reasonable costs of sale, inventory and publishing, posting, serving and preparing notices, including the district judge’s or magistrate’s fees and the fees of the peace officer, and second, of the holder’s charges, with interest at the legal rate, against the property.

History. (§ 22-7-6 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.45.070. Proceeds of sale.

  1. The peace officer, upon completion of the sale of the property, shall make and file with the district judge or magistrate a verified, written return of the conduct of the sale and of the application of the proceeds derived from it, and shall pay all money in excess of costs and charges to the district judge or magistrate.
  2. The district judge or magistrate shall hold the money in trust for the owner of the property and shall pay it to the owner upon the latter’s making a written, verified claim to it, with proof of ownership, within one year after the date of the sale.  If no claim is made within one year after the date of the sale, the district judge or magistrate shall immediately pay the excess proceeds to the Department of Revenue.  Excess proceeds that are required to be paid over to the Department of Revenue under this section are subject to AS 34.45.280 and 34.45.330 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 22-7-7 ACLA 1949; am § 10 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.080. Sale of perishable property.

  1. Property of a perishable nature and subject to decay by keeping, if not taken away within 30 days after it has been left, may be sold by giving 10 days’ notice of sale.  In that case the notice provided in AS 34.45.040 need not be given.
  2. The sale shall be conducted and the proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the manner provided in AS 34.45.010 34.45.080 , except that property in a state of decay, or that is plainly subject to immediate decay, may be summarily sold by order of a district judge or magistrate, after inspection of it, as provided in AS 34.45.010 34.45.080 .
  3. The return of the sale shall be made and the proceeds derived from it shall be applied in the manner provided in AS 34.45.060 and 34.45.070 .

History. (§ 22-7-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 34.45.085. Definition.

In AS 34.45.010 and 34.45.020 , “property” does not include property covered by AS 14.57.200 14.57.290 .

History. (§ 3 ch 122 SLA 2000)

Sec. 34.45.090. Fees of officers. [Repealed, § 14 ch 133 SLA 1986.]

Article 2. Personal Property Presumed Abandoned; General Rules.

Revisor’s notes. —

AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 derive from the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1981.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 15, ch. 133, SLA 1986, provides that AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 “does not apply to personal property already delivered to the state or already the subject of escheat proceedings before September 7, 1986.”

Collateral references. —

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property, § 1 et seq.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat, §§ 7, 9, 34, 44, 45.

30A C.J.S., Escheat, §§ 4-6, 22.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes implementing the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act or its predecessor — modern status. 29 ALR6th 507.

Sec. 34.45.110. General rule for property presumed abandoned.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in AS 34.45.120 34.45.780 , all intangible property, including income or increment derived from the property, less lawful charges, that is held, issued, or owing in the ordinary course of a holder’s business and has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than three years after becoming payable or distributable is presumed abandoned.
  2. Property is payable or distributable for the purposes of AS 34.45.120 34.45.780 even if the owner failed to demand the property or to present an instrument or document required to receive payment of the property.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Editor’s notes. —

Under sec. 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, the changes made by that 2004 Act apply to property that, on June 26, 2004, already was subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act or that, on or after June 26, 2004, becomes subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act. See § 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, in the 2004 Temporary and Special Acts.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 90, SLA 2004 (SB 231), amending this section, see 2003 Senate Journal 1721 - 1722.

Sec. 34.45.120. General rules for taking custody of unclaimed intangible property.

Unless otherwise provided in this chapter or by another statute of the state, intangible property is subject to the custody of the state as unclaimed property if the conditions raising a presumption of abandonment under AS 34.45.110 or 34.45.140 34.45.260 are satisfied and

  1. the last known address of the apparent owner, as shown on the records of the holder, is in the state;
  2. the records of the holder do not reflect the identity of the person entitled to the property and it is established that the last known address of the person entitled to the property is in the state;
  3. the records of the holder do not reflect the last known address of the apparent owner, and it is established that
    1. the last known address of the person entitled to the property is in the state, or
    2. the holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental subdivision or agency, including a municipality, of the state and has not previously paid or delivered the property to the state of the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property;
  4. the last known address of the apparent owner, as shown on the records of the holder, is in a state that either does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property, or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property, and the holder is a domiciliary, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, including a municipality, of the state;
  5. the last known address of the apparent owner, as shown on the records of the holder, is in a foreign nation and the holder is a domiciliary, government, or governmental subdivision, including a municipality, or agency of the state; or
  6. the transaction out of which the property arose occurred in the state and
    1. the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is unknown, or the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is in a state that either does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law does not apply to the property, and
    2. the holder is a domiciliary of a state that either does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law does not apply to the property.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Article 3. Conditions Leading to Presumption of Aban- donment of Particular Types of Personal Property.

Editor’s notes. —

With respect to the 2004 amendments made to sections within this article, under sec. 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, the changes made by that 2004 Act apply to property that, on June 26, 2004, already was subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act or that, on or after June 26, 2004, becomes subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act. See § 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, in the 2004 Temporary and Special Acts.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 90, SLA 2004 (SB 231), amending sections within this article, see 2003 Senate Journal 1721 - 1722.

Sec. 34.45.140. Traveler’s checks and money orders.

  1. Subject to (d) of this section, money payable on a traveler’s check that has been outstanding for more than 15 years after its issuance is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within the preceding 15 years, has communicated in writing with the issuer concerning it or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by an employee of the issuer.
  2. Subject to (d) of this section, money payable on a money order or similar written instrument, other than a third-party bank check, that has been outstanding for more than seven years after its issuance is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within the preceding seven years, has communicated in writing with the issuer concerning it or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by an employee of the issuer.
  3. A holder may not deduct from the amount of a traveler’s check or money order a charge imposed for failure to present the instrument for payment unless there is a valid and enforceable written contract between the issuer and the owner of the instrument under which the issuer may impose a charge, and the issuer regularly imposes charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them.
  4. Money payable on a traveler’s check, money order, or similar written instrument, other than a third-party check, described in (a) and (b) of this section, is not subject to the custody of the state as unclaimed property unless
    1. the records of the issuer show that the traveler’s check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased in the state;
    2. the issuer has its principal place of business in the state and the records of the issuer do not show the state in which the traveler’s check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased; or
    3. the issuer has its principal place of business in the state, the records of the issuer show the state in which the traveler’s check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased and the state of purchase either does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , (d) of this section applies to money payable on traveler’s checks, money orders, and similar written instruments, other than a third-party bank check, presumed abandoned after January 31, 1965, except to the extent that those sums have been paid over to a state before January 1, 1974.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.150. Checks, drafts, and similar instruments issued or certified by banking and financial organizations.

  1. Other than money payable on an instrument that is subject to AS 34.45.140 , money payable on a check, draft, or similar instrument on which a banking or financial organization is directly liable, including a cashier’s check and a certified check, that has been outstanding for more than five years after it was payable or after its issuance if payable on demand, is presumed abandoned. This presumption does not apply if the owner, within the preceding five years, has communicated in writing with the banking or financial organization concerning the instrument or has otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by an employee of the organization.
  2. A holder may not deduct from the amount of an instrument subject to this section a charge imposed for failure to present the instrument for payment unless there is a valid and enforceable written contract between the holder and the owner of the instrument under which the holder may impose a charge, and the holder regularly imposes the charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 2 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.160. Bank deposits and money in financial organizations.

  1. A demand, savings, or matured time deposit with a banking or financial organization, including a deposit that is automatically renewable, and money paid toward the purchase of a share, a mutual investment certificate, or other intangible property interest in a banking or financial organization is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within the preceding five years, has
    1. in the case of a deposit, increased or decreased its amount or presented the passbook or other similar evidence of the deposit for the crediting of interest;
    2. communicated in writing with the banking or financial organization concerning the property; or
    3. otherwise indicated an interest in the property as evidenced by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by an employee of the banking or financial organization.
  2. A holder may not impose, with respect to property described in (a) of this section, a charge due to dormancy or inactivity, or cease payment of interest.
  3. Property described in (a) of this section that is automatically renewable is matured for purposes of (a) of this section upon the expiration of its initial time period. However, in the case of a renewal to which the owner consents at or about the time of renewal by communicating in writing with the banking or financial organization or by otherwise indicating consent as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file, prepared by an employee of the organization, the property is matured upon the expiration of the last time period for which consent was given.  If, at the time provided for delivery in AS 34.45.320 , a penalty or forfeiture in the payment of interest would result from the delivery of the property, the time for delivery is extended until the time when no penalty or forfeiture would result.
  4. For purposes of this section, “property” includes interest and dividends.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 3 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.170. Money owing under life insurance policies.

  1. Money held or owing under a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract that has matured or terminated is presumed abandoned if unclaimed for more than three years after the money became due and payable as established from the records of the insurance company holding or owing the money.
  2. If a person other than the insured or annuitant is entitled to the money and the address of that person is not known to the company, or it is not definite and certain from the records of the company who is entitled to the money, it is presumed that the last known address of the person entitled to the money is the same as the last known address of the insured or annuitant according to the records of the company.
  3. For purposes of this section, a life endowment insurance policy or annuity contract not matured by actual proof of the death of the insured or annuitant according to the records of the company is matured and the proceeds are due and payable if
    1. the company has received due proof that the insured or annuitant has died; or
    2. the insured has attained, or would have attained if still living, the limiting age under the mortality table on which the reserve is based and
      1. the policy was in force at the time the insured attained, or would have attained, the limiting age; and
      2. neither the insured nor another person appearing to have an interest in the policy has, within the preceding two years, according to the records of the company, assigned, readjusted, or paid premiums on the policy, subjected the policy to a loan, corresponded in writing with the company concerning the policy, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidence by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by an employee of the company.
  4. For purposes of this section, the application of an automatic premium loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision contained in an insurance policy does not prevent a policy from being matured or terminated under (a) of this section if the insured has died or the insured or the beneficiary of the policy otherwise has become entitled to the proceeds of the policy before the depletion of the cash surrender value of a policy by the application of those nonforfeiture provisions.
  5. If the laws of the state or the terms of the life insurance policy require the company to give notice to the insured or the owner that an automatic premium loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision has been exercised and the notice is to be given to an insured or owner whose last known address, according to the records of the company, is in the state but is undeliverable, the company shall make a reasonable search to ascertain the policyholder’s correct address to which the notice must be mailed.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the company learns of the death of the insured or annuitant and the beneficiary has not communicated with the insurer within four months after the death, the company shall take reasonable steps to pay the proceeds to the beneficiary.
  7. Commencing September 8, 1988, every change-of-beneficiary form issued by an insurance company under a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract to an insured or owner who is a resident of the state must request the following information:
    1. the name of each beneficiary, or if a class of beneficiaries is named, the name of each current beneficiary in the class;
    2. the address of each beneficiary; and
    3. the relationship of each beneficiary to the insured.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 4 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.175. Certain property distributed in insurance company reorganizations.

  1. The following property distributable in the course of a demutualization or related reorganization of an insurance company is considered abandoned two years after the date of demutualization or reorganization as follows:
    1. money that remains unclaimed and the owner has not otherwise communicated with the holder or its agent regarding the property as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the holder or its agent;
    2. stock or other equity interest if
      1. the instruments or statements reflecting the distribution are either mailed to the owner and returned by the post office as undeliverable, or not mailed to the owner because of an address on the books and records of the holder that is known to be incorrect; and
      2. the owner has not otherwise communicated with the holder or its agent regarding the property as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the holder or agent.
  2. Property that is not subject to (a) of this section is reportable as otherwise provided in AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 5 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.180. Deposits held by utilities.

A deposit, including interest on the deposit, made by a subscriber with a utility to secure payment, or money paid in advance for utility services to be furnished, less lawful deductions, that remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after the termination of the services for which the deposit or advance payment was made is presumed abandoned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Opinions of attorney general. —

While AS 34.45.190 may be reasonably construed to give the Commission authority to prescribe a longer period before a refund is “presumed abandoned,” it cannot be interpreted to grant the Commission authority over the disposition of the abandoned deposits and refunds. These are to be reported to and delivered to the Department which has the responsibility for attempting to locate the missing owners. To construe the statute otherwise would grant a windfall to the utilities and their present customers, to the detriment of the owners of the property. June 1, 1987, Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 34.45.190. Refunds held by business associations.

Except to the extent otherwise ordered by a court or administrative agency, money that a business association has been ordered by the court or administrative agency to refund is presumed abandoned if it remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after it became payable in accordance with the final determination or order providing for the refund, regardless of whether the final determination or order requires the owner to make a claim for it.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.200. Stock and other intangible interests in business associations.

  1. Stock or other equity interest in a business association is presumed abandoned five years after the earliest of the date
    1. of the most recent dividend, stock split, or other distribution unclaimed by the owner;
    2. that a statement of account or other notification or communication concerning the stock or other equity interest was returned as undeliverable; or
    3. that the holder of the stock or other equity interest discontinued mailings, notifications, or communications to the owner.
  2. Unmatured or unredeemed debt of a business association, other than a bearer bond or an original issue discount bond, is presumed abandoned five years after the date of the most recent interest payment unclaimed by the owner.
  3. Matured or redeemed debt, including bearer bonds and original issue discount bonds, is presumed abandoned five years after the date of maturity or redemption.
  4. At the time property is presumed abandoned under this section, any other property right accrued or accruing to the owner as a result of the property interest and not previously presumed abandoned is also presumed abandoned.
  5. A distribution of net margins by a cooperative incorporated under AS 10.25 is presumed abandoned if the distribution remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after the date authorized for the distribution. The distribution presumed abandoned under this subsection reverts to the cooperative if the cooperative has, at least six months before the proposed date that the distribution reverts to the cooperative, mailed a notice of the proposed reversion to the last known address of the owner as shown on the cooperative records and
    1. if the cooperative does not have an Internet website, published notice of the proposed reversion in the manner provided by law or court rule for service of a summons by publication; or
    2. if the cooperative has an Internet website,
      1. posted for at least 180 days on the cooperative’s Internet website
        1. a list of the persons for whom the cooperative has unclaimed distributions; and
        2. a notice of the proposed reversion that prominently displays a notice line and that provides a link to the list identified in (i) of this subparagraph; the notice must appear on the home page of the cooperative’s Internet website; and
      2. published once a week for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the judicial district where the cooperative is located a notice of the proposed reversion that provides the address of the cooperative’s Internet website and indicates that the list identified in (A)(i) of this paragraph can be found at that address; the notice shall be published simultaneously
        1. in the print version of the newspaper in a display advertisement; the display advertisement must be at least 18 square inches in area and must prominently display the notice line at the top; and
        2. on the Internet version of the newspaper, if an Internet version of the newspaper exists.
  6. In (e) of this section,
    1. “newspaper of general circulation” has the meaning given in AS 09.35.140 ;
    2. “notice line” means the words “do we owe you money? unclaimed (name of cooperative) capital credits” in capital letters.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 145 SLA 1996; am § 6 ch 90 SLA 2004; am §§ 1, 2 ch 43 SLA 2008)

Sec. 34.45.210. Property of business associations held in course of dissolution.

Intangible property distributable in the course of a dissolution of a business association that remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after the date specified for final distribution is presumed abandoned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 99 ch 26 SLA 1993)

Sec. 34.45.220. Property held by agents and fiduciaries.

  1. Intangible property and income or increment derived from the intangible property held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within three years after it has become payable or distributable, has increased or decreased the principal, accepted payment of principal or income, communicated concerning the property, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record, on file, prepared by the fiduciary.
  2. Money in an individual retirement account or a retirement plan for self-employed individuals or similar account or plan established under the internal revenue laws of the United States is not payable or distributable within the meaning of (a) of this section unless, under the terms of the account or plan, distribution of all or part of the funds would then be mandatory.
  3. For the purpose of this section, a person who holds property as an agent for a business association is considered as holding the property in a fiduciary capacity for that business association alone, unless the agreement between that person and the business association provides otherwise.
  4. For the purposes of this chapter, a person who is considered as holding property in a fiduciary capacity for a business association alone is the holder of the property only so far as the interest of the business association in the property is concerned, and the business association is the holder of the property so far as the interest of another person in the property is concerned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 7 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.230. Property held by courts and public agencies.

Except as provided by AS 34.45.720(d) , intangible property held for the owner by a court, state, municipality, or other government, governmental subdivision, or agency, public corporation, or public authority, that remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after becoming payable or distributable, is presumed abandoned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 9 ch 129 SLA 1996)

Sec. 34.45.240. Gift certificates and credit memos.

  1. A gift certificate or a credit memo, issued in the ordinary course of an issuer’s business, that remains unclaimed by the owner for more than three years after becoming payable or distributable is presumed abandoned.
  2. In the case of a gift certificate, the amount presumed abandoned is the price paid by the purchaser for the gift certificate.  In the case of a credit memo, the amount presumed abandoned is the amount credited to the recipient of the memo.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 8 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.250. Wages.

Unpaid wages, including wages represented by unpresented payroll checks, owing in the ordinary course of the holder’s business and that remain unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after becoming payable are presumed abandoned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.260. Contents of safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository.

All tangible and intangible personal property held in a safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository in a financial organization in the state in the ordinary course of the holder’s business, and proceeds resulting from the sale of the property permitted by other law, that remain unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after the lease or rental period on the box or other repository has expired, are presumed abandoned.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.270. Burden of proof as to property evidenced by record of check, draft, or similar instrument.

A record of the issuance of a check, draft, or similar instrument is prima facie evidence of an obligation. In claiming property from a holder who is also the issuer, the department’s burden of proof as to the existence and amount of the property and its abandonment is satisfied by showing issuance of the instrument and passage of the requisite period of abandonment. Defenses of payment, satisfaction, discharge, and want of consideration are affirmative defenses that must be established by the holder.

History. (§ 9 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Article 4. Reporting and Disposition of Personal Property.

Editor’s notes. —

With respect to the 2004 amendments made to sections within this article, under sec. 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, the changes made by that 2004 Act apply to property that, on June 26, 2004, already was subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act or that, on or after June 26, 2004, becomes subject to a statutory provision amended by the Act. See § 19, ch. 90, SLA 2004, in the 2004 Temporary and Special Acts.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 90, SLA 2004 (SB 231), amending sections within this article, see 2003 Senate Journal 1721 — 1722.

Sec. 34.45.280. Report of abandoned personal property.

  1. A person holding personal property, tangible or intangible, presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 , shall report to the department concerning the property as provided in this section.
  2. The report must be made on a form bearing a notice that statements are made under penalty of unsworn falsification and must include
    1. except with respect to traveler’s checks and money orders, the name, if known, and last known address, if any, of each person appearing from the records of the holder to be the owner of property, the value of which is $100 or more, presumed abandoned under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 and other statutes specifically made subject to this reporting requirement;
    2. in the case of unclaimed money amounting to $100 or more, held or owing under a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract, the full name and last known address of the insured or annuitant and of the beneficiary or other person who is entitled to the proceeds according to the records of the insurance company holding or owing the funds;
    3. in the case of the contents of a safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository or of other tangible personal property, a description of the property and the place where it is held and may be inspected by the department and any amounts owing to the holder;
    4. the nature and identifying number, if any, or description of the property and the amount appearing from the records to be due; items of value under $100 each may be reported in the aggregate;
    5. the date the property became payable, demandable, or returnable, and the date of the last transaction with the apparent owner with respect to the property; and
    6. other information that the department prescribes by regulation as necessary for the administration of this chapter.
  3. If the holder of property presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property is a successor to other persons who previously held the property for the apparent owner, or the holder has changed the holder’s name while holding the property, the holder shall file with the holder’s report all known names and addresses of each previous holder of the property.
  4. The report required under (a) of this section shall be filed before November 1 of each year for unclaimed property held as of June 30 of that year. On written request by a person required to file a report, the commissioner may postpone the reporting date.
  5. Not more than 120 days before filing the report required by this section, the holder in possession of property presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 shall send written notice to the apparent owner at the owner’s last known address informing the owner that the holder is in possession of property subject to this chapter if
    1. the holder has in its records an address for the apparent owner that the holder believes to be accurate;
    2. the claim of the apparent owner is not barred by the statute of limitations; and
    3. the property has a value of $100 or more.
  6. The requirements of this section apply to the holder of intangible property with a total aggregate value greater than $750 that is presumed abandoned under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 during the year preceding June 30 of each year. For purposes of determining total aggregate value under this subsection, the holder shall include all intangible property from prior years that was not reported under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 145 SLA 1996; am § 45 ch 65 SLA 1998; am § 10 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.290. Requests for reports and examination of records.

  1. The department may require a person who has not filed a report under AS 34.45.280 or a person who the department believes has filed an inaccurate, incomplete, or false report to file a verified report in a form specified by the department. The report must state whether the person is holding property reportable under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , describe property not previously reported or as to which the department has made inquiry, and specifically identify and state the amounts of the property that may be in issue.
  2. The department, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, may examine the records of any person to determine whether the person has complied with AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 . The department may conduct the examination even if the person believes it is not in possession of any property that must be reported, paid, or delivered under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 . The department may contract with any other person to conduct the examination on behalf of the department.
  3. The department at reasonable times may examine the records of an agent, including a dividend disbursing agent or transfer agent, of a business association that is the holder of property presumed abandoned if the department has given the notice required by (b) of this section to both the association and the agent at least 90 days before the examination.
  4. Documents and working papers obtained or compiled by the department or the department’s agents, employees, contractors, or designated representatives in the course of conducting an examination under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 are confidential and are not public records, but the documents and papers may be
    1. used by the department in the course of an action to collect unclaimed property or otherwise enforce AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 ;
    2. used in joint examinations conducted with or under an agreement with another state, the federal government, or any other governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality;
    3. produced under subpoena or court order; or
    4. disclosed to the unclaimed property office of another state for that state’s use in circumstances equivalent to those described in this subsection, if the other state is bound to keep the documents and papers confidential.
  5. If an examination of the records of a person results in the disclosure of property reportable under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , the department may assess the cost of the examination against the holder at the rate of $200 a day for each examiner, or a greater amount that is reasonable and was incurred, but the assessment may not exceed the value of the property found to be reportable under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 . The cost of an examination made under (c) of this section may be assessed only against the business association.
  6. If a holder does not maintain the records required by AS 34.45.300 and the records of the holder available for the periods subject to AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 are insufficient to permit the preparation of a report, the department may require the holder to report and pay to the department the amount the department reasonably estimates, on the basis of any available records of the holder or by any other reasonable method of estimation, should have been but was not reported.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 46 ch 65 SLA 1998; am § 45 ch 35 SLA 2003; am § 11 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.300. Retention of records.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in (b) of this section, a holder required to file a report under AS 34.45.280 shall maintain the records containing the information required to be included in the report for 10 years after the holder files the report, unless a shorter period is provided by regulations adopted by the department.
  2. A business association that sells, or provides such instruments to others for sale, in the state its traveler’s checks, money orders, or other similar written instruments, other than third-party bank checks on which the business association is directly liable, shall maintain a record of the instruments while they remain outstanding, indicating the state and date of issue, for three years after the date the property is reportable.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 12 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.310. Notice and publication of lists of unclaimed property.

  1. The department shall notify apparent owners of unclaimed property under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 in the manner and method set out in (b) of this section. In deciding whether to use an additional method specified in (b)(2) of this section, and which of those methods to use, the department shall employ the most cost-effective method available within its appropriations.
  2. The department
    1. shall notify all apparent owners of the unclaimed property in accordance with this section by means of posting on the department’s website on the Internet;
    2. may use any of the following to provide additional notice to the apparent owners:
      1. publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state in which the last known address of a person to be named in the notice is located or, if the address is unknown, in the area in which the holder has its principal place of business in the state;
      2. individual contact by regular or electronic mail, or by telephone, if the department has current contact information on file under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 ;
      3. any other manner and method that the department considers effective for providing notice and publication under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 .
  3. In its notice and publication under (b) of this section, the department shall provide the names of the apparent owners of the property and information regarding recovery of the unclaimed property.
  4. The department is not required to publish in the notice an item of less than $100 in value.
  5. This section does not apply to money payable on traveler’s checks, money orders, and other written instruments presumed abandoned under AS 34.45.140 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am §§ 5 — 7, 12 ch 145 SLA 1996; am § 13 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.320. Payment or delivery of abandoned property.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in (b) of this section, a person who is required to file a report under AS 34.45.280 , shall, at the time of filing the report under that section, pay or deliver to the administrator all of the property shown on the report and remaining unclaimed by the apparent owner. Upon written request showing good cause, the administrator may postpone the payment or delivery upon the terms or conditions the administrator considers necessary and appropriate. The property paid or delivered to the administrator must include all interest, dividends, increments, and accretions due, payable, or distributable on the property at the time of filing the report. If payment or delivery is postponed, the property paid or delivered to the administrator must include all interest, dividends, increments, and accretions due, payable, or distributable on the day that the property is paid or delivered to the administrator.
  2. If the owner establishes the right to receive the abandoned property to the satisfaction of the holder before the property has been delivered or if it appears that the presumption of abandonment is erroneous, the holder need not pay or deliver the property to the department, and the property is no longer presumed abandoned. The holder shall file with the department a written explanation, made under penalty of unsworn falsification in the second degree, of the proof of claim or of the error in the presumption of abandonment.
  3. [Repealed, § 12 ch 145 SLA 1996.]
  4. The holder of an equity interest under AS 34.45.200 shall deliver a duplicate certificate, or other evidence of ownership if the holder does not issue certificates of ownership, to the department. Upon delivery of a duplicate certificate to the department, the holder and a transfer agent, registrar, or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder in executing or delivering the duplicate certificate is relieved of all liability, in accordance with the provisions of AS 34.45.330 to every person, including a person acquiring the original certificate or the duplicate of the certificate issued to the department, for loss or damage resulting to a person by the issuance and delivery to the department of the duplicate certificate.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am §§ 8, 12 ch 145 SLA 1996; am § 47 ch 65 SLA 1998; am § 14 ch 90 SLA 2004; am § 19 ch 58 SLA 2010)

Sec. 34.45.330. Custody by state.

  1. Upon the payment or delivery of property to the department, the state assumes custody and responsibility for the safekeeping of the property.  A person who pays or delivers property to the department in good faith is relieved of all liability to the extent of the value of the property paid or delivered for a claim existing at the time of the payment or delivery or that may arise or be made with respect to the property after the payment or delivery.
  2. A holder who has paid money to the department under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 may make payment to a person appearing to the holder to be entitled to payment.  Upon receiving proof of payment from the holder and proof that the payee was entitled to the payment, the department shall promptly reimburse the holder for the payment without imposing a fee or other charge.  If reimbursement is sought for a payment made on a negotiable instrument, including a traveler’s check or money order, the department shall reimburse the holder under this subsection when the holder files proof that the instrument was presented and that payment was made to a person who appeared to the holder to be entitled to payment.  The department shall reimburse the holder for payment made under this subsection even if the holder paid a person whose claim was barred under AS 34.45.430 .
  3. A holder who has delivered property other than money to the department under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 may reclaim the property if it is still in the possession of the department, without payment of a fee or other charge, upon filing proof that the owner has claimed the property from the holder.
  4. The department may accept the holder’s affidavit as sufficient proof of the facts that entitle the holder to recover money and property under this section.
  5. If a holder pays or delivers property to the department in good faith and another person subsequently claims the property from the holder or another state claims the property under the laws of the other state relating to escheat or unclaimed property, the department, upon receiving written notice of the claim, shall defend the holder against the claim and indemnify the holder against liability on the claim.
  6. Property removed from a safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository is received by the department subject to the holder’s right under this subsection to be reimbursed for the actual cost of the opening and to a valid lien or contract providing for the holder to be reimbursed for unpaid rent or storage charges.  For charges other than the actual cost of the opening, the department shall reimburse or pay the holder an amount no greater than the value of the property recovered less the department’s selling cost.
  7. For the purposes of this section, “good faith” means that
    1. payment or delivery was made in a reasonable attempt to comply with this chapter;
    2. the person delivering the property was not a fiduciary then in breach of trust in respect to the property, and had a reasonable basis for believing, based on the facts then known to the person, that the property was abandoned for the purposes of this chapter; and
    3. there is no showing that the records under which the delivery was made did not meet reasonable commercial standards of practice in the industry.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 15 ch 90 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.340. Crediting of dividends, interest, or increments to owner’s account.

Except as provided under AS 34.45.360(d) for appreciation of securities, if property other than money is paid or delivered to the department under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 , the owner is entitled to receive from the department dividends, interest, or other increments realized or accruing on the property at or before the department’s liquidation or conversion of the property into money.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Article 5. Administration of Abandoned Property.

Sec. 34.45.360. Public sale of abandoned property.

  1. Except as provided in (c) and (d) of this section, the department, within three years after receiving abandoned property, shall sell it to the highest bidder at public sale in the area of the state that the department determines to be the most favorable market for the property involved.  The department may decline the highest bid and reoffer the property for sale if in the judgment of the department the bid is insufficient.  If in the judgment of the department the probable cost of sale exceeds the value of the property, the department need not offer the property for sale.  A sale held under this section must be preceded by a single publication of notice, at least three weeks in advance of sale, in a newspaper of general circulation in the general area in which the property is to be sold.
  2. Securities listed on an established stock exchange must be sold at prices prevailing at the time of sale on the exchange.  Other securities may be sold over the counter at prices prevailing at the time of sale or by another method the department considers advisable.
  3. Unless the department considers it to be in the best interest of the state to do otherwise, the department shall hold all securities that have been delivered to the department, other than those presumed abandoned under AS 34.45.200 , for at least one year before the department may sell the securities.
  4. Unless the department considers it to be in the best interest of the state to do otherwise, the department shall hold all securities presumed abandoned under AS 34.45.200 and delivered to the department for at least three years before selling the securities.  A person making a claim under AS 34.45.380 is entitled to receive either the securities delivered to the department by the holder, if they still remain in the hands of the department, or the proceeds received from sale, less amounts deducted under AS 34.45.380(c) .  A person does not have a claim under this section or AS 34.45.380 against the state, the holder, a transfer agent, a registrar, or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder for appreciation in the value of the property occurring after delivery by the holder to the department.
  5. The purchaser of property at a sale conducted by the department under this section takes the property free of all claims of the owner or previous holder of the property and of all persons claiming through or under them.  The department shall execute all documents necessary to complete the transfer of ownership.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.370. Deposit of money and accounting.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this section, the department shall promptly deposit in the general fund of the state all money received under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , including the proceeds from the sale of abandoned property under AS 34.45.360 .  The department shall retain in a separate trust fund an amount not less than $100,000 from which the department shall make prompt payment of allowed claims. Before making the deposit, the department shall record the name and last known address of each person appearing from the holders’ reports to be entitled to the property and the name and last known address of each insured person or annuitant and beneficiary and, with respect to each policy or contract listed in the report of an insurance company, its number, the name of the company, and the amount due.  The department shall make the record available for public inspection at all reasonable business hours.
  2. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991)

Sec. 34.45.380. Filing of claim with department.

  1. A person, excluding another state, claiming an interest in property paid or delivered to the department may file a claim on a form prescribed by the department and bearing a notice that statements are made under penalty of unsworn falsification in the second degree.
  2. The department shall consider each claim after it is filed and shall give written notice to the claimant if the claim is denied in whole or in part.  The notice may be given by mailing it to the address, if any, stated in the claim as the address to which notices are to be sent.  If an address for notices is not stated in the claim, the notice may be mailed to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim.  A notice of denial need not be given if the claim states neither the address to which notices are to be sent nor the address of the claimant.
  3. If a claim is allowed, the department shall pay or deliver to the claimant the property or the amount the department actually received, or the net proceeds if it has been sold by the department, together with an additional amount required by AS 34.45.340 .  For the purposes of determining net proceeds after sale of the property, the department may deduct
    1. costs incurred in connection with the sale of the property;
    2. costs of mailing and publication in connection with the property;
    3. reasonable service charges; and
    4. costs incurred in examining records of the holder of the property and in collecting the property from the holder.
  4. If a claim is allowed and the property claimed was interest-bearing to the owner on the date of surrender by the holder, the department also shall pay interest at the rate prescribed in AS 45.45.010 or a lesser rate the property earned while in the possession of the holder.  Interest begins to accrue when the property is delivered to the department and ceases on the expiration of 10 years after delivery or the date on which payment is made to the owner, whichever is earlier.  The department may not pay interest on interest-bearing property for a period occurring before September 7, 1986.
  5. A holder who pays the owner for property that has been delivered to the state and that, if claimed from the department, would be subject to (d) of this section shall add interest as provided in (d) of this section.  The added interest shall be repaid to the holder by the commissioner in the same manner as the principal.
  6. Unless another state files a claim to recover the property, if the identity of the owner of the property is known, the department shall apply the fair market value of the property to satisfaction of the following, in the order listed:
    1. the child support obligations of the owner;
    2. upon application of the Department of Law or submission of documentation satisfactory to the Department of Revenue, court-ordered restitution owed by the owner under AS 12 or AS 47, including any interest, collection costs, and attorney fees awarded by the court.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 48 ch 65 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 122 SLA 2002; am § 20 ch 58 SLA 2010)

Editor’s notes. —

Under § 2, ch. 122, SLA 2002, the 2002 amendment to subsection (f) applies to a payment made by the Department of Revenue under this chapter on or after July 6, 2002.

Sec. 34.45.390. Claim of another state to recover property.

  1. After personal property has been paid or delivered to the department under this chapter another state may recover the property if
    1. this state took custody of the property because the records of the holder did not reflect the last known address of the apparent owner when the property was presumed abandoned under this chapter, the person entitled to the property was in the other state, and under the laws of the other state the property escheated to or was subject to a claim of abandonment by that state;
    2. the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property, as reflected by the records of the holder, is in the other state and under the laws of the other state the property has escheated to or become subject to a claim of abandonment by that state;
    3. the records of the holder were erroneous in that they did not accurately reflect the actual owner of the property and the last known address of the actual owner is in the other state and under the laws of the other state the property escheated to or was subject to a claim of abandonment by the other state;
    4. this state took custody of the property under AS 34.45.120 (6), and, under the laws of the state of domicile of the holder, the property has escheated to or become subject to a claim of abandonment by the state of domicile; or
    5. the property is the sum payable on a traveler’s check, money order, or other similar instrument of which this state took custody under AS 34.45.140 , and the instrument was purchased in the other state, and, under the laws of the other state, the property escheated to or became subject to a claim of abandonment by the other state.
  2. The claim of another state to recover escheated or abandoned property must be presented in a form prescribed by the department.  The department shall allow the claim if it determines that the other state is entitled to the abandoned property under (a) of this section.
  3. The department shall require a state, before recovering property under this section, to agree to indemnify this state and its officers and employees against liability on a claim for the property.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.400. Action to establish claim.

  1. A person aggrieved by a decision or action of the department under this chapter may apply to the department within 60 days after the mailing date of the department’s notice to the person, giving notice of the grievance and requesting an informal conference.  At the conference the person aggrieved may present arguments and evidence relevant to the decision or action of the department.  If the department determines that a correction is warranted, the department shall make the correction.
  2. A person aggrieved by a decision or action of the department may apply to the department and request a formal hearing
    1. in place of the informal conference provided for in (a) of this section, within 60 days after the mailing date of the department’s notice to the person; or
    2. within 30 days after the decision resulting from an informal conference.
  3. At the formal hearing, the administrative law judge from the office of administrative hearings (AS 44.64.010 ) may subpoena witnesses and may administer oaths and make inquiries necessary to determine the validity of the claim. The person aggrieved may present arguments and evidence relevant to the decision or action of the department. If, after the hearing, the department determines that a correction is warranted, the department shall make the correction.
  4. A person aggrieved by the decision of the department may, within 30 days after the formal hearing and decision by the department, appeal to the superior court in the judicial district in which the person resides.  The department shall give appellant access to the department’s file in the matter for preparation of the appeal.  If, after the appeal is heard, it appears that the decision of the department was correct, the court shall confirm that decision.  If incorrect the court shall determine the amount that the person aggrieved is entitled to recover and shall order the repayment.  The department shall immediately pay the amount due and attach a certified copy of the judgment to the payment.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 50 ch 163 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.410. Election to take delivery.

  1. The department may decline to receive property reported under this chapter.  If the department elects not to receive custody of the property, the department shall notify the holder within 120 days after the holder files the report required under AS 34.45.280 .
  2. A holder, with the written consent of the department and upon terms prescribed by the department, may report and deliver property before the property is presumed abandoned.  Property delivered under this subsection shall be held by the department and is not presumed abandoned until the property would otherwise be presumed abandoned under this chapter.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.420. Destruction or disposition of property having insubstantial commercial value.

If the department determines after investigation that property delivered under this chapter has insubstantial commercial value, the department may destroy or otherwise dispose of the property at any time. An action or proceeding may not be maintained against the state or an officer of the state or against the holder because of an action taken by the department under this section.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.430. Periods of limitation.

The expiration, before or after September 7, 1986, of a period of time specified by contract, statute, or court order, during which a claim for money or property may be made or during which an action or proceeding may be commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for money or to recover property, does not prevent the money or property from being presumed abandoned, and does not affect a duty to file a report or to pay or deliver abandoned property to the department as required by AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Article 6. Enforcement and Penalties.

Sec. 34.45.450. Enforcement.

The department may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.460. Interstate agreements and cooperation.

  1. The department may enter into agreements with other states to exchange information needed to enable this or another state to audit or otherwise determine unclaimed personal property that this state or another state may be entitled to subject to a claim of custody.  The department may, by regulation, require the reporting of information needed to enable compliance with agreements made under this section, and prescribe the form for the report.
  2. To avoid conflicts between the department’s procedures and the procedures in other jurisdictions that enact the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, the department, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this chapter, shall, before adopting, amending, or repealing regulations, advise and consult with administrators in other jurisdictions that enact, substantially, the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, and shall take into consideration the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions that enact the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.
  3. The department may join with other states to seek enforcement of AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 against a person who is or may be holding property reportable under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 .
  4. At the request of another state, the attorney general of this state may bring an action in the name of the other state in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the unclaimed property laws of the other state against a holder in this state or property laws of the other state against a holder in this state of property subject to escheat or a claim of abandonment by the other state.  An action may be brought under this subsection only if the other state has agreed to pay expenses incurred by the attorney general of this state in bringing the action.
  5. The department may request that the attorney general of another state, or another person, bring an action to enforce this chapter in the other state in the name of the department.  This state shall pay all expenses including attorney fees in an action under this subsection.  The department may agree to pay the person bringing the action attorney fees based in whole or in part on a percentage of the value of property recovered in the action.  Expenses paid under this subsection may not be deducted from the amount that is subject to a claim by the owner under AS 34.45.110 34.45.430 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.470. Interest and penalties.

  1. A person who fails to pay or deliver property within the time prescribed by this chapter may be required to pay to the department interest at the annual rate calculated under AS 43.05.225 on the property or the value of it from the date the property should have been paid or delivered.
  2. A person who fails to pay or deliver property or fails to perform other duties required under this chapter may be required to pay the civil penalties calculated under AS 43.05.220 , on the property, or the value of the property, that the person had a duty to pay, deliver, or report to the department.
  3. A person who intentionally refuses after written demand by the department to pay or deliver property to the department as required under this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Article 7. General Provisions.

Sec. 34.45.700. Agreement to locate reported property.

  1. An agreement to pay compensation to locate, deliver, recover, or assist in the recovery of property reported under AS 34.45.280 while in the possession of a holder is unenforceable if made
    1. before the date payment or delivery is made under AS 34.45.320 ; or
    2. within 24 months after the date payment or delivery is made under AS 34.45.320 .
  2. An agreement executed after the 24-month period is enforceable only if
    1. the fee or compensation is not more than
      1. 20 percent of the value of the property if the value of the property is less than $500; and
      2. 10 percent of the value of the property if the value of the property is $500 or more;
    2. the agreement is in writing, signed by the apparent owner, does not exceed six months, and specifies the fees to be charged, nature and value of the property, and the value of the apparent owner’s share after the fee or compensation is deducted.
  3. This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement to locate property is otherwise invalid.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 9 ch 145 SLA 1996)

Sec. 34.45.710. Foreign transactions.

AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 do not apply to property held, due, and owing in a foreign country and arising out of a foreign transaction.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.720. Application; exceptions.

  1. AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 do not relieve a holder of a duty that arose before September 7, 1986 to report, pay, or deliver property.  A holder who did not comply with the law in effect before September 7, 1986 is subject to the applicable enforcement and penalty provisions that existed before September 7, 1986, and the applicable enforcement and penalty provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of this subsection.
  2. The initial report filed under AS 34.45.280 for property that was not required to be reported before September 7, 1986 but that is subject to AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 must include all items of property that would have been presumed abandoned during the six-year period preceding September 7, 1986, as if AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 had been in effect during that period.
  3. AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 do not apply to a disbursement for the payment of a permanent fund dividend.
  4. Checks, drafts, currency, and tangible property that are found and turned over to, or found and recovered by, a law enforcement agency of a municipality are not subject to AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 if the municipality has adopted an ordinance providing for the custody and disposition of the property.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 2 ch 4 SLA 1992; am § 10 ch 129 SLA 1996; am § 16 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Sec. 34.45.730. Regulations.

The department shall adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 .

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.740. Uniformity of application and construction.

AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 shall be applied and construed so as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to unclaimed property among states enacting the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.750. Report by department upon failure to make report or making false report.

If a person fails to submit a report as required under AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , or makes, wilfully or otherwise, a false report, the department shall make the report from the information it obtains under AS 43.05.050 . A report made by the department is prima facie valid for all legal purposes.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Sec. 34.45.760. Definitions.

In AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 , unless the context requires otherwise,

  1. “apparent owner” means the person whose name appears on the records of the holder as the person entitled to property held, issued, or owing by the holder;
  2. “banking organization” means a bank, trust company, savings bank, industrial bank, land bank, safe deposit company, private banker, or an organization defined by other applicable laws as a bank or banking organization;
  3. “business association” means a nonpublic corporation, joint stock company, investment company, business trust, mutual fund, joint venture, limited liability company, partnership, or association for business purposes or other business entity of one or more individuals, whether or not for profit, including a banking organization, financial organization, insurance company, or utility;
  4. “commissioner” means the commissioner of revenue;
  5. “department” means the Department of Revenue;
  6. “domicile” means the state of incorporation of a corporation and the state of the principal place of business of an unincorporated person;
  7. “financial organization” means a savings and loan association, cooperative bank, building and loan association, or credit union;
  8. “gift certificate” means an obligation of a business association arising from a transaction between the business association and a consumer to provide goods or services at a future date; “gift certificate” includes a gift certificate, stored value card, gift card, on-line gift account, or other representation or evidence of the obligation of a business association;
  9. “holder” means a person, wherever organized or domiciled, who is
    1. in possession of property belonging to another,
    2. a trustee, or
    3. indebted to another on an obligation;
  10. “insurance company” means an association, corporation, fraternal or mutual benefit organization, whether or not for profit, that is engaged in providing insurance coverage, including accidental, burial, casualty, credit life, contract performance, dental, fidelity, fire, health, hospitalization, illness, life, including endowments and annuities, malpractice, marine, mortgage, surety, and wage protection insurance;
  11. “intangible property”
    1. includes
      1. money, checks, drafts, warrants, deposits, interest, dividends, and income;
      2. credit balances, customer overpayments, gift certificates, security deposits, refunds, credit memos, unpaid wages, and unidentified remittances;
      3. stocks and other intangible equity interests in business associations;
      4. money deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons, and other securities, or to make distributions;
      5. amounts due and payable under the terms of insurance policies;
      6. amounts distributable from a trust or custodial fund established under a plan to provide health, welfare, pension, vacation, severance, retirement, death, stock purchase, profit-sharing, employee savings, supplemental unemployment insurance, or similar benefits; and
      7. amounts due and payable as mineral proceeds;
    2. does not include
      1. unused airline tickets;
      2. shares of stock issued by a corporation organized under 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act) or unclaimed dividends payable on the shares of stock; or
      3. overpaid contributions by employers to the unemployment compensation fund under AS 23.20.130 ;
  12. “mineral” means gas; oil; other gaseous, liquid, and solid hydrocarbons; oil shale; cement material; sand and gravel; road material; building stone; chemical raw material; gemstone; fissionable and nonfissionable ores; colloidal and other clay; steam and other geothermal resources; or any other substance defined as mineral by other state law;
  13. “mineral proceeds” means amounts payable for the extraction, production, or sale of minerals, or, upon the abandonment of those payments, all payments that become payable after the abandonment; “mineral proceeds” includes amounts payable
    1. for the acquisition and retention of a mineral lease, including bonuses, royalties, compensatory royalties, shut-in royalties, minimum royalties, and delay rentals;
    2. for the extraction, production, or sale of minerals, including net revenue interests, royalties, overriding royalties, extraction payments, and production payments;
    3. under an agreement or option, including a joint operating agreement, unit agreement, pooling agreement, and farm-out agreement;
  14. “owner” means a depositor in the case of a deposit, a beneficiary in the case of a trust other than a deposit in trust, a creditor, claimant, or payee in the case of other intangible property, or a person having a legal or equitable interest in property subject to AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 ; the term includes a person’s legal representative;
  15. “person” means an individual, business association, state, municipality or other government, including the United States government, subdivision or agency, public corporation, public authority, estate, trust, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or other legal or commercial entity;
  16. “property” means personal property, but does not include property covered by
    1. AS 14.57.200 14.57.290 ;
    2. AS 23.20;
  17. “state” means a state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession, or other area subject to the legislative authority of the United States;
  18. “unsworn falsification” means the offense described in AS 11.56.210 ;
  19. “utility” means a person who owns or operates for public use a plant, equipment, property, franchise, or license for the transmission of communications or the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water, steam, or gas.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 29 SLA 1988; am § 29 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 10, 11 ch 145 SLA 1996; am § 49 ch 65 SLA 1998; am § 4 ch 122 SLA 2000; am §§ 16 — 18 ch 90 SLA 2004; am § 12 ch 130 SLA 2004; am § 42 ch 56 SLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Renumbered and reorganized in 1998 and in 2004 to alphabetize the defined terms.

The 2005 amendment has been given effect in paragraph (11), rather than in paragraph (10) as enacted, to correct a manifest error.

Sec. 34.45.780. Short title.

AS 34.45.110 34.45.780 may be cited as the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.

History. (§ 11 ch 133 SLA 1986)

Chapter 50. Actions for Injuries to Property Interests.

Sec. 34.50.010. Action for injury to the inheritance.

A person seized of an estate in remainder or reversion may maintain a civil action for an injury done to the inheritance, notwithstanding an intervening estate for life or years.

History. (§ 22-1-5 ACLA 1949)

Collateral references. —

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen, §§ 3, 4, 25, 112-115.

31 C.J.S., Estates, §§ 83, 105, 109.

Sec. 34.50.020. Renumbered as AS 09.65.255.

Chapter 55. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.

Administrative Code. —

For land sales, see 3 AAC 20.

Notes to Decisions

Basis for this chapter. —

This chapter is based on the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Constitutionality of 1977 amendatory act. —

Chapter 138, SLA 1977, entitled “An Act Relating to Land; and Providing for an Effective Date,” did not violate Alaska Const., art. II, § 13 since “land” can be considered “one subject” and all of the provisions of Chapter 138 relate to this subject. State v. First Nat’l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982). Chapter 138, SLA 1977 added AS 34.55.006 and amended AS 34.55.008 , 34.55.022 , 34.55.028 , 34.55.030 , 34.55.032 , 34.55.042 , and 34.55.044 . — Editor’s notes .

1977 amendatory act not retroactive. Chapter 138, § 1 — 8, SLA 1977, which added AS 34.55.006 and amended this chapter to apply to in-state subdividers, contained no express declaration of retroactivity, nor does its legislative history indicate that retrospective application was intended. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

This chapter cannot be retrospectively applied to hold a developer liable for conduct predating its application to in-state land sales. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Stated in

Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).

Collateral references. —

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 19.

37 C.J.S., Fraud, §§ 123, 124.

Sec. 34.55.004. Administration.

This chapter shall be administered by the department.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.006. Fraudulent and prohibited practices.

It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of subdivided land directly or indirectly, to knowingly

  1. employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
  2. make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit a statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
  3. engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person.

History. (§ 1 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Notes to Decisions

Effect of registration exemption on liability. —

The fact that a developer received an exemption from the registration provisions of the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C., §§ 1701 — 1720, and therefore is also exempt from the registration provisions of this chapter, does not immunize the developer from liability under this section. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

The conduct complained of must occur “in connection with” the sale. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Land developer’s post-sale “lulling” conduct directed at pre-September 21, 1977 purchasers was not “in connection with” the sales to such purchasers since the developer’s relationship with these purchasers was “in effect, a ‘one-shot deal’ ” rather than one involving a “series of ‘investment decisions,’ ” and accordingly, the developer’s liability, if any, to pre-September 21, 1977, lot purchasers could not be predicated on violations of this chapter. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Collateral references. —

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 ALR4th 511.

Sec. 34.55.008. Prohibitions on dispositions of interests in subdivisions.

Unless the subdivided land or the transaction is exempt under AS 34.55.042 ,

  1. a person may not offer or dispose of in this state an interest in subdivided land before the time the subdivided land is registered in accordance with this chapter;
  2. a person may not dispose of an interest in subdivided land unless a current public offering statement is delivered to the purchaser and the purchaser is afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the public offering statement before the disposition.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 2 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 34.55.010. Application for registration.

  1. The application for registration of subdivided land shall be filed as prescribed by the department’s regulations and must contain the following documents and information:
    1. an irrevocable appointment of the department to receive service of lawful process in a noncriminal proceeding arising under this chapter against the applicant or personal representative of the applicant;
    2. a legal description of the subdivided land offered for registration, together with a map showing the division proposed or made, and the dimensions of the lots, parcels, units, or interest and the relation of the subdivided land to existing streets, roads, and other off-site improvements;
    3. the states or jurisdictions in which an application for registration or similar document has been filed, and an adverse order, judgment, or decree entered in connection with the subdivided land by the regulatory authorities in each jurisdiction or by a court;
    4. the applicant’s name, address, and the form, date, and jurisdiction of organization; and the address of each of its offices in this state;
    5. the name, address, and principal occupation for the past five years of every director and officer of the applicant or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions; the extent and nature of the interest of the director, officer, or other person in the applicant or the subdivided land as of a specified date within 30 days of the filing of the application;
    6. a statement, in a form acceptable to the department, of the condition of the title to the subdivided land including encumbrances as of a specified date within 30 days of the date of application by a title opinion of a licensed attorney, not a salaried employee, officer, or director of the applicant or owner, or by other evidence of title acceptable to the department;
    7. copies of the instruments that will be delivered to a purchaser to evidence the interest of the purchaser in the subdivided land and of the contracts and other agreements that a purchaser will be required to agree to or sign;
    8. copies of the instruments by which the interest in the subdivided land was acquired and a statement of any lien or encumbrance upon the title and copies of the instruments creating the lien or encumbrance, if any, with data as to recording;
    9. if there is a lien or encumbrance affecting more than one lot, parcel, unit, or interest a statement of the consequences for a purchaser of failure to discharge the lien or encumbrance and the steps, if any, taken to protect the purchaser in case of this eventuality;
    10. copies of instruments creating easements, restrictions, or other encumbrances, affecting the subdivided land;
    11. a statement of the zoning and other governmental regulations affecting the use of the subdivided land and also of any existing tax and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments which affect the subdivided land;
    12. a statement of the existing provisions for access, sewage disposal, water, and other public utilities in the subdivision; a statement of the improvements to be installed, the schedule for their completion, and a statement as to the provisions for improvement maintenance;
    13. a narrative description of the promotional plan for the disposition of the subdivided land together with copies of all advertising material that has been prepared for public distribution by any means of communication;
    14. the proposed public offering statement;
    15. other information, including a current financial statement, that the department by its regulations requires for the protection of purchasers.
  2. If the subdivider registers additional subdivided land to be offered for disposition, the subdivider may consolidate the subsequent registration with an earlier registration offering subdivided land for disposition under the same promotional plan.
  3. The subdivider shall immediately report a material change in the information contained in an application for registration.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Administrative Code. —

For filing procedures, see 3 AAC 20, art. 1.

For advertising and promotional plans, see 3 AAC 20, art. 3.

For protection of purchasers, see 3 AAC 20, art. 4.

Sec. 34.55.012. Public offering statement.

  1. A public offering statement must disclose fully and accurately the physical characteristics of the subdivided land offered and must make known to prospective purchasers all unusual and material circumstances or features affecting the subdivided land.  The proposed public offering statement submitted to the department must be in a form prescribed by its regulations and must include
    1. the name and principal address of the subdivider;
    2. a general description of the subdivided land stating the total number of lots, parcels, units, or interests in the offering;
    3. the significant terms of encumbrances, easements, liens, and restrictions, including zoning and other regulations affecting the subdivided land and each unit or lot, and a statement of all existing taxes and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments that affect the subdivided land;
    4. a statement of the use for which the property is offered;
    5. information concerning improvements, including streets, water supply, levees, drainage control systems, irrigation systems, sewage disposal facilities, and customary utilities, and the estimated cost, date of completion and responsibility for construction and maintenance of existing and proposed improvements that are referred to in connection with the offering or disposition of any interest in subdivided land;
    6. additional information required by the department to assure full and fair disclosure to prospective purchasers.
  2. The public offering statement may not be used for promotional purposes before registration of the subdivided land and afterwards only if it is used in its entirety.  A person may not advertise or represent that the department approves or recommends the subdivided land or its disposition.  No portion of the public offering statement may be underscored, italicized, or printed in larger or heavier or different color type than the remainder of the statement unless the department requires it.
  3. The department may require the subdivider to alter or amend the proposed public offering statement in order to assure full and fair disclosure to prospective purchasers. A change in the substance of the promotional plan or plan of disposition or development of the subdivision may not be made after registration without notifying the department and without making appropriate amendment of the public offering statement.  A public offering statement is not current unless all amendments are incorporated.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Revisor’s notes. —

The word “department” was substituted for “agency” in the second sentence of (c) of this section in 1985 to correct an old error.

Administrative Code. —

For advertising and promotional plans, see 3 AAC 20, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Liability of subdivider for damages caused by undetected permafrost. —

A subdivider cannot be held liable for damages caused by undetected permafrost on either of two theories: (1) breach of an implied warranty of fitness or (2) strict liability. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

The liability of a subdivider depends, not upon the theories of strict liability or liability for breach of an implied warranty, but upon the failure to disclose permafrost conditions that are known to him or those that he could have known of through the exercise of reasonable care, i.e., the use of appropriate testing methods, review of available geologic data, etc. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

The presence of permafrost is an important “physical characteristic” and one of the “material circumstances or features affecting . . . subdivided land.” As such, the failure to disclose its existence in the public offering statement required by AS 34.55.008 and subsection (a) of this section can result in civil liability under the present statutory scheme. However, such liability does not attach under AS 34.55.030 if “the person offering or disposing of subdivided land did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the . . . omission.” Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 34.55.014. Inquiry and examination.

Upon receipt of an application for registration in proper form, the department shall immediately initiate an examination to determine that

  1. the subdivider can convey or cause to be conveyed the interest in subdivided land offered for disposition if the purchaser complies with the terms of the offer, and when appropriate, that release clauses, conveyances in trust or other safeguards have been provided;
  2. there is reasonable assurance that all proposed improvements will be completed as represented;
  3. the advertising material and the general promotional plan are not false or misleading and comply with the standards prescribed by the department in its regulations and afford full and fair disclosure;
  4. the subdivider has not, or if a corporation, its officers, directors, and principals have not, been convicted of a crime involving land dispositions or any aspect of the land sales business in this state, the United States, or any other state or foreign country within the past 10 years and has not been subject to an injunction or administrative order within the past 10 years restraining a false or misleading promotional plan involving land dispositions;
  5. the public offering statement requirements of this chapter have been satisfied.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Administrative Code. —

For advertising and promotional plans, see 3 AAC 20, art. 3.

For protection of purchasers, see 3 AAC 20, art. 4.

Sec. 34.55.016. Notice of filing and registration.

  1. Upon receipt of the application for registration in proper form, the department shall issue a notice of filing to the applicant.  Within 90 days from the date of the notice of filing, the department shall enter an order registering the subdivided land or rejecting the registration.  If no order of rejection is entered within 90 days from the date of notice of filing, the land shall be considered registered unless the applicant has consented in writing to a delay.
  2. If the department affirmatively determines, upon inquiry and examination, that the requirements of AS 34.55.014 have been met, it shall enter an order registering the subdivided land and shall designate the form of the public offering statement.
  3. If the department determines upon inquiry and examination that any of the requirements of AS 34.55.014 has not been met, the department shall notify the applicant that the application for registration must be corrected in the particulars specified within 10 days.  If the requirements are not met within the time allowed the department shall enter an order rejecting the registration which shall include the findings of fact upon which the order is based.  The order rejecting the registration may not become effective for 20 days during which time the applicant may petition for reconsideration and shall be entitled to a hearing.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.018. Annual report.

  1. Within 30 days after each annual anniversary date of an order registering subdivided land, the subdivider shall file a report in the form prescribed by the regulations of the department.  The report must reflect material changes in information contained in the original application for registration.
  2. The department at its option may permit the filing of annual reports within 30 days after the anniversary date of the consolidated registration in lieu of the anniversary date of the original registration.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.020. General powers and duties.

  1. The department shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act).  The regulations must include but not be limited to provisions for advertising standards to assure full and fair disclosure; provisions for escrow or trust agreements or other means reasonably to assure that all improvements referred to in the application for registration and advertising will be completed and that purchasers will receive the interest in land contracted for; provisions for operating procedures; and other provisions as are necessary and proper to accomplish the purpose of this chapter.
  2. The department, by regulation or by an order, after notice and hearing, may require the filing of advertising material relating to subdivided land before its distribution.
  3. If it appears that a person has engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter, or a regulation or order under this chapter, the department, with or without prior administrative proceedings may bring an action in the superior court to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a regulation or order under this chapter.  Upon proper showing, injunctive relief or temporary restraining orders shall be granted, and a receiver or conservator may be appointed.  The department is not required to post a bond in court proceedings.
  4. The department may intervene in a suit involving subdivided land.  In a suit by or against a subdivider involving subdivided land, the subdivider promptly shall furnish the department notice of the suit and copies of all pleadings.
  5. The department may
    1. accept registrations filed in other states or with the federal government;
    2. contract with agencies in this state or other jurisdictions to perform investigative functions;
    3. accept grants in aid from any source.
  6. The department shall cooperate with similar departments in other jurisdictions to establish uniform filing procedures and forms, uniform public offering statements, advertising standards, rules, and common administrative practices.
  7. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 52 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991)

Administrative Code. —

For filing procedures, see 3 AAC 20, art. 1.

For unfair acts and practices, see 3 AAC 20, art. 2.

For advertising and promotional plans, see 3 AAC 20, art. 3.

For protection of purchasers, see 3 AAC 20, art. 4.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Sec. 34.55.022. Investigations and proceedings.

  1. The department may
    1. make necessary public or private investigations inside or outside this state to determine whether a person has violated or is about to violate this chapter or a regulation or order under this chapter or to aid in the enforcement of this chapter or in the adoption of regulations and forms under this chapter;
    2. require or permit a person to file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as the department determines, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated.
  2. For the purpose of an investigation or proceeding under this chapter, the department or an officer designated by the department may administer oaths or affirmations, and upon its own motion or upon request of any party shall subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any matter that is relevant to the investigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts or any other matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material evidence.
  3. Upon failure to obey a subpoena or to answer questions propounded by the investigating officer and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected, the department may apply to the superior court for an order compelling compliance.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, all proceedings under this chapter must be in accordance with AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act).

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 3 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Notes to Decisions

Restitution authorized. —

The trial court has the inherent power to order restitution in an action brought by the state under this chapter. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

That the legislature saw fit to provide a private right of action for restitution under this chapter does not operate to curtail the court’s power to award such relief at the instance of the state. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Procedure in restitution cases. —

See State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Sec. 34.55.024. Cease and desist orders.

  1. The department may issue an order requiring the person to cease and desist from the unlawful practice and to take affirmative action that in the judgment of the department will carry out the purposes of this chapter, if it determines after notice and hearing that a person has
    1. violated a provision of this chapter;
    2. directly or through an agent or employee knowingly engaged in a false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, promotional or sales method to offer or dispose of an interest in subdivided land;
    3. made a substantial change in the plan of disposition and development of the subdivided land subsequent to the order of registration without obtaining prior written approval from the department;
    4. disposed of subdivided land that has not been registered with the department; or
    5. violated a lawful order or regulation of the department.
  2. If the department makes a finding of fact in writing that the public interest will be irreparably harmed by delay in issuing an order, it may issue a temporary cease and desist order. Before issuing the temporary cease and desist order, the department, whenever possible, by telephone or otherwise shall give notice of the proposal to issue a temporary cease and desist order to the person. Every temporary cease and desist order must include in its terms a provision that upon request a hearing will be held within 10 days to determine whether or not it becomes permanent.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.026. Revocation.

  1. A registration may be revoked after notice and hearing upon a written finding of fact that the subdivider has
    1. failed to comply with the terms of a cease and desist order;
    2. been convicted in a court subsequent to the filing of the application for registration for a crime involving fraud, deception, false pretenses, misrepresentation, false advertising, or dishonest dealing in real estate transactions;
    3. disposed of, concealed, or diverted funds or assets of any person so as to defeat the rights of subdivision purchasers;
    4. failed faithfully to perform a stipulation or agreement made with the department as an inducement to grant a registration, to reinstate a registration, or to approve a promotional plan or public offering statement;
    5. made intentional misrepresentations or concealed material facts in an application for registration.
  2. The findings of fact, if set out in statutory language, must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.
  3. If the department finds after notice and hearing that the subdivider has been guilty of a violation for which revocation could be ordered, it may issue a cease and desist order instead.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.028. Penalties.

  1. A person who wilfully violates AS 34.55.006 or 34.55.008 is, upon conviction, punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000, or by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years, or by both fine and imprisonment.
  2. A violation of this chapter other than as provided in (a) of this section or of a regulation adopted under this chapter is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not less than $1,000 or double the amount of gain from the transaction, whichever is larger but not more than $50,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both fine and imprisonment.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 4 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Sec. 34.55.030. Civil remedy.

  1. A person who disposes of subdivided land in violation of AS 34.55.006 or 34.55.008 is liable as provided in this section to the purchaser unless in the case of an untruth or omission it is proved that the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission or that the person offering or disposing of subdivided land did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission.
  2. In addition to any other remedies, the purchaser, under (a) of this section, may recover the consideration paid for the lot, parcel, unit, or interest in subdivided land together with interest at the rate of six percent a year from the date of payment, property taxes paid, costs, and reasonable attorney fees less the amount of income received from the subdivided land upon tender of appropriate instruments of reconveyance. If the purchaser no longer owns the lot, parcel, unit, or interest in subdivided land, the purchaser may recover the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender of a reconveyance less the value of the land when disposed of and less interest at the rate of six percent a year on that amount from the date of disposition.
  3. Every person who directly or indirectly controls a subdivider liable under (a) of this section, every general partner, officer, or director of a subdivider, every person occupying a similar status or performing a similar function, every employee of the subdivider who materially aids in the disposition, and every agent who materially aids in the disposition is also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the subdivider, unless the person otherwise liable sustains the burden of proof that the person did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.  There is a right to contribution as in cases of contract among persons so liable.
  4. A person whose occupation gives authority to a statement that has been used with the person’s consent in an application for registration or public offering statement, who is not otherwise associated with the subdivision and development plan in a material way, is liable only for false statements and omissions in the person’s statement and only if the person fails to prove
    1. lack of knowledge of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist; and
    2. that in the exercise of the reasonable care a person in the same occupation could not have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
  5. A tender of reconveyance may be made at any time before the entry of judgment.
  6. A person may not recover under this section in an action commenced more than four years after the person’s first payment of money to the subdivider in the contested transaction.
  7. A stipulation or provision purporting to bind a person acquiring subdivided land to waive compliance with this chapter or a regulation or order under it is void.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 5 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Notes to Decisions

Liability of subdivider for failure to disclose certain physical characteristics of land. —

In enacting AS 34.55.004 34.55.046 , the legislature clearly intended to impose a system of controls on the activities of large-scale subdividers. One of those controls is civil liability when subdividers fail to disclose to a purchaser a physical characteristic of the subdivided land which adversely affects the usefulness of the land. But, when the condition is unknown to the subdivider, he is liable only if it is one that he could have learned of through the exercise of reasonable care. This standard also applies to subdividers operating before the statutory controls became effective and to small-tract subdividers who are still outside the provision of AS 34.55.004 34.55.046 . Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Such as permafrost. —

The presence of permafrost is an important physical characteristic and a material circumstance affecting subdivided land. As such, the failure to disclose its existence in the public offering statement required by AS 34.55.008 and 34.55.012(a) can result in civil liability under the present statutory scheme. However, such liability does not attach if “the person offering or disposing of subdivided land did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the . . . omission.” Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

The liability of a subdivider depends, not upon the theories of strict liability or liability for breach of an implied warranty, but upon the failure to disclose permafrost conditions that are known to him or those that he could have known of through the exercise of reasonable care, i.e., the use of appropriate testing methods, review of available geologic data, etc. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Restitution is expressly available in a private action under this chapter. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Collateral references. —

Award of attorneys’ fees in actions under state deceptive trade practice and consumer protection acts. 35 ALR4th 12.

Necessity of real-estate purchaser’s election between remedy of rescission and remedy of damages for fraud. 40 ALR4th 627.

Sec. 34.55.032. Jurisdiction.

A disposition of subdivided land is subject to this chapter, and the superior court of this state has jurisdiction in claims or causes of action arising under this chapter if

  1. the subdivider’s principal office is located in this state;
  2. an offer or disposition of subdivided land is made in this state, whether or not the offeror or offeree is then present in this state, if the offer originates in this state or is directed by the offeror to a person or place in this state and received by the person or at the place to which it is directed; or
  3. the subdivided land is located in this state.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 6 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Sec. 34.55.034. Interstate rendition.

In the proceedings for extradition of a person charged with a crime under this chapter, it need not be shown that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.036. Service of process.

  1. In addition to the methods of service provided for in the Rules of Civil Procedure, service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to the department, but it is not effective unless
    1. the plaintiff, which may be the department in a proceeding instituted by it, immediately sends a copy of the process and of the pleading by certified mail to the defendant or respondent at the last known address of the defendant or respondent; and
    2. the plaintiff’s affidavit of compliance with this section is filed in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such further time as the court allows.
  2. If a person, including a nonresident of this state, engages in conduct prohibited by this chapter or a regulation or order under this chapter, and has not filed a consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction cannot otherwise be obtained in this state, the department is authorized to receive service of process in any noncriminal proceeding against the person or the person’s successor that grows out of that conduct and that is brought under this chapter or a regulation or order under this chapter, with the same force and validity as if served on the person personally.  Notice shall be given as provided in (a) of this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.038. Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Sec. 34.55.042. Exemptions.

  1. Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of evasion of this chapter, the registration provisions of this chapter do not apply to offers or dispositions of an interest in land
    1. by a purchaser of subdivided land for the account of the purchaser in a single or isolated transaction;
    2. if fewer than 10 separate lots, parcels, units, or interests in subdivided land located outside this state are offered by a subdivider in a period of 12 months, or if fewer than 50 separate lots, parcels, units, or interests in subdivided land located in this state are offered by a subdivider in a period of 12 months;
    3. on which there is a residential, commercial, or industrial building, or as to which there is a legal obligation on the part of the seller to construct such a building within one year from date of disposition;
    4. to persons who are engaged in the business of construction of buildings for resale, or to persons who acquire an interest in subdivided land for the purpose of engaging, and do engage in the business of construction of buildings for resale;
    5. under court order;
    6. by a government or government agency;
    7. as cemetery lots or interest;
    8. if the land is located in this state and is registered or exempt from registration under the provisions of the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1701  — 1720).
  2. Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of evasion of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter do not apply to
    1. offers or dispositions of evidences of indebtedness secured by a mortgage or deed of trust of real estate;
    2. offers or dispositions of securities or units of interest issued by a real estate investment trust regulated under a state or federal statute;
    3. offers or dispositions of securities currently registered with the department; and
    4. offers or disposition of an interest in oil, gas, or other minerals or a royalty interest therein if the offers or dispositions of the interests are regulated as securities by the department or by the United States.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 64 ch 69 SLA 1970; am § 7 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraphs (b)(3) and (4) were formerly (b)(4) and (5), respectively; renumbered in 2002 to reflect the 1970 repeal of former (b)(3).

Notes to Decisions

Effect of registration exemption on liability under AS 34.55.006 . —

The fact that a developer received an exemption from the registration provisions of the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C., §§ 1701 — 1720, and therefore is also exempt from the registration provisions of this chapter, does not immunize the developer from liability under AS 34.55.006 . State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Applied in

Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 34.55.044. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “department” means Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development;
  2. “disposition” includes sale, lease, assignment, award by lottery, or any other transaction concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for gain or profit;
  3. “offer” includes every inducement, solicitation, or attempt to encourage a person to acquire an interest in land, if undertaken for gain or profit;
  4. “person” means an individual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated association, two or more of any of them having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity;
  5. “purchaser” means a person who acquires or attempts to acquire or succeeds to an interest in land;
  6. “subdivider” means an owner of subdivided land who offers it for disposition or the principal agent of an inactive owner;
  7. “subdivision” and “subdivided land” mean land that is divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into two or more lots, parcels, units, or interests and also includes any land whether contiguous or not if two or more lots, parcels, units, or interests are offered as a part of a common promotional plan of advertising and sale; if the land is contiguous or is known, designated, or advertised as a common unit or by a common name, the land shall be presumed, without regard to the number of lots covered by each individual offering, as being offered for disposition as part of a common promotional plan.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968; am § 8 ch 138 SLA 1977)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1985 to alphabetize the defined terms.

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Commerce and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Community and Economic Development” in accordance with § 88, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Notes to Decisions

“Transactions concerning land.” —

“Lulling” activities by land developer designed to induce purchasers to continue making their property payments were not “transactions concerning land” within the meaning of this section. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

“Offer”. —

The payment of installments by the equitable owner would not constitute further acquisitions of land under paragraph (3) of this section. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Post-sale conduct designed to induce the continuation of payments does not constitute an “offer” as that term is defined in paragraph (3) of this section since legal title to the property vests in the purchasers at the time the contracts are signed and the continuation of payments under the land sales contracts does not result in the acquisition by purchasers of further interests in land. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).

Applied in

Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Quoted in

West v. Umialik Ins. Co., 8 P.3d 1135 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 34.55.046. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 179 SLA 1968)

Chapter 60. Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Practices.

Administrative Code. —

For relocation assistance services, see 17 AAC 81.

Sec. 34.60.010. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of federally assisted public construction and improvement projects and programs in order that the displaced persons will not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 13 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 44.81.010 . Renumbered in 1971.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 6, ch. 13, SLA 2018, the 2018 changes to this section are “retroactive to October 1, 2014.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective May 17, 2018, inserted “public construction and improvement projects and” following “federally assisted”.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

State v. Ness, 516 P.2d 1212 (Alaska 1973).

Collateral references. —

40 Am. Jur. 2d, Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment, § 23.

Validity, construction, and application of state relocation assistance laws. 49 ALR4th 491.

Sec. 34.60.020. State agencies to establish program.

State agencies shall establish and provide the means for implementing a program providing fair and reasonable relocation and other payment for persons displaced as a result of federally assisted activities undertaken by state agencies, to carry out relocation assistance programs for persons displaced, and to provide payments to persons as a result of acquisition of real property for activities of state agencies.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 44.81.020 . Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.030. Administration of program.

In order to prevent unnecessary expenses and duplication of functions, and to promote uniform and effective administration of relocation assistance programs for displaced persons under this chapter, state agencies may enter into contracts with any individual, firm, association, or corporation for services in connection with relocation assistance programs, or may carry out its functions under this chapter through any federal or state governmental agency or instrumentality having an established organization for conducting relocation assistance programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 44.81.030 . Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.040. Relocation payments.

  1. When the acquisition of real property for a federally assisted program or project undertaken by a state agency will result in the displacement of a person, the state agency responsible for the program or project shall make payment to the displaced person, upon proper application as approved by the state agency, for
    1. actual reasonable expenses in moving a person, the person’s family, business, farm operation, or other personal property;
    2. actual direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation, but not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses that would have been required to relocate the property as determined by the state agency; and
    3. actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or farm.
  2. A displaced person eligible for payments under (a) of this section who is displaced from a dwelling and who elects to accept the payments authorized by this subsection in place of payments authorized by (a) of this section may receive a moving expense allowance, determined according to a schedule established by the state agency.
  3. A displaced person eligible for payments under (a) of this section who is displaced from a place of business or from a farm operation and who elects to accept the payment authorized by this subsection in place of the payment authorized by (a) of this section may receive a fixed payment, in an amount determined by the state agency, subject to the payment amount limitations under 42 U.S.C. 4622(c), as amended. A person whose sole business at the real property acquired is the rental of the property to others does not qualify for payment under this subsection.
  4. In addition to the moving expenses allowed under this section, a displaced farm or business may receive a payment, not to exceed the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4622(a)(4), as amended, for the actual reasonable expenses necessary to reestablish the operation at a new site.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 54 SLA 1989; am §§ 2, 3 ch 13 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 44.81.040 . Renumbered in 1971.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 6, ch. 13, SLA 2018, the 2018 changes to subsections (c) and (d) are “retroactive to October 1, 2014.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective May 17, 2018, rewrote (c); in (d), substituted “the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4622(a)(4), as amended” for “$10,000” following “not to exceed”.

Sec. 34.60.050. Replacement housing for homeowners.

  1. In addition to payments otherwise authorized by this chapter, the state agency shall make an additional payment, not to exceed the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4623(a)(1), as amended, to a displaced person who is displaced from a dwelling actually owned and occupied by the person for not less than 90 days before the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of the property. This additional payment must include the following elements:
    1. the amount, if any, that, when added to the acquisition cost of the dwelling acquired by the state agency, equals the reasonable cost of a comparable replacement dwelling that is a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling adequate to accommodate the displaced person, is reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment, and is available on the private market; all determinations required to carry out this paragraph shall be made in accordance with standards established by the state agency making the additional payment;
    2. the amount, if any, that will compensate the displaced person for any increased interest costs that the displaced person is required to pay for financing the acquisition of the comparable replacement dwelling; this amount may be paid only if the dwelling acquired by the state agency was encumbered by a bona fide mortgage that was a valid lien on the dwelling for not less than 90 days before the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of the dwelling; and
    3. reasonable expenses incurred by the displaced person for evidence of title, recording fees, and other closing costs incident to the purchase of the replacement dwelling, but not including prepaid expenses.
  2. The additional payment authorized by (a) of this section may be made only to a displaced person who purchases and occupies a replacement dwelling that is decent, safe, and sanitary not later than the end of the one year period beginning on the date on which the person receives from the state agency final payment of all costs of the acquired dwelling, or the date on which the person moves from the acquired dwelling, whichever is the later date.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 2 ch 54 SLA 1989; am § 4 ch 13 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 44.81.050 . Renumbered in 1971.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 6, ch. 13, SLA 2018, the 2018 changes to subsection (a) are “retroactive to October 1, 2014.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective May 17, 2018, in the introductory language in (a), substituted “the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4623(a)(1), as amended” for “$22,500” following “not to exceed”, substituted “for not less than 90 days” for “for not less than 180 days” following “occupied by the person”, and made a stylistic change; in (a)(2), substituted “for not less than 90 days” for “for not less than 180 days” following “a valid lien on the dwelling”.

Sec. 34.60.060. Replacement housing for tenants and others.

In addition to amounts otherwise authorized by this chapter, the state agency shall make a payment to or for a displaced person displaced from a dwelling, who is not eligible to receive a payment under AS 34.60.050 , if the dwelling was actually and lawfully occupied by the displaced person for not less than 90 days before the initiation of negotiations for acquisition of the dwelling. The payment must be either

  1. the amount necessary to enable the displaced person to lease or rent for a period not to exceed three years and six months, a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to accommodate the displaced person in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities, and reasonably accessible to the person’s place of employment, but not to exceed the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4624(a), as amended; or
  2. the amount necessary to enable the displaced person to make a down payment, including incidental expenses described in AS 34.60.050(a)(3) , on the purchase of a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to accommodate the displaced person in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities, but not to exceed the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4624(a), as amended.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 3 ch 54 SLA 1989; am § 5 ch 13 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.060. Renumbered in 1971.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 6, ch. 13, SLA 2018, the 2018 changes to this section are “retroactive to October 1, 2014.”

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective May 17, 2018, at the end of (1) and (2), substituted “the amount described in 42 U.S.C. 4624(a) as amended” for “$5,250”.

Sec. 34.60.070. Expenses incidental to transfer of property.

The state agency, as soon as practicable after the date of payment of the purchase price or the date of deposit in court of funds to satisfy the award of compensation in a condemnation proceeding to acquire real property, whichever is the earlier, shall reimburse the owner, to the extent the department considers fair and reasonable, for expenses necessarily incurred for

  1. recording fees, transfer taxes, and similar expenses incidental to conveying the real property to the state agency;
  2. penalty costs for prepayment of a preexisting recorded mortgage entered into in good faith encumbering the real property, if the mortgage was a valid lien on the property for not less than 180 days before the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of the property; and
  3. the pro rata portion of real property taxes paid that are allocable to a period subsequent to the date of vesting title in the state, or the effective date of possession of the real property by the state agency, whichever is the earlier.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.070. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.080. Litigation expenses.

  1. The state court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by the state agency to acquire real property by condemnation shall award the owner of any right to, or title to, or interest in, the real property a sum that will in the opinion of the court reimburse the owner for reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, if
    1. the final judgment is that the state agency cannot acquire the real property by condemnation; or
    2. the proceeding is abandoned by the state agency.
  2. An award made under (a) of this section shall be paid by the state agency for whose benefit the condemnation proceedings were instituted.
  3. The court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding brought against a state agency, awarding compensation for the taking of property by the state agency, or the attorney for the state agency effecting a settlement of any such proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to the plaintiff, as a part of the judgment or settlement, a sum which will in the opinion of the court or the attorney for the state agency reimburse the plaintiff for reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred because of the proceeding.
  4. If an inconsistency occurs between the provisions of this section and the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure govern.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.080. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.090. Relocation services.

  1. When the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by a state agency for a federally assisted program or project undertaken by the state agency will result in the displacement of a person on or after January 2, 1971, the state agency shall provide a relocation assistance advisory program for displaced persons which offers the services described in (c) of this section.  If the state agency determines that a person occupying property immediately adjacent to the real property acquired is caused substantial economic injury because of the acquisition, it may offer the occupant relocation advisory services under the program.
  2. State agencies administering programs which may be of assistance to displaced persons covered by this chapter shall cooperate to the maximum extent feasible with the state agency causing the displacement to assure that the displaced persons receive the maximum assistance available to them.
  3. Each relocation assistance advisory program required by (a) of this section must include measures, facilities, or services necessary or appropriate in order to
    1. determine the need, if any, of displaced persons, for relocation assistance;
    2. provide current and continuing information on availability, prices, and rentals, of comparable decent, safe, and sanitary sales and rental housing, and of comparable commercial properties and locations for displaced businesses;
    3. assure that, within a reasonable time before displacement, there will be available in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families and individuals displaced decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, as defined by the state agency, equal in number to the number of and available to the displaced persons who require the dwellings and reasonably accessible to their places of employment except that the state agency may prescribe by regulation situations in which these assurances may be waived;
    4. assist a person displaced from the person’s business or farm operation in obtaining and becoming established in a suitable replacement location;
    5. supply information concerning federal and state housing programs, disaster loan programs, and other federal or state programs offering assistance to displaced persons; and
    6. provide other advisory services to displaced persons in order to minimize hardships in adjusting to relocation.
  4. The state agency shall coordinate relocation activities with project work, and other planned or proposed governmental actions in the community or nearby areas that may affect the carrying out of relocation assistance programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.090. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.100. Eminent domain.

Nothing contained in this chapter creates, in a condemnation proceeding brought under the power of eminent domain, an element of damages not in existence on January 2, 1971.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.100. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.110. Nontaxation of payments.

A payment received by a displaced person under this chapter is not income for the purposes of the state or federal income tax, personal or corporate. The payments are not income or resources to a recipient of public assistance and the payments may not be deducted from the amount of aid to which the recipient would otherwise be entitled.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.110. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.120. Uniform real property acquisition policy.

A state agency or other entity acquiring real property for any project or program in which federal or federal-aid funds are used shall to the greatest extent practicable comply with the following policies:

  1. Every reasonable effort shall be made to expeditiously acquire real property by negotiation.
  2. Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or a designated representative shall be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during the inspection of the property.
  3. Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount shall be established that is reasonably believed to be just compensation for the real property and that amount shall be offered for the property. In no event may the amount be less than the approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property.  A decrease or increase in the fair market value of real property before the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for which the property is acquired or by the likelihood that the property would be acquired for the improvement, other than that due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property. The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a written statement of, and a summary of the basis for, the amount established as just compensation.
  4. An owner may not be required to surrender possession of real property before the state agency concerned pays the agreed purchase price or deposits with the court in accordance with applicable law, for the benefit of the owner, an amount not less than the approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property, or the amount of the award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding for the property.
  5. The construction or development of a public improvement shall be so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, a person lawfully occupying real property is not required to move from a dwelling, assuming a replacement dwelling will be available, or to move the person’s business or farm operation, without at least 90 days’ written notice of the date by which the move is required.
  6. If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for a period subject to termination by the state agency on short notice, the amount of rent required may not exceed the fair rental value of the property to a short-term occupier.
  7. In no event may the time of condemnation be advanced or negotiations or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the owner be deferred, nor any other coercive action be taken in order to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the property.
  8. If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the power of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be instituted.  The acquiring state agency may not intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of the real property.
  9. If the acquisition of only part of the property would leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the entire property shall be made.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.120. Renumbered in 1971.

Notes to Decisions

Inclusion of value enhancement attributable to the project for which the property is being taken is generally prohibited in determining condemnation awards in Alaska. This general rule is in accordance with the requirement in the Alaska and United States Constitutions that just compensation be paid for private property taken for public use, since it only prevents a landowner from receiving more value for his property than he would if the government had no use for his land and it was purchased by a private buyer. However, this rule does not preclude an owner from receiving compensation for value added to the property by an unrelated public project which took no portion of the tract involved. State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., 630 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980).

An exception to the general prohibition against awarding enhanced value from the project for which a parcel is taken occurs when the parcel was not properly within the scope of the original project but was included in a subsequent enlargement of the project. In those circumstances, a landowner should not be deprived of the value added in the meantime by the proximity of the improvement. State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., 630 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980).

The burden of proving that the projects should be considered as one for valuation purposes was on the state, the party asserting the claim. State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., 630 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980).

Sec. 34.60.130. Uniform acquisition policy for improvements.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a state agency acquires any interest in real property, the state agency must acquire at least an equal interest in all buildings, structures, or other improvements located upon the real property which the state agency requires to be removed from the real property or which the state agency determines will be adversely affected by the use to which the real property will be put.
  2. For the purpose of determining just compensation to be paid for a building, structure, or other improvement required to be acquired under (a) of this section, the building, structure, or other improvement is considered to be a part of the real property to be acquired notwithstanding the right or obligation of a tenant, as against the owner of any other interest in the real property, to remove the building, structure, or improvement at the expiration of the tenant’s term, and the fair market value which the building, structure, or improvement contributes to the fair market value of the real property to be acquired, or the fair market value of the building, structure, or improvement for removal from the real property, whichever is the greater, shall be paid to the tenant.
  3. Payment for the buildings, structures, or improvements under this section may not result in duplication of payments otherwise authorized by law.  A payment for buildings, structures, or improvements may not be made unless the owner of the land involved disclaims all interest in the improvements of the tenant.  In consideration for any such payment, the tenant shall assign, transfer, and release to the state agency all right, title, and interest in and to the improvements.  Nothing in this subsection and in (b) of this section deprives the tenant of any rights to reject payment and to obtain payment for the property interests in accordance with other laws of the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.130. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.135. Planning loans for additional housing.

In addition to the other programs authorized by this chapter, the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation may make loans in order to encourage and facilitate the construction or rehabilitation of housing to meet the needs of displaced persons. These loans are a part of the federally assisted project cost and may be made to nonprofit, limited dividend, or cooperative organizations, or to public bodies. The loans may be made only for necessary and reasonable expenses, before construction, for planning and obtaining federally insured mortgage financing for the rehabilitation or construction of housing for displaced persons. The loans may not exceed 80 percent of the reasonable costs expected to be incurred in planning, and in obtaining financing for housing for displaced persons. Reasonable costs include but are not limited to costs for preliminary surveys and analysis of market needs, preliminary architectural fees, site acquisition, application and mortgage commitment fees, and construction loan fees and discounts. Loans to an organization established for profit shall bear interest at a market rate established by the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation. All other loans shall be without interest. The Alaska Housing Finance Corporation shall require repayment of loans made under this section under terms and conditions that it may prescribe. Repayment shall be made upon completion of the project or sooner, and except in the case of a loan to an organization established for profit, the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation may cancel any part or all of a loan if the corporation determines that a permanent loan to finance the rehabilitation or construction of the housing cannot be obtained in an amount adequate for repayment of the loan.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 108 ch 4 FSSLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.135. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.137. Housing replacement assistance as last resort.

If a federal aided program or project cannot proceed to actual construction because comparable replacement sale or rental housing is not available, and the state agency determines that housing cannot otherwise be made available, the agency may take, or may request the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation to take, action necessary or appropriate to provide the housing either by use of funds authorized for the project or by use of money available to the corporation.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 109 ch 4 FSSLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.137. Renumbered in 1971.

Sec. 34.60.140. Regulations.

State agencies are authorized to adopt regulations to implement this chapter. These regulations must include provisions relating to

  1. a moving expense allowance for displaced persons who move from a dwelling, determined according to a schedule;
  2. procedures for an aggrieved person to have a determination of eligibility or amount of payment reviewed by the state agency;
  3. eligibility of a displaced person for relocation assistance payment, the procedure for displaced persons to claim the payments, amount of the payments; and
  4. other regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 4 ch 54 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.140. Renumbered in 1971.

Administrative Code. —

For relocation assistance services, see 17 AAC 81.

Sec. 34.60.150. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “business” means any lawful activity, excepting a farm operation, conducted primarily
    1. for the purchase, sale, lease, and rental of personal and real property, and manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, commodities, or other personal property;
    2. for the sale of services to the public;
    3. by a nonprofit organization; or
    4. for assisting, solely for the purpose of AS 34.60.040(a) , in the purchase, sale, resale, manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, commodities, personal property, or services by the erection and maintenance of an outdoor advertising display, whether or not the display is located on the premises on which any of the above activities are conducted;
  2. “displaced person” means any person who moves from real property, or moves personal property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of the real property, in whole or in part, or as a result of the written order of the state agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by the state agency, and solely for the purpose of AS 34.60.040(a) and 34.60.090 , as a result of the acquisition of, or as a result of the written order of a state agency to vacate other real property on which the person conducts a business or farm operation for the program or project;
  3. “farm operation” means any activity conducted solely or primarily for the production of one or more agricultural products or commodities, including timber, for sale or home use, and customarily producing these products or commodities in sufficient quantity to be capable of contributing materially to the operator’s support;
  4. “mortgage” means those classes of liens commonly given to secure advances on, or the unpaid purchase price of, real property, under the law of the state in which the real property is located, together with the credit instruments, if any, secured by the property;
  5. “person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, or association;
  6. “state agency” means a department, agency, instrumentality, corporate authority of the state, or a political subdivision of the state, or a department, agency, instrumentality, or authority of two or more political subdivisions of the state participating in federally assisted programs.

History. (§ 1 ch 41 SLA 1971; am § 42 ch 21 SLA 1991)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as 44.81.150. Renumbered in 1971.

Chapter 65. Land Surveys.

Cross references. —

For rules for construing real estate descriptions, see AS 09.25.040 .

Collateral references. —

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boundaries, §§ 46-53.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 45.

75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, § 94.

11 C.J.S., Boundaries, §§ 17-21, 207–216.

76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 1, 2, 9–11.

87 C.J.S., Trespass, §§ 37, 57, 61–63.

Sec. 34.65.010. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to authorize right of entry on land for survey purposes, and to provide a method for preserving evidence of land surveys by filing records of survey and monument records. The provisions of this chapter supplement laws relating to land survey platting and subdivision surveys.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.65.020. Entry upon land for survey purposes.

  1. A land surveyor or an employee of a land surveyor may enter public or private land or water in the state only to occupy, locate, relocate, install, or replace survey monuments, to locate boundaries, to determine geodetic positions, and to make surveys and maps.
  2. The land surveyor shall give reasonable notice to the owner or occupant of the land of an intent to enter private land for survey purposes.  The notice must indicate the anticipated date of the entry for survey purposes.
  3. Notice under (b) of this section is not required for a survey along previously surveyed boundaries within a platted subdivision accepted or recorded by the federal government or approved under AS 29.40.110 or 40.15.010 .
  4. A land surveyor or an employee of a land surveyor who complies with the notice requirements of (b) of this section is liable to the landowner only for actual damages.
  5. The attorney general may bring an action in the name of the state to restrain and prevent the obstruction of entry under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990, “AS 29.40.110 ” was substituted for “AS 29.33.160” in (c) of this section to correct a drafting oversight in ch. 74, SLA 1985.

Sec. 34.65.030. Records of survey.

After making a survey in conformity with the practice and definition of land surveying, a land surveyor shall record with the district recorder a record of the survey within 90 days if the survey discloses

  1. material evidence or physical change that in whole or in part does not appear on a plat of record previously filed or recorded in the office of the district recorder or in the records of the Bureau of Land Management;
  2. a material discrepancy with a plat of record previously filed or recorded in the office of the district recorder or in the records of the Bureau of Land Management; or
  3. evidence that by reasonable analysis might result in alternate positions of boundaries from those of record.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in this section in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Administrative Code. —

For document recording and filing, see 11 AAC 6.

Sec. 34.65.040. Records of monument.

  1. A land surveyor who in the course of a survey establishes, reestablishes, uses as control, or restores a monument to make it readily identifiable or reasonably durable shall record a monument record, unless the monument and its accessories are substantially as described in a monument record filed or recorded under this chapter or on a survey plat of record.
  2. An agency whose activities will disturb or destroy a monument or its accessories shall have a land surveyor
    1. record a monument record before the monument or its accessories are disturbed or destroyed;
    2. restore or replace the monument and its accessories after the activities have ceased; and
    3. record a new monument record after restoring or replacing the monument or its accessories.
  3. A person who disturbs or destroys a monument shall record a notice of the disturbance or destruction in the office of the district recorder.
  4. A land surveyor may record a monument record for any monument.
  5. A land surveyor who is required to record a monument record under this section shall do so within 90 days of the completion of the survey or of the establishment, reestablishment, or rehabilitation of a monument.
  6. A monument record shall be signed and sealed by the land surveyor responsible for the survey.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (a)-(e) in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Administrative Code. —

For document recording and filing, see 11 AAC 6.

Sec. 34.65.050. When record of survey is not required.

A record of survey is not required for a survey

  1. made by the Bureau of Land Management;
  2. when a plat of the survey has been recorded or will be recorded within 18 months after the field survey is completed.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in paragraph (2) in 1988 because of the enactment of ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Sec. 34.65.060. Duties of the commissioner.

  1. The commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement this chapter.
  2. The commissioner shall provide a standard form for a monument record.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Administrative Code. —

For document recording and filing, see 11 AAC 6.

Sec. 34.65.070. Duties of the district recorder.

  1. The district recorder shall provide a copy of a monument record or a copy of a record of survey to the municipal clerk for the municipality in which the monument or survey is located.
  2. The district recorder shall keep a proper index of monument records and records of survey by the survey name, tract designation, subdivision designation, or United States public land designation.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985)

Sec. 34.65.100. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of natural resources;
  2. “land surveyor” means a professional land surveyor licensed under AS 08.48;
  3. “monument” means
    1. a United States public land survey monument;
    2. an Alaska state land survey primary monument;
    3. an exterior primary monument controlling a recorded survey;
    4. a geodetic control monument established by a state or federal agency;
  4. “subdivision” has the meaning given in AS 40.15.900 ;
  5. “United States public land survey monument”
    1. means a survey monument established in a cadastral survey by the Bureau of Land Management or its predecessor;
    2. includes a monument in a United States special survey and United States mineral survey that is a part of the public land records of the Bureau of Land Management.

History. (§ 1 ch 32 SLA 1985; am § 62 ch 21 SLA 1991; am § 4 ch 40 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (4) was originally enacted as paragraph (6). This section was reorganized in 1998 to reflect the 1998 addition of paragraph (4) and 1991 repeal of former paragraph (1).

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Lee v. Konrad, 337 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Chapter 70. Disclosures in Residential Real Property Transfers.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 115, SLA 1992 provides: “This Act applies to transfers of interests in residential real property that occur on or after July 1, 1993.”

Notes to Decisions

Innocent misrepresentation claims precluded. —

This chapter precludes claims of innocent misrepresentation as to residential property concerning conditions included in the mandatory disclosure form; to be actionable, misrepresentations in the disclosure form must be at least negligently made. Amyot v. Luchini, 932 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 34.70.010. Disclosures in residential real property transfers.

Before the transferee of an interest in residential real property makes a written offer, the transferor shall deliver by mail or in person a completed written disclosure statement in the form established under AS 34.70.050 . Delivery to the spouse of the transferee constitutes delivery to the transferee unless the transferor and the transferee agree otherwise before the delivery.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Notes to Decisions

Failure to disclose defects unreasonable. —

Because defendant was required by statute to disclose even minor defects of which she had been notified, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by enhancing the fee awards based on the unreasonableness of defendant’s claims and defenses. Cole v. Bartels, 4 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000).

Cited in

Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23 (Alaska 2007); Laybourn v. City of Wasilla, 362 P.3d 447 (Alaska 2015); Miller v. Fowler, 424 P.3d 306 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 34.70.020. Termination of offer.

If a disclosure statement or material amendment is delivered to the transferee after the transferee has made a written offer, the transferee may terminate the offer by delivering a written notice of termination to the transferor or the transferor’s agent within three days after the disclosure statement or amendment is delivered in person or within six days after the disclosure statement or amendment is delivered by deposit in the mail.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.030. Liability after disclosure.

A transferor is not liable for a defect or other condition in the real property or the real property interest being transferred if the transferor discloses the existence of the defect or condition in the disclosure statement.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.040. Subsequent events and approximations.

  1. If information in a disclosure statement becomes inaccurate as a result of an act or agreement after the disclosure statement is delivered to the transferee, the resulting inaccuracy does not violate this chapter and the transferor is required to deliver an amendment for the disclosure statement to the transferee.
  2. If an item that is required in the disclosure statement is unknown or is unavailable to the transferor, and if the transferor or the transferor’s agent has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the information, the transferor may insert an approximation of the information. The approximation must be reasonable, clearly identified as an approximation, based on the best information available to the transferor or the transferor’s agent, and not used to avoid the requirements of this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Notes to Decisions

Duty to amend disclosure statement. —

Seller did not violate subsection (a) where his duty to amend the disclosure statement with respect to the condition of an underground septic tank was never triggered and the purchaser’s receipt of a copy of a report informing him that a new pump had been installed was sufficient disclosure. Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.70.050. Form of disclosure statement.

The Real Estate Commission established under AS 08.88.011 shall establish the form of the disclosure statement required by AS 34.70.010 . The disclosure statement must include a provision that notifies transferees

  1. that they are responsible for determining whether a person who has been convicted of a sex offense resides in the vicinity of the property that is the subject of the transferee’s potential real estate transaction;
  2. where information about the location of convicted sex offenders can be obtained; and
  3. that they are responsible for determining whether, in the vicinity of the property that is the subject of the transferee’s potential real estate transaction, there is an agricultural facility or agricultural operation that might produce odor, fumes, dust, blowing snow, smoke, burning, vibrations, noise, insects, rodents, the operation of machinery including aircraft, and other inconveniences or discomforts as a result of lawful agricultural operations.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992; am § 54 ch 45 SLA 1998; am § 4 ch 28 SLA 2001)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 5, ch. 28, SLA 2001 provides that paragraph (3) of this section applies if the “sale, purchase, or exchange is agreed to on or after August 7, 2001.”

Sec. 34.70.060. Good faith.

A person who makes a disclosure or performs an act under this chapter shall do so in good faith.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Notes to Decisions

No duty to disclose certain structural damage. —

Seller did not have a duty to disclose that her mother’s body had decomposed in her home, which caused structural damage to the home: The buyers had waived their right to statutory disclosure, and the seller did not make any misrepresentations; moreover, the seller was not aware that the body had caused damage to the subflooring of the kitchen. Deptula v. Simpson, 164 P.3d 640 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.70.070. Effect on other required disclosures.

The requirements of this chapter do not affect other obligations for disclosure required by law.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.080. Written amendment.

An amendment to a disclosure statement must be in writing.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.090. Failure to comply.

  1. A transfer that is subject to this chapter is not invalidated solely because a person fails to comply with this chapter.
  2. A person who negligently violates this chapter or fails to perform a duty required by this chapter is liable to the transferee for the amount of the actual damages suffered by the transferee as a result of the violation or failure.
  3. A person who wilfully violates this chapter or fails to perform a duty required by this chapter is liable to the transferee for up to three times the actual damages suffered by the transferee as a result of the violation or failure.
  4. In addition to the damages allowed under (b) or (c) of this section, a court may also award the transferee costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed under the rules of court.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Cole v. Bartels, 4 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000); Beaux v. Jacob, 30 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Diblik v. Marcy, 166 P.3d 23 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 34.70.110. Waiver by agreement.

This chapter does not apply to the transfer of an interest in residential real property if the transferor and transferee agree in writing that the transfer will not be covered under this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.120. Exemption for first sales.

This chapter does not apply to the transfer of an interest in residential real property if the transfer is the first transfer of the property and if the property has never been occupied.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992)

Sec. 34.70.200. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “disclosure statement” means the disclosure statement required by AS 34.70.010 ;
  2. “real property” includes a unit in real property subject to AS 34.07 or AS 34.08;
  3. “residential real property” means real property whose primary purpose is to provide a single-family dwelling, or two single-family dwellings in one building, including a manufactured home that has become real property under AS 34.85.010 ; in this paragraph, “manufactured home” has the meaning given in AS 45.29.102 ;
  4. “transfer” means transfers by sale, exchange, installment land sale contract, lease with an option to purchase, other option to purchase, or a ground lease coupled with improvements.

History. (§ 1 ch 115 SLA 1992; am § 25 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Cross references. —

For a saving clause relating to interpretation of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 31, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

For severability of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 32, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Chapter 75. Noise Levels of Sport Shooting Facilities and Private Airport Facilities.

Sec. 34.75.010. Limitation on actions arising from noise level.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 09.45.230 , AS 11.61.110 , and any other state or municipal law, except (b) of this section and except as may be otherwise provided by federal law, a person may not bring a civil or criminal action against a person who operates or uses a sport shooting facility or a private airport facility if the action arises out of the noise level resulting from the normal operation or use of the facility and if the facility
    1. was established or began operation before any noise control law applied to the facility; or
    2. complies with the noise control laws that applied to the facility when the facility was established or began operation.
  2. The prohibition in (a) of this section does not apply to an action that arises out of
    1. a contract;
    2. a personal injury suffered by a person while on the premises of the facility; or
    3. a substantial change in the use of the facility.
  3. Except as may be otherwise provided by federal law, even if otherwise allowed by (a) and (b) of this section, a person may not bring a nuisance action for noise level against a facility located in the vicinity of the person’s property if the facility was established before the person acquired the property, unless the facility substantially changes the use of the facility after the person acquires the property.

History. (§ 1 ch 19 SLA 1997)

Editor’s notes. —

Section 2, ch. 19, SLA 1997 provides that enactment of this section does not prohibit the bringing of civil actions for causes of action that accrue before August 5, 1997 or the prosecution of criminal actions for activity that occurs before August 5, 1997.

Sec. 34.75.020. Time limitation on nuisance actions.

Except as may otherwise be provided by federal law, a person may not bring a nuisance action otherwise allowed under this chapter for the level of noise against a facility unless the action is brought within five years after the facility is established or begins operation or, if the action is brought after a substantial change in the use of the facility, within three years after the substantial change. In this section, “established” includes resuming shooting activity at a sport shooting facility if there has not been shooting activity at the facility for three or more years, or resuming airport activity at a private airport facility if there has not been airport activity at the facility for three or more years.

History. (§ 1 ch 19 SLA 1997)

Sec. 34.75.030. State and municipal regulation.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 02.15.020 and AS 02.25.020 , the state or a municipality may not regulate the outdoor level of noise at a facility if the facility is exempt from a criminal or civil action under AS 34.75.010(a) .
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a municipality may regulate the noise level produced by a facility.

History. (§ 1 ch 19 SLA 1997)

Sec. 34.75.040. Construction and meaning of “substantial change in the use”.

In this chapter, the phrase “substantial change in the use” shall be strictly construed to maximize the immunity from civil and criminal actions provided under AS 34.75.010 — AS 34.75.020 for sport shooting facilities and private airport facilities.

In this chapter, “substantial change in the use” does not include a mere increase in the frequency of flights or the number of shots.

History. (§ 1 ch 19 SLA 1997)

Sec. 34.75.090. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise,

  1. “airport facility” means an area of land or water that is used or intended for use for the landing and takeoff of aircraft, including appurtenant areas that are used or intended for use as airport buildings or rights-of-way; in this paragraph, “aircraft” includes fixed-wing and rotor aircraft;
  2. “facility” means a sport shooting facility or a private airport facility;
  3. “law” means a state statute or regulation or an ordinance of a municipality;
  4. “person” includes the state, a state agency, and a municipality;
  5. “private” means an airport that is privately owned and operated; airports owned, operated, or leased by the state, a municipality, or a political subdivision of the state or a local government are considered public airports;
  6. “sport shooting facility” means real property operated for the use of rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, trap, black powder, archery, or similar activity related to sport shooting.

History. (§ 1 ch 19 SLA 1997)

Chapter 77. Community Property Act.

Sec. 34.77.010. Good faith requirement.

A spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in matters involving community property. The obligation under this section may not be varied by a community property agreement or a community property trust.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.010 . Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.020. Variation by marital property agreement.

Except as provided in AS 34.77.010 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) , and 34.77.090(c) , a community property agreement or a community property trust may vary the effect of this chapter.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.020 . Renumbered in 1998, at which time the reference to “AS 34.77.010 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) , and 34.77.090(c) ” was substituted for “AS 34.75.010 , 34.75.070(h), 34.75.080(b), and 34.75.090(c)” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Sec. 34.77.030. Classification of property of spouses.

  1. Except for property that is classified otherwise in this chapter, property of spouses is community property under this chapter only to the extent provided in a community property agreement or a community property trust.
  2. If a community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage is community property, the property of the spouses acquired during the marriage and after the determination date is presumed to be community property.
  3. A spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in community property.
  4. If the community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage is community property, income earned or accrued by a spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during marriage and after the determination date is community property.
  5. Community property transferred to a trust remains community property.
  6. Whether or not the community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage is community property, property that is owned by a spouse at the time of a marriage but before the determination date is not community property except to the extent otherwise expressly provided in the community property agreement.
  7. Whether or not the community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage is community property, and except to the extent otherwise expressly provided by the spouses in the community property agreement or by the settlors in a community property trust, property acquired by a spouse during marriage and after the determination date is individual property if acquired
    1. by gift or a disposition at death made by a third person to the spouse and not to both spouses;
    2. in exchange for or with the proceeds of other individual property of the spouse;
    3. from appreciation or income of the spouse’s individual property except to the extent that the income or appreciation is classified as community property under AS 34.77.130 ;
    4. by a decree, community property agreement, written consent, or reclassification under AS 34.77.060(b) designating it as the individual property of the spouse;
    5. as a recovery for damage to property under AS 34.77.140 , except as specifically provided otherwise in a decree, community property agreement, community property trust, or written consent;
    6. as a recovery for personal injury, except for the amount of the recovery attributable to expenses paid or otherwise satisfied from community property; or
    7. as a transfer to a community property trust and declared by the trust to be the individual property of the spouse.
  8. Appreciation and income of property transferred to a community property trust is community property if declared in the trust to be community property.
  9. Community property held by a community property trust or another trust remains community property of the spouses if distributed to the spouses.
  10. Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, this chapter does not alter the classification and ownership rights of property acquired before or during the marriage.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am § 41 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.030 . Renumbered in 1998, at which time references to “AS 34.77.130 ”, “AS 34.77.060(b) ”, and “AS 34.77.140 ” in paragraphs (g)(3), (g)(4), and (g)(5), respectively, were substituted for “AS 34.75.130”, “AS 34.75.060(b)”, and “AS 34.75.140”, respectively, to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Phillips v. Bremner-Phillips, 477 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 34.77.040. Management and control of property of spouses.

  1. A spouse acting alone may manage and control
    1. that spouse’s property that is not community property;
    2. except as provided in (c) of this section, community property held in that spouse’s name alone or not held in the name of either spouse;
    3. a policy of insurance if that spouse is designated as the owner on the records of the issuer of the policy;
    4. the rights of an employee under an arrangement for deferred employment benefits that accrue as a result of that spouse’s employment;
    5. a claim for relief vested in that spouse by other law;
    6. community property held in the names of both spouses in the alternative, including using the names of both spouses with the word “or.”
  2. Spouses may not manage and control community property held in the names of both spouses other than in the alternative unless they act together.
  3. The right to manage and control community property that is transferred to a trust, including property that is community property under the trust, is determined by the terms of the trust.
  4. The right to manage and control community property does not determine the classification of property of the spouses and does not rebut the presumption of AS 34.77.030(b) .
  5. The right to manage and control community property does not permit gifts of the property, except to the extent provided in AS 34.77.050 .
  6. Except to the extent otherwise expressly provided in a community property agreement or a community property trust, the right to manage and control the property of spouses is not affected by this chapter if the property is acquired before the determination date.
  7. A court may appoint a conservator or guardian to exercise a disabled spouse’s right to manage and control community property.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.040 . Renumbered in 1998, at which time references to “AS 34.77.030(b) ” and “AS 34.77.050 ” in subsections (d) and (e), respectively, were substituted for “AS 34.75.030(b) ” and “AS 34.75.050” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Sec. 34.77.050. Gifts of community property to third persons.

  1. A spouse acting alone may not give to a third person community property that the spouse has the right to manage and control unless the value of the community property given to the third person does not aggregate more than $1,000 in a calendar year, or a larger amount if, when made, the gift is reasonable in amount considering the economic position of the spouses.
  2. A gift of community property to a third person that is not allowed under (a) of this section is subject to AS 34.77.140(e) — (h) unless both spouses act together in making the gift or the other spouse ratifies the gift.
  3. Reporting any part of a gift made by the other spouse on a United States gift tax return under 26 U.S.C. 2501 — 2524 or consenting to the treatment of a gift under 26 U.S.C. 2513 (Internal Revenue Code) by signing the consent on the other spouse’s United States gift tax return is treated as the spouses acting together in making the gift.
  4. [Repealed, § 46 ch 45 SLA 2013.]

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am §§ 42, 46 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.050. Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.060. Certain property transactions between spouses.

  1. While both spouses are domiciled in this state, spouses may classify any or all of their property as community property in a community property agreement.
  2. Whether or not both, one, or neither is domiciled in this state, spouses may classify any or all of their property as community property by transferring property to a community property trust and providing in the trust that the property is community property.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.060. Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.070. Obligations of spouses.

  1. [Repealed, § 6 ch 80 SLA 2001.]
  2. After the determination date, a spouse’s obligation to satisfy a duty of support owed to the other spouse or to a child of the marriage may be satisfied only from community property and the other property of the obligated spouse that is not community property.
  3. [Repealed, § 6 ch 80 SLA 2001.]
  4. [Repealed, § 6 ch 80 SLA 2001.]
  5. [Repealed, § 6 ch 80 SLA 2001.]
  6. This chapter does not alter the relationship between spouses and their creditors with respect to property or an obligation in existence before the determination date.
  7. A writing that is signed by a creditor and that reduces a creditor’s rights under this section is binding on the creditor.
  8. A provision of a community property agreement or a community property trust does not adversely affect the interest of a creditor unless the creditor has actual knowledge of the provision when the obligation to the creditor is incurred. The effect of this subsection may not be varied by a community property agreement or a community property trust.
  9. This chapter does not affect an exemption provided under other law for the property of spouses.
  10. An obligation incurred by only one spouse before or during marriage may be satisfied only from the property of that spouse that is not community property and from that spouse’s interest in community property. This subsection does not apply to an obligation described in (b) of this section.
  11. An obligation incurred during marriage by both spouses may be satisfied from property of each spouse that is not community property and from the community property.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am §§ 1, 6 ch 80 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.070. Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.080. Protection of bona fide purchasers dealing with spouses.

  1. Notice of the existence of a community property agreement, a community property trust, a marriage, or the termination of a marriage does not affect the status of a purchaser as a bona fide purchaser.
  2. Community property purchased by a bona fide purchaser from a spouse having the right to manage and control the property under AS 34.77.040 is acquired free of any claim of the other spouse. The effect of this subsection may not be varied by a community property agreement or a community property trust.
  3. In this section,
    1. “bona fide purchaser” means a purchaser of property for value who has not knowingly been a party to fraud or illegality affecting the interest of the spouses or other parties to the transaction, does not have notice of an adverse claim by a spouse, and has acted in the transaction in good faith; in this paragraph, a purchaser gives “value” for property if the property is acquired
      1. in return for a binding commitment to extend credit;
      2. as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a preexisting claim;
      3. by accepting delivery under a preexisting contract for purchase; or
      4. in return for other consideration sufficient to support a contract;
    2. “purchaser” means a person who acquires property by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, or lien, or otherwise deals with property in a voluntary transaction other than making a gift.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.080. Renumbered in 1998, at which time the reference to “AS 34.77.040 ” in subsection (b) was substituted for “AS 34.75.040 ” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of that section.

Sec. 34.77.090. Community property agreement.

  1. A community property agreement must be contained in a written document signed by both spouses and classify some or all of the property of the spouses as community property. It is enforceable without consideration.
  2. A community property agreement must contain the following language in capital letters at the beginning of the agreement:
  3. A community property agreement may not adversely affect the right of a child to support.
  4. Except as provided in AS 34.77.020 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) , and in (c) of this section, in a community property agreement, spouses may agree
    1. on the rights and obligations in the property, notwithstanding when and where the property is acquired and located;
    2. on the management and control of their property;
    3. on the disposition of their property on dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of another event;
    4. on making a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the agreement;
    5. that, upon the death of either of them, any of their property, including after-acquired property, passes without probate to a designated person, trust, or other entity by nontestamentary disposition;
    6. on the choice of law governing the interpretation of the agreement; and
    7. on any other matter that affects their property and does not violate public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
  5. A community property agreement may not be amended or revoked unless the agreement itself provides for amendment or revocation, or unless the agreement is amended or revoked by a later community property agreement. To amend or revoke the agreement, the later community property agreement is not required to declare any property of the spouses as community property. The amended agreement or the revocation is enforceable without consideration. However, notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, unless the community property agreement expressly provides otherwise, if a community property agreement provides for the nontestamentary disposition of property without probate, at any time after the death of the first spouse the surviving spouse may amend the community property agreement with regard to the surviving spouse’s property to be disposed of at the surviving spouse’s death. In this subsection, “surviving spouse’s property” means the property that consists of the surviving spouse’s separate property and the surviving spouse’s share of the community property determined as of the date of the first spouse’s death.
  6. Persons intending to marry each other may enter into a community property agreement as if married, but the agreement does not become effective until the persons are married.
  7. A community property agreement executed during marriage is not enforceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought proves that
    1. the agreement was unconscionable when made;
    2. the spouse against whom enforcement is sought did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
    3. before execution of the agreement, the spouse against whom enforcement is sought
      1. was not given a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse;
      2. did not voluntarily sign a written consent expressly waiving the right to disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse beyond the disclosure provided; and
      3. did not have notice of the property or financial obligations of the other spouse.
  8. A community property agreement executed before marriage is not enforceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought proves that
    1. the spouse against whom enforcement is sought did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
    2. the agreement was unconscionable when made and, before execution of the agreement, the spouse against whom enforcement is sought
      1. was not given a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse;
      2. did not voluntarily sign a written consent expressly waiving the right to disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse beyond the disclosure provided; and
      3. did not have notice of the property or financial obligations of the other spouse.
  9. Whether or not a community property agreement is unconscionable is determined by a court as a matter of law.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE VERY EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, YOUR RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO CREDITORS AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES, AND YOUR RIGHTS WITH YOUR SPOUSE BOTH DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR MARRIAGE AND AT THE TIME OF A DIVORCE. ACCORDINGLY, THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE SIGNED AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.

Click to view

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 2 SLA 2000)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.090 . Renumbered in 1998, at which time the reference to “AS 34.77.020 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) ” in subsection (d) was substituted for “AS 34.75.020 , 34.75.070(h), 34.75.080(b)” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 3, ch. 2, SLA 2000 provides that the amendment made to (e) of this section by sec. 1, ch. 2, SLA 2000 “applies to community property agreements . . . that are entered into or created under AS 34.77 before, on, or after March 8, 2000.”

Notes to Decisions

Presumptive ownership determined by title. —

Intestate decedent’s husband was presumptively the sole owner of a boat and skiff, even though they were purchased during the marriage with marital funds, because the husband’s name alone was on the title to the boats and the related business. Because Alaska is not a community property state, title cannot be disregarded in determining which spouse owns property at death; there is a presumption that the person with title owns the property. Pestrikoff v. Hoff, 278 P.3d 281 (Alaska 2012).

Cited in

Phillips v. Bremner-Phillips, 477 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 34.77.100. Community property trust.

  1. An arrangement is a community property trust if one or both spouses transfer property to a trust, the trust expressly declares that some or all the property transferred is community property under this chapter, and at least one trustee is a qualified person whose powers include or are limited to maintaining records for the trust on an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis and preparing or arranging for the preparation of, on an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis, any income tax returns that must be filed by the trust. A community property trust is enforceable without consideration. Both spouses or either spouse may be a trustee. The trust must be signed by both spouses. In this subsection, “qualified person” means
    1. an individual
      1. who, except for brief intervals, military service, attendance at an educational or training institution, or absences for good cause shown, resides in this state;
      2. whose true and permanent home is in this state;
      3. who does not have a present intention of moving from this state; and
      4. who intends to return to this state when away;
    2. a trust company that is organized under AS 06.26 and that has its principal place of business in this state; or
    3. a bank that is organized under AS 06.05 or a national banking association that is organized under 12 U.S.C. 21 — 216d if the bank or national banking association possesses and exercises trust powers and has its principal place of business in this state.
  2. A community property trust must contain the following language in capital letters at the beginning of the trust:
  3. A community property trust may not adversely affect the right of a child to support.
  4. Except as provided in AS 34.77.010 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) , and in (c) of this section, in a community property trust spouses may agree on
    1. the rights and obligations in the property transferred to the trust, notwithstanding when and where the property is acquired or located;
    2. the management and control of the property transferred to the trust;
    3. the disposition of the property transferred to the trust on dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of another event;
    4. the choice of law governing the interpretation of the trust; and
    5. any other matter that affects the property transferred to the trust and does not violate public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.
  5. A community property trust may not be amended or revoked unless the agreement itself provides for amendment or revocation, or unless the agreement is amended or revoked by a later community property trust. To amend or revoke the trust, the later community property trust is not required to declare any property held by the trustee as community property. The amended trust or the revocation is enforceable without consideration. However, notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, unless the community property trust expressly provides otherwise, at any time after the death of the first spouse the surviving spouse may amend the community property trust with regard to the surviving spouse’s property to be disposed of at the surviving spouse’s death. In this subsection, “surviving spouse’s property” means the property that consists of the surviving spouse’s separate property and the surviving spouse’s share of the community property determined as of the date of the first spouse’s death.
  6. A community property trust executed during marriage is not enforceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is sought proves that
    1. trust was unconscionable when made; or
    2. the spouse against whom enforcement is sought did not execute the community property trust agreement voluntarily; or
    3. before execution of the community property trust agreement, the spouse against whom enforcement is sought
      1. was not given a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse;
      2. did not voluntarily sign a written waiver expressly waiving right to disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other spouse beyond the disclosure provided; and
      3. did not have notice of the property or financial obligations of the other spouse.
  7. Whether or not a community property trust is unconscionable is determined by a court as a matter of law.
  8. The trustee of a community property trust shall maintain records that identify which property held by the trust is community property and which property held by the trust is not community property.
  9. In addition to other transfers of property to a community property trust, property will be considered transferred to a community property trust if the property is subject to a nonprobate transfer on death under AS 13.33.101 and the community property trust is designated as the beneficiary to receive the property under the transfer.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS TRUST MAY BE VERY EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, YOUR RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO CREDITORS AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES, AND YOUR RIGHTS WITH YOUR SPOUSE BOTH DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR MARRIAGE AND AT THE TIME OF A DIVORCE. ACCORDINGLY, THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE SIGNED AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.

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History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 2 SLA 2000; am § 2 ch 80 SLA 2001; am § 7 ch 77 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.100. Renumbered in 1998, at which time the reference to “AS 34.77.010 , 34.77.070(h) , 34.77.080(b) ” in subsection (d) was substituted for “AS 34.75.010 , 34.75.070(h), 34.75.080(b)” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 3, ch. 2, SLA 2000 provides that the amendment made to (e) of this section by sec. 2, ch. 2, SLA 2000 “applies to . . . community property trusts that are entered into or created under AS 34.77 before, on, or after March 8, 2000.”

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Phillips v. Bremner-Phillips, 477 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 34.77.110. Forms of holding property.

  1. Spouses may hold community property in a form that designates the holders of it by the words “(name of one spouse) or (name of other spouse) as community property.” Community property held in this form is subject to AS 34.77.040(a)(6) .
  2. Spouses may hold community property in a form that designates the holder of it by the words “(name of one spouse) and (name of other spouse) as community property.” Community property held in this form is subject to AS 34.77.040(b) .
  3. A spouse may hold individual property in a form that designates the holder of it by the words “(name of spouse) as individual property.” Individual property held in this form is subject to AS 34.77.040(a)(1) .
  4. [Repealed, § 46 ch 45 SLA 2013.]
  5. If the words “survivorship community property” are used instead of the words “community property” in the form described in (a) or (b) of this section, the community property is survivorship community property. On the death of a spouse, the ownership rights of that spouse in survivorship community property vest solely in the surviving spouse by nontestamentary disposition at death. The first deceased spouse does not have a right of disposition at death of any interest in survivorship community property. Holding community property in a form described in (a) or (b) of this section does not by itself establish survivorship ownership between the spouses for the property held in that form.
  6. Property that spouses agree in a community property agreement is community property or property that is transferred to a community property trust and expressly declared by the trust to be community property is owned as community property regardless of the form of title to the property, even if the title indicates that the property is owned unequally by the spouses or is only in the name of one spouse.
  7. If the title to community property is in a form that provides for ownership by survivorship between the spouses, then ownership by survivorship is presumed to have been made with the consent of both spouses.
  8. If a spouse with management and control of community property designates a beneficiary for the property on the death of one or both of the spouses, and if the community property is held in a form of title that permits a beneficiary designation, the beneficiary designation is effective only for the designating spouse’s one-half interest in the community property unless the other spouse consents in writing to the designation. A designation of the following as the beneficiary is presumed to have been made with the consent of the other spouse:
    1. the other spouse or an ancestor or descendant of either spouse;
    2. a charity; or
    3. a trust, to the extent that the beneficiaries consist of persons or entities identified in (1) or (2) of this subsection.
  9. The testimony of one spouse is sufficient to rebut a presumption established under this section.
  10. A disposition of community property contrary to (e) — (h) of this section is voidable. An action in court to void the disposition must be commenced within the time specified by AS 34.77.140(e) .

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am §§ 43, 46 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.110. Renumbered in 1998, at which time references to “AS 34.77.040(a)(6) ”, “AS 34.77.040(b) ”, and “AS 34.77.040(a)(1) ” in subsections (a), (b), and (c), respectively, were substituted for “AS 34.75.040(a)(6)”, “AS 34.75.040(b)”, and “AS 34.75.040(a)(1)”, respectively, to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Cross references. —

For the effect of (i) of this section on Rule 301(a), Alaska Rules of Evidence, see sec. 47(a), ch. 45, SLA 2013.

Sec. 34.77.120. Classification of life insurance policies and proceeds.

  1. If a policy issuer makes payments or takes actions in accordance with the policy and the issuer’s records, the issuer is not liable because of the payments or actions unless, at the time of the payments or actions, the issuer had actual knowledge of inconsistent provisions of a community property agreement, a community property trust, a decree relating to a community property agreement or a community property trust, or an adverse claim that is brought by a spouse, former spouse, surviving spouse, or persons claiming under a deceased spouse’s disposition at death and that relates to a community property agreement or a community property trust.
  2. Except as provided in (c) — (e) of this section,
    1. the ownership interest in and proceeds of a policy that insures the life of one of the spouses and that has been classified by a community property agreement or a community property trust as community property are community property without regard to the classification of property used to pay premiums on the policy;
    2. the ownership interest in and proceeds of a policy that is owned by one spouse and that has not been classified by a community property agreement or a community property trust as community property are mixed property if all or part of a premium on the policy is paid from community property after the determination date; the community property component of the ownership interest and proceeds is the part resulting from multiplying the entire ownership interest and proceeds by a fraction that consists of a numerator that is the sum of the net premiums and portions of net premiums paid from community property and a denominator that is the sum of the net premiums paid;
    3. the ownership interest in and proceeds of a policy issued during marriage that designates the spouse of the insured as the owner are the individual property of the owner without regard to the classification of property used to pay premiums on the policy;
    4. the ownership interest in and proceeds of a policy that designates a person other than either of the spouses as the owner are not affected by this chapter if a premium on the policy is not paid from community property after the determination date; if all or part of a premium on the policy is paid from community property after the determination date, the ownership interest and proceeds of the policy are in part property of the designated owner of the policy and in part community property of the spouses without regard to the classification of property used to pay premiums on the policy after the initial payment of a premium on the policy from community property; the community property component of the ownership interest and proceeds is the part resulting from multiplying the entire ownership interest and proceeds by a fraction that consists of a numerator that is the sum of the net premiums and portions of net premiums paid from community property and a denominator that is the sum of the net premiums paid;
    5. written consent by a spouse to the designation of another person as the beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy is effective to relinquish that spouse’s interest in the ownership interest and proceeds of the policy without regard to the classification of property used by a spouse or another person to pay premiums on the policy; a designation of any of the following persons or trusts as the beneficiary of a policy is presumed to have been made with the consent of the other spouse:
      1. the other spouse or an ancestor or descendant of either spouse; or
      2. a trust, to the extent that its beneficiaries consist of one or more of the persons named in (A) of this paragraph;
    6. unless the spouses provide otherwise in a community property agreement or community property trust, designation of a trust as the beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy with a community property component does not reclassify the component;
    7. unless the spouses provide otherwise, if an irrevocable trust owns a life insurance policy insuring the life of one spouse and the spouse whose life is not insured by the policy is provided a beneficial interest in the trust, then, before a contribution of assets to the trust, the spouse whose life is not insured by the policy is presumed to have relinquished any community property interest that the spouse whose life is not insured by the policy may have had in the assets contributed to the trust; the presumption in this paragraph applies only to the extent that the beneficiaries of the trust consist of one or more of the following persons:
      1. the spouse whose life is not insured;
      2. an ancestor of either spouse;
      3. a descendant of either spouse;
    8. the testimony of the spouse whose life is not insured is sufficient to rebut a presumption in (5) or (7) of this subsection.
  3. This section does not affect a creditor’s interest in the ownership interest or proceeds of a policy assigned or made payable to the creditor as security.
  4. The interest of a person as owner or beneficiary of a policy acquired under a decree or property settlement agreement incident to a prior marriage or parenthood is not community property notwithstanding the classification of property used to pay premiums on the policy.
  5. This section does not affect the ownership interest or proceeds of a policy unless a spouse or a trust described in (b)(7) of this section is designated as an owner in the policy or on the records of the policy issuer and community property is used to pay a premium on the policy.
  6. In this section,
    1. “owner” means a person appearing on the records of a policy issuer as the person having the ownership interest, or, if a person other than the insured does not appear on the records as a person having the interest, “owner” means the insured;
    2. “ownership interest” means the rights of an owner under a policy;
    3. “policy” means an insurance policy insuring the life of a spouse and providing for payment of death benefits at the spouse’s death;
    4. “proceeds” means the death benefit from a policy and all other economic benefits from the policy, whether the economic benefits accrue or become payable as a result of the death of an insured person or upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of another event.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am §§ 3, 4 ch 80 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.120. Renumbered in 1998.

Cross references. —

For effect of paragraph (b)(8) on Rule 301, Alaska Rules of Evidence, see § 7, ch. 80, SLA 2001, in the 2001 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 34.77.130. Mixed property.

  1. Except as provided otherwise in AS 34.77.110 , mixing community property with property having another classification reclassifies the other property as community property unless the component of the mixed property that is not community property can be traced.
  2. If a community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage is community property, application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inventiveness, physical skill, intellectual skill, creativity, or managerial activity on individual property of the other spouse creates community property attributable to the application if
    1. reasonable compensation is not received for the application; and
    2. substantial appreciation of the individual property of the other spouse results from the application.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.130. Renumbered in 1998, at which time the reference to “AS 34.77.110 ” in subsection (a) was substituted for “AS 34.75.110” to reflect the 1998 renumbering of that section.

Sec. 34.77.140. Interspousal remedies.

  1. A spouse has a claim against the other spouse for breach of the good faith requirement under AS 34.77.010 resulting in damage to the claimant spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in community property.
  2. If the spouses have signed a community property agreement or a community property trust, a court may order an accounting of the property and obligations of the spouses and may determine rights of ownership in, beneficial enjoyment of, or access to marital property and the classification of all property of the spouses.
  3. A court may order that the name of a spouse be added to community property held in the name of the other spouse alone, except
    1. a partnership interest held by the other spouse as a general partner;
    2. an interest in a professional corporation, professional association, or similar entity held by the other spouse as a stockholder or member;
    3. an asset of an unincorporated business if the other spouse is the only spouse involved in operating or managing the business; or
    4. other property if the addition would adversely affect the rights of a third person.
  4. Except as provided otherwise in (e) — (h) of this section, a spouse must begin an action against the other spouse under (a) of this section within three years after acquiring actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim.
  5. Except as provided by (f) — (h) of this section, if a gift of community property during marriage by a spouse does not comply with AS 34.77.050(a) , the nondonor spouse may bring an action to recover the property or the amount of money by which the gift exceeded the limit under AS 34.77.050(a) . The nondonor spouse may bring the action against the donor spouse, the gift recipient, or both. The nondonor spouse must commence the action within the earliest of the following times:
    1. one year after the nondonor spouse receives notice of the gift;
    2. one year after dissolution of the marriage; or
    3. on or before the deadline for filing a claim under AS 13.16.460 after the death of the donor spouse.
  6. If a recovery under (e) of this section occurs during the marriage of the donor spouse and the nondonor spouse, the property or money that is recovered is considered community property. If the recovery occurs after the dissolution of the marriage of the donor and nondonor spouses or after the death of either the donor or the nondonor spouse, the recovery is limited to 50 percent of the property or money that would have been recovered if the recovery had occurred during the marriage.
  7. If a transfer of community property to a third person during marriage by a spouse acting without the other spouse becomes a completed gift on the death of the donor spouse, or if an arrangement involving community property during marriage by a spouse acting without the other spouse is intended to be and becomes a gift to a third person on the death of the donor spouse, the surviving spouse may bring an action in court against the gift recipient to recover one-half of the gift. To bring an action under this subsection, the surviving spouse must commence the action on or before the deadline for filing a claim under AS 13.16.460 .
  8. If a spouse who would have been entitled to bring an action under (e) — (g) of this section predeceases the donor spouse, the deceased spouse’s successor in interest may bring an action for recovery under (e) — (g) of this section, but the action must be commenced within one year after the deceased spouse’s death. Recovery in an action under this subsection is the same as if the donor spouse had predeceased the spouse entitled to the recovery, but the amount of the recovery is calculated as of the date of the death of the spouse entitled to the recovery.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998; am §§ 44, 45 ch 45 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.140. Renumbered in 1998, at which time the references to “AS 34.77.010 ” and “AS 34.77.050(d) ” in subsections (a) and (d), respectively, were substituted for “AS 34.75.010 ” and “AS 34.75.050(d)”, respectively, to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Sec. 34.77.150. Treatment of certain property at death of spouse.

If a community property agreement provides that all property acquired by either or both spouses during marriage is community property, at the death of a spouse domiciled in this state, property of the spouse that can be traced to property received by the spouse after the determination date as a recovery for a loss of earning capacity during marriage shall be treated as if it were community property.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.150. Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.155. Division of community property at death.

  1. Upon the death of a spouse, one-half of the aggregate value of the community property owned by the spouses and by any community property trust established by the spouses reflects the share of the surviving spouse and the other one-half reflects the share of the decedent.
  2. Upon the death of a spouse, the deceased spouse’s personal representative and the trustee of a community property trust each have the power to distribute community property in divided or undivided interests and to adjust resulting differences in valuation. A distribution of community property in kind may be made on the basis of a non pro rata division of the aggregate value of the community property, on the basis of a pro rata division of each individual item or asset of community property, or by using both methods.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, spouses may agree in writing to divide their community property on the basis of a non pro rata division of the aggregate value of the community property or on the basis of a pro rata division of each individual item or asset of community property, or by using both methods.

History. (§ 5 ch 80 SLA 2001)

Sec. 34.77.160. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose and to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.160. Renumbered in 1998.

Sec. 34.77.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “acquire” in relation to property includes obtaining reductions of indebtedness on encumbered property and obtaining a lien on or a security interest in property;
  2. “appreciation” means a realized or unrealized increase in the value of property;
  3. “community property” means property owned jointly by both spouses under a community property agreement or a community property trust;
  4. “community property agreement” means an agreement that complies with AS 34.77.090 ;
  5. “community property trust” means an express trust that complies with AS 34.77.100 ;
  6. “decree” means a judgment or other order of a court;
  7. “determination date” means the later of
    1. marriage;
    2. the effective date of a community property agreement or a community property trust; or
    3. May 23, 1998;
  8. “disposition at death” means the transfer of property by will, intestate succession, nontestamentary transfer, or other means that take effect at the transferor’s death;
  9. “dissolution” means
    1. termination of a marriage by a decree of dissolution, divorce, annulment, or declaration of invalidity; or
    2. entry of a decree of legal separation or separate maintenance;
  10. “during marriage” means a period that begins at marriage and ends at divorce, dissolution, or the death of a spouse;
  11. “held” means the registration, recordation, or filing by a person in a public office in the name of the person of a document of title to property, or the issuance in the person’s name of a writing that customarily operates as a document of title to the property;
  12. “income” means dividends, interest, and net rents and other net returns attributable to investment, rental, licensing, or other use of property unless attributable to a return of capital or to appreciation;
  13. “management and control” means the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, institute or defend a civil action regarding, or otherwise deal with property as if the property is the property of an unmarried person;
  14. “notice” of a fact means a knowledge of it, receipt of a notification of it, or reason to know that it exists from the facts and circumstances known to the person;
  15. “presume” or a “presumption” means the imposition on the person against whom the presumption or presumed fact is directed of the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence;
  16. “property” means an interest, present or future, legal or equitable, vested or contingent, in real or personal property;
  17. “written waiver” means a document signed by a person against whose interests it is sought to be enforced.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.900. Renumbered in 1998, at which time references to “AS 34.77.090 ” and “AS 34.77.100 ” in paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively, were substituted for “AS 34.75.090 ” and “AS 34.75.100”, respectively, to reflect the 1998 renumbering of those sections.

Editor’s notes. —

With respect to paragraph (15), § 12, ch. 42, SLA 1998 provides the following: “COURT RULE. AS 34.77.900 (15), enacted by sec. 11 of this Act, changes Rule 301, Alaska Rules of Evidence, by changing the effect of presumptions established under AS 34.77.”

Sec. 34.77.995. Short Title.

This chapter may be cited as the Alaska Community Property Act.

History. (§ 11 ch 42 SLA 1998)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 34.75.995. Renumbered in 1998.

Chapter 80. Escrow Transactions for Residential Real Property.

Cross references. —

For legislative purpose in enacting this chapter, see § 1, ch. 30, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 4, ch. 30, SLA 1999 provides that this chapter “applies to escrow transactions that begin on or after July 1, 1999.”

Sec. 34.80.010. Characterization of escrow money.

The money that is received by a settlement agent for an escrow transaction is not the property of the settlement agent and is not subject to execution, attachment, or other form of collection for a claim against the settlement agent. Escrow money may not be used for a purpose other than to fulfill the terms of the escrow transaction agreement.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Sec. 34.80.020. Segregation and deposit of escrow money.

  1. A settlement agent shall segregate on the records of the settlement agent the escrow money from one escrow transaction from all other money, including the escrow money of other escrow transactions. Escrow money from more than one escrow transaction may be deposited into a single depository escrow account.
  2. A settlement agent shall deposit escrow money in a depository escrow account of a financial institution located in this state.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Sec. 34.80.030. Interest on escrow money.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, interest may not be collected or paid by a settlement agent on money held for an escrow transaction unless authorized in writing by the parties to the escrow transaction, including the settlement agent.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Sec. 34.80.040. Disbursement of escrow money.

  1. A settlement agent may not disburse escrow money unless items that are at least equal in value to the proposed disbursements have been received by the settlement agent for the escrow transaction, have been deposited as required by AS 34.80.020(b) , and are available for withdrawal as a matter of right from the depository escrow account.
  2. A settlement agent may not disburse escrow money on the same business day as the items are deposited under AS 34.80.020(b) unless the deposit is made in cash, by interbank electronic transfer, or in a form that permits conversion of the deposit to cash on the same day the deposit is made.
  3. A settlement agent may not disburse escrow money on the business day after the business day on which the items are deposited under (a) of this section unless the deposit is made by
    1. a cashier’s check or a certified check and the cashier’s check or certified check is payable in the state and drawn on a financial institution located in the state;
    2. a cashier’s check, a negotiable order of withdrawal, a money order, or another item and the check, order of withdrawal, money order, or other item has been finally paid before the disbursement; or
    3. a depository check, including a cashier’s, certified, or teller’s check, that is governed by 12 U.S.C. 4001 — 4010 (Expedited Funds Availability Act).
  4. In (a) of this section, “available for withdrawal as a matter of right” means
    1. when the item has been submitted for collection and payment for the item has been received;
    2. when the financial institution where an item has been deposited considers the money represented by the item available for withdrawal; or
    3. unless written notification has been received from the financial institution where the item was deposited establishing a longer period for an item drawn on an out-of-state financial institution, after a reasonable time has passed for prohibiting customers from drawing on the item.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Sec. 34.80.050. Recording, filing, or delivery of escrow transaction documents.

A settlement agent may not record in the office of the recorder in this state or record in an office in another state that is equivalent to the office of the recorder, file under AS 45.29 in this state or file under an equivalent statute in another state, or deliver a conveyance of property, loan documents, documents establishing a security interest in property, or other documents from an escrow transaction until the money required by the escrow transaction agreement to be disbursed at the same time is available for disbursement under AS 34.80.040 .

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 45.29” was substituted for “AS 45.09” in accordance with § 35, ch. 113, SLA 2000.

Sec. 34.80.090. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “depository escrow account” means an account that holds escrow money pending completion of an escrow transaction and that is in a financial institution;
  2. “escrow money” means the money that is received by a settlement agent for an escrow transaction;
  3. “escrow transaction” means a transaction where, for the purpose of effecting and closing the sale, purchase, exchange, transfer, encumbrance, leasing, or other disposition of an interest in a single piece of residential real property, persons agree that
    1. money, written documents, evidence of title to real or personal property, or other things of value will be delivered to a person for retention until the happening of a specific event or the performance of a prescribed condition; and
    2. upon the happening of the event or performance of the condition, the person holding the things of value will deliver them to the persons entitled to them under the escrow transaction agreement;
  4. “financial institution” means a financial institution
    1. whose accounts are insured by an agency of the federal government;
    2. that is located in this state and does not meet the requirements of (A) of this paragraph, but is subject to regulation by the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development; or
    3. that is located in another state and does not meet the requirements of (A) of this paragraph, but is subject to regulation in the other state by an agency comparable to the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development;
  5. “item” means cash, a check, a negotiable order of withdrawal, a share draft, a traveler’s check, a money order, or an interbank electronic transfer; in this paragraph, “check” includes a cashier’s check;
  6. “residential real property” means real property on which there are one to four attached or detached dwelling units, or any number of apartments if the apartments are in a horizontal property regime formed under AS 34.07 or any number of units if the units are in a common interest community created under AS 34.08; “residential real property” includes a manufactured home that has become real property under AS 34.85.010 ; in this paragraph, “manufactured home” has the meaning given in AS 45.29.102 ;
  7. “settlement agent” means a person who handles an escrow transaction for compensation, but does not mean a financial institution or other person when the financial institution or other person collects money for the sole purpose of applying the money to the payment of an indebtedness; “settlement agent” includes an employee of a person who handles an escrow transaction for compensation when the employee is carrying out employment duties related to the escrow transaction.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999; am § 20 ch 14 SLA 2005; am § 26 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (4)(B) and (4)(C) of this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was substituted for “Department of Commerce and Economic Development” to reconcile chs. 30 and 58, SLA 1999.

In 2004, in (4)(B) and (4)(C) of this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Cross references. —

For a saving clause relating to interpretation of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 31, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

For severability of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 32, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 14, SLA 2005 (SB 52), amending paragraph (4) of this section, see 2005 Senate Journal 42 — 43.

Sec. 34.80.095. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Good Funds Act.

History. (§ 3 ch 30 SLA 1999)

Chapter 85. Manufactured Home Property Act.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and purpose of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 1, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

For severability of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 32, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

For a saving clause relating to the interpretation of the provisions of ch. 64, SLA 2012, see § 31, ch. 64, SLA 2012 in the 2012 Temporary and Special Acts.

Sec. 34.85.010. Real property characterization.

A manufactured home becomes real property if

  1. the home is permanently affixed to land under AS 34.85.150 ;
  2. an affixation affidavit has been recorded under AS 40.17.125 ;
  3. the ownership interests in the manufactured home and in the real property to which the manufactured home is permanently affixed are identical, except as provided by AS 34.85.040 ; and
  4. the manufactured home is
    1. covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin that the owner of the manufactured home is able to produce, and the department has cancelled the manufacturer’s certificate of origin under AS 28.10.262 ;
    2. covered by a certificate of title that the owner of the manufactured home is able to produce, and the department has cancelled the certificate of title under AS 28.10.263 ; or
    3. not covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin or a certificate of title, or if the manufactured home is covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin or a certificate of title but the owner of the manufactured home, after diligent search and inquiry, was unable to produce the manufacturer’s certificate of origin or certificate of title, and the department has provided a written confirmation under AS 28.10.264 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.020. Effect of real property characterization.

  1. When a manufactured home becomes real property under AS 34.85.010 , a mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or security interest that can attach to land, buildings erected on land, or fixtures affixed to land or buildings attaches to the manufactured home in the same manner as if the manufactured home were built from ordinary building materials on the land where the manufactured home is located.
  2. If the title to a manufactured home is transferred after the manufactured home becomes real property under AS 34.85.010 , title to the manufactured home, together with the land to which the converted manufactured home is affixed, shall be transferred by deed or other form of conveyance that is effective to transfer an interest in real property.
  3. When a manufactured home becomes real property under AS 34.85.010 , the manufactured home is governed by the laws applicable to real property in effect on the date the manufactured home satisfies AS 34.85.010 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.040. Ownership interest exception.

If the owner of a manufactured home is not the owner of the real property on which the manufactured home is located, the requirement under AS 34.85.010 (3) that the ownership interests be identical is satisfied if the owner possesses the real property under

  1. a lease in a recordable form that has a term that continues for at least 20 years after the date of execution of the affixation affidavit; and
  2. the lessor of the real property consents.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.060. Affixation affidavit requirements.

An affixation affidavit must provide

  1. the name of the manufacturer, the make, the model name, the model year, the dimensions, and the manufacturer’s serial number of the manufactured home;
  2. whether the manufactured home is new or used;
  3. a statement that the person executing the affidavit is
    1. the owner of the real property described in the affixation affidavit; or
    2. not the owner of the real property described in the affixation affidavit, and the person
      1. is in possession of the real property under a lease in recordable form that has a term that continues for at least 20 years after the date of execution of the affidavit; and
      2. the lessor of the real property consents;
  4. if (3)(B)(ii) of this section applies, the consent of the lessor of the real property endorsed on or attached to the affidavit and acknowledged or proved in the manner required for the conveyance to be recorded;
  5. the street address and the legal description of the real property to which the manufactured home is or shall be permanently affixed;
  6. if the manufactured home is not covered by a certificate of title, a statement by the owner to that effect;
  7. an owner’s statement under AS 34.85.070 ;
  8. a statement whether or not the manufactured home is subject to a lien or encumbrance;
  9. if the manufactured home is subject to a lien or encumbrance, a statement giving the name and address of each person who holds a lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home, including each holder of a lien or encumbrance shown on a certificate of title issued by the department, the original principal amount secured by each lien and encumbrance, and a statement that
    1. the lien or encumbrance shall be released; or
    2. each lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home has been released and proof of the release;
  10. if the manufactured home is not covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin or a certificate of title, a statement by the owner of the manufactured home that the manufactured home is not covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin or a certificate of title and that the owner of the manufactured home will apply to the department under AS 28.10.264 ;
  11. a statement that the manufactured home is or will be permanently affixed to the real property; and
  12. the name and address of a person designated for filing the certified copy of the affixation affidavit with the department.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.070. Owner’s statement for affixation affidavit.

  1. An owner’s statement for an affixation affidavit must comply with (b) or (c) of this section.
  2. If a manufactured home is covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin, the owner of the manufactured home shall
    1. state that the manufactured home is covered by a manufacturer’s certificate of origin, provide the date the manufacturer’s certificate of origin was issued, provide the manufacturer’s serial number, state that the original manufacturer’s certificate of origin for the manufactured home is annexed to the affixation affidavit and is endorsed to the owner of the manufactured home, and state that the owner of the manufactured home will surrender the manufacturer’s certificate of origin for cancellation under AS 28.10.262 ; or
    2. state that the owner of the manufactured home, after diligent search and inquiry, has been unable to produce the original manufacturer’s certificate of origin for the manufactured home and shall apply to the department under AS 28.10.264 .
  3. If a manufactured home is covered by a certificate of title, the owner of the manufactured home shall
    1. state that the manufactured home is covered by a certificate of title, provide the date the title was issued and the title number, and state that the owner shall surrender the title for cancellation under AS 28.10.263 ; or
    2. state that the owner, after diligent search and inquiry, has been unable to produce the certificate of title to the manufactured home and shall apply to the department under AS 28.10.264 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.080. Effect on liens and encumbrances.

Permanently affixing a manufactured home to real property or recording an affixation affidavit under AS 40.17.125 does not impair the rights of a holder of, or the character of, a lien or encumbrance on a manufactured home under AS 28.10.381 unless an application to cancel the title is filed with the department under AS 28.10.263 and the lien or encumbrance is released under AS 28.10.401 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.090. Filing affixation affidavit with department.

When a person designated in an affixation affidavit to file the affixation affidavit with the department receives a certified copy of the recorded affixation affidavit, the person shall deliver the certified copy of the affixation affidavit to the department for filing under AS 28.10.262 28.10.264 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.100. Use of affidavit.

  1. Except as provided in AS 34.85.010 , 34.85.020 , 34.85.090 , and AS 40.17.125 , an affixation affidavit is not necessary or effective to convey or encumber a manufactured home or to change the character of a manufactured home to real property.
  2. A conveyance of land on which a manufactured home is located must recite that the conveyance does not affect the title to the manufactured home and that the transfer or encumbrance of the manufactured home can only be made under AS 28.10 if
    1. an affixation affidavit has not been recorded for the manufactured home; or
    2. a severance affidavit has been recorded for the manufactured home.
  3. An agreement that waives the requirements of (a) or (b) of this subsection is void.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.110. Severance of manufactured home.

If an affixation affidavit has been recorded for a converted manufactured home and if the converted manufactured home is severed from the real property to which it was affixed, each person having an interest in the real property shall record a severance affidavit in the recording district where the affixation affidavit was recorded.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.120. Severance affidavit.

The severance affidavit must contain or be accompanied by

  1. the name, residence, and mailing address of the owner of the manufactured home;
  2. a description of the manufactured home, including the name of the manufacturer, the make, the model name, the model year, the dimensions, and the manufacturer’s serial number of the manufactured home;
  3. a statement of whether the manufactured home is new or used;
  4. the serial numbers and date when the affixation affidavit was recorded;
  5. a statement
    1. of any facts or information known to the person signing the affidavit that could reasonably affect the validity of the title to the manufactured home or the existence or nonexistence of a lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home; or
    2. that the person signing the affidavit does not know any facts or information that could reasonably affect the validity of the title to the manufactured home or the existence or nonexistence of a lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home;
  6. a declaration made under oath or affirmation by an attorney authorized under AS 08.08 to practice law in the state or an agent of a title insurance company entitled under AS 21.66 to transact a title insurance business in this state that the manufactured home is free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, and
    1. stating any facts or information known to the attorney or agent that could reasonably affect the validity of the title to the manufactured home or the existence or nonexistence of a lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home; or
    2. that the attorney or agent does not know any facts or information that could reasonably affect the validity of the title to the manufactured home or the existence or nonexistence of a lien or encumbrance on the manufactured home; and
  7. the name and address of the person designated to file the certified copy of the severance affidavit with the department under AS 28.10.265 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.130. Filing of severance affidavit.

On receipt of a certified copy of the severance affidavit by the person designated in the affidavit for filing with the department, the person shall file the certified copy with the department under AS 28.10.262 28.10.264 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.140. Affidavit form and acknowledgment.

  1. An affixation affidavit and a severance affidavit must be acknowledged in the same manner as a conveyance of real property and must be in a form that may be recorded under AS 40.17.
  2. The department shall establish by regulation the forms for an affixation affidavit and a severance affidavit.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.150. Permanently affixed.

A manufactured home is permanently affixed when it is

  1. anchored to real property by attachment to a permanent foundation;
  2. constructed in accordance with applicable state and local building codes and manufacturer’s specifications as provided in the Model Manufactured Home Installation Standards of the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (24 C.F.R. 3285); and
  3. connected to a residential utility, including water, gas, electricity, sewer, or septic service.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.190. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise,

  1. “affixation affidavit” means an affixation affidavit under AS 34.85.060 ;
  2. “department” means the Department of Administration;
  3. “manufactured home” has the meaning given in AS 45.29.102 ;
  4. “permanently affixed” means when a manufactured home is permanently affixed under AS 34.85.150 ;
  5. “severance affidavit” means a severance affidavit under AS 34.85.120 .

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)

Sec. 34.85.195. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Manufactured Home Property Act.

History. (§ 27 ch 64 SLA 2012)