COCODE

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section

PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

PART 2 COURT-APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE PROGRAM

PART 3 RECORDS AND INFORMATION

PART 4 PREVENTION PROGRAMS FUNDED THROUGH STATE AGENCIES

PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

19-1-101. Short title.

This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Children's Code".

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 695, § 1, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. This section, as it existed in 1987, is the same as 19-1-101 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

An award of custody must serve the public as well as the best interests of the child. S.F.E. in Interest of T.I.E., 981 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1998).

In determining custody in dependency and neglect hearing, juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to consider any purposes of this Colorado Children's Code and in relying solely on a limited number of purposes set forth in § 14-10-124 . L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385 ( Colo. 1996 ).

Applied in Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419 , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).

19-1-102. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly declares that the purposes of this title are:
1. To secure for each child subject to these provisions such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society;
2. To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including improvement of home environment;
3. To remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endangered and, in either instance, for the courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child; and
4. To secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.
1. (1.5) (a) The general assembly declares that it is in the best interests of the child who has been removed from his own home to have the following guarantees:
  1. To be placed in a secure and stable environment;
  2. To not be indiscriminately moved from foster home to foster home; and
  3. To have assurance of long-term permanency planning.
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 92, p. 220 , § 1, effective July 1, 1992.)
(1.6) The general assembly recognizes the numerous studies establishing that children undergo a critical bonding and attachment process prior to the time they reach six years of age. Such studies further disclose that a child who has not bonded with a primary adult during this critical stage will suffer significant emotional damage which frequently leads to chronic psychological problems and antisocial behavior when the child reaches adolescence and adulthood. Accordingly, the general assembly finds and declares that it is appropriate to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that children under the age of six years who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes as expeditiously as possible.

(1.7) The general assembly further declares that it is the intent of the general assembly to have the media and the courts refrain from causing undue hardship, discomfort, and distress to any juvenile victims of sexual assault, child abuse, incest, or any offenses listed in wrongs to children pursuant to part 4 of article 6 of title 18, C.R.S., by not disseminating or publishing the names of such victims.

(1.9) The federal "Family First Prevention Services Act" was enacted on February 9, 2018. In order to comply with the provisions of the federal "Family First Prevention Services Act", the general assembly finds that it is necessary to update current statutes to enable Colorado to provide enhanced support to children, juveniles, or youth, and their families in order to prevent foster care placements. The state department of human services shall implement the updated provisions in this title 19 utilizing prevention services and qualified residential treatment programs when the federal government approves Colorado's five-year Title IV-E prevention plan, and subject to available general fund appropriations or federal funding.
To carry out these purposes, the provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to serve the welfare of children and the best interests of society.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 695, § 1, effective October 1. L. 88: (1.5) added, p. 755, § 1, effective May 31. L. 90: (1.7) added, p. 1007, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (1.5) amended, p. 220, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (1.6) added, p. 2051, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2019: (1.9) added, (HB 19-1308), ch. 256, p. 2458, § 2, effective August 2. L. 2020: (1.9) amended, (SB 20-162), ch. 221, p. 1087, § 1, effective July 2; (1.9) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1047, § 32, effective June 30.

Editor's note:

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. This section, as it existed in 1987, is the same as 19-1-102 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Amendments to subsection (1.9) by SB 20-162 and HB 20-1402 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the "Family First Prevention Services Act", see Pub.L. 115-123.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado: The Law's Response to Society's Need", see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 89 (1963). For note, "Juvenile Delinquency -- Colorado's Unassumed Burden", see 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 519 (1964). For article, "Children in Need: Observations of Practice of the Denver Juvenile Court", see 51 Den. L.J. 337 (1974). For comment, "Bastardizing the Legitimate Child: The Colorado Supreme Court Invalidates the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legitimacy in R. McG. v. J.W.", see 59 Den. L.J. 157 (1981). For article, "The Role of Parents' Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings -- Part II", see 14 Colo. Law. 794 (1985).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The provisions of this title must be read and construed together. To hold otherwise would open the door to endless confusion and a myriad of conflicting jurisdictional claims respecting the interests of children in this state. Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121 , 308 P.2d 1000 (1957).

The Colorado Children's Code must be liberally construed. People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172 , 511 P.2d 477 (1973).

Provisions of the Children's Code should be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose and to effectuate the intent of the general assembly. R.M. v. District Court, 191 Colo. 42 , 550 P.2d 346 (1976).

In the best interest of child and society. When the general assembly said that "this title shall be liberally construed", it meant that it should be construed favorably to the best interests of the child and society. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973); People in Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1992).

Purpose of code. One of the underlying purposes of the Colorado Children's Code is to create distinction between adults and children who violate law. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).

The Colorado Children's Code's sole emphasis is on rehabilitating children, assisting them in becoming responsible and productive members of society, and preventing them, while at an impressionable and vulnerable age, from becoming criminals. People in Interest of M.C., 750 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 774 P.2d 857 ( Colo. 1989 ).

The overriding purpose of the Colorado Children's Code is to protect the welfare and safety of Colorado children by providing procedures through which their best interests can be served. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 ( Colo. 1995 ); People ex rel. C.M., 116 P.3d 1278 (Colo. App. 2005); People ex rel. B.C., 122 P.3d 1067 (Colo. App. 2005).

To this end, dependency or neglect proceedings focus primarily on the protection and safety of children susceptible to harm from the effect of abuse and neglect, not on the custodial interests of the parent. People ex rel. C.M., 116 P.3d 1278 (Colo. App. 2005); People ex rel. B.C., 122 P.3d 1067 (Colo. App. 2005).

The purposes of the Colorado Children's Code are quite different from the purposes of the Criminal Code, and an amendment furthering the purposes of one cannot be deemed invalid on the ground that such legislation is contrary to the purposes of the other. People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).

The adoption of the Colorado Children's Code and the establishment of a juvenile court was based on a legislative conclusion that adjudication of issues arising from the conduct of young persons must focus on the protection and rehabilitation of such persons. But the Children's Code expressly recognizes the necessity of balancing the primary concern for protecting and nurturing young persons with concern for the safety of all members of society. People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).

Consecutive commitments. Since the purposes of the Colorado Children's Code focus on the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the offender, such purposes may be fostered by the imposition of consecutive commitments. People in Interest of S.A.E., 724 P.2d 100 (Colo. App. 1986), overruled in S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, ( Colo. 1988 ).

State's interest relative to preventing delinquent children from becoming adult criminals is compelling. People in Interest of M.C., 750 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 774 P.2d 857 ( Colo. 1989 ).

Prosecution of juveniles under municipal ordinance does not conflict with Colorado Children's Code and, although municipalities are not prohibited from adopting same procedures as Children's Code, municipalities are not required to follow such procedures. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Colorado Children's Code does not require that juvenile proceedings in municipal courts be civil in nature as Children's Code and ordinances of municipality on juvenile proceedings do not conflict. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Intent of general assembly that the Colorado Children's Code apply only to juvenile proceedings in juvenile court, and not to municipal court proceedings involving prosecution of juveniles under municipal ordinances. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Since a person under age 18 can only be charged with an offense in the manner permitted by the Colorado Children's Code, the county court had no jurisdiction to entertain or to dispose of the merits of the proceeding involving an offense alleged against a juvenile and was without authority to go further than merely dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. People in Interest of C.O., 870 P.2d 1266 (Colo. App. 1994).

Public policy. The public policy of the state is to provide for a neglected and dependent child in a manner that will best serve his welfare and the interests of society. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974); People in Interest of M.B., 188 Colo. 370 , 535 P.2d 192 (1975).

The juvenile system is premised on the concept that a more informal, simple, and speedy judicial setting will best serve the needs and welfare of juvenile defendants. The designs of the juvenile system, however, must be tempered with procedural rules that recognize the children who commit serious offenses may need to be treated differently than other juveniles. J.T. v. O'Rourke ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 651 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1982).

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of a child. However, that parental right to due process is subject to the power of the state to act in the child's best interest. People in Interest of M.H., 855 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1993).

Fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of a child not extended to stepparent. Absent substantial evidence that a stepparent stands in loco parentis to the child, there is no authority to extend a similar liberty interest to either a stepparent or a family unit created by the natural or adoptive parent and a stepparent. People ex rel. of E.S., 49 P.3d 1221 (Colo. App. 2002).

The state acts as parens patriae -- sovereign guardian -- to safeguard the interests of vulnerable children within the state. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995).

Termination of parental rights is drastic remedy in which a most serious interest of the parents is jeopardized. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Home care and guidance preferred. A neglected and dependent child's care and guidance should be preferably in his own home, so as to preserve and strengthen family ties. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Absent a showing of a causal relationship between such an environment and a serious threat to the emotional or physical stability of the child, public policy requires that the care and guidance of each child should remain with his parents and in his own home. People in Interest of D.L.R., 44 Colo. App. 327, 618 P.2d 687 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 638 P.2d 39 ( Colo. 1981 ).

As is maintenance of family ties. The general assembly has declared its preference for the maintenance of family ties whenever possible in subsection (1)(b). People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Under this code, parties are precluded from stipulating restrictions upon court's duty to protect best interests of child. In re People in Interest of A.R.S, 31 Colo. App. 268, 502 P.2d 92 (1972).

Applied in Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600 , 99 P. 333 (1908); Cruz v. Morley, 77 Colo. 25 , 234 P. 178 (1925); Johnson v. People, 170 Colo. 137 , 459 P.2d 579 (1969); Stjernholm v. Mazaheri, 180 Colo. 352 , 506 P.2d 155 (1973); P.F.M. v. Dist. Court, 184 Colo. 393 , 520 P.2d 742 (1974); Dept. of Insts. ex rel. S.L.G. v. Bushnell, 195 Colo. 566 , 579 P.2d 1168 (1978); People in Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430 , 586 P.2d 46 (1978); Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419 , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979); B.G. v. S.G., 199 Colo. 403 , 609 P.2d 121 (1980); Villareal v. Lopez, 44 Colo. App. 555, 619 P.2d 86 (1980); People in Interest of C.A.K., 628 P.2d 136 (Colo. App. 1980); People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 ( Colo. 1981 ); People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 ( Colo. 1982 ); People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 ( Colo. 1982 ); People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1982); People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of M.H., 661 P.2d 1173 ( Colo. 1983 ); People in Interest of A.J., 757 P.2d 1165 (Colo. App. 1988).

19-1-103. Definitions.

As used in this title 19 or in the specified portion of this title 19, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. "Abuse" or "child abuse or neglect", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means an act or omission in one of the following categories that threatens the health or welfare of a child:
  1. Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death and either: Such condition or death is not justifiably explained, the history given concerning such condition is at variance with the degree or type of such condition or death, or the circumstances indicate that such condition may not be the product of an accidental occurrence;
  2. Any case in which a child is subjected to unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9);
  3. Any case in which a child is in need of services because the child's parent, legal guardian, or custodian fails to take the same actions to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision that a prudent parent would take. The requirements of this subsection (1)(a)(III) are subject to the provisions of section 19-3-103.
  4. Any case in which a child is subjected to emotional abuse. As used in this subsection (1)(a)(IV), "emotional abuse" means an identifiable and substantial impairment of the child's intellectual or psychological functioning or development or a substantial risk of impairment of the child's intellectual or psychological functioning or development.
  5. Any act or omission described in section 19-3-102 (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c);
  6. Any case in which, in the presence of a child, or on the premises where a child is found, or where a child resides, a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), is manufactured or attempted to be manufactured;
  7. Any case in which a child is born affected by alcohol or substance exposure, except when taken as prescribed or recommended and monitored by a licensed health care provider, and the newborn child's health or welfare is threatened by substance use;
  8. Any case in which a child is subjected to human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude, as described in section 18-3-503, or human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude, as described in section 18-3-504 (2).
2. In all cases, those investigating reports of child abuse shall take into account accepted child-rearing practices of the culture in which the child participates, including but not limited to accepted work-related practices of agricultural communities. Nothing in this subsection (1) refers to acts that could be construed to be a reasonable exercise of parental discipline or to acts reasonably necessary to subdue a child being taken into custody pursuant to section 19-2.5-209 that are performed by a peace officer, as described in section 16-2.5-101, acting in the good-faith performance of the officer's duties.
"Adjudication" has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-2.5-102.
"Adjudicatory hearing" means a hearing to determine whether the allegations of a petition in dependency and neglect are supported by the evidence.
"Adjudicatory trial" means a trial to determine whether the allegations of a petition in delinquency are supported by the evidence.
"Administrative review" means a review conducted by the department of human services that is open to the participation of the parents of the child and conducted by an administrative reviewer who is not responsible for the case management of, or the delivery of services to, either the child or the parents who are the subject of the review.
"Adoptee", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means a person who, as a minor, was adopted pursuant to a final decree of adoption entered by a court.
1. "Adoption record", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, with the exception of section 19-5-305 (2)(b)(I) to (2)(b)(IV), means the following documents and information:
  1. The adoptee's original birth certificate and amended birth certificate;
  2. The final decree of adoption;
  3. Nonidentifying information, as defined in subsection (103) of this section;
  4. The final order of relinquishment; and
  5. The order of termination of parental rights.
2. "Adoption record", as used in section 19-5-305 (2)(b)(I) to (2)(b)(IV), means the following documents and information, without redaction:
  1. The adoptee's original birth certificate and amended birth certificate;
  2. The final decree of adoption;
  3. Any identifying information, such as the name of the adoptee before placement in adoption; the name and address of each birth parent as they appear in the birth records; the name, address, and contact information of the adult adoptee; and the current name, address, and contact information of each birth parent, if known, or other information that might personally identify a birth parent;
  4. Any nonidentifying information, as defined in subsection (103) of this section;
  5. The final order of relinquishment; and
  6. The order of termination of parental rights.
3. "Adoption record", as used in either subsection (6)(a) or (6)(b) of this section, must not include pre-relinquishment counseling records, which must remain confidential.
"Adoption triad" means the three parties involved in an adoption: The adoptee, the birth parent, and the adoptive parent.
"Adoptive parent", as used in parts 3 and 4 of article 5 of this title 19, means an adult who has become a parent of a minor through the legal process of adoption.
"Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or older; except that any person eighteen years of age or older who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, who is before the court for an alleged delinquent act committed prior to the person's eighteenth birthday, or concerning whom a petition has been filed for the person's adoption other than pursuant to this title 19 must be referred to as a juvenile.
"Adult adoptee", as used in parts 3 and 4 of article 5 of this title 19, means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older and who, as a minor, was adopted pursuant to a final decree of adoption entered by a court.
"Appropriate treatment plan", as used in section 19-3-508 (1)(e), means a treatment plan approved by the court that is reasonably calculated to render the particular respondent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time and that relates to the child's needs.
"Assessment center for children", as used in part 3 of this article 1, means a multi-disciplinary, community-based center that provides services to children and their families, including, but not limited to, detention, screening, case management, and therapeutic intervention relating to delinquency, abuse or neglect, family conflict, and truancy.
"Basic identification information", as used in article 2.5 of this title 19, means the name, place and date of birth, last-known address, social security number, occupation and address of employment, last school attended, physical description, photograph, handwritten signature, sex, fingerprints, and any known aliases of any person.
"Biological parent" or "birth parent", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means a parent, by birth, of an adopted person.
"Biological sibling", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means a sibling, by birth, of an adopted person. "Biological sibling", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, for purposes of the definition of sibling group, as defined in subsection (127) of this section, means a brother, sister, or half-sibling of a child who is being placed in foster care or being placed for adoption.
"Birth parents", as used in part 4 of article 5 of this title 19, means genetic, biological, or natural parents whose rights were voluntarily or involuntarily terminated by a court or otherwise. "Birth parents" includes a man who is the parent of a child as established in accordance with the provisions of the "Uniform Parentage Act", article 4 of this title 19, prior to the termination of parental rights.
"Board", as used in article 3.5 of this title 19, means the Colorado child abuse prevention board created in section 19-3.5-103.
"Case management purposes" means assessments, evaluations, treatment, education, proper disposition or placement of the child, interagency coordination, and other services that are incidental to the administration of the program and in the best interests of the child.
"Chief justice", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court.
"Child" means a person under eighteen years of age.
"Child abuse", as used in article 3.5 of this title 19, means any act that reasonably may be construed to fall under the definition of abuse or child abuse or neglect in subsection (1) of this section.
"Child advocacy center", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means a center that provides a comprehensive multidisciplinary team response to allegations of child abuse or neglect in a dedicated, child-friendly setting. The team response to allegations of child abuse or neglect includes but is not limited to technical assistance for forensic interviews, forensic medical examinations, mental health and related support services, consultation, training, and education.
"Child care center" means a child care center licensed and approved pursuant to article 6 of title 26. If the facility is located in another state, the department of human services shall designate, upon certification, that an appropriate available space does not exist in a child care facility in this state, and the facility must be licensed or approved as required by law in that state.
"Child placement agency" means an agency licensed or approved pursuant to law. If such agency is located in another state, it must be licensed or approved as required by law in that state.
"Child protection team", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means a multidisciplinary team consisting, where possible, of a physician; a representative of the juvenile court or the district court with juvenile jurisdiction; a representative of a local law enforcement agency; a representative of the county department of human or social services; a representative of a mental health clinic; a representative of a county, district, or municipal public health agency; an attorney; a representative of a public school district; and one or more representatives of the lay community, at least one of whom must be a person who serves as a foster parent in the county. Each public agency may have more than one participating member on the team; except that, in voting on procedural or policy matters, each public agency shall have only one vote. In no event must an attorney member of the child protection team be appointed as guardian ad litem for the child or as counsel for the parents at any subsequent court proceedings. The child protection team must never be composed of fewer than three persons. When any racial, ethnic, or linguistic minority group constitutes a significant portion of the population of the jurisdiction of the child protection team, a member of each such minority group must serve as an additional lay member of the child protection team. At least one of the preceding members of the team must be chosen on the basis of representing low-income families. The role of the child protection team is advisory only.
"Citizen review panel", as used in section 19-3-211, means the panel created in a county by the board of county commissioners or in a city and county by the city council that reviews and makes recommendations regarding grievances referred to the panel by the county director pursuant to the conflict resolution process.
"Commercial sexual exploitation of a child" means a crime of a sexual nature committed against a child for financial or other economic reasons.
"Commit", as used in article 2.5 of this title 19, means to transfer legal custody.
"Community placement" means the placement of a child for whom the department of human services or a county department has placement and care responsibility pursuant to article 2.5 or 3 of this title 19 in any licensed or certified twenty-four-hour nonsecure care and treatment facility away from the child's parent or guardian. "Community placement" includes but is not limited to placement in a foster care home, group home, residential child care facility, or residential treatment facility.
"Complainant", as used in section 19-3-211, means any person who was the subject of an investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect or any parent, guardian, or legal custodian of a child who is the subject of a report of child abuse or neglect and brings a grievance against a county department of human or social services in accordance with the provisions of section 19-3-211.
"Confidential intermediary", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means a person twenty-one years of age or older who has completed a training program for confidential intermediaries that meets the standards set forth by the commission pursuant to section 19-5-303 and who is authorized to inspect confidential relinquishment and adoption records at the request of an adult adoptee, adoptive parent, biological parent, or biological sibling.
"Confirmed", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means any report made pursuant to article 3 of this title 19 that is found by a county department of human or social services, law enforcement agency, or entity authorized to investigate institutional abuse to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
"Consent", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means voluntary, informed, written consent. When used in the context of confidential intermediaries, "consent" always must be preceded by an explanation that consent permits the confidential intermediary to arrange a personal contact among biological relatives. "Consent" may also mean the agreement for contact or disclosure of records by any of the parties identified in section 19-5-304 (2) as a result of an inquiry by a confidential intermediary pursuant to section 19-5-304.
"Consent form", as used in section 19-5-305 (3), means a verified written statement signed by an adult adoptee or an adult adoptee's consenting birth parent or an adoptive parent of a minor adoptee, and notarized, and that authorizes the release of adoption records or identifying information, to the extent available, by a licensed child placement agency.
"Contact information" means information supplied voluntarily by a birth parent on a contact preference form, including the name of the birth parent at the time of relinquishment of the adoptee; the alias, if any, used at the time of relinquishment of the adoptee; and the current name, current address, and current telephone number of the birth parent.
"Contact preference form" means a written statement signed by a birth parent indicating whether the birth parent prefers future contact with an adult adoptee, an adult descendant of the adoptee, or a legal representative of the adoptee or the descendant and, if contact is preferred, whether the contact should be through a confidential intermediary or a designated employee of a child placement agency.
"Continuously available", as used in section 19-3-308 (4), means the assignment of a person to be near an operable telephone not necessarily located on the premises ordinarily used for business by the county department of human or social services or to have such arrangements made through agreements with local law enforcement agencies.
"Convicted" or "conviction", as used in section 19-5-105.5, means a plea of guilty accepted by the court, including a plea of guilty entered pursuant to a deferred sentence pursuant to section 18-1.3-102, a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury, or a plea of no contest accepted by the court, or having received a disposition as a juvenile or having been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent based on the commission of any act that constitutes sexual assault, as defined in subsection (124) of this section.
"Cost of care" means the cost to the department of human services or the county department of human or social services for a child placed out of the home; or the cost to the department of human services or the county department of human or social services charged with the custody of the juvenile for providing room, board, clothing, education, medical care, and other normal living expenses for a child placed out of the home; or the cost to the department of human services or the county department of human or social services for a juvenile sentenced to a placement out of the home as determined by the court. As used in this title 19, "cost of care" also includes any costs associated with maintenance of a juvenile in a home detention program, supervision of probation when the juvenile is granted probation, or supervision of parole when the juvenile is placed on parole.
"Counsel" means an attorney-at-law who acts as a person's legal advisor or who represents a person in court.
"County attorney" means the office of the county attorney or city attorney representing a county or a city and county and includes the attorneys employed or retained by such county or city and county.
1. "County department", as used in this article 1; part 2, part 3, and part 7 of article 3 of this title 19; part 2 of article 5 of this title 19; and part 3 of article 7 of this title 19, means the county or district department of human or social services.
2. "County department" means a county or a city and county department of human or social services.
"County director", as used in section 19-3-211 and part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means the county director or district director appointed pursuant to section 26-1-117.
"Court", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means any court of record with jurisdiction over the matter at issue.
"Court-appointed special advocate" or "CASA volunteer" means a volunteer appointed by a court pursuant to part 2 of this article 1 to assist in advocacy for children.
"Court-appointed special advocate program" or "CASA program" means a program established pursuant to part 2 of this article 1.
"Criminal justice agency", as used in this section, has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-72-302 (3).
"Custodial adoption", as used in part 2 of article 5 of this title 19, means an adoption of a child by any person and the person's spouse, as required pursuant to section 19-5-202 (3), who:
1. Has been awarded custody or allocated parental responsibilities by a court of law in a dissolution of marriage, custody or allocation of parental responsibilities proceeding, or has been awarded guardianship of the child by a court of law in a probate action, such as pursuant to part 2 of article 14 of title 15; and
2. Has had physical custody of the child for a period of one year or more.
"Custodian" means a person who has been providing shelter, food, clothing, and other care for a child in the same fashion as a parent would, whether or not by order of court.
1. 1. "Custodian of records", as used in sections 19-5-305 (2) and 19-5-305.5, means any of the following individuals or entities that have custody of records relating to the relinquishment or adoption of a child: (51) (a) (I) "Custodian of records", as used in sections 19-5-305 (2) and 19-5-305.5, means any of the following individuals or entities that have custody of records relating to the relinquishment or adoption of a child:
    1. A court;
    2. A state agency; or
    3. The legal agent or representative of any entity described in subsections (51)(a)(I)(A) and (51)(a)(I)(B) of this section.
  2. "Custodian of records", as used in sections 19-5-305 (2) and 19-5-305.5, does not include a licensed child placement agency.
2. "Custodian of records", as used in section 19-5-109, means an entity that has custody of records relating to the relinquishment of a child, including a court, state agency, licensed child placement agency, maternity home, or the legal agent or representative of any such entity.
"Delinquent act", as used in article 2.5 of this title 19, means a violation of any statute, ordinance, or order enumerated in section 19-2.5-103. If a juvenile is alleged to have committed or is found guilty of a delinquent act, the classification and degree of the offense is determined by the statute, ordinance, or order that the petition alleges was violated. "Delinquent act" does not include truancy or habitual truancy.
"Department" or "state department" means the state department of human services created in section 24-1-120.
"Designated adoption" means an adoption in which:
1. The birth parent or parents designate a specific applicant with whom they wish to place their child for purposes of adoption; and
2. The anonymity requirements of section 19-1-309 are waived.
"Detention" means the temporary care of a child who requires secure custody in physically restricting facilities pending court disposition or an execution of a court order for placement or commitment.
"Director", as used in article 2.5 of this title 19, is defined in section 19-2.5-102.
"Disability" has the same meaning as set forth in the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., and its related amendments and implementing regulations.
"Dispositional hearing" means a hearing to determine what order of disposition should be made concerning a child who is neglected or dependent. The hearing may be part of the proceeding that includes the adjudicatory hearing, or it may be held at a time subsequent to the adjudicatory hearing.
"Diversion" has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-2.5-102.
"Division of youth services" or "division" means the division of youth services, created in section 19-2.5-1501.
"Donor", as used in section 19-4-106, means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, whether or not for consideration. "Donor" does not include a spouse who provides sperm or eggs to be used for assisted reproduction by the other spouse.
"Executive director", as used in article 3.3 of this title 19 and part 3 of article 7 of this title 19, means the executive director of the department of human services.
"Expungement", as used in section 19-1-306, means the designation of juvenile delinquency records whereby such records are deemed never to have existed.
"Family child care home" means a family child care home licensed and approved pursuant to article 6 of title 26. If such facility is located in another state, the department of human services shall designate, upon certification, that an appropriate available space does not exist in a facility in this state. An out-of-state family child care home must be licensed or approved as required by law in that state.
"Fire investigator" means a person who:
1. Is an officer or member of a fire department, fire protection district, or firefighting agency of the state or any of its political subdivisions;
2. Is engaged in conducting or is present for the purpose of engaging in the conduct of a fire investigation; and
3. Is either a volunteer or is compensated for services rendered by the person.
"Foster care" means the placement of a child or youth into the legal custody or legal authority of a county department of human or social services for physical placement of the child or youth in a kinship care placement; supervised independent living placement, as defined in section 19-7-302; or certified or licensed facility, or the physical placement of a juvenile committed to the custody of the state department of human services into a community placement.
"Foster care home" means a foster care home certified pursuant to article 6 of title 26.
"Foster care prevention services" means mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services, in-home parent skill-based programs, kinship navigator programs, and other programs eligible for reimbursement under the federal "Family First Prevention Services Act" that are trauma-informed, promising, supported or well-supported, and provided to prevent foster care placement.
"Governing body", as used in section 19-3-211, means the board of county commissioners of a county or the city council of a city and county.
1. "Grandparent" means a person who is the parent of a child's father or mother, who is related to the child by blood, in whole or by half, adoption, or marriage.
2. "Grandparent", as used in sections 19-1-117 and 19-1-117.5, has the same meaning as set forth in subsection (70)(a) of this section; except that "grandparent" does not include the parent of a child's legal father or mother whose parental rights have been terminated in accordance with sections 19-5-101 and 19-1-104 (1)(d).
"Great-grandparent", as used in sections 19-1-117 and 19-1-117.5, means a person who is the grandparent of a child's father or mother, who is related to the child by blood, in whole or by half, adoption, or marriage. "Great-grandparent" does not include the grandparent of a child's legal father or mother whose parental rights have been terminated in accordance with sections 19-5-101 and 19-1-104 (1)(d).
"Grievance", as used in section 19-3-211, means a dispute between a complainant and a county department of human or social services concerning the conduct of county department personnel in performing their duties pursuant to article 3 of this title 19.
"Group care facilities and homes" means places other than foster family care homes providing care for small groups of children. Group care facilities and homes are licensed as provided in article 6 of title 26 or meet the requirements of section 25.5-10-214.
"Guardian ad litem" means a person appointed by a court to act in the best interests of a person whom the person appointed is representing in proceedings pursuant to this title 19 and who, if appointed to represent a person in a dependency and neglect proceeding pursuant to article 3 of this title 19, must be an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in Colorado.
"Guardianship of the person" means the duty and authority vested by court action to make major decisions affecting a child, including but not limited to:
1. The authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and to medical or surgical treatment;
2. The authority to represent a child in legal actions and to make other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the child;
3. The authority to consent to the adoption of a child when the parent-child legal relationship has been terminated by judicial decree; and
4. The rights and responsibilities of legal custody when legal custody has not been vested in another person, agency, or institution.
"Half-sibling" has the same meaning as set forth for "biological sibling" in subsection (16) of this section.
"Human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude" means an act as described in section 18-3-503.
"Human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude" means an act as described in section 18-3-504 (2).
"Identifying" means giving, sharing, or obtaining information.
"Identifying information", as used in section 19-5-305 (3), means copies of any adoption records, as that term is defined in subsection (6) of this section, that are in the possession of the child placement agency. "Identifying information" also includes the name of the adoptee before placement in adoption; the name and address of each consenting birth parent as they appear in the birth records; the current name, address, and telephone number of the adult adoptee; and the current name, address, and telephone number of each consenting birth parent to the extent such information is available to the child placement agency.
"Imminent placement out of the home", as used in section 19-1-116 (2), means that without intercession the child will be placed out of the home immediately.
"Independent living" means a form of placement out of the home arranged and supervised by the county department of human or social services where the child is established in a living situation designed to promote and lead to the child's emancipation. Independent living must only follow some other form of placement out of the home.
"Indian child" means an unmarried person who is younger than eighteen years of age and who is either:
1. A member of an Indian tribe; or
2. Eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and who is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
"Indian child's tribe" means:
1. The Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for membership; or
2. In the case of an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the most significant contacts.
"Indian tribe" means an Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the federal governmental services provided to Indians because of their status as Indians.
"Institutional abuse", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means any case of abuse, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, that occurs in any public or private facility in the state that provides child care out of the home, supervision, or maintenance. "Institutional abuse" includes an act or omission that threatens the life, health, or welfare of a child or a person who is younger than twenty-one years of age who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the court pursuant to this title 19. "Institutional abuse" does not include abuse that occurs in any public, private, or parochial school system, including any preschool operated in connection with said system; except that, to the extent the school system provides extended day services, abuse that occurs while such services are provided is institutional abuse. For the purposes of this subsection (86), "facility" means a residential child care facility, specialized group facility, foster care home, family child care home, or any other facility subject to the Colorado "Child Care Licensing Act", part 1 of article 6 of title 26; noncertified kinship care providers that provide care for children with an open child welfare case who are in the legal custody of a county department of human or social services; or a facility or community placement, as described in section 19-2.5-1502, for a juvenile committed to the custody of the department of human services. "Facility" does not include any adult detention or correctional facility.
"Intrafamilial abuse", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means any case of abuse, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, that occurs within a family context by a child's parent, stepparent, guardian, legal custodian, or relative; by a spousal equivalent, as defined in subsection (130) of this section; or by any other person who resides in the child's home or who is regularly in the child's home for the purpose of exercising authority over or care for the child; except that "intrafamilial abuse" does not include abuse by a person who is regularly in the child's home for the purpose of rendering care for the child if such person is paid for rendering care and is not related to the child.
"Juvenile" means a child as defined in subsection (21) of this section.
"Juvenile court" or "court" means the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver or the juvenile division of the district court outside of the city and county of Denver.
"Juvenile delinquent" has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-2.5-102.
"Kin" may be a relative of the child, a person ascribed by the family as having a family-like relationship with the child, or a person who has a prior significant relationship with the child. These relationships take into account cultural values and continuity of significant relationships with the child.
"Kinship adoption", as used in part 2 of article 5 of this title 19, means an adoption of a child by a relative of the child and such relative's spouse, as required pursuant to section 19-5-202 (3), who:
1. Is either a grandparent, brother, sister, half-sibling, aunt, uncle, or first cousin; and
2. Has had physical custody of the child for a period of one year or more and the child is not the subject of a pending dependency and neglect proceeding pursuant to article 3 of this title 19.
"Law enforcement officer" means a peace officer, as described in section 16-2.5-101.
1. "Legal custody" means the right to the care, custody, and control of a child and the duty to provide food, clothing, shelter, ordinary medical care, education, and discipline for a child and, in an emergency, to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care. "Legal custody" may be taken from a parent only by court action.
2. For purposes of determining the residence of a child as provided in section 22-1-102 (2)(b), guardianship is in the person to whom legal custody has been granted by the court.
1. "Legal representative", as used in sections 19-5-304 and 19-5-305, means the person designated by a court to act on behalf of any person described in section 19-5-304 (1)(b)(I) or 19-5-305 (2).
2. For purposes of the term "legal representative", as used in sections 19-5-304 and 19-5-305 and as defined in subsection (95)(a) of this section, "legal guardian" does not include a governmental entity of any foreign country from which a child has been adopted or any representative of such governmental entity.
"Local law enforcement agency", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means a police department in incorporated municipalities or the office of the county sheriff.
"Locating" means engaging in the process of searching for or seeking out.
"Mental health professional" means a person licensed to practice medicine or psychology in this state or any person on the staff of a facility designated by the executive director of the department of human services for seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation who is authorized by the facility to do mental or behavioral health hospital placement prescreenings, as defined in section 19-2.5-102, and who is under the supervision of a person licensed to practice medicine or psychology in this state.
"Need to know", as used in section 19-1-303, means agencies or individuals who need access to certain information for the care, treatment, supervision, or protection of a child.
"Neglect", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means acts that can reasonably be construed to fall under the definition of "child abuse or neglect" as defined in subsection (1) of this section.
"Newborn child" means a child who is less than seventy-two hours old.
"Noncertified kinship care" means a child is being cared for by a relative or kin who has a significant relationship with the child in circumstances when there is a safety concern by a county department of human or social services and where the relative or kin has not met the foster care certification requirements for a kinship foster care home or has chosen not to pursue that certification process.
"Nonidentifying information", as used in part 4 of article 5 of this title 19, means information that does not disclose the name, address, place of employment, or any other material information that would lead to the identification of the birth parents and that includes but is not limited to the following:
1. The physical description of the birth parents;
2. The educational background of the birth parents;
3. The occupation of the birth parents;
4. Genetic information about the birth family;
5. Medical information about the adult adoptee's birth;
6. Social information about the birth parents; and
7. The placement history of the adoptee.
"Nonpublic agency interstate and foreign adoption", as used in section 19-5-205.5, means an interstate or foreign adoption that is handled by a private, licensed child placement agency.
1. "Parent" means either a natural parent of a child, as may be established pursuant to article 4 of this title 19, or a parent by adoption.
2. "Parent", as used in sections 19-1-114, 19-2.5-501, and 19-2.5-611, includes a natural parent having sole or joint custody, regardless of whether the parent is designated as the primary residential custodian, or a parent allocated parental responsibilities with respect to a child, or an adoptive parent. For the purposes of section 19-1-114, "parent" does not include a person whose parental rights have been terminated pursuant to the provisions of this title 19 or the parent of an emancipated minor. (106) "Permanency hearing" means a hearing in which the permanency plan for a child in foster care is determined by the court.
  (107) "Placement out of the home" means placement for twenty-four-hour residential care in any facility or center operated or licensed by the department of human services, but "placement out of the home" does not include any placement that is paid for totally by private money or any placement in a home for the purposes of adoption in accordance with section 19-5-205. "Placement out of the home" may be voluntary or court ordered. "Placement out of the home" includes independent living.
  
  (108) (a) "Post-adoption record", as used in part 3 of article 5 of this title 19, means information contained in the files subsequent to the completion of an adoption proceeding.
  
  (b) The post-adoption record may contain information concerning but not limited to:
  1. The written inquiries from persons requesting access to records;
  2. The search efforts of the confidential intermediary;
  3. The response, if any, to those search efforts by the persons sought;
  4. Any updated medical information gathered pursuant to part 3 of article 5 of this title 19; and
  5. Any personal identifying information concerning any persons subject to part 3 of article 5 of this title 19.
    (109) "Prevention program", as used in article 3.5 of this title 19, means a program of direct child abuse prevention services to a child, parent, or guardian and includes research or education programs related to the prevention of child abuse. Such a prevention program may be classified as a primary prevention program when it is available to the community on a voluntary basis and as a secondary prevention program when it is directed toward groups of individuals who have been identified as high risk.
    
    (110) "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court order under which the child is permitted to remain in the child's home or is placed with a relative or other suitable person and supervision and assistance is provided by the court, department of human services, or other agency designated by the court.
    
    (111) "Public adoption", as used in part 2 of article 5 of this title 19, means an adoption involving a child who is in the legal custody and guardianship of the county department of human or social services that has the right to consent to adoption for that child.
    
    (112) "Qualified individual" means a trained professional or licensed clinician, as defined in the federal "Family First Prevention Services Act". "Qualified individual" must be approved to serve as a qualified individual according to the state plan. "Qualified individual" must not be an interested party or participant in the juvenile court proceeding and must be free of any personal or business relationship that would cause a conflict of interest in evaluating the child, juvenile, or youth and making recommendations concerning the child's, juvenile's, or youth's placement and therapeutic needs according to the federal Title IV-E state plan or any waiver in accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 675a.
    
    (113) "Qualified residential treatment program" means a licensed and accredited program that has a trauma-informed treatment model that is designed to address the needs, including clinical needs, as appropriate, of children and youth with serious emotional or behavioral disorders or disturbances in accordance with the federal "Family First Prevention Services Act", 42 U.S.C. sec. 672 (k)(4), and is able to implement the treatment identified for the child or youth by the assessment of the child required in section 19-1-115 (4)(e)(I).
    
    (114) "Reasonable efforts", as used in articles 1, 2.5, 3, and 7 of this title 19, means the exercise of diligence and care throughout the state of Colorado for children and youth who are in foster care or out-of-home placement or are at imminent risk of foster care or out-of-home placement. In determining whether it is appropriate to provide, purchase, or develop the supportive and rehabilitative services that are required to prevent unnecessary placement of a child or youth outside of a child's or youth's home or to foster the safe reunification of a child or youth with a child's or youth's family, as described in section 19-3-208, or whether it is appropriate to find and finalize an alternative permanent plan for a child or youth, and in making reasonable efforts, the child's or youth's health and safety are the paramount concern. Services provided by a county or city and county in accordance with section 19-3-208 are deemed to meet the reasonable effort standard described in this subsection (114). Nothing in this subsection (114) is construed to conflict with federal law.
    
    (115) "Recipient", as used in article 3.5 of this title 19, means and is limited to a nonprofit or public organization that receives a grant from the trust fund created in section 19-3.5-105.
    
    (116) "Record", as used in section 19-4-106 and section 19-4.5-108, means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
    
    (117) "Register of actions" means those portions of the electronic case management system necessary to carry out a statutory purpose or the duties of a court appointment.
    
    (118) "Repeat juvenile offender" is described in section 19-2.5-1125.
    
    (119) "Residual parental rights and responsibilities" means those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after legal custody, guardianship of the person, or both, have been vested in another person, agency, or institution, including but not limited to the responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to reasonable parenting time unless restricted by the court, and the right to determine the child's religious affiliation.
    
    (120) "Responsible person", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means a child's parent, legal guardian, or custodian or any other person responsible for the child's health and welfare. (121) "Restorative justice" has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-2.5-102.
    
    (122) "Reunited parties", as used in section 19-5-305, means any two persons who qualify as and meet any specified requirements for parties under the list of individuals in section 19-5-304 (1)(b)(I).
    
    (123) "School", as used in sections 19-1-303 and 19-1-304, means a public or parochial or other nonpublic school that provides a basic academic education in compliance with school attendance laws for students in grades one to twelve. "Basic academic education" has the same meaning as set forth in section 22-33-104 (2)(b).
    
    (124) "Sexual assault", as used in sections 19-5-105, 19-5-105.5, and 19-5-105.7, means:
    
    (a) "Sexual assault", as defined in section 18-3-402;
    
    (b) "Sexual assault on a child", as defined in section 18-3-405;
3. "Sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust", as defined in section 18-3-405.3;
4. "Sexual assault on a client by a psychotherapist", as defined in section 18-3-405.5; or
5. "Unlawful sexual contact", as defined in section 18-3-404.
  (125) "Sexual conduct", as used in section 19-3-304 (2.5), means any of the following:
  
  (a) Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals;
  
  (b) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object;
  
  (c) Masturbation; or
  
  (d) Sexual sadomasochistic abuse.
  
  (126) "Shelter" means the temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution of a court order for placement.
  
  (127) "Sibling group", as used in articles 3 and 5 of this title 19, means biological siblings.
  
  (128) "Special county attorney", as used in article 3 of this title 19, means an attorney hired by a county attorney or city attorney of a city and county or hired by a county department of human or social services with the concurrence of the county attorney or city attorney of a city and county to prosecute dependency and neglect cases.
  
  (129) "Special respondent", as used in article 3 of this title 19, means any person who is not a parent, guardian, or legal custodian and who is voluntarily or involuntarily joined in a dependency or neglect proceeding for the limited purposes of protective orders or inclusion in a treatment plan and for the grounds outlined in sections 19-3-502 (6) and 19-3-503 (4).
  
  (130) "Spousal equivalent" means a person who is in a family-type living arrangement with a parent and who would be a stepparent if married to that parent.
  
  (131) "Standardized behavioral or mental health disorder screening" means the behavioral or mental health disorder screening conducted using the juvenile standardized screening instruments and the procedures adopted pursuant to section 16-11.9-102.
  
  (132) "State board", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means the state board of human services.
  
  (133) "State department", as used in section 19-3-211, part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, article 3.3 of this title 19, and part 3 of article 7 of this title 19, means the department of human services created in section 24-1-120.
  
  (134) "State registrar" means the state registrar of vital statistics in the department of public health and environment.
  
  (135) "Status offense" has the same meaning as is defined in federal law in 28 CFR 31.304, as amended.
  
  (136) "Stepparent" means a person who is married to a parent of a child but who has not adopted the child.
  
  (137) "Temporary holding facility" means an area used for the temporary holding of a child from the time that the child is taken into temporary custody until a detention hearing is held, if it has been determined that the child requires a staff-secure setting. Such an area must be separated by sight and sound from any area that houses adult offenders.
  
  (138) "Temporary shelter" means the temporary placement of a child with kin, as defined in subsection (91) of this section; with an adult with a significant relationship with the child; or in a licensed and certified twenty-four-hour care facility.
  
  (139) "Termination of the parent-child legal relationship", as used in articles 3 and 5 of this title 19, means the permanent elimination by court order of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental rights and responsibilities, as provided in section 19-3-608.
  
  (140) "Third-party abuse", as used in part 3 of article 3 of this title 19, means a case in which a child is subjected to abuse, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, by any person who is not a parent; stepparent; guardian; legal custodian; spousal equivalent, as defined in subsection (130) of this section; or any other person not included in the definition of "intrafamilial abuse", as defined in subsection (87) of this section.
  
  (141) "Trauma-informed" refers to the services to be provided to or on behalf of a child or youth under an organizational structure and treatment framework that involves understanding, recognizing, and responding to the effects of all types of trauma in accordance with recognized principles of a trauma-informed approach and trauma-specific interventions to address trauma's consequences and facilitate healing.
  
  (142) "Trust fund", as used in article 3.5 of this title 19, means the Colorado child abuse prevention trust fund created in section 19-3.5-105.
  
  (143) "Updated medical history statement" means a written narrative statement dated and signed by a birth parent about the medical history of the birth parent or other biological relatives of the adoptee that can be voluntarily submitted by the birth parent to the state registrar for future disclosure to the birth parent's adult child who is an adult adoptee or an adult descendant of the adoptee or legal representative of such person in accordance with the provisions of section 19-5-305 (1.5).
  
  (144) (a) "Victim", as used in this title 19 and except as provided in subsection (144)(b) of this section, has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-2.5-102.
  
  (b) "Victim", as used in section 19-5-105.5, means any natural person against whom a crime of sexual assault or a crime in which the underlying factual basis was sexual assault is perpetrated or is alleged to have been perpetrated.
  
  (145) "Youth" means an individual who is less than twenty-one years of age.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 696, § 1, effective October 1. L. 88: (11.5) added, p. 748, § 1, effective March 18; (3) amended, p. 741, § 1, effective July 1; (3.5) added, p. 750, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (27) added, p. 926, § 1, effective April 23. L. 90: (9.5)(b) amended, p. 1011, § 3, effective July 1. L. 91: (12.5) added, p. 263, § 5, effective May 31. L. 92: (2.5) added, p. 220, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (22) amended, p. 1134, § 64, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (12.3) added, p. 910, § 5, effective April 28; (2.5), (5), (12), (20), and (23) amended, p. 2658, § 144, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section R&RE, p. 68, § 1, effective March 20; (34.3) and (34.5) added, p. 1089, § 1, effective May 23; (49) amended and (51.5) added, p. 264, § 13, effective July 1; (66) amended, p. 265, § 15, effective July 1; (1)(b), (2), (12), (30), (36), (44), (45), (46), (47), (50), (52), (53), (61), (69), (82)(b), (83), (84), (88), (92), (95), (96), and (105) amended and (40.5), (94.5), and (101.5) added, p. 1684, § 12, effective January 1, 1997; (48) amended and (16.5) and (77.5) added, p. 1174, § 10, effective January 1, 1997; (112) added, p. 1783, § 12, effective January 1, 1997. L. 97: (1), (23), (25), and (57) amended, p. 1431, § 6, effective July 1; (8) and (37) amended and (61.5) added, p. 1167, § 14, effective July 1; (32)(a) amended, p. 150, § 2, effective July 1. L. 98: (51.3) added and (89) amended, p. 1417, § 2, effective July 1; (82)(b) amended, p. 1404, § 60, effective February 1, 1999. L. 99: (87.5) added, p. 1025, § 6, effective May 29; (34.7) and (71.5) added and (107) amended, pp. 1061, 1062, §§ 1, 2, effective June 1; (6.5), (28.5), (63.5), and (85.5) added and (28) amended, p. 1129, § 1, effective July 1; (24.5) added, p. 908, § 2, effective July 1; (112) amended, p. 624, § 21, effective August 4. L. 2000: (10.5), (34.6), and (94.3) added, p. 320, § 7, effective April 7; (29.5) added, p. 1723, § 6, effective June 1; (94.3) added, p. 1965, § 9, effective June 2; (14) and (32)(a) amended and (98.5) added, p. 474, § 1, effective July 1; (28.5) and (63.5) amended and (73.5) and (94.2) added, p. 1367, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: (5) and (89) amended and (83.5) added, p. 841, § 2, effective June 1; (1)(b) and (27) amended, p. 853, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 568, § 1, effective May 24; (76) and (77) amended and (101.7) added, p. 574, § 4, effective May 24; (65.3), (65.5), and (65.7) added, p. 783, § 2, effective May 30; (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 1192, § 43, effective July 1; (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 1592, § 29, effective July 1. L. 2003: (48) amended, p. 1991, § 32, effective May 22; (1)(a) amended, p. 819, § 1, effective July 1; (44.5) and (91.5) added, p. 1266, § 54, effective July 1; (1)(b) and (72) amended, pp. 1622, 1619, §§ 36, 28, effective August 6; (29.5) repealed, p. 1401, § 5, effective January 1, 2004. L. 2004: (19.5) added, p. 807, § 2, effective May 21; (78.5) added, p. 430, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1)(a)(VII) added, p. 587, § 1, effective July 1; (6.7), (28.6), (28.7), (103.5), and (111.5) added and (9) and (13) amended, p. 991, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2006: (103.7) added and (106) amended, p. 256, § 1, effective March 31; (51.3) amended, p. 507, § 1, effective April 18. L. 2007: (30) amended, p. 1506, § 2, effective May 31. L. 2008: (44) amended and (94.1) added, p. 225, § 1, effective March 31; (31.5) and (91.7) added, p. 1241, § 2, effective August 5. L. 2010: (76) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 788, § 36, effective April 29; (32) and (103) amended and (47.5) added, (SB 10-171), ch. 225, p. 981, § 2, effective May 14; (22) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2074, § 34, effective August 11. L. 2011: (44) amended, (HB 11-1032), ch. 296, p. 1404, § 9, effective August 10. L. 2013: (29.3) and (96.5) added and (112) amended, (SB 13-227), ch. 353, p. 2056, § 1, effective July 1; (44) amended, (HB 13-1254), ch. 341, p. 1982, § 3, effective August 7; (58) amended, (HB 13-1314), ch. 323, p. 1804, § 31, effective March 1, 2014. L. 2014: (56.5) added, (HB 14-1362), ch. 374, p. 1787, § 1, effective June 6; (28.7) amended and (35.3) added, (SB 14-051), ch. 260, p. 1047, § 2, effective July 1; IP(96.5) amended, (HB 14-1162), ch. 167, p. 594, § 9, effective July 1; (35.3) added, (HB 14-1042), ch. 261, p. 1050, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2015: IP(6.5)(a) and (6.5)(b) amended and (6.5)(a.5) added, (HB 15-1106), ch. 59, p. 141, § 1, effective March 30; (32) amended and (71.3) and (78.7) added, (SB 15-087), ch. 263, p. 1011, § 7, effective June 2; (35.3)(a) amended, (HB 15-1355), ch. 311, p. 1275, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2016: (32)(b) amended, (HB 16-1316), ch. 127, p. 363, § 2, effective August 10; (1)(a)(VIII) and (23.5) added, (HB 16-1224), ch. 101, p. 290, § 1, effective January 1, 2017. L. 2017: IP and (101.7) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1309, § 148, effective May 25; IP and (69) amended and (113) added, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, pp. 1972, 1962, §§ 27, 3, effective June 6; IP and (100) amended, (SB 17-177), ch. 118, p. 418, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2018: (34.7) amended and (34.8) and (44.7) added, (SB 18-154), ch. 161, p. 1123, § 1, effective April 25; (42.5) added, (HB 18-1104), ch. 164, p. 1134, § 4, effective April 25; (66) amended, (HB 18-1346), ch. 326, p. 1964, § 2, effective May 30; (36) amended, (HB 18-1156), ch. 378, p. 2288, § 6, effective August 8; (51.3), (65), (69), (87.5), and (99) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 406, § 28, effective August 8. L. 2019: IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(VIII), and (23.5) amended and (62.5) and (62.6) added, (SB 19-185), ch. 147, p. 1765, § 2, effective May 6; (44) and (94.1) amended and (106.5) added, (SB 19-108), ch. 294, p. 2694, § 2, effective July 1; (51.7), (87.7), (87.9), and (109.5) added, (HB 19-1308), ch. 256, p. 2458, § 3, effective August 2; (98.5) amended, (HB 19-1288), ch. 216, p. 2234, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2020: (1)(a)(VII) amended, (SB 20-028), ch. 186, p. 853, § 4, effective June 30; (87.9) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1048, § 33, effective June 30; (71.3) and (87.7) amended, (SB 20-162), ch. 221, p. 1087, § 2, effective July 2. L. 2021: (116) amended, (HB 21-1022), ch. 103, p. 417, § 2, effective May 6; (43), (62), (66), (114), and (133) amended, (HB 21-1094), ch. 340, p. 2214, § 2, effective June 25; (47) repealed, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3313, § 17, effective July 6; (18), (115), and (142) amended, (HB 21-1248), ch. 335, p. 2167, § 3, effective September 7; entire section R&RE, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 753, § 144, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act enacting subsection (24.5), see section 1 of chapter 233, Session Laws of Colorado 1999. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsections (5) and (89) and enacting subsection (83.5), see section 1 of chapter 241, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act enacting subsections (65.3), (65.5), and (65.7), see section 1 of chapter 217, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act repealing subsection (29.5), see section 1 of chapter 196, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act enacting subsection (78.5), see section 1 of chapter 140, Session Laws of Colorado 2004. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act amending subsection (30), see section 1 of chapter 351, Session Laws of Colorado 2007. For the short title ("Heritage Act") and the legislative declaration in HB 15-1355, see section 1 of chapter 311, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in HB 18-1156, see section 1 of chapter 378, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in SB 19-185, see section 1 of chapter 147, Session Laws of Colorado 2019. For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

(2) For the "Family First Prevention Services Act", see Pub.L. 115-123.

ANNOTATION

Analysis

I. General Consideration.
II. Specific Definitions.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "Towards a More Practical Central Registry", see 51 Den. L.J. 509 (1974). For article, "The Role of Parents' Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings -- Part I", see 14 Colo. Law. 568 (1985). For article, "House Bill 1268 -- In the Best Interests of the Child", see 18 Colo. Law. 1703 (1989). For article, "Interested Parties in Juvenile Dependency and Neglect Cases", see 33 Colo. Law. 109 (Aug. 2004). For article, "Family Law and Juvenile Delinquency", see 37 Colo. Law. 61 (Oct. 2008).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Section not unconstitutionally vague. This section is not so vague and uncertain that it fails to meet the constitutional requirements for statutory definiteness. People in Interest of D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11 , 596 P.2d 747, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub nom. J.K.S. v. Colo., 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 515, 62 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979).

Parent-child relationship constitutionally protected. The parent-child relationship finds protection in both the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and parents have a fundamental interest in maintaining this legal relationship with their natural children. Termination of the parent-child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights and obligations with respect to each other. For this reason, the power of the state to sever parental ties should be exercised with extreme caution. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981).

Proceedings under this title are not criminal or penal, but protective, and, in so far as may be, those in charge of prosecution should not make use of instrumentalities or terms that are peculiarly adapted to prosecutions for misdemeanors or crimes as such. Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928).

Guardian includes persons vested by court action with duty and authority to make major decisions affecting a child. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

Colorado Children's Code does not supply definition of "interested party". In re People in Interest of C.P., 34 Colo. App. 54, 524 P.2d 316 (1974).

Legal custodian is an interested party to delinquency action. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

Child's legal custodian stands in loco parentis to child, and is one who assumes the status and obligations of a parent without the formality of an adoption proceeding. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

Termination of loco parentis status. One standing in loco parentis may at his election be relieved of that status and the attendant obligations at any time upon petition to the court. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

"Termination" of the parent-child legal relationship includes the elimination of any right of continued visitation between parent and child, including such rights provided in a court order. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986).

Fact that state department of institutions was vested with right to control an individual incident to its legal custody of that person is not per se determinative of the question of whether the person was a member of his father's household for purposes of the "family car doctrine". Hasegawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936 (Colo. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 ( Colo. 1992 ).

"Order". This section does not define "order" as that word is used in § 19-2-103 (6)(a). However, court order has been broadly defined in case law as any direction of a court not contained or included in a judgment. Hence, a directive issued by a juvenile court judge to a director of a juvenile detention center and warden of a county jail defining standards for placing a juvenile in the county jail was an order satisfying the requirements of § 19-2-103 (6)(a). C.C.C. v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 437 , 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

For case construing "child in need of supervision", see People in Interest of D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971).

Petition in dependency cannot be converted into adoption proceeding, and legal custody, unlike adoption, is not meant to create a permanent status. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

"Juvenile court" or "court", as defined in former subsection (17) (now subsection (70)) of this section, means juvenile court of Denver or the juvenile division of any district court outside of Denver and does not include municipal courts. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

In a dispute between parents, the factors enumerated in § 14-10-124 (1.5) may be considered in determining the best interests of the child. People in Interest of A.A.G., 902 P.2d 437 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 1385 ( Colo. 1996 ).

"Physical custodian" is only responsible for meeting a child's needs, unlike a legal custodian who stands in loco parentis to a child. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).

Person not a custodian who has not been providing shelter, food, clothing, or care for the juvenile at the time of the arrest, has not seen or heard from the juvenile in over two months, and has refused to allow juvenile to return to her home. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).

Questions concerning a child's health and safety are purview of trial court , which retains ultimate decision-making authority in the case. The trial court itself must make decisions regarding visitation and may not delegate this function to third parties. People ex rel. B.C., 122 P.3d 1067 (Colo. App. 2005).

Applied in People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979); People in Interest of R.R., 43 Colo. App. 208, 607 P.2d 1013 (1979); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 (1980); People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 ( Colo. 1981 ); People v. R.V., 635 P.2d 892 ( Colo. 1981 ); Hesseltine v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1982 ); People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 352 ( Colo. 1982 ); McCall v. Dist. Court ex rel. County of Montezuma, 651 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1982); J.T. v. O'Rourke ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 651 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of C.R.B., 662 P.2d 198 (Colo. App. 1983); City & County of Denver v. Dist. Court, 675 P.2d 312 ( Colo. 1984 ); People ex rel. T.D., 140 P.3d 205 (Colo. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1020, 127 S. Ct. 564, 166 L. Ed. 2d 411, and 549 U.S. 1024, 127 S. Ct. 565, 166 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2006).

II. SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS.

A. Abuse.

The purpose behind the definition of abuse in the reporting section is to encourage persons to report any suspected child abuse. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

And it is thus much more liberal than a definition of abuse which would be used to support an adjudication that a child is neglected or dependent. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

The applicability of the definition of "abuse" is limited to the statutory provisions on reporting child abuse. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

For a finding of institutional neglect or abuse under subsection (1)(a)(III), child abuse or neglect can be found when one has failed to act as a "prudent parent" would under the circumstances. In applying the "prudent parent" standard, it is improper to consider the adult's status as a licensed child care provider under the circumstances in the analysis. Ansel v. State Dept. of Human Servs., 2020 COA 172 M, 480 P.3d 758.

Question of fact. Where, in a neglect or dependency proceeding, it is shown that a child has sustained a nonaccidental injury resulting from an instance of parent-administered corporal punishment, the reasonableness of that punishment is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 553 P.2d 103 (1976).

Where instruction on definition of abuse improper. Where it is contended that the child is dependent or neglected because of injuries resulting from the intentional infliction of corporal punishment, an instruction on the definition of "abuse" in this section is improper because it includes both unexplained and nonaccidental injury, and such an instruction would tend only to confuse the jury. People in Interest of M.A.L., 37 Colo. App. 307, 592 P.2d 415 (1976).

Where no evidence was presented that child suffered bruising and child could not be ruled to have become a child in need of services as a result of subject's actions of requiring the child, a resident at an institution for juvenile offenders, to remove his clothing as punishment for his disruptive actions, subject's actions cannot be described as child abuse. Wilson v. State Dept. of Human Servs., 969 P.2d 770 (Colo. App. 1998).

Where evidence showed that mother allowed the six-year-old child to go on a 26-day road trip with stepfather and allowed the stepfather to spank the child during that road trip and at home, which spankings became increasingly severe, evidence was sufficient to support jury finding that the child was dependent and neglected. People ex rel. of E.S., 49 P.3d 1221 (Colo. App. 2002).

Applied in People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1982).

B. Adjudication.

Definition of "adjudication" specifically requires that the juvenile has committed a delinquent act or that the juvenile has pled guilty to committing a delinquent act. Gilmore v. Concerned Parents of Pueblo, 28 P.3d 963 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 47 P.3d 311 ( Colo. 2002 ).

C. Appropriate Treatment Plan.

The appropriateness of a treatment plan must be measured by its likelihood of success in reuniting the family and must be assessed in light of the facts existing at the time of its adoption. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 ( Colo. 1986 ); People in Interest of R.J.A., 994 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1999); People ex rel. J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790 (Colo. App. 2002); People ex rel. T.T., 128 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005).

It is because it is the parent's responsibility to assure compliance with and success of a treatment plan that the appropriateness of a treatment plan is not nullified by its ultimate failure to rehabilitate a parent. People in the Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425 (Colo. App. 1987); People in Interest of R.J.A., 994 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1999); People ex rel. J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790 (Colo. App. 2002).

The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the problems that required intervention into the family. People ex rel. D.G., 140 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2006).

D. Child.

Definition of "child" to include unborn child is constitutional. Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133 , 53 P.2d 1189 (1936).

It is liberally construed. The definition of a "child" as a person under 18 years of age unless the context otherwise requires manifests the intention of the general assembly that the word should be construed liberally to aid in implementing the purposes of the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

"Child" includes human being during pregnancy. No violence is done to the orderly process of the rational mind by letting the word "child" include a human being immediately upon conception and during the period of pregnancy, as well as one actually born. Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133 , 53 P.2d 1189 (1936).

The welfare of a child is well-served by proper care during pregnancy. The general assembly violates no constitutional principle by providing that "child" should include a human being upon conception and during pregnancy, as well as one actually born. People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

Otherwise, father could evade support responsibility by leaving state. To construe "child" so as to exclude an unborn child would permit the father of an unborn child to evade his responsibility for support by leaving the state at any time prior to the birth of the child. People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

The Colorado Children's Code defines a "child" as a person under 18 years of age and therefore does not include an "unborn child". When the general assembly amended the definition of child in 1967 and removed the reference to an unborn child, the intent was to change the law and no longer subject an unborn child to the provisions of the Children's Code. People ex rel. H., 74 P.3d 494 (Colo. App. 2003).

Defendant becoming 18 before trial included. The juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction continued regardless of the fact that at least one defendant reached his eighteenth birthday before trial. Maddox v. People, 178 Colo. 366 , 497 P.2d 1263 (1972).

Age at which acts are committed is determinative factor as to the applicability of the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of M.C., 750 P.2d 69 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 774 P.2d 857 ( Colo. 1989 ).

Duty of parent to support until 21 years or emancipation not abrogated. There is no general mandate in subsection (3) of this section, as it existed prior to 1987, or § 19-7-101 (2) or 13-22-101 which abrogates the duty of support a parent has toward his minor child until the age of 21 or emancipation. In re Weaver, 398 Colo. App. 523, 571 P.2d 307 (1977).

Applied in People ex rel. Rodello v. Dist. Court, 164 Colo. 530 , 436 P.2d 672 (1968); Jaramillo v. Dist. Court, 173 Colo. 459 , 480 P.2d 841 (1971).

E. Delinquent Child.

By its definition of a "delinquent child" the general assembly includes, in its first two categories, only those children who commit acts which, if they were adults, would constitute commission of either a felony or a major misdemeanor. The act of violating a child in need of supervision probation is not remotely comparable to those set forth in the statute. People in Interest of D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971).

A delinquent child is defined as one under 18 but over 10, who violates a state law, excepting state traffic laws. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

Juvenile charged under municipal shoplifting ordinance not "delinquent child". A juvenile who could have been charged under the general theft statute but is only charged under a municipal shoplifting ordinance carrying no jail sentence is not a delinquent child and the juvenile court does not have sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Wigent v. Shinsato, 43 Colo. App. 83, 601 P.2d 653 (1979).

Age of no criminal responsibility for felony raised to 14. Though the Colorado Children's Code may not in so many words raise the age below which there can be no criminal responsibility as concerns a felony from 10 to 14 years, that is exactly what it did. People ex rel. Terrell v. Dist. Court, 164 Colo. 437 , 435 P.2d 763 (1967).

Child may be directly prosecuted for violation of traffic law. One under 18 who violates a traffic law is not, under the definition of the Colorado Children's Code, a delinquent child, and is therefore not subject to the original exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court in delinquency proceedings, and may be directly prosecuted for a violation of a state traffic law. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

However, the Colorado Children's Code contains no limitation on the authority of the juvenile court to consider traffic charges when coupled with other misdemeanor or felony charges committed as a part of the same act or series of acts and thus charges were subject to the compulsory joinder statute, § 18-1-408 (2) . Marquez v. County Court, 719 P.2d 737 (Colo. App. 1986).

But vehicular homicide is not a violation of traffic law as that phrase is used in the Colorado Children's Code, but is a form of homicide constituting a felony when committed by an adult. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

County court may sentence minor to jail term for traffic offense. When a minor is convicted of a traffic offense in a county court which has jurisdiction over that minor, the Colorado Children's Code does not prohibit the court from sentencing the minor to serve a term in the county jail. Villareal v. Lopez, 44 Colo. App. 555, 619 P.2d 86 (1980).

The act of entering into a marriage contract regardless of age is not one of the statutory acts of delinquency. Spencer v. People in Interest of Spencer, 133 Colo. 196 , 292 P.2d 971 (1956).

Delinquency provisions formerly excluded crimes "punishable by death or life imprisonment" which were held not to embrace offenses which have a sentence of less than life imprisonment as a minimum and a maximum of either life imprisonment or death. Jaramillo v. Dist. Court, 173 Colo. 459 , 480 P.2d 841 (1971); Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 394 , 484 P.2d 105 (1971); Maddox v. People, 178 Colo. 366 , 497 P.2d 1263 (1972).

Applied in John Doe v. People, 156 Colo. 311 , 398 P.2d 624 (1965); People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197 , 606 P.2d 450 (1980).

F. Dependency.

"Abuse". The term "abuse" must be liberally construed to carry out the declared purpose of neglect and dependency proceedings. People in Interest of D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11 , 596 P.2d 747, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub nom. J.K.S. v. Colo., 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 515, 62 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979).

An ordinarily reasonable parent can understand what it means to "abuse" and "mistreat" a child. Fundamental fairness does not require a statute to enumerate in all-encompassing examples, or exactly described acts, precisely how poorly a parent can treat a child before risking loss of parental rights. People in Interest of D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11 , 596 P.2d 747, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub nom. J.K.S. v. Colo., 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 515, 62 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979).

The terms of subsection (1)(b) of this section, although general in nature, are sufficiently precise to permit persons of common intelligence to understand their meaning, and are not void for vagueness under the due process requirements of the Colorado Constitution. Watso v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Purpose of adjudicatory hearing. An adjudicatory hearing on dependency or neglect is designed to determine whether the child, for whatever reason, lacks the benefit of parental guidance, concern, protection or support to which he is entitled. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1981).

Determination proceeding is civil in nature. A proceeding to determine whether a child is dependent or neglected is civil in nature. People in Interest of D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11 , 596 P.2d 747, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub nom. J.K.S. v. Colo., 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 515, 62 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979).

And child is entitled to support until 18. Under the provisions concerning dependent and neglected children, there is a continuing liability upon the father of a legitimate, or illegitimate child, to provide reasonable support commensurate with the need of the child and the ability of the father until said child has attained the age of 18 years. Ortega v. Portales, 134 Colo. 537 , 307 P.2d 193 (1957).

Dependent child becomes ward of state. This section defines dependent and neglected children, and a child under the age of 18 years that falls within the classification of a dependent or neglected child becomes a ward of the state and the state can intervene. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217 , 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

"Legal custodian" does not encompass a state agency or employee thereof to which a delinquent child has been committed. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).

Care is preferably in child's own home. A neglected and dependent child's care and guidance should be preferably in his own home, so as to preserve and strengthen family ties. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Absent a showing of a causal relationship between an environment and a serious threat to the emotional or physical stability of the child, public policy requires that the care and guidance of each child should remain with his parents and in his own home. People in Interest of D.L.R., 44 Colo. App. 327, 618 P.2d 687 ( Colo. 1980 ), rev'd on other grounds, 638 P.2d 39 ( Colo. 1981 ).

Removal only where child's welfare and safety and protection of public endangered. The court should not remove a neglected and dependent child from the custody of his parents except when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public would be endangered. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Upon determination that conditions will continue in future. To determine that the best interests and welfare of a dependent or neglected child would be served by a termination of parental rights, the trial court must find that the condition which resulted in the determination that the child is dependent and neglected will in all probability continue into the future. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Showing of prospective harm suffices. Former subsection (20) (now subsection (1)) can be satisfied upon a proper showing of prospective harm to the child. People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981).

The rule of statutory construction of § 2-4-104 which states that words in the present tense include the future tense requires that former subsection (20) be interpreted to read "who lacks or will lack proper parental care." People in the Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981).

Abuse of siblings may be considered in determining dependency and neglect. In determining the dependency and neglect of a child, evidence that his siblings have been abused may be considered by the trial court as probative of whether the nonabused child lacks proper parental care. People in Interest of B.W., 626 P.2d 742 (Colo. App. 1981).

While a parent's treatment of one child may be considered in determining whether another child is dependent or neglected, consideration of the individual needs, strengths, and weaknesses of each child and each parent is also probative. People ex rel. T.T., 128 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005).

And court must evaluate disabled parent's capabilities and contributions. The court must evaluate a disabled parent's actual and potential physical capabilities, his adaptation to the disability, how other members of the family have adjusted to the disability, and the special contributions the person may make to the family. The paramount consideration in this type of proceeding is the best interests of the child. People in Interest of B.W., 626 P.2d 742 (Colo. App. 1981).

Court must find that under no reasonable circumstances can welfare of child be served by continuation of parent-child relationship. This test requires the court to explore and specifically eliminate alternative remedies. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

But termination of parental rights is not mandatory. Although the evidence may be sufficient to support a finding of neglect and dependency and may require termination of parental rights in order to serve the best interests of the child, it does not follow that the court must terminate parental rights because the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of neglect and dependency. In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974).

Insufficient findings and conclusions. Findings and conclusions of the referee that the father failed without cause to provide reasonable support for his daughter and that the child's best interests dictated that his parental rights be terminated did not satisfy the prerequisites of subsection (20) and fell short of the required finding of a history of severe and continuous neglect, conclusion that there exists a substantial probability of future deprivation, and determination that under no reasonable circumstances could the child's welfare be served by a continuation of her relationship with her father. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Loss of physical custody pursuant to marriage dissolution may terminate custodial duties. A person who initiates a dependency or neglect action and obtains legal custody of a child need not continue to serve as legal custodian and provide support after losing physical custody of the child in a dissolution of marriage action. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

However, a person who undertakes a permanent obligation pursuant to a parental responsibility order under § 14-10-123 owes a duty of support to the child in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, and trial court has authority to enter a child support order pursuant to § 14-10-115 (1) and (17). In re Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2007).

Child was not "dependent child". Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 290 , 104 P.2d 612 (1940).

Applied in Bd. of Control v. Mulertz, 60 Colo. 468 , 154 P. 742 (1916); Storey v. Shumaker, 131 Colo. 131 , 279 P.2d 1057 (1955); Daugaard v. People in Interest of Daugaard, 176 Colo. 38 , 488 P.2d 1101 (1971).

G. Emancipated Juvenile.

Trial court properly applied the definition of "emancipated juvenile" in finding that the juvenile was emancipated. The trial court appropriately found that the juvenile was emancipated where the juvenile had been on his own for three months and had not been receiving financial support from his mother. People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999).

H. Grandparent.

Exclusion from "grandparent" definition refers to all orders of termination, including those entered in dependency and neglect proceedings. People in Interest of J.W.W., 936 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1997); People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165 , 431 P.3d 1219.

"Great-grandmother" does not fall within the definition of "grandparent", therefore, great-grandmother lacked standing to seek visitation under § 19-1-117 . In re M.D.E., 2013 COA 13 , 297 P.3d 1058.

I. Guardian Ad Litem.

Law reviews. For casenote, "A Colorado Child's Best Interests: Examining the Gabriesheski Decision and Future Policy Implications", see 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 537 (2014).

Guardian ad litem may make recommendations to trial court by presenting opinions based upon an independent investigation or by advocating a specific result based upon the evidence. People in Interest of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372 (Colo. App. 1993); People in the Matter of A.L.B., 994 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1999).

J. Independent Living.

Placement with a natural parent does not qualify as "independent living" within the meaning of subsection (65). People ex rel. P.C., 80 P.3d 942 (Colo. App. 2003).

K. Placement Out of the Home.

A natural parent does not constitute a "facility or center operated or licensed by the department of human services" for purposes of subsection (85). People ex rel. P.C., 80 P.3d 942 (Colo. App. 2003).

19-1-103.5. Other definitions. (Repealed)

Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 82, § 2, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section repealed, p. 1031, § 67, effective August 6.

19-1-104. Jurisdiction.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
1. Concerning any child committing a delinquent act, as defined in section 19-2.5-102;
2. Concerning any child who is neglected or dependent, as set forth in section 19-3-102;
3. To determine the legal custody of any child or to appoint a guardian of the person or legal custodian of any child who comes within the juvenile court's jurisdiction under provisions of this section, and may also enter findings and orders as described in section 14-10-123 (1.5) and section 15-14-204 (2.5);
4. To terminate the legal parent-child relationship;
5. For the issuance of orders of support under article 6 of this title;
6. To determine the parentage of a child and to make an order of support in connection therewith;
7. For the adoption of a person of any age;
8. For judicial consent to the marriage, employment, or enlistment of a child, when such consent is required by law;
9. For the treatment or commitment pursuant to article 23 of title 17 and part 2 of article 10 of title 25.5 of a child who has a behavioral or mental health disorder or an intellectual and developmental disability and who comes within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section;
10. Under the interstate compact on juveniles, part 7 of article 60 of title 24, C.R.S.;
11. To make a determination concerning a petition filed pursuant to the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., and to enforce any lawful order of court made thereunder;
12. To make a determination concerning a petition for review of need for placement in accordance with the provisions of section 19-1-115 (8);
13. To decide the appeal of any child found to be in contempt of a municipal court located within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, if confinement of the child is ordered by the municipal court;
14. Concerning any youth who is voluntarily participating in the foster youth in transition program established in section 19-7-303.
(1.5) A juvenile court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(f), or (1)(g) of this section may enter findings establishing eligibility for classification as a special immigrant juvenile under federal law.
Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any adult who abuses, ill-treats, neglects, or abandons a child who comes within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section.
1. Upon hearing after prior notice to the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the court may issue temporary orders providing for legal custody, protection, support, medical evaluation or medical treatment, surgical treatment, psychological evaluation or psychological treatment, or dental treatment as it deems in the best interest of any child concerning whom a petition has been filed prior to adjudication or disposition of his case.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (3), the court may, on the basis of a report that a child's welfare may be endangered, and if the court believes that a medical evaluation or emergency medical or surgical treatment is reasonably necessary, issue ex parte emergency orders. Where the need for a medical evaluation or medical or surgical emergency orders arises and the court is not in regular session, the judge or magistrate may give oral or telephone authorization for the necessary medical evaluation or emergency medical, surgical, or hospital care, which authorization shall have the same force and effect as if written, the same to be followed by a written order to enter on the first regular court day thereafter. Such written order shall make specific findings of fact that such emergency existed. Prior to the entry of any emergency order, reasonable effort shall be made to notify the parents, guardian, or other legal custodian for the purpose of gaining consent for such care; except that, if such consent cannot be secured and the child's welfare so requires, the court may authorize needed medical evaluation or emergency medical, surgical, or hospital care. Such ex parte emergency orders shall expire twenty-four hours after issuance; except that, at any time during such twenty-four-hour period, the parents, guardian, or other legal custodian may apply for a hearing to set aside the ex parte emergency order.
Nothing in this section shall deprive the district court of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child nor of jurisdiction to determine the legal custody of a child upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of legal custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in the district court; except that:
1. If a petition involving the same child is pending in juvenile court or if continuing jurisdiction has been previously acquired by the juvenile court, the district court shall certify the question of legal custody to the juvenile court; and
2. The district court at any time may request the juvenile court to make recommendations pertaining to guardianship or legal custody.
Where a custody award or an order allocating parental responsibilities with respect to a child has been made in a district court in a dissolution of marriage action or another proceeding and the jurisdiction of the district court in the case is continuing, the juvenile court may take jurisdiction in a case involving the same child if the child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The juvenile court shall provide notice in compliance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure; except that service must be effected not less than seven business days prior to the hearing. The notice must be written in clear language stating that the hearing concerns the allocation of parental responsibilities. When creating or modifying an existing order, the juvenile court shall proceed as set forth in subsection (6) of this section for a dependency and neglect proceeding pursuant to article 3 of this title 19, or as set forth in subsection (8) of this section for a juvenile delinquency case pursuant to article 2.5 of this title 19.
When the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child who is dependent or neglected and no child custody action or action for the allocation of parental responsibilities concerning the same child is pending in a district court in this state, upon the petition of a party to the dependency or neglect case, the juvenile court may enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting time and child support matters. The parent or person other than a parent with whom the child resides the majority of the time pursuant to the juvenile court's order shall file a certified copy of the order in the district court in the county where the child is permanently resident. Such order shall be treated in the district court as any other decree issued in a proceeding concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities.
Upon motion of the city or county attorney, guardian ad litem, counsel for youth, or respondent parent counsel, the district or the juvenile court has jurisdiction to enter a civil protection order pursuant to article 14 of title 13 in actions brought pursuant to article 3 of this title 19 or part 3 of article 7 of this title 19. The court shall use the standardized forms developed by the judicial department pursuant to section 13-1-136 and shall follow the standards and procedures for the issuance of civil protection orders set forth in article 14 of title 13, including but not limited to personal service upon the restrained person. Once issued, the clerk of the issuing court shall enter the civil protection order into the computerized central registry of protection orders created pursuant to section 18-6-803.7. If the person who is the subject of the civil protection order has not been personally served pursuant to section 13-14-107 (3), a peace officer responding to a call for assistance shall serve a copy of the civil protection order on the person who is subject to the order. If the civil protection order is made permanent pursuant to the provisions of section 13-14-106, the civil protection order remains in effect upon termination of the juvenile court action. The clerk of the court issuing the order shall file a certified copy of the permanent civil protection order into an existing case in the district court, if applicable, or with the county court in the county where the protected party resides. Civil protection orders issued by the district or the juvenile court pursuant to article 14 of title 13 have the same force and effect as protection orders issued pursuant to article 14 of title 13 by a court with concurrent jurisdiction.
1. Upon submission of a stipulated agreement of all parties, parents, guardians, and other legal custodians, if the juvenile court finds that it is in the best interests of the juvenile, the juvenile court may enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting time and child support matters when:
  1. The juvenile court has maintained jurisdiction in a case involving an adjudicated juvenile, a juvenile with a deferred adjudication, or a juvenile on a management plan developed pursuant to section 19-2.5-704 (3);
  2. A child custody action, a dependency and neglect action, or an action for allocation of parental responsibilities concerning the same juvenile is not pending in a district court of this state, and the court complies, as applicable, with the requirements of the "Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act", as set forth in article 13 of title 14; and
  3. All parties, parents, guardians, and other legal custodians involved are in agreement, or after notice is given to all parents, guardians, and other legal custodians and a response or objection is not filed.
2. The parent or person other than a parent with whom the juvenile resides the majority of the time pursuant to a juvenile court order shall file a certified copy of the order in the district court in the county where the juvenile is a permanent resident. The district court shall treat the order as with any other decree issued in a proceeding concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 698, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: (3)(b) amended, p. 360, § 24, effective April 9. L. 92: (3) amended, p. 173, § 1, effective April 16. L. 97: (6) added, p. 516, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(a) amended, p. 820, § 21, effective August 5; (5) and (6) amended, p. 1405, § 61, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2001: (1)(k) amended, p. 870, § 2, effective June 1. L. 2006: (1)(i) amended, p. 1399, § 51, effective August 7. L. 2008: (1)(l) amended, p. 1891, § 59, effective August 5. L. 2017: (7) added, (HB 17-1111), ch. 96, p. 290, § 1, effective April 4; (1)(i) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1309, § 149, effective May 25; (5) amended and (8) added, (HB 17-1110), ch. 137, p. 458, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: IP(1) and (1)(c) amended and (1.5) added, (HB 19-1042), ch. 55, p. 194, § 6, effective March 28. L. 2020: (1)(i) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1048, § 34, effective June 30. L. 2021: (1)(n) added and (7) amended, (HB 21-1094), ch. 340, p. 2215, § 3, effective June 25; (1)(a), (5), and (8)(a)(I) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 725, § 60, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in § 19-1-104 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

Cross references: (1) For the jurisdiction of the juvenile court of Denver, see § 13-8-103; for the exemption from criminal responsibility for insufficient age, see § 18-1-801.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Analysis

I. General Consideration.
II. Particular Proceedings.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "The Denver Juvenile Court", see 5 Den. B. Ass'n Rec. 1 (May, 1928). For article, "The State as Parens Patriae: Juvenile Versus the Divorce Courts on Questions Pertaining to Custody", see 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 375 (1949). For article, "Workmen's Compensation, Attorneys and Family Law", see 31 Dicta 1 (1954). For note, "Jurisdiction of Custody Matters in Colorado", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 393 (1956). For note, "Compulsory Medical Care for Infants", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 235 (1956). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 34 Dicta 108 (1957). For article, "Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado: The Law's Response to Society's Need", see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 35 Dicta 36 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 36 Dicta 34 (1959). For article, "The Adoption of Children in Colorado", see 37 Dicta 100 (1960). For note, "Enforcement of Support Duties in Colorado", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 70 (1960). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 38 Dicta 84 (1961). For note, "Juvenile Delinquency -- Colorado's Unassumed Burden", see 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 519 (1964). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 97 (1964). For note, "In re Gault and the Colorado Children's Code", see 44 Den. L.J. 644 (1967). For note, "Delinquency Jurisdiction in Colorado: Garcia and the Children's Code", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 80 (1967). For article, "Colorado Felony Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). For article, "Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility", see 60 Den. L.J. 485 (1983). For note, "The Expanding Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging Juveniles as Adults: A Critical Look at People v. Thorpe", see 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 617 (1983). For article, "The Expanded Jurisdiction of the Probate Court Under In re J.C.T.", see 37 Colo. Law. 83 (Nov. 2008).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The juvenile court is a statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121 , 308 P.2d 1000 (1957); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425 , 386 P.2d 595 (1963); People in Interest of L.B., 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), aff'd, 179 Colo. 11 , 498 P.2d 1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976, 93 S. Ct. 1497, 36 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1973); Pueblo County Comm'rs v. Dist. Court, 708 P.2d 466 ( Colo. 1985 ).

Purpose is to secure uniform administration. Jurisdiction vested in the court of the county where the child resides provides uniform administration of the law and uniform protection of all children in the county. Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121 , 308 P.2d 1000 (1957).

The juvenile court being a creature of statute is limited by the provisions of the statute creating it and defining its jurisdiction. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217 , 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

This code intends to grant broad jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Jaramillo v. District Court, 173 Colo. 459 , 480 P.2d 841 (1971).

The identification of those authorized to invoke the court's jurisdiction operates to exclude all persons not mentioned. Where this section specifically identifies the officers or persons who may invoke the jurisdiction of a court in a proceeding which is purely statutory, it is necessary and essential that the persons thus named shall institute the proceedings. Avery v. County Court, 126 Colo. 421 , 250 P.2d 122 (1952).

General rule. Jurisdiction attaches only in proceedings brought, not in behalf of any person, but solely where children are found delinquent or have been so circumstanced, neglected, or imposed upon as to require the state to take over their custody or act otherwise for their protection. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421 , 283 P.2d 162 (1955); Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121 , 308 P.2d 1000 (1957); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425 , 386 P.2d 595 (1963).

The status of being a neglected or dependent child triggers juvenile court jurisdiction over a child so circumstanced in Colorado. People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 ( Colo. 1982 ).

Allocation of juvenile and district court jurisdiction in criminal proceedings. Once an indictment charging a class 1 felony is filed, the jurisdiction of the district court is expressly fixed under subsection (4)(b)(I), and that jurisdiction is not lost simply because the juvenile defendant is convicted of a lesser offense. People v. Davenport, 43 Colo. App. 41, 602 P.2d 871 (1979).

Charges involving a minor should be resolved in adult court when the requirements of the direct filing statute are satisfied as to any charge. People v. Dalton, 70 P.3d 517 (Colo. App. 2002).

Juvenile court lacks exclusive jurisdiction where juvenile charged with municipal ordinance violation. A juvenile who could have been charged under the general theft statute but is only charged under a municipal shoplifting ordinance carrying no jail sentence is not a delinquent child and the juvenile court does not have sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Wigent v. Shinsato, 43 Colo. App. 83, 601 P.2d 653 (1979).

Juveniles to have same rights as adults in trials for municipal ordinance violations. The juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction carries with it the same trial duties as to juveniles who have violated municipal ordinances, as a municipal court has to adults who violated the same ordinances. People v. Hight, 198 Colo. 299 , 599 P.2d 885 (1979).

The Colorado Children's Code confers on Colorado courts jurisdiction over any child physically present in the state. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Colorado domicile of a child is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction of Colorado courts over that child. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Certification of the issue of custody to the juvenile court pursuant to former subsection (5)(a) (now subsection (4)(a)) is mandatory. In re Eckman, 645 P.2d 866 (Colo. App. 1982).

Juvenile court has power and duty to make such determinations as it deems appropriate regarding custody and care of a child adjudicated to be within its exclusive jurisdiction. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

But department of welfare does not. Given the broad power of the juvenile court to make determinations as to the custody and care of a child under its jurisdiction, it would be inconsistent and contrary to the intent of the general assembly to also find such a power in the Denver department of welfare. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

Juvenile court may delegate responsibility for placement of child. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

And department of welfare is agent of court subject to court's further authority. The court is vested with the ultimate responsibility in the placement of a child for adoption, and thus, whatever authority the welfare department may have concerning custody and/or placement arises as a result of a delegation of that authority by the court. In essence, therefore, the department acts as the agent of the court, assisting in the fulfillment of the court's responsibility. The grant to the welfare department of custody and authority to place for adoption is thus subject to revocation, limitation, or control by the court delegating such authority. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

In evaluating the child's best interests, the probate court did not exceed its jurisdiction by directing the GAL to find a permanent guardian or by considering the potential for a future adoption. Nothing in this section deprives the district court of the authority to appoint a guardian for a child. In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726 (Colo. 2007).

No automatic repeal by § 16-11-309 . The general assembly did not automatically intend to repeal the special provision for discretionary sentencing of juveniles, this section, by the enactment of the general mandatory sentencing statute, § 16-11-309 . People v. Dist. Court, 196 Colo. 249 , 585 P.2d 913 (1978).

Testimony as to age is prima facie case for jurisdiction. The defendants, by their own testimony that they were 17 years old, made a prima facie case as to their juvenility, and it became incumbent upon the prosecutor to either prove that the defendants were 18 or older or to ask that the case be remanded to the juvenile court for transfer proceeding under the Colorado Children's Code. Maddox v. People, 178 Colo. 366 , 497 P.2d 1263 (1972).

Waiver of juvenile court's jurisdiction, after a transfer hearing, will not be set aside unless the findings upon which the waiver was based were erroneous. People in Interest of G.A.T., 183 Colo. 111 , 515 P.2d 104 (1973).

Jurisdiction to order placement of juvenile in private facilities. Courts have the jurisdiction to enter custodial orders placing a juvenile in private facilities and directing that the appropriate county department of social services pay the cost of such private treatment. Heim v. Dist. Court, 195 Colo. 107 , 575 P.2d 850 (1978).

While subsection (1) generally provides exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the actions enumerated therein, the clause "except as otherwise provided by law," is an express limitation on such jurisdiction. In re De La Cruz, 791 P.2d 1254 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applied in People v. Dist. Court, 191 Colo. 298 , 552 P.2d 297 (1976); People v. Maynes, 193 Colo. 111 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977); Ford v. Ford, 194 Colo. 134 , 571 P.2d 717 (1977); People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978); People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197 , 606 P.2d 450 (1980); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 ( Colo. 1981 ); May v. People, 636 P.2d 672 ( Colo. 1981 ); People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981); People v. M.A.W., 651 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1982); City & County of Denver v. Dist. Court, 675 P.2d 312 ( Colo. 1984 ); People v. Cunningham, 678 P.2d 1058 (Colo. App. 1983); Rocha v. People, 713 P.2d 350 ( Colo. 1986 ).

II. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS.

A. Delinquency.

Child may be prosecuted directly for traffic violation. One under 18 who violates a traffic law is not a delinquent child, and is therefore not subject to the original exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court in delinquency proceedings, and may be directly prosecuted for a violation of a state traffic law. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

However, the Colorado Children's Code contains no limitation on the authority of the juvenile court to consider traffic charges when coupled with other misdemeanor or felony charges committed as a part of the same act or series of acts and thus charges are subject to the compulsory joinder statute, § 18-1-408 (2) . Marquez v. County Court, 719 P.2d 737 (Colo. App. 1986).

B. Dependency.

The remedy in case of an abandoned and neglected child rests exclusively in a juvenile court as provided in this section. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

Juvenile courts are authorized to determine the question of dependency, and, if found, to determine who is responsible therefor, and to enforce their findings by judgment and execution. Ortega v. Portales, 134 Colo. 537 , 307 P.2d 193 (1957); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425 , 386 P.2d 595 (1963).

Jurisdiction proper where child abandoned to care of relatives. The assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction over a child because the child was not dependent and neglected is without merit where the child has been abandoned to the care of a grandfather and aunt. People in Interest of F.M., 44 Colo. App. 142, 609 P.2d 1123 (1980).

A juvenile court has no jurisdiction in contests about custody of children, whether it is between parents or other individuals. In re People in Interest of McChesney, 103 Colo. 115 , 83 P.2d 772 (1938); Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307 , 194 P.2d 909 (1948); Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34 , 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217 , 301 P.2d 515 (1956); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102 , 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

Determination of neglect and dependency can be sought only where immediate needs and welfare of child are in peril, and consequently, they represent situations where the doctrine of parens patriae would be applicable. Such being the case, the trial court properly assumes preliminary jurisdiction over children brought into the state by their mother, but whose custody had been previously awarded to the father by a court in another state, which jurisdiction will become absolute if a valid showing is made by the state of a dependency and neglect situation as defined in the Colorado Children's Code. In re People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Such a dispute is one for determination by a divorce proceeding by which proper jurisdiction of the person and subject matter could be had and all parties properly protected. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217 , 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

But district court jurisdiction suspended when state brings dependency proceeding. A district court's jurisdiction to dispose of the custody of a child as between the parties to a divorce proceeding and as ancillary to that proceeding, is suspended by the institution of and during the pendency of a direct proceeding in dependency by the state in the interest of the child in a county court under this section. People ex rel. Lucke v. County Court, 109 Colo. 447 , 126 P.2d 334 (1942).

The jurisdiction of a divorce court is exercised as between a husband and wife; that of a juvenile court in dependency proceedings, as between the state in the interest of the child, and the parents of the child. The two courts may have simultaneous, though not concurrent, jurisdiction concerning the custody of a child. But where both courts make orders concerning such custody, the operation of the order of the divorce court is suspended during the period, and only during the period, that the order of the juvenile court remains in force. Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536 , 5 P.2d 246 (1931); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

District court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction by ordering that defendant not have custody of her children as a condition of probation for the crime of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in death. Subsection (1) grants the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legal custody of any child who is dependent or neglected. People v. Forsythe, 43 P.3d 652 (Colo. App. 2001).

Once a petition for custody under § 14-10-123 is certified to be determined as part of a pending dependency and neglect action pursuant to this section, dissolution of marriage statutes cease to apply. Instead, provisions of the Colorado Children's Code govern, in view of the differing policies behind the respective statutes. People in Interest of D.C., 851 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1993); People in Interest of A.A.G., 902 P.2d 437 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 1385 ( Colo. 1996 ).

Juvenile court acting under subsection (6) may enter child support order, which order must follow the provisions of article 6 of this title and the child support guidelines set forth in § 14-10-115 . Where delinquency court granted stipulation allocating parental responsibilities to mother, in determining support, court was required to follow the provisions of article 6, including § 19-6-106 , which in turn requires compliance with the child support guidelines. Court erred in failing to address the factors set forth in § 14-10-115 . People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118 , 472 P.3d 1115.

District court on habeas corpus has no jurisdiction over abandonment. A district court in habeas corpus proceedings has jurisdiction to determine whether a child is being unlawfully restrained by the grandparents. Such determination cannot in any manner affect the outcome of any adoption proceedings. An adjudication in the habeas corpus proceedings cannot be considered as an adjudication of abandonment as defined in the adoption provisions or as used in the dependent and neglected children provisions, as the question of abandonment is not an issue and the district court has no jurisdiction over abandonment. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119 , 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

In view of the state's strong interest in providing for the welfare of children within its borders, the presence of an allegedly dependent or neglected child within Colorado will generally provide an adequate jurisdictional basis to adjudicate the dependency status of the child within Colorado. E.P. v. Dist. Court, 696 P.2d 254 ( Colo. 1985 ).

The trial court properly assumes preliminary jurisdiction over children brought into the state by their mother, but whose custody had been previously awarded to the father by a court in another state, which jurisdiction will become absolute if a valid showing is made by the state of a dependency and neglect situation as defined in the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

An action in dependency may not be used as a means of making a child available for adoption in a stepparent adoption proceeding. Such tactic is inappropriate and contrary to the statutory language as well as the legislative intent of the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Judgment reversed for lack of jurisdiction. Cullen v. People ex rel. Baer, 152 Colo. 531 , 383 P.2d 316 (1963).

Statute as basis of jurisdiction. Johnson v. People, 170 Colo. 137 , 459 P.2d 579 (1969).

Applied in Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235 , 179 P.2d 662 (1947); People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

C. Paternity.

This section confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to determine parentage. Dikeou v. People, 95 Colo. 537 , 38 P.2d 772 (1934); In re Morrow's Estate, 100 Colo. 424 , 68 P.2d 36 (1937).

When a court declares a child dependent or neglected in a case filed under article 3, a court presiding over a separate parentage proceeding under article 4 loses jurisdiction to determine that child's parentage. All matters pertaining to the child's status must be addressed in the open dependency and neglect case. People in Interest of D.C.C., 2018 COA 98 , __ P.3d __.

The courts should primarily be more concerned about the welfare of the child than in the residential status of the parties to the proceeding. No unreasonable impediment should be allowed which would prevent an expectant mother from pursuing the father of the unborn child and invoking the aid of a court having proper jurisdiction at the residence or domicile of the neglectful father if in this state. Campbell v. Gilliam, 127 Colo. 471 , 257 P.2d 965 (1953).

The juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the parentage of children yet unborn. Cederquist v. Archuleta, 127 Colo. 41 , 253 P.2d 431 (1953); People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445 , 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

D. Adoption.

Department's authority in adoption. Inasmuch as the general assembly has granted the court exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions, has expressly authorized adoptive placement, and has given the court the final and sole responsibility of approving or disapproving adoptions, it would be totally inconsistent to conclude that the welfare department or licensed placement agencies are the sole entities authorized to place a child for adoption following termination of parental rights. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

Court's adoption authority not limited by former § 19-3-111 (2)(b). Subsection (1)(h) expressly provides that the court has exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the adoption of any person. No limitation on that authority arises by virtue of former § 19-3-111 (2)(b). People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

District court had jurisdiction to rule on nullification of adoption where issues regarding legal custody and adoption of child were incidental to determination of issues presented in dissolution proceeding and no petition was filed in juvenile court. In re Dickson, 983 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1998).

Limit on jurisdiction for interstate adoptions. The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children limits the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interstate adoptions as an exception "otherwise provided by law". Denver Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dist. Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1987).

Under article V of such compact, the sending agency retains jurisdiction until the child is adopted, and the mere filing of an adoption petition is not sufficient to divest the sending agency of jurisdiction. Denver Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dist. Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1987).

E. Other Proceedings.

General rule whereby Colorado courts must respect custodial decrees of other states is subject to two exceptions: (1) When the domicile of the child subject to a foreign decree changes to Colorado and there is a showing of a change in circumstances after the foreign decree; and (2) when conditions necessitate Colorado's intervention for the protection of any child found within its borders, through the doctrine of parens patriae. Thus, the requirement that a child need only be physically present within the state of Colorado does no violence to the rules governing interstate recognition of custodial decrees. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Court without power to proceed if prescribed residence lacking. Where a statute makes the residence of a petitioner within a particular county a condition upon which the jurisdiction of a court can be invoked, a court is wholly without power or authority to proceed in a statutory action unless the petitioner is a resident of such county within which the action is brought. Avery v. County Court, 126 Colo. 421 , 250 P.2d 122 (1952).

Jurisdiction not divested when children move from county. The paternity action having been properly commenced in Denver as the statute provided, jurisdiction attached, and the court is not divested of it thereafter by reason of the fact that the children move out of the county. Del Campo v. People in Interest of Del Campo, 172 Colo. 277 , 472 P.2d 130 (1970).

A prima facie case of sufficient residency, and also of dependency, established. Campbell v. Gilliam, 127 Colo. 471 , 257 P.2d 965 (1953).

A parent may make necessary arrangements for the care of a child without order of court, guardianship or otherwise. It is not the law that before a child can be placed by a parent in temporary custody of a relative permission must be first obtained from the court. Diernfeld v. People in Interest of Diernfeld, 137 Colo. 238 , 323 P.2d 628 (1958).

Attainment of majority while minor's appeal from adjudication as "child in need of supervision" is pending renders appeal moot in light of the Colorado Children's Code attempt to eliminate collateral legal consequences of adjudication. People v. T.B., 183 Colo. 310 , 516 P.2d 642 (1973).

Jurisdiction to order department of welfare to return child to group care facility. The juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction, or lack jurisdiction, to order the Denver department of welfare to return a child who was adjudicated in need of supervision to a group care facility. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157 , 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

The provisions of the Parental Notification Act supersede subsection (3) with regard to the provision of notice to parents about abortions. Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mtns. Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2002).

As a result, the Parental Notification Act must be held unconstitutional because it lacks a health exception to the parental notification requirement. Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mtns. Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2002).

Removal of extraordinary life-sustaining devices. A juvenile court has jurisdiction in a shelter hearing to order the removal of all extraordinary life-sustaining devices from a child in the temporary custody of the department of social services if in the doctor's opinion the legal standard of cerebral death has been met. Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419 , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).

Juvenile may not be compelled to undergo psychological evaluation under subsection (3), for purposes of a transfer hearing, because of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. People in Interest of A.D.G., 895 P.2d 1067 (Colo. App. 1994).

Juvenile's refusal to undergo psychological evaluation may not be used against him in a transfer hearing because it would impermissibly penalize his exercise of the fifth amendment right. People in Interest of A.D.G., 895 P.2d 1067 (Colo. App. 1994).

Applied in In re U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1981).

19-1-105. Right to counsel and jury trial.

All hearings, including adjudicatory hearings, shall be heard by a judge or magistrate without a jury, except as otherwise provided by this title.
The right to counsel shall be as provided in this title; except that, in all proceedings under the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., the court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the child, unless the child is already represented by counsel. If the court finds that it is in the best interest and welfare of the child, the court may appoint both counsel and a guardian ad litem. Nothing in this title shall prevent the court from appointing counsel if it deems representation by counsel necessary to protect the interests of the child or other parties. In addition, in all proceedings under the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., the court shall make available to the child's parent or guardian ad litem information concerning the truancy process.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 700, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 360, § 25, effective April 9. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 1320, § 1, effective August 6.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-106 and 19-1-107 as said sections existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "In re Gault and the Colorado Children's Code", see 44 Den. L.J. 644 (1967). For article, "Representing the Mentally Retarded or Disabled Parent in a Colorado Dependent or Neglected Child Action", see 11 Colo. Law. 693 (1982). For comment, "Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: Due Process Takes an Ad Hoc Turn -- What's a Parent to Do?", see 59 Den. L.J. 591 (1982). For article, "The Role of Parents' Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings -- Part I", see 14 Colo. Law. 568 (1985). For article, "The Role of Children's Counsel in Contested Child Custody, Visitation and Support Cases", see 15 Colo. Law. 224 (1986). For article, "Final Draft of Proposed GAL Standards of Practice", see 22 Colo. Law. 1907 (1993).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

State's interest in juvenile proceedings stems from its role as parens patriae, and that interest is of significance both in the context of delinquency cases, and in neglect and dependency matters. McCall v. District Court ex rel. County of Montezuma, 651 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1982).

Trial by jury in the adjudicative stage of a juvenile proceeding is not required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. People in Interest of T.A.W., 38 Colo. App. 175, 556 P.2d 1225 (1976).

And six-member jury is sufficient. Due process of law does not mandate that a juvenile be tried by a 12-member jury in connection with an adjudicatory hearing under the Colorado Children's Code even though the code limits the jury to six members. A six-member jury satisfies due process requirements. People in Interest of T.A.W., 38 Colo. App. 175, 556 P.2d 1225 (1976).

Jury demand right extended to all parties of record to delinquency proceeding. The general assembly's selection of "any interested party" stands out as a purposeful choice to extend the right of jury demand to all parties of record to the delinquency proceeding. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

And juvenile has no veto power over state's demand. There is no indication of an intent to bestow on the juvenile a veto power over the state's jury demand through a statutory right of jury waiver. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

The putative father has a statutory right to a jury trial in determining the issue of paternity. People in Interest of L.B., 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), aff'd, 179 Colo. 11 , 498 P.2d 1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976, 93 S. Ct. 1497, 36 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1973).

There is no right to a jury trial in a support hearing such as set forth in article 7. People in Interest of L.B., 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), aff'd, 179 Colo. 11 , 498 P.2d 1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976, 93 S. Ct. 1497, 36 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1973).

Substantial compliance required. Proceedings in dependency or neglect affect important rights, so there must be substantial compliance with statutory requirements for conduct of those proceedings. People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 ( Colo. 1982 ); C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 ( Colo. 2004 ).

Substantial compliance must appear of record. These proceedings are statutory and as they affect substantial rights there must be a substantial compliance with the provisions of the legislative enactment. Such a compliance must appear of record. It cannot be ignored. Storey v. Shumaker, 131 Colo. 131 , 279 P.2d 1057 (1955).

Any person proceeded against in court is entitled to counsel of his or her own choosing, and the selection of such counsel cannot be dictated by those who instigate the action. Selby v. Jacobucci, 142 Colo. 52 , 349 P.2d 567 (1960).

In a proceeding following a complaint filed by parents of an allegedly delinquent minor 17 years of age, who had selected her own counsel to represent her, an order of the trial court incorporating the parents' request that such counsel be prohibited from appearing or representing such minor was in excess of its jurisdiction. Selby v. Jacobucci, 142 Colo. 52 , 349 P.2d 567 (1960).

Parent has a statutory right to counsel at a statutorily prescribed proceeding for review of out-of-home placements of children. People in Interest of J.B., 702 P.2d 753 (Colo. App. 1985).

In determining whether an indigent parent has the right to appointed counsel in a termination proceeding resulting from a dependency and neglect adjudication, a court is to consider whether (1) the parent's interest is an extremely important one; (2) the state shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and, in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and (3) the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounselled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high. In re C.A.O., 192 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2008).

These factors should be considered to resolve parent's due process argument in a stepparent adoption proceeding. In re C.A.O., 192 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2008).

These factors should also be considered to resolve parent's due process argument in adoption proceedings when parent is incarcerated out of state and has no ability to participate in the proceedings. In re R.L.S., 2019 COA 112 , 451 P.3d 1249.

The decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in stepparent adoption proceedings must be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject to appellate review. In re C.A.O., 192 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2008).

Due process requires the appointment of counsel only where the parent's interests are at their strongest, where the state's interests are at their weakest, and where the risks of error are at their peak, and because risk of error was low, state's interest in achieving permanency for children was high, and hearing was not characterized by troublesome points of law, either substantive or procedural, parent's fundamental right to assistance of counsel was not implicated and court was not required to give parent a detailed advisement regarding her decision to appear pro se. C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2004).

In a direct appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, an appellate court may consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's performance at an adjudicatory hearing only when the party claiming ineffective assistance did not have a full and fair opportunity to assert such a claim immediately after his or her child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. People in Interest of A.R., 2020 CO 10, 456 P.3d 1266.

Court must follow the prejudice test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984), for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in termination of parental rights proceedings. To establish prejudice from counsel's deficient performance in a dependency and neglect proceeding, a party must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People in Interest of A.R., 2020 CO 10, 456 P.3d 1266; People in Interest of A.L.W, 2020 CO 11, 456 P.3d 1284.

Standing to appear of party entrusted with care of child. The Colorado Children's Code has not changed the basic law of the state that a grandparent to whom the child has been entrusted for care has status to appear and protest the actions of the court relative to the child. C.B. v. People in Interest of J.T.B., 30 Colo. App. 269, 493 P.2d 691 (1971).

Guardian includes persons vested by court with duty and authority to make major decisions affecting a child. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

"Legal custodian" does not encompass a state agency or employee thereof to which a delinquent child has been committed. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).

Legal custodian would be an interested party to a delinquency action. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

State is a party of record to a delinquency proceeding. S.A.S. v. Dist. Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981).

Juvenile witness protected against self-incrimination. The fifth amendment, applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment, protects a child against self-incrimination under juvenile delinquency laws. The privilege of declining to testify is not a matter which lies within the exclusive discretion of a juvenile witness. The judge makes the decision based upon his understanding of the circumstances of the case. People v. Ledesma, 171 Colo. 407 , 468 P.2d 27 (1970).

Respondents in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, having made a prior demand, were entitled to a jury trial at the adjudicatory hearing on remand. People in Interest of M.B., 188 Colo. 370 , 535 P.2d 192 (1975).

Error for trial judge to refuse a jury trial and fail to notify defendants or parents or friends present, that a trial by jury might be had if they wished it. Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928).

Procedure of jury trial before referee improper. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in prescribing instead of a jury trial, and in lieu of a trial before a master or referee, a procedure whereby the parties were to have a "jury trial in all respects" but conducted by the referee, where it was agreed that the referee and the court would be bound by the jury verdict, although the jury was described as being "an advisory one". Maniatis v. Karakitsios, 161 Colo. 378 , 422 P.2d 52 (1967).

Statute as basis for jurisdiction. People v. Flanigan, 191 Colo. 43 , 536 P.2d 41 (1975).

Applied in Rose v. People, 111 Colo. 220 , 139 P.2d 261 (1943); In re People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298 , 520 P.2d 128 (1974); People in Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430 , 586 P.2d 46 (1978); Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419 , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979); People in Interest of V.A.E.Y.H.D., 199 Colo. 148 , 605 P.2d 916 ( Colo. 1980 ); People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 ( Colo. 1981 ); People in Interest of R.M.S., 651 P.2d 377 ( Colo. 1982 ).

19-1-106. Hearings - procedure - record.

The Colorado rules of juvenile procedure shall apply in all proceedings under this title.
Hearings may be conducted in an informal manner. The general public shall not be excluded unless the court determines that it is in the best interest of the child or of the community to exclude the general public, and, in such event, the court shall admit only such persons as have an interest in the case or the work of the court, including persons whom the district attorney, the county or city attorney, the child, or the parents, guardian, or other custodian of the child wish to be present.
A verbatim record shall be taken of all proceedings.
When more than one child is named in a petition alleging neglect or dependency, the hearings may be consolidated; except that separate hearings may be held with respect to disposition.
Children's cases shall be heard separately from adults' cases, and the child or his parents, guardian, or other custodian may be heard separately when deemed necessary by the court.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 700, § 1, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-107 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: The Due Process Model", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 315 (1968).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Juvenile proceedings are governed by the procedural rules contained in the Colorado Children's Code. People ex rel. M.C.L., 671 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1983).

Hearing may be informally conducted, and the court may take into consideration all factors which he normally takes into account when sentencing. People in Interest of B.L.M. v. B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).

And court is not bound by strict rules of evidence in a hearing to determine whether probation should be revoked. People in Interest of B.L.M. v. B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).

Thus, there is a presumption that all incompetent or hearsay evidence is disregarded by a court in reaching its conclusions, so a judgment will not be reversed on appeal because of the admission of such evidence. People in Interest of B.L.M. v. B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).

However, the Colorado Children's Code does not dispense with rules of evidence which directly bear upon substantive proof although the Children's Code does permit hearings to be conducted in an informal manner. Daugaard v. People in Interest of Daugaard, 176 Colo. 38 , 488 P.2d 1101 (1971).

Arguments to the court are not matters of evidence, have no probative value, and are designed only to sway the court's findings and conclusions. People in Interest of B.L.M. v. B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).

In delinquency cases a verbatim record of the proceedings and evidence shall be maintained unless expressly waived. John Doe v. People, 156 Colo. 311 , 398 P.2d 624 (1965).

Lack of transcript and evidence required reversal. Where an order was entered declaring a child neglected and dependent, severing parental rights, and holding the child's grandfather in contempt of court for failure to deliver the child, but the court reporter certified that there had been no transcript made of any of the hearings prior to the one on the contempt violation, and since there was no evidence or showing that the home environment which the grandfather might provide for the child would be unsatisfactory the judgment and orders of the trial court were reversed. C.B. v. People in Interest of J.T.B., 30 Colo. App. 269, 493 P.2d 691 (1971).

The prosecutor may establish the same facts by the same witnesses and by the same real and documentary evidence that may have been used in earlier proceeding in the juvenile court. When oral testimony is offered for its intrinsic value with relation to the issue to be tried, rather than to establish what was said or done in proceedings before the juvenile court, former § 19-1-109 (2) does not prevent the giving of testimony because the same witness was previously called upon to give evidence relating to the same transaction in juvenile court proceedings. Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53 , 358 P.2d 1028 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965, 82 S. Ct. 1579, 8 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1962).

Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination paramount to juvenile's interests. Where both juveniles admittedly participated in the crimes which were charged against the defendant, both juveniles were seeking leniency and had already obtained the dismissal of serious felony counts which would have mandated imprisonment, the dispositional hearing was purposely set for a time subsequent to the defendant's trial, and no testimony tied the defendant to the crime other than that of the juvenile witnesses, the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination was paramount to the interests afforded a juvenile under former § 19-1-109 (2). People v. Pate, 625 P.2d 369 (Colo. 1981).

Court may conduct in camera interview with a child to determine child's best interests and how to allocate parental responsibilities within a dependency and neglect proceeding. Unless waived by the parties, a record of the interview must be made. The record must be made available to parents, upon request, in situations in which a parent needs (1) to determine whether the court's findings, insofar as they relied on facts from the interview, are supported by the record, or (2) an opportunity to contest information supplied by the child during the interview and relied on by the court. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70 , 417 P.3d 875.

Appellate court may vacate a juvenile court's decision in a dependency and neglect proceeding on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel without remanding for further fact-finding when either (1) the record is sufficiently developed to allow the appellate court to decide the question of counsel's ineffectiveness or (2) the record establishes presumptive prejudice under the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). People in Interest of A.R., 2020 CO 10, 456 P.3d 1266; People in Interest of A.L.W, 2020 CO 11, 456 P.3d 1284.

Applied in Lindsey v. People ex rel. Rush, 66 Colo. 343 , 181 P. 531 (1919); People v. Hinchman, 196 Colo. 526 , 589 P.2d 917 (1978); People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197 , 606 P.2d 450 (1980); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 ( Colo. 1982 ); People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 ( Colo. 1982 ).

19-1-107. Social study and other reports.

Unless waived by the court, an agency designated by the court shall make a social study and report in writing in all children's cases; except that:
1. Repealed.
2. Adoption reports shall be as provided in article 5 of this title.
For the purpose of determining proper disposition of a child, written reports and other material relating to the child's mental, physical, and social history may be received and considered by the court along with other evidence; but the court, if so requested by the child, his parent or guardian, or other interested party, shall require that the person who wrote the report or prepared the material appear as a witness and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. In the absence of such request, the court may order the person who prepared the report or other material to appear if it finds that the interest of the child so requires.
(2.5) For purposes of determining the appropriate treatment plan in connection with the disposition of a child who is under six years of age at the time a petition is filed in accordance with section 19-3-501 (2), the report shall include a list of services available to families that are specific to the needs of the child and the child's family and that are available in the community where the family resides. The report shall establish a priority of the services if multiple services are recommended. The services may include, but are not limited to, transportation services, visitation services, psychological counseling, drug screening and treatment programs, marriage and family counseling, parenting classes, housing and day care assistance, and homemaker services.
In a case where placement out of the home is recommended, the social study required by subsection (1) of this section must include the cost of the recommended placement and an evaluation for placement containing the information required by section 19-1-115 (8)(e). The department of education and the department of human services shall jointly develop placement criteria, and, in the case of matters involving juvenile delinquency, the criteria must be in accordance with the criteria for the placement of juveniles specified in section 19-2.5-1404. Such criteria must be used by the agency designated by the court to determine its recommendation about the need for placement.
The court shall inform the child, his parent or legal guardian, or other interested party of the right of cross-examination concerning any written report or other material as specified in subsection (2) of this section.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 701, § 1, effective October 1. L. 93: (3) amended, p. 1546, § 1, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 1134, § 65, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (2.5) added, p. 2051, § 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (3) amended, p. 1441, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 766, § 29, effective June 1. L. 2008: (3) amended, p. 1891, § 60, effective August 5. L. 2015: IP(1) and (3) amended and (1)(a) repealed, (SB 15-099), ch. 99, p. 290, § 3, effective August 5. L. 2021: (3) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 726, § 61, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in § 19-1-108 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Amendments to subsection (3) in Senate Bill 93-134 and House Bill 93-1317 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1993 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 230, Session Laws of Colorado 1993.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Referee/Commissioner Duties and Procedures in Denver Metro Domestic Matters", see 11 Colo. Law 951 (1982). For article, "Interested Parties in Juvenile Dependency and Neglect Cases", see 33 Colo. Law. 109 (Aug. 2004).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Colorado Children's Code expressly contemplates participation of interested parties in juvenile cases. People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).

But does not supply definition of "interested party". In re People in Interest of C.P., 34 Colo. App. 54, 524 P.2d 316 (1974).

The Colorado Children's Code expressly contemplates the active participation of interested parties at the dispositional hearing. The Children's Code does not, however, delineate who is entitled to participate as an interested party. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

While the Colorado Children's Code does not expressly define those persons who may become "parties" to proceedings, it does contemplate the participation of interested third parties. In re People in Interest of C.P., 34 Colo. App. 54, 524 P.2d 316 (1974).

Includes persons furnishing child support pursuant to juvenile court order. Since the juvenile court has the power to compel legally responsible persons to support a child, it necessarily follows that a person furnishing support to a child in accordance with an order of the juvenile court has the right to intervene in a child in need of supervision proceeding as an interested party for the purpose of recovering the cost of that support. People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).

And persons able to aid court in its determination. Among those who can be considered interested parties are individuals who, because of their relationship with or particular knowledge concerning the child, can materially aid the court in its determination of what in fact is in the child's best interest. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

State is an "interested party". The state of Colorado, through its representative, the district attorney, is an "interested party" at the dispositional stage of a delinquency proceeding, as the same factors which establish the state's status as an interested party at the adjudicatory stage of the delinquency proceeding are equally applicable to the dispositional stage. People in Interest of R.M.S., 651 P.2d 377 ( Colo. 1982 ).

State's interest in juvenile proceedings stems from its role as parens patriae, and that interest is of significance both in the context of delinquency cases, and neglect and dependency matters. McCall v. Dist. Court ex rel. County of Montezuma, 651 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1982).

Those having custodial experience with child have sufficient interest, knowledge, and concern relative to the child to bring them within the classification of "interested parties" and thus they are entitled, upon application, to intervene as a matter of right in the dispositional hearing. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

Common-law hearsay objections as to admissibility of social study are not applicable. In re People in Interest of A.R.S., 31 Colo. App. 268, 502 P.2d 92 (1972).

Nonexpert or hearsay content affects weight, not admissibility. Where this section authorizes consideration of social reports, fact that they may contain hearsay or are prepared by nonexperts becomes matter concerning their weight and probative value and not their admissibility. In re People in Interest of A.R.S., 31 Colo. App. 268, 502 P.2d 92 (1972); People in Interest of R.D.H., 944 P.2d 660 (Colo. App. 1997).

And admission of reports with cross-examination did not deny due process. Where parents obtained attendance of authors of social reports admitted in proceeding to adjudge child to be dependent and neglected and to terminate parental rights, and where parents cross-examined each author, admission of such reports did not deny due process to parents. In re People in Interest of A.R.S., 31 Colo. App. 268, 502 P.2d 92 (1972).

Admission of reports not unconstitutional. The admission of reports into evidence pursuant to subsection (2) violates neither constitutional confrontation requirements nor due process of law, where the reports are made available to all interested parties sufficiently in advance of the termination hearing to permit the parties to compel the attendance of the persons who wrote the reports or prepared the materials therein and to subject them to examination under oath. People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982).

Opportunity to request cross-examination denied. Where it appeared the court in proceeding to terminate parental rights considered the contents of a letter in the nature of a social study as provided for by this section, but the respondents were not apprised of its existence, the respondents were not provided with an opportunity to request the cross-examination of the persons responsible for the study. People in Interest of M.B., 188 Colo. 370 , 535 P.2d 192 (1975).

C.R.C.P. 24 has no application in a proceeding under the Colorado Children's Code, as the code itself expressly contemplates the active participation of interested parties. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

19-1-108. Magistrates - qualifications - duties.

The juvenile court may appoint one or more magistrates to hear any case or matter under the court's jurisdiction, except where a jury trial has been requested pursuant to section 19-2.5-610 and in transfer hearings held pursuant to section 19-2.5-802. Magistrates shall serve at the pleasure of the court, unless otherwise provided by law.
Every magistrate appointed pursuant to this section shall be licensed to practice law in Colorado; except that county judges who are not lawyers may be appointed to serve as magistrates, as authorized by section 13-6-105 (3), C.R.S., to hear detention and bond matters.
1. Repealed.
2. Magistrates shall conduct hearings in the manner provided for the hearing of cases by the court. During the initial advisement of the rights of any party, the magistrate shall inform the party that, except as set forth in this subsection (3), the party has the right to a hearing before the judge in the first instance and the party may waive that right but that, by waiving that right, the party is bound by the findings and recommendations of the magistrate, subject to a request for review as set forth in subsection (5.5) of this section. The right to require a hearing before a judge does not apply to hearings at which a child is advised of his or her rights pursuant to section 19-2.5-605; detention hearings held pursuant to sections 19-2.5-303, 19-2.5-304, and 19-2.5-305; preliminary hearings held pursuant to section 19-2.5-609; temporary custody hearings held pursuant to section 19-3-403; proceedings held pursuant to article 4 of this title 19; and support proceedings held pursuant to article 6 of this title 19. In proceedings held pursuant to article 4 or 6 of this title 19, contested final orders regarding allocation of parental responsibilities may be heard by the magistrate only with the consent of all parties.
3. In proceedings pursuant to article 2.5 of this title 19, the right to require a hearing before a judge is deemed waived unless a request is made by any party that the hearing be held before a judge at the time the matter is set for hearing.
4. In proceedings under article 3 of this title, the right to require a hearing before a judge is waived unless:
  1. A request is made by a party or the people of the state of Colorado that the hearing be held before the judge at the time the matter is set for hearing, if counsel for the party is present at the time the matter is set; or
  2. A request is made by a party or the people of the state of Colorado in writing within seven days after receipt of notice of the setting if the matter is set for hearing outside of the presence of counsel for a represented party or if the matter is set on notice.
At the conclusion of a hearing, the magistrate shall:
1. Advise the parties before him of his findings and ruling;
2. Advise the parties of their right to review by the judge of his findings and ruling;
3. Prepare findings and a written order that shall become the order of the court, absent a petition for review being filed as provided in subsection (5.5) of this section; and
4. Advise the parties that they have a right to object to an order allowing the review of any decree for placement of a child to be conducted as an administrative review by the department of human services and that if any party objects to administrative review, the court shall conduct the review.
Repealed.
(5.5) A request for review must be filed within fourteen days for proceedings under articles 2, 4, and 6 of this title or within seven days for proceedings under article 3 of this title after the parties have received notice of the magistrate's ruling and must clearly set forth the grounds relied upon. Such review is solely upon the record of the hearing before the magistrate and is reviewable upon the grounds set forth in rule 59 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. A petition for review is a prerequisite before an appeal may be filed with the Colorado court of appeals or Colorado supreme court. The judge may, on his or her own motion, remand a case to another magistrate after action is taken on a petition for review.
A magistrate may issue a lawful warrant taking a child into custody pursuant to section 19-2.5-204 and may issue search warrants as provided in sections 19-1-112 and 19-2.5-205.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 701, § 1, effective October 1. L. 88: (3) amended, p. 741, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 361, § 26, effective April 9. L. 92: (4)(d) added, p. 221, § 3, effective July 1. L. 94: (4)(d) amended, p. 2658, § 145, effective July 1. L. 97: (3) and (5) amended, p. 517, § 4, effective July 1. L. 99: (1) and (6) amended, p. 1375, § 11, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1086, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3)(c) amended, p. 35, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2003: (3)(b) amended, p. 1901, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (3)(a) and (5) amended, p. 451, § 2, effective April 18; (3)(a.5) and (5.5) added, p. 452, §§ 3, 4, effective July 1, 2007. L. 2007: (3)(a.5) amended, p. 1652, § 9, effective May 31; (3)(a.5) amended, p. 2029, § 35, effective June 1; (4)(c) amended, p. 2029, § 36, effective July 1. L. 2016: IP(3)(c), (3)(c)(II), and (5.5) amended, (HB 16-1057), ch. 31, p. 70, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2019: (3)(a.5) amended, (SB 19-108), ch. 294, p. 2727, § 21, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1), (3)(a.5), (3)(b), and (6) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 726, § 62, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-110 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Subsection (3)(a)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(a), effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 451 .)
Amendments to subsection (3)(a.5) by House Bill 07-1349 and House Bill 07-1367 were harmonized.
Subsection (5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (5), effective July 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 451 .)

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "In re Gault and the Colorado Children's Code", see 44 Den. L. J. 644 (1967).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Natural parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children. B.B. v. People in Interest of T.S.B., 785 P.2d 132 ( Colo. 1990 ); In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2004).

To protect this interest, a court must provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures if termination of parental rights is sought. In re Petition of R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482 ( Colo. 1985 ); In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2004).

Where an error of the trial court is considered fundamental or involves a miscarriage of justice, the appellate court may consider the issue for the first time on appeal. In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2004).

Two-stage proceeding before referee and court satisfies due process. Where, in a juvenile case, the procedure involves a two-stage fact-finding process with the first stage conducted by agreement of the parties before a referee with final judgment reserved for the court, it is not violative of the standards of due process and fair treatment. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

Actions of court and referee constitute one proceeding. There are not two separate proceedings, one before the referee and a second before the court, but rather one proceeding to pass on the question of possible delinquency. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

This section does not outline two separate proceedings, one before the referee and a second before the court; instead it prescribes a single, two-step proceeding in which the question of dependency or neglect is decided. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

And second hearing is not double jeopardy. A second hearing before the judge on motions of the people in juvenile proceedings, and the modification of the referee's findings, do not place the child twice in jeopardy. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

When parties agree to hearing before referee, they also agree to statutory procedures outlined for such hearings in this section. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

The referee is a hearing officer who acts with limited authority under the supervision and direction of a judge and who has no independent power to enter orders or decrees. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

The procedural powers of a juvenile court after reviewing a juvenile magistrate's findings are governed not only by relevant provisions of the Colorado Children's Code but also by the Colorado Rules for Magistrates (C.R.M.). People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731 ( Colo. 1997 ).

Requirement in subsection (3)(a) that a magistrate inform the parties of their right to a hearing before a judge in the first instance is mandatory. In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958 (Colo. App. 2004); In re A.P.H., 98 P.3d 955 (Colo. App. 2004).

Waiver of initial advisement of rights in § 19-3-202 (1) includes waiver of advisement of right to be heard by a judge in subsection (3)(a) of this section. People ex rel. T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905 (Colo. App. 2005).

Subsection (3)(a) does not require parent to be advised at any time other than the initial appearance. Accordingly, a parent's waiver of right to formal advisement is effective throughout the dependency and neglect proceedings. People ex rel. T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905 (Colo. App. 2005).

Acts of referee dependent on waiver by parties and court confirmation. The essential ingredients to give judicial effect to a referee's findings and recommendations are: (a) A waiver, on the part of all parties, of a request for hearing before a judge, which may be affirmatively stated or may result from a lapse of five days without request; and (b) confirmation of the findings and recommendations by the court. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

Only if no request for review is filed, and if they are confirmed by judicial order, do the findings and recommendations of the referee become the decree of the court. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Final judgment results only after court acts. The findings and recommendations of the referee do not have the effect of a final judgment until adopted or modified by the court. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

Final responsibility for disposition lies with trial judge. Since the referee's recommendations do not automatically become the order of the court, and since the court may, even upon its own motion, order a rehearing, the final responsibility for the disposition of the case lies in every instance with the trial judge regardless of whether the parties request review. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

This responsibility may neither be assumed by, nor delegated to, a referee. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

The court must draw its own conclusions from the testimony and must independently ascertain how the best interests of the child and of society may most appropriately be served in the case before him. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

The parties have the right to demand that a judge hear the matter in the first instance, and the referee must so advise them. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Failure of magistrate to advise party of the right to a hearing before a judge or to secure a waiver of that right does not divest magistrate of subject matter jurisdiction . In re A.P.H., 98 P.3d 955 (Colo. App. 2004).

Magistrate's failure to advise party of this right, however, requires reversal of the order modifying the parties' parental responsibilities. In re A.P.H., 98 P.3d 955 (Colo. App. 2004).

Referee to transmit papers, findings, and recommendations to judge. At the conclusion of any hearing conducted by a referee, he must promptly transmit to the judge all papers relating to the case along with his findings of fact and recommendations as to the disposition of the case. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Jury trial held before referee was improper. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in prescribing, instead of a jury trial and in lieu of a trial before a master or referee, a procedure whereby the parties were to have a "jury trial in all respects" but conducted by the referee, where it was agreed that the referee and the court would be bound by the jury verdict, although the jury was described as being "an advisory one". Maniatis v. Karakitsios, 161 Colo. 378 , 422 P.2d 52 (1967).

C.R.C.P. 53(e)(2) inapplicable in dependency proceeding. C.R.C.P. 53(e)(2), which provides that in an action tried without a jury the court shall accept a master's or referee's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, is inapplicable in a dependency proceeding because that is a statutory proceeding in which the statute supersedes the conflicting rule. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Grandmother required to file petition for district court review of magistrate's denial of motion to intervene before seeking appellate review in paternity action where grandmother sought to intervene for visitation rights. This section is properly applied, not C.R.M. 7, if parents have waived the right to a hearing by a judge. In re K.L.O-V., 151 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2006).

Period for filing requests for review. For purposes of subsection (5) the "conclusion of the [juvenile] hearing" does not occur until the juvenile commissioner signs the written findings and recommendations, and transmits them to the juvenile judge by filing in the office of the clerk. The five-day period within which to file a request for review does not commence running until the filing date. People ex rel. M.C.L., 671 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1983).

A request for review of the commissioner's findings, filed within five days after the commissioner's written findings and recommendations are filed in the district court, is timely. C.T.R. v. R.C.S., 672 P.2d 548 (Colo. App. 1983).

And such review shall be before the district court. The statute calls for an initial decision by the commissioner, with the right of appeal to the judge. There is nothing in the statute providing for new trial or rehearing directed to the commissioner. M.E.G. v. R.B.D., 676 P.2d 1250 (Colo. App. 1983).

Under subsection (5), the district court reviews only the record of the hearing before the magistrate and its review is similar to an appellate review of the magistrate's decision. The review of the trial court's decision by an appellate court, therefore, is similar to a second level of appellate review. People ex rel. J.G., 97 P.3d 300 (Colo. App. 2004).

Magistrate has jurisdiction over juvenile's Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw previously entered guilty plea until the proceedings have culminated in a final order or judgment. Juvenile sought to withdraw guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel in delinquency action subject to deferred adjudication prior to the imposition of sentence. A magistrate is not prohibited from reviewing prior rulings, decrees, or other decisions in a case the magistrate is properly appointed to hear until there is a final appealable order or judgment. A guilty plea, prior to sentencing and entry of a judgment or conviction, does not constitute a final judgment or order. People in Interest of J.D., 2020 CO 48, 464 P.3d 785.

A party must present an issue to the district court in a petition for review before that issue may be raised in the court of appeals. A party seeking review of a magistrate's decision must raise a particular issue in the district court so that the district court may have an opportunity to correct any error that may have been made by the magistrate. If a party does not raise an issue before the district court in a petition for review, but raises the issue on appeal for the first time, such party seeks to have the court of appeals correct an error that could have been corrected by the district court in a petition for review. People ex rel. K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2006).

A juvenile must petition the district court for review of a magistrate's order revoking probation before the juvenile may pursue review by the court of appeals. People in Interest of A.P.H., 2020 COA 159 , 478 P.3d 1284.

Appeal of magistrate's dispositional order in accordance with subsection (5.5) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to appealing the district court's adjudicatory order to the court of appeals or the supreme court. The parties did not appeal the magistrate's dispositional order. The adjudicatory order became final and appealable upon entry of the disposition. People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109 , 451 P.3d 1232.

Reinstatement of magistrate's delinquency judgment by appellate court does not violate double jeopardy if the district court acting pursuant to subsection (5) erroneously reversed the judgment. People ex rel. J.G., 97 P.3d 300 (Colo. App. 2004).

Interpreting the filing requirement of subsection (5) liberally to account for the best interests of the child and avoiding a construction of the statute that would call into question its constitutional validity, district court was determined to be authorized to retain jurisdiction to consider a late-filed petition when the delay was excusable neglect and the department failed to raise the timing issue. C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 ( Colo. 2004 ); People ex rel. M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169 (Colo. App. 2007) (decided prior to 2007 repeal of subsection (5)).

For the purpose of evaluating a court's discretionary decision whether to accept an untimely petition for review of a magistrate's order pursuant to former subsection (5), "excusable neglect" shall be defined as a situation where the failure to act results from circumstances that would cause a reasonably careful person to neglect a duty. People ex rel. M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169 (Colo. App. 2007) (decided prior to 2007 repeal of subsection (5)).

District court's determination that counsel's misunderstanding of the law did not constitute good cause amounted to a finding that juvenile had not shown "excusable neglect". People ex rel. M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169 (Colo. App. 2007) (decided prior to 2007 repeal of subsection (5)).

Allegations of "inexcusable neglect" should be resolved by the district court in the course of determining whether there is good cause to consider juvenile's petition for review, even though there was no excusable neglect to justify its late filing. People ex rel. M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169 (Colo. App. 2007) (decided prior to 2007 repeal of subsection (5)).

Because a district court's review of a magistrate's order is effectively appellate in nature, the factors identified in Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241 ( Colo. 1988 ), and People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893 ( Colo. 2005 ), are equally important when a juvenile's ability to obtain appellate review of a judgment of delinquency entered by a magistrate is foreclosed by counsel's failure to file a timely petition for district court review pursuant to former subsection (5) and should be considered as part of a determination whether there is good cause to permit the late filing of a petition for review. Only after a determination is made that counsel's acts or omissions were inexcusable should the court turn to the Estep-Baker analysis of whether other factors "weigh heavily" in favor of permitting the late filing. People ex rel. M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169 (Colo. App. 2007) (decided prior to 2007 repeal of subsection (5)).

Magistrate may not synthesize conflicting testimony. Where the magistrate apparently combined portions of two very different versions of the facts into a third version unsupported by the record, the magistrate's findings could not be upheld. Although the magistrate may believe all or part of the testimony of any witness, he or she may not create a version which is not supported by the testimony of any witness. People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1997).

Failure of commissioner to prepare a detailed written order as promised concerning child's placement in residential care facility excuses any delay by the school district in requesting review under either the "Exceptional Children's Educational Act" or the "Colorado Children's Code" because the time for filing for review would not begin to run until the written order was received. People v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50, 732 P.2d 1222 (Colo. App. 1986).

Commissioner's statement at restitution hearing as to the amount of damages to be paid did not constitute sufficient findings to satisfy statutory requirement that findings be prepared at the conclusion of such hearing. People in Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1992).

Mittimus order signed by commissioner two months prior to restitution hearing failed to satisfy statutory requirement that a written order be prepared. People in Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1992).

District court did not provide a sufficient record to support its affirmation of the commissioner's order where commissioner failed to make sufficient findings at the conclusion of restitution hearing. People in Interest of A.R.M., 832 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1992).

A court may consider a late petition for review, in accordance with subsection (5.5), if the court finds the delay is the result of a party's counsel's medical condition or need for medical care that constitutes excusable neglect. A party must show that the counsel's medical condition or need for care was so disabling as to prevent counsel from filing the petition or a request for an extension of time. People in Interest of L.B-H-P., 2021 COA 5 , 482 P.3d 527.

Subsection (5.5) does not provide for district court review of magistrate's orders in proceedings under article 5 of this title. In a kinship adoption case, appeal is made directly to the appellate courts. In re C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433 (Colo. App. 2009).

Applied in People in Interest of J.F.C., 660 P.2d 7 (Colo. App. 1982); In re Petition of Taylor, 134 P.3d 559 (Colo. App. 2006).

19-1-109. Appeals.

An appeal as provided in the introductory portion to section 13-4-102 (1), C.R.S., may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment. Appellate procedure shall be as provided by the Colorado appellate rules. Initials shall appear on the record on appeal in place of the name of the child and respondents. Appeals shall be advanced on the calendar of the appellate court and shall be decided at the earliest practical time.
1. The people of the state of Colorado shall have the same right to appeal questions of law in delinquency cases as exists in criminal cases.
2. An order terminating or refusing to terminate the legal relationship between a parent or parents and one or more of the children of such parent or parents on a petition, or between a child and one or both parents of the child, shall be a final and appealable order.
3. An order decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent shall be a final and appealable order after the entry of the disposition pursuant to section 19-3-508. Any appeal shall not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter such further dispositional orders as the court believes to be in the best interests of the child.
A workgroup to consider necessary changes to practices, rules, and statutes in order to ensure that appeals in cases concerning relinquishment, adoption, and dependency and neglect be resolved within six months after being filed shall be established. The workgroup shall be known as the child welfare appeals workgroup and shall be created in the state judicial department.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 702, § 1, effective October 1. L. 97: (2) amended and (3) added, p. 1433, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1546, § 3, effective August 2.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-112 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Judgments in dependency proceedings may be reviewed by the supreme court as in appeal proceedings. Selk v. Ramsey, 110 Colo. 223 , 132 P.2d 454 (1942).

Juvenile delinquency cases may be appealed to the supreme court after trial. People in Interest of P.L.V. v. P.L.V., 172 Colo. 269 , 472 P.2d 127 (1970).

But an interlocutory appeal is not available to either the state or the respondent in a delinquency proceeding under the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of P.L.V. v. P.L.V., 172 Colo. 269 , 472 P.2d 127 (1970).

Neither the state nor the respondent can prosecute interlocutory appeals in delinquency proceedings. People in Interest of G.D.K. v. G.D.K., 30 Colo. App. 54, 491 P.2d 81 (1971).

And C.A.R. 4.1 does not apply. C.A.R. 4.1 cannot be stretched to permit an interlocutory appeal in a delinquency proceeding without doing violence to the distinction carefully drawn by the supreme court between a criminal proceeding and a proceeding in delinquency. People in Interest of P.L.V. v. P.L.V., 172 Colo. 269 , 472 P.2d 127 (1970).

C.A.R. 4.1, which authorizes certain interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, has no application to delinquency proceedings. People in Interest of G.D.K. v. G.D.K., 30 Colo. App. 54, 491 P.2d 81 (1971).

Statute does not describe the order or judgment terminating the parent-child legal relationship as interlocutory, therefore, intent of the general assembly is to require immediate appeal of any order terminating parental rights. People ex rel. A.E., 994 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1999).

Application of C.A.R. 1(a)(1). Delinquency proceedings are no less subject to the finality requirements of C.A.R. 1(a)(1) than any other type of proceeding. People in Interest of D.H., 37 Colo. App. 544, 552 P.2d 29 (1976), aff'd, 192 Colo. 542 , 561 P.2d 5 (1977).

Issue of notice and pleading in juvenile proceeding of constitutional proportions. Even if an allegation in a mother's motion for a new trial after the termination of her parental rights in her child was inadequate to raise the issue of adequacy of notice and pleading in a juvenile proceeding, it is of constitutional proportions, and the court of appeals is obliged to address the issue on its merits. People in Interest of Baby Girl D., 44 Colo. App. 192, 610 P.2d 1086 (1980).

Majority renders minor's appeal moot. Attainment of majority while minor's appeal from adjudication as child in need of supervision is pending renders the appeal moot in light of the Colorado Children's Code attempt to eliminate collateral legal consequences of adjudication. People v. T.B., 183 Colo. 310 , 516 P.2d 642 (1973).

An order denying termination of the parent-child legal relationship does not "completely determine the rights of the parties involved" and is interlocutory in nature; therefore, such an order is not final and appealable. People in the interest of D.B., 855 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1993) (decided under law in effect prior to the 1997 amendment).

An order terminating a parent-child legal relationship is final and appealable thereby furnishing the right of immediate appeal to a parent, even when order relates to only one parent. People ex rel. A.E., 994 P.2d 465 (Colo. App. 1999).

Juvenile court's order denying a tribe's request to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court is a final, appealable order based on the collateral order doctrine. People in Interest of L.R.B., 2019 COA 85 , __ P.3d __ (decided prior to 2019 amendment to § 19-1-126 ).

The juvenile court's finding that a juvenile cannot be restored to competency is a final appealable order. People ex rel. C.Y., 2012 COA 31 , 275 P.3d 762.

A party has a right to appeal both the adjudicatory order and the initial disposition order. An initial dispositional order, by itself, however, is not a final, appealable order. People in Interest of H.T., 2019 COA 72 , __ P.3d __.

Fact finder's "no adjudication" finding with respect to one party is not a proper basis for a motion notwithstanding the verdict and not a final appealable order under C.A.R. 3.4(a) or subsection (2)(c) of this section. Statute provides that an order decreeing a child neglected or dependent is a final and appealable order. Father's dismissal from the petition based on a jury verdict that the child was not dependent and neglected with respect to him is not subject to direct appeal under C.A.R. 3.4. People in Interest of S.M-L, 2016 COA 173 , 459 P.3d 572, aff'd sub nom. People in Interest of R.S., 2018 CO 31, 416 P.3d 905.

C.A.R. 2 permits an appellate court to expedite decisions and order proceedings in accordance with its direction even though C.A.R. 3.4 does not extend to permanent custody orders entered in dependency or neglect proceedings. People ex rel. K.A., 155 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2006).

Application of C.A.R. 3.4(b). Based on the "unique circumstances exception", court of appeals has the authority to extend the deadline for filing the notice of appeal in a dependency and neglect case. The "no extensions" provision in C.A.R. 3.4(b) does not preclude application of the unique circumstances exception, because it is an exception to procedural rules limiting a court's authority to grant exceptions. Here, the trial court must bear some responsibility for the late filing because of an ambiguous ruling and subsequent written orders. People ex rel. A.J.H., 134 P.3d 528 (Colo. App. 2006).

Mother cannot wait until appeal of termination order to challenge counsel's performance at the earlier adjudicatory proceeding. Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at adjudicatory hearing was untimely because mother was or should have been aware of facts giving rise to claim at or shortly after adjudicatory hearing, but made no effort to file a timely appeal from adjudication order, nor could mother allege any factual or legal impediments to pursuing a timely appeal. People in Interest of A.R., 2020 CO 10, 456 P.3d 1266.

Subsection (2)(c) is not meant to delay permanent placement decisions while appeals of dependency and neglect orders are litigated. Subsection (2)(c) provides the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to enter further permanent custody orders under § 19-3-702 if it furthers the child's best interests, even if those orders are entered after the order adjudicating the child dependent or neglected is appealed. People ex rel. K.A., 155 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2006).

Party may appeal adjudicatory order after entry of disposition, even though magistrate's dispositional order has not been appealed. Under the plain language of subsection (2)(c), an adjudicatory order is final and appealable upon entry of the disposition. The parties did not appeal the dispositional order, and appeal of the magistrate's dispositional order to the district court is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to appealing the adjudicatory order to the court of appeals or the supreme court. People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109 , 451 P.3d 1232.

Matter is moot where guardian ad litem (GAL) failed to offer facts in supplemental brief demonstrating a current basis to terminate mother's parental rights. Although the GAL argued on appeal that the court improperly failed to terminate mother's rights, the child has been returned to the mother and all parties believed that the child should remain in the mother's custody. A matter is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect on the existing controversy. People ex rel. L.O.L., 197 P.3d 291 (Colo. App. 2008).

Appellate court may review an otherwise moot issue, however, when it is capable of repetition and yet will evade review. The issue of whether the trial court rendered its decision using the wrong burden of proof is an issue that is capable of repetition and yet may evade review and thus may be addressed on its merits. People ex rel. L.O.L., 197 P.3d 291 (Colo. App. 2008).

Applied in People in Interest of R.R., 43 Colo. App. 208, 607 P.2d 1013 (1979).

19-1-110. Previous orders and decrees - force and effect.

All orders and decrees in proceedings concerning dependency and neglect, delinquency, relinquishment, adoption, paternity, or contributing to dependency or delinquency entered by the court prior to October 1, 1987, shall remain in full force and effect until modified or terminated by the court, as provided in this title.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 702, § 1, effective October 1; entire section amended, p. 1827, § 1, effective August 27.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-113 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Action founded on repealed statute continued in full force. A properly filed action founded on a statute later repealed by the Colorado Children's Code continues in full force and effect for the purpose of sustaining liability, penalty, or forfeiture. People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172 , 511 P.2d 477 (1973).

Based on savings clause. It is the legislative intent based upon the savings clause of the Colorado Children's Code and the general savings clause that a properly filed cause of action founded on the then existing statute, though that statute is later repealed, continues in full force and effect for the purpose of sustaining liability, penalty, or forfeiture. People in Interest of M.K.A., 182 Colo. 172 , 511 P.2d 477 (1973).

19-1-111. Appointment of guardian ad litem.

The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child in all dependency or neglect cases under this title.
The court may appoint a guardian ad litem in the following cases:
1. For a child in a delinquency proceeding where:
  1. No parent, guardian, legal custodian, custodian, person to whom parental responsibilities have been allocated, relative, stepparent, or spousal equivalent appears at the first or any subsequent hearing in the case;
  2. The court finds that a conflict of interest exists between the child and parent, guardian, legal custodian, custodian, person to whom parental responsibilities have been allocated, relative, stepparent, or spousal equivalent; or
  3. The court makes specific findings that the appointment of a guardian ad litem is necessary to serve the best interests of the child and such specific findings are included in the court's order of appointment.
2. For a child in proceedings under the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., when the court finds that the appointment is necessary due to exceptional and extraordinary circumstances;
3. For a parent, guardian, legal custodian, custodian, person to whom parental responsibilities have been allocated, stepparent, or spousal equivalent in dependency or neglect proceedings who has been determined to have a behavioral or mental health disorder or an intellectual and developmental disability by a court of competent jurisdiction; except that, if a conservator has been appointed, the conservator shall serve as the guardian ad litem. If the conservator does not serve as guardian ad litem, the conservator shall be informed that a guardian ad litem has been appointed.
4. For an underage party seeking a marriage license, as provided in section 14-2-108 (2).
(2.5) A court shall not deem a guardian ad litem who is appointed by the court for a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding pursuant to subsection (2) of this section to be a substitute for defense counsel for the juvenile.
The guardian ad litem for the child shall have the right to participate in all proceedings as a party, except in delinquency cases.
1. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection (4), the appointment of a guardian ad litem pursuant to this section shall continue until such time as the court's jurisdiction is terminated.
2. The appointment of the guardian ad litem shall terminate in a delinquency proceeding:
  1. At the time sentence is imposed, unless the court continues the appointment because the child is sentenced to residential or community out-of-home placement as a condition of probation; or
  2. When the child reaches eighteen years of age, unless the child has a developmental disability.
3. The court may terminate the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a delinquency proceeding on its own motion or on the motion of the guardian ad litem when the appointment is no longer necessary due to any of the following reasons:
  1. The child's parent, guardian, legal custodian, custodian, person to whom parental responsibilities have been allocated, relative, stepparent, or spousal equivalent appears at a hearing in the case;
  2. The conflict of interest described in subparagraph (II) of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section no longer exists; or
  3. The appointment no longer serves the best interests of the child.
The guardian ad litem shall cooperate with any CASA volunteer appointed pursuant to section 19-1-206.
Any person appointed to serve as a guardian ad litem pursuant to this section shall comply with the provisions set forth in any chief justice directive concerning the court appointment of guardians ad litem and other representatives and of counsel for children and indigent persons in titles 14, 15, 19 (dependency and neglect only), 22, and 27, C.R.S., and any subsequent chief justice directive or other practice standards established by rule or directive of the chief justice pursuant to section 13-91-105, C.R.S., concerning the duties or responsibilities of guardians ad litem in legal matters affecting children.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 702, § 1, effective October 1. L. 92: (1) amended, p. 221, § 4, effective July 1. L. 96: (5) added, p. 1089, § 2, effective May 23. L. 98: (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(II), and (2)(c) amended, p. 1405, § 62, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2000: (6) added, p. 1774, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2006: (2)(c) amended, p. 1400, § 52, effective August 7. L. 2009: (2)(a)(III), (2)(b), and (4) amended, (SB 09-268), ch. 207, p. 942, § 3, effective May 1. L. 2014: (2.5) added, (HB 14-1032), ch. 247, p. 954, § 5, effective November 1. L. 2015: (6) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 952, § 41, effective August 5. L. 2017: (2)(c) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1309, § 150, effective May 25. L. 2019: (2)(d) added, (HB 19-1316), ch. 380, p. 3422, § 6, effective August 2.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-3-105 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "The Role of Parents' Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings -- Part I", see 14 Colo. Law. 568 (1985). For article, "The Role of Children's Counsel in Contested Child Custody, Visitation and Support Cases", see 15 Colo. Law. 224 (1986). For article, "Final Draft of Proposed GAL Standards of Practice", see 22 Colo. Law. 1907 (1993). For Supreme Court directive, see "Colorado Supreme Court Issues a Directive on GALs in Cases Under CRS Title 19", 25 Colo. Law. 17 (March 1996). For article, "The Role of the Guardian ad Litem in Juvenile Delinquency Court", see 27 Colo. Law. 53 (Feb. 1998). For article, "The Guardian ad Litem in Juvenile Delinquency Court", see 27 Colo. Law. 83 (March 1998). For article, "The Updated Role of the Guardian ad Litem in Juvenile Delinquency Cases", see 31 Colo. Law. 79 (May 2002). For article, "Ethical Issues for Guardians ad Litem Representing Children in Dependency and Neglect Cases", see 31 Colo. Law. 43 (Oct. 2002). For article, "Report-Writing Tips for Guardians ad Litem in Dependency and Neglect Cases", see 31 Colo. Law. 87 (Oct. 2002). For casenote, "A Colorado Child's Best Interests: Examining the Gabriesheski Decision and Future Policy Implications", see 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 537 (2014). For article, "Defense Counsel's Duties in Juvenile Delinquency Cases: Should a Guardian ad Litem be Appointed?", see 47 Colo. Law. 48 (Nov. 2018).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

This section does not limit a court's discretionary power to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to only those parents determined to be mentally ill or developmentally disabled. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986).

Duties of parent's GAL and attorney in termination proceedings discussed in People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986).

In dependency and neglect proceeding, GAL appointed for respondent parent with intellectual disability does not have a statutory right to participate in proceedings or to make recommendations to the court. GAL's role is different when representing an adult than when representing a child. The role is assistive: to facilitate communication between the parent and parent's counsel and to help parent participate in the proceeding. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136 , 454 P.3d 375.

GAL improperly participated when she purported to represent parent's best interests while advocating terminating parental rights, against parent's legal interest and over parent's objection. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136 , 454 P.3d 375.

Period of appointment of GAL. A GAL appointed with respect to a motion to terminate the parent-child relationship serves until entry of a final decree of adoption or until the juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated. People in Interest of M.C.P., 768 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1988).

Father did not waive his right to the appointment of a GAL when he did not appear in court. Because father was in custody out of state, unrepresented, and indigent, he could not appear in court. Nothing prohibits such an appointment should a parent fail to appear. In re R.L.S., 2019 COA 112 , 451 P.3d 1249.

Court erred in appointing GAL to assist parent and then allowing GAL to testify against parent in closing arguments, violating parent's right to fundamentally fair procedures in termination proceeding. GAL had no right to present closing argument or to make recommendations based on independent observations not in evidence. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136 , 454 P.3d 375.

19-1-111.5. Court-appointed special advocate.

The court may appoint a CASA volunteer pursuant to the provisions of part 2 of this article if the court finds that the appointment would be in the best interests of the child. The court may direct the manner in which a CASA volunteer and any guardian ad litem appointed in a case shall collaborate.

Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 1089, § 3, effective May 23.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article "CASA--A Powerful Voice for a Child", see 36 Colo. Law. 97 (Oct. 2007).

19-1-112. Search warrants for the protection of children.

A search warrant may be issued by the juvenile court to search any place for the recovery of any child within the jurisdiction of the court believed to be a delinquent child or a neglected or dependent child.
Such warrant shall be issued only on the conditions that the application for the warrant shall:
1. Be in writing and supported by affidavit sworn to or affirmed before the court;
2. Name or describe with particularity the child sought;
3. State that the child is believed to be a delinquent child or a neglected or dependent child and the reasons upon which such belief is based;
4. State the address or legal description of the place to be searched;
5. State the reasons why it is necessary to proceed pursuant to this section.
If the court is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, it shall issue a search warrant identifying by name or describing with particularity the child sought and the place to be searched for the child.
The search warrant shall be directed to any officer authorized by law to execute it in the county wherein the place to be searched is located.
The warrant shall state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof.
The warrant shall be served in the daytime unless the application for the warrant alleges that it is necessary to conduct the search at some other time, in which case the court may so direct.
A copy of the warrant, the application therefor, and the supporting affidavit shall be served upon the person in possession of the place to be searched and where the child is to be sought.
If the child is found, the child may be taken into custody pursuant to section 19-2.5-209 or 19-3-401.
The warrant shall be returned to the issuing court.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 703, § 1, effective October 1. L. 2021: (8) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 727, § 63, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-2-104 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Caseworkers who did not obtain a warrant under this section but instead obtained only an order to investigate under § 19-3-308 (3)(b) were not authorized to enter a home without consent, making their entry illegal under the fourth amendment. People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161 , 457 P.3d 783.

Exclusionary rule therefore required suppression of all evidence obtained by exploiting the illegal entries into the home. People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161 , 457 P.3d 783.

19-1-113. Emergency protection orders.

The juvenile court is authorized to issue an ex parte written or verbal emergency protection order for the protection of a child pursuant to this section. A judge or magistrate shall be available in the juvenile court in each judicial district to issue by telephone emergency protection orders at all times when the juvenile court is otherwise closed for judicial business.
Any person who has the responsibility of supervising a child placed out of the home by court order may seek an emergency protection order, through a P.O.S.T.-certified peace officer, when such person asserts reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in immediate and present danger based on an allegation that the child is absent without permission from the court-ordered placement.
An emergency protection order may include, but need not be limited to:
1. Restraining a person from threatening, molesting, or injuring the child;
2. Restraining a person from interfering with the supervision of the child;
3. Restraining a person from having contact with the child or the child's court-ordered residence;
4. Restraining a person from harboring a child who is absent without permission from a court-ordered placement.
An emergency protection order shall expire not later than the close of judicial business on the next day of judicial business following the day of issue, unless otherwise continued by the court. With respect to any continuing order, on two days' notice to the person who obtained the emergency protection order or on such shorter notice to that person as the court may prescribe, the responding person may appear and move for its dissolution or modification. The motion to dissolve or modify the emergency protection order shall be set for hearing at the earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all matters except any emergency protection orders issued earlier, and the court shall determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
1. An emergency protection order may be issued only if the issuing judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger exists to the welfare of a child based on an allegation that the child is absent without permission from the court-ordered placement. A verbal order shall be reduced to writing and signed by the peace officer through whom the emergency order was sought and shall include a statement of the grounds for the order asserted through the P.O.S.T.-certified peace officer. An order initially written shall meet the same requirement as an order issued verbally.
2. The emergency protection order shall be served upon the respondent with a copy given to the person who sought the order and filed with the juvenile court as soon as practicable after issuance. If any person named as a respondent in an order issued pursuant to this section has not been served personally with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order from any sheriff, deputy sheriff, or police officer, any act in violation of the order may be deemed by the juvenile court a violation of the order and as such may be sufficient to subject the respondent to the order to any penalty for such violation. If the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to enforce the emergency protection order has cause to believe that a violation of the order has occurred, it shall enforce the order.
The issuance of an emergency protection order shall not be considered evidence of any wrongdoing.
A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and without malice shall not be held civilly or criminally liable for acts performed pursuant to this section.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 704, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: (1) and (5)(a) amended, p. 362, § 27, effective April 9. L. 2003: (2) and (5)(a) amended, p. 1632, § 79, effective August 6.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-3-110.1 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

19-1-114. Order of protection.

The court may make an order of protection in assistance of, or as a condition of, any decree authorized by this title. The order of protection may set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period by the parent, guardian, legal custodian, custodian, person to whom parental responsibilities have been allocated, stepparent, spousal equivalent, or any other person who is party to a proceeding brought under this title.
The order of protection may require any such person:
1. To stay away from a child or his residence;
2. To permit a parent to visit a child at stated periods;
3. To abstain from offensive conduct against a child, the child's parent or parents, the child's guardian or legal custodian, or any other person to whom legal custody of or parental responsibilities with respect to a child has been given;
4. To give proper attention to the care of the home;
5. To cooperate in good faith with an agency:
  1. Which has been given legal custody of a child;
  2. Which is providing protective supervision of a child by court order; or
  3. To which the child has been referred by the court;
6. To refrain from acts of commission or omission that tend to make a home an improper place for a child;
7. To perform any legal obligation of support; or
8. To pay for damages recoverable under the provisions of section 13-21-107, C.R.S.
1. When such an order of protection is made applicable to a parent or guardian, it may specifically require his or her active participation in the rehabilitation process and may impose specific requirements upon such parent or guardian, subject to the penalty of contempt for failure to comply with such order without good cause, as provided in subsection (5) of this section.
2. The court may, when the court determines that it is in the best interests of the child, make an order of protection that is applicable to a parent or guardian of a child and the person with whom the child resides, if other than the child's parent or guardian, subject to article 2.5 of this title 19. The order must require the parent or guardian and the person with whom the child resides, if other than the parent or guardian, to be present at any juvenile proceeding concerning the child.
After notice and opportunity for a hearing is given to a person subject to an order of protection, the order may be terminated, modified, or extended for a specified period of time if the court finds that the best interests of the child and the public will be served thereby.
1. A person failing to comply with an order of protection without good cause may be found in contempt of court.
2. The court shall issue a bench warrant for any parent or guardian or person with whom the child resides, if other than the parent or guardian, who, without good cause, fails to appear at any proceeding.
3. For purposes of this subsection (5), good cause for failing to appear shall include, but shall not be limited to, a situation where a parent or guardian:
  1. Does not have physical custody of the child and resides outside of Colorado;
  2. Has physical custody of the child, but resides outside of Colorado and appearing in court will result in undue hardship to such parent or guardian; or
  3. Resides in Colorado, but is outside of the state at the time of the juvenile proceeding for reasons other than avoiding appearance before the court and appearing in court will result in undue hardship to such parent or guardian.
4. The general assembly hereby declares that every parent or guardian whose child is the subject of a juvenile proceeding under this article should attend any such proceeding as often as is practicable.
Repealed.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a right for any juvenile to have his or her parent or guardian present at any proceeding at which such juvenile is present.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 705, § 1, effective October 1. L. 93, 1st Ex. Sess.: (3) and (5) amended and (6) and (7) added, p. 29, § 1, effective September 13. L. 96: (6) repealed, p. 85, § 11, effective March 20. L. 98: (1) and (2)(c) amended, p. 1406, § 63, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2021: (3)(b) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 727, § 64, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-3-110 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The language in subsection (1), "the parent, guardian, or any other person who is party to a proceeding brought under § 19-1-104(1)(a) , (1)(b), or (1)(c)", contemplates no limitation except that the person subject to the order be a party to the action. People in Interest of C.S.M., 194 Colo. 76 , 570 P.2d 229 (1977); People v. Dist. Court, 731 P.2d 652 ( Colo. 1987 ).

The joining of the district attorney and law enforcement officers as parties to case and issuing said parties protective orders does not exceed the court's jurisdiction. The requirement that the court order an appropriate treatment plan implicitly authorizes the court to issue such orders as are reasonably necessary to implement that mandate. People v. Dist. Court, 731 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1987).

Where no protection was provided for disclosure of plans for future criminal conduct or past criminal conduct not related to the treatment plans and communications between therapists and children and between the therapists and parents who had not engaged in sexually abusive conduct were not protected, protective orders were properly confined to reasonably necessary relief. People v. Dist. Court, 731 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1987).

Applied in People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982).

19-1-115. Legal custody - guardianship - placement out of the home - petition for review for need of placement.

1. Except as otherwise provided by law, in awarding legal custody of a child pursuant to this title 19, the court may, if in the best interests of the child, give preference to the child's grandparent who is appropriate, capable, willing, and available to care for the child, if the court finds that there is no suitable natural or adoptive parent available, with due diligence having been exercised in attempting to locate any such natural or adoptive parent. Any individual, agency, or institution vested by the court with legal custody of a child has the rights and duties defined in section 19-1-103.
2. Any individual, agency, or institution vested by the court with the guardianship of the person of a child has the rights and duties defined in section 19-1-103; except that a guardian of the person may not consent to the adoption of a child unless the court has expressly given that authority.
1. If legal custody or guardianship of the person is vested in an agency or institution, the court shall transmit, with the court order, copies of the social study, any clinical reports, and other information concerning the care and treatment of the child.
2. An individual, agency, or institution vested by the court with legal custody or guardianship of the person of a child shall give the court any information concerning the child which the court at any time may require.
1. Any agency vested by the court with legal custody of a child shall have the right, subject to the approval of the court, to determine where and with whom the child shall live, but this paragraph (a) shall not apply to placement of children committed to the department of human services. In determining where and with whom a child shall live, if in the best interests of the child, preference may be given to the child's grandparent who is appropriate, capable, willing, and available to care for the child.
2. No individual or agency vested by the court with legal custody of a child or with which a child is placed pursuant to subsection (8) of this section shall remove the child from the state for more than thirty days without court approval. When granting such approval, if appropriate, the court shall enter an order that the individual or agency comply with the requirements of the "Interstate Compact on Placement of Children" set forth in part 18 of article 60 of title 24, C.R.S.
1. A decree vesting legal custody of a child in an individual, institution, or agency or providing for placement of a child pursuant to section 19-2.5-1102 or 19-3-403 or subsection (8) of this section must be for a determinate period. The court shall review the decree no later than three months after it is entered, except a decree vesting legal custody of a child with the department of human services.
2. The individual, institution, or agency vested with the legal custody of a child may petition the court for renewal of the decree. The court, after notice and hearing, may renew the decree for such additional determinate period as the court may determine if it finds such renewal to be in the best interests of the child and of the community. The findings of the court and the reasons therefor shall be entered with the order renewing or denying renewal of the decree.
3. The court shall review any decree or, if there is no objection by any party to the action, the court may, in its discretion, require an administrative review by the state department of human services of any decree entered in accordance with this subsection (4) each six months after the initial review provided in subsection (4)(a) of this section. In the event that an administrative review is ordered, all counsel of record must be notified and may appear at said review. Periodic reviews must include the determinations and projections required in section 19-3-702.5.
4. 1. A decree vesting legal custody of a child or providing for placement of a child with an agency in which public money is expended must be accompanied by an order of the court that obligates the parent of the child to pay a fee, based on the parent's ability to pay, to cover the costs of the guardian ad litem and of providing for residential care of the child. When custody of the child is given to the county department of human or social services, the fee for residential care must be in accordance with the fee requirements as provided by rule of the state department of human services, and the fee applies, to the extent unpaid, to the entire period of placement. When a child is committed to the state department of human services, the fee for care and treatment must be in accordance with the fee requirements as provided by rule of the state department of human services, and the fee applies, to the extent unpaid, to the entire period of placement.
  2. For an adoptive family who receives an approved Title IV-E adoption assistance subsidy pursuant to the federal "Social Security Act", 42 U.S.C. sec. 673 et seq., or an approved payment in subsidization of adoption pursuant to article 7 of title 26, the cost of care, as defined in section 19-1-103, must not exceed the amount of the adoption assistance payment.
  3. The state department of human services shall convene a working group of geographically and demographically diverse partners and stakeholders to provide feedback and recommendations regarding the collection of fees for the residential care of children or youth in out-of-home placement who are not adjudicated dependent or neglected pursuant to section 19-3-102, ensuring compliance with federal law, including but not limited to Title IV of the federal "Social Security Act". On or before March 31, 2022, the state department shall submit a report of the recommendations of the working group to the public behavioral health care and human services committee of the house of representatives and the health and human services committee of the senate, or their successor committees.
5. When a child, juvenile, or youth has been committed to the division of youth services and the court no longer has ongoing jurisdiction, the administrative review division shall review the placement of that child, juvenile, or youth in a qualified residential treatment program within sixty days after placement. When the child, juvenile, or youth has not been committed to the division of youth services and the court has ongoing jurisdiction, within sixty days after a placement of that child, juvenile, or youth in a qualified residential treatment program, or within thirty days after a placement when the qualified individual does not support the qualified residential treatment program level of care or the child, juvenile, youth, guardian ad litem, or any party objects to the placement, a juvenile court shall review that placement. In both instances, the juvenile court or the administrative review division of the state department shall:
  1. Consider the assessment, determination, and documentation made by the qualified individual;
  2. Determine whether the needs of the child, juvenile, or youth can be met through placement with a parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, kin caregiver, or in a foster care home, or whether placement of the child, juvenile, or youth in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child, juvenile, or youth in the least restrictive environment, and whether that placement is consistent with the short- and long-term goals, including mental, behavioral, and physical health goals, for the child, juvenile, or youth as specified in the permanency plan for the child, juvenile, or youth or as outlined in the family services plan or division of youth services plan; and
  3. Approve or disapprove of the placement.
6. As long as a child, juvenile, or youth remains in a qualified residential treatment program, the county department or the division of youth services shall submit evidence:
  1. Demonstrating that ongoing assessment of the strengths and needs of the child, juvenile, or youth continues to support the determination that the needs of the child, juvenile, or youth cannot be met through placement with a parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, kin caregiver, or in a foster family home; that the placement in a qualified residential treatment program provides the most effective and appropriate level of care for the child, juvenile, or youth in the least restrictive environment; and that the placement is consistent with the short- and long-term goals for the child, juvenile, or youth as specified in the permanency plan for the child, juvenile, or youth, or as outlined in the family services plan;
  2. Documenting the specific treatment or service needs that will be met for the child, juvenile, or youth in the placement and the length of time the child, juvenile, or youth is expected to need treatment or services; and
  3. Documenting the efforts made by the county department to prepare the child, juvenile, or youth to return home or to be placed with a fit and willing kin caregiver, a legal guardian, legal custodian, or an adoptive parent, or in a foster family.
7. The evidence required pursuant to subsection (4)(f) of this section must be submitted at each subsequent review and each subsequent permanency hearing held concerning the child, juvenile, or youth. The evidence must not be submitted less frequently than every ninety days during the duration of the placement of the child, juvenile, or youth in the qualified residential treatment program. The evidence must be submitted to the court or to the administrative review division of the state department of human services if parties consent to the latter. The court shall review the evidence submitted pursuant to subsection (4)(f) of this section at each subsequent permanency and status review hearing at least every ninety days during the duration of the placement of the child, juvenile, or youth in the qualified residential treatment program. If the parties consent to a review by the administrative review division, attorneys of record must be notified and may appear at the review. The administrative review division shall review the evidence submitted pursuant to subsection (4)(f) of this section at least every ninety days during the duration of the placement of the child, juvenile, or youth in the qualified residential treatment program.
8. In making a decision as to proper placement in a qualified residential treatment program, the court or the administrative review division shall consider the assessment provided by the qualified individual and the most recent assessment, as described in subsection (4)(e) of this section, and shall give great weight to the recommendation in the assessment when making a qualified residential treatment program placement decision. An assessment prepared by the qualified individual must identify whether a qualified residential treatment program is the most effective, appropriate, and least restrictive placement for the child or youth. The assessment must also identify child- or youth-specific short- and long-term goals for the child or youth and the family. If the court or administrative review division deviates from the qualified individual's assessment and recommendation, the court or the administrative review division shall make specific findings of fact regarding the most effective, appropriate, and least restrictive placement for the child or youth and whether the placement is consistent with child- or youth-specific short- and long-term goals for the child or youth and the family. When making such findings of fact, the court or administrative review division shall consider all relevant information, including:
  1. Whether the protocol for the qualified residential treatment program assessment was followed;
  2. The strengths and specific treatment or service needs of the child or youth and the family;
  3. The expected length of stay; and
  4. The placement preference of the child or youth and the family.
(4.5) The department of human services shall implement the provisions of subsections (4)(e) and (4)(f) of this section when the federal government approves Colorado's five-year Title IV-E prevention plan, at which time the department of human services may submit a budget request to the joint budget committee for necessary funding to implement the plan.
No legal custodian or guardian of the person may be removed without his consent until given notice and an opportunity to be heard by the court if he so requests.
Any time the court enters an order awarding legal custody of a child to the department of human services or to a county department pursuant to the provisions of this title, even temporarily, said order shall contain specific findings, if warranted by the evidence, as follows:
1. That continuation of the child in the home would be contrary to the child's best interests;
2. That there has been compliance with reasonable efforts requirements regarding removal of the child from the home, as follows:
  1. That reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home; or
  2. That an emergency situation exists which requires the immediate temporary removal of the child from the home and it is reasonable that preventive efforts not be made due to the emergency situation; or
  3. That reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home are not required because of the existence of a circumstance described in subsection (7) of this section;
3. That reasonable efforts have been made or will be made to reunite the child and the family or that efforts to reunite the child and the family have failed or that reasonable efforts to reunite the child and the family are not required pursuant to subsection (7) of this section; and
4. That procedural safeguards with respect to parental rights have been applied in connection with the removal of the child from the home, a change in the child's placement out of the home, and any determination affecting parental visitation.
(6.5) Any time the court enters an order continuing a child in a placement out of the home pursuant to this title, said order shall contain specific findings, if warranted by the evidence, as follows:
1. The continuation of the child in out-of-home placement is in the best interests of the child;
2. That reasonable efforts have been made to reunite the child and the family or that reasonable efforts to reunite the child and the family are not required pursuant to subsection (7) of this section; and
3. That procedural safeguards with respect to parental rights have been applied in connection with the continuation of the child in out-of-home placement, a change in the child's placement out of the home, and any determination affecting parental visitation.
(6.7) Any time the court enters an order related to out-of-home placement pursuant to subsections (6)(a) to (6)(c) or subsection (6.5)(b) of this section; subsection (8)(f) of this section; section 19-2.5-305 (3)(a)(XI)(A) and (3)(a)(XI)(B); section 19-2.5-1116 (1)(a), (1)(b), and (3)(a)(III); or sections 19-3-702 (3)(b) and 19-3-702.5 (1)(b), the order is effective as of the date the findings were made by the court, notwithstanding the date that a written order may be signed by the court. Written orders entered pursuant to subsections (6)(a) to (6)(c) or subsection (6.5)(b) of this section; subsection (8)(f) of this section; section 19-2.5-305 (3)(a)(XI)(A) and (3)(a)(XI)(B); section 19-2.5-1116 (1)(a), (1)(b), and (3)(a)(III); or sections 19-3-702 (3)(b) and 19-3-702.5 (1)(b) must state "the effective date of this order is" and must not use the words "nunc pro tunc".
Reasonable efforts are not required to prevent the child's removal from the home or to reunify the child and the family in the following circumstances:
1. When the court finds that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as described in sections 19-3-604 (1) and (2); or
2. When the parental rights of the parent with respect to a sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated; unless the prior sibling termination resulted from a parent delivering a child to a firefighter or a staff member of a hospital or community clinic emergency center, as defined in section 19-3-304.5 (9), pursuant to the provisions of section 19-3-304.5; or
3. When the court finds that the parent has been convicted of any of the following crimes:
  1. Murder of another child of the parent;
  2. Voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent;
  3. Aiding, abetting, or attempting the commission of or conspiring or soliciting to commit the crimes in subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph (c); or
  4. A felony assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent.
1. Whenever it appears necessary that the placement of a child out of the home will be for longer than ninety days, the placement is voluntary and not court-ordered, and the placement involves the direct expenditure of funds appropriated by the general assembly to the department of human services, a petition for review of need for placement shall be filed by the department or agency with which the child has been placed before the expiration of ninety days in the placement. A decree providing for voluntary placement of a child with an agency in which public moneys are expended shall be renewable in circumstances where there is documentation that the child has an emotional, a physical, or an intellectual disability that necessitates care and treatment for a longer duration than ninety days as provided pursuant to this paragraph (a). The court shall not transfer or require relinquishment of legal custody of, or otherwise terminate the parental rights with respect to, a child who has an emotional, a physical, or an intellectual disability and who was voluntarily placed out of the home for the purposes of obtaining special treatment or care solely because the parent or legal guardian is unable to provide the treatment or care. Whenever a child fifteen years of age or older consents to placement in a mental health facility pursuant to section 27-65-103, C.R.S., the review under section 27-65-103 (5), C.R.S., shall be conducted in lieu of and shall fulfill the requirements for review under this paragraph (a).
2. 1. The petition and all subsequent court documents in any proceedings brought under paragraph (a) of this subsection (8) shall be titled "The People of the State of Colorado, in the Interest of , a child (or children) and Concerning , Respondent." The petition shall be verified, and the statements in the petition may be made upon information and belief.
  2. The petition shall set forth plainly the facts that bring the child within the court's jurisdiction, specifying that the child is subject to immediate placement out of the home or has been in voluntary placement out of the home and it appears that continuation of the placement is necessary for a time exceeding ninety days and continuation of the placement is necessary and is in the best interest of the child, the family, and the community. The petition shall also state the name, age, and residence of the child and the names and residences of his or her parents, guardian, or other legal custodian or of his or her nearest known relative if no parent, guardian, or other legal custodian is known.
  3. All petitions filed pursuant to this subsection (8) shall include the following statement: "If the child is placed out of the home for a period of twelve months or longer, the court shall hold a permanency hearing within said twelve months to determine the future status of the child. The review of any decree of placement of a child subsequent to the three-month review required by section 19-1-115 (4)(a), Colorado Revised Statutes, may be conducted as an administrative review by the department of human services. If you are a party to the action, you have a right to object to an administrative review, and, if you object, the review shall be conducted by the court."
3. After a petition has been filed, the court shall promptly issue a summons reciting briefly the substance of the petition. The summons shall be substantially in the form specified in section 19-3-502 and be dealt with in the manner provided in section 19-3-503 and shall set forth the constitutional and legal rights of the child, his or her parents or guardian, and any other respondent, including the right to have an attorney present at the hearing on the petition. The petitioner shall send the summons to the child and his or her parents, guardian, or legal custodian by certified mail. Notice of the hearing shall be given by the court to the director of the facility or agency in which the child is placed and any person who has physical custody of the child and any attorney or guardian ad litem of record. Nothing in this subsection (8) shall require the presence of any person before the court unless the court so directs.
4. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of the child for any child who is the subject of a petition for review of placement, unless the court makes specific findings that no useful purpose would be served by such appointment.
5. For purposes of determining proper placement of the child, the petition for review of placement or social study shall be accompanied by an evaluation for placement prepared by the department or agency that recommends placement or with which the child has been placed. The evaluation for placement shall include an assessment of the child's physical and mental health, developmental status, family and social history, and educational status. The petition shall also be accompanied by recommended placements for the child and the monthly cost of each and a treatment plan that contains, at a minimum, the goals to be achieved by the placement; the services to be provided; the intensity, duration, and provider of the services; identification of the services that can be provided only in a residential setting; and the recommended duration of the placement. The petition or social study shall also be accompanied by the required fee to be charged to the parents pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection (4) of this section. In addition, if a change in legal custody is recommended, the evaluation for placement shall include other alternatives that have been explored and the reason for their rejection, and the evaluation for placement shall contain an explanation of any particular placements that were considered and rejected and the reason for their rejection.
6. The petition for review of need for placement shall request the court to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether placement or continued placement is necessary and in the best interest of the child, the family, and the community and whether reasonable efforts have been made to return the child to a safe home or whether the child should be permanently removed from his or her home. If the court makes such findings, it shall enter a decree ordering the child's placement out of the home in the facility or setting that most appropriately meets the needs of the child, the family, and the community. In making its decision as to proper placement, the court shall utilize the evaluation for placement prepared pursuant to section 19-1-107 or the evaluation for placement required by paragraph (e) of this subsection (8) that shall state the cost of recommended placement. If the evaluation for placement recommends placement in a facility located in Colorado that can provide appropriate treatment and that will accept the child, then the court shall not place the child in a facility outside this state. If the court deviates from the recommendations of the evaluation for placement in a manner that results in a difference in the cost of the disposition ordered by the court and the cost of the disposition recommended in the evaluation, the court shall make specific findings of fact relating to its decision, including the monthly cost of the placement, if ordered. A copy of such findings shall be sent to the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court, who shall report annually to the joint budget committee and the health and human services committees of the house of representatives and senate of the general assembly, or any successor committees, on such orders. If the court commits the child to the department of human services, it shall not make a specific placement, nor shall the provisions of this paragraph (f) relating to specific findings of fact be applicable. If the court makes a finding that continued placement is not necessary and is not in the best interest of the child, the family, and the community, the court shall dismiss the petition for review of need for placement and shall order that the child be returned home. The court may require a continued hearing of the petition for review of need for placement for a period not to exceed fourteen days if it finds that the materials submitted are insufficient to make a finding as provided in this paragraph (f).
7. A petition for review of need for placement shall not be handled as an informal adjustment in accordance with the provisions of section 19-3-501 (2).

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 706, § 1, effective October 1. L. 89: (4)(c) amended, p. 930, § 1, effective April 23. L. 90: (4)(d) amended, p. 1014, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: (1)(a) and (3)(a) amended, p. 264, § 6, effective May 31. L. 92: (3)(b) and (4) amended and (6) added, p. 221, § 5, effective July 1. L. 93: (4)(c) and (6) amended, p. 388, § 1, effective April 19; (4)(d) amended, p. 1546, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(a), (4)(a), (4)(c), and (4)(d) amended, p. 2659, § 146, effective July 1. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 820, § 22, effective August 5. L. 2001: (6) amended and (7) added, p. 842, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2003: (7)(b) amended, p. 769, § 2, effective March 25; (1)(a) amended, p. 2629, § 12, effective June 5; IP(6) and (6)(b)(II) amended and (6.5) added, p. 2486, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (6.7) added, p. 357, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (4)(d) amended and (8) added, p. 1506, § 4, effective May 31. L. 2008: (3)(b), (4)(a), and (6.7) amended, p. 1891, § 61, effective August 5. L. 2009: (4)(a) amended, (SB 09-292), ch. 369, p. 1949, § 34, effective August 5. L. 2010: (8)(a) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 788, § 37, effective April 29. L. 2018: (7)(b) amended, (SB 18-050), ch. 20, p. 270, § 2, effective March 7; (4)(d)(I) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 407, § 29, effective August 8. L. 2019: (6.7) amended, (SB 19-108), ch. 294, p. 2728, § 22, effective July 1; (4)(c) and (6.7) amended, (HB 19-1219), ch. 237, p. 2355, § 4, effective August 2; (4)(d)(II) amended, (SB 19-178), ch. 180, p. 2048, § 2, effective August 2; (4)(e), (4)(f), and (4.5) added, (HB 19-1308), ch. 256, p. 2459, § 4, effective August 2. L. 2020: IP(4)(e), (4)(e)(II), and (4)(f) amended and (4)(g) and (4)(h) added, (SB 20-162), ch. 221, p. 1088, § 3, effective July 2. L. 2021: (4)(d)(III) added and IP(4)(e) and IP(4)(h) amended, (SB 21-278), ch. 344, pp. 2244, 2240, §§ 6, 1, effective June 25; (1), (4)(a), (4)(d)(II), and (6.7) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 727, § 65, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in § 19-3-115 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Amendments to subsection (6.7) by SB 19-108 and HB 19-1219 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (6) and enacting subsection (7), see section 1 of chapter 241, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act amending subsection (4)(d) and enacting subsection (8), see section 1 of chapter 351, Session Laws of Colorado 2007. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 34 Dicta 108 (1957). For article, "Representing the Mentally Retarded or Disabled Parent in a Colorado Dependent or Neglected Child Action", see 11 Colo. Law. 693 (1982). For article, "House Bill 1268 -- In the Best Interests of the Child", see 18 Colo. Law. 1703 (1989). For article, "Parental Financial Liability for Juvenile Delinquents", see 37 Colo. Law. 49 (Nov. 2008).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

This section concerns guardianship of a child taken into custody and found to be dependent. Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Colo. 188 , 247 P.2d 813 (1952).

Guardianship creates legal obligation to care for child. Strangers are under no legal obligations to care for a child although they would be if awarded custody or decreed legal guardians after the child has been declared dependent and neglected. Jones v. Koulos, 142 Colo. 92 , 349 P.2d 704 (1960).

Legal custody cannot be imposed on unwilling person not child's parent. While a public agency can be forced to accept legal custody of a child and assume the responsibilities enunciated in this section, legal custody of a child, with its attendant duties, may not be imposed upon an unwilling person who is not the child's parent. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

One standing in loco parentis may at his election be relieved of that status and the attendant obligations at any time upon petition to the court. People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978).

Lack of notice to guardian denied due process. The lack of notice to guardians of the pendency of the petition to dismiss the guardianship was a denial of due process sufficient to deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction and render its order of dismissal void, and the full hearing accorded guardians in habeas corpus proceedings did not cure the infirmity which resulted from the failure of the juvenile court to give the guardians notice of the petition. Woodson v. Ingram, 173 Colo. 65 , 477 P.2d 455 (1970).

Parent awarded custody acts as representative of state. Upon adjudication of dependency, the child may be committed to a state institution. If it is assigned to a parent, the parent acts not as such, but as a representative of the state, and is subject to visitation or inspection. The court may require reports as to the care and training of the child, as well as of ability to care for it; and the court may impose conditions for the care of the child. In re People in Interest of Murley, 124 Colo. 581 , 239 P.2d 706 (1951); Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Colo. 188 , 247 P.2d 813 (1952).

Placing child in foster care rather than with grandparents out of state is permissible when purpose of the placement is to strengthen family ties and secure potential relative placement within the state. People ex rel. E.C., 47 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2002).

Custodial order not disturbed unless for good cause shown. Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Colo. 188 , 247 P.2d 813 (1952).

Fact that state department of institutions was vested with right to control an individual incident to its legal custody of that person is not per se determinative of the question of whether the person was a member of his father's household for purposes of the "family car doctrine". Hasegawa v. Day, 684 P.2d 936 (Colo. App. 1983), overruled in Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Court had statutory duty to conduct periodic reviews of child's case and, therefore, had jurisdiction to enter order refusing to exercise continuing jurisdiction over case. People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied, 754 P.2d 1177 ( Colo. 1988 ).

Responsibility for costs of private placement may remain with the local social services department, even where legal custody is not granted to the department if the court finds the placement necessary to protect the best interests of the child. People in Interest of J.H., 770 P.2d 1355 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 786 P.2d 411 ( Colo. 1989 ).

This section imposes an obligation on the parents to contribute towards the costs of their child's residential placement, computed according to their ability to pay, in accordance with fee requirements established by rule. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1991).

The broad language of subsection (4)(d) applies to a juvenile adjudicated delinquent who was placed with an agency in which public moneys were expended. The obligation of his or her parents to reimburse the county for the cost of that care is mandatory. People ex rel. M.L.M., 104 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2004).

Subsection (4)(d) of this section and § 19-2-114 can be harmonized, however , to provide the court flexibility in allocating costs. People ex rel. M.L.M., 104 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2004).

Section 19-2-114 gives the court flexibility in allocating the cost of a juvenile's care. If appropriate, the court may order that the juvenile, in addition to his or her parents, also make reasonable payments, after considering the factors enumerated in the statute and making allowances for any restitution ordered to the victim or victims of a crime. People ex rel. M.L.M., 104 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2004).

The language of subsection (4)(d) of this section and § 26-5-102 conflicts with § 14-7-102 since those sections speak in terms of the parents ability to pay while § 14-7-102 imposes absolute liability without regard for the parents financial condition. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1991).

Subsection (4)(d) of this section and § 26-5-102 are specific provisions concerning dependency and neglect adjudications and, with regard to the parental support obligation, control over § 14-7-102. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1991).

Once child has been adjudicated dependent or neglected and placed pursuant to this section, the responsibility to reimburse state for costs for residential care is governed by subsection (4)(d), not § 14-7-102. People ex rel. B.S.M., 251 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2010).

No violation of due process rights of parents under subsection (4)(d) where parents were provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the cost of their child's residential care. People ex rel. N.D.S., 5 P.3d 382 (Colo. App. 2000).

Where parents were the victims of their child's criminal acts, neither the Colorado Children's Code nor the Colorado Crime Victim Compensation Act implicitly or explicitly obviates the parents' duty of support under subsection (4)(d). People ex rel. N.D.S., 5 P.3d 382 (Colo. App. 2000).

Absent exceptional circumstances, former stepparent does not have an obligation to reimburse the state for costs incurred on behalf of his former stepchild. People ex rel. B.S.M., 251 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2010).

This section concerns only temporary awards. Findings under subsection (6.5) are not required for permanent custody orders. People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121 , 338 P.3d 1120.

Mother's failure to bring any perceived deficiency in department's efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the family to the juvenile court's attention results in a waiver of her right to raise the reasonable efforts issue on appeal. People ex rel. T.M.W., 208 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2009).

Applied in People in Interest of A.L.B., 683 P.2d 813 (Colo. App. 1984); People in Interest of M.A.G., 732 P.2d 649 (Colo. App. 1986); People in Interest of A.J., 757 P.2d 1165 (Colo. App. 1988).

19-1-115.3. Missing children and youth from out-of-home placement - required reporting to law enforcement.

If a child or youth for whom the department of human services or a county department of human or social services has legal custody pursuant to the provisions of this title 19 is determined by the agency to be missing, the agency having legal custody of the child or youth shall report the disappearance immediately, and in no case later than twenty-four hours after learning of the disappearance, to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and to law enforcement. Law enforcement authorities shall notify the Colorado bureau of investigation for transmission to the federal bureau of investigation for entry into the national crime information center database pursuant to section 16-2.7-103. The reporting requirements set forth for foster parents and out-of-home placement facilities in section 19-2.5-1508 apply.

Source: L. 2015: Entire section added, (HB 15-1078), ch. 41, p. 101, § 1, effective January 1, 2016. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 728, § 66, effective October 1.

19-1-115.5. Placement of children out of home - legislative declaration.

1. 1. The general assembly hereby finds that the number of children in out-of-home placement has increased significantly. The general assembly further finds that the facility in which a child is placed out of home is often not located in the same school district as the child's school district of residence. Nevertheless, the general assembly finds that, under the provisions of the "Public School Finance Act of 1994", article 54 of title 22, C.R.S., children in foster home placement are considered residents of the school district in which the foster home is located. Accordingly, the school district in which the child is placed must accommodate the child and provide the child with the necessary educational services that serve the child's best interests while absorbing the costs associated with such services within the constraints of the school district's existing budget. The general assembly finds that in many circumstances it is not possible to meet the best interests of the child in out-of-home placement and the needs of other children enrolled in the school district within the confines of the district's budget. (1) (a) (I) The general assembly hereby finds that the number of children in out-of-home placement has increased significantly. The general assembly further finds that the facility in which a child is placed out of home is often not located in the same school district as the child's school district of residence. Nevertheless, the general assembly finds that, under the provisions of the "Public School Finance Act of 1994", article 54 of title 22, C.R.S., children in foster home placement are considered residents of the school district in which the foster home is located. Accordingly, the school district in which the child is placed must accommodate the child and provide the child with the necessary educational services that serve the child's best interests while absorbing the costs associated with such services within the constraints of the school district's existing budget. The general assembly finds that in many circumstances it is not possible to meet the best interests of the child in out-of-home placement and the needs of other children enrolled in the school district within the confines of the district's budget.
  2. The general assembly determines that the number of children in out-of-home placement and the severity of their attendant needs are increasing. The ability to meet the needs of the children in out-of-home placement is frequently restricted by the limited resources available to a school district. Furthermore, the general assembly finds that there is a disproportionately larger number of children in out-of-home placement in some school districts than in others, thereby directly impacting the ability of certain school districts to effectively manage and finance the provision of quality educational services to all students in those districts.
2. The general assembly therefore determines that it would serve the best interests of all children enrolled in a school district if the number of children placed in out-of-home placement facilities by county departments of human or social services in each of the various school districts is monitored so that the financial impact on all school districts throughout the state is manageable and equitable and so that the best interests of all children, whether or not in out-of-home placement, can be served.
1. Contingent upon implementation of the children, youth, and families automation project in the department of human services, the department shall make the following information available to all county departments throughout the state:
  1. Vacancies in out-of-home placement facilities within each county;
  2. The number of out-of-home placement children enrolled in each school district in relation to the total number of students enrolled in the school district;
  3. A list of all out-of-home placement facilities in each school district; and
  4. To the extent known and within available resources, a list of the types of services available in each school district to meet the special needs of children in out-of-home placement.
2. In every proceeding pursuant to this title in which the court contemplates placing a child out of home, the county department shall make recommendations to the court concerning the proposed placement. Such recommendations shall include information about placement facilities that are most able to serve appropriately the best interests of the child. In making its recommendations to the court, the county department shall consider:
  1. The special needs, if any, of the child to be placed, including the ability of the proposed out-of-home placement facility and the school district in which the proposed out-of-home placement facility is located to provide the necessary services to meet those needs;
  2. The proximity of the proposed out-of-home placement facility to the child's parents' home, if parental rights have not been terminated;
  3. Whether the proposed placement facility is in the same school district as the child's parents' residence;
  4. If the proposed placement facility is not in the same school district as the child's parents' residence and if the information is available through the children, youth, and families automation project, the number of children placed out of home by the court who are already enrolled in the school district in which the proposed out-of-home placement facility is located.
3. If the recommendation of the county department is to place the child in a placement facility that is not located in the same school district as the child's parents' residence, the placing county department shall inform the school district in which the child's parents reside of the recommended placement.
4. In placing a child out of home, the court shall consider the recommendations of the county department and any information it may have concerning whether the child's educational needs can be met adequately if the child is placed in an out-of-home placement facility located in a school district other than the district in which the child's parents reside.
5. Upon entry of the court's order placing a child in an out-of-home placement facility located in a school district other than the school district in which the child's parents reside, the county department shall advise the school district in which the child's parents reside of the court's order.
6. When a school district is advised by the county department that a child residing in that school district is to be placed in an out-of-home placement facility in another school district pursuant to a court order, the school district shall contact the school district in which the child is to be placed concerning:
  1. The special educational needs, if any, of the child; and
  2. The resources necessary to meet those special needs.
The state board of education shall provide the department of human services with all aggregate, nonidentifying information concerning student enrollment in every school district in the state that the department of human services may request for purposes of implementing this section.

Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 147, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2018: (1)(b) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 408, § 30, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

19-1-115.7. Foster care prevention services - provision of services - rights and remedies - exchange of information.

A county department of human or social services may provide both child welfare and prevention services, including but not limited to foster care prevention services, as defined in section 19-1-103, to families, kin caregivers, children, juveniles, and youth.
Nothing in this section affects any existing rights of a child, juvenile, or youth or a parent or legal guardian.
When prevention services information is exchanged between state agencies, county departments, and service providers to allow for the provision of prevention services, such information is confidential and not available to the public. Any entities providing prevention services shall ensure that all information obtained and exchanged is confidential as required pursuant to this section, sections 19-1-103 and 19-1-307, and any other applicable state or federal law.

Source: L. 2020: Entire section added, (SB 20-162), ch. 221, p. 1090, § 4, effective July 2. L. 2021: (1) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 729, § 67, effective October 1.

19-1-116. Funding - alternatives to placement out of the home - services to prevent continued involvement in child welfare system.

The state department of human services shall reimburse allowable expenses to county departments of human or social services for foster care. The state department's budget request for foster care must be based upon the actual aggregate expenditure of federal, state, and local funds of all counties during the preceding twenty-four months on foster care. Special purpose funds, not to exceed five percent of the total appropriation for foster care, must be retained by the state department of human services for purposes of meeting emergencies and contingencies in individual counties. The amount thus reimbursed to each county must represent the total expenditure by an individual county for foster care and for alternative services provided in conformance with the plan prepared and approved pursuant to subsections (2)(b) and (4) of this section.
(1.5) No later than July 1, 1994, each county in the state shall assure access to alternatives to out-of-home placements for families with children and youth who are at imminent risk of out-of-home placements. Beginning September 1, 2011, a county may also provide access for families to alternative services to prevent continued involvement with the county department child welfare system. Beginning September 1, 2018, a county may also provide access to alternative services for former foster care youth, as defined in section 26-5-101, who are no longer in the custody of the department but need limited assistance from the county. Two or more counties may jointly provide or purchase alternative services to families in the respective counties. Such services shall either be provided for under the plan adopted by placement alternative commissions in accordance with subsection (2)(b) of this section or purchased by the county if such county does not have a placement alternative commission for the county. If a county purchases alternative services, the county shall ensure that the services purchased meet the goals of placement alternative commission plans, as described in subsection (2)(b)(I) of this section.
1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(a) is effective until July 1, 2024.] The county commissioners in each county may appoint a placement alternatives commission consisting, where possible, of a physician or a licensed health professional, an attorney, representatives of a local law enforcement agency, representatives recommended by the court and probation department, representatives from the county department of human or social services, a local mental health clinic, and the county, district, or municipal public health agency, a representative of a local school district specializing in special education, a representative of a local community centered board, representatives of a local residential child care facility and a private nonprofit agency providing nonresidential services for children and families, a representative specializing in occupational training or employment programs, a foster parent, and one or more representatives of the lay community. At least fifty percent of the commission members must represent the private sector. The county commissioners of two or more counties may jointly establish a district placement alternatives commission. A placement alternatives commission may be consolidated with other local advisory boards pursuant to section 24-1.7-103.
  (2) (a) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(a) is effective July 1, 2024. ] The county commissioners in each county may appoint a placement alternatives commission consisting, where possible, of a physician or a licensed health professional, an attorney, representatives of a local law enforcement agency, representatives recommended by the court and probation department, representatives from the county department of human or social services, a local mental health clinic, and the county, district, or municipal public health agency, a representative of a local school district specializing in special education, a representative of a local case management agency, as defined in section 25.5-6-1702, representatives of a local residential child care facility and a private nonprofit agency providing nonresidential services for children and families, a representative specializing in occupational training or employment programs, a foster parent, and one or more representatives of the lay community. At least fifty percent of the commission members must represent the private sector. The county commissioners of two or more counties may jointly establish a district placement alternatives commission. A placement alternatives commission may be consolidated with other local advisory boards pursuant to section 24-1.7-103.
2. 1. On or before July 1, 1994, the commission, if established, shall annually prepare a plan for the provision of services. The primary goals under the plan shall be to prevent imminent placement of children out of the home and to reunite children who have been placed out of the home with their families. If a county provides services to children who, without intervention, risk continued involvement with the child welfare system, the county shall include in the plan the goals to be achieved by providing said services. The plan shall be prepared using all available sources of information in the community, including public hearings. The plan shall specify the nature of the expenditures to be made and shall identify the services which are intended to prevent or minimize placement out of the home and to what extent. The plan shall contain, whenever practicable, a vocational component to provide assistance to older children concerning a transition into the work force upon completion of school. Upon approval of the plan by the county commissioners, the counties shall submit the plan to the department of human services.
  2. On and after July 1, 1994, the commissions shall prepare multi-year plans for services which contain the same goals as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), and the period for the plans shall be determined in state board rules. The multi-year plans may be amended annually for budgetary or programmatic changes that are necessary to enhance service delivery or as otherwise deemed necessary to accomplish the goals of the plan, which reasons shall be set forth in state board rules. Counties shall submit the multi-year plans for approval by the state board.
3. The commission shall review, on an ongoing basis, the effectiveness of programs within its jurisdiction which are designed to prevent or reduce placement and shall report its findings to the county commissioners annually.
4. Repealed.
5. Upon approval by the state board of human services of the plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), the department of human services shall reimburse county departments, as described in section 26-1-122, C.R.S., for eighty percent of the expenditures made in conformance with the plan.
Repealed.
1. The departments of human services and education and the judicial department shall jointly develop guidelines for the content and submission of plans as described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section. Said guidelines shall include but not be limited to the information that is gathered by the commission, the goals to be addressed by the plan, the form of the budget for expenditures that are to be made under the plan, the services that are to be provided which are intended to prevent or minimize placement out of the home and to reunite children with their families and to what extent, and the method by which the plan may be amended during the year to meet the changing local conditions; except that amendments to the plan on and after July 1, 1994, shall be in accordance with subparagraph (II) of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section. On and after July 1, 1993, any amendments to the guidelines shall be developed by the department of human services. Said guidelines shall then be submitted to the state board of human services, which shall promulgate rules for the submission of plans.
2. In addition to the duties described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (4), the state board of human services is hereby authorized to develop through the adoption of rules categories of programs and services that promote the primary goals of the plan established in accordance with paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section. Any plan established on and after July 1, 1994, shall provide for the availability and provision of services or programs within such categories. Any plan established before July 1, 1994, shall be amended on or before that date to provide for the availability and provision of services or programs within such categories. The department of human services shall monitor the implementation of the plans as approved by the state board.
Children currently residing in institutions whose condition would permit them to be discharged to less restrictive settings shall be so transferred at the earliest possible date. Moneys appropriated and available to the department of human services shall be allocated on a priority basis by the department to county departments for the purposes of providing care to children who are discharged from the institution in which they reside if such children then receive care that is less intensive, closer to the residence of the parents or family, or in a less restrictive setting.
It is the intent of the general assembly that state money appropriated for placements out of the home must not be used by county boards of human or social services for the development of new county-run programs or for the expansion of existing staff or programs, if such development or expansion duplicates services already provided in the community, including, but not limited to, day care programs, independent living programs, home-based care, transitional care, alternative school programs, counseling programs, street academies, tutorial programs, and in-home treatment and counseling programs.
1. Any county is hereby authorized to establish a program under which a multidisciplinary, noncategorical program fund for the county shall be created and moneys from such fund shall be used to provide child welfare services to at-risk children and their families. Except as otherwise provided by federal law, the moneys in the county's fund contributed by state agencies shall be exempt from restrictive, categorical rules otherwise governing the use of such funds, including the "M" notation in the state's annual appropriations act which describes the general and federal fund contributions for federally supported programs.
2. Such services shall include, but are not limited to, assessment, intervention, treatment, supervision, and shelter when and if appropriate.
3. 1. The fund for each county must consist of contributions, made by any state, county, or local agency, of federal, state, or local funds appropriated to or contributed by such agencies for child welfare services for at-risk children and their families. Appropriated funds include, but are not limited to, those appropriated to county departments of human or social services, the state department of human services, the department of public health and environment, the department of education, the department of public safety, the judicial department, and the job training partnership office in the governor's office. Each state agency's contribution to a county's fund must be contingent upon and equal to contributions from the participating county and any other local agency that participates and seeks money from the fund. Nothing in this subsection (7) allows the allocation of general fund money to any other participating county in the same manner that such money is allocated to Mesa county in accordance with section 2 of House Bill 93-1171, as enacted during the first regular session of the fifty-ninth general assembly.
  2. The fund for each county may also consist of contributions from the fund of any other participating county.
4. The county board of human or social services for a county shall convene a meeting of the local and state agencies that provide child welfare services to at-risk children and their families, that will participate in the program, and that seek money from the county's fund. The meeting is for the purpose of developing and adopting a memorandum of understanding between such agencies and the county's board of human or social services concerning the amount of contributions to the fund described in subsection (7)(c) of this section and the allocation and use of money allocated from the fund. The memorandum of understanding must provide for the designation of a governing entity to oversee the administration of the fund and a fiscal agent, a three-year plan, provisions for evaluating the programmatic and fiscal impact and overall effectiveness of the program, and a process for submitting the results of the evaluation to the general assembly and state officials on an annual basis.
5. The state agencies affected by the implementation of the three-year plan described in subsection (7)(d) of this section shall review and approve the plan. The state agencies shall act on the plan within ninety days after the plan is submitted to the state agencies. It is the intent of the general assembly that the plan be implemented and that the state agencies cooperate in the plan's development and implementation. Prior to the implementation of the program, a copy of the approved plan must be submitted to the joint budget committee of the general assembly. Prior to the expiration of the three-year plan, the county board of human or social services shall follow the procedures described in subsection (7)(d) of this section for readoption of or revisions to the three-year plan.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 707, § 1, effective October 1. L. 90: (1), (2)(b), (2)(e), and (3) amended and (2)(d) repealed, pp. 1013, 1015, §§ 1, 4, effective July 1. L. 93: (1.5) added and (2) and (4) amended, p. 2002, § 2, effective June 9; (7) added, p. 2095, § 1, effective July 1; (4) amended, p. 1135, § 66, effective July 1, 1994. L. 94: (1), (2)(a), (2)(b)(I), (2)(e), (3), (4)(b), (5), and (7)(c) amended, pp. 2659, 2736, §§ 147, 363, effective July 1; (7) amended, p. 1798, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(b)(I) amended, p. 82, § 3, effective March 20; (3) amended, p. 1256, § 143, effective August 7. L. 97: (2)(a) amended, p. 1191, § 12, effective July 1. L. 98: (3) amended, p. 729, § 16, effective May 18; (4)(a) amended, p. 821, § 23, effective August 5. L. 2001: (3) repealed, p. 1176, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2010: (2)(a) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2075, § 35, effective August 11. L. 2011: (1.5) and (2)(b)(I) amended, (HB 11-1196), ch. 160, p. 553, § 3, effective August 10. L. 2018: (1.5) amended, (HB 18-1319), ch. 217, p. 1391, § 4, effective May 18; (1), (2)(a), (6), (7)(c)(I), (7)(d), and (7)(e) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 408, § 31, effective August 8. L. 2021: (2)(a) amended, (HB 21-1187), ch. 83, p. 326, § 7, effective July 1, 2024.

Editor's note:

This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-3-120 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.
Amendments to subsection (4) in Senate Bill 93-254 and House Bill 93-1317 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (2)(a) in section 147 of House Bill 94-1029 were superseded by amendments in section 363 of House Bill 94-1029. Amendments to subsection (7) in House Bill 94-1357 and House Bill 94-1029 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1993 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 230, Session Laws of Colorado 1993. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Provision stating that the department shall reimburse each county for an amount representing the "total expenditure" does not require a reimbursement rate of one hundred percent. Section 26-5-104 describes the applicable rate as eighty percent. Colo. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Montezuma County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 844 P.2d 1341 (Colo. App. 1992).

19-1-117. Visitation rights of grandparents or great-grandparents.

Any grandparent or great-grandparent of a child may, in the manner set forth in this section, seek a court order granting the grandparent or great-grandparent reasonable grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights when there is or has been a child custody case or a case concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities relating to that child. Because cases arise that do not directly deal with child custody or the allocation of parental responsibilities but nonetheless have an impact on the custody of or parental responsibilities with respect to a child, for the purposes of this section, a "case concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to a child" includes any of the following, whether or not child custody was or parental responsibilities were specifically an issue:
1. That the marriage of the child's parents has been declared invalid or has been dissolved by a court or that a court has entered a decree of legal separation with regard to such marriage;
2. That legal custody of or parental responsibilities with respect to the child have been given or allocated to a party other than the child's parent or that the child has been placed outside of and does not reside in the home of the child's parent, excluding any child who has been placed for adoption or whose adoption has been legally finalized; or
3. That the child's parent, who is the child of the grandparent or grandchild of the great-grandparent, has died.
A party seeking a grandchild or great-grandchild visitation order shall submit, together with his or her motion for visitation, to the district court for the district in which the child resides an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested order and shall give notice, together with a copy of his or her affidavit, to the party who has legal custody of the child or to the party with parental responsibilities as determined by a court pursuant to article 10 of title 14, C.R.S. The party with legal custody or parental responsibilities as determined by a court pursuant to article 10 of title 14, C.R.S., may file opposing affidavits. If neither party requests a hearing, the court shall enter an order granting grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights to the petitioning grandparent or great-grandparent only upon a finding that the visitation is in the best interests of the child. A hearing shall be held if either party so requests or if it appears to the court that it is in the best interests of the child that a hearing be held. At the hearing, parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an opportunity to be heard. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court finds it is in the best interests of the child to grant grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights to the petitioning grandparent or great-grandparent, the court shall enter an order granting such rights.
A grandparent or great-grandparent shall not file an affidavit seeking an order granting grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights more than once every two years absent a showing of good cause. If the court finds there is good cause to file more than one such affidavit, it shall allow such additional affidavit to be filed and shall consider it. The court may order reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. The court may not make any order restricting the movement of the child if such restriction is solely for the purpose of allowing the grandparent or great-grandparent the opportunity to exercise his grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights.
The court may make an order modifying or terminating grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights whenever such order would serve the best interests of the child.
Any order granting or denying parenting time rights to the parent of a child shall not affect visitation rights granted to a grandparent or great-grandparent pursuant to this section.

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 709, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: (5) added, p. 262, § 3, effective May 31. L. 93: (5) amended, p. 581, § 18, effective July 1. L. 98: IP(1), (1)(b), and (2) amended, p. 1406, § 64, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2014: IP(1), (1)(c), (2), (3), (4), and (5) amended, (HB 14-1362), ch. 374, p. 1787, § 2, effective June 6.

Editor's note: This section was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-116 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1993 act amending subsection (5), see section 1 of chapter 165, Session Laws of Colorado 1993.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Parental Rights and Responsibilities of Grandparents and Third Parties", see 30 Colo. Law. 63 (May 2001). For article, "The Constitutionality of Colorado's Grandparent Visitation and Third-Party Standing Statutes", see 32 Colo. Law. 51 (Feb. 2003). For article, "Securing the Nonparent's Place in a Child's Life Through Adoption and Adoption Alternatives", see 37 Colo. Law. 27 (Oct. 2008). For article, "Constitutional Issues and Legal Standards in Parental Responsibility Matters", see 42 Colo. Law. 33 (Jan. 2013).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

This section not unconstitutional on its face. This section may be construed to embody the protections required by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). The court read this section as requiring that the biological parent's decisions concerning grandparent visitation must carry special weight and significance in the adjudication of the grandparent's visitation petition. The burden of proof must be such that the parent need not prove that the grandparent visitation would adversely affect the child. In re C.M., 74 P.3d 342 (Colo. App. 2002); In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

Section does not violate due process clause of the United States Constitution merely because it authorizes visitation rights for grandparents. In re M.G., 58 P.3d 1145 (Colo. App. 2002).

Due process does not require a showing of parental unfitness prior to applying the best interest of the child standard to determine custody of a child. In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

Adoptive parents not similarly situated to biological parents for purposes of an equal protection analysis when determining the threshold circumstances under which grandparents could be permitted to seek court-enforced visitation rights. In re Petition of R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

The wishes of adoptive parents should be given "special significance" like those of biological parents in determining the merits of a grandparents' visitation request, since the intent underlying the adoption statutes is to place the adopted child in the same position as the natural child and, correspondingly, bestow upon the adoptive parents the same rights and duties of natural parents. In re Petition of R.A., 121 P.3d 295 (Colo. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 ( Colo. 2006 ).

Appropriate standard for issuance of an order of grandparent visitation requires: (1) A presumption in favor of the parental visitation determination; (2) to rebut this presumption, a showing by grandparents through clear and convincing evidence that the parental determination is not in the child's best interests; and (3) placement of the ultimate burden on grandparents to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the visitation they seek is in the best interests of the child. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006).

In applying the best interest of the child standard in grandparent visitation petitions, the court must, if it orders grandparent visitation, make findings of fact and conclusions of law identifying those "special factors" upon which it relied. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006).

Colorado statute is construed to contain a presumption that parental determinations about grandparent visitation are in the child's best interest. This is a rebuttable presumption, however, when the grandparent presents clear and convincing evidence that the parent is either unfit to make the grandparent visitation determination or that the grandparent visitation decision made by the parent is not in the best interests of the child. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006).

Grandparent bears same burden of proof in resisting subsequent motion to terminate grandparent visitation as in seeking initial order for grandparent visitation. Mother and adoptive father, as movants, have burden to present some evidence of a material change in circumstances affecting the child's best interests to support their motion to terminate grandparent visitation, and the marriage of the mother, the adoption of the child by stepfather, the reports of the child's therapist, and evidence of the child's difficulties in school met this burden. Grandparent must then rebut the presumption, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother's request to terminate visitation is in the best interests of the child. In re A.M., 251 P.3d 1119 (Colo. App. 2010).

Nonparent need not show demonstrated harm to child to satisfy "special weight" accorded to parental determinations. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 ( Colo. 2006 ); In re Reese, 227 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2010).

Trial court correctly determined that the filing requirement set forth in this section did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction; instead, this section is a venue provision and, as such, is subject to waiver. In re Villalva, 56 P.3d 1214 (Colo. App. 2002).

Hearing required if custodial parent requests. Subsection (2) requires the trial court to hold a hearing if the custodial parent so requests. In re Seright, 649 P.2d 730 (Colo. App. 1982).

Filing of an opposing affidavit is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the right to require the holding of such a hearing. In re Seright, 649 P.2d 730 (Colo. App. 1982).

No time limitation for hearing request. This section does not specify any time limitation upon the abilities of the custodial parent to request a hearing. In re Seright, 649 P.2d 730 (Colo. App. 1982).

Denial of visitation rights held in the best interests of the children. Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783 (Colo. App. 1981).

Proceeding under article 4 of this title is a custody case for purposes of this section. F.H. v. K.L.M., 740 P.2d 1006 (Colo. App. 1987).

Dependency and neglect proceeding is a custody case for purposes of this section. People in Interest of J.W.W., 936 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1997).

Father did not have standing to argue the inadequacy of visitation rights of child's grandparents. In Interest of D.R.V., 885 P.2d 351 (Colo. App. 1994).

Grandmother lacked standing on the sole basis that the children did not reside with their father, who was never married to the children's mother, as the plain meaning of this section does not authorize the court to hear grandmother's petition unless there has been a judicial intervention into the marriage of the children's parents, a judicial placement of the children outside their family, or the death of the grandparent's child. In re D.C., 116 P.3d 1251 (Colo. App. 2005).

A paternity proceeding is a "child custody case" within the meaning of this section and, therefore, grants grandparent standing to seek visitation under the statute. Although paternity actions are not enumerated in this section, the statute has been construed to include paternity actions within its definition of a child custody case. In re K.L.O-V., 151 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2006).

"Great-grandmother" does not fall within the definition of "grandparent", therefore, great-grandmother lacked standing to seek visitation under this section. In re M.D.E., 2013 COA 13 , 297 P.3d 1058.

Mother may make determinations about the level of contact her children have with her own family without fear of court intervention when the children are in the care and custody of their mother, grandmother's daughter, and there has been no prior court intervention. In re D.C., 116 P.3d 1251 (Colo. App. 2005).

Visitation is primarily a right of the child and only secondarily a right of the visiting party. Conditions on visitation are within the sound discretion of the trial court, taking the best interests of the child into consideration. In re Oswald, 847 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1993).

Order under this section expressly allowing noncustodial grandparent to take children to church, contrary to wishes of custodial parent, was invalid and unconstitutional. In re Oswald, 847 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1993).

Because trial court made no findings concerning child's best interests, did not accord special weight to mother's visitation proposal nor address whether mother's proposal would fail to meet the child's interests, and made no findings supporting its order allowing grandparent to take child to Wyoming over mother's objections, the visitation issue must be redetermined. In re C.M., 74 P.3d 342 (Colo. App. 2002).

This section does not authorize an order impinging on custodial parent's rights under § 14-10-130. In re Oswald, 847 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1993).

The presumption giving custodial preference to biological parent need not be accorded to a legal guardian. In re M.G., 58 P.3d 1145 (Colo. App. 2002).

No irreconcilable conflict between subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c). The so-called "adoption exclusion" in subsection (1)(b) has been construed to apply only when a child becomes available for adoption because the natural parents' rights have been legally terminated. Thus, subsection (1)(b) creates an interim statutory right in favor of grandparents to visit grandchildren until placement of the child for adoption or entry of a final decree of adoption. Under subsection (1)(c), a grandparent may seek visitation even after an adoption if a parent is deceased. In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

Grandparents' visitation rights not subject to exclusion under subsection (1)(b). Exclusionary statutory phrase concerning a child for whom adoption is pending or final pertains only to situations in which legal custody is vested in someone other than child's natural parents or in which child is place out of the natural parents' home. In re Aragon, 764 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1988).

Grandparents' visitation rights not automatically terminated by adoption of child by natural parent's new spouse. Paternal grandparents' right to visitation with grandchild after dissolution of parents' marriage was not automatically divested when child was subsequently adopted by mother's new spouse. In re Aragon, 764 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1988).

Grandparents' visitation rights automatically terminate upon completion of adoption, regardless of whether adoption is by strangers or a natural relative. Thus, paternal grandparents' visitation rights terminated upon completion of adoption by maternal grandparents. People in Interest of N.S., 821 P.2d 931 (Colo. App. 1991).

Grandparent's visitation rights terminated and grandparent did not have standing to assert rights under this section where she did not seek to intervene in dependency and neglect proceeding and no order granting her leave to do so was entered by the trial court. People in Interest of J.W.W., 936 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1997).

Grandparent's visitation rights terminated and grandparent did not have standing in the relinquishment proceedings where the child had been placed for adoption with the family designated by the birth parents. Petition of B.D.G., 881 P.2d 375 (Colo. App. 1993).

Grandparent's visitation rights are lapsed, not terminated because of death of biological parents. In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

Adoptive parents and biological parents not treated differently when grandparents are allowed visitation rights of an adopted child unless a custody case has taken place. In re R.A., 66 P.3d 146 (Colo. App. 2002).

Marriage dissolved for purposes of subsection (1)(a) speaks to the marriage between persons who were parties to child custody case. In re Davisson, 797 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applicability of statute is not limited by parents' marital status at the time visitation motion is filed. In re Davisson, 797 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1990).

An administrative paternity proceeding is a child custody case within the meaning of subsection (1). People in Interest of A.M.B., 946 P.2d 607 (Colo. App. 1997).

This section does not confer an unconditional right to intervene in a paternity action under C.R.C.P. 24(a)(1) or as of right under 24(a)(2). Because the statute requires a grandparent to rebut the presumption that the parent's decision regarding visitation is in the child's best interest, it does not give rise to an absolute right to visitation. Because the statute does not vest a grandparent with an absolute right to visitation and issues concerning grandparent visitation are not inherent in a paternity action, there is no absolute or unconditional right for a grandparent to intervene in a paternity action. In re K.L.O-V., 151 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2006).

Subsection (3) does not authorize court to award attorney fees in all requests for grandparent visitation. Subsection (3) does not apply to initial requests for visitation; rather, it applies only when visitation rights have been established in a prior dissolution proceeding. In re Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1086 (Colo. App. 2010).

19-1-117.5. Disputes concerning grandparent or great-grandparent visitation.

Upon a verified motion by a grandparent or great-grandparent who has been granted visitation or upon the court's own motion alleging that the person with legal custody or parental responsibilities of the child as determined by a court pursuant to article 10 of title 14, C.R.S., with whom visitation has been granted is not complying with a grandparent or great-grandparent visitation order or schedule, the court shall determine from the verified motion, and response to the motion, if any, whether there has been or is likely to be a substantial and continuing noncompliance with the grandparent or great-grandparent visitation order or schedule and either:
1. Deny the motion, if there is an inadequate allegation; or
2. Set the matter for hearing with notice to the grandparent or great-grandparent and the person with legal custody or parental responsibilities of the child as determined by the court of the time and place of the hearing; or
3. Require said parties to seek mediation and report back to the court on the results of the mediation within sixty days. Mediation services shall be provided in accordance with section 13-22-305, C.R.S. At the end of the mediation period, the court may approve an agreement reached by the parties or shall set the matter for hearing.
After the hearing, if a court finds that the person with legal custody or parental responsibilities of the child as determined by the court has not complied with the visitation order or schedule and has violated the court order, the court, in the best interests of the child, may issue orders which may include but need not be limited to:
1. Imposing additional terms and conditions which are consistent with the court's previous order;
2. Modifying the previous order to meet the best interests of the child;
3. Requiring the violator to post bond or security to insure future compliance;
4. Requiring that makeup visitation be provided for the aggrieved grandparent or great-grandparent and child under the following conditions:
  1. That such visitation is of the same type and duration of visitation as that which was denied, including but not limited to visitation during weekends, on holidays, and on weekdays and during the summer;
  2. That such visitation is made up within one year after the noncompliance occurs;
  3. That such visitation is in the manner chosen by the aggrieved grandparent or great-grandparent if it is in the best interests of the child;
5. Finding the person who did not comply with the visitation schedule in contempt of court and imposing a fine or jail sentence;
6. Awarding to the aggrieved party, where appropriate, actual expenses, including attorney fees, court costs, and expenses incurred by a grandparent or great-grandparent because of the other person's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. Nothing in this section shall preclude a party's right to a separate and independent legal action in tort.

Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 262, § 4, effective May 31. L. 98: IP(1), (1)(b), and IP(2) amended, p. 1407, § 65, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2014: IP(1), (1)(b), IP(2)(d), (2)(d)(III), and (2)(f) amended, (HB 14-1362), ch. 374, p. 1788, § 3, effective June 6.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Parental Rights and Responsibilities of Grandparents and Third Parties", see 30 Colo. Law. 63 (May 2001).

A grandparent can possess visitation rights. Although the visitation rights of a grandparent are more limited than those of parents, they are still recognized by Colorado law. A limited right remains a right. Thus, a Colorado state court order of visitation rights vests a maternal grandmother with "parental rights" under the plain language of the federal International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA). Further, a grandparent with joint custody or sole custody as defined by state law also has "parental rights" under the IPKCA. U.S. v. Alahmad, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Colo. 1998) (decided under law in effect prior to the 1998 amendment), aff'd, 211 F.3d 538 (10th Cir. 2000).

19-1-117.6. Definitions. (Repealed)

Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 262, § 4, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 85, § 11, effective March 20.

19-1-117.7. Requests for placement - legal custody by grandparents.

Whenever a grandparent seeks the placement of his or her grandchild in the grandparent's home or seeks the legal custody of his or her grandchild pursuant to the provisions of this title, the court entering such order shall consider any credible evidence of the grandparent's past conduct of child abuse or neglect. Such evidence may include, but shall not be limited to, medical records, school records, police reports, information contained in records and reports of child abuse or neglect, and court records received by the court pursuant to section 19-1-307 (2)(f).

Source: L. 91: Entire section added, p. 262, § 4, effective May 31. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1401, § 6, effective January 1, 2004.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 196, Session Laws of Colorado 2003.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Parental Rights and Responsibilities of Grandparents and Third Parties", see 30 Colo. Law. 63 (May 2001).

19-1-118. Court records - inspection. (Repealed)

Source: L. 87: Entire title R&RE, p. 710, § 1, effective October 1. L. 89: (4) and (5) added, p. 914, § 1, effective July 1. L. 90: Entire section repealed, p. 1012, § 8, effective July 1.

19-1-119. Confidentiality of juvenile records - delinquency. (Repealed)

Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1007, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: IP(1)(a) amended and (1)(b.5) added, p. 205, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 932, § 2, effective May 28; (1)(a), (1)(b), and (2)(a) amended, p. 1547, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(a)(VII) amended, p. 969, § 5, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 453, § 4, effective July 1. L. 93, 1st Ex. Sess.: (1)(b.5) amended, p. 36, § 1, effective September 13. L. 94: (1)(b.5), IP(1)(c)(II), IP(2)(a), and (5) amended and (1)(b.7) added, p. 910, § 6, effective April 28; (1)(a)(X), (1)(a)(XIII)(A), (1)(c)(V), (2)(a)(X), (2)(a)(XIV)(A), and (6) amended, p. 2661, § 148, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(a)(XIV) added, p. 1585, § 8, effective July 1; entire section repealed, p. 1173, § 7, effective January 1, 1997.

Editor's note: This section was relocated to § 19-1-304 in 1997.

19-1-120. Confidentiality of records - dependency and neglect. (Repealed)

Source: L. 90: Entire section added, (2)(k) and (2)(k)(I) amended, and (2)(l) added, pp. 1009, 1031, 1845, §§ 2, 21, 27, effective July 1; (2)(j) amended, p. 1845, § 37, effective October 1. L. 91: (2)(k) amended and (2)(m) to (2)(o) and (2.5) added, pp. 221, 222, §§ 1, 2, effective May 24. L. 92: (2)(a) amended, p. 406, § 21, effective June 3; (2)(a) amended, p. 1103, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(k) and (2)(l) amended, p. 1779, § 42, effective June 6. L. 94: (2)(p) added, p. 2084, § 3, effective June 3; (2)(k), IP(2)(m), and (2)(o) amended, p. 2662, § 149, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(q) added and (2.5) amended, p. 1586, §§ 9, 10, effective July 1; entire section repealed, p. 1173, § 7, effective January 1, 1997.

Editor's note: This section was relocated to § 19-1-307 in 1997.

19-1-121. Confidentiality of records - "Uniform Parentage Act". (Repealed)

Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1011, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 1540, § 12, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1173, § 7, effective January 1, 1997.

Editor's note: This section was relocated to § 19-1-308 in 1997.

19-1-122. Confidentiality of records - relinquishments and adoptions. (Repealed)

Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1011, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 656, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1173, § 7, effective January 1, 1997.

Editor's note: This section was relocated to § 19-1-309 in 1997.

19-1-123. Expedited procedures for permanent placement - children under the age of six years - designated counties.

1. The expedited procedures for the permanent placement of children under the age of six years required by article 3 of this title 19 must be implemented on a county-by-county basis beginning July 1, 1994. The state department of human services, in consultation with the judicial department and the governing boards of each county department of human or social services, shall have the responsibility for establishing an implementation schedule that provides for statewide implementation of such expedited procedures by June 30, 2004. A designated county is required to implement the expedited procedures on and after the implementation date applicable to the county as specified in the implementation schedule for each new case filed in the county involving a child who is under six years of age at the time a petition is filed in accordance with section 19-3-501 (2) .
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 73 , § 1, effective March 10, 2000.)
1. The implementation of expedited procedures in additional counties shall be subject to specific appropriation by the general assembly or by determination by a county that no additional resources are needed.
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 193 , § 6, effective August 4, 2004.)

Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 2052, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (2)(a) amended, p. 730, § 17, effective May 18. L. 2000: (1)(b) and (2)(a) amended, p. 73, § 1, effective March 10. L. 2004: (2) amended, p. 193, § 6, effective August 4. L. 2018: (1)(a) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 409, § 32, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Where trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent's conduct or condition is unlikely to change and parent has not therefore been adversely affected by decrease in time to comply with a treatment plan, parent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of this section under the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and art. II, § 25, Colo. Const., as discriminatory based upon county-by-county adoption of the section. People in Interest of R.J.A., 994 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1999).

The policies underlying both the expedited procedures and sibling group preference do not permit the application of the shorter incarceration period so as to terminate parental rights concerning an older child whose parent is subject to the longer incarceration period. The termination of parental rights concerning the older child must still be subject to the longer allowable incarceration period. People ex rel. T.M., 240 P.3d 542 (Colo. App. 2010).

19-1-124. Providers of children's services using federal or state moneys - use of state accounting standards.

In order to ensure financial accountability, on and after July 1, 1997, all service providers receiving federal or state moneys through the state for the provision of services to children, youth, and families pursuant to this title shall use the accounting standards of the governmental accounting standards board.

Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 1155, § 5, effective January 1, 1997.

19-1-125. Family stabilization services.

It is the intent of the general assembly to assist in the provision of appropriate and necessary short-term services to help stabilize families that are at risk of having their children placed in out-of-home placement when those families voluntarily request such services. It is further the intent of the general assembly that county departments provide for family stabilization services through contracts with private or nonprofit organizations or entities whenever possible.
Repealed.
County departments shall use any moneys allocated pursuant to this section to provide for family stabilization services, defined by rule of the state board of human services, that may include but not be limited to:
1. Less than twenty-four-hour respite care for parents and children;
2. In-home services that may include kinship care and counseling; or
3. Services that assist the family to reintegrate following a separation or out-of-home placement.

Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 739, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2002: (1) and (2) amended, p. 528, § 2, effective May 24. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 386, § 1, effective March 5. L. 2004: (2)(d) added, p. 1555, § 3, effective May 28.

Editor's note: Subsection (2)(d)(I) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2004, p. 1555 .)

19-1-126. Compliance with the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act".

In each case filed pursuant to this title 19 that constitutes a child custody proceeding, as defined in the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act", 25 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq., and therefore to which the terms of the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act", 25 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq., apply, the court and each party to the proceeding shall comply with the federal implementing regulations, and any modifications thereof, of the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act", 25 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq., located in 25 CFR 23, which outline the minimum federal standards governing the implementation of the "Indian Child Welfare Act" to ensure the statute is applied in Colorado consistent with the act's express language, congress's intent in enacting the statute, and to promote the stability and security of Indian children, tribes, and families. In each child-custody proceeding filed pursuant to this title 19 to which the terms of the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act", 25 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq., apply:
1. 1. The court shall make inquiries to determine whether the child who is the subject of the proceeding is an Indian child, and, if so, shall determine the identity of the Indian child's tribe. In determining the Indian child's tribe:
    1. The court shall ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The inquiry is to be made at the commencement of the proceeding, and all responses must be on the record. The court shall instruct the participants to inform the court if any participant subsequently receives information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.
    2. Any party to the proceeding shall disclose any information indicating that the child is an Indian child or provide an identification card indicating membership in a tribe to the petitioning and filing parties and the court in a timely manner. The court shall order the party to provide the information no later than seven business days after the date of the hearing or prior to the next hearing on the matter, whichever occurs first. The information should be filed with the court and provided to the county department of human or social services and each party no later than seven business days after the date of the hearing.
  2. The court, upon conducting the inquiry described in subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section, has reason to know that a child is an Indian child if:
    1. Any participant in the child-custody proceeding, officer of the court involved in the child-custody proceeding, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child;
    2. Any participant in the child-custody proceeding, officer of the court involved in the child-custody proceeding, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child;
    3. The child who is the subject of the child-custody proceeding gives the court reason to know he or she is an Indian child;
    4. The court is informed that the domicile or residence of the child, the child's parent, or the child's Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska native village;
    5. The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, as defined in 25 U.S.C. sec. 1903; or
    6. The court is informed that the child or the child's parent possesses an identification card indicating membership in an Indian tribe.
2. If the court knows or has reason to know, as defined in subsection (1)(a)(II) of this section, that the child who is the subject of the proceeding is an Indian child, the petitioning or filing party shall send notice by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the parent or parents, the Indian custodian or Indian custodians of the child and to the tribal agent of the Indian child's tribe as designated in 25 CFR 23, or, if there is no designated tribal agent, the petitioning or filing party shall contact the tribe to be directed to the appropriate office or individual. In providing notice, the court and each party shall comply with 25 CFR 23.111.
3. The petitioning or filing party shall disclose in the complaint, petition, or other commencing pleading filed with the court that the child who is the subject of the proceeding is an Indian child and the identity of the Indian child's tribe or what efforts the petitioning or filing party has made in determining whether the child is an Indian child. If the child who is the subject of the proceeding is determined to be an Indian child, the petitioning or filing party shall further identify what reasonable efforts have been made to send notice to the persons identified in subsection (1)(b) of this section. The postal receipts indicating that notice was properly sent by the petitioning or filing party to the parent or Indian custodian of the Indian child and to the Indian child's tribe must be attached to the complaint, petition, or other commencing pleading filed with the court; except that, if notification has not been perfected at the time the initial complaint, petition, or other commencing pleading is filed with the court or if the postal receipts have not been received back from the post office, the petitioning or filing party shall file the postal receipts with the court. Any responses sent by the tribal agents to the petitioning or filing party, the county department of human or social services, or the court must be distributed to the parties and deposited with the court.
If there is reason to know the child is an Indian child but the court does not have sufficient evidence to determine that the child is or is not an Indian child, the court shall:
1. Confirm, by way of a report, declaration, or testimony included in the record, that the petitioning or filing party used due diligence to identify and work with all of the tribes of which there is reason to know the child may be a member, or eligible for membership, to verify whether the child is in fact a member, or a biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for membership; and
2. Treat the child as an Indian child, unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an Indian child.
If the court receives information that the child may have Indian heritage but does not have sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(II) of this section, the court shall direct the petitioning or filing party to exercise due diligence in gathering additional information that would assist the court in determining whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall direct the petitioning or filing party to make a record of the effort taken to determine whether or not there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.
If the court finds that the child is an Indian child, the court shall ensure compliance with the requirements of the federal "Indian Child Welfare Act", 25 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq.

Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 784, § 3, effective May 30. L. 2018: (3) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 410, § 33, effective August 8. L. 2019: Entire section amended, (HB 19-1232), ch. 305, p. 2791, § 2, effective May 28.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 217, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018. For the legislative declaration in HB 19-1232, see section 1 of chapter 305, Session Laws of Colorado 2019.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Moves Toward Full Compliance With Federal Indian Child Welfare Act", see 31 Colo. Law. 77 (Nov. 2002). For article, "Finding the Indian Child Welfare Act in Unexpected Places: Applicability in Private Non-Parent Custody Actions", see 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1119 (2010). For article, "New ICWA Regulations Promote Tribal Sovereignty and Culture for Native American Children", see 46 Colo. Law. 41 (Apr. 2017). For article, "ICWA on Appeal: New Challenges and New Approaches" see 49 Colo. Law. 8 (Jan. 2020).

Reasonable grounds to believe that a child is an Indian child must depend upon the totality of the circumstances. In light of the purpose of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), however, to permit tribal involvement in child-custody determinations whenever tribal members are involved, the threshold requirement for notice is clearly not intended to be high. B.H. v. People ex rel. X.H., 138 P.3d 299 (Colo. 2006).

Even if a trial court inquires at an initial temporary custody hearing at the commencement of a dependency and neglect proceeding whether there is a reason to know that the child is an Indian child, it must make another inquiry when termination is sought if the court has not already identified the child as an Indian child and the petitioning party has not disclosed what efforts it has made to determine if the child is an Indian child. People in Interest of C.A., 2017 COA 135 , 417 P.3d 909.

Where caseworker knew that child would be able to enroll in a tribe if mother enrolled, this knowledge is sufficient to warrant notice to the tribe of a motion to terminate parental rights. The state's obligation to notify potentially concerned tribes necessarily arises prior to an ultimate determination of the child's Indian status. As long as there is sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which membership might be based, there is adequate information to trigger the notice provisions of the federal ICWA. People ex rel. S.R.M., 153 P.3d 438 (Colo. App. 2006).

Department of human services must file notices or return receipt cards with the court even if the status of the minor child as an Indian child pursuant to the federal ICWA is undetermined. Failure to file notices or return receipts was not harmless error because department had relevant facts about the child, and it was not possible to determine from the record whether those facts were shared with the tribe. People ex rel. N.D.C., 210 P.3d 494 (Colo. App. 2009).

Father's failure to timely return assessment form did not eliminate the duty of notice and further inquiry under subsection (1)(a). People ex rel. J.O., 170 P.3d 840 (Colo. App. 2007).

Waiver of notice. Tribe does not waive right to intervene, or corresponding right to receive notice, unless it explicitly states that it will not intervene. People ex rel. S.R.M., 153 P.3d 438 (Colo. App. 2006); People ex rel. T.M.W., 208 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2009).

Court may not rely on notice given to tribe concerning sibling. Notice was insufficient where court relied on notice given to tribe concerning a sibling to determine another child's membership in, or eligibility to enroll in, the tribe. Although the siblings had the same parents, determination of tribal membership is made on an individual basis and tribe is free to change enrollment criteria at any time. People ex rel. T.M.W., 208 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2009).

Notice requirement of the federal ICWA not sufficiently complied with. People ex rel. J.O., 170 P.3d 840 (Colo. App. 2007); People ex rel. N.D.C., 210 P.3d 494 (Colo. App. 2009); People ex rel. E.C., 259 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010); People in Interest of L.L., 2017 COA 38 , 395 P.3d 1209.

Notice under the federal ICWA not required when court had no reason to know or believe that child had possible Indian ancestry because mother failed to provide information in that regard during termination proceedings. People ex rel. J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2011).

The federal ICWA does not set forth any different standard of proof for an adjudicatory hearing in a dependency and neglect proceeding. The state need only prove the allegations set forth in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence in all adjudications, regardless of heritage. People in Interest of L.L., 2017 COA 38 , 395 P.3d 1209.

Trial court erred in using the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in termination hearing because, on the date of the termination hearing, the court could not conclude that the child was an Indian child within the meaning of the federal ICWA. More than 10 days had passed since notice was made to tribes and at least two tribes had responded that the child was not eligible for enrollment. Further, no tribe indicated the child was an Indian child. Although mother provided the department with the child's grandfather's death certificate, and the department had the obligation to make continuing efforts to determine whether the child is an Indian child, the mother should have sought a continuance to require the department to send proper notice based upon information in its possession. Because no tribe responded within the statutory time frame stating that the child was an Indian child within the meaning of the federal ICWA, the trial court was required to apply the clear and convincing burden of proof at the termination hearing. People ex rel. L.O.L., 197 P.3d 291 (Colo. App. 2008).

Juvenile court erred in denying tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction and entertaining former foster parents' opposition to the transfer. Plain language of the Children's Code applies transfer of jurisdiction requests to pre-adoptive and adoptive placement proceedings and places burden of proof on the party opposing transfer, who in this case lacked standing to oppose motion. People in Interest of L.R.B., 2019 COA 85 , __ P.3d __ (decided prior to 2019 amendment).

Inquiries related to the federal ICWA in a prior case involving the same child(ren) and same parent(s) does not nullify the court's or a department of human or social services' obligation to conduct "continuing inquiries" in a subsequent new case. People in Interest of A.D., 2017 COA 61 , 413 P.3d 290.

The federal ICWA's "active efforts" standard requires more than the "reasonable efforts" standard in non-ICWA cases (§ 19-3-604 ). People ex rel. A.R., 2012 COA 195 M, 310 P.3d 1007.

By expressly defining the term "parent" in the federal ICWA, Congress expressed its intention that the term is not subject to definition by state courts. In re Stockwell, 2019 COA 96 , 446 P.3d 957.

Therefore, even though father was the minor's "legal father" under state law, he was not the minor's "parent" for purposes of the federal ICWA. In re Stockwell, 2019 COA 96 , 446 P.3d 957.

If a person is not a "parent" under the federal ICWA, then an allocation of parental responsibilities becomes a foster care placement and a child custody placement under the federal ICWA. In re Stockwell, 2019 COA 96 , 446 P.3d 957.

Applied in In re People ex rel. A.R.Y.-M., 230 P.3d 1259 (Colo. App. 2010); People in Interest of L.H., 2018 COA 27 , 431 P.3d 663; People in Interest of K.R., 2020 COA 35 , 463 P.3d 336.

19-1-127. Responsibility for placement and care.

"Responsibility for placement and care", for purposes of compliance with federal requirements pursuant to the federal "Social Security Act", 42 U.S.C. sec. 672 (2), means the specified entity is considered to have the responsibility for placement and care of a child if:
1. A county department of human or social services has entered into a voluntary placement agreement with the parent or guardian of the child;
2. A court, as a result of a petition for review of need of placement, has determined that a county department of human or social services shall have continuing placement and care responsibility of the child who entered care pursuant to a voluntary placement;
3. A court has awarded legal custody of the child to a county department of human or social services, or has committed the child to the custody of the state department of human services; or
4. An agency, such as a tribal agency, with which the state department of human services has a contract pursuant to the federal "Social Security Act", has placement and care responsibility of the child pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement or a court order awarding custody of the child to the agency.

Source: L. 2006: Entire section added, p. 507, § 2, effective April 18. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 410, § 34, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

19-1-128. Foster care sibling visits - rules. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2019: Entire section repealed, (HB 19-1288), ch. 216, p. 2238, § 3, effective August 2.

Editor's note: This section was relocated to § 19-7-204 in 2019.

19-1-129. Department - research authorized - prenatal substance exposure - newborn and family outcomes - report.

The state department of human services may conduct research as related to the definition of "abuse" in section 19-1-103 concerning the incidence of prenatal substance exposure and related newborn and family health and human services outcomes as the result of a mother's lawful and unlawful intake of controlled substances.
Beginning in January 2021 and every two years thereafter, the state department of human services shall report the outcomes of any research conducted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the joint health committees of the general assembly as part of its "State Measurement for Accountable, Responsive, and Transparent (SMART) Government Act" presentation required by section 2-7-203.

Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (SB 19-228), ch. 276, p. 2603, § 6, effective May 23. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1048, § 35, effective June 30.

19-1-130. Access to services related to out-of-home placement - definitions.

As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Gender expression" means a person's way of reflecting and expressing their gender to the outside world, typically demonstrated through appearance, dress, and behavior.
2. "Gender identity" means a person's innate sense of the person's own gender, which may or may not correspond with the person's sex as assigned at birth.
3. "Placement-related service" means any program, benefit, or service related to out-of-home placement, including adoption, kinship care, foster care homes, and private child placement, or a benefit or service described in title 26 that is related to out-of-home placement, provided by the state department of human services, a county department of human or social services, a child placement agency, or any other such entity, or a contractor or subcontractor that provides such program, benefit, or service on behalf of the state department of human services, a county department of human or social services, a child placement agency, or any other such entity. Placement-related services may include, but are not limited to, pursuing adoption or any other child placement; providing early intervention services, out-of-home placement prevention services, or family preservation services; or any service related to licensing or training for child care centers, adoptive or foster parents, or kinship care. The state department of human services, a county department of human or social services, a child placement agency, or any other such entity is not required to contract with or access a placement-related service outside the current placement-related services that are utilized by that specific entity.
4. "Service provider" means the state department of human services, a county department of human or social services, or a child placement agency. "Service provider" includes a contractor or subcontractor that provides placement-related services on a service provider's behalf.
A service provider that receives state money to provide placement-related services shall provide to each individual, family, or other service provider requesting services, including a service provider under investigation by the state department of human services or its designee for a violation of this section, fair and equal access to all available placement-related services offered by the service provider. Service providers that provide specialized placement-related services to specific populations are not required to provide services outside the scope of their specialized service or their specific population if the specialization serves a specific treatment-related purpose.
In addition to any restrictions set forth in section 24-34-805 (2)(b), a service provider that receives state money to provide placement-related services shall not:
1. Deny any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent solely on the basis of a real or perceived disability, race, creed, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, or any communicable disease, including HIV, of the person or a member of the person's household. Any denial to care for a specific child or youth that includes one of these factors as the basis for the denial must be documented, must have a clear nexus to the ability to meet the needs of the child or youth, and the denial to care must not be detrimental to the health or welfare of the child or youth.
2. Delay or deny the placement of a child or youth for adoption or into foster care on the basis of a real or perceived disability, race, creed, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, national origin, ancestry, or any communicable disease, including HIV, of the child or youth, unless the delay or denial of the placement is not detrimental to the health or welfare of the child or youth;
3. Require different or additional screenings, processes, or procedures for adoptive or foster placement decisions solely on the basis of the following, unless such screenings, processes, or procedures are necessary to determine if the placement is detrimental to the health or welfare of the child or youth:
  1. A real or perceived disability, race, creed, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, or any communicable disease, including HIV, of the prospective adoptive or foster parent; or
  2. A real or perceived disability, race, creed, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, national origin, ancestry, or any communicable disease, including HIV, of the child or youth involved; or
4. Subject a child or youth in foster care or an individual, family, or other service provider to discrimination or harassment on the basis of actual or perceived disability, race, creed, religion, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, or any communicable disease, including HIV, when providing any placement-related service.
1. A service provider shall provide placement-related services in a manner that is culturally responsive to the complex social identity of the individual receiving such services. Complex social identities include but are not limited to race, ethnicity, nationality, age, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, socioeconomic status, physical or cognitive ability, language, beliefs, values, behavior patterns, and customs. Nothing in this subsection (4) may be used to cause the delay or denial of an out-of-home placement of a child or youth, unless the delay or denial of the placement is not detrimental to the health or welfare of the child or youth.
2. The state department of human services shall determine whether placement-related services are provided in a manner that is culturally responsive to the complex social identity of the individual receiving such services.
Nothing in this section diminishes the protections afforded to a parent, prospective parent, child or youth with a disability, as described in sections 19-3-208, 19-5-100.2, and 24-34-805.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1072), ch. 43, p. 182, § 1, effective April 19.

PART 2 COURT-APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATE PROGRAM

Law reviews: For article "CASA--A Powerful Voice for a Child", see 36 Colo. Law. 97 (Oct. 2007).

19-1-201. Legislative intent.

1. The general assembly hereby finds and declares that quality representation for children requires legal expertise and thorough case monitoring.
2. The work of community volunteers has been proven to be effective in addressing the needs of children. Partnerships between guardians ad litem and community volunteers can enhance the quality of representation for children.
3. The general assembly further finds and declares that the state should promote volunteerism and the exercise of responsible citizenship to enable members of local communities to become advocates for children.
Therefore, the general assembly hereby authorizes the creation of volunteer court-appointed special advocate (CASA) programs in order to enhance the quality of representation of children.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1090, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 754, § 5, effective March 25.

19-1-202. Creation of CASA programs.

CASA programs may be established in each judicial district or any two or more judicial districts and shall operate pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the chief judge of the judicial district and the CASA program. The memorandum of understanding must identify the roles and responsibilities of any CASA volunteer appointed in the judicial district or districts and must indicate whether any CASA volunteer may be made a party to the action. The memorandum of understanding may be amended or modified at any time to add or delete roles and responsibilities pursuant to this part 2.
A CASA program established pursuant to the provisions of this part 2 must:
1. Be a community organization that screens, trains, and supervises CASA volunteers to advocate for the best interests of children in actions brought pursuant to this title and titles 14 and 15, C.R.S., or for a child in a truancy proceeding pursuant to the "School Attendance Law of 1963", part 1 of article 33 of title 22, C.R.S.;
2. Be a member in good standing of the Colorado CASA association and the national CASA association and adhere to the guidelines established by those associations;
3. Appoint a program director who shall have the responsibilities set forth in section 19-1-203;
4. Have adequate supervisory and support staff who shall be easily accessible, hold regular case conferences with CASA volunteers to review case progress, and conduct annual performance reviews for all CASA volunteers;
5. Provide staff and CASA volunteers with written program policies, practices, and procedures;
6. Provide the training required pursuant to section 19-1-204; and
7. Attempt to maintain a CASA volunteer-to-supervisor ratio of thirty-to-one.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1090, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2008: (1) amended, p. 30, § 1, effective March 13. L. 2015: (1), IP(2), and (2)(a) amended, (SB 15-004), ch. 254, p. 925, § 1, effective August 5.

19-1-203. Program director.

The program director shall be responsible for the administration of the CASA program, including recruitment, selection, training, and supervision and evaluation of staff and CASA volunteers.
The program director shall serve as a professional liaison between the court and community agencies serving children.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1091, § 4, effective May 23.

19-1-204. Training requirements.

All CASA volunteers shall participate fully in preservice training, including instruction on recognizing child abuse and neglect, cultural awareness, child development, education standards, the juvenile court process, permanency planning, volunteer roles and responsibilities, advocacy, information gathering, and documentation. CASA volunteers shall be required to participate in observation of court proceedings prior to appointment.
All CASA volunteers shall receive a training manual that shall include guidelines for their service and duties.
Each CASA program shall provide a minimum of ten hours of in-service training per year to CASA volunteers.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1091, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2015: (1) amended, (SB 15-004), ch. 254, p. 926, § 2, effective August 5.

19-1-205. Selection of CASA volunteers.

Each CASA program shall adopt regulations consistent with subsection (2) of this section and with the Colorado CASA association and national CASA association guidelines governing qualifications and selection of CASA volunteers. Each CASA program's regulations shall include provisions that qualified adults shall not be discriminated against based on gender, socioeconomic, religious, racial, ethnic, or age factors.
The minimum qualifications for any prospective CASA volunteer are that he or she shall:
1. Be at least twenty-one years of age or older and have demonstrated an interest in children and their welfare;
2. Be willing to commit to the court for a minimum of one year of service to a child;
3. Complete an application, including providing background information required pursuant to subsection (3) of this section;
4. Participate in a screening interview;
5. Participate in the training required pursuant to section 19-1-204; and
6. Meet other qualifications as determined by the CASA program director and the chief judge of the judicial district.
A prospective CASA volunteer's application shall include:
1. A copy of any criminal history record and motor vehicle record;
2. Written authorization for the CASA program to obtain information contained in any records or reports of child abuse or neglect concerning the prospective CASA volunteer;
3. At least three references who can address his or her character, judgment, and suitability for the position; and
4. Records from any other jurisdictions in which he or she resided during the one-year time period prior to the date of the application if the prospective CASA volunteer has resided in the state of Colorado for less than twelve months.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1091, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2003: (3)(a) amended and (3)(a.5) added, p. 1401, § 7, effective January 1, 2004.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsection (3)(a) and enacting subsection (3)(a.5), see section 1 of chapter 196, Session Laws of Colorado 2003.

19-1-206. Appointment of CASA volunteers.

1. A judge or magistrate may appoint a CASA volunteer in any action brought pursuant to this title and titles 14 and 15, C.R.S., when, in the opinion of the judge or magistrate, a child who may be affected by such action requires services that a CASA volunteer can provide. At the discretion of the judge or magistrate, a CASA volunteer may be a party to the action if so provided for in the memorandum of understanding.
2. A judge or magistrate may appoint a CASA volunteer in any action brought in a proceeding pursuant to the "School Attendance Law of 1963", part 1 of article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., provided that at least one parent or legal guardian of the child involved is provided with notice of the appointment of a CASA volunteer.
A CASA volunteer shall be appointed at the earliest stages of an action pursuant to a court order that gives him or her the authority to review all relevant documents and interview all parties involved in the case, including parents, other parties in interest, and any other persons having significant information relating to the child.
The CASA volunteer's appointment concludes:
1. When the court's jurisdiction over the child terminates; or
2. Upon discharge by the court on its own motion or at the request of the program director of the CASA program to which the CASA volunteer is assigned.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1092, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2015: (1) and IP(3) amended, (SB 15-004), ch. 254, p. 926, § 3, effective August 5.

19-1-207. Restrictions.

A CASA volunteer shall not:
1. Accept any compensation for the duties and responsibilities of his or her appointment;
2. Have any association that creates a conflict of interest with his or her duties;
3. Be related to any party or attorney involved in a case;
4. Be employed in a position that could result in a conflict of interest or give rise to the appearance of a conflict;
5. Use the CASA volunteer position to seek or accept gifts or special privileges.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1093, § 4, effective May 23.

19-1-208. Duties of CASA volunteer.

Independent case investigation. Upon appointment in an action, a CASA volunteer may:
1. Conduct an independent investigation regarding the best interests of the child that will provide factual information to the court regarding the child and the child's family. The investigation shall include interviews with and observations of the child, interviews with other appropriate individuals, and the review of relevant records and reports.
2. Determine if an appropriate treatment plan, as described in section 19-1-103, has been created for the child, whether appropriate services are being provided to the child and family, and whether the treatment plan is progressing in a timely manner;
3. Determine if additional services are necessary to ensure educational success for a child in a proceeding pursuant to the "School Attendance Law of 1963", part 1 of article 33 of title 22, C.R.S.
Recommendations. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the CASA volunteer, with the support and supervision of the CASA program staff, shall make recommendations consistent with the best interests of the child regarding placement, visitation, and appropriate services for the child and family and shall prepare a written report to be distributed to the parties of the action.
Reports. The CASA volunteer shall assure that the child's best interests are being advocated at every stage of the case and prepare written reports to be distributed to the parties of the action.
Case monitoring. The CASA volunteer shall monitor the case to which he or she has been appointed to assure that the child's essential needs are being met and that the terms of the court's orders have been fulfilled in an appropriate and timely manner.
Witness. The CASA volunteer may be called as a witness in an action by any party or the court and may request of the court the opportunity to appear as a witness.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1093, § 4, effective May 23. L. 98: (1)(b) amended, p. 821, § 24, effective August 5. L. 2015: (1)(c) added, (SB 15-004), ch. 254, p. 926, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2021: IP(1) and (1)(b) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 729, § 68, effective October 1.

19-1-209. Role and responsibilities of guardians ad litem - other parties.

1. Any guardian ad litem, and all state and local agencies, departments, authorities, and institutions shall cooperate and share information with any CASA volunteer appointed to serve on a case and with each local CASA program to facilitate the implementation of its program.
2. The CASA program will help facilitate the cooperation and sharing of information among CASA volunteers, the attorneys, the county department of human or social services, and other community agencies.
In any case in which the court has appointed both a CASA volunteer and a guardian ad litem, the CASA volunteer and the guardian ad litem shall cooperate to represent the best interests of the child.
The CASA volunteer shall be notified of hearings, staffings, meetings, and any other proceedings concerning the case to which he or she has been appointed.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2018: (1)(b) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 410, § 35, effective August 8.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

19-1-210. Access to information.

Upon appointment of a CASA volunteer, the court shall issue an order authorizing access to such records and other information relating to the child, parent, legal guardian, or other parties in interest as the court deems necessary.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 4, effective May 23.

19-1-211. Confidentiality.

A CASA volunteer shall not disclose the contents of any document, record, or other information relating to a case to which the CASA volunteer has access in the course of an investigation. All such information shall be considered confidential and shall not be disclosed to persons other than the court and parties to the action.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 4, effective May 23.

19-1-212. Liability.

CASA program directors and volunteers participating in a CASA program shall have the same civil immunity and liability as described in sections 13-21-115.5 and 13-21-115.7, C.R.S.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added, p. 1094, § 4, effective May 23.

19-1-213. State CASA entity - duties - state court administrator duties - state court-appointed special advocate fund - definitions.

For the purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Local CASA program" means a CASA program established in a judicial district, or any two or more judicial districts, pursuant to section 19-1-202.
2. "Office of the child's representative" means the office of the child's representative created in section 13-91-104.
3. "State CASA entity" means the nonprofit entity that has entered into a contract with the office of the child's representative as described in subsection (2) of this section.
The office of the child's representative shall contract with a nonprofit entity that is in good standing with the national CASA association to enhance the CASA program in Colorado. The state CASA entity shall:
1. Aid and develop local CASA programs in each judicial district or in adjacent judicial districts;
2. Ensure that local CASA programs adhere to state and national CASA standards;
3. Ensure the provision and availability of high-quality accessible training for local CASA programs and volunteers;
4. Seek to enhance existing funding sources, develop private-public partnership funding, and study the availability of new funding sources for the provision of high-quality local CASA programs in each judicial district or in adjacent judicial districts.
Beginning July 1, 2019, and at least annually thereafter, the office of the child's representative shall allocate money appropriated to the state judicial department for CASA programs to the state CASA entity for allocation to local CASA programs. The state CASA entity shall report to the office of the child's representative regarding its duties described in subsection (2) of this section within one month before receiving an allocation.
The state CASA entity, in consultation with local CASA programs, shall annually establish a formula for the allocation of money appropriated and shall allocate money to the local CASA programs in accordance with the established allocation formula. The allocation formula must be provided to the office of the child's representative no later than June 15, 2019, and each June 15 thereafter, prior to the state CASA entity receiving its annual allocation. On a schedule described in the contract, but at least annually, the state CASA entity shall provide to the office of the child's representative a certification from each local CASA program of the amount that program received from each allocation since the prior certification.
On or before November 1, 2020, and on or before November 1 each year thereafter, the state CASA entity shall report its activities and the activities of each local CASA program to the office of the child's representative.
1. The state court-appointed special advocate fund, referred to in this subsection (6) as the "fund", is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money credited to the fund pursuant to subsection (6)(b) of this section and any other money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the fund. The money in the fund is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the state judicial department for the purposes of funding local CASA programs established in each judicial district, or in adjacent judicial districts, pursuant to this part 2, and the enhancement of local CASA programs. Any money not appropriated remains in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.
2. The office of the child's representative may seek, accept, and expend gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources to fund the work of the state CASA entity. The office of the child's representative shall transmit all money received through gifts, grants, or donations to the state treasurer, who shall credit the money to the fund.

Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1282), ch. 312, p. 2813, § 1, effective May 28.

PART 3 RECORDS AND INFORMATION

Editor's note: This part 3 was added with relocations in 1996, effective January 1, 1997. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.

19-1-301. Short title.

This part 3 shall be known and may be cited as the "Children's Code Records and Information Act".

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1156, § 6, effective January 1, 1997.

19-1-302. Legislative declaration.

1. The general assembly declares that information obtained by public agencies in the course of performing their duties and functions under this title is considered public information under the "Colorado Open Records Act", part 2 of article 72 of title 24, C.R.S. The general assembly, however, recognizes that certain information obtained in the course of the implementation of this title is highly sensitive and has an impact on the privacy of children and members of their families. The disclosure of sensitive information carries the risk of stigmatizing children; however, absolute confidentiality of such information may result in duplicated services in some cases, fragmented services in others, and the delivery of ineffective and costly programs and, in some situations, may put other members of the public at risk of harm. In addition, disclosure may result in serving the best interests of the child and may be in the public interest.
2. Furthermore, the general assembly specifically finds that schools, school districts, and criminal justice agencies attempting to protect children and the public are often frustrated by their lack of ability to exchange information concerning disruptive children who may have experienced disciplinary actions at school or whose actions outside of a school setting may have resulted in contact with local law enforcement. The general assembly finds that schools, school districts, and criminal justice agencies are often better able to assist such disruptive children and to preserve school safety when they are equipped with knowledge concerning a child's history and experiences. The general assembly, however, recognizes that any such sharing of information among and between schools, school districts, and agencies to promote school safety or otherwise to assist disruptive children mandates an awareness of the responsibility on the part of those schools, school districts, and agencies receiving or providing the information that it be used only for its intended and limited purpose as authorized by law and that the confidential nature of the information be preserved. The general assembly finds, therefore, that it is desirable to authorize and encourage open communication among appropriate agencies, including criminal justice agencies, assessment centers for children, school districts, and schools, in order to assist disruptive children and to maintain safe schools.
3. The general assembly further finds that partners in multi-agency assessment centers for children are often frustrated by their lack of ability to exchange information with each other when attempting to serve children and the public. The general assembly finds that assessment centers for children are better able to assist children when they are equipped with knowledge concerning a child's history and experiences. The general assembly, however, recognizes that any such sharing of information among agencies who are part of a multi-agency assessment center for children mandates an awareness of the responsibility on the part of the agencies receiving or providing the information that it be used only for its intended and limited purpose as authorized by law and that the confidential nature of the information be preserved.
4. The general assembly recognizes the importance of children receiving support from all responsible parties and further finds that the state child support enforcement agency and the delegate child support enforcement units have a need to exchange information with other state, federal, and local agencies in order to effectively locate responsible parties; establish paternity and child support, including child support debt pursuant to section 14-14-104, C.R.S.; enforce support orders; disburse collected child support payments; and facilitate the efficient and effective delivery of services under articles 13 and 13.5 of title 26, C.R.S. Therefore, the general assembly recognizes that the state child support enforcement agency and the delegate child support enforcement units need access to the records and databases of the judicial department, the contents of which are otherwise protected under the provisions of this part 3. The general assembly, however, recognizes that any such information sharing mandates an awareness of responsibility on the part of the state child support enforcement agency and the delegate child support enforcement units receiving information that it be used only for its intended purposes as authorized by law and in accordance with the provisions of section 26-13-102.7, C.R.S., and that the confidential nature of the information be preserved.
5. The general assembly recognizes the need to make recommendations to the court concerning the many aspects of a child's legal status, including but not limited to existing court orders on placement of the child, legal custody of the child, and orders of protection. Because the population of this state is transitory, and jurisdictional lines for the purpose of court actions are arbitrary, communication of certain information available electronically on a statewide basis may assist state and county agencies, attorneys representing state or county agencies, and attorneys appointed by the court in making recommendations to the court. The general assembly recognizes that any such sharing of information among agencies, attorneys representing agencies, and attorneys appointed by the court mandates an awareness of the responsibility on the part of these agencies, attorneys representing agencies, and attorneys appointed by the court in receiving and providing the information that it be used only for its intended and limited purpose as authorized by law and that the confidential nature of the information be preserved.
6. 1. The general assembly further recognizes the need for the command authority of military installations under the United States secretary of defense to receive notice and information regarding any report that is assigned for an assessment by the state department of human services or a county department of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect in which the person having care of the child in question is a member of the armed forces or a spouse, or a significant other or family member residing in the home of the member of the armed forces. The general assembly recognizes the need for the state department of human services and county departments to collect information concerning the military affiliation of the individual having custody or control of a child who is the subject of an investigation of child abuse or neglect.
  2. To further the fulfillment of these needs, the state department of human services and county departments should be able to enter into memorandums of understanding with the command authority of military installations. The memorandums of understanding may establish protocols for the sharing of information related to assessments of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect and for collaboration on the oversight of child abuse or neglect investigations involving a member of the armed forces or a spouse, or a significant other or family member residing in the home of the member of the armed forces.
  3. The general assembly, however, recognizes that any sharing of such information is critical for an awareness of the responsibility of the involved agencies and military installations that receive or provide the information that it be used only for its intended and limited purpose as authorized by law and that the confidential nature of the information must be preserved.
  4. The general assembly finds, therefore, that it is desirable to authorize and encourage open communication between the state department of human services, county departments, and command authority of military installations to better serve children and families of Colorado.
Therefore, in an effort to balance the best interests of children and the privacy interests of children and their families with the need to share information among service agencies and schools and the need to protect the safety of schools and the public at large, the general assembly enacts the provisions of this part 3.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1156, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 314, § 1, effective April 7. L. 2003: (1)(d) added, p. 1266, § 55, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1)(e) added, p. 1241, § 3, effective August 5. L. 2009: (1)(a) amended, (SB 09-292), ch. 369, p. 1949, § 35, effective August 5. L. 2017: (1)(f) added, (SB 17-028), ch. 332, p. 1782, § 1, effective August 9.

19-1-303. General provisions - delinquency and dependency and neglect cases - exchange of information - civil penalty - rules - definitions.

1. The judicial department or any agency that performs duties and functions under this title with respect to juvenile delinquency or dependency and neglect cases or any other provisions of this title may exchange information, to the extent necessary, for the acquisition, provision, oversight, or referral of services and support with the judicial department or any other agency or individual, including an attorney representing state or county agencies and an attorney appointed by the court, that performs duties and functions under this title with respect to such cases. In order to receive such information, the judicial department, attorney, or agency shall have a need to know for purposes of investigations and case management in the provision of services or the administration of their respective programs. The judicial department or the agencies shall exchange information in accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection (1).
2. The judicial department, an agency, an attorney representing an agency, or an attorney appointed by the court described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall exchange information with the judicial department or similar agencies or individuals who have a need to know to the extent necessary for the acquisition, provision, oversight, and referral of services and support and if provided in the course of an investigation or for case management purposes. The provision of information by the judicial department shall include electronic read-only access to the name index and register of actions for agencies or attorneys appointed by the court to those case types necessary to carry out their statutory purpose and the duties of their court appointment as provided in this part 3. The state court administrator of the judicial department and the executive directors of the affected agencies shall ensure that there is a process for electronically exchanging information pursuant to this section. Agencies, attorneys, and individuals shall maintain the confidentiality of the information obtained.
3. Nothing in this section shall require the exchange of information that is subject to the attorney-client privilege under section 13-90-107 (1)(b), C.R.S.
1. School personnel may obtain from the judicial department or agencies described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section any information required to perform their legal duties and responsibilities. Said personnel shall maintain the confidentiality of the information obtained.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any criminal justice agency or assessment center for children in the state may share any information or records concerning a specific child who is or will be enrolled as a student at a school with that school's principal or with the principal's designee and, if the student is or will be enrolled at a public school, with the superintendent of the school district in which the student is or will be enrolled or the superintendent's designee as follows:
  1. Any information or records, except mental health or medical records, relating to incidents that, in the discretion of the agency or center, rise to the level of a public safety concern including, but not limited to, any information or records of threats made by the child, any arrest or charging information, any information regarding municipal ordinance violations, and any arrest or charging information relating to acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute misdemeanors or felonies; or
  2. Any records, except mental health or medical records, of incidents that such agency or center may have concerning the child that, in the discretion of the agency or center, do not rise to the level of a public safety concern but that relate to the adjudication or conviction of a child for a municipal ordinance violation or that relate to the charging, adjudication, deferred prosecution, deferred judgment, or diversion of a child for an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted a misdemeanor or a felony.
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a criminal justice agency investigating a criminal matter or a matter under the "School Attendance Law of 1963", part 1 of article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., concerning a child may seek disciplinary and truancy information from the principal of a school, or the principal's designee, at which the child is or will be enrolled as a student and, if the student is enrolled in a public school, from the superintendent of the school district in which the student is enrolled, or such superintendent's designee. Upon written certification by the criminal justice agency that the information will not be disclosed to any other party, except as specifically authorized or required by law, without the prior written consent of the child's parent, either the principal of the school in which the child is enrolled, or such principal's designee, or, if the student is enrolled in a public school, the superintendent of the school district in which the student is enrolled, or such superintendent's designee, shall provide the child's attendance and disciplinary records to the requesting criminal justice agency. The criminal justice agency receiving such information shall use it only for the performance of its legal duties and responsibilities and shall maintain the confidentiality of the information received.
4. School and school district personnel receiving information pursuant to this subsection (2) shall use it only in the performance of their legal duties and responsibilities and shall otherwise maintain the confidentiality of the information received. Any information received by a school or a school district pursuant to this subsection (2) that is shared with another school or a school district to which a student may be transferring shall only be shared in compliance with the requirements of federal law.
1. (2.5) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and in addition to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, assessment centers for children and the agencies, other than schools and school districts, participating in the local assessment centers for children are authorized to provide and share information, except for mental health or medical records and information, with each other, without the necessity of signed releases, concerning children who have been taken into temporary custody by law enforcement or who have been referred to the assessment center for children for case management purposes. Agencies shall have annually updated signed agreements with assessment centers for children to be considered a participating agency.
2. For purposes of sharing information pursuant to this subsection (2.5) only, "mental health or medical records and information" does not include the standardized behavioral or mental health disorder screening. An assessment center that conducts a standardized behavioral or mental health disorder screening on a child who has been taken into temporary custody by law enforcement or has been referred to the assessment center for children for case management purposes may share the results of such screening, without the necessity of a signed release, with the agencies, other than schools and school districts, participating in the assessment center for children. To receive the results of the standardized behavioral or mental health disorder screening, a participating agency must have a need to know for purposes of investigations and case management in the administration of its respective programs. Any participating agency receiving such information shall use it only for the performance of its legal duties and responsibilities and shall maintain the confidentiality of the information received, except as may be required pursuant to rule 16 of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure.
1. (2.6) (a) The state department of human services and county departments:
  1. Shall collect information concerning the military affiliation of any person who has custody or control of a child who is the subject of an investigation of child abuse or neglect;
  2. Shall provide notice and information to the command authority of military installations under the United States secretary of defense regarding any report received of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect that is assigned for an assessment and in which the person having custody or control of the child is a member of the armed forces or a spouse, or a significant other or family member residing in the home of the member of the armed forces assigned to that military installation; and
  3. May enter into memorandums of understanding with the command authority of military installations establishing protocols for the sharing of information and for collaboration on the oversight of investigations involving a member of the armed forces or a spouse, or a significant other or family member residing in the home of the member of the armed forces. The military installation receiving information shall ensure it is used only for its intended and limited purpose as authorized by law and that the confidential nature of the information is preserved.
2. The state board of human services may promulgate any rules necessary for the implementation of this subsection (2.6).
1. (2.7) (a) Upon the receipt of written notice sent by a foster parent, employees of the department of human services and of county departments, or other individuals with a need to know, shall be prohibited from releasing personally identifiable information about a foster parent, other than the foster parent's first name, to any adult member of the foster child's family, unless the foster parent subsequently provides his or her express written consent for the release of the information. The consent may consist of a hand-written note by the foster parent specifying the foster child's name, the consent for release of information to the foster child's family, the foster parent's signature, and the date. The consent shall be given individually for each foster child, unless the foster children are members of a sibling group.
2. The civil penalty described in subsection (4.7) of this section shall not apply to any foster child or siblings of the foster child.
and (4) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 315 , § 2, effective April 7, 2000.) (4.3) School and school district personnel, employees of the state judicial department, employees of state agencies, employees of criminal justice agencies, and employees of assessment centers for children who share information concerning a child pursuant to this part 3 shall be immune from civil and criminal liability if such personnel or employee acted in good faith compliance with the provisions of this part 3.
(4.4) The judicial department, with respect to dependency or neglect cases or any other provisions under this title, shall exchange information, to the extent necessary, with the state child support enforcement agency and the delegate child support enforcement units for the purposes of effectively locating responsible parties, establishing paternity and child support, including child support debt pursuant to section 14-14-104 , C.R.S., enforcing support orders, disbursing collected child support payments, and facilitating the efficient and effective delivery of services under articles 13 and 13.5 of title 26, C.R.S.

(4.7) Any person who knowingly violates the confidentiality provisions of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars. (5) The provisions of this section are in addition to and not in lieu of other statutory provisions of law pertaining to the release of information. Access to or exchange of information not otherwise addressed by this section is governed as otherwise provided by law. (6) For purposes of this section:
1. "Assessment center for children" is defined in section 19-1-103 (10.5).
2. "Case management purposes" is defined in section 19-1-103 (16.5).
3. "Criminal justice agency" is defined in section 19-1-103 (34.6).
4. "Need to know" is defined in section 19-1-103 (77.5).
5. "School" is defined in section 19-1-103 (94.3). (7) This section shall be interpreted to promote the best interests of the child and, where possible, the child's family. (8)(Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 1242 , § 4, effective August 5, 2008.) (9)(Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 1242 , § 4, effective August 5, 2008.) (10) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 1242, § 4, effective August 5, 2008.) (11) (a) The judicial department or any agency described in subsection (1)(a) of this section may provide a prospective foster parent, as defined by rule of the department of human services, or a foster parent who is responsible for the health or welfare of a foster child named in a report who is residing in the foster parent's home, with information that is necessary to meet the foster child's physical, mental, emotional, behavioral, and other identified trauma needs. (b) The information described in subsection (11)(a) of this section is only information directly relevant to meeting the foster child's physical, mental, emotional, behavioral, and other identified trauma needs, and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
  1. A foster child's educational records;
  2. Relevant information in the family services plan to meet the safety, permanency, and well-being needs of the foster child, including any safety issues that impact the foster parent's ability to parent the foster child;
  3. Circumstances related to the removal of the foster child from his or her home; and
  4. Youth placement history, including safety concerns and reasons for unplanned placement moves. (c) Mental health and medical records of a child may be released pursuant to this subsection (11), subject to any privilege recognized or governed by state or federal law.
6. The foster parent shall maintain the confidentiality of any information obtained pursuant to this subsection (11).

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1156, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 315, § 2, effective April 7. L. 2001: (2)(c) amended, p. 870, § 1, effective June 1. L. 2002: (2.5) amended, p. 575, § 5, effective May 24. L. 2003: (4.4) added, p. 1267, § 56, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2.7) added, p. 973, § 2, effective August 4. L. 2007: (8), (9), and (10) added, p. 1300, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1), (8), (9), and (10) amended, p. 1242, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2016: (5) amended, (HB 16-1098), ch. 103, p. 297, § 1, effective April 15. L. 2017: (2.5)(b) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1309, § 151, effective May 25; (2.6) added, (SB 17-028), ch. 332, p. 1783, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2018: (11) added, (HB 18-1348), ch. 325, p. 1960, § 1, effective May 30.

Editor's note: Subsection (6)(c) was originally enacted as subsection (6)(a.7) in House Bill 00-1119 but was renumbered on revision in 2003 for ease of location.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

19-1-304. Juvenile delinquency records - division of youth services critical incident information - definitions.

1. Court records - open. Except as provided in subsection (1)(b.5) of this section, court records in juvenile delinquency proceedings or proceedings concerning a juvenile charged with the violation of any municipal ordinance except a traffic ordinance are open to inspection to the following persons without court order:
  1. The juvenile named in said record;
  2. The juvenile's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney;
  3. Any attorney of record;
  4. The juvenile's guardian ad litem;
  5. The juvenile probation department and the adult probation department for purposes of a presentence investigation and the preparation of a presentence report as described in section 16-11-102 (1)(a), C.R.S.;
  6. Any agency to which legal custody of the juvenile has been transferred;
  7. Any law enforcement agency or police department in the state of Colorado;
    (VII.5) The Colorado bureau of investigation for purposes of conducting a criminal background investigation relating to authorization of a firearm purchase;
  8. A court which has jurisdiction over a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  9. Any attorney of record in a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  10. The state department of human services;
  11. Any person conducting an evaluation pursuant to section 14-10-127, C.R.S.;
  12. All members of a child protection team, if one exists pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a);
  13. Any person or agency for research purposes, if all of the following conditions are met:
    1. The person or agency conducting the research is employed by the state of Colorado or is under contract with the state of Colorado and is authorized by the department of human services to conduct the research; except that the department of public safety is not required to obtain prior authorization from the department of human services for purposes of this subsection (1)(a)(XIII);
    2. The person or agency conducting the research ensures that all documents containing identifying information are maintained in secure locations and access to such documents by unauthorized persons is prohibited; that no identifying information is included in documents generated from the research conducted; and that all identifying information is deleted from documents used in the research when the research is completed; and
    3. Any data released must only be in aggregate form;
  14. The victim and the complaining party, if different, identified in the court file;
  15. The department of corrections for aid in determinations of recommended treatment, visitation approval, and supervised conditions;
  16. The principal, or the principal's designee, of a school in which the juvenile is or will be enrolled as a student and, if the student is or will be enrolled in a public school, to the superintendent of the school district in which the student is or will be enrolled, or such superintendent's designee;
  17. The department of education when acting pursuant to section 22-2-119, C.R.S., or pursuant to the "Colorado Educator Licensing Act of 1991", article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S.
2. Court records - limited. With consent of the court, records of court proceedings in delinquency cases may be inspected by any other person having a legitimate interest in the proceedings.
3. Arrest and criminal records - certain juveniles - public access - information limited. The public has access to information reporting the arrest or other formal filing of charges against a juvenile; the identity of the criminal justice agency taking such official action relative to an accused juvenile; the date and place that such official action was taken relative to an accused juvenile; the nature of the charges brought or the offenses alleged; and one or more dispositions relating to the charges brought against an accused juvenile, when this information:
  1. Is in the custody of the investigating law enforcement agency, the agency responsible for filing a petition against the juvenile, and the court; and
  2. Concerns a juvenile who:
    1. Is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or is subject to a revocation of probation for committing the crime of possession of a handgun by a juvenile or for committing an act that would constitute a class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony or would constitute any crime that involves the use or possession of a weapon if such act were committed by an adult; or
    2. Is charged with the commission of any act described in sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (II).
4. The information that is open to the public pursuant to subsection (1)(b.5) of this section regarding a juvenile who is charged with the commission of a delinquent act shall not include records of investigation as such records are described in section 24-72-305 (5). In addition, any psychological profile of any such juvenile, any intelligence test results for any such juvenile, or any information regarding whether such juvenile has been sexually abused is not open to the public unless released by an order of the court. The information that is open to the public pursuant to subsection (1)(b.5) of this section regarding a juvenile who is charged with a delinquent act shall not include the juvenile's name, birth date, or photograph.
5. The court shall report the final disposition concerning a juvenile who has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent to the Colorado bureau of investigation in a form that is electronically consistent with applicable law. The report must be made within seventy-two hours after the final disposition; except that the time period shall not include Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. The report must include the disposition of each charge and the court case number, and the Colorado bureau of investigation shall reflect any change of status but shall not delete or eliminate information concerning the original charge. Colorado bureau of investigation records regarding juvenile offenses are not open to the public.
6. Probation records - limited access. Except as otherwise authorized by section 19-1-303, a juvenile probation officer's records, whether or not part of the court file, are not open to inspection except as provided in subsection (1)(c)(I) to (1)(c)(XI) of this section:
  1. To persons who have the consent of the court;
  2. To law enforcement officers, as defined in section 19-1-103 (72), and to fire investigators, as defined in section 19-1-103 (51). The inspection shall be limited to the following information:
    1. Basic identification information as defined in section 24-72-302 (2), C.R.S.;
    2. Details of the offense and delinquent acts charged;
    3. Restitution information;
    4. Juvenile record;
    5. Probation officer's assessment and recommendations;
    6. Conviction or plea and plea agreement, if any;
    7. Sentencing information; and
    8. Summary of behavior while the juvenile was in detention, if any;
      (II.5) To the Colorado bureau of investigation for purposes of conducting a criminal background investigation relating to authorization of a firearm purchase. The inspection shall be limited to the information identified in sub-subparagraphs (A) to (H) of subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c).
  3. To a court which has jurisdiction over a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  4. To any attorney of record in a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  5. To the state department of human services;
  6. To any person conducting an evaluation pursuant to section 14-10-127, C.R.S.;
  7. To all members of a child protection team, if one exists pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a);
    (VII.5) To the juvenile named in the record;
  8. To the juvenile's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney;
  9. To the juvenile's guardian ad litem;
  10. To the principal of a school, or such principal's designee, in which the juvenile is or will be enrolled as a student and, if the student is or will be enrolled in a public school, to the superintendent of the school district in which the student is or will be enrolled, or such superintendent's designee; or
  11. To the department of education when acting pursuant to section 22-2-119, C.R.S., or pursuant to the "Colorado Educator Licensing Act of 1991", article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S.
7. Social and clinical studies - closed - court authorization. Except as otherwise authorized by section 19-1-303, any social and clinical studies, including all formal evaluations of the juvenile completed by a professional, whether or not part of the court file or any other record, are not open to inspection, except:
  1. To the juvenile named in the record;
  2. To the juvenile's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney; or
  3. By order of the court, upon a finding of a legitimate interest in and need to review the social and clinical studies.
1. Law enforcement records in general - closed. Except as otherwise provided by subsection (1)(b.5) of this section and otherwise authorized by section 19-1-303, the records of law enforcement officers concerning juveniles, including identifying information, must be identified as juvenile records and must not be inspected by or disclosed to the public, except:
  1. To the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney;
  2. To other law enforcement agencies and to fire investigators, as defined in section 19-1-103 (51), who have a legitimate need for such information;
    (II.5) To the Colorado bureau of investigation for purposes of conducting a criminal background investigation relating to authorization of a firearm purchase;
  3. To the victim and the complaining party, if different, in each case after authorization by the district attorney or prosecuting attorney;
  4. When the juvenile has escaped from an institution to which such juvenile has been committed;
  5. When the court orders that the juvenile be tried as an adult criminal;
  6. When there has been an adult criminal conviction and a presentence investigation has been ordered by the court;
  7. By order of the court;
  8. To a court which has jurisdiction over a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  9. To any attorney of record in a juvenile or domestic action in which the juvenile is named;
  10. To the state department of human services;
  11. To any person conducting an evaluation pursuant to section 14-10-127, C.R.S.;
  12. To all members of a child protection team, if one exists pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a);
  13. To the juvenile's guardian ad litem;
  14. To any person or agency for research purposes, if all of the following conditions are met:
    1. The person or agency conducting such research is employed by the state of Colorado or is under contract with the state of Colorado and is authorized by the department of human services to conduct such research; except that the department of public safety does not need to obtain prior authorization from the department of human services for the purposes of this subsection (2)(a)(XIV)(A); and
    2. The person or agency conducting the research ensures that all documents containing identifying information are maintained in secure locations and access to such documents by unauthorized persons is prohibited; that no identifying information is included in documents generated from the research conducted; and that all identifying information is deleted from documents used in the research when the research is completed;
  15. To the principal of a school, or such principal's designee, in which the juvenile is or will be enrolled as a student and, if the student is or will be enrolled in a public school, to the superintendent of the school district in which the student is or will be enrolled, or such superintendent's designee;
  16. To assessment centers for children;
  17. To the department of education when acting pursuant to section 22-2-119, C.R.S., or pursuant to the "Colorado Educator Licensing Act of 1991", article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S.
2. The fingerprints, photograph, name, address, and other identifying information regarding a juvenile may be transmitted to the Colorado bureau of investigation to assist in any apprehension or investigation and for purposes of conducting a criminal background investigation relating to authorization of a firearm purchase.
(2.5) Parole records. Parole records are open to inspection by the principal of a school, or such principal's designee, in which the juvenile is or will be enrolled as a student and, if the student is or will be enrolled in a public school, by the superintendent of the school district in which the student is or will be enrolled, or such superintendent's designee. Parole records are also open to inspection by assessment centers for children and by the juvenile named in the record and the juvenile's parent, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney.
Prior to adjudication, the defense counsel, the district attorney, the prosecuting attorney, or any other party to a pending delinquency petition with consent of the court must have access to records of any proceedings pursuant to this title 19, except as provided in section 19-1-309, which involve a juvenile against whom criminal or delinquency charges have been filed. No new criminal or delinquency charges against such juvenile may be brought based upon information gained initially or solely from such examination of records.
For the purpose of making recommendations concerning sentencing after an adjudication of delinquency, the defense counsel and the district attorney or prosecuting attorney shall have access to records of any proceedings involving the adjudicated juvenile pursuant to this title, except as provided in sections 19-1-307, 19-1-308, and 19-1-309. No new criminal or delinquency charges against the adjudicated juvenile shall be brought based upon information gained initially or solely from such examination of records.
Direct filings - arrest and criminal records open. Whenever a petition filed in juvenile court alleges that a juvenile between the ages of twelve to eighteen years has committed an offense that would constitute unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S., or a crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406, C.R.S., if committed by an adult or whenever charges filed in district court allege that a juvenile has committed such an offense, then the arrest and criminal records information, as defined in section 24-72-302 (1), C.R.S., and including a juvenile's physical description, concerning such juvenile shall be made available to the public. The information is available only from the investigative law enforcement agency, the agency responsible for filing a petition, and the court, and shall not include records of investigation as such records are described in section 24-72-305 (5), C.R.S. Basic identification information, as defined in section 24-72-302 (2), C.R.S., along with the details of the alleged delinquent act or offense, shall be provided immediately to the school district in which the juvenile is enrolled. Such information shall be used by the board of education for purposes of section 22-33-105 (5), C.R.S., but information made available to the school district and not otherwise available to the public shall remain confidential.
(5.5) Whenever a petition is filed in juvenile court alleging a class 1, class 2, class 3, or class 4 felony; a level 1, level 2, or level 3 drug felony; an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9); a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406; a burglary offense as described in part 2 of article 4 of title 18; felony menacing, in violation of section 18-3-206; harassment, in violation of section 18-9-111; fourth degree arson, in violation of section 18-4-105; aggravated motor vehicle theft, in violation of section 18-4-409; hazing, in violation of section 18-9-124; or possession of a handgun by a juvenile, in violation of section 18-12-108.5, or when a petition is filed in juvenile court in which the alleged victim of the crime is a student or staff person in the same school as the juvenile or in which it is alleged that the juvenile possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged crime, the prosecuting attorney, within three working days after the petition is filed, shall make good faith reasonable efforts to notify the principal of the school in which the juvenile is enrolled and shall provide such principal with the arrest and criminal records information, as defined in section 24-72-302 (1). In the event the prosecuting attorney, in good faith, is not able to either identify the school that the juvenile attends or contact the principal of the juvenile's school, then the prosecuting attorney shall contact the superintendent of the juvenile's school district.
The department of human services shall release to the committing court, the prosecuting attorney, the Colorado bureau of investigation, and local law enforcement agencies basic identification information as defined in section 24-72-302 (2) concerning any juvenile released or released to parole supervision or any juvenile who escapes. This information is not open to the public.
In addition to the persons who have access to court records pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section, statewide electronic read-only access to the name index and register of actions of the judicial department must be allowed to the following agencies or persons:
1. County departments, as defined in section 19-1-103 (43), and attorneys who represent the county departments as county attorneys, as defined in section 19-1-103 (42), as it relates to the attorneys' work representing the county;
2. The office of the state public defender, created in section 21-1-101, C.R.S.;
3. Guardians ad litem under contract with the office of the child's representative, created in section 13-91-104, C.R.S., or authorized by the office of the child's representative to act as a guardian ad litem, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;
4. Attorneys under contract with the office of the alternate defense counsel, created in section 21-2-101, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;
5. A respondent parent's counsel under contract with the office of the respondent parents' counsel, created in section 13-92-103, or authorized by the office of the respondent parents' counsel to act as a respondent parent's counsel, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court; and
6. A licensed attorney working with a nonprofit association providing free legal assistance as it relates to screening an applicant for eligibility for free services or to a case in which the organization has entered an appearance to provide free representation, if the office of the alternate defense counsel agrees to monitor the attorney's use of the electronic name index and register of actions.
Division of youth services critical incident information.
1. For the purposes of this subsection (8), "critical incident" means any of the following:
  1. An intentional physical or sexual act of aggression that:
    1. Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury;
    2. Causes bodily injury that requires only first aid or lesser attention; or
    3. Causes no bodily injury;
  2. Unauthorized physical or sexual contact caused through recklessness or negligence, where physical or sexual harm was not intended; or
  3. An attempt to harm or gain power by blows or with weapons.
2. The department of human services, the division of youth services, or any agency with relevant information shall release the following information related to any critical incident, or aggregate of critical incidents, that occurred in a facility operated by the division of youth services upon request so long as the disclosing agency, except as described in subsection (8)(b)(V) of this section, redacts any identifying information, any information concerning security procedures or protocols, and any information that would jeopardize the safety of the community, youths, or staff:
  1. The type of critical incident that occurred or a summary of types of critical incidents that have occurred within a given time frame;
  2. A summary of whether the number and types of critical incidents are increasing or decreasing in frequency and severity;
  3. On average, how many of the youth have been involved in multiple critical incidents and the average length of detainment;
  4. A summary of responses to critical incidents by the facility involved, such as de-escalation or typical consequence imposed; and
  5. A summary of any critical incident that has occurred, which summary must include a summary of any use of force on a youth, including any physical-management techniques or restraints utilized and any seclusion of a youth. The division shall not redact the information other than to protect the personal identifying information of any individual.
3. The division of youth services, the department of human services, or any agency with relevant information related to a critical incident shall provide redacted records related to the critical incident, provided confidentiality is maintained. The division may charge a fee in accordance with section 24-72-205.
4. The division of youth services may release to the public information at any time to correct inaccurate information pertaining to the critical incident that was reported in the news media, so long as the release of information by the division protects the confidentiality of any youth involved; is not explicitly in conflict with federal law; is not contrary to the best interest of the child who is the subject of the report, or his or her siblings; is in the public's best interest; and is consistent with the federal "Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Reauthorization Act of 2010", Pub.L. 111-320.
5. Except as otherwise authorized by section 19-1-303, all records prepared or obtained by the department of human services in the course of carrying out its duties pursuant to article 2.5 of this title 19 are confidential and privileged.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1158, § 6, effective January 1, 1997; (1)(a)(XV) added, p. 1587, § 15, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98: (1)(a)(XI), (1)(c)(VI), and (2)(a)(XI) amended, p. 1407, § 66, effective February 1, 1999. L. 99: (1)(a)(V) amended, p. 316, § 5, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1144, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(b.8) added, p. 12, § 5, effective March 7; (1)(a)(VII.5), (1)(c)(II.5), and (2)(a)(II.5) added and (2)(b) amended, pp. 226, 227, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, effective March 29; (1)(a)(XVI), (1)(c)(X), (2)(a)(XV), (2)(a)(XVI), and (2.5) added and IP(1)(c) and (5) amended, pp. 319, 320, §§ 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, effective April 7; (1)(a)(XVI), (1)(c)(X), and (5.5) added and IP(1)(c) amended, pp. 1964, 1965, §§ 6, 7, 8, effective June 2. L. 2001: (5.5) amended, p. 138, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: (5) amended, p. 1187, § 23, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1522, § 222, effective October 1. L. 2003: (1)(c)(II.5) amended, p. 1991, § 33, effective May 22. L. 2008: (1)(a)(XVII), (1)(c)(XI), and (2)(a)(XVII) added and IP(1)(c), (1)(c)(IX), and (1)(c)(X) amended, pp. 1667, 1668, §§ 10, 11, 12, effective May 29; (7) added, p. 1243, § 5, effective August 5. L. 2015: (8) added, (HB 15-1131), ch. 164, p. 499, § 2, effective May 8. L. 2016: IP(1)(a) and (1)(a)(XIII) amended, (HB 16-1098), ch. 103, p. 297, § 2, effective April 15; IP(7) and (7)(e) amended, (HB 16-1193), ch. 81, p. 207, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2017: IP(8)(b), (8)(b)(V), (8)(c), and (8)(d) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1965, § 6, effective June 6; IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(XII), IP(1)(c), (1)(c)(VII), IP(2)(a), and (2)(a)(XII) amended, (SB 17-016), ch. 107, p. 391, § 3, effective August 9; IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(II), (1)(a)(XIII)(A), IP(1)(b.5), (1)(b.7), (1)(b.8), IP(1)(c), (1)(c)(VIII), (1)(d), IP(2)(a), (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(XIV)(A), (2.5), (3), (5.5), (6), IP(7), (7)(d), and (7)(e) amended and (1)(c)(VII.5) and (7)(f) added, (HB 17-1204), ch. 206, p. 771, § 1, effective November 1. L. 2021: (8)(e) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 729, § 69, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section was formerly numbered as § 19-1-119.
Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(XVI) by Senate Bill 00-133 and House Bill 00-1119 were harmonized.
1. Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (1)(c) by Senate Bill 00-133 and House Bill 00-1119 were harmonized.
2. Subsection (1)(c)(XI) as enacted by Senate Bill 00-133 was renumbered as (1)(c)(X) and harmonized with subsection (1)(c)(X) as enacted by House Bill 00-1119.
Amendments to subsection (5) by House Bill 02-1046 and Senate Bill 02-010 were harmonized.
Subsection (7) was originally numbered as (8.5) in House Bill 08-1264 but has been renumbered on revision for ease of location.
Amendments to subsection IP(2)(a) by SB 17-016 and HB 17-1204 were harmonized, effective November 1, 2017.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2000 act enacting subsection (1)(b.8), see section 1 of chapter 5, Session Laws of Colorado 2000. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (5), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Review of New Legislation Relating to Criminal Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 2148 (1982).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The disposition of arrest records is subject to legislative control. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123 , 503 P.2d 157 (1972).

The Colorado Children's Code does not supply definition of "interested party". In re People in Interest of C.P., 34 Colo. App. 54, 524 P.2d 316 (1974).

C.R.C.P. 24 has no application in proceeding under the Colorado Children's Code, as the code itself expressly contemplates the active participation of interested parties. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

19-1-305. Operation of juvenile facilities.

Except as otherwise authorized by section 19-1-303 or 19-1-304 (8), all records prepared or obtained by the department of human services in the course of carrying out its duties pursuant to article 2.5 of this title 19 are confidential and privileged. The records may be disclosed only:
1. To the parents, legal guardian, legal custodian, attorney for the juvenile, district attorney, guardian ad litem, law enforcement official, and probation officer;
2. In communications between appropriate personnel in the course of providing services or in order to facilitate appropriate referrals for services;
3. To the extent necessary to make application for or to make claims on behalf of the juvenile who is eligible to receive aid, insurance, federal or state assistance, or medical assistance;
4. To the court as necessary for the administration of the provisions of article 2 of this title;
5. To persons authorized by court order after notice and a hearing, to the juvenile, and to the custodian of the record;
6. For research or evaluation purposes pursuant to rules regarding research or evaluation promulgated by the department of human services. Any rules so promulgated shall require that persons receiving information for research or evaluation purposes are required to keep such information confidential; and
7. To the department of revenue pursuant to sections 39-22-120 and 39-22-2003, C.R.S.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the effect of any other provision of this part 3 which requires the confidentiality of records under the control of the department of human services.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1163, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98, 2nd Ex. Sess.: (1)(e) and (1)(f) amended and (1)(g) added, p. 7, § 3, effective September 16. L. 99: (1)(g) amended, p. 1317, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2015: IP(1) amended, (HB 15-1131), ch. 164, p. 499, § 1, effective May 8. L. 2021: IP(1) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 729, § 70, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was formerly numbered as 19-2-1104.5.

19-1-306. Expungement of juvenile delinquent records - definition.

1. For the purposes of this section, "expungement" is defined in section 19-1-103 (48). Upon the entry of an expungement order, the person who is the subject of the record that has been expunged may assert that he or she has no juvenile delinquency record. Further, the person who is the subject of the record that has been expunged may lawfully deny that he or she has ever been arrested, charged, adjudicated, convicted, or sentenced in regard to the expunged case, matter, or charge.
2. The court, law enforcement, and all other agencies shall reply to any inquiry regarding an expunged record that no record exists with respect to the person named in the record, unless information may be shared with the inquiring party pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
3. The expungement order only applies to the named juvenile and not to any co-participant.
1. At the time of the adjudication, the court shall advise the adjudicated juvenile and any respondent parent or guardian, in writing, of the right to expunge and the time period and process for expunging the order. The court, on its own motion or the motion of the juvenile probation department, the juvenile parole department, the juvenile, a respondent parent or guardian, or a court-appointed guardian ad litem, may initiate expungement proceedings concerning the record of any juvenile who has been under the jurisdiction of the court.
2. If a juvenile is supervised by probation, the probation department, upon the termination of the juvenile's supervision period, shall provide the juvenile with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record.
3. If a juvenile is supervised by parole, the department or division supervising the juvenile's parole, upon the termination of the juvenile's parole supervision period, shall provide the juvenile with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record.
4. If the juvenile is supervised by a diversion officer or agency other than probation, the agency supervising the diversion program, upon the termination of the juvenile's diversion period, shall provide the juvenile with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record.
5. If a juvenile is sentenced in municipal court, the municipal court, at sentencing, shall provide the juvenile and any respondent parent or guardian with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record. The municipal court may provide the notice through a municipal diversion program, the city attorney, or a municipal probation program.
6. If a juvenile is committed to the division of youth services and is released without a requirement to complete further parole, the division shall provide the juvenile with a written advisement of the right to expungement and the time period and process for expunging the record.
7. Expungement must be effectuated by physically sealing or conspicuously indicating on the face of the record or at the beginning of the computerized file of the record that the record has been designated as expunged.
8. The prosecuting attorney shall not require as a condition of a plea agreement that the juvenile waive his or her right to expungement under this section upon the completion of the juvenile's sentence.
9. Prior to the court ordering any records expunged, the court shall determine whether the juvenile has any felony, drug felony, misdemeanor, drug misdemeanor, petty offense, or delinquency actions pending, and, if the court determines that there is a felony, drug felony, misdemeanor, drug misdemeanor, petty offense, or delinquency action pending against the juvenile, the court shall stay the petition for expungement proceedings until the resolution of the pending case.
1. After expungement, basic identification information on the juvenile and a list of any state and local agencies and officials having contact with the juvenile, as they appear in the records, are not open to the public but are available to a prosecuting attorney, local law enforcement agency, the department of human services, the state judicial department, and the victim as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5); except that such information is not available to an agency of the military forces of the United States.
2. Notwithstanding any order for expungement pursuant to this section, any record that is ordered expunged is available to any judge and the probation department for use in any future proceeding in which the person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense as either a juvenile or as an adult. A new criminal or delinquency charge may not be brought against the juvenile based upon information gained initially or solely from examination of the expunged records.
3. Notwithstanding an order for expungement pursuant to this section, any criminal justice record of a juvenile who has been charged, adjudicated, or convicted of any offense shall be available for use by the juvenile, the juvenile's attorney, a prosecuting attorney, any law enforcement agency, or any agency of the state judicial department in any subsequent criminal investigation or prosecution as a substantive predicate offense conviction or adjudication of record.
4. Notwithstanding any order for expungement issued pursuant to this section, nothing prevents the prosecuting attorney, including the staff of a prosecuting attorney's office or a victim or witness assistance program or a law enforcement agency or law enforcement victim assistance program, from discussing with the victim the case, the results of any expungement proceedings, information regarding restitution, and information related to any victim services available to the victim as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5), but copies of expunged records must not be provided to the victim. The victim may petition the court and request that a copy of the expunged records be provided to the victim. If the court finds that there are compelling reasons for the release, a copy of the expunged records may be released to the victim. If the court orders the release of a copy of the expunged records to the victim, the court must issue a protective order regarding the usage of the expunged records.
5. Notwithstanding any order for expungement issued pursuant to this section, any information, including police affidavits and reports and records related to any prior conviction or adjudication, are available without court order to the persons, government agencies, or entities allowed access to or allowed to exchange such information pursuant to section 19-1-303 for the purposes described therein. Any person who knowingly violates the confidentiality provisions of section 19-1-303 is subject to the penalty in section 19-1-303 (4.7).
6. Notwithstanding any order for expungement issued pursuant to this section, nothing in this section precludes a county department of human or social services employee from reviewing internal department records that are ordered expunged and are in the county department's possession for purposes of department investigations and case management in the provision of child welfare services.
1. The court shall order all records in a juvenile delinquency case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged within forty-two days after:
  1. A finding of not guilty at an adjudicatory trial;
  2. Dismissal of the petition in its entirety prior to any disposition or alternative to sentencing, including diversion, a deferred adjudication, or an informal adjustment; or
  3. The completion of a sentence or alternative to sentencing, including diversion, a deferred adjudication, or an informal adjustment, for a petty offense, drug petty offense, class 2 or class 3 misdemeanor offense, or level 1 or level 2 drug misdemeanor if the offense does not involve unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), is not an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3, or is not a crime listed under section 24-4.1-302 (1), and the defendant was under eighteen years of age at the time the offense was committed.
2. 1. Upon successful completion of diversion at the prefiling level as an alternative to the filing of a petition, the custodian of any record shall expunge the record in the custody of law enforcement, the juvenile's school, the diversion provider, and the district attorney without the need for a court order.
  2. The district attorney or other diversion provider shall notify the Colorado bureau of investigation, the law enforcement agency that had contact with the juvenile, and the juvenile's school, if the incident occurred at school or the district attorney notified the school of the case, that diversion is complete and the records are expunged. Any law enforcement agency or school that receives a notice shall acknowledge receipt of the notice. The Colorado bureau of investigation, law enforcement agency, school, diversion provider, and district attorney shall treat the records as expunged within thirty-five days after the completion of diversion, and all provisions of this section addressing expunged records apply to those records.
  3. If victim notification is required pursuant to part 4.1 of title 24, the district attorney shall notify the victim prior to sending the notice pursuant to subsection (4)(b)(II) of this section, and offer the victim an opportunity to object. If the victim objects, the district attorney shall notify the court and the diversion provider. Upon receipt of the notice of objection from the district attorney, the diversion provider shall complete and file a report pursuant to subsection (5)(c) of this section, and the provisions of subsections (5)(e), (5)(e.5), (5)(f), and (5)(g) of this section apply.
3. The court shall, on or before November 1 of each year, review all juvenile delinquency court files during the two previous years that resulted in a finding of not guilty; a dismissal of the petition; a sentence for a petty offense; a sentence for a drug petty offense; a sentence for a drug misdemeanor offense; or a sentence for a class 2 or class 3 misdemeanor offense if the offense does not involve unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), is not an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3, or is not a crime listed under section 24-4.1-302 (1), and the defendant was under eighteen years of age at the time the offense was committed. The court shall enter an expungement order for all juveniles eligible for expungement pursuant to this subsection (4), if the expungement order was not previously made.
1. At the time that the court orders the following sentences or alternatives to sentencing, the court shall make a finding that the juvenile is eligible for expungement pursuant to this subsection (5) and include that finding on the written mittimus or other sentencing document:
  1. A juvenile diversion program, a deferred adjudication, or an informal adjustment, except for those described in subsection (4)(a)(III) of this section;
  2. A juvenile sentence for an adjudication for a class 1 misdemeanor or a petty or a misdemeanor offense that is not eligible for expungement pursuant to subsection (4) of this section; or
  3. Repealed.
  4. A juvenile sentence for an adjudication for a felony offense or felony drug offense if:
    1. The felony offense did not constitute unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9);
    2. The felony offense was not a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406;
    3. The felony offense was not a class 1 or class 2 felony; and
    4. The juvenile had no prior felony adjudications.
2. Repealed.
3. 1. If the court makes a finding that a juvenile is eligible for expungement pursuant to subsection (5)(a) of this section, the agency supervising the juvenile shall, at the conclusion of the agency's supervision, prepare a report and summary of supervision outlining the performance of the juvenile while under supervision. The supervising agency shall provide the report to the court and provide a copy of the report to the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile, and the juvenile's attorney of record no earlier than thirty-five days prior to the end of supervision and no later than fourteen days after the conclusion of supervision. If there is no supervising agency, the court shall send a notice that the unsupervised sentence is complete to the district attorney when the sentence is complete.
  2. Upon receipt of the report or notice pursuant to this subsection (5)(c), the prosecuting attorney shall contact the victim regarding expungement if notification is required pursuant to part 4.1 of title 24.
4. If neither the prosecuting attorney nor a victim files an objection within thirty-five days after the filing of the report or notice pursuant to subsection (5)(c) of this section, the court shall order all records in the juvenile delinquency case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged.
5. If the prosecuting attorney or a victim files an objection within thirty-five days after the filing of the report or notice pursuant to subsection (5)(c) of this section, the court shall schedule a hearing on the issue of expungement. The court shall notify all objecting parties of the hearing date. The hearing must be set at least thirty-five days after the date the court sends notice of the hearing.
6. If the offense for which the records are eligible for expungement requires the juvenile to register pursuant to section 16-22-103 and the court has not already issued a notice pursuant to section 16-22-113 (1.3)(b), upon receipt of the report from the supervising agency pursuant to subsection (5)(c) of this section, the court shall issue a notice pursuant to section 16-22-113 (1.3)(b) and this subsection (5)(e.5), and the victim and prosecution have sixty-three days from the issuance of that notice to file an objection to expungement or the discontinuation of registration. All other requirements of subsections (5)(d), (5)(e), (5)(f), and (5)(g) of this section apply to the expungement. The provisions of section 16-22-113 (1.3) apply to the issue of discontinuing registration. The court shall consider both issues at the same hearing. If the court has not already ordered that the juvenile may discontinue registration pursuant to section 16-22-113, the court shall enter an order granting expungement and discontinuing the registration requirement, denying expungement and discontinuing the registration requirement, or denying expungement and continuing the registration requirement.
7. If a hearing is scheduled pursuant to subsection (5)(e) of this section, the court shall send notice to the last known address of the juvenile notifying the juvenile of the date of the hearing and of the juvenile's right to appear at the hearing and to present evidence to the court in writing prior to the hearing and in person at the hearing. The notice must indicate that, at the hearing, the court will consider whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated and whether expungement is in the best interest of the juvenile and the community. The juvenile is not required to appear at the hearing.
8. At a hearing held pursuant to this subsection (5), the court shall order all records of the case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case or charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged if the court makes written findings that:
  1. The rehabilitation of the juvenile has been attained to the satisfaction of the court; and
  2. The expungement is in the best interest of the juvenile and the community.
9. The court shall, starting on November 1, 2019, and each November 1 thereafter, review all juvenile delinquency court files during the two previous years that resulted in participation in diversion, a deferred adjudication, or an informal adjustment; a sentence for a class 1 misdemeanor offense, any drug felony offense, or a misdemeanor offense involving domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3; or a felony offense that did not constitute unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), was not a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406, and was not a class 1 or class 2 felony. The court shall send the notice required for all records eligible for a notice pursuant to this subsection (5) if the notice was not previously sent and an expungement order was not previously made. After the notice is sent, the provisions of subsections (5)(b) to (5)(g) of this section apply.
10. With the victim's consent, or if there is no named victim, the prosecuting attorney may agree at the time of a plea that there will be no objection to expungement upon the completion of the juvenile's sentence. In such a case, the court shall order all records of the case in the custody of the court, and any records related to the case or charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization, expunged upon completion of the juvenile's sentence. A hearing is not required.
11. A juvenile who was adjudicated as a mandatory sentence offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (1) or as a repeat juvenile offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (2) is not eligible for expungement pursuant to this subsection (5) but may petition for expungement pursuant to subsection (6)(e) of this section.
1. A person may petition the juvenile court to expunge records in a closed case pursuant to subsection (4) of this section if the records are otherwise eligible for expungement, have not been expunged by the court, and a proceeding concerning a felony, misdemeanor, or delinquency action is not pending against the petitioner. A filing fee, notarization, or other formalities are not required. If the court determines the records are eligible for expungement pursuant to the requirements of subsection (4) of this section, the court shall grant the petition to expunge without a hearing and shall issue an order pursuant to subsection (4) of this section.
2. A person may petition the juvenile court to expunge records in a closed case pursuant to subsection (5) of this section if the records are otherwise eligible for expungement, have not been expunged by the court, and a proceeding concerning a felony, misdemeanor, or delinquency action is not pending against the petitioner. A filing fee, notarization, or other formalities are not required. If the records are eligible for expungement pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the court shall request a report from the agency supervising the juvenile or issue a notice pursuant to subsection (5)(c) of this section, and the provisions of subsection (5) of this section apply.
3. A person may petition the juvenile court to expunge records related to a law enforcement contact that did not result in referral to another agency after one year has passed since the law enforcement contact and a proceeding concerning a felony, misdemeanor, or delinquency action is not pending against the petitioner. A filing fee, notarization, or other formalities are not required. If the records are eligible for expungement pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the court shall issue a notice to the district attorney that the records will be expunged if no objection is received, and the provisions of subsection (5) of this section apply.
4. A person may petition the juvenile court to expunge records in a closed case pursuant to subsection (5) of this section if the person was previously denied an expungement order for those same records pursuant to subsection (5) of this section and at least twelve months have passed since the date of the original denial order, the petitioner provides new information not previously considered by the prior reviewing court, and a proceeding concerning a felony, misdemeanor, or delinquency action is not pending against the petitioner. The court shall schedule a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney of the hearing date. The court shall set the hearing at least thirty-five days after the court sends the notice of the hearing. All other provisions of subsection (5) of this section apply.
5. A juvenile who does not qualify for expungement pursuant to subsection (4) or (5) of this section, including a mandatory sentence offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (1) or a repeat offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (2), and is not otherwise ineligible for expungement pursuant to subsection (8) of this section and does not have a proceeding concerning a felony, misdemeanor, or delinquency action pending against himself or herself, may petition the court to request expungement of the juvenile's record thirty-six months after the date of the petitioner's unconditional release from the juvenile sentence. A filing fee, notarization, or other formalities are not required. The court shall schedule a hearing, and subsections (5)(e), (5)(e.5), (5)(f), and (5)(g) of this section apply.
Unless otherwise stated in the applicable section, a person may file a petition with the court for expungement of his or her record pursuant to subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this section only once during a twelve-month period.
Notwithstanding subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this section, a court shall not expunge the record of a person who is:
1. Adjudicated as an aggravated juvenile offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (4) or as a violent juvenile offender pursuant to section 19-2.5-1125 (3);
2. Adjudicated of homicide and related offenses pursuant to part 1 of article 3 of title 18;
3. Adjudicated for a felony offense involving unlawful sexual behavior as described in section 16-22-102 (9); or
4. Charged, adjudicated, or convicted of any offense or infraction pursuant to title 42.
Municipal court records.
1. Municipal court records are expunged pursuant to section 13-10-115.5.
2. If municipal court records have not been expunged within seventy days from the end of the case pursuant to section 13-10-115.5, an individual may petition the juvenile court in the judicial district where the municipality is located to expunge records of a municipal case brought against a juvenile. Expungement proceedings pursuant to this subsection (9) must be initiated by the filing of a petition requesting an order of expungement. A filing fee, notarization, or other formalities are not required. If the petition is not granted without a hearing, the court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition for expungement and shall notify the appropriate prosecuting attorney.
Upon the entry of an order expunging a record pursuant to this section, the court shall order, in writing, the expungement of all case records in the custody of the court and any records related to the case and charges in the custody of any other agency, person, company, or organization. The court may order expunged any records, but, at a minimum, the following records must be expunged pursuant to every expungement order:
1. All court records;
2. All records retained within the office of the prosecuting attorney;
3. All probation and parole records;
4. All law enforcement records;
5. All department of human services records;
6. All division of youth services records;
7. All department of corrections records; and
8. References to the criminal case or charge contained in the school records.
1. When an expungement order is issued pursuant to this section, the court shall send a copy of the order to the juvenile, the juvenile's last attorney of record, the prosecuting attorney, any law enforcement agency that investigated the case, the state court administrator's office, and the Colorado bureau of investigation directing the entity to expunge its records within thirty-five days after the receipt of the order.
2. The court shall send a copy of an expungement order to each of the following, directing the entity to expunge the records in its custody as soon as practicable but no later than ninety days after the receipt of the order:
  1. The probation office if the juvenile was placed on probation at any point during the case;
  2. The division of youth services if the juvenile was detained in a facility operated by the division, committed to the custody of the division, or screened through the Colorado youth detention continuum at any point during the case;
  3. Any county department of human or social services through which the juvenile received services at any point during the juvenile's case; and
  4. Any other agency, person, company, or organization named in the order if the court is aware that the entity has records related to the case in its possession.
3. Each entity described in this subsection (11) shall expunge the records in its custody as directed by the order.
4. The person who is the subject of records expunged pursuant to this section may petition the court to permit inspection of the records held by persons named in the order, and the court may so order.
Any agency, person, company, or organization that violates this section and knew that the records in question were subject to an expungement order may be subject to criminal and civil contempt of court and may be punished by a fine.
Employers; educational institutions; landlords; and state and local government agencies, officials, and employees shall not, in any application or interview or in any other way, require an applicant to disclose any information contained in expunged records. In answer to any question concerning arrest or juvenile and criminal records information that has been expunged, an applicant need not include a reference to or information concerning the expunged information and may state that no record exists. An application may not be denied solely because of the applicant's refusal to disclose records or information that has been expunged.
Nothing in this section authorizes the physical destruction of any juvenile or criminal justice record.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1163, § 6, effective January 1, 1997; (9) added, p. 1588, § 18, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98: (7)(d) added and (9) repealed, p. 399, §§ 4, 5, effective April 21. L. 2002: (7)(d) amended, p. 1187, § 24, effective July 1; (7)(b) amended, p. 1523, § 223, effective October 1. L. 2009: (7)(c) amended, (HB 09-1044), ch. 19, p. 96, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2012: (5)(d) and (6)(a.5) added, (HB 12-1151), ch. 174, p. 623, § 6, effective August 8. L. 2013: (2)(a), (3), (5)(c)(I), (6), and (7) amended and (5)(a.5) and (10) added, (HB 13-1082), ch. 238, p. 1155, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2014: (5)(d)(I) amended, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1157, § 21, effective July 1. L. 2016: (5)(c)(II.5) added and (7)(e) repealed, (SB 16-065), ch. 277, p. 1143, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2017: Entire section R&RE, (HB 17-1204), ch. 206, p. 775, § 2, effective November 1. L. 2019: (1)(c) and (5)(e.5) added, (4)(a)(II), (4)(a)(III), (4)(b), IP(5)(a), (5)(a)(I), (5)(a)(II), (5)(c), (5)(d), (5)(e), (6)(b), (6)(c), (6)(e), (10)(e), and (11) amended, (5)(a)(III) and (5)(b) repealed, and (9) R&RE, (HB 19-1335), ch. 304, p. 2780, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2020: (11)(b)(III) amended, (HB 20-1402), ch. 216, p. 1048, § 36, effective June 30. L. 2021: (5)(j), (6)(e), IP(8), and (8)(a) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 729, § 71, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section was formerly numbered as 19-2-902. The said section 19-2-902 was contained in a title that was repealed and reenacted in 1987. Provisions of that section, as it existed in 1987, are similar to those contained in 19-1-111 as said section existed in 1986, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this title.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (7)(b), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Review of New Legislation Relating to Criminal Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 2148 (1982).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The disposition of arrest records is subject to legislative control. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123 , 503 P.2d 157 (1972).

The general assembly did not intend that the limitation on expungement set forth in subsection (7)(d) apply to a person who has successfully completed a deferred adjudication. C.B. v. People, 122 P.3d 1065 (Colo. App. 2005).

The Colorado Children's Code does not supply definition of "interested party". In re People in Interest of C.P., 34 Colo. App. 54, 524 P.2d 316 (1974).

Since § 24-72-308 concerns the sealing of criminal records and juvenile delinquency proceedings are noncriminal in nature, the trial court should have proceeded under the expungement provisions set forth in this section when considering a petition to seal arrest and criminal records relating to a juvenile delinquency case. C.B. v. People, 122 P.3d 1065 (Colo. App. 2005).

19-1-307. Dependency and neglect records and information - access - fee - rules - records and reports fund - misuse of information - penalty - adult protective services data system check.

1. Identifying information - confidential. Except as otherwise provided in this section and section 19-1-303, reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying information contained in such reports shall be confidential and shall not be public information.
2. Good cause exception. Disclosure of the name and address of the child and family and other identifying information involved in such reports shall be permitted only when authorized by a court for good cause. Such disclosure shall not be prohibited when there is a death of a suspected victim of child abuse or neglect and the death becomes a matter of public record or the alleged juvenile offender is or was a victim of abuse or neglect or the suspected or alleged perpetrator becomes the subject of an arrest by a law enforcement agency or the subject of the filing of a formal charge by a law enforcement agency.
3. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(c) is effective until March 1, 2022.] Any person who violates any provision of this subsection (1) is guilty of a class 2 petty offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars.
  (c) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(c) is effective March 1, 2022. ] Any person who violates any provision of this subsection (1) commits a civil infraction.
Records and reports - access to certain persons - agencies. Except as set forth in section 19-1-303 , only the following persons or agencies shall have access to child abuse or neglect records and reports:
1. The law enforcement agency, district attorney, coroner, or county or district department of human or social services investigating a report of a known or suspected incident of child abuse or neglect or treating a child or family that is the subject of the report;
2. A physician who has before him or her a child whom the physician reasonably suspects to be abused or neglected;
3. An agency having the legal responsibility or authorization to care for, treat, or supervise a child who is the subject of a report or record or a parent, guardian, legal custodian, or other person who is responsible for the child's health or welfare, including, in the case of an anatomical gift, a coroner and a procurement organization, as those terms are defined in section 15-19-202 ;
4. Any person named in the report or record who was alleged as a child to be abused or neglected or, if the child named in the report or record is a minor or is otherwise incompetent at the time of the request, his or her guardian ad litem;
5. A parent, guardian, legal custodian, or other person responsible for the health or welfare of a child named in a report, or the assigned designee of any such person acting by and through a validly executed power of attorney, with protection for the identity of reporters and other appropriate persons;
6. 1. A mandatory reporter specified in this subsection (2)(e.5)(I) who is and continues to be officially and professionally involved in the ongoing care of the child who was the subject of the report, but only with regard to information that the mandatory reporter has a need to know in order to fulfill his or her professional and official role in maintaining the child's safety. A county department shall request written affirmation from a mandatory reporter stating that the reporter continues to be officially and professionally involved in the ongoing care of the child who was the subject of the report and describing the nature of the involvement, unless the county department has actual knowledge that the mandatory reporter continues to be officially and professionally involved in the ongoing care of the child who was the subject of the report. This subsection (2)(e.5)(I) applies to:
    1. Hospital personnel engaged in the admission, care, or treatment of children;
    2. Mental health professionals;
    3. Physicians or surgeons, including physicians in training;
    4. Registered nurses or licensed practical nurses;
    5. Dentists;
    6. Psychologists;
    7. Unlicensed psychotherapists;
    8. Licensed professional counselors;
    9. Licensed marriage and family therapists;
    10. Public or private school officials or employees;
    11. Social workers or workers with any facility or agency that is licensed or certified pursuant to part 1 of article 6 of title 26, C.R.S.;
    12. Victim's advocates, as defined in section 13-90-107 (1)(k) (II), C.R.S.;
    13. Clergy members, as defined in section 19-3-304 (2) (aa)(III);
    14. Educators providing services through a federal special supplemental nutrition program for women, infants, and children, as provided for in 42 U.S.C. sec. 1786;
    15. A person who is registered as a psychologist candidate pursuant to section 12-245-304 (3) , marriage and family therapist candidate pursuant to section 12-245-504 (4) , or licensed professional counselor candidate pursuant to section 12-245-604 (4) , or who is described in section 12-245-217 ; and
    16. Officials or employees of county departments of health, human services, or social services.
  2. Within sixty calendar days after receipt of a report of suspected child abuse or neglect from a mandatory reporter specified in subsection (2)(e.5)(I) of this section, a county department shall provide the following information to the mandatory reporter for the purpose of assisting the mandatory reporter in his or her professional and official role in maintaining the child's safety:
    1. The name of the child and the date of the report;
    2. Whether the referral was accepted for assessment;
    3. Whether the referral was closed without services;
    4. Whether the assessment resulted in services related to the safety of the child;
    5. The name of and contact information for the county caseworker responsible for investigating the referral; and
    6. Notice that the reporting mandatory reporter may request updated information identified in sub-subparagraphs (A) to (E) of this subparagraph (II) within ninety calendar days after the county department received the report and information concerning the procedure for obtaining updated information.
  3. Information disclosed to a mandatory reporter pursuant to this paragraph (e.5) is confidential and shall not be disclosed by the mandatory reporter to any other person except as provided by law.
  4. Unless requested by a county department, a mandatory reporter shall not have the authority to participate in any decision made by the county department concerning a report of abuse or neglect.
  5. In accordance with the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., the state department shall promulgate any rules necessary for the implementation of this paragraph (e.5).
7. A court, upon its finding that access to such records may be necessary for determination of an issue before such court, but such access shall be limited to in camera inspection unless the court determines that public disclosure of the information contained therein is necessary for the resolution of an issue then pending before it;
8. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1401 , § 8, effective January 1, 2004.)
9. All members of a child protection team, if one exists pursuant to section 19-3-308 (6)(a) ;
10. Such other persons as a court may determine, for good cause;
11. The state department of human services or a county or district department of human or social services or a child placement agency investigating an applicant for a license to operate a child care facility or agency pursuant to section 26-6-107 , when the applicant, as a requirement of the license application, has given written authorization to the licensing authority to obtain information contained in records or reports of child abuse or neglect. Access to the records and reports of child abuse or neglect granted to the named department or agencies must serve only as the basis for further investigation.
12. The state department of human services or a county or district department of human or social services investigating an exempt family child care home provider pursuant to section 26-6-120 , as a prerequisite to issuance or renewal of a contract or any payment agreement to receive money for the care of a child from publicly funded state child care assistance programs. Access to the records and reports of child abuse or neglect granted to the named department or agencies must serve only as the basis for further investigation.
13. The state department of human services investigating an applicant for an employee or volunteer position with, or an employee or volunteer of, a licensed neighborhood youth organization pursuant to section 26-6-103.7 (4) , C.R.S., when the applicant, employee, or volunteer has given written authorization to the state department of human services to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect;
14. The state department of human services investigating any person required to submit to a background check pursuant to section 26-6-705 (2) , when the person has given written authorization to the state department of human services to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect;
15. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(k) is effective until March 1, 2022.] The state department of human services, when requested in writing by any operator of a facility or agency that is licensed by the state department of human services pursuant to section 26-6-107 , C.R.S., to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect for the purpose of screening an applicant for employment or a current employee. Any such operator who requests such information concerning an individual who is neither a current employee nor an applicant for employment commits a class 1 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501 , C.R.S. Within ten days of the operator's request, the state department of human services shall provide the date of the report of the incident, the location of investigation, the type of abuse and neglect, and the county which investigated the incident contained in the confirmed reports of child abuse and neglect. Any such operator who releases any information obtained under this paragraph (k) to any other person shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of subsection (4) of this section and shall be subject to the penalty therefor. (k) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(k) is effective March 1, 2022. ] The state department of human services, when requested in writing by any operator of a facility or agency that is licensed by the state department of human services pursuant to section 26-6-107, to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect for the purpose of screening an applicant for employment or a current employee. Any such operator who requests such information concerning an individual who is neither a current employee nor an applicant for employment commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501 . Within ten days of the operator's request, the state department of human services shall provide the date of the report of the incident, the location of investigation, the type of abuse and neglect, and the county which investigated the incident contained in the confirmed reports of child abuse and neglect. Any such operator who releases any information obtained under this subsection (2)(k) to any other person shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of subsection (4) of this section and shall be subject to the penalty therefor.
16. The state department of human services, when requested in writing by a qualified county department, individual, or child placement agency approved to conduct home study investigations and reports pursuant to section 19-5-207.5 (2)(b)(I) for purposes of screening a prospective adoptive parent or any adult residing in the home under section 19-5-207 (2.5)(c), or investigating a prospective foster care parent, kinship care parent, or an adult residing in the home under section 26-6-107 (1) (a.7), C.R.S. Within ten days after the request, the state department of human services shall provide the date of the report of the incident, the location of investigation, the type of abuse and neglect, and the county that investigated the incident contained in the confirmed reports of child abuse or neglect. The county department, individual, or child placement agency shall be subject to the fee assessment established in subsection (2.5) of this section. With respect to screening a prospective adoptive parent, any employee of the county department or the child placement agency or any individual who releases any information obtained under this paragraph (k.5) to any person other than the adoption court shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of subsection (4) of this section and shall be subject to penalty therefor.
17. The state department of human services, when requested in writing by the department of education to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect for the purpose of aiding the department of education in its investigation of an allegation of abuse by an employee of a school district in this state. Within ten days of the department of education's request, the state department of human services shall provide the date of the report of the incident, the location of investigation, the type of abuse or neglect, and the county which investigated the incident contained in the confirmed reports of child abuse or neglect. The department of education shall be subject to the fee assessment established in subsection (2.5) of this section. Any employee of the department of education who releases any information obtained under this paragraph (l) to any person not authorized to receive such information pursuant to the provisions of section 22-32-109.7 , C.R.S., or any member of the board of education of a school district who releases such information obtained pursuant to said section shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of subsection (4) of this section and shall be subject to the penalty therefor.
18. The state department of human services and the county departments of human or social services, for the following purposes:
  1. Screening any person who seeks employment with, is currently employed by, or who volunteers for service with the state department of human services, department of health care policy and financing, or a county department of human or social services, if the person's responsibilities include direct contact with children;
  2. Conducting evaluations pursuant to section 14-10-127 , C.R.S.;
  3. Screening any person who will be responsible to provide child care pursuant to a contract with a county department for placements out of the home or private child care;
  4. Screening prospective adoptive parents;
19. Private adoption agencies, including private adoption agencies located in other states, for the purpose of screening prospective adoptive parents;
20. A person, agency, or organization engaged in a bona fide research or evaluation project, but without information identifying individuals named in a report, unless having said identifying information open for review is essential to the research and evaluation, in which case the executive director of the state department of human services shall give prior written approval and the child through a legal representative shall give permission to release the identifying information;
21. An auditor conducting a financial or performance audit of a county department of human or social services pursuant to section 26-1-114.5 , C.R.S.;
22. The governing body as defined in section 19-1-103 and the citizen review panels created pursuant to section 19-3-211 , for the purposes of carrying out their conflict resolution duties as set forth in section 19-3-211 and rules promulgated by the state department of human services;
23. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1401 , § 8, effective January 1, 2004.)
24. The state department of human services investigating an applicant for a supervisory employee position or an employee of a guest child care facility or a public services short-term child care facility pursuant to section 26-6-103.5 , C.R.S., when the applicant or employee, as a requirement of application for employment, has given written authorization to the state department of human services to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect;
25. The state department of human services investigating a prospective CASA volunteer for the CASA program when the prospective CASA volunteer has given written authorization to the CASA program to check any records or reports of child abuse or neglect pursuant to section 19-1-205 (3) (a.5);
26. State, county, and local government agencies of other states and child placement agencies located in other states, for the purpose of screening prospective foster or adoptive parents or any adult residing in the home of the prospective foster or adoptive parents;
27. The child protection ombudsman program created in section 19-3.3-102 , when conducting an investigation pursuant to article 3.3 of this title;
28. A licensed child placement agency, for the purpose of screening prospective foster parents, any adult residing in the home of the prospective foster parent, and specialized group facilities, pursuant to the following conditions:
  1. Access is limited to information concerning a current or prospective foster parent, an adult residing in the home of the current or prospective foster parent, or a specialized group facility and includes only the following information:
    1. Whether a report of child abuse or neglect has been made regarding the person;
    2. The general nature of the alleged incident of child abuse or neglect, including the category of the allegation, and the name and relationship of the perpetrator and victim;
    3. Whether the report of child abuse or neglect was screened for assessment;
    4. The outcome of the investigation including the investigator's summary of the reason or reasons for his or her finding or conclusions; and
    5. Child care and child welfare licensing history;
  2. 1. Access is limited to one person at each child placement agency, as designated by the agency and reported to the state department of human services.
    2. The state department of human services shall monitor a child placement agency's access to the records and reports of child abuse or neglect to ensure that the child placement agency is accessing the records and reports of child abuse or neglect in accordance with this paragraph (v).
    3. An unaccepted referral or an unfounded or inconclusive assessment pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (v) does not necessarily require that a current or prospective foster parent be denied placement pursuant to this article.
29. The designated authorities at the military base of assignment or installation for a member of the armed forces or a spouse, or a significant other or family member residing in the home of the member of the armed forces who is the individual responsible for the abused or neglected child. The authorities may be designated in a memorandum of understanding as described and authorized in section 19-1-303 (2.6).
30. A county department that assesses or provides protective services for at-risk adults, pursuant to article 3.1 of title 26, when the information is necessary for the county department to adequately assess for safety and risk or to provide protective services for an at-risk adult. The information disclosed pursuant to this subsection (2)(x) is limited to information regarding prior or current referrals, assessments, investigations, or case information related to a child or an alleged perpetrator. A county department that assesses or provides protective services for children is permitted to access information from a county department that assesses or provides protective services for at-risk adults pursuant to section 26-3.1-102 (7)(b) (VIII). The provisions of this subsection (2)(x) are in addition to and not in lieu of other federal and state laws concerning protected or confidential information.
31. The state department of human services, when requested in writing by an individual to check records or reports of child abuse or neglect for the purpose of screening that individual when such individual's responsibilities include care of children, treatment of children, supervision of children, or unsupervised contact with children.
(2.3) The following agencies or attorneys appointed by the court must be granted statewide read-only access to the name index and register of actions for the judiciary department:
1. Criminal justice agencies as described in section 24-72-302 (3) , C.R.S.;
2. County departments, as defined in section 19-1-103 , and attorneys who represent the county departments as county attorneys, as defined in section 19-1-103 , as it relates to the attorneys' work representing the county;
3. Guardians ad litem under contract with the office of the child's representative, created in section 13-91-104 , C.R.S., or authorized by the office of the child's representative to act as a guardian ad litem, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court; and
4. A respondent parent's counsel under contract with the office of the respondent parents' counsel, created in section 13-92-103 , or authorized by the office of the respondent parents' counsel to act as a respondent parent's counsel, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court.
(2.5) Fee - rules - records and reports fund.
1. Any person or agency provided information from the state department of human services pursuant to subsections (2)(i), (2)(k) to (2)(o), (2)(t), and (2)(y) of this section and any child placement agency must be assessed a fee that is established and collected by the state department of human services pursuant to parameters set forth in rule established by the state board of human services. At a minimum, the rules must include a provision requiring the state department of human services to provide notice of the fee to interested persons and the maximum fee amount that the department shall not exceed without the express approval of the state board of human services. The fee established must not exceed the direct and indirect costs of administering subsections (2)(i), (2)(k) to (2)(o), (2)(t), and (2)(y) of this section and the direct and indirect costs of administering section 19-3-313.5 (3) and (4).
2. All fees collected in accordance with subsection (2.5)(a) of this section must be transmitted to the state treasurer who shall credit the same to the records and reports fund, which fund is hereby created. The fund also consists of fees credited to the fund pursuant to section 26-3.1-111 . The money in the records and reports fund is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the direct and indirect costs of administering subsections (2)(i), (2)(k) to (2)(o), (2)(t), and (2)(y) of this section, for the direct and indirect costs of administering section 19-3-313.5 (3) and (4), and for the direct and indirect costs described in section 26-3.1-111 .
After a child who is the subject of a report to the state department of human services reaches the age of eighteen years, access to that report shall be permitted only if a sibling or offspring of such child is before any person mentioned in subsection (2) of this section and is a suspected victim of child abuse or neglect.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (4) is effective until March 1, 2022.] Any person who improperly releases or who willfully permits or encourages the release of data or information contained in the records and reports of child abuse or neglect to persons not permitted access to such information by this section or by section 19-1-303 commits a class 1 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501, C.R.S.
(4) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (4) is effective March 1, 2022. ] Any person who improperly releases or who willfully permits or encourages the release of data or information contained in the records and reports of child abuse or neglect to persons not permitted access to such information by this section or by section 19-1-303 commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1166, § 6, effective January 1, 1997; (2)(q) added and (2.5) amended, pp. 1587, 1588, §§ 16, 17, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98: IP(2) and (2)(p) amended, p. 821, § 25, effective August 5; (2)(m)(II) amended, p. 1408, § 67, effective February 1, 1999. L. 99: (2)(k.5) added, p. 1025, § 10, effective May 29. L. 2002: (2)(e) amended, p. 1809, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(r) added, p. 411, § 3, effective July 1; (2)(k) amended, p. 1523, § 224, effective October 1. L. 2003: (2), (2.5), and (3) amended and (4) added, p. 1401, § 8, effective January 1, 2004. L. 2006: (2)(j.5) added, p. 1084, § 5, effective May 25. L. 2007: (2)(j.5) amended, p. 318, § 3, effective April 2; (2)(r) amended, p. 866, § 3, effective May 14; (2)(k.5), (2)(n), and (2.5) amended and (2)(t) added, p. 1015, § 1, effective May 22; (2)(c) amended, p. 798, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2008: (2.3) added, p. 1243, § 6, effective August 5; (2.5) amended, p. 1892, § 62, effective August 5. L. 2010: (2)(j.7) added, (HB 10-1044), ch. 85, p. 288, § 3, effective April 14; (2)(u) added, (SB 10-171), ch. 225, p. 982, § 3, effective May 14; (2)(e.5) added, (SB 10-152), ch. 224, p. 971, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2011: IP(2)(e.5)(I) and (2)(e.5)(I)(G) amended, (SB 11-187), ch. 285, p. 1327, § 70, effective July 1; (2)(j.7) amended, (HB 11-1145), ch. 163, p. 563, § 5, effective August 10; IP(2)(e.5)(I), (2)(e.5)(I)(L), and (2)(e.5)(I)(M) amended and (2)(e.5)(I)(N) added, (SB 11-034), ch. 125, p. 390, § 2, effective January 1, 2012. L. 2013: (2)(e.5)(I)(M) and (2)(e.5)(I)(N) amended and (2)(e.5)(I)(O) added, (HB 13-1104), ch. 77, p. 248, § 5, effective August 7. L. 2015: (2)(k.5) amended, (SB 15-087), ch. 263, p. 1019, § 13, effective June 2; (2)(o) amended and (2)(o.5) added, (HB 15-1370), ch. 324, p. 1326, § 3, effective June 5; (2)(v) added, (HB 15-1248), ch. 306, p. 1253, § 1, effective July 1; (2.5) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 952, § 42, effective August 5. L. 2017: (2.5) amended, (HB 17-1284), ch. 272, p. 1503, § 7, effective May 31; IP(2) amended and (2)(w) added, (SB 17-028), ch. 332, p. 1784, § 3, effective August 9; (2)(c) amended, (SB 17-223), ch. 158, p. 563, § 16, effective August 9; (2)(h) amended, (SB 17-016), ch. 107, p. 392, § 4, effective August 9; IP(2)(e.5)(I), (2)(e.5)(I)(N), (2)(e.5)(I)(O), and IP(2)(e.5)(II) amended and (2)(e.5)(I)(P) added, (HB 17-1185), ch. 194, p. 709, § 1, effective December 31. L. 2018: (2)(a), (2)(j), (2)(j.5), IP(2)(m), and (2)(m)(I) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 411, § 36, effective August 8. L. 2019: (2)(j.8) added, (HB 19-1142), ch. 265, p. 2509, § 2, effective August 2; (2)(w) and (2.5) amended and (2)(y) added, (SB 19-177), ch. 311, p. 2810, § 1, effective August 2; (2)(x) added, (HB 19-1063), ch. 46, p. 155, § 1, effective August 2; IP(2.3) and (2.3)(d) amended, (HB 19-1104), ch. 14, p. 56, § 1, effective August 2; (2)(e.5)(I)(O) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1681, § 111, effective October 1. L. 2020: (2)(e.5)(I)(G) amended, (HB 20-1206), ch. 304, p. 1550, § 64, effective July 14. L. 2021: IP(2), (2)(p), and (2.3)(b) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 730, § 72, effective October 1; (1)(c), (2)(k), and (4) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3219, § 386, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section was formerly numbered as § 19-1-120.
Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (2)(e.5)(I) by Senate Bill 11-187 and Senate Bill 11-034 were harmonized, effective January 1, 2012.
Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (2)(k), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsections (2), (2.5), and (3) and enacting subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 196, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration in HB 15-1370, see section 1 of chapter 324, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The child protection team is subject to the provisions of the public meetings law, former § 29-9-101 , since it is a committee of a political subdivision of the state. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976).

Coverage of confidentiality provision. The confidentiality provision of this article covers the entire contents of a child abuse report and the records related thereto. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976).

Matters to be handled at open meetings. Discussion of matters not contained in reports, and which do not pertain to identifying information, are not appropriate subjects for executive session. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976).

The child protection team's consideration of questions other than those on specific cases, such as agency availability and responsiveness to reports of child abuse, must be handled in meetings open to the public. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976).

Subsection (2) does not provide equal access to social services records in a criminal case. People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

Subsection (2)(f) limits defendant's access to items that the trial court, after an in camera review, determines necessary for the resolution of an issue. Therefore, defendant cannot expect automatic disclosure of records within the possession and control of prosecuting attorney. Instead, defendant must request an in camera review, identify the information sought, and explain why disclosure is necessary for resolution of an issue. To achieve the broadest possible disclosure, defendant should explain the relevance and materiality of the information sought. People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

Prosecutor has full access to records while investigating a report of known or suspected incident of child abuse or neglect. Subsection (2)(f) does not suspend prosecutor's obligation to disclose information that is materially favorable to defendant. However, that duty to disclose is still subject to the in camera review process in subsection (2)(f). Therefore, if the prosecutor believes a social services record contains information it must disclose, the prosecutor must ask the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the information to determine if disclosure is necessary for the resolution of an issue. If the trial court determines the information is necessary then it is disclosed to the defendant. The prosecutor does not have the right to offer the material into evidence without first obtaining the trial court's approval. People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

Subsection (2)(f) places the trial court in the middle of a procedural issue that normally would have been handled by counsel through the automatic disclosure requirements of Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1). The trial court must review the records to determine whether the records are necessary for the resolution of an issue. Although the determination of whether the records should be disclosed must be made on case-specific circumstances, there are three principles that apply generally. First, under due process considerations, the trial court must disclose any information that is materially favorable to defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching. Second, the trial court should disclose inculpatory information when the information would materially assist in preparing the defense. Finally, it may be significant, although not determinative, that the information would be otherwise subject to automatic disclosure under Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1). People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

Defendant received adequate discovery of department of social services records. Subsection (2)(f) prohibits defendant from having the same direct access the prosecution has to the records. Moreover, trial court does not have an obligation through the in camera review to provide defendant all of the records, only those that are necessary for determination of an issue. People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

Trial court erred in not disclosing report from department of social services file, but error was not prejudicial. People v. Jowell, 199 P.3d 38 (Colo. App. 2008).

A defendant meets the burden for requesting review and disclosure of juvenile records when the defendant joins the people's request for review based on the people's review of the records and belief they contain information that would materially assist the defendant in preparing a defense. People v. Herrera, 2012 COA 13 , 272 P.3d 1158.

Identification of informant released only upon court's finding of necessity. In an action for slander, outrageous conduct, negligence, gross negligence arising out of a child abuse investigation, access to data that would identify the informant shall be given to the plaintiffs only upon a finding by the trial court that public disclosure of the information may be necessary for the resolution of an issue in the case then pending before it. Martin v. County of Weld, 43 Colo. App. 49, 598 P.2d 532 (1979).

Court should make in camera inspection of records to determine if public disclosure is necessary in the interest of a fair trial. People v. Ross, 745 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1987).

Party seeking access to child abuse reports has the burden of establishing the existence of an exception to the statute's rule of confidentiality. People v. Dist. Court, 743 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1987).

Trial court need not review department of social services child abuse reports to determine whether confidentiality of reports should be waived when defendant did not meet his initial burden of showing applicability of the exception even though he did allege the reports were crucial to his case. People v. Exline, 775 P.2d 48 (Colo. App. 1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that nondisclosed documents were not relevant to any issue before the court. Further, defendant's appellate counsel had no right to review sealed records for purposes of his appeal. Neither appellate defense counsel nor the attorney general's office was allowed access to the records, and allowing appellate defense counsel to review the entire social services file would unnecessarily sacrifice the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of social services records. People v. Frost, 5 P.3d 317 (Colo. App. 1999).

Juvenile court abused its discretion when it chose to review only the last of nine volumes of department of human services' records. First, after the court necessarily determined that defendant had made a sufficient showing to warrant in camera review of those records, it was obligated to review all of the records, despite the fact that such review would have imposed a significant burden on the court. Second, because subsection (2)(f) authorizes only the juvenile court to review the department of human services' records in a case such as this, only the court could determine whether any of the records might be necessary to the determination of an issue before it. People ex rel. A.D.T., 232 P.3d 313 (Colo. App. 2010).

Juvenile court erred in refusing to order disclosure of certain department of human services' records that were exculpatory or impeaching or that would materially assist in preparing a defense. People ex rel. A.D.T., 232 P.3d 313 (Colo. App. 2010).

19-1-308. Parentage information.

Notwithstanding any other law concerning public hearings and records, any hearing or trial held pursuant to article 4 of this title 19 must be held in closed court without admittance of any person other than those necessary to the action or proceeding. In addition to access otherwise provided for pursuant to section 19-1-303, all papers and records pertaining to the action or proceeding that are part of the permanent record of the court are subject to inspection by the parties to the action and their attorneys of record, and such parties and their attorneys are subject to a court order that must be in effect against all parties to the action prohibiting the parties from disclosing the genetic testing information contained in the court's record. Such court papers and records are not subject to inspection by any person not a party to the action except the state child support enforcement agency or delegate child support enforcement units for the purposes set forth in section 19-1-303 (4.4) or upon consent of the court and all parties to the action, or, in exceptional cases only, upon an order of the court for good cause shown. All papers and records in the custody of the county department of human or social services must be available for inspection by the parties to the action only upon the consent of all parties to the action and as provided by section 26-1-114, or by the rules governing discovery, but the papers and records must not be subject to inspection by any person not a party to the action except upon consent of all parties to the action; except that the results of genetic testing may be provided to all parties, when available, notwithstanding laws governing confidentiality and without the necessity of formal discovery. Any person receiving or inspecting paternity information in the custody of the county department of human or social services is subject to a court order that must be in effect prohibiting such persons from disclosing the genetic testing information contained in the department's record.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1169, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1267, § 57, effective July 1. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 411, § 37, effective August 8.

Editor's note: This section was formerly numbered as 19-1-121.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Section is intended to protect confidentiality of adoption proceedings against disclosure to third parties and not to protect confidentiality among siblings or parents and, therefore, separate petitions to adopt all four children of deceased natural mother are not required. Hopp v. Patterman, 757 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1988).

19-1-309. Relinquishments and adoption information.

Except as provided in parts 3 and 4 of article 5 of this title and section 19-1-303, all records and proceedings in relinquishment or adoption shall be confidential and open to inspection upon order of the court for good cause shown or as otherwise authorized pursuant to article 5 of this title. The court shall act to preserve the anonymity of the biological parents, the adoptive parents, and the child from the general public, except as ordered by the court for good cause shown pursuant to this section or except as authorized pursuant to a designated adoption or pursuant to section 19-5-104 (2) or part 3 or 4 of article 5 of this title. A separate docket shall be maintained for relinquishment proceedings and for adoption proceedings.

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1169, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 822, § 26, effective August 5. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 1130, § 2, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section was formerly numbered as 19-1-122.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Section applies to adult adoption proceedings under § 14-1-101. In re W.D.A. v. City & County of Denver, 632 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1981).

The general assembly intended that adoption proceedings should be heard separately from a dependency and neglect proceeding even if the proceedings are related, such as a dependency and neglect proceeding that later results in an adoption. People in Interest of C.N., 2018 COA 165 , 431 P.3d 1219.

19-1-309.3. Exchange of information for child support purposes - process.

The state court administrator of the judicial department and the executive director of the state department of human services, or their designees, shall design a process for exchanging information related to dependency or neglect actions, parentage actions, and any other actions brought pursuant to this title, as contemplated in sections 19-1-303 (4.4), 19-1-308, and 19-1-309, for purposes of locating responsible parties to pay child support, establishing paternity and child support, including child support debt pursuant to section 14-14-104, C.R.S., enforcing child support orders, disbursing collected child support payments, and facilitating the efficient and effective delivery of services under articles 13 and 13.5 of title 26, C.R.S. The process shall allow for the exchange of information by the state child support enforcement agency or the delegate child support enforcement units prior to or after intervention by the agency or units in an action brought pursuant to this title. Except for the limited purposes of the duties described in this section, the state child support enforcement agency or a delegate child support enforcement unit shall maintain the confidentiality of the information received pursuant to this part 3 and such information shall not be subject to discovery.

Source: L. 2003: Entire section added, p. 1268, § 58, effective July 1.

19-1-309.5. Adoptive family resource registry.

Limitations concerning the accessibility to information on the adoptive family resource registry are set forth in section 19-5-207.5 (5)(c).

Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 1025, § 7, effective May 29.

19-1-310. Information related to intervention and prevention programs - review and evaluation of programs. (Repealed)

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1169, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: Entire section repealed, p. 585, § 12, effective May 18.

19-1-311. Centralized integrated data base system for children and families - strategic business plan - technology plan - children's information management committee - report. (Repealed)

Source: L. 96: Entire part added with relocations, p. 1170, § 6, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 1017, § 23, effective June 1.

19-1-312. Central registry phase out - implementation plan - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 45, § 1, effective July 1.

Editor's note: Subsection (3) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2000. (See L. 97, p. 45 .)

PART 4 PREVENTION PROGRAMS FUNDED THROUGH STATE AGENCIES

19-1-401 to 19-1-403. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2000: Entire part repealed, p. 585, § 9, effective May 18.

Editor's note: This part 4 was added in 1999 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 2000. For the text of this part 4 prior to 2000, consult the 1999 Colorado Revised Statutes.

ARTICLE 1.5 TASK FORCE STUDY TO RECODIFY CODE

19-1.5-101 to 19-1.5-106. (Repealed)

Editor's note:

This article was added in 1994 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 1997. For the text of this article prior to 1997, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.
Section 19-1.5-106 provided for the repeal of this article, effective July 1, 1997. (See L. 94, p. 1479 .)

ARTICLE 2 THE COLORADO JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

19-2-101 to 19-2-1305. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2021: Entire article repealed, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 557, § 1, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This title 19 was repealed and reenacted in 1987, and this article 2 was subsequently amended with relocations in 1996, effective January 1, 1997. For amendments to this article 2 prior to its repeal in 2021, consult the 2020 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. This article 2 was relocated to article 2.5 of this title 19. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this article 2, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.
1. Changes by HB 21-1090 to § 19-2-104 (1)(a)(I) and (5) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-103 (1)(a)(I) and (5), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from May 20, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 901 .
2. 1. Changes by SB 21-066 to § 19-2-303 (1)(a), (2), (3)(d.5), (4), (4.5), (5), (6)(a), and (9) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-402 (1)(a) , (2), (3)(d.5), (4), (4.5), (5), (6)(a), and (9), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from April 29, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 254 .
  2. Changes by HB 21-1108 to § 19-2-303 (4)(c)(III) were harmonized with SB 21-066. All changes were subsequently harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-402 (4)(c) (III), effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from September 7, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 891 .
3. Changes by SB 21-066 to § 19-2-202 were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-1401 , effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from April 29, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 254 .
4. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-212 IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(IV), (1)(a)(VIII), (1)(a)(IX), (1)(a)(X), (1)(a)(XI), (1)(a)(XII), (1)(a)(XIII), (1)(a.5), (1)(b)(I), and (3) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-1404 IP(1)(a), (1)(a)(IV), (1)(a)(VIII), (1)(a)(IX), (1)(a)(X), (1)(a)(XI), (1)(a)(XII), (1)(a)(XIII), (1)(a.5), (1)(b)(I), and (3), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3336 .
5. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-503 (3) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-204 (3) , effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3333 .
6. 1. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-508 (3)(a)(VII)(C), (4)(e)(I), and (5) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-305 (3)(a) (VII)(C), (4)(e)(I), and (5), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3333 .
  2. Changes by HB 21-1187 to § 19-2-508 (3)(b)(I) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-305 (3)(b)(I) , effective July 1, 2024.
7. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-509 IP(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (10) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-306 IP(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3334 .
8. Changes by HB 21-1187 to § 19-2-906 (2) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-1102 (2) , effective July 1, 2024.
9. Changes by HB 21-1214 to § 19-2-927 (9) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-910 (9) , effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from September 7, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3029 .
10. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-1201 (4) and (5) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-1514 (4) and (5), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3335 .
11. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-1202 IP(1) and (1)(b) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-1405 IP(1) and (1)(b), respectively, effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3335 .
12. Changes by SB 21-071 to § 19-2-1303 (4) were harmonized with SB 21-059 and relocated to § 19-2.5-704 (4) , effective October 1, 2021. For the law in effect from July 6, 2021, until the effective date of the relocation, see L. 2021, p. 3336 .
1. Section 19-2-103 (7) was repealed in HB 21-1315. That repeal was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the repeal of § 19-2-103 (7) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3113 .)
2. Section 19-2-104 (9) was added in SB 21-271, effective March 1, 2022. However, that section was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021.
3. Section 19-2-114 (1)(a), (1)(b), (2), and (3) was amended in HB 21-1315. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the amendments to § 19-2-114 (1)(a), (1)(b), (2), and (3) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3106 .)
4. Section 19-2-115 was added in HB 21-1315. That section was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For § 19-2-115 in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3115 .)
5. Section 19-2-303 (7) was amended in SB 21-066, effective July 1, 2023. However, that section was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021.
6. Section 19-2-508 IP(3)(a)(VII) was amended in SB 21-071. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the amendments to § 19-2-508 IP(3)(a)(VII) in SB 21-071 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 463, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3333 .)
7. Section 19-2-518 (1)(d) was repealed and reenacted in HB 21-1091. That repeal and reenactment was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the repeal and reenactment of § 19-2-518 (1)(d) in HB 21-1091 in effect from May 24, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 175, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 954 .)
8. Section 19-2-706 (2)(b) was repealed in HB 21-1315. That repeal was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the repeal of § 19-2-706 (2)(b) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3108 .)
9. Section 19-2-905 (4) was amended in HB 21-1315. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the amendments to § 19-2-905 (4) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3111 .)
10. Section 19-2-907 (6) was repealed in HB 21-1315. That repeal was superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the repeal of § 19-2-907 (6) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3112 .)
11. Section 19-2-925 IP(2)(a), (2)(a)(VII), (2)(a)(VIII), and (2)(a)(IX) was amended in HB 21-1315. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the amendments to § 19-2-925 IP(2)(a), (2)(a)(VII), (2)(a)(VIII), and (2)(a)(IX) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3113 .)
12. Section 19-2-925.6 IP(1), (3)(a), (4), and (6) was amended in HB 21-1315. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of this article 2 in SB 21-059, effective October 1, 2021. For the amendments to § 19-2-925.6 IP(1), (3)(a), (4), and (6) in HB 21-1315 in effect from July 6, 2021, to October 1, 2021, see chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. ( L. 2021, p. 3110 .)

ARTICLE 2.5 THE COLORADO JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Editor's note: This article 2.5 was added with relocations in 2021. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this article 2.5, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.

Section

PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

PART 2 INVESTIGATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

PART 3 DETENTION

PART 4 DIVERSION

PART 5 INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS

PART 6 COURT PROCEEDINGS

PART 7 COMPETENCY TO PROCEED

PART 8 DIRECT FILING AND TRANSFER HEARINGS

PART 9 ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS

PART 10 TEEN COURTS

PART 11 SENTENCING

SUBPART A IN GENERAL

SUBPART B OFFENSE-SPECIFIC SPECIALIZED SENTENCING

SUBPART C SENTENCING - SPECIAL OFFENDERS

PART 12 JUVENILE PAROLE

PART 13 APPEALS

PART 14 ADMINISTRATION

SUBPART A IN GENERAL

SUBPART B PROGRAMS

PART 15 FACILITIES

SUBPART A IN GENERAL

SUBPART B BEDS AND FACILITIES

SUBPART C FACILITIES - COMMITMENT

PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

19-2.5-101. Legislative declaration.

1. The general assembly finds that the intent of this article 2.5 is to protect, restore, and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law and, in certain cases, will also provide the opportunity to bring together affected victims, the community, and juvenile offenders for restorative purposes.
2. The general assembly further finds that, while holding paramount the public safety, the juvenile justice system must take into consideration the best interests of the juvenile, the victim, and the community in providing appropriate treatment to reduce the rate of recidivism in the juvenile justice system and to assist the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society.
The general assembly finds that the public has the right to safe and secure homes and communities and that when a delinquent act occurs, safety and security is compromised; and the result is harm to the victim, the community, and the juvenile offender. The general assembly finds that the juvenile justice system should seek to repair such harm and that victims and communities should be provided with the opportunity to elect to participate actively in a restorative process that would hold the juvenile offender accountable for the offense.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 557, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-102 (1) and (2) as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "In re Gault and the Colorado Children's Code", see 44 Den. L. J. 644 (1967).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Design of the Colorado Children's Code. The code was designed to benefit youthful offenders. C.C.C. v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 437 , 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

Construction of the Colorado Children's Code. The code should not be construed to diminish the rights of youthful offenders. C.C.C. v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 437 , 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

Procedural safeguards to curb administrative abuse. Procedural safeguards in article 2 were established to curb possible abuse inherent in informal administrative practices in an area involving both the parents' and the child's rights. P.F.M. v. Dist. Court, 184 Colo. 393 , 520 P.2d 742 (1974).

The Colorado Children's Code requires balancing. Because the code is for the benefit and best interests of all Colorado's children, a balancing effect must take place. C.C.C. v. Dist. Court, 188 Colo. 437 , 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

There is a very fundamental difference between a criminal proceeding and a delinquency proceeding, and the clear legislative intent is that the handling of juvenile delinquents should be oriented towards rehabilitation and reformation, and not punishment as such, even though the actions of the child if committed by an adult would justify a criminal proceeding. People ex rel. Terrell v. Dist. Court, 164 Colo. 437 , 435 P.2d 763 (1967).

But juvenile cases must accord due process. There is no constitutional requirement that proceedings in juvenile cases shall be conducted according to the criminal law, or that proceedings need take any particular form, so long as the essentials of due process and fair treatment are accorded. In re People in Interest of J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245 , 483 P.2d 362 (1971).

19-2.5-102. Definitions.

In addition to the terms defined in section 19-1-103, as used in this article 2.5, unless the context otherwise requires:

"Adjudication" means a determination by the court that it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act or that a juvenile has pled guilty to committing a delinquent act. In addition, when a previous conviction must be pled and proven as an element of an offense or for purposes of sentence enhancement, "adjudication" means conviction.
"Adjudicatory trial" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Adult" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Basic identification information" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Behavioral health" has the same meaning as set forth in section 27-60-100.3.
"Child" means a person under eighteen years of age.
"Commit" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Competent to proceed" means that a juvenile has sufficient present ability to consult with the juvenile's attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the defense and that the juvenile has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.
"Cost of care" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"County department" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Crossover youth plan" means the portion of the annual plan described in section 19-2.5-302 and devised in each judicial district by the juvenile services planning committee that outlines identification and notification of dually identified crossover youth as described in section 19-2.5-302.
"Delinquent act" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Detention" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Determinate period" means that the department of human services may not transfer legal or physical custody of a juvenile until the juvenile has completed the period of commitment imposed by the court, unless otherwise ordered by the court; except that the department of human services may release the juvenile on parole prior to completion of the determinate period, pursuant to section 19-2.5-1203.
"Diagnostic and evaluation center" means a facility for the examination and study of persons committed to the custody of the department of human services.
"Director" means the executive director of the department of public safety.
1. "Diversion" means a decision made by a person with authority or a delegate of that person that results in specific official action of the legal system not being taken in regard to a specific juvenile or child and in lieu thereof providing or referring the juvenile or child to an individually designed program or activity, if necessary, provided by district attorneys' offices, governmental units, or nongovernmental units. The goal of diversion is to prevent further involvement of the juvenile or child in the formal legal system.
2. Diversion of a juvenile or child may take place either at the prefiling level as an alternative to the filing of a petition pursuant to section 19-2.5-502 or postfiling as an alternative to adjudication. Services may include restorative justice practices as defined in subsection (45) of this section.
"Division of youth services" or "division" means the division of youth services, created in section 19-2.5-1501.
"Dually identified crossover youth" means youth who are currently involved in the juvenile justice system and the child welfare system or have a history in the child welfare system that includes, but is not limited to, a family assessment response service plan or an open case.
Repealed.
"Gang", as used in sections 19-2.5-305 and 19-2.5-1504, means a group of three or more individuals with a common interest, bond, or activity characterized by criminal or delinquent conduct, engaged in either collectively or individually.
"Governmental unit", as used in sections 19-2.5-402, 19-2.5-1502, and 19-2.5-1519, means any county, city and county, city, town, judicial district attorney's office, or school district.
"Guardian ad litem" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Halfway house" means a group care facility for juveniles who have been placed on probation or parole pursuant to the terms of this article 2.5.
"Incompetent to proceed" means that, based on an intellectual or developmental disability, mental health disorder, or lack of mental capacity, a juvenile does not have sufficient present ability to consult with the juvenile's attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the defense or that the juvenile does not have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings taking place.
"Indian child" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Intellectual and developmental disability" means a disability that is manifested before the person reaches his or her twenty-second birthday, that constitutes a substantial disability to the affected individual, and that is attributable to an intellectual disability or other neurological conditions when those conditions result in impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of a person with an intellectual disability. Unless otherwise specifically stated, the federal definition of "developmental disability", 42 U.S.C. sec. 15002 (8), does not apply.
"Juvenile" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Juvenile community review board" means any board appointed by a board of county commissioners for the purpose of reviewing community placements pursuant to this article 2.5. A juvenile community review board, if practicable, includes but is not limited to a representative from a county department of human or social services, a local school district, a local law enforcement agency, a local probation department, a local bar association, the division of youth services, and private citizens.
"Juvenile court" or "court" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Juvenile delinquent" means a juvenile who has been found guilty of a delinquent act.
"Mental capacity" means a juvenile's capacity to meet all of the following criteria:
1. Appreciate the charges or allegations against the juvenile;
2. Appreciate the nature of the adversarial process, which includes having a factual and rational understanding of the participants in the proceeding and their roles, including the judge, defense counsel, prosecutor, and, if applicable, the guardian ad litem and the jury;
3. Appreciate the range and nature of allowable dispositions that may be imposed by the court;
4. Have the ability to communicate to counsel information known to the juvenile regarding the allegations against the juvenile, as well as information relevant to the proceeding at issue; and
5. Understand and appreciate the right to testify and to voluntarily exercise the right.
"Mental health disorder" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, or cognitive ability that results in marked functional disability and significantly interferes with adaptive behavior. "Mental health disorder" does not include acute intoxication from alcohol or other substances, any condition manifested only by antisocial behavior, or any substance abuse impairment resulting from recent use or withdrawal. However, substance abuse that results in a long-term, substantial disorder of thought, mood, or cognitive ability may constitute a mental health disorder.
"Mental health hospital placement prescreening" means a face-to-face mental health examination conducted by a mental health professional to determine whether a child should be placed in a facility for evaluation pursuant to section 27-65-105 or 27-65-106. The prescreening may include consultation with other mental health professionals and review of all available records on the child.
"Office of alternate defense counsel" means the office of alternate defense counsel created and existing pursuant to section 21-2-101.
"Office of the state public defender" means the office of state public defender created and existing pursuant to section 21-1-101.
"Parent" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Peace officer" has the same meaning as set forth in section 16-2.5-101.
"Physical custodian", as used in sections 19-2.5-203 and 19-2.5-501, means a guardian, whether or not appointed by court order, with whom the juvenile has resided.
"Reasonable efforts" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Receiving center" means a facility used by the department of human services to provide temporary detention and care for juveniles pending placement in a training school, camp, or other facility.
"Repeat juvenile offender" is described in section 19-2.5-1125 (2).
"Residential community placement" means any placement for residential purposes permitted pursuant to this title 19, except in an institutional facility directly operated by, or a secure facility under contract with, the department of human services and except while a juvenile is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile parole board.
"Restoration to competency hearing" means a hearing to determine whether a juvenile who has previously been determined to be incompetent to proceed has achieved or is restored to competency.
1. "Restorative justice" means those practices that emphasize repairing the harm to the victim and community caused by delinquent acts. Restorative justice practices may include victim-offender conferences attended voluntarily by the victim, a victim advocate, the offender, community members, and supporters of the victim or the offender that provide an opportunity for the offender to accept responsibility for the harm caused to those affected by the crime and to participate in setting consequences to repair the harm. Consequences recommended by the participants may include but need not be limited to apologies, community service, restoration, and counseling. The selected consequences are incorporated into an agreement that sets time limits for completion of the consequences and is signed by all participants.
2. Any statements made during the restorative justice process are confidential and must not be used against the juvenile, or as a basis for charging or prosecuting the juvenile, unless the juvenile commits a chargeable offense during the process.
3. Nothing precludes a person from reporting child abuse or neglect when required pursuant to section 19-3-304 or a mental health provider from complying with a duty to warn pursuant to section 13-21-117 (2).
"Screening team" means the person or persons designated, pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Colorado rules of juvenile procedure, by the chief judge in each judicial district or, for the second judicial district, the presiding judge of the Denver juvenile court to make recommendations to the juvenile court concerning whether a juvenile taken into temporary custody should be released or admitted to a detention or shelter facility pursuant to section 19-2.5-305.
"Sentencing hearing" means a hearing to determine what sentence must be imposed on a juvenile delinquent or what other order of disposition must be made concerning a juvenile delinquent, including commitment. A sentencing hearing may be part of the proceeding that includes the adjudicatory trial, or it may be held at a time subsequent to the adjudicatory trial.
"Staff secure facility" means a group facility or home at which each juvenile is continuously under staff supervision and at which all services, including education and treatment, are provided on site. A staff secure facility may or may not be a locked facility.
"Standardized mental health disorder screening" means the mental health disorder screening conducted using the juvenile standardized screening instruments and the procedures adopted pursuant to section 16-11.9-102.
"Status offense" has the same meaning as defined in federal law in 28 CFR 31.304, as amended.
"Temporary holding facility" is defined in section 19-1-103.
"Training school" means an institution providing care, education, treatment, and rehabilitation for juveniles in a closed setting and includes a regional center established in part 3 of article 10.5 of title 27.
"Victim", as used in this article 2.5, means any party immediately and directly aggrieved by the juvenile or youth; that party's spouse; the party's parent, sibling, or child who is living with the party; a victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation claim; a person or entity that has suffered losses because of a contractual relationship with such party, including an insurer or because of liability under section 14-6-110; or, in the absence of any of the above, the state.
"Youth" is defined in section 19-1-103.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 558, § 2, effective October 1; (20) repealed, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3118, § 29, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 19-2-103 as it existed prior to 2021.
Section 36 of chapter 461 (HB 21-1315), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act repealing subsection (20) takes effect only if SB 21-059 becomes law and takes effect either upon the effective date of HB 21-1315 or SB 21-059, whichever is later. SB 21-059 became law and both bills have an effective date of October 1, 2021.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

19-2.5-103. Jurisdiction.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
1. Concerning any juvenile ten years of age or older who has violated:
  1. Any federal or state law, except nonfelony state traffic, game and fish, and parks and recreation laws or rules; the offense specified in section 18-13-122, concerning the illegal possession or consumption of ethyl alcohol or marijuana by an underage person or illegal possession of marijuana paraphernalia by an underage person; the offenses specified in section 18-18-406 (5)(b)(I) and (5)(b)(II), concerning marijuana and marijuana concentrate; and the civil infraction in section 18-7-109 (3), concerning exchange of a private image by a juvenile;
  2. Any county or municipal ordinance except traffic ordinances, the penalty for which may be a jail sentence of more than ten days; or
  3. Any lawful order of the court made pursuant to this title 19;
2. Concerning a juvenile to whom section 19-2.5-802 applies; except that, after filing charges in the juvenile court but prior to the time that the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing, the district attorney may file the same or different charges against the juvenile by direct filing of an information in the district court or by indictment pursuant to section 19-2.5-801. Upon such filing or indictment in the district court, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over proceedings concerning such charges.
The juvenile court has limited jurisdiction in matters to which section 19-2.5-801 applies.
The fact that a juvenile has been prosecuted or convicted in the county court for a nonfelony violation pursuant to title 42 is not a bar to a subsequent or parallel proceeding pursuant to this title 19 for delinquent acts arising out of the same criminal episode; nor are proceedings pursuant to this title 19 a bar to a subsequent or parallel prosecution in the county court for a nonfelony violation pursuant to title 42 for the same delinquent acts arising from the same criminal episode.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile who is under sixteen years of age and who has violated a traffic law or ordinance if the juvenile's case is transferred to the juvenile court from the county court. Such a transfer is subject to approval by the juvenile court.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the juvenile court and the county court have concurrent jurisdiction over a juvenile who is under eighteen years of age and who is charged with a violation of section 18-13-122, 18-18-406 (5)(b)(I) and (5)(b)(II), 18-18-428, 18-18-429, 18-18-430, or 42-4-1301; except that, if the juvenile court accepts jurisdiction over such a juvenile, the county court jurisdiction terminates.
The juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a juvenile until all orders have been fully complied with by such person, or any pending cases have been completed, or the statute of limitations applicable to any offense that may be charged has run, regardless of whether such person has attained the age of eighteen years, and regardless of the age of such person.
This section does not confer any jurisdiction upon the court over a person for any offense committed after the person attains the age of eighteen years.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile to determine the legal custody of a juvenile or to appoint a guardian of the person or legal custodian of any child who comes within the juvenile court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 19-1-104.
[ Editor's note: Subsection (9) is effective March 1, 2022.] If a juvenile is charged with a civil infraction and is not charged with an additional offense that would constitute a criminal offense if charged against an adult, the county court has jurisdiction over the civil infraction.

Source: L. 2021: (1)(a)(I) and (5) amended, (HB 21-1090), ch. 157, p. 901, § 5, effective May 20; entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 564, § 2, effective October 1; (9) added, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3220, § 388, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 19-2-104 as it existed prior to 2021.
Subsections (1)(a)(I) and (5) were numbered as 19-2-104 (1)(a)(I) and (5) in HB 21-1090 (see L. 2021, p. 901 ). Those provisions were harmonized with subsections (1)(a)(I) and (5) of this section as they appear in SB 21-059.
Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Prosecution of Juveniles in Colorado Municipal Courts", see 21 Colo. Law. 1151 (1992). For article, "New Juvenile Justice Laws Increase Options for Youth", see 42 Colo. Law. 37 (April 2013).

Annotator's note. Since § 19-2.5-103 is similar to § 19-2-104 as it existed prior to the 2021 amendments relocating repealed article 2 of title 19 to this article 2.5, relevant cases decided under former provisions similar to that section have been included in the annotations to this section.

A juvenile's age at the time of an offense is a matter of jurisdiction. People in Interest of P.K., 2015 COA 121 , 411 P.3d 963.

When a range of dates on a delinquency petition charge an offense, both dates must fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. If not, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over the delinquency petition and any admission of the petition by the juvenile. People in Interest of P.K., 2015 COA 121 , 411 P.3d 963.

Juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent until any restitution order is fully complied with, even though it may subject him to the court's jurisdiction indefinitely into his adult years. People v. T.R., 860 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1993).

This section is inapplicable where there has been no adjudication concerning the petitioner in the juvenile court. Jaramillo v. Dist. Court, 173 Colo. 459 , 480 P.2d 841 (1971).

No new trial where court terminates jurisdiction. A new trial cannot be held upon reversal where the trial court, at a hearing subsequent to its order adjudging respondent a delinquent child, terminated its jurisdiction pursuant to this section. People in Interest of J.S.C. v. J.S.C., 30 Colo. App. 381, 493 P.2d 671 (1972).

Prosecution of juveniles under municipal ordinance does not conflict with Colorado Children's Code and, although municipalities are not prohibited from adopting same procedures as the Children's Code, municipalities are not required to follow such procedures. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Intent of general assembly that Colorado Children's Code apply only to juvenile proceedings in juvenile court, and not to municipal court proceedings involving prosecution of juveniles under municipal ordinances. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 ( Colo. 1992 ).

Juvenile court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. A court of the juvenile division of the district court should take judicial notice of those municipal ordinances within the contemplation of the juvenile code, when the municipalities are within the judicial district where the juvenile court sits. People v. Hight, 198 Colo. 299 , 599 P.2d 885 (1979).

Juveniles to receive same trial rights as adults. The juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction carries with it the same trial duties as to juveniles who have violated municipal ordinances, as a municipal court has to adults who violated the same ordinances. People v. Hight, 198 Colo. 299 , 599 P.2d 885 (1979).

Delinquency proceeding and child in need of supervision proceeding compared. In delinquency proceedings, the child stands charged with activity which would constitute a crime if done by an adult. In contrast, a child in need of supervision proceeding determines whether the child is a truant, a runaway, or a danger to himself or others. People in Interest of Y.D.M., 197 Colo. 403 , 593 P.2d 1356 (1979).

Juvenile court lacks exclusive jurisdiction. Where the violation charged is of a municipal ordinance that does not carry a jail sentence, the general assembly has not intended by the Colorado Children's Code to give sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Wigent v. Shinsato, 43 Colo. App. 83, 601 P.2d 653 (1979).

Application of former subsection (9)(c) (now subsection (4)). Although subsection (9)(c) (now subsection (4)) gives the juvenile court jurisdiction over a traffic offender under 16 years of age whose case has been transferred from county court, this provision obviously does not apply to a 16 year old who holds a valid Colorado driver's license. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 153 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).

The intent of the Colorado Children's Code is to restrict the institution of felony charges in a criminal proceeding against one under 18 years of age. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970); D.W. v. Dist. Court, 193 Colo. 194 , 564 P.2d 949 (1976).

The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings concerning any delinquent child, which proceeding is to be distinguished from a true criminal proceeding. People ex rel. Terrell v. Dist. Court, 164 Colo. 437 , 435 P.2d 763 (1967); I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

It has jurisdiction over a petition in delinquency alleging vehicular homicide, which is not excluded by the Colorado Children's Code as a "traffic offense". I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54 , 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

But not over child leaving home to be married. The mere fact that a minor child left the home of her mother and was taken by respondent to a neighboring state and was married does not show her to be a delinquent under the statute, such as to give the court jurisdiction. Spencer v. People in Interest of Spencer, 133 Colo. 196 , 292 P.2d 971 (1956).

The district court still retains original jurisdiction in all criminal cases. This is so because a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal case. People ex rel. Terrell v. Dist. Court, 164 Colo. 437 , 435 P.2d 763 (1967).

The district attorney may not directly file charges in district court where the identical charges were initially filed in juvenile court and a transfer hearing is pending. J.D.C. v. Dist. Court 18th Jud. Dist., 910 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1996) (decided prior to amendment of subsection (1)(b) specifically authorizing direct filing under such circumstances).

Exception to juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction in cases where prosecution directly files charges. Under the plain language of subsection (1)(b) of this section and §§ 19-2-517 (2) and 19-2-518 (2), a prosecutor has discretion to proceed charging alleged juvenile offenders who are eligible to be charged as adults by means of a direct filing in district court until such time as the juvenile court actually conducts a transfer hearing. People v. Pino, 262 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2011).

Because the conducting of a transfer hearing is the only event that vests the juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction and the juvenile court had not conducted a transfer hearing before the prosecution directly filed the information, the district court had jurisdiction. People v. Pino, 262 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2011).

When a juvenile is charged in Denver district court as a result of a direct file and the offense that permitted the direct file is dismissed, the Denver district court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the additional charge that was not eligible for direct file. The Denver juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over that charge. People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 57 , 383 P.3d 92.

Defendant's conviction in the Denver district court, therefore, is a nullity and must be vacated. People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 57 , 383 P.3d 92.

Jurisdiction not affected by removing case from docket. A trial court order removing a parental rights termination case from the docket of cases maintained by the court did not affect the court's continuing statutory jurisdiction over the child involved. People in Interest of T.A.F. v. B.F., 624 P.2d 349 (Colo. App. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825, 102 S. Ct. 115, 70 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1981).

This section allows the juvenile court's jurisdiction to continue until the juvenile completes any sentence imposed, regardless of whether the juvenile reaches 18 years of age prior to completion of the sentence. Thus, where the 18-year-old defendant escaped while serving a juvenile sentence, he remained under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court and was a "juvenile" for purposes of § 18-8-210.1, the juvenile custody and confinement statute, and subject to the provisions of § 18-8-208, the felony escape statute. People v. Young, 908 P.2d 1147 (Colo. App. 1995).

Applied in People in Interest of Maddox v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 208 , 597 P.2d 573 (1979).

19-2.5-104. Venue.

1. Proceedings in cases brought pursuant to this article 2.5 must be commenced in the county in which the alleged violation of the law, ordinance, or court order took place; except that the court may order a change of venue based upon written findings that a change of venue is necessary to ensure that the juvenile receives a fair trial, in which case venue must be transferred to an appropriate jurisdiction prior to the findings of fact. When the court in which the petition was filed is in a county other than where the juvenile resides, such court may transfer venue to the court of the county of the juvenile's residence for the purposes of supervision after sentencing and entry of any order for payment of restitution. A transfer of venue may not be rejected for any reason except where venue would be improper.
2. For purposes of determining proper venue, a juvenile who is placed in the legal custody of a county department of human or social services is deemed for the entire period of placement to reside in the county in which the juvenile's legal custodian is located, even if the juvenile is physically residing in a residential facility located in another county. If a juvenile is placed in the legal custody of a county department of human or social services, the court shall not transfer venue during the period of placement to any county other than the county in which the juvenile's legal custodian is located.
In determining proper venue, section 18-1-202 applies.
A court transferring venue pursuant to this section shall transmit all documents and legal social records, or certified copies of such documents, to the receiving court. The receiving court shall then proceed with the case as if the petition had been originally filed or the adjudication had been originally made in such court.
Upon transfer of venue, the receiving court shall set a date not more than thirty-five days following the date upon which the change of venue is ordered for the juvenile and the juvenile's parent or guardian to appear.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 565, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-105 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

No authority for transfer to certain counties. There is no statutory authority for transfer of a juvenile case to a county which is neither the county where the offense occurred nor the county of the accused juvenile's residence. People v. Dist. Court, 191 Colo. 28 , 549 P.2d 1317 (1976).

Motion for change of venue untimely in delinquency hearing where merits already adjudicated. A change of venue is properly a pretrial motion to have the merits of the action adjudicated in the correct forum and county. Accordingly, such a motion is untimely in a juvenile delinquency hearing if the merits have already been adjudicated in their entirety, which occurs with the determination that the allegations in the original petition are true and the finding that the child is a juvenile delinquent. People in Interest of Maddox v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 208 , 597 P.2d 573 (1979).

19-2.5-105. Representation of petitioner.

In all matters pursuant to this article 2.5, the district attorney shall represent the petitioner.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 566, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-106 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include a case decided under a former provision similar to this section.

19-2.5-106. Victim's right to attend dispositional, review, and restitution proceedings.

The victim of any delinquent act, or a relative of the victim, if the victim has died, has the right to attend all dispositional, review, and restitution proceedings resulting from the adjudication of such act. The victim or the victim's relative has the right to appear at the proceedings personally or with counsel and to adequately and reasonably express the victim's views concerning the act, the juvenile, the need for restitution, and the type of dispositional orders that the court should issue. When issuing such orders, the court shall consider the statements made by the victim, or the victim's relative, and shall make a finding, on the record, when appropriate, as to whether the juvenile would pose a threat to public safety if granted probation.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 566, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-112 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-107. Parental accountability - legislative intent.

1. The parent, guardian, or legal custodian of any juvenile subject to proceedings pursuant to this article 2.5 is required to attend all proceedings that may be brought pursuant to this article 2.5 concerning the juvenile. The court may impose contempt sanctions against the parent, guardian, or legal custodian for failure, without good cause, to attend any proceeding concerning the juvenile; except that, if the juvenile's legal custodian is a county department of human or social services or the state department of human services, the legal custodian need not attend any proceeding at which the juvenile's guardian ad litem is present.
2. For any juvenile adjudicated pursuant to this article 2.5, the court may specify its expectations for the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian, so long as the parent, guardian, or legal custodian is a party to the delinquency proceedings.
1. The general assembly determines that families play a significant role in the cause and cure of delinquent behavior of children. It is therefore the intent of the general assembly that parents cooperate and participate significantly in the assessment and treatment planning for their children.
2. Any treatment plan developed pursuant to this article 2.5 may include requirements to be imposed on the juvenile's parent, so long as the parent is a party to the delinquency proceedings. These requirements may include, but are not limited to, the following:
  1. Maximum parent involvement in the sentencing orders;
  2. Participation by the parent in parental responsibility training;
  3. Cooperation by the parent in treatment plans for the juvenile;
  4. Performance of public service by the parent;
  5. Cost of care reimbursement by the parent;
  6. Supervision of the juvenile; and
  7. Any other provisions the court deems to be in the best interests of the juvenile, the parent's other children, or the community.
3. Any parent who is a party to the delinquency proceedings and who fails to comply with any requirements imposed on the parent in a treatment plan may be subject to contempt sanctions.
4. The court has discretion to exempt the parent from participation in the juvenile's treatment.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 566, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-113 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Although a parent may be held in contempt pursuant to this section, the court is not permitted to impose a suspended jail sentence against a parent to attempt to prevent a failure to comply with the court's order regarding the juvenile's treatment plan. People v. J.M., 22 P.3d 545 (Colo. App. 2000) (decided under former law).

19-2.5-108. Effect of proceedings.

An adjudication or proceeding pursuant to this article 2.5 must not impose any civil disability upon a juvenile or disqualify the juvenile from holding any position under the state personnel system or submitting any governmental or military service application or receiving any governmental or military service appointment or from holding public office.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-111 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-109. Saving clause.

The repeal of article 2 of this title 19 and the enactment of this article 2.5, effective October 1, 2021, do not affect the validity of any actions or proceedings initiated or in existence prior to such effective date and brought pursuant to the legislative provisions in place prior to such effective date.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1; entire section amended, (SB 21-266), ch. 423, p. 2800, § 15, effective October 1.

Editor's note: Section 47(2)(b) of chapter 423 (SB 21-266), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section takes effect only if SB 21-059 becomes law. SB 21-059 became law, and both bills have an effective date of October 1, 2021.

19-2.5-110. Outstanding balances owed by juveniles - report - repeal.

On and after the effective date of this section, the balance of any court-assessed or court-ordered costs imposed pursuant to section 19-2.5-605 (2)(b), 19-2.5-1101 (4), 19-2.5-1103 (1)(l) or (6), 19-2.5-1108 (2)(a)(VIII) or (2)(a)(IX), 19-2.5-1119 (1), or 19-2.5-1120, other than payments required pursuant to Title IV of the federal "Social Security Act", against a juvenile, the parent or guardian of a juvenile, or other person who is liable for the support of a juvenile who was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court are unenforceable and not collectable.
1. Within six months after the effective date of section 19-2-115, as enacted by House Bill 21-1315, the court shall vacate the portion of a court order imposing the costs described in subsection (1) of this section.
2. If the judicial department has referred the outstanding balance of the costs to a private collection agency for collection, the department shall inform the agency that the balance has been vacated and the balance is not collectable.
3. On or before July 1, 2022, the state court administrator shall report to the house of representatives judiciary committee and the senate judiciary committee, or their successor committees, the number of orders vacated or partially vacated pursuant to this section, or section 19-2-115 prior to its repeal in 2021, in each judicial district and the amount of the balances vacated in each judicial district.
This section is repealed, effective June 30, 2025.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3119, § 31, effective October 1.

Editor's note: Section 36 of chapter 461 (HB 21-1315), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act adding this section takes effect only if SB 21-059 becomes law and takes effect either upon the effective date of HB 21-1315 or SB 21-059, whichever is later. SB 21-059 became law, and both bills have an effective date of October 1, 2021.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1315, see section 1 of chapter 461, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

PART 2 INVESTIGATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

19-2.5-201. Preliminary investigation.

Whenever it appears to a law enforcement officer or any other person that a juvenile is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction, as provided in section 19-2.5-103, the law enforcement officer or other person may refer the matter conferring or appearing to confer jurisdiction to the district attorney, who shall determine whether the interests of the juvenile or of the community require further action.
Upon the district attorney's request, the matter may be referred to any agency for an investigation and recommendation.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-510 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-202. Consent to search.

In determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's consent to a search or seizure, the court shall consider the totality of the circumstances.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-506 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

This section and former § 19-2-209 (4) (now § 19-2-803 (4)) contain proper test to measure validity of consent to search given by juvenile in noncustodial setting. People in Interest of S.J., 778 P.2d 1384 ( Colo. 1989 ); People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731 ( Colo. 1997 ).

19-2.5-203. Statements - definitions.

A statement or admission of a juvenile made as a result of the custodial interrogation of the juvenile by a law enforcement official concerning delinquent acts alleged to have been committed by the juvenile are not admissible in evidence against the juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian were advised of the juvenile's right to remain silent and that any statements made may be used against the juvenile in a court of law, of the juvenile's right to the presence of an attorney during such interrogation, and of the juvenile's right to have counsel appointed if the juvenile so requests at the time of the interrogation; except that, if a public defender or counsel representing the juvenile is present at such interrogation, such statements or admissions may be admissible in evidence even though the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian was not present.
1. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile may be admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the court finds that, under the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights and:
  1. The juvenile is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interrogation or the juvenile misrepresents his or her age as being eighteen years of age or older and the law enforcement official acts in good-faith reliance on such misrepresentation in conducting the interrogation;
  2. The juvenile is emancipated from the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian; or
  3. The juvenile is a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient age and understanding.
2. For the purposes of this subsection (2), "emancipated juvenile" means a juvenile over fifteen years of age and under eighteen years of age who has, with the real or apparent assent of the juvenile's parents, demonstrated independence from the juvenile's parents in matters of care, custody, and earnings. The term may include, but is not limited to, any such juvenile who has the sole responsibility for the juvenile's own support, who is married, or who is in the military.
Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile are not inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian if the juvenile was accompanied by a responsible adult who was a custodian of the juvenile or assuming the role of a parent at the time.
For the purposes of this section, "physical custodian" is defined in section 19-2.5-102.
Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement that the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian be present during the juvenile's interrogation. This express waiver must be in writing and must be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement by a law enforcement official. If said requirement is expressly waived, statements or admissions of the juvenile are not inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian during interrogation. Notwithstanding the requirements of this subsection (5), a county department of human or social services and the state department of human services, as legal or physical custodian, may not waive said requirement.
Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile are not inadmissible into evidence by reason of the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the juvenile makes any deliberate misrepresentations affecting the applicability or requirements of this section and a law enforcement official, acting in good faith and in reasonable reliance on such deliberate misrepresentation, conducts a custodial interrogation of the juvenile that does not comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.
1. Notwithstanding any provisions of this section to the contrary, if the juvenile asserts that statements made during the custodial interrogation are inadmissible because a responsible adult had an interest adverse to the juvenile, the prosecution, as part of its burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress the statements, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the person interrogating the juvenile reasonably believed that the responsible adult did not have any interests adverse to those of the juvenile and that the responsible adult was able to provide protective counseling to the juvenile concerning the juvenile's rights during the interrogation.
2. For purposes of this subsection (7):
  1. "Protective counseling" means an ongoing opportunity to offer guidance and advice concerning the juvenile's right to remain silent and to obtain retained or appointed counsel associated with the custodial interrogation; and
  2. "Responsible adult" means a parent, guardian, legal or physical custodian, or other responsible adult who was a custodian of the juvenile or who assumed the role of a parent at the time of the interrogation.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-511 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Confessions and the Juvenile Offender", see 11 Colo. Law. 96 (1982). For comment, "Fourth Amendment Protection in the School Environment: The Colorado Supreme Court's Application of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard in State v. P.E.A.", 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153 (1990). For article, "Family Law and Juvenile Delinquency", see 37 Colo. Law. 61 (Oct. 2008).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Constitutional source of rights. Rights set out in this section of the Colorado Children's Code find genesis in the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and in the sixth amendment right to counsel. People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280 , 505 P.2d 7 (1973).

Section does not diminish fifth amendment protections but instead provides for additional protection. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).

Section provides for due process. The specific procedures in this section grant to juveniles all that is required under the due process clauses of the United States and the Colorado constitutions. J.T. v. O'Rourke ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 651 P.2d 407 ( Colo. 1982 ).

Subsection (2)(a)(III) does not confer a fundamental right to a runaway from another state when he or she is of sufficient age and understanding and has waived his or her right to remain silent or to have an attorney present. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).

The clear purpose in enacting former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) is to afford a special protection to a juvenile who is in police custody because of alleged criminal acts. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977); People in Interest of R.L.N., 43 Colo. App. 542, 605 P.2d 491 (1980).

Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) of this section provides an additional and necessary assurance that the juvenile's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel will be fully afforded to him. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 ( Colo. 1981 ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S. Ct. 1036, 71 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1982).

Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) was enacted to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination, the same privilege protected by Miranda, and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by unconstitutional police action applies to its violation. People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1980).

The purpose of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) is to provide a child with parental guidance during police interrogation and to ensure that any waiver of the child's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel will be made knowingly and intelligently. People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1981).

Legislative purpose of subsection (1), barring admission of statements made during police interrogation of minor unless minor's parents, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney are present, is to provide minor with an opportunity to consult with such person before deciding whether to assert or waive fifth amendment rights. People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1992).

Subsection (1) does not condition the admissibility of a juvenile's statements to law enforcement on more than his or her parent's presence during a Miranda advisement and interrogation. The plain language of subsection (1) requires only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation. It is unnecessary for a trial court to examine a parent's motivation. People in the Interest of A.L.-C., 2016 CO 71, 382 P.3d 842.

Factual findings as to "custody" and "interrogation" are necessary predicates to any application of this section. Where magistrate failed to make findings on question of whether juvenile was in custody and being interrogated, matter was remanded to the district court for development of further evidence. People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1997).

Protection afforded statements and admissions of child applies to searches. The same test is applicable to the validity of the search whether the consenting party is an adult or a juvenile with the one exception noted in former subsection (3) (now subsection (1)) of this section. That is, a parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child must be present and freely and intelligently give his consent. Although this subsection (3) refers specifically to "statements and admissions", and requires that the interrogating officer afford both the juvenile and his parent, guardian, or legal custodian full fifth amendment protection, the juvenile is entitled to comparable protection in connection with the waiver of his fourth amendment rights. People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377 , 483 P.2d 1342 (1971).

Search properly conducted in accordance with safeguards arising out of fourth amendment to constitution of United States is not inconsistent with this section. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).

Defendant's consent to search was voluntary and not the result of coercion. Defendant's parents provided guidance and advice before, during, and after the interrogation. The parents' position that they approved of DNA testing was consistent throughout. There is no requirement that the defendant's parents be present during the sample collection. People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98 (Colo. App. 2004).

The language, "acts which if committed by an adult", which appears almost verbatim in former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)), was intended to define, by analogy, a general type of conduct for which a child might be taken into custody and for which he might be adjudicated a delinquent. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).

The words "at the time of the interrogation" refer to the request for appointment of counsel and do not refer to all the rights listed. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).

Department of institutions not "legal custodian". The department of institutions, into whose control an adjudicated delinquent has been placed, is not a "legal custodian" for the purposes of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).

This section is to be strictly construed. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).

Former subsection (1) (now § 19-2-507) dovetails with requirement of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Former subsection (1) (now § 19-2-507), requiring prompt notification to the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of a child taken into temporary custody, dovetails with the requirement of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) that a parent, guardian, or legal custodian be present during interrogation. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).

The warnings incorporated in a Miranda advisement have been codified in the juvenile context by this section, together with the requirement that the juvenile be accompanied by a parent, guardian, or custodian during the advisement and interrogation. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).

The standard of review for determining custody for this section's purpose is the same standard for determining custody in Miranda cases. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).

In determining whether a juvenile is in custody for purposes of this section, a court must consider whether a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would consider himself or herself significantly deprived of his or her liberty. In deciding whether a reasonable person would believe himself or herself to be deprived of his or her freedom of action, the court must consider the totality of circumstances. The factors the court should consider are: The time, place, and purpose of the encounter; the persons present during the interrogation; the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; the length and mood of the interrogation; whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and the defendant's verbal or nonverbal response to such directions. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).

Additional factor required when determining whether a juvenile is in custody. When considering the totality of the circumstances, the court must also consider the age of the juvenile. People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, 329 P.3d 285.

A police officer's subjective view that the individual under question is a suspect, if undisclosed, has no bearing on whether the suspect is in custody. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).

Not in custody for Miranda purposes. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).

This section does not require, in every case, a repetitive advisement of rights immediately before any statement is taken. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).

Parent not required to be present when juvenile makes voluntary statements to police after police ended interrogation with parent because of request for counsel. People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2000).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress statements made during a phone conversation with a victim who was a minor. First, the standards for determining whether a party's consent is voluntary for purposes of the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are less stringent than the standards applicable to questions of voluntariness arising in the context of alleged violations of constitutional rights. Second, the victim was not in custody when he agreed to the recording of the conversation but rather his consent was given in an effort to assist in the apprehension and prosecution of defendant. People v. Richardson, 2014 COA 50 , 350 P.3d 905.

Limitations of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) does not require that a juvenile be warned that his statements "will" be used against him or that a juvenile be advised that he has the right to terminate the questioning at any time. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).

Factors in determining voluntariness of confession. In determining whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary, the primary factors to be considered are the juvenile's age, experience, background, and intelligence, his capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).

And prosecution to prove voluntariness by preponderance. Once the issue of voluntariness has been raised, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were made voluntarily. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).

Confession obtained during custodial interrogation properly determined voluntary despite fact that waiver of parental attendance was not in writing. The juvenile and his parents waived their right to consult with an attorney and orally waived their right to parental attendance at the interrogation, and the interviewing detective's "soft technique", if any, did not constitute improper coercion. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 ( Colo. 2002 ).

The remedy for a violation of this section is suppression of the statements obtained. However, that remedy applies only to statements made as a result of custodial interrogation. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).

Section is applicable even when a juvenile lies to police about his age. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).

General assembly did not provide for an exception for juveniles who lie about their age to the police and claim to be adults. Nor is there a "good faith" exception for cases in which the police reasonably but mistakenly believe that their suspect is an adult. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).

This interpretation is consistent with the way civil law protects juveniles from being bound by legal decisions they make even if they lie about their age. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).

Admissibility governed by circumstances surrounding interrogation. Whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).

Interrogation conducted via telephone not custodial since police officer could not exercise immediate control over juvenile. Juvenile not entitled to protection of subsection (1). People in Interest of J.C., 844 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1993).

Statements inadmissible unless special protection provided. Statements and admissions made to the police by a juvenile in the course of a criminal investigation are not admissible in evidence against a juvenile unless the special protection contemplated by former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) of this section is provided. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977).

And simply reciting required warnings does not sever illegal connection. Simply reciting the warnings required by this section does not sever the connection between illegal questioning and subsequently incriminating statements. People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1980).

If the adult appearing with the juvenile has interests that are objectively hostile to those of the juvenile and cannot aid the juvenile in making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her constitutional rights, the juvenile is deprived of the protections of this section. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).

Child's confession, obtained without compliance with this section, was inadmissible, and the court should have granted the child's motion to suppress the confession. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).

Minor's statements suppressed when gained through police urgings following his expressed desire to stop interrogation. Where a minor defendant responded to one of the officer's questions by stating, "I ain't going to say nothing no more", but the officers continued to urge defendant to tell the truth, a statement gained by those urgings was suppressed. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).

Where the police were actively involved in the continued urging of minor defendant "to tell the truth", the fact that the defendant's parents made similar requests did not absolve the police of any wrongdoing, or allow them to disregard defendant's exercise of his right to cut off questioning. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).

Tainted fruit doctrine does not require the automatic suppression of later statements made by the defendant or by witnesses whose identity was derived from the defendant's initial, unwarned statement. Although the lack of a Miranda warning creates a presumption of compulsion, the presumption can be rebutted and the initial statement shown to be voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).

Thus, fruits doctrine does not require suppression of properly obtained second confession where, although first confession was suppressed for lack of the written parental attendance waiver required under subsection (5), first confession nevertheless was voluntary. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 543 ( Colo. 2002 ).

Physical evidence which is fruit of statement improperly obtained from juvenile is inadmissible. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).

It is implicit that a child involved in the commission of an offense should be afforded protective counseling concerning his legal rights from one whose interests are not adverse to those of the child, to the end that any statements made by the child be given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976); People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 ( Colo. 1998 ).

Counselors of a school for boys cannot be considered the neutral counselors contemplated by former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).

Purpose of parental presence at interrogation. The statutory requirement of the presence of a parent or guardian at the interrogation of a child by law enforcement officers is designed to provide parental guidance and assistance to the child and thereby to provide at least some minimal assurance that a child's waiver of his right against self-incrimination is knowingly and intelligently made. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).

Subsection (5) requires police to advise a juvenile of the right to have a parent present during custodial interrogation and acquire an express waiver of that right from the juvenile prior to conducting an interrogation of the juvenile without the presence of a parent. People v. Barrow, 139 P.3d 636 (Colo. 2006).

The "full advisement" requirement of subsection (5) is not satisfied by merely showing the minor defendant a form signed by his parent indicating that she granted permission for the interview to proceed outside her presence. People v. Barrow, 139 P.3d 636 (Colo. 2006).

Subsection (5) requires that a waiver of the right to parental attendance must be express, in writing, and obtained after a Miranda advisement; however, it does not require that the writing be signed. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 ( Colo. 2002 ).

Although subsection (5) does not require a signature on the written waiver of parental attendance, the written waiver must in some manner be attributable to the person against whom it is to be enforced. A signature on the document obviously is the most direct means to demonstrate this, but it is not the only way for one to acknowledge or ratify the document. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 ( Colo. 2002 ).

Detective complied with this section by informing both the juvenile and his guardian verbally that the juvenile had the right to have his guardian present during police questioning. The signed waiver form also indicated the right to have the guardian present. People v. Barrios, 2019 CO 10, 433 P.3d 1218.

Even though the detective minimized the potential offenses and there was a lack of actual consultation between the juvenile and his guardian, the juvenile legally waived his right to have his guardian present during the interrogation. Under the totality of the circumstances, those concerns did not undermine the reliability of the waiver. People v. Barrios, 2019 CO 10, 433 P.3d 1218.

Where parent is himself incarcerated, his ability to guide and advise the child is hobbled and restrained by his own circumstances to such an extent that his mere physical presence does not satisfy the requirements of this section concerning confessions of a child. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).

A child's confession is inadmissible where the child receives inadequate guidance because the parent is present but also incarcerated, or where a counselor or caseworker is substituted for the parent. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).

Because parent must be in position to freely advise. To effectively provide the guidance and advice contemplated by this section, the parent must be in a position to give advice freely, and a parent who is himself incarcerated is in no such position. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).

Where interest of parents is obviously adverse to interests of minor, they are disqualified to act under the provisions of this section. People in Interest of P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342 , 490 P.2d 685 (1971); People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).

The fact that the father was upset with his son's possible involvement in a crime does not mean that their interests were necessarily adverse. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).

A pending investigation against a parent does not create a per se rule that the parent's interests are hostile or adverse to those of a child who comes under police investigation. People v. White, 64 P.3d 864 (Colo. App. 2002).

Out-of-state runaways are not afforded the protections of this section. Statements from a juvenile who is a runaway from another state are admissible if the juvenile is of sufficient age and understanding. Sufficient age and understanding refers to the juvenile's ability to understand his or her constitutional rights and to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. People v. Blankenship, 30 P.3d 698 (Colo. App. 2000).

There is a rational basis under subsection (2) for distinguishing between out-of-state runaways and in-state runaways. Parents of in-state runaways presumably live in state and can be contacted more easily and be present for an interrogation with less difficulty. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).

Runaway is defined as an unmarried person under the age of 18 and who ran away from home or is otherwise beyond parental control. People v. Blankenship, 30 P.3d 698 (Colo. App. 2000).

Counsel appointed if person appearing with juvenile is neutral or hostile. The only effective means of implementing the purposes of this statute in situations where person appearing with juvenile is neutral or hostile to the juvenile's interests is to appoint counsel. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977).

Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) provides for the presence of an attorney, or the public defender, at the interrogation. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).

Appointed counsel must be present at confession. Appointment of counsel does not alleviate the necessity for compliance with this section where counsel was not present at the time of the confession. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).

But right to counsel held waived. Child's execution of financial eligibility form and interview by member of public defender's office did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Under totality of the circumstances, statement by juvenile's mother to police concerning public defender representation simply indicated mother's concern over legal representation in light of financial circumstances, and was not a clear assertion of right to counsel. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 543 ( Colo. 2002 ).

Guardian ad litem appointed for custody purposes may be representative for juvenile's interests in criminal interrogation. Attorney guardian ad litem who was familiar with the juvenile and his familial and criminal background was qualified to appropriately serve the interests of the juvenile. Fact that the guardian was originally appointed to represent juvenile in custodial proceeding was not dispositive of whether guardian could also adequately represent juvenile defendant during custodial interrogation. People v. S.M.D., 864 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1994).

Trial court properly found that juvenile was emancipated, therefore absence of the juvenile's parent at custodial interrogation did not require the court to suppress the juvenile's statement. The trial court appropriately found that the juvenile was emancipated where the juvenile had been on his own for three months and had not been receiving financial support from his mother. People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999).

Trial court properly held that juvenile was emancipated even though legal and physical custody of the juvenile had been placed with the department of human services. The language of this section implicitly recognizes that a juvenile may be emancipated from the custody of someone other than the parent, including the state. People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999).

Application of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Read in context, the limitations of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) apply only when a child is in temporary custody or under detention, as those terms are used in the Colorado Children's Code. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 ( Colo. 1980 ); People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 ( Colo. 1981 ).

Although not expressly so limited, it is clear that former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) concerns questioning of a child while in temporary custody or under detention. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).

The requirements of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) do not apply to interrogation of a child by a law enforcement official concerning traffic offenses which could not result in the child's being adjudicated a delinquent. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).

The exclusionary rule of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) does not apply to a child's statement made to a treating physician when that statement is not the result of an interrogation by a law enforcement official. People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981).

Under Miranda and former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)), the decisive stage for the warnings is custodial interrogation, i.e., questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S. Ct. 1036, 71 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1982).

Subsection (1) applies only to consent searches and not to searches incident to a lawful arrest. People in Interest of S.J.F., 736 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1987).

Subsection (1) is inapplicable to a search consented to by a minor in a noncustodial setting. People in Interest of S.J., 778 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1989).

Subsection (1) does not require that parents, irrespective of the rules of evidence, be permitted to testify concerning all statements made by their child during an interrogation at which they were present. People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1992).

Physical custodians under subsection (1) must be limited to the adult or adults with whom the child resided immediately prior to the arrest and custodial interrogation. If an adult is functioning as a current physical custodian for the child at the time of the interrogation, a protective relationship sufficient to satisfy the legislative purposes presumptively exists. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).

Principal and security officer did not act as agents of the police. Whether or not an individual conducting a search is an agent of the police and thus "a law enforcement official" under subsection (1) is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The fact that the police officer supplied information to the school principal with the intent of initiating a search and that he was present on school premises during the investigation do not support a finding that the principal and security officer acted as agent of "a law enforcement official". People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 ( Colo. 1988 ); People in Interest of F.M., 754 P.2d 390 ( Colo. 1988 ).

This section does not apply to admission of paternity by minor. People in Interest of R.L.N., 43 Colo. App. 542, 605 P.2d 491 (1980).

Applied in People v. Salazar, 189 Colo. 429 , 541 P.2d 676 (1975); D.W. v. Dist. Court, 193 Colo. 194 , 564 P.2d 949 (1976); People v. Cunningham, 194 Colo. 228 , 570 P.2d 1086 (1977); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 (1980); People v. Trujillo, 624 P.2d 924 (Colo. App. 1980).

19-2.5-204. Issuance of a lawful warrant taking a juvenile into custody.

A lawful warrant taking a juvenile into custody may be issued pursuant to this section by any judge of a court of record or by a juvenile magistrate upon receipt of an affidavit relating facts sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that a delinquent act has been committed and probable cause to believe that a particular juvenile committed that act. Upon receipt of such affidavit, the judge or magistrate shall issue a lawful warrant commanding any peace officer to take the juvenile named in the affidavit into custody and to take the juvenile without unnecessary delay before the nearest judge of the juvenile court or magistrate pursuant to section 19-2.5-305 (4)(e)(I).
Upon filing of a petition in the juvenile court, the district attorney may request a warrant to issue that authorizes the taking of a juvenile into temporary custody. If a warrant is requested, the petition must be accompanied by a verified affidavit relating facts sufficient to establish probable cause that the juvenile has committed the delinquent act set forth in the petition.
A warrant for the arrest of a juvenile for violation of the conditions of probation or of a bond may be issued by any judge of a court of record or juvenile magistrate upon the report of a juvenile probation officer or upon the verified complaint of any person, establishing to the satisfaction of the judge or juvenile magistrate probable cause to believe that a condition of probation or of a bond has been violated and that the arrest of the juvenile is reasonably necessary. The warrant may be executed by any juvenile probation officer or by a peace officer authorized to execute warrants in the county in which the juvenile is found. If the warrant is for a juvenile found in contempt of court in a truancy proceeding, the court shall follow the procedures set forth in section 22-33-108 (7).

Source: L. 2021: (3) amended, (SB 21-071), ch. 463, p. 3333, § 1, effective July 6; entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 569, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 19-2-503 as it existed prior to 2021.
Subsection (3) was numbered as 19-2-503 (3) in SB 21-071 (see L. 2021, p. 3333 ). That provision was harmonized with subsection (3) of this section as it appears in SB 21-059.

19-2.5-205. Search warrants - issuance - grounds.

A search warrant authorized by this section may be issued by any judge of a court of record or by a juvenile magistrate.
A search warrant may be issued pursuant to this section to search for and seize any property:
1. That is stolen or embezzled; or
2. That is designed or intended for use as a means of committing a delinquent act; or
3. That is or has been used as a means of committing a delinquent act; or
4. The possession of which is illegal; or
5. That would be material evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution or delinquency adjudication in this state or in another state; or
6. The seizure of which is expressly required, authorized, or permitted by any statute of this state; or
7. That is kept, stored, maintained, transported, sold, dispensed, or possessed in violation of a statute of this state, under circumstances involving a serious threat to public safety or order or to public health.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 570, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-504 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-206. Search warrants - application.

A search warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to or affirmed before the judge or juvenile magistrate and relating facts sufficient to:
1. Identify or describe, as nearly as may be, the premises, person, place, or thing to be searched;
2. Identify or describe, as nearly as may be, the property to be searched for, seized, or inspected;
3. Establish the grounds for issuance of the warrant or probable cause to believe that such grounds exist; and
4. Establish probable cause to believe that the property to be searched for, seized, or inspected is located at, in, or upon the premises, person, place, or thing to be searched.
The affidavit required by this section may include sworn testimony reduced to writing and signed under oath by the witness giving the testimony before issuance of the warrant. A copy of the affidavit and a copy of the transcript of testimony taken in support of the request for a search warrant must be attached to the search warrant filed with the court.
The supreme court may establish rules for procedures governing application for and issuance of search warrants consistent with this section.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 570, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-505 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-207. Fingerprinting - juvenile under arrest - ordered by court - definition.

For purposes of this section, "juvenile" means any juvenile who is charged with committing, summoned, or held in detention for committing a delinquent act that constitutes a felony, a class 1 misdemeanor, or a misdemeanor pursuant to section 42-4-1301 or a crime, the underlying factual basis of which included an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), as if committed by an adult.
1. Any juvenile detained pursuant to this article 2.5 must be fingerprinted by the entity authorized by the court or the local law enforcement agency to obtain fingerprints, except for juvenile detention centers and alternative service programs, otherwise known as "SB 91-94 programs", described in section 19-2.5-606. Such entity or local agency shall forward a set of the juvenile's fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation in the form and manner prescribed by the bureau.
2. Any fingerprints required by this section to be forwarded to the Colorado bureau of investigation must be forwarded within twenty-four hours after completion of the fingerprinting, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 571, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-503.5 (1), (2), and (4) as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-208. Petty tickets - summons - contracts - data.

1. If a law enforcement officer contacts a juvenile ten years of age or older for a delinquent act that would be a petty offense if committed by an adult or a municipal ordinance violation, the officer may issue the juvenile a petty ticket that requires the juvenile to go through an assessment process or procedure as designated by the municipal, county, or district court, including assessment by a law enforcement officer, assessment officer, or a screening team, referred to in this section as the "screening entity". When a petty ticket is issued, an assessment officer or screening team officer shall offer a petty offense contract to the juvenile and the juvenile's parent or legal guardian if:
  1. The juvenile has no prior adjudication or non-traffic conviction in a municipal, county, juvenile, or district court;
  2. The alleged offense would be a class 1, class 2, or unclassified petty offense;
  3. The juvenile admits to the offense; and
  4. The petty offense contract is in the best interests of the juvenile.
2. If the juvenile is otherwise eligible for a petty offense contract pursuant to this subsection (1), but the screening entity finds that the issuance of a petty offense contract is not in the best interests of the juvenile, the screening entity shall state the reasons in writing. The screening entity shall provide a copy of the written statement to the juvenile and shall maintain a copy of the written statement. If there is no agreement resulting in a signed contract pursuant to this section, the prosecuting attorney may file a petition of delinquency.
Every contract entered into pursuant to this section must be in writing and contain the following:
1. Consent to the contract terms by the juvenile and the juvenile's parent or legal guardian;
2. An agreement to pay restitution, when applicable;
3. An agreement to perform useful community service, when applicable;
4. An agreement to attend school unless the juvenile is in a certified home study program or is otherwise legally excused from such attendance;
5. A requirement of restorative justice practices, when appropriate;
6. A requirement that the juvenile not commit a delinquent act during the term of the contract; and
7. Any other conditions determined appropriate by the screening entity.
The term of the contract may not exceed ninety-one days; except that the contract may be extended for an additional thirty-five days for good cause.
Upon the successful completion of the contract to the satisfaction of the screening entity, the juvenile is released from any further obligation, and the prosecuting attorney shall not file a petition in delinquency for the admitted act. The completed contract remains confidential except to the ticketing agency, the screening and supervisory entity, the juvenile, and the juvenile's parent or legal guardian.
1. If a juvenile fails to comply with a written condition of the contract within a specific time designated in the contract, the prosecuting attorney may file charges with the court. The contract and any statements contained in the contract or made by the juvenile to the screening entity administering the contract must not be used against the juvenile.
2. If there is no agreement resulting in a signed contract, any statement made by the juvenile to the screening entity administering the assessment must not be used against the juvenile.
3. Notwithstanding subsections (5)(a) and (5)(b) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile contained in the contract or made by the juvenile to the screening entity are admissible into evidence, if the juvenile makes any deliberate misrepresentations affecting the applicability or requirements of this section.
1. Each law enforcement agency that issues petty offense tickets pursuant to this section shall maintain annual data on the number of tickets issued and the age, ethnicity, gender, and final disposition for each ticket.
2. The data collected pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section is public and must be made available upon request.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 571, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-302.5 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-209. Taking juvenile into custody.

A juvenile may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile has committed a delinquent act.
A juvenile may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer executing a lawful warrant taking a juvenile into custody issued pursuant to section 19-2.5-204.
A juvenile probation officer may take a juvenile into temporary custody:
1. Under the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of this section; or
2. If the juvenile has violated the conditions of probation and is under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
A juvenile may be detained temporarily by an adult other than a law enforcement officer if the juvenile has committed or is committing a delinquent act in the presence of such adult. Any person detaining a juvenile shall notify, without unnecessary delay, a law enforcement officer, who shall assume custody of said juvenile.
The taking of a juvenile into temporary custody pursuant to this section is not an arrest, nor does it constitute a police record.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 573, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-502 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Phrase, "acts which if committed by an adult," was intended to define general type of conduct for which child might be taken into custody and for which he might be adjudicated delinquent. The phrase does not create limitation on power of state, but merely establishes general category of behavior for which children may be adjudicated delinquent. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).

Section 19-2-511 is applicable even when a juvenile lies to police about his age. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).

Grounds for custody include violation of statute. Child may be taken into temporary custody if he violates statute or ordinance which makes specific behavior by children unlawful, even though such behavior if committed by adult is not unlawful. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).

Jurisdiction to order removal of life-sustaining devices. A juvenile court has jurisdiction in a shelter hearing to order the removal of all extraordinary life-sustaining devices from a child in the temporary custody of the department of social services if in the doctor's opinion the legal standard of cerebral death has been met. Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419 , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).

Applied in People ex rel. Thompson v. Purcell, 70 Colo. 399 , 201 P. 881(1921); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 (1980); Griffin v. Pate, 644 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1981).

PART 3 DETENTION

19-2.5-301. Legislative declaration.

The general assembly declares that the placement of children and juveniles in a detention facility exacts a negative impact on the mental and physical well-being of the child or juvenile, and such detention may make it more likely that the child or juvenile will reoffend. Children and juveniles who are detained are more likely to penetrate deeper into the juvenile justice system than similar children or juveniles who are not detained, and community-based alternatives to detention should be based on the principle of using the least-restrictive setting possible and returning a child or juvenile to his or her home, family, or other responsible adult whenever possible consistent with public safety. It is the intent of the general assembly in adopting section 19-2.5-304 and amending sections 19-2.5-303, 19-2.5-305, and 19-2.5-1404 to limit the use of detention to only those children and juveniles who pose a substantial risk of serious harm to others or that are a flight risk from prosecution.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 573, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-211.5 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-302. Local juvenile services planning committee - creation - duties - identification and notification of dually identified crossover youth.

If all of the boards of commissioners of each county or the city council of each city and county in a judicial district agree, there may be created in the judicial district a local juvenile services planning committee that is appointed by the chief judge of the judicial district or, for the second judicial district, the presiding judge of the Denver juvenile court, from persons recommended by the boards of commissioners of each county or the city council of each city and county within the judicial district. The committee, if practicable, must include, but need not be limited to, a representative from a county department of human or social services, a local school district, a local law enforcement agency, a local probation department, the division of youth services, private citizens, the district attorney's office, the public defender's office, a community mental health representative, and a representative of the concerns of municipalities. The committee, if created, shall meet as necessary to develop a plan for the allocation of resources for local juvenile services within the judicial district for the fiscal year. The committee is strongly encouraged to consider programs with restorative justice components when developing the plan. The state department of human services shall approve the plan. A local juvenile services planning committee may be consolidated with other local advisory boards pursuant to section 24-1.7-103.
The plan must provide for the management of dually identified crossover youth. The plan must contain descriptions and processes to include:
1. A process for the identification of dually identified crossover youth at the earliest reasonable point of contact;
2. A method for collaborating and exchanging information with other judicial districts, including with the collaborative management program described in section 24-1.9-102 and consistent with the data-sharing policies of the collaborative management program;
3. A process for promptly communicating information about the youth's crossover status between the child welfare and juvenile justice systems and to notify each other of the new involvement in the respective system or information that may aid in the identification of dually identified crossover youth. The following parties should be notified of a youth's status as a dually identified crossover youth if applicable: Public defenders, district attorneys, local juvenile services planning committee coordinators, human or social services department representatives, probation representatives, juvenile court representatives, parents, and guardians ad litem.
4. A process for identifying the appropriate services or placement-based assessment for a dually identified crossover youth;
5. A process for sharing and gathering information in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and county policy;
6. A process for the development of a single case management plan and identification of the lead agency for case management purposes and the engagement of dually identified crossover youth and their caregivers;
7. A process that facilitates the sharing of assessments and case planning information and includes policies around sharing information with other judicial districts;
8. A process for a multidisciplinary group of professionals to consider decisions that include youth and community safety, placement, provision of needed services, alternatives to detention and commitment, probation, parole, permanency, education stability, and case closure; and
9. A requirement that dually identified crossover youth placed in a secure detention facility who are deemed eligible for release by the court be placed in the least restrictive setting whenever possible to reduce the disparity between dually identified crossover youth and nondually identified crossover youth in secure detention.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 574, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-211 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-303. Duty of officer - screening teams - notification - release or detention.

When a juvenile is taken into temporary custody and not released pending charges, the officer shall notify the screening team for the judicial district in which the juvenile is taken into custody. The screening team shall notify the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian without unnecessary delay and inform the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian that, if the juvenile is placed in detention or a temporary holding facility, all parties have a right to a prompt hearing to determine whether the juvenile is to be detained further. Such notification may be made to a person with whom the juvenile is residing if a parent, guardian, or legal custodian cannot be located. If the screening team is unable to make such notification, the notification may be made by any law enforcement officer, juvenile probation officer, detention center counselor, or detention facility staff in whose physical custody the juvenile is placed.
1. If the law enforcement officer does not release the juvenile to the care of the juvenile's parents, legal guardian, kin, or other responsible adult, the screening team shall administer a validated detention screening instrument developed or adopted pursuant to section 19-2.5-1404. The law enforcement officer, screening team, or juvenile court shall not remove the juvenile from the custody of the parent or legal guardian pursuant to this section unless the screening team or the juvenile court:
  1. 1. First finds that a validated detention screening instrument selected or adopted pursuant to section 19-2.5-1404 has been administered and the juvenile scored as detention-eligible; or
    2. There are grounds to override the results of the detention screening instrument based on the criteria developed in accordance with section 19-2.5-1404; and
  2. Finds that the juvenile poses a substantial risk of serious harm to others or a substantial risk of flight from prosecution and finds that community-based alternatives to detention are insufficient to reasonably mitigate that risk. Flight from prosecution is distinguished from simple failure to appear and must generally be evidenced by a demonstrated record of repeat, recent willful failures to appear at a scheduled court appearance.
2. The screening team shall administer the detention screening instrument for each juvenile under consideration for detention. The detention screening instrument must be administered by a screener who has completed training to administer the detention screening instrument.
3. Any information concerning a juvenile that is obtained during the administration of the detention screening instrument must be used solely for the purpose of making a recommendation to the court regarding the continued detention of the juvenile. The information is not subject to subpoena or other court process, for use in any other proceeding, or for any other purpose.
4. Court records and division of youth services records must include data on detention screening scores and, if the score does not mandate detention, the explanation for the override placing the juvenile in detention.
5. A juvenile who must be taken from the juvenile's home but who does not require physical restriction must be given temporary care with a grandparent, kin, or other suitable person; in a temporary shelter facility designated by the court; or with the county department of human or social services and must not be placed in detention.
6. The screening team and the juvenile court shall use the results from the detention screening instrument in making a release determination. Release options include allowing a juvenile to return home with no supervision, or with limited supervision such as a location monitoring device, or a referral to a preadjudication alternative to detention or service program established pursuant to section 19-2.5-606.
1. The juvenile must be released to the care of the juvenile's parents, kin, or other responsible adult, unless a determination has been made in accordance with subsection (2) of this section that the juvenile's substantial risk of serious harm to others requires that the juvenile be detained. The court may make reasonable orders as conditions of release pursuant to section 19-2.5-305 (5). In addition, the court may provide that any violation of such orders may subject the juvenile to contempt sanctions of the court. The parent, kin, or other person to whom the juvenile is released is required to sign a written promise, on forms supplied by the court, to bring the juvenile to the court at a time set or to be set by the court. Failure, without good cause, to comply with the promise subjects the juvenile's parent or any other person to whom the juvenile is released to contempt sanctions of the court.
2. Parents or legal guardians of a juvenile released from detention pursuant to this section shall complete the relative information form described in section 19-2.5-1404 (1)(b)(VIII) no later than the next hearing on the matter.
1. Except as required in subsection (4)(b) of this section, a law enforcement officer shall not detain a juvenile any longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain basic identification information and to contact the juvenile's parents, guardian, or legal custodian.
2. If the juvenile is not released as required in subsection (3) of this section, the juvenile must be taken directly to the court or to the place of detention, a temporary holding facility, a temporary shelter designated by the court, or a preadjudication service program established pursuant to section 19-2.5-606 without unnecessary delay.
1. As an alternative to taking a juvenile into temporary custody pursuant to subsections (1), (3), and (4) of this section, a law enforcement officer may, if authorized by the establishment of a policy that permits such service by order of the chief judge of the judicial district or the presiding judge of the Denver juvenile court, which policy is established after consultation between such judge and the district attorney and law enforcement officials in the judicial district, serve a written promise to appear for juvenile proceedings based on any act that would constitute a felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense upon the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
2. A promise to appear served pursuant to subsection (5)(a) of this section must state any charges against the juvenile and the date, time, and place where the juvenile is required to answer such charges. The promise to appear must also state:
  1. That the juvenile has the right to have the assistance of counsel;
  2. That counsel can be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian lack adequate resources to retain counsel or the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian refuses to retain counsel for the juvenile;
  3. That, to determine if the juvenile is eligible for court-appointed counsel, or to apply for court-appointed counsel, the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian is advised to call the office of the state public defender, visit the state public defender's office, or visit the state public defender's internet website;
  4. That, to avoid delay in obtaining counsel, the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian is advised to apply for court-appointed counsel at least five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, before the juvenile's promised date of appearance; and
  5. The contact information for the local office of the state public defender, including the office's telephone number and address, and the address of the internet website of the office of the state public defender.
3. A law enforcement officer who serves a juvenile or a juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian with a written promise to appear in a court that participates in the court reminder program established in section 13-3-101 (14)(a)(I) shall notify the person served that the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian can elect to provide a mobile telephone number that will be used by the court solely to provide text message reminders for future court dates and unplanned court closures and shall provide the opportunity for the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian to provide a mobile telephone number or update a mobile telephone number for that purpose.
4. The juvenile shall sign the promise to appear. The promise to appear must be served upon the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian by personal service or by certified mail, return receipt requested. The date established for the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian to appear must not be earlier than seven days nor later than thirty-five days after the promise to appear is served upon both the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal custodian.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 575, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-507 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

19-2.5-304. Limitations on detention.

Detention is not permitted for the following:
1. Juveniles who have not committed, or have not been accused of committing, a delinquent act unless otherwise found in contempt of court;
2. Delinquent and nondelinquent juveniles who have been placed in the legal custody of a county department of human or social services pursuant to a petition in dependency or neglect and are solely awaiting out-of-home placement;
3. Juveniles who at admission require medical care, are intoxicated, or are under the influence of drugs, to an extent that custody of the juvenile is beyond the scope of the detention facility's medical service capacity;
4. Juveniles who are solely assessed as suicidal or exhibit behavior placing them at imminent risk of suicide; and
5. Juveniles who have not committed a delinquent act but present an imminent danger to self or others or appear to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder or an intellectual and developmental disability.
A juvenile court shall not order a juvenile who is ten years of age and older but less than thirteen years of age to detention unless the juvenile has been arrested for a felony or weapons charge pursuant to section 18-12-102, 18-12-105, 18-12-106, or 18-12-108.5. A preadjudication service program created pursuant to section 19-2.5-606 shall evaluate a juvenile described in this subsection (2). The evaluation may result in the juvenile:
1. Remaining in the custody of a parent or legal guardian;
2. Being placed in the temporary legal custody of kin, for purposes of a kinship foster care home or noncertified kinship care placement, as defined in section 19-1-103, or other suitable person under such conditions as the court may impose;
3. Being placed in a temporary shelter facility; or
4. Being referred to a local county department of human or social services for assessment for placement.
A juvenile shall not be placed in detention solely:
1. Due to lack of supervision alternatives, service options, or more appropriate facilities;
2. Due to the community's inability to provide treatment or services;
3. Due to a lack of supervision in the home or community;
4. In order to allow a parent, guardian, or legal custodian to avoid legal responsibility;
5. Due to a risk of the juvenile's self-harm;
6. In order to attempt to punish, treat, or rehabilitate the juvenile;
7. Due to a request by a victim, law enforcement, or the community;
8. In order to permit more convenient administrative access to the juvenile;
9. In order to facilitate further interrogation or investigation; or
10. As a response to technical violations of probation unless the results of a detention screening instrument indicate that the juvenile poses a substantial risk of serious harm to others or if the applicable graduated responses system adopted pursuant to section 19-2.5-1108 allows for such a placement.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 578, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-507.5 as it existed prior to 2021.

19-2.5-305. Detention and shelter - hearing - time limits - findings - review - confinement with adult offenders - restrictions.

Unless placement is prohibited pursuant to section 19-2.5-304, when a juvenile is placed in a detention facility, in a temporary holding facility, or in a temporary shelter facility designated by the court, the screening team shall promptly notify the court, the district attorney, and the local office of the state public defender. The screening team shall also notify a parent or legal guardian or, if a parent or legal guardian cannot be located within the county, the person with whom the juvenile has been residing and inform such person of the right to a prompt hearing to determine whether the juvenile is to be detained further. The court shall hold the detention hearing within forty-eight hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. For a juvenile being held in detention on a warrant for violating a valid court order on a status offense, the court shall hold the detention hearing within twenty-four hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
A juvenile who is detained for committing a delinquent act must be represented at the detention hearing by counsel. If the juvenile has not retained his or her own counsel, the court shall appoint the office of the state public defender or, in the case of a conflict, the office of alternate defense counsel to represent the juvenile. This appointment continues if the court appoints the office of the state public defender or the office of alternate defense counsel pursuant to section 19-2.5-605 (2)(a) unless:
1. The juvenile retains his or her own counsel; or
2. The juvenile makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, as described in section 19-2.5-605 (2)(c).
1. 1. A juvenile taken into custody pursuant to this article 2.5 and placed in a detention or temporary shelter facility or a temporary holding facility is entitled to a hearing within forty-eight hours after such placement, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to determine if the juvenile should be detained. The time of the detention hearing must allow defense counsel sufficient time to consult with the juvenile before the detention hearing. This consultation may be performed by secure electronic means if the conditions under which the electronic consultation is held allow the consultation to be confidential. The time in which the hearing must be held may be extended for a reasonable time by order of the court upon good cause shown. (3) (a) (I) A juvenile taken into custody pursuant to this article 2.5 and placed in a detention or temporary shelter facility or a temporary holding facility is entitled to a hearing within forty-eight hours after such placement, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to determine if the juvenile should be detained. The time of the detention hearing must allow defense counsel sufficient time to consult with the juvenile before the detention hearing. This consultation may be performed by secure electronic means if the conditions under which the electronic consultation is held allow the consultation to be confidential. The time in which the hearing must be held may be extended for a reasonable time by order of the court upon good cause shown.
  2. The law enforcement agency that arrested the juvenile shall promptly provide to the court and to defense counsel the affidavit supporting probable cause for the arrest and the arrest report, if the arrest report is available, and the screening team shall promptly provide to the court and to defense counsel results from the detention risk screening prepared pursuant to the juvenile's arrest. Upon completion of the detention hearing, the defense shall return any materials received pursuant to this subsection (3)(a)(II) unless the appointment is continued at the conclusion of the hearing.
  3. The only purposes of a detention hearing are to determine if a juvenile should be detained further and to define conditions under which the juvenile may be released, if release is appropriate. A detention hearing must not be combined with a preliminary hearing or a first advisement. Due to the limited scope of a detention hearing, the representation of a juvenile by appointed counsel at a detention hearing does not, by itself, create a basis for disqualification in the event that such counsel is subsequently appointed to represent another individual whose case is related to the juvenile's case.
  4. With respect to this section, the court may further detain the juvenile only if the court finds from the information provided at the hearing that:
    1. Probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the delinquent act charged;