COCODE

GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

Section

PART 1 DEFINITIONS AND CITATION

PART 2 ADMINISTRATION

PART 3 GREEN TRUCK GRANT PROGRAM

PART 4 LICENSE PLATE AUCTIONS

PART 1 DEFINITIONS AND CITATION

42-1-101. Short title.

Articles 1 to 4 of this title shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Motor Vehicle Law".

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2094, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

42-1-102. Definitions.

As used in articles 1 to 4 of this title 42, unless the context otherwise requires:

"Acceleration lane" means a speed-change lane, including tapered areas, for the purpose of enabling a vehicle entering a roadway to increase its speed to a rate at which it can more safely merge with through traffic.
"Administrator" means the property tax administrator.
"Alley" means a street or highway intended to provide access to the rear or side of lots or buildings in urban areas and not intended for the purpose of through vehicular traffic.
"Apportioned registration" means registration of a vehicle pursuant to a reciprocal agreement under which the fees paid for registration of such vehicle are ultimately divided among the several jurisdictions in which the vehicle travels, based upon the number of miles traveled by the vehicle in each jurisdiction or upon some other agreed criterion.
(4.5) "Appurtenance" means a piece of equipment that is affixed or attached to a motor vehicle or trailer and is used for a specific purpose or task, including awnings, support hardware, and extractable equipment. "Appurtenance" does not include any item or equipment that is temporarily affixed or attached to the exterior of a motor vehicle for the purpose of transporting such vehicle.
"Authorized agent" means the county clerk and recorder in each county in the state of Colorado, the clerk and recorder in the city and county of Broomfield, and the manager of revenue or such other official of the city and county of Denver as may be appointed by the mayor to perform functions related to the registration of, titling of, or filing of liens on motor vehicles, wheeled trailers, semitrailers, trailer coaches, special mobile machinery, off-highway vehicles, and manufactured homes.
"Authorized emergency vehicle" means such vehicles of the fire department, police vehicles, ambulances, and other special-purpose vehicles as are publicly owned and operated by or for a governmental agency to protect and preserve life and property in accordance with state laws regulating emergency vehicles; said term also means the following if equipped and operated as emergency vehicles in the manner prescribed by state law:
1. Privately owned vehicles as are designated by the state motor vehicle licensing agency necessary to the preservation of life and property; or
2. Privately owned tow trucks approved by the public utilities commission to respond to vehicle emergencies.
"Authorized service vehicle" means such highway or traffic maintenance vehicles as are publicly owned and operated on a highway by or for a governmental agency the function of which requires the use of service vehicle warning lights as prescribed by state law and such other vehicles having a public service function, including, but not limited to, public utility vehicles and tow trucks, as determined by the department of transportation under section 42-4-214 (5). Some vehicles may be designated as both an authorized emergency vehicle and an authorized service vehicle.
(7.5) "Autocycle" means a three-wheeled motorcycle that does not use handlebars or any other device that is directly connected to a single front wheel to steer and in which the driver and each passenger ride in a fully or partly enclosed seating area that is equipped with safety belts for all occupants that constitute a safety belt system, as defined in section 42-4-237 (1)(b). For purposes of this subsection (7.5), "partly enclosed seating area" means a seating area that is entirely or partly surrounded on the sides by the frame or body of a vehicle but is not fully enclosed.

(7.7) "Automated driving system" means hardware and software that are collectively capable, without any intervention or supervision by a human operator, of performing all aspects of the dynamic driving task for a vehicle on a part-time or full-time basis, described as levels 4 and 5 automation in SAE International's standard J3016, as it existed in September 2016.
"Automobile" means any motor vehicle.
(8.5) "BAC" means either:
1. A person's blood alcohol content, expressed in grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood as shown by analysis of the person's blood; or
2. A person's breath alcohol content, expressed in grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath as shown by analysis of the person's breath.
"Base jurisdiction" means the state, province, or other jurisdiction which receives, apportions, and remits to other jurisdictions moneys paid for registration of a vehicle pursuant to a reciprocal agreement governing registration of vehicles.
"Bicycle" means a vehicle propelled by human power applied to pedals upon which a person may ride having two tandem wheels or two parallel wheels and one forward wheel, all of which are more than fourteen inches in diameter.
(10.3) "Bicycle lane" means a portion of the roadway that has been designated by striping, signage, or pavement markings for the exclusive use of bicyclists and other authorized users of bicycle lanes. "Bicycle lane" includes an intersection if the bicycle lane is marked on opposite sides of the intersection.

(10.5) "Bulk electronic transfer" means the mass electronic transfer of files, updated files, or portions thereof, in the same form as those files exist within the department.
"Business district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway when within any six hundred feet along such highway there are buildings in use for business or industrial purposes, including but not limited to motels, banks, office buildings, railroad stations, and public buildings which occupy at least three hundred feet of frontage on one side or three hundred feet collectively on both sides of the highway.
"Calendar year" means the twelve calendar months beginning January 1 and ending December 31 of any year.
"Camper coach" means an item of mounted equipment, weighing more than five hundred pounds, which when temporarily or permanently mounted on a motor vehicle adapts such vehicle for use as temporary living or sleeping accommodations.
"Camper trailer" means a wheeled vehicle having an overall length of less than twenty-six feet, without motive power, which is designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle over the public highways and which is generally and commonly used for temporary living or sleeping accommodations.
"Chauffeur" means every person who is employed for the principal purpose of operating a motor vehicle and every person who drives a motor vehicle while in use as a public or common carrier of persons or property.
"Classified personal property" means any personal property which has been classified for the purpose of imposing thereon a graduated annual specific ownership tax.
(16.5) "Colorado DRIVES" is an acronym that stands for "Colorado driver's license, record, identification, and vehicle enterprise solution" and means the driver and vehicle services information technology system that the department uses to provide driver, identification, and vehicle title and registration services to Colorado residents.
"Commercial carrier" means any owner of a motor vehicle, truck, laden or unladen truck tractor, trailer, or semitrailer used in the business of transporting persons or property over the public highways for profit, hire, or otherwise in any business or commercial enterprise.
(17.5) "Commercial vehicle" means a vehicle used to transport cargo or passengers for profit, hire, or otherwise to further the purposes of a business or commercial enterprise. This subsection (17.5) shall not apply for purposes of sections 42-4-235 and 42-4-707 (1).
"Controlled-access highway" means every highway, street, or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons have no legal right of access to or from the same except at such points only and in such manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over such highway, street, or roadway.
"Convicted" or "conviction" means:
1. A plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
2. A verdict of guilty;
3. An adjudication of delinquency under title 19, C.R.S.;
4. The payment of a penalty assessment under section 42-4-1701 if the summons states clearly the points to be assessed for the offense; and
5. As to a holder of a commercial driver's license as defined in section 42-2-402 or the operator of a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 42-2-402:
  1. An unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination by an authorized administrative hearing that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law;
  2. An unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's appearance in court;
  3. The payment of a fine or court cost or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated; or
  4. A deferred sentence.
"Court" means any municipal court, county court, district court, or any court having jurisdiction over offenses against traffic regulations and laws.
"Crosswalk" means that portion of a roadway ordinarily included within the prolongation or connection of the lateral lines of sidewalks at intersections or any portion of a roadway distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other marking on the surface.
"Dealer" means every person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or exchanging vehicles of a type required to be registered under articles 1 to 4 of this title and who has an established place of business for such purpose in this state.
"Deceleration lane" means a speed-change lane, including tapered areas, for the purpose of enabling a vehicle that is to make an exit to turn from a roadway to slow to the safe speed on the ramp ahead after it has left the mainstream of faster-moving traffic.
(23.5) "Declared gross vehicle weight" means the combined weight of the vehicle or combination vehicle and its cargo when operated on the public highways of this state. Such weight shall be declared by the vehicle owner at the time the vehicle is registered. Accurate records shall be kept of all miles operated by each vehicle over the public highways of this state by the owner of each vehicle.
"Department" means the department of revenue acting directly or through a duly authorized officer, agent, or third-party provider.
(24.3) [ Editor's note: Subsection (24.3) is effective November 11, 2021. ] "Discharged LGBT veteran" has the same meaning as set forth in section 28-5-100.3.

(24.5) "Distinctive special license plate" means a special license plate that is issued to a person because such person has an immutable characteristic or special achievement honor. Such special achievement honor shall not include a common achievement such as graduating from an institution of higher education. Such special achievement shall include honorable service in the armed forces of the United States. "Distinctive special license plate" shall include a license plate that is issued to a person or the person's family to honor such person's service in the armed forces.
"Divided highway" means a highway with separated roadways usually for traffic moving in opposite directions, such separation being indicated by depressed dividing strips, raised curbings, traffic islands, or other physical barriers so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic or otherwise indicated by standard pavement markings or other official traffic control devices as prescribed in the state traffic control manual.
"Drive-away transporter" or "tow-away transporter" means every person engaged in the transporting of vehicles which are sold or to be sold and not owned by such transporter, by the drive-away or tow-away methods, where such vehicles are driven, towed, or transported singly, or by saddlemount, towbar, or fullmount methods, or by any lawful combination thereof.
"Driver" means every person, including a minor driver under the age of twenty-one years, who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.
(27.3) "DUI" means driving under the influence, as defined in section 42-4-1301 (1)(f), and use of the term shall incorporate by reference the offense described in section 42-4-1301 (1)(a).

(27.5) "DUI per se" means driving with a BAC of 0.08 or more, and use of the term shall incorporate by reference the offense described in section 42-4-1301 (2)(a).

(27.7) "DWAI" means driving while ability impaired, as defined in section 42-4-1301 (1)(g), and use of the term shall incorporate by reference the offense described in section 42-4-1301 (1)(b).
1. (27.8) (a) "Dynamic driving task" means all of the following aspects of driving:
  1. Operational aspects, including steering, braking, accelerating, and monitoring the vehicle and the roadway; and
  2. Tactical aspects, including responding to events, determining when to change lanes, turning, using signals, and other related actions.
2. "Dynamic driving task" does not include strategic aspects, including determining destinations or way points, of driving.
"Effective date of registration period certificate" means the month in which a fleet owner must register all fleet vehicles.
(28.5) "Electrical assisted bicycle" means a vehicle having two or three wheels, fully operable pedals, and an electric motor not exceeding seven hundred fifty watts of power. Electrical assisted bicycles are further required to conform to one of three classes as follows:
1. "Class 1 electrical assisted bicycle" means an electrical assisted bicycle equipped with a motor that provides assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that ceases to provide assistance when the bicycle reaches a speed of twenty miles per hour.
2. "Class 2 electrical assisted bicycle" means an electrical assisted bicycle equipped with a motor that provides assistance regardless of whether the rider is pedaling but ceases to provide assistance when the bicycle reaches a speed of twenty miles per hour.
3. "Class 3 electrical assisted bicycle" means an electrical assisted bicycle equipped with a motor that provides assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that ceases to provide assistance when the bicycle reaches a speed of twenty-eight miles per hour.
(28.7) "Electric personal assistive mobility device" or "EPAMD" means a self-balancing, nontandem two-wheeled device, designed to transport only one person, that is powered solely by an electric propulsion system producing an average power output of no more than seven hundred fifty watts.
1. (28.8) (a) "Electric scooter" means a device:
  1. Weighing less than one hundred pounds;
  2. With handlebars and an electric motor;
  3. That is powered by an electric motor; and
  4. That has a maximum speed of twenty miles per hour on a paved level surface when powered solely by the electric motor.
2. "Electric scooter" does not include an electrical assisted bicycle, EPAMD, motorcycle, or low-power scooter.
"Empty weight" means the weight of any motor vehicle or trailer or any combination thereof, including the operating body and accessories, as determined by weighing on a scale approved by the department.
"Essential parts" means all integral parts and body parts, the removal, alteration, or substitution of which will tend to conceal the identity or substantially alter the appearance of the vehicle.
"Established place of business" means the place actually occupied either continuously or at regular periods by a dealer or manufacturer where such dealer's or manufacturer's books and records are kept and a large share of his or her business transacted.
(31.5) "Exceptions processing" means the procedures the department uses to assist persons who are unable for reasons beyond their control to present all the necessary documents required by the department and must rely on alternative documents to establish identity, date of birth, or United States citizenship in lieu of lawful presence in the United States.
"Explosives and hazardous materials" means any substance so defined by the code of federal regulations, title 49, chapter 1, parts 173.50 through 173.389.
"Farm tractor" means every implement of husbandry designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows and mowing machines and other implements of husbandry.
"Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flash point of seventy degrees Fahrenheit or less, as determined by a Tagliabue or equivalent closed-cup test device.
"Fleet operator" means any resident who owns or leases ten or more motor vehicles, trailers, or pole trailers and who receives from the department a registration period certificate in accordance with article 3 of this title.
"Fleet vehicle" means any motor vehicle, trailer, or pole trailer owned or leased by a fleet operator and registered pursuant to section 42-3-125.
"Foreign vehicle" means every motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which is brought into this state otherwise than in the ordinary course of business by or through a manufacturer or dealer and which has not been registered in this state.
"Fullmount" means a vehicle which is mounted completely on the frame of the first vehicle or last vehicle in a saddlemount combination.
"Garage" means any public building or place of business for the storage or repair of automobiles.
(39.5) "Golf car" means a self-propelled vehicle not designed primarily for operation on roadways and that has:
1. A design speed of less than twenty miles per hour;
2. At least three wheels in contact with the ground;
3. An empty weight of not more than one thousand three hundred pounds; and
4. A carrying capacity of not more than four persons.
"Graduated annual specific ownership tax" means an annual tax imposed in lieu of an ad valorem tax upon the personal property required to be classified by the general assembly pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of article X of the state constitution.
"Gross dollar volume" means the total contracted cost of work performed or put in place in a given county by the owner or operator of special mobile machinery.
(41.5) "Group special license plate" means a special license plate that is not a distinctive plate and is issued to a group of people because such people have a common interest or affinity.

(41.7) Repealed.
"High occupancy vehicle lane" means a lane designated pursuant to the provisions of section 42-4-1012 (1).
"Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state.
(43.3) "Human operator" means a natural person in the vehicle with immediate access to controls for steering, braking, and acceleration.

(43.5) "Immediate family" means a person who is related by blood, marriage, or adoption.
1. On and after July 1, 2000, "implement of husbandry" means every vehicle that is designed, adapted, or used for agricultural purposes. It also includes equipment used solely for the application of liquid, gaseous, and dry fertilizers. Transportation of fertilizer, in or on the equipment used for its application, shall be deemed a part of application if it is incidental to such application. It also includes hay balers, hay stacking equipment, combines, tillage and harvesting equipment, agricultural commodity handling equipment, and other heavy movable farm equipment primarily used on farms or in a livestock production facility and not on the highways. Trailers specially designed to move such equipment on highways shall, for the purposes of part 5 of article 4 of this title, be considered as component parts of such implements of husbandry.
2. Effective July 1, 2013, for purposes of this section, "implements of husbandry" includes personal property valued by the county assessor as silvicultural.
"Intersection" means the area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict. Where a highway includes two roadways thirty feet or more apart, every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. In the event such intersecting highway also includes two roadways thirty feet or more apart, every crossing of two roadways of such highways shall be regarded as a separate intersection. The junction of an alley with a street or highway does not constitute an intersection.
(45.5) "Kit vehicle" means a passenger-type motor vehicle assembled, by other than a licensed manufacturer, from a manufactured kit that includes a prefabricated body and chassis and is accompanied by a manufacturer's statement of origin.
"Lane" means the portion of a roadway for the movement of a single line of vehicles.
"Laned highway" means a highway the roadway of which is divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic.
(47.3) "Last-known address" means:
1. For notifications regarding motor vehicles, the most recent mailing address provided on a vehicle registration or vehicle registration mailing address change notification provided in accordance with section 42-3-113 or the corrected address as reported by an address correction service licensed by the United States postal service;
2. For notifications regarding driving privileges, driver's licenses, or identification cards when there is a driver's license or identification card on file with the department, the most recent of either:
  1. The mailing address provided by an applicant for a driver's license or identification card;
  2. The mailing address stated on an address change notification provided to the department pursuant to subsection (47.3)(a) of this section; or
  3. The corrected address as reported by an address correction service licensed by the United States postal service;
3. For notifications regarding driving privileges or identification cards when there is no driver's license or identification card on file with the department, the most recent address shown on any other record on file with the department pursuant to this article 1 and as may be corrected by an address correction service licensed by the United States postal service.
(47.5) "Lien" means a security interest in a motor or off-highway vehicle under article 9 of title 4, C.R.S., and this article.
"Local authorities" means every county, municipal, and other local board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the constitution and laws of this state.
1. (48.5) (a) "Low-power scooter" means a self-propelled vehicle designed primarily for use on the roadways with not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, no manual clutch, and either of the following:
  1. A cylinder capacity not exceeding fifty cubic centimeters if powered by internal combustion; or
  2. A wattage not exceeding four thousand four hundred seventy-six if powered by electricity.
2. "Low-power scooter" does not include a toy vehicle, bicycle, electrical assisted bicycle, electric scooter, wheelchair, or any device designed to assist people with mobility impairments who use pedestrian rights-of-way.
(48.6) "Low-speed electric vehicle" means a vehicle that:
1. Is self-propelled utilizing electricity as its primary propulsion method;
2. Has at least three wheels in contact with the ground;
3. Does not use handlebars to steer; and
4. Exhibits the manufacturer's compliance with 49 CFR 565 or displays a seventeen-character vehicle identification number as provided in 49 CFR 565.
"Manufacturer" means any person, firm, association, corporation, or trust, whether resident or nonresident, who manufactures or assembles new and unused motor vehicles of a type required to be registered under articles 1 to 4 of this title.
"Manufacturer's suggested retail price" means the retail price of such motor vehicle suggested by the manufacturer plus the retail price suggested by the manufacturer for each accessory or item of optional equipment physically attached to such vehicle prior to the sale to the retail purchaser.
"Markings" means all lines, patterns, words, colors, or other devices, except signs, set into the surface of, applied upon, or attached to the pavement or curbing or to objects within or adjacent to the roadway, conforming to the state traffic control manual and officially placed for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.
"Metal tires" means all tires the surface of which in contact with the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard, nonresilient material.
(52.5) "Military vehicle" means a vehicle of any size or weight that is valued for historical purposes, that was manufactured for use by any nation's armed forces, and that is maintained in a condition that represents its military design and markings.
"Minor driver's license" means the license issued to a person who is at least sixteen years of age but who has not yet attained the age of twenty-one years.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (HB 10-1172), ch. 320, p. 1486, § 1, effective October 1, 2010.)
"Motorcycle" means an autocycle or a motor vehicle that uses handlebars or any other device connected to the front wheel to steer and that is designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground; except that the term does not include a farm tractor, low-speed electric vehicle, or low-power scooter.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1260, § 22, effective October 1, 2009.)
"Motor home" means a vehicle designed to provide temporary living quarters and which is built into, as an integral part of or a permanent attachment to, a motor vehicle chassis or van.
"Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle that is designed primarily for travel on the public highways and that is generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over the public highways or a low-speed electric vehicle; except that the term does not include electrical assisted bicycles, electric scooters, low-power scooters, wheelchairs, or vehicles moved solely by human power. For the purposes of the offenses described in sections 42-2-128, 42-4-1301, 42-4-1301.1, and 42-4-1401 for farm tractors and off-highway vehicles, as defined in section 33-14.5-101 (3), operated on streets and highways, "motor vehicle" includes a farm tractor or an off-highway vehicle that is not otherwise classified as a motor vehicle. For the purposes of sections 42-2-127, 42-2-127.7, 42-2-128, 42-2-138, 42-2-206, 42-4-1301, and 42-4-1301.1, "motor vehicle" includes a low-power scooter.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1260, § 22, effective October 1, 2009.)
"Mounted equipment" means any item weighing more than five hundred pounds that is permanently mounted on a vehicle, including mounting by means such as welding or bolting the equipment to a vehicle.
(60.3) "Multipurpose trailer" means a wheeled vehicle, without motive power, that is designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle over the public highways. A "multipurpose trailer" is generally and commonly used for temporary living or sleeping accommodation and transporting property wholly upon its own structure and is registered as a vehicle.

(60.5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (SB 09-075), ch. 418, p. 2320, § 4, effective August 5, 2009.)
"Noncommercial or recreational vehicle" means a truck, or unladen truck tractor, operated singly or in combination with a trailer or utility trailer or a motor home, which truck, or unladen truck tractor, or motor home is used exclusively for personal pleasure, enjoyment, other recreational purposes, or personal or family transportation of the owner, lessee, or occupant and is not used to transport cargo or passengers for profit, hire, or otherwise to further the purposes of a business or commercial enterprise.
"Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of this state.
"Off-highway vehicle" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 33-14.5-101 (3), C.R.S.
"Official traffic control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, and devices, not inconsistent with this title, placed or displayed by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.
"Official traffic control signal" means any device, whether manually, electrically, or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and to proceed.
"Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle; or, if a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee or if a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of articles 1 to 4 of this title. The term also includes parties otherwise having lawful use or control or the right to use or control a vehicle for a period of thirty days or more.
"Park" or "parking" means the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than very briefly for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers.
"Pedestrian" means any person afoot or any person using a wheelchair.
1. (68.5) (a) "Persistent drunk driver" means any person who:
  1. Has been convicted of or had his or her driver's license revoked for two or more alcohol-related driving violations;
  2. Continues to drive after a driver's license or driving privilege restraint has been imposed for one or more alcohol-related driving offenses;
  3. Drives a motor vehicle while the amount of alcohol in such person's blood, as shown by analysis of the person's blood or breath, was 0.15 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood or 0.15 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath at the time of driving or within two hours after driving; or
  4. Refuses to take or complete, or to cooperate in the completing of, a test of his or her blood, breath, saliva, or urine as required by section 18-3-106 (4) or 18-3-205 (4), C.R.S., or section 42-4-1301.1 (2).
2. Nothing in this subsection (68.5) shall be interpreted to affect the penalties imposed under this title for multiple alcohol- or drug-related driving offenses, including, but not limited to, penalties imposed for violations under sections 42-2-125 (1)(g) and (1)(i) and 42-2-202 (2).
"Person" means a natural person, estate, trust, firm, copartnership, association, corporation, or business entity.
(69.5) "Plug-in electric motor vehicle" means:
1. A motor vehicle that has received an acknowledgment of certification from the federal internal revenue service that the vehicle qualifies for the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit set forth in 26 U.S.C. sec. 30D, as amended, or any successor statute; or
2. Any motor vehicle that can be recharged from an external source of electricity and that uses electricity stored in a rechargeable battery pack to propel or contribute to the propulsion of the vehicle's drive wheels.
"Pneumatic tires" means all tires inflated with compressed air.
"Pole", "pipe trailer", or "dolly" means every vehicle of the trailer type having one or more axles not more than forty-eight inches apart and two or more wheels used in connection with a motor vehicle solely for the purpose of transporting poles or pipes and connected with the towing vehicle both by chain, rope, or cable and by the load without any part of the weight of said dolly resting upon the towing vehicle. All the registration provisions of articles 1 to 4 of this title shall apply to every pole, pipe trailer, or dolly.
"Police officer" means every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.
(72.2) "Power takeoff equipment" means equipment that is attached to a motor vehicle and is powered by the motor that powers the locomotion of the motor vehicle.

(72.5) "Primary user" means an organization that collects bulk data for the purpose of in-house business use.

(72.7) "Principal office" means the office in this state designated by a fleet owner as its principal place of business.
"Private road" or "driveway" means every road or driveway not open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
Repealed.
"Railroad sign or signal" means any sign, signal, or device erected by authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad train.
"Reciprocal agreement" or "reciprocity" means an agreement among two or more states, provinces, or other jurisdictions for coordinated, shared, or mutual enforcement or administration of laws relating to the registration, operation, or taxation of vehicles and other personal property in interstate commerce. The term includes without limitation the "international registration plan" and any successor agreement providing for the apportionment, among participating jurisdictions, of vehicle registration fees or taxes.
"Reconstructed vehicle" means any vehicle which has been assembled or constructed largely by means of essential parts, new or used, derived from other vehicles or makes of vehicles of various names, models, and types or which, if originally otherwise constructed, has been materially altered by the removal of essential parts or by the addition or substitution of essential parts, new or used, derived from other vehicles or makes of vehicles.
"Registration period" or "registration year" means any consecutive twelve-month period.
"Registration period certificate" means the document issued by the department to a fleet owner, upon application of a fleet owner, which states the month in which registration is required for all motor vehicles owned by the fleet owner.
"Residence district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the frontage on such highway for a distance of three hundred feet or more is mainly occupied by dwellings or by dwellings and buildings in use for business.
"Resident" means any person who owns or operates any business in this state or any person who has resided within this state continuously for a period of ninety days or has obtained gainful employment within this state, whichever shall occur first.
"Right-of-way" means the right of one vehicle operator or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle operator or pedestrian approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other.
"Road" means any highway.
"Road tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load thereon independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so drawn.
"Roadway" means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder even though such sidewalk, berm, or shoulder is used by persons riding bicycles or other human-powered vehicles and exclusive of that portion of a highway designated for exclusive use as a bicycle path or reserved for the exclusive use of bicycles, human-powered vehicles, or pedestrians. In the event that a highway includes two or more separate roadways, "roadway" refers to any such roadway separately but not to all such roadways collectively.
(85.5) "Roughed-in road" means an area of ground that has been cut with the intention to make a highway but which has not been improved enough to make the area qualify as a highway.
"Saddlemount combination" means a combination of vehicles in which a truck or laden or unladen truck tractor tows one or more additional trucks or laden or unladen truck tractors and in which each such towed truck or laden or unladen truck tractor is connected by a saddle to the frame or fifth wheel of the vehicle immediately in front of such truck or laden or unladen truck tractor. For the purposes of this subsection (86), "saddle" means a mechanism which connects the front axle of a towed vehicle to the frame or fifth wheel of a vehicle immediately in front of such towed vehicle and which functions like a fifth wheel kingpin connection. A saddlemount combination may include one fullmount.
"Safety zone" means the area or space officially set aside within a highway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is so plainly marked or indicated by proper signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone.
"School bus" means a motor vehicle that is designed and used specifically for the transportation of school children to or from a public or private school or a school-related activity, whether the activity occurs within or without the territorial limits of any district and whether or not the activity occurs during school hours. "School bus" does not include informal or intermittent arrangements, such as sharing of actual gasoline expense or participation in a car pool, for the transportation of school children to or from a public or private school or a school-related activity.
1. (88.5) (a) "School vehicle" means a motor vehicle, including but not limited to a school bus, that is owned by or under contract to a public or private school and operated for the transportation of school children to or from school or a school-related activity.
2. "School vehicle" does not include:
  1. Informal or intermittent arrangements, such as sharing of actual gasoline expense or participation in a car pool, for the transportation of school children to or from a public or private school or a school-related activity; or
  2. A motor vehicle that is owned by or under contract to a child care center, as defined in section 26-6-102 (5), C.R.S., and that is used for the transportation of children who are served by the child care center.
"Semitrailer" means any wheeled vehicle, without motor power, designed to be used in conjunction with a laden or unladen truck tractor so that some part of its own weight and that of its cargo load rests upon or is carried by such laden or unladen truck tractor and that is generally and commonly used to carry and transport property over the public highways.
"Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between the curb lines or the lateral lines of a roadway and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.
1. (90.5) (a) "Signature" means either a written signature or an electronic signature.
2. "Electronic signature" has the same meaning as set forth in section 24-71-101.
"Snowplow" means any vehicle originally designed for highway snow and ice removal or control or subsequently adapted for such purposes which is operated by or for the state of Colorado or any political subdivision thereof.
"Solid rubber tires" means every tire made of rubber other than a pneumatic tire.
"Specially constructed vehicle" means any vehicle which has not been originally constructed under a distinctive name, make, model, or type by a generally recognized manufacturer of vehicles.
1. (93.5) (a) "Special mobile machinery" means machinery that is pulled, hauled, or driven over a highway and is either:
  1. A vehicle or equipment that is not designed primarily for the transportation of persons or cargo over the public highways; or
  2. A motor vehicle that may have been originally designed for the transportation of persons or cargo over the public highways, and has been redesigned or modified by the addition of mounted equipment or machinery, and is only incidentally operated or moved over the public highways.
2. "Special mobile machinery" includes vehicles commonly used in the construction, maintenance, and repair of roadways, the drilling of wells, and the digging of ditches.
"Stand" or "standing" means the halting of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than momentarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.
"State" means a state, territory, organized or unorganized, or district of the United States.
"State motor vehicle licensing agency" means the department of revenue.
"State traffic control manual" means the most recent edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways", including any supplement thereto, as adopted by the transportation commission.
"Steam and electric trains" includes:
1. "Railroad", which means a carrier of persons or property upon cars, other than street cars, operated upon stationary rails;
2. "Railroad train", which means a steam engine, electric, or other motor, with or without cars coupled thereto, operated upon rails, except streetcars;
3. "Streetcar", which means a car other than a railroad train for transporting persons or property upon rails principally within a municipality.
"Stinger-steered" means a semitrailer combination configuration wherein the fifth wheel is located on a drop frame located behind and below the rearmost axle of the power unit.
"Stop" or "stopping" means, when prohibited, any halting, even momentarily, of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or official traffic control device.
"Stop line" or "limit line" means a line which indicates where drivers shall stop when directed by an official traffic control device or a police officer.
(101.5) "Street rod vehicle" means a vehicle manufactured in 1948 or earlier with a body design that has been modified for safe road use.
"Supervisor" means the executive director of the department of revenue or head of a group, division, or subordinate department appointed by the executive director in accordance with article 35 of title 24, C.R.S.
(102.5) "Surge brakes" means a system whereby the brakes of a trailer are actuated as a result of the forward pressure of the trailer against the tow vehicle during deceleration.

(102.7) "Temporary special event license plate" means a special license plate valid for a limited time period that is issued to a person or group of people in connection with a special event. "Temporary special event license plate" does not mean a special plate for the purposes of section 42-3-207.

(102.8) "Third-party provider" means an electronic vehicle or special mobile machinery registration, lien, or titling service provider that is approved by the department to perform the registration, lien, and titling functions set forth in articles 1 to 6 of this title 42.
"Through highway" means every highway or portion thereof on which vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way and at the entrances to which other vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield the right-of-way to vehicles on such through highway in obedience to a stop sign, yield sign, or other official traffic control device when such signs or devices are erected as provided by law.
1. (103.5) (a) "Toy vehicle" means any vehicle that has wheels and is not designed for use on public highways or for off-road use.
2. "Toy vehicle" includes, but is not limited to, gas-powered or electric-powered vehicles commonly known as mini bikes, "pocket" bikes, kamikaze boards, go-peds, and stand-up scooters.
3. "Toy vehicle" does not include electric scooters, off-highway vehicles, or snowmobiles.
"Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, and vehicles, streetcars, and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for the purposes of travel.
"Trailer" means any wheeled vehicle, without motive power, which is designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle and to carry its cargo load wholly upon its own structure and that is generally and commonly used to carry and transport property over the public highways. The term includes, but is not limited to, multipurpose trailers as defined in subsection (60.3) of this section.
1. "Trailer coach" means a wheeled vehicle having an overall length, excluding towing gear and bumpers, of not less than twenty-six feet, without motive power, that is designed and generally and commonly used for occupancy by persons for residential purposes, in temporary locations, and that may occasionally be drawn over the public highways by a motor vehicle and is licensed as a vehicle.
2. "Manufactured home" means any preconstructed building unit or combination of preconstructed building units, without motive power, where such unit or units are manufactured in a factory or at a location other than the residential site of the completed home, which is designed and commonly used for occupancy by persons for residential purposes, in either temporary or permanent locations, and which unit or units are not licensed as a vehicle.
"Transporter" means every person engaged in the business of delivering vehicles of a type required to be registered under articles 1 to 4 of this title from a manufacturing, assembling, or distributing plant to dealers or sales agents of a manufacturer.
"Truck" means any motor vehicle equipped with a body designed to carry property and which is generally and commonly used to carry and transport property over the public highways.
"Truck tractor - laden" or "laden truck tractor" means any motor vehicle carrying cargo that is generally and commonly designed and used to draw, and is drawing, a semitrailer or trailer and its cargo load over the public highways.
(109.5) "Truck tractor - unladen" or "unladen truck tractor" means any motor vehicle not carrying cargo that is generally used to draw a semitrailer or trailer and its cargo load over the public highways.

(109.7) "UDD" means underage drinking and driving, and use of the term shall incorporate by reference the offense described in section 42-4-1301 (2)(d).
"Used vehicle" means every motor vehicle which has been sold, bargained for, exchanged, or given away, or has had the title transferred from the person who first acquired it from the manufacturer or importer, and has been so used as to have become what is commonly known as "secondhand" within the ordinary meaning thereof.
"Utility trailer" means any wheeled vehicle weighing two thousand pounds or less, without motive power, which is designed to be drawn by a motor vehicle and which is generally and commonly used to carry and transport personal effects, articles of household furniture, loads of trash and rubbish, or not to exceed two horses over the public highways.
"Vehicle" means a device that is capable of moving itself, or of being moved, from place to place upon wheels or endless tracks. "Vehicle" includes a bicycle, electrical assisted bicycle, electric scooter, or EPAMD, but does not include a wheelchair, off-highway vehicle, snowmobile, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry designed primarily or exclusively for use and used in agricultural operations or any device moved exclusively over stationary rails or tracks or designed to move primarily through the air.
(112.5) "Vendor" means an organization that collects bulk data for the purpose of reselling the data.
"Wheelchair" means a motorized or nonmotorized wheeled device designed for use by a person with a physical disability.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2094, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (17), (86), (89), and (109) amended and (109.5) added, p. 470, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (102.5) added, p. 629, § 1, effective January 1, 1997. L. 97: (58) amended and (60.5) added, p. 392, § 1, effective August 6. L. 98: (68.5) added, p. 1239, § 2, effective July 1. L. 99: (10.5), (72.5), and (112.5) added, p. 1239, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2000: (88) amended, p. 20, § 1, effective March 9; (96) and (102) amended, p. 1639, § 21, effective June 1; (44) amended, p. 548, § 1, effective July 1; (58) amended, p. 698, § 16, effective July 1; (53) and (74) amended, p. 1348, § 13, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (17.5) added and (61) amended, p. 504, § 1, effective May 18; (24.5) and (41.5) added, p. 729, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2002: (35) and (36) amended, p. 1, § 1, effective March 1; (27) amended, p. 1033, § 72, effective June 1; (4.5) added, p. 404, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2003: (102.7) added, p. 1847, § 1, effective May 21; (72.7) added, p. 809, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2005: (19) and (69) amended, p. 640, § 1, effective May 27; (103.5) added, p. 1241, § 1, effective June 3; (43.5) added, p. 335, § 4, effective July 1; (23.5) and (101.5) added and (36) amended, p. 1071, § 1, effective August 8; (24.5) amended, p. 665, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2006: (102.7) amended, p. 1509, § 62, effective June 1; (17.5) amended, p. 43, § 2, effective July 1; (24.5) amended, p. 1753, § 4, effective January 1, 2007; (68.5) amended, p. 1366, § 1, effective January 1, 2007; (45.5) added, p. 1411, § 1, effective July 1, 2007. L. 2007: (109) and (109.5) amended, p. 282, § 1, effective March 29. L. 2008: (6) amended, p. 2083, § 8, effective June 3; (8.5), (27.3), (27.5), (27.7), (41.7), and (109.7) added, p. 243, § 2, effective July 1; (19)(e) added, p. 473, § 2, effective July 1; (60.3) added and (105) and (106)(a) amended, p. 637, § 1, effective August 5; (69) amended, p. 2271, § 1, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (39.5) and (48.6) added and (55), (58), and (60.5) amended, (SB 09-075), ch. 418, p. 2320, § 4, effective August 5; (10), (55), (56), (58), (59), (103.5), and (112) amended and (28.5), (28.7), and (48.5) added, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1260, § 22, effective October 1. L. 2010: (88) amended and (88.5) added, (HB 10-1232), ch. 163, p. 572, § 10, effective April 28; (72.2) added, (SB 10-144), ch. 289, p. 1345, § 1, effective July 1; (44) amended, (SB 10-177), ch. 392, p. 1861, § 2, effective August 11; (52.5) added, (SB 10-075), ch. 169, p. 597, § 1, effective August 11; (33), (41), (54), and (60) amended and (93.5) added, (HB 10-1172), ch. 320, p. 1486, § 1, effective October 1. L. 2011: (55) amended, (HB 11-1188), ch. 175, p. 663, § 6, effective May 13. L. 2013: (41.7) repealed, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1879, § 4, effective May 28; (47.5) added, (HB 13-1289), ch. 380, p. 2224, § 2, effective June 5; (47.5) amended, (SB 13-280), ch. 407, p. 2396, § 40, effective June 5; (68.5) amended, (HB 13-1240), ch. 361, p. 2112, § 2, effective January 1, 2014. L. 2014: (31.5) added, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1541, § 1, effective June 5; (7.5) added and (55) amended, (HB 14-1367), ch. 303, p. 1285, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2015: (109.7) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 996, § 5, effective August 5. L. 2016: (88.5)(b)(II) amended, (SB 16-189), ch. 210, p. 797, § 118, effective June 6. L. 2017: (7.5) and (55) amended, (HB 17-1044), ch. 72, p. 228, § 1, effective March 23; IP amended and (7.7), (27.8), and (43.3) added, (SB 17-213), ch. 277, p. 1517, § 2, effective August 9; (5) amended and (16.5) and (47.3) added, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 358, § 1, effective August 9; (28.5) and (58) amended, (HB 17-1151), ch. 98, p. 295, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2018: (24) amended and (90.5) and (102.8) added, (HB 18-1299), ch. 297, p. 1808, § 1, effective July 1, 2019. L. 2019: (28.8) added and (48.5)(b), (58), (103.5)(c), and (112) amended, (HB 19-1221), ch. 271, p. 2557, § 1, effective May 23; (69.5) added, (HB 19-1298), ch. 384, p. 3438, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2020: (10.3) added, (SB 20-061), ch. 30, p. 101, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2021: (85.5) added, (SB 21-084), ch. 50, p. 213, § 1, effective September 7; (24.3) added, (SB 21-026), ch. 42, p. 177, § 16, effective November 11.

Editor's note:

Subsection (74)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (74), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2000, p. 1348 .)
Amendments to subsections (55) and (58) by Senate Bill 09-075 and House Bill 09-1026 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1998 act amending subsection (68.5), see section 1 of chapter 295, Session Laws of Colorado 1998. For the legislative declaration in the 2013 act adding subsection (47.5), see section 1 of chapter 380, Session Laws of Colorado 2013. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-213, see section 1 of chapter 277, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

(2) Section 1 of chapter 412, Session Laws of Colorado 2008, provides that the act amending subsection (6) shall be known and may be cited as the "Charles Mather Highway Safety Act".

(3) For the short title ("Restoration of Honor Act") in SB 21-026, see section 1 of chapter 42, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Scope of the Right-of-Way Privilege", see 19 Dicta 122 (1942).

This article is general, uniform in its operation, and not special within the meaning of § 25 of art. V, Colo. Const. Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334 , 14 P.2d 1098 (1932).

Definition of "chauffeur" constitutional. The statutory definition of "chauffeur" is not irrational. Moreover, it relates to a legitimate government purpose and, thus, must be upheld as constitutional. Bedell v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 655 P.2d 849 (Colo. App. 1982).

"Automobile" is not limited to passenger cars. Word "automobile" should be given its ordinary and generally accepted meaning, and not limited to passenger cars only. Lombardi v. Bd. of Adjustment, 675 P.2d 21 (Colo. App. 1983).

"Crosswalk", as defined in this section, does not include a wheelchair ramp or curb cut. May v. Petersen, 2020 COA 75 , 465 P.3d 589.

"Driver". Person who was in the driver's seat of an automobile which had its motor running and its parking lights on and which was located in a private parking lot was in actual physical control of the automobile and thus was driving a motor vehicle. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Warman, 763 P.2d 558 (Colo. 1988).

"Driver" includes a person seated behind a steering wheel with the seat belt fastened with the key in the ignition turned to "on", even though the car is not running. Caple v. Dept. of Rev., 804 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1990).

Based on the definition of "driver" in subsection (27), the terms "drive" and "drove", for purposes of the DUI statute, include "actual physical control" of a vehicle. Thus, a person may be deemed to be driving a vehicle even if the vehicle is not actually moving. People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1998).

Car qualifies as "emergency vehicle". Clark v. Fellin, 126 Colo. 519 , 251 P.2d 940 (1952).

A police car is an "emergency vehicle" for purposes of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. Fogg v. Macaluso, 870 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 892 P.2d 271 ( Colo. 1995 ).

The point at which a crossroad enters the main highway is an "intersection" within the statutory definition of that term. General Foods Sales Co. v. Smith, 105 Colo. 305 , 97 P.2d 429 (1939).

The board of county commissioners falls within the statutory definition of "local authority". Asphalt Paving Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 Colo. 254 , 425 P.2d 289 (1967).

The definition of "motor vehicle" in § 24-10-106 and "mobile machinery" in this section are mutually exclusive. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152 , 300 P.3d 977.

The definitions of motor vehicle and mobile machinery each combine two factors, design and use. A motor vehicle is primarily designed to travel on public highways and is generally and commonly used to transport persons and property over those highways. Mobile machinery is not primarily designed to transport persons or cargo over the public highways and is commonly used in the maintenance of roadways. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152 , 300 P.3d 977.

The definitions of "motor vehicle" and "special mobile machinery" in this section are mutually exclusive. Roper v. Carneal, 2015 COA 13 , 411 P.3d 889.

Definition of "motor vehicle" in this section does not include a street sweeper for purposes of the Colorado governmental immunity act. For purposes of the act, a street sweeper fits under the definition of "special mobile machinery" as defined in this section. Henderson v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 152 , 300 P.3d 977.

Definition of "motor vehicle" in this section did not apply to road grader operating on highway and fell within the motor vehicle exception to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. For purposes of the Act, "motor vehicle" includes any "vehicle on wheels having its own motor and not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or highways". Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 873 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994).

Definition of "motor vehicle" in this section includes a snowplow. A snowplow meets both elements of the motor vehicle definition in that it is designed primarily for travel on the public highways and is used to transport persons or property over such highways. Roper v. Carneal, 2015 COA 13 , 411 P.3d 889.

A vehicle does not have to transport both "persons and property" to meet the definition of "motor vehicle" in this section. Such an interpretation would exclude a vehicle that only transports people or that only transports property over the public highways, which would be absurd and unreasonable. A vehicle that transports either persons or property over the public highways may qualify as a "motor vehicle". Roper v. Carneal, 2015 COA 13 , 411 P.3d 889.

Use of "county" with "municipal" indicates intent for county to have police powers. The fact that the term "county" was included in this section along with "municipal" units indicates that the general assembly intended such county governmental units, functioning through their boards of county commissioners, to have at least certain police powers. Asphalt Paving Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 Colo. 254 , 425 P.2d 289 (1967).

The provision relating to "other local board or body" can apply only to the numerous units of local government other than counties and municipalities, which overlap our state in profusion. Asphalt Paving Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 Colo. 254 , 425 P.2d 289 (1967).

Presumption in § 42-2-126 (8)(e)(II) does not apply to determination of whether a person is a "persistent drunk driver". Presumption that favors the accuracy of a blood alcohol content analysis done on behalf of a law enforcement agency when a driver submits conflicting test results applies only to revocation determinations. Garcia v. Huber, 252 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2010).

Definition of "police officer" is not limited to state, county, or municipal personnel. Air Force security police are law enforcement officers who can request testing pursuant to the express consent law under § 42-4-1301 (6). Eggleston v. Dept. of Rev. Motor Veh. Div., 895 P.2d 1169 (Colo. App. 1995).

A "public highway" is defined as (a) the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel; or (b) the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state. Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959).

A "private roadway" is defined as every road or driveway not open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959).

When a highway is closed to the use of the public, its status is within the definition of a private road or driveway. Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959).

For example, under this section, a highway under construction and not open to the public use is a private roadway. Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959).

Applied in Lorenzini v. Rucker, 95 Colo. 246 , 35 P.2d 865 (1936); Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 507 , 290 P.2d 229 (1955); Britto v. People, 178 Colo. 216 , 497 P.2d 325 (1972); State, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Dayhoff, 199 Colo. 363 , 609 P.2d 119 (1980); Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Western Sur. Co., 44 Colo. App. 257, 616 P.2d 163 (1980); Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 ( Colo. 1982 ); Lombardi v. Bd. of Adjustment, 675 P.2d 21 (Colo. App. 1983).

PART 2 ADMINISTRATION

42-1-201. Administration - supervisor.

The executive director of the department is empowered to administer and enforce the provisions of articles 1 to 4 of this title. There shall be at least one supervisor who shall be employed under section 13 of article XII of the state constitution.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2106, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1639, § 22, effective June 1.

ANNOTATION

These provisions vest authority in the executive director to hold hearings, make findings and determinations, and upon a proper showing revoke the driving privileges of a person found to have violated § 42-4-1202 . Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court ex rel. County of Adams, 172 Colo. 144 , 470 P.2d 864 (1970).

42-1-202. Have charge of all divisions.

The supervisor shall have charge of all divisions as provided in articles 1 to 4 of this title to carry out the purposes of said articles.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2106, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

42-1-203. Executive director to cooperate with others - local compliance required.

The executive director of the department shall coordinate motor vehicle enforcement throughout the state by cooperating with other officials connected with traffic enforcement, as may appear to the executive director as advantageous. The executive director shall bring to the attention of proper officials information and statistics in connection with enforcement and shall urge the desirability and necessity of uniformity. It is the executive director's duty to cooperate and confer with officials of other states charged with like duties, and the executive director is authorized to attend conferences called among said officials, and the executive director's necessary traveling expenses in attending said meetings shall be paid as are other traveling expenses of said department.
In the coordination of motor vehicle law enforcement reporting throughout the state, the executive director, upon the failure of any local jurisdiction to take the necessary steps to achieve uniformity, may order such local jurisdiction to come into conformity with state coordination plans, including all information and statistics relating thereto.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2106, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

42-1-204. Uniform rules and regulations.

The executive director of the department has the power to make uniform rules and regulations not inconsistent with articles 1 to 4 of this title and to enforce the same.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2107, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Cross references: For rule-making procedures, see article 4 of title 24.

ANNOTATION

Rules and regulations must be consistent with statutes authorizing such. Agency rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the statutes under which they are promulgated are invalid. A & A Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 85, 602 P.2d 10 (1979).

Applied in Dept. of Rev. v. A & A Auto Wrecking, Inc., 43 Colo. 85 , 625 P.2d 1021 (1981); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 632 P.2d 1044 (Colo. App. 1981).

42-1-205. Record of official acts - seal.

The executive director of the department shall keep a record of all the executive director's official acts and shall preserve a copy of all decisions, rules, and orders made by the executive director, and the executive director shall adopt an official seal for the department. Copies of any act, rule, order, or decision made by the executive director or of any paper or papers filed in the executive director's office may be authenticated by the executive director or the executive director's deputy under said seal at a cost not exceeding one dollar for each authentication and when so authenticated shall be evidence equally with and in like manner as the originals and may be received by the courts of this state as evidence of the contents.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2107, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Cross references: For use of a rubber stamp that produces a facsimile of the seal, see § 42-2-121 (3).

42-1-206. Records open to inspection - furnishing of copies - rules.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2107, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (3) added, p. 1178, § 2, effective July 1; entire section amended, p. 1051, § 3, effective September 1. L. 98: (4) added, p. 1351, § 92, effective June 1. L. 99: (3) amended and (3.5) added, p. 345, § 3, effective April 16; (3) repealed and (3.7) added, pp. 1241, 1239, §§ 4, 2, effective August 4. L. 2000: (1)(b)(I)(A), (2)(a), (3.5)(c), and (3.7)(a) amended, p. 1340, § 2, effective May 30. L. 2001: (1)(b), (3.7)(a), IP(3.7)(b), (3.7)(b)(I), and (3.7)(b)(IV) amended and (5) added, p. 587, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2003: (2)(a) amended, p. 1978, § 2, effective May 22. L. 2005: (1)(a) and (2)(a) amended and (6) added, p. 673, § 1, effective June 1; (3.5)(d) amended, p. 782, § 75, effective June 1; (3.7)(a) amended, p. 1171, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2014: (2)(a) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1541, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2017: (3.5)(e) added, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 359, § 2, effective August 9. L. 2018: (6) amended, (HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1082, § 22, effective October 1; IP(1)(b)(I), (1)(b)(I)(B), and (5) amended, (HB 18-1299), ch. 297, p. 1808, § 2, effective July 1, 2019. L. 2021: IP(1)(b)(I) and (3.5)(b) amended, (SB 21-131), ch. 353, p. 2299, § 3, effective June 25.

Editor's note: Subsection (3.7)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3.7)(c), effective July 1, 2000. (See L. 99, p. 1239 .)

Cross references: (1) For public records and the inspection, copying, or photographing thereof, see part 2 of article 72 of title 24.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1997 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 201, Session Laws of Colorado 1997.

42-1-207. No supplies for private purposes - penalty.

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until March 1, 2022. ] No officer or employee at any time shall use for private or pleasure purposes any of the equipment or supplies furnished for the discharge of such officer or employee's duties. The use of such equipment for private or personal use is declared to be a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, the violator shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment and by dismissal from office.

42-1-207. No supplies for private purposes - penalty.

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective March 1, 2022. ] An officer or employee shall not, at any time, use for private or pleasure purposes any of the equipment or supplies furnished for the discharge of such officer or employee's duties. The use of equipment for private or personal use is a civil infraction punishable by both fine and dismissal.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2107, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3299, § 705, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

42-1-208. Information on accidents - published.

The department shall receive accident reports required to be made by law and shall tabulate and analyze such reports and publish annually, or at more frequent intervals, statistical information based thereon as to the number, cause, and location of highway accidents. The statistical information shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of section 24-1-136, C.R.S.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2108, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2007: Entire section amended, p. 30, § 2, effective August 3.

42-1-209. Copies of law published. (Repealed)

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2108, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2007: Entire section repealed, p. 30, § 3, effective August 3.

42-1-210. Authorized agents - legislative declaration - fee.

1. 1. Authorized agents are hereby designated as the authorized agents of the department, under direction of the executive director of the department, for the administration of articles 1, 3, 4, 6, and 12 of this title and rules adopted under those articles relating to the performance of their duties; for the enforcement of section 42-6-139 relating to the registering and titling of motor vehicles; and for the enforcement of section 38-29-120 relating to the titling of manufactured homes. (1) (a) (I) Authorized agents are hereby designated as the authorized agents of the department, under direction of the executive director of the department, for the administration of articles 1, 3, 4, 6, and 12 of this title and rules adopted under those articles relating to the performance of their duties; for the enforcement of section 42-6-139 relating to the registering and titling of motor vehicles; and for the enforcement of section 38-29-120 relating to the titling of manufactured homes.
  2. An authorized agent may appoint and employ such motor vehicle registration and license clerks as are actually necessary in the issuance of motor vehicle licenses and may retain for the purpose of defraying these expenses, including mailing, a sum equal to four dollars per paid motor vehicle registration and registration requiring a license plate or plates; individual temporary registration number plates; or a validation tab, sticker, decal, or certificate as provided in sections 42-3-201 and 42-3-203. This fee of four dollars applies to every registration of a motor vehicle except motor vehicles that are specifically exempted from payment of any registration fee by article 3 of this title 42, and is required in addition to the annual registration fee prescribed by law for a motor vehicle. When the department collects the fee, the department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the Colorado DRIVES vehicle services account created in section 42-1-211; except that, if the fee is collected by a third-party provider, the department shall transmit the fee to the authorized agent where the vehicle or special mobile machinery is registered. Authorized agents serve under this part 2 without additional remuneration or fees, except as otherwise provided in articles 1 to 6 of this title 42.
2. The fee established by subsection (1)(a) of this section does not apply to a shipping and handling fee for the mailing of a license plate, individual temporary registration number plate, and certificate, decal, or validation tab or sticker pursuant to section 42-3-105 (1)(a).
The general assembly hereby finds that, since it is the government that requires citizens to register, license, and undertake other actions concerning their motor vehicles, it is thus the duty of government to provide convenient and easily accessible motor vehicle services to the public.
1. An authorized agent is responsible for the preservation of title and registration paperwork processed in the agent's office until each document has been converted to a digital image and verified by the department.
2. The department is responsible for the preservation of title and registration paperwork digitally stored in Colorado DRIVES.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2108, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1053, § 5, effective September 1. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 136, § 1, effective March 30; (1) amended, p. 1019, § 2, effective May 27. L. 2000: (1)(b) amended, p. 824, § 1, effective May 24. L. 2001: (1)(a) amended, p. 269, § 18, effective November 15. L. 2003: (1)(a) amended, p. 562, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 1171, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2007: (1)(a) amended, p. 976, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2017: (1) amended and (3) added, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 359, § 3, effective August 9. L. 2018: (1)(a)(II) amended, (HB 18-1299), ch. 297, p. 1809, § 3, effective July 1, 2019.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1) by House Bill 98-1064 and House Bill 98-1070 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1997 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 201, Session Laws of Colorado 1997.

ANNOTATION

One purpose of this section and §§ 42-1-211 , 42-3-104 , 42-3-105 , and 42-3-107 to 42-3-110 is to add security to motor vehicle titles. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Morris, 104 Colo. 139 , 89 P.2d 248 (1939).

Authority of clerk is not a personal right or privilege. The authority to make registrations, give examinations, collect specific ownership taxes, and receive the statutory fees provided therefor, is conferred upon the county clerk and recorder, not in his individual capacity but by virtue of his office. The authority follows the office, and is by no means a personal right or privilege of the incumbent. Flanders v. Kochenberger, 118 Colo. 104 , 193 P.2d 281 (1948).

42-1-211. Driver's license, record, identification, and vehicle enterprise solution.

The department is hereby authorized to coordinate the management of a statewide system, referred to as Colorado DRIVES. The department shall provide the necessary hardware, software, and support and training to aid the authorized agents in the performance of their duties.
(1.5) and (1.7) Repealed.
1. (1.9) (a) In accordance with section 24-21-521 (2), the department of revenue and the department of state shall allow for the exchange of information on legal names and signatures between the systems used by the department of revenue and the notary public filing system maintained by the department of state for the purpose of electronic filing of notary applications and renewals.
2. For purposes of this subsection (1.9), "systems used by the department of revenue" means Colorado DRIVES.
1. Repealed.
2. 1. There is hereby created the Colorado DRIVES vehicle services account in the highway users tax fund for the purpose of providing funds for the development and operation of Colorado DRIVES, including operations performed under articles 3, 4, 6, 7, and 12 of this title 42, to cover the costs of administration and enforcement of the motorist insurance identification database program created in section 42-7-604, and to purchase and issue license plates, decals, and validating tabs in accordance with article 3 of this title 42. Money received from the fees imposed by section 38-29-138 (1), (2), (4), and (5) and sections 42-1-206 (2)(a), 42-1-231, 42-3-107 (22), 42-3-213 (1)(b)(IV), 42-3-304 (18), 42-3-306 (14), 42-3-313 (2)(c)(I), and 42-6-137 (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6), as well as any money received through gifts, grants, and donations to the account from private or public sources for the purposes of this section, shall be credited by the state treasurer to the Colorado DRIVES vehicle services account. The general assembly shall appropriate annually the money in the account for the purposes of this subsection (2). If any unexpended and unencumbered money remains in the account at the end of a fiscal year, the balance remains in the account and is not transferred to the general fund or any other fund.
  2. Repealed.
  3. One employee of the governor's office of information technology who is familiar with the division of motor vehicle systems and process and who is appointed by the executive director of the governor's office of information and technology.
Repealed.
1. There is hereby created the Colorado DRIVES county governance committee. The committee consists of the following nine members:
  (I) Six authorized agents appointed by the executive director of the department of revenue based on recommendations of an association representing authorized agents, which agents have the following qualifications:
  1. Two authorized agents from a category I or category II county as established in section 30-2-102 (1)(a) and (1)(b);
  2. Two authorized agents from a category III or category IV county as established in section 30-2-102 (1)(c) and (1)(d);
  3. Two authorized agents from a category V or category VI county as established in section 30-2-102 (1)(e) and (1)(f);
    (II) Two employees of the department of revenue, appointed by the executive director of the department of revenue; and
2. Notwithstanding subsections (4)(a)(I)(A) to (4)(a)(I)(C) of this section, the executive director of the department of revenue may appoint, at the discretion of the executive director, an authorized agent to represent a category of county that the authorized agent is not from if an authorized agent from that category of county is not recommended or available for appointment or for other reasons as determined by the executive director.
3. An act of the committee is void unless a majority of the appointed members has voted in favor of the act.
4. The committee has the following powers and duties:
  1. To approve the annual operation budget proposal for the appropriations for the following categories of Colorado DRIVES:
    1. Personal services;
    2. Operating expenses;
    3. County office asset maintenance; and
    4. County office improvements;
  2. To fix the time when and place where meetings are held; and
  3. To establish subcommittees and working groups to report to the committee.
Repealed.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2001, p. 815 , § 3, effective July 1, 2001.)
Repealed.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2108, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: IP(1) and (4)(a) amended, p. 182, § 1, effective April 8. L. 2001: (1)(b) amended, p. 516, § 3, effective May 18; (8) added, p. 521, § 2, effective May 22; IP(1), (2), IP(4)(a), (4)(a)(I), (4)(a)(II), (5), and (7) amended, p. 815, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(b) and IP(4)(a) amended, p. 270, § 19, effective November 15; (4)(b) repealed, p. 516, § 4, effective January 1, 2002. L. 2002: (1.5) added, p. 1642, § 38, effective June 7. L. 2003: (1.5)(a) amended and (1.5)(c) added, p. 2080, § 17, effective May 22; (2) amended, p. 1979, § 6, effective May 22; IP(4)(a) amended, p. 563, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1.5)(c) amended, p. 18, § 3, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 1172, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2009: (1.5)(a) amended, (HB 09-1160), ch. 263, p. 1208, § 3, effective May 15. L. 2010: (2) amended, (SB 10-055), ch. 152, p. 526, § 1, effective April 21; (1.7) added, (HB 10-1045), ch. 317, p. 1478, § 2, effective July 1, 2011. L. 2012: (1.9) added, (HB 12-1274), ch. 214, p. 924, § 11, effective August 8. L. 2014: (2) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1542, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2017: (2) amended, (SB 17-176), ch. 12, p. 36, § 1, effective March 1; (1), (1.9)(b), and (2) amended and (1.5), (1.7), and (3) repealed, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 360, § 4, effective August 9; (1.9)(a) amended, (SB 17-132), ch. 207, p. 808, § 6, effective July 1, 2018 (see (4)(b) of the editor's note); (4)(a) amended, (4)(b) RC&RE, and (4)(c) and (4)(d) added, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 363, § 5, effective July 1, 2018; (5)(b) and (6)(b) added by revision, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, pp. 363, 377, §§ 5, 36. L. 2018: (2)(a) and (2)(b)(II) amended, (SB 18-253), ch. 293, p. 1798, § 1, effective May 29.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-1-210.1 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-1-211 was relocated to § 42-1-213.
Amendments to subsection (1)(b) by House Bill 01-1307 and Senate Bill 01-102 were harmonized. Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (4)(a) by Senate Bill 01-102 and House Bill 01-1100 were harmonized.
Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2002. (See L. 2001, p. 521 .)
The effective date for changes to subsection (1.9)(a) by Senate Bill 17-132 was changed from August 9, 2017, to July 1, 2018, by section 121 of Senate Bill 17-294. (See L. 2017, p. 1418 .)
Amendments to this section by SB 17-176 and HB 17-1107 were harmonized.
Subsections (5)(b) and (6)(b) provided for the repeal of subsections (5) and (6), respectively, effective July 30, 2018. (See L. 2017, pp. 363, 377.)
Subsections (2)(a)(II) and (2)(b)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b)(II), respectively, effective July 1, 2020. (See L. 2018, p. 1798 .)

42-1-212. Consolidated data processing system - voter registration. (Repealed)

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2110, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2001: (1) and (2)(a) amended, p. 816, § 4, effective July 1; entire section repealed, p. 516, § 5, effective January 1, 2002.

42-1-213. Commission of authorized agents.

Authorized agents may retain fifty cents out of the money collected by them on each transaction in which specific ownership tax is collected, which fifty cents is the only remuneration an authorized agent is allowed to retain for collecting specific ownership taxes and issuing receipts. In counties of the fifth class, the authorized agent shall use the retained funds to defray the necessary expenses in connection with the collection and administration of specific ownership taxes as directed by articles 1 to 4 of this title 42. Authorized agents in all other counties above the fifth class shall deposit in the general fund of said city and county, or of said county, all such sums so retained under this section.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2111, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 563, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 364, § 6, effective August 9.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-1-211 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-1-213 was relocated to § 42-1-215.

42-1-214. Duties of authorized agents.

Every authorized agent, on or before the fifteenth day of each calendar month, shall transmit to the department all fees and money collected by the agent under articles 1 to 4 (except part 3 of article 2) of this title 42 during the preceding calendar month, except such sums as are specifically authorized to be retained by the authorized agent.
The authorized agents shall deposit all money received in the administration of any motor vehicle license law with the county treasurers of their respective counties and take a receipt. The authorized agent shall deposit the money in a separate fund administered by the county treasurers, and the authorized agents are not liable for the safekeeping of the funds after depositing them. The county treasurers shall accept all money tendered to them by the authorized agents for deposit as provided in this section.
On or before the fifteenth day of each calendar month, the county treasurer shall send the money collected for the department by the authorized agent to the department by:
1. An electronic funds transfer covering the funds that have been deposited with the county treasurer during the previous month; or
2. A warrant drawn on the county treasurer of their county, payable to the department on demand, covering the amount of the funds that may have been deposited with the county treasurer during the previous month, and the county treasurer shall pay the warrant on demand and presentation.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2111, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2017: Entire section amended, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 365, § 7, effective August 9.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-1-212 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-1-214 was relocated to § 42-1-216.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-1-214 is similar to § 42-1-212 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

42-1-215. Oaths.

The executive director of the department, the deputy director of the department, the supervisor, and the authorized agents of the department are empowered to administer oaths or affirmations as provided in articles 1 to 4 of this title.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2112, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-1-213 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-1-215 was relocated to § 42-1-217.

42-1-216. Destruction of obsolete records.

The department is empowered to destroy or otherwise dispose of all obsolete motor and other vehicle records, number plates, and badges after the same have been in its possession for twelve calendar months; but all records of accidents must be preserved by the department for a period of six years.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2112, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-1-214 as it existed prior to 1994.

42-1-217. Disposition of fines and surcharges.

All judges, clerks of a court of record, or other officers imposing or receiving fines, penalties, or forfeitures, except those moneys received pursuant to sections 42-4-313 (3), 42-4-413, 42-4-1409, 42-4-1701 (5)(a), 42-8-105, and 42-8-106, collected pursuant to or as a result of a conviction of any persons for a violation of articles 1 to 4 (except part 3 of article 2) of this title, shall transmit, within ten days after the date of receipt of any such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, all such moneys so collected in the following manner:
1. The aggregate amount of such fines, penalties, or forfeitures, except for a violation of section 42-4-1301 or 42-4-237, shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.
2. Fifty percent of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture for a violation of section 42-4-1301 occurring within the corporate limits of a city or town shall be transmitted to the treasurer or chief financial officer of said city or town, and the remaining fifty percent shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.; except that twenty-five percent of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture for a violation of section 42-4-1301 occurring on a state or federal highway shall be transmitted to the treasurer or chief financial officer of said city or town, and the remaining seventy-five percent shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.
3. Any other provision of law notwithstanding, all moneys collected pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3 shall be transmitted to the state treasurer to be credited to the account of the alcohol and drug driving safety program fund.
4. Fifty percent of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture for a violation of section 42-4-1301 occurring outside the corporate limits of a city or town shall be transmitted to the treasurer of the county in which the city or town is located, and the remaining fifty percent shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.; except that twenty-five percent of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture for a violation of section 42-4-1301 occurring on a state or federal highway shall be transmitted to the treasurer of the county in which the city or town is located, and the remaining seventy-five percent shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.
5. Any fine, penalty, or forfeiture collected for a violation of section 42-4-237 shall be transmitted to the treasurer of the local jurisdiction in which the violation occurred; except that:
  1. If the citing officer was an officer of the Colorado state patrol, the fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.; or
  2. If the violation occurred on a state or federal highway, fifty percent of the fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be transmitted to the treasurer of the local jurisdiction in which the violation occurred and the remaining fifty percent shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.
Except for the first fifty cents of any penalty for a traffic infraction, which shall be retained by the department and used for administrative purposes, moneys collected by the department pursuant to section 42-4-1701 (5)(a) shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the highway users tax fund for allocation and expenditure as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(a), C.R.S.; except that moneys collected pursuant to section 42-4-1701 (5)(a) for a violation of section 42-4-237 shall be allocated pursuant to paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section.
Failure, refusal, or neglect on the part of any judicial or other officer or employee to comply with the provisions of this section shall constitute misconduct in office and shall be grounds for removal therefrom.
1. All moneys collected by the department as surcharges on penalty assessments issued for violations of a class A or a class B traffic infraction or a class 1 or a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, pursuant to section 42-4-1701, shall be transmitted to the court administrator of the judicial district in which the offense or infraction was committed and credited fifty percent to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund established in that judicial district and fifty percent to the crime victim compensation fund established in that judicial district.
2. Repealed.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2112, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: IP(1) amended, p. 385, § 1, effective April 17. L. 2002: (1)(c) amended, p. 1921, § 15, effective July 1. L. 2003: (4) amended, p. 1550, § 9, effective May 1; (1)(c) amended, p. 2003, § 71, effective May 22. L. 2004: IP(1) amended, p. 792, § 1, effective January 1, 2005. L. 2005: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (2) amended, p. 141, § 6, effective April 5. L. 2007: (4) amended, p. 1114, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2008: IP(1), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (2) amended, p. 2085, § 2, effective July 1.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-1-215 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-1-217 was relocated to § 42-1-218.
Subsection (4)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(b), effective July 1, 2008. (See L. 2007, p. 1114 .)

Cross references: For costs levied on traffic offenses pursuant to the "Colorado Crime Victim Compensation Act", see § 24-4.1-119; for costs levied on alcohol- and drug-related traffic offenses, see §§ 42-4-1301.3 (4)(a), 42-4-1301.4 (5), 42-4-1307, and 43-4-402; for establishment of the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund and the authority for levying of surcharges, see §§ 24-4.2-103 and 24-4.2-104.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-1-217 is similar to § 42-1-215 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

For the legislative history of this section, see State v. Beckman, 149 Colo. 54 , 368 P.2d 793 (1961).

42-1-218. Revocations and suspensions of licenses published. (Repealed)

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2113, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2007: Entire section repealed, p. 30, § 4, effective August 3.

42-1-218.5. Electronic hearings.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title to the contrary, at the discretion of the department, any hearing held by the department pursuant to this title may be conducted in whole or in part, in real time, by telephone or other electronic means.
The general assembly recognizes that there is an increase in the number of hearings conducted by the department; that a licensee has the right to appear in person at a hearing; and that a licensee or a law enforcement officer may not be able to appear in person at a hearing. The general assembly therefore directs the department to consider the circumstances of the licensee when a licensee requests to appear in person, and grant the request whenever possible. The general assembly further directs the department to consider the circumstances of the licensee and the law enforcement officer when either may not be able to appear in person, and allow the appearance by electronic means whenever possible.
and (4) Repealed.

Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 552, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2003: (3) and (4) repealed, p. 2620, § 2, effective June 5.

ANNOTATION

Applied in Shafron v. Cooke, 190 P.3d 812 (Colo. App. 2008).

42-1-219. Appropriations for administration of title.

The general assembly shall make appropriations for the expenses of administration of this title.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2113, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-1-218 as it existed prior to 1994.

42-1-220. Identification security fund - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 940, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 535, § 1, effective May 24. L. 2006: (2) and (3) amended, p. 656, § 2, effective April 24. L. 2009: (3) amended, (SB 09-025), ch. 266, p. 1215, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: (1) amended and (2) repealed, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1542, § 4, effective June 5.

Editor's note: Subsection (3) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2014. (See L. 2009, p. 1215 .)

42-1-221. Fuel piracy computer reprogramming cash fund - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 1132, § 3, effective July 1.

Editor's note: Subsection (3) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2003. (See L. 2002, p. 1132 .)

42-1-222. Motor vehicle investigations unit.

The department shall establish a motor vehicle investigations unit to investigate and prevent fraud concerning the use of driver's licenses, identification cards, motor vehicle titles and registrations, and other motor vehicle documents issued by the department. Such unit shall also assist victims of identity theft by means of such documents.

Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 1736, § 1, effective July 1.

42-1-223. Monitoring driving improvement schools - fund - rules - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2009: Entire section added, (HB 09-1246), ch. 346, p. 1811, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2014: (1) to (3) repealed and (4) and (5) added, (HB 14-1228), ch. 337, p. 1501, § 1, effective June 5.

Editor's note: Subsection (5) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2015. (See L. 2014, p. 1501 .)

42-1-224. Criminal history check.

The department may submit fingerprints of an employee or prospective employee to the Colorado bureau of investigation to obtain a fingerprint-based criminal history record check if the employee's duties do or will provide them with access to Colorado driver's licenses and identification cards issued pursuant to article 2 of this title 42 or personal identifying information collected or stored by the department in order to issue driver's licenses or identification cards. The department of revenue shall require all such employees hired on or after April 15, 2010, to obtain a fingerprint-based criminal history record check prior to performing their official duties, and shall require all such employees hired before April 15, 2010, to obtain a fingerprint-based criminal history record check by July 1, 2011. The department may use this information to make employment decisions concerning such employees. Upon receipt of fingerprints and payment for the costs, the Colorado bureau of investigation shall conduct a state and national fingerprint-based criminal history record check utilizing records of the Colorado bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation. The department shall be the authorized agency to receive information regarding the result of the national criminal history record check. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall charge the department a fee for record checks conducted pursuant to this section. The Colorado bureau of investigation shall set such fee at a level sufficient to cover the direct and indirect costs of processing requests made pursuant to this section. Money collected by the bureau pursuant to this section is subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the administration of this section.
When the results of a fingerprint-based criminal history record check of a person performed pursuant to this section reveal a record of arrest without a disposition, the department shall require the person to submit to a name-based criminal history record check, as defined in section 22-2-119.3 (6)(d). The department shall pay the costs associated with a name-based criminal history record check.

Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1011), ch. 110, p. 367, § 1, effective April 15. L. 2019: Entire section amended, (HB 19-1166), ch. 125, p. 558, § 51, effective April 18.

42-1-225. Commercial vehicle enterprise tax fund - creation.

The commercial vehicle enterprise tax fund is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of moneys collected and transmitted to the fund pursuant to section 42-4-1701 (4)(a)(II). The general assembly shall annually appropriate the moneys in the fund to cover the actual cost of administering sections 39-26-113.5 and 39-30-104 (1)(b), C.R.S. Moneys in the fund are continuously appropriated to the department of revenue for the payment of sales and use tax refunds pursuant to section 39-26-113.5, C.R.S. After receiving the statement pursuant to section 39-30-104 (1)(b)(VI), C.R.S., the state treasurer shall credit the total cost of the amount of the tax credits stated therein to the general fund. Any moneys remaining in the commercial vehicle enterprise tax fund at the end of the fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund.
1. On July 1, 2011, and each July 1 thereafter, the department shall allocate one-third of the fund balance, not including the amount appropriated to cover the actual cost of administering sections 39-26-113.5 and 39-30-104 (1)(b), C.R.S., to make the sales tax refunds granted in section 39-26-113.5, C.R.S.
2. On July 1, 2011, and each July 1 thereafter, the department shall allocate two-thirds of the fund balance, not including the amount appropriated to cover the actual cost of administering sections 39-26-113.5 and 39-30-104 (1)(b), C.R.S., to offset the income tax credit granted in section 39-30-104 (1)(b), C.R.S. By January 1, 2012, the department shall notify the Colorado economic development commission created in section 24-46-102, C.R.S., of the amount allocated for such purposes.

Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1285), ch. 423, p. 2187, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1) amended, (SB 12-041), ch. 165, p. 576, § 1, effective May 9.

42-1-226. Disabled parking education and enforcement fund - created.

There is hereby created in the state treasury the disabled parking education and enforcement fund, which consists of money collected pursuant to this section and section 42-4-1208 (6) and (7). The general assembly shall appropriate the money in the fund for the purposes specified in sections 42-3-204 and 42-4-1208. Unexpended and unencumbered money in the fund at the end of a fiscal year remains in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or another fund. The department may accept gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources for the purposes of this section. All private and public funds received through gifts, grants, or donations must be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the money to the fund.

Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1019), ch. 400, p. 1917, § 1, effective January 1, 2011. L. 2020: Entire section amended, (HB 20-1392), ch. 132, p. 575, § 5, effective June 26.

42-1-227. Disabled parking education program. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1019), ch. 400, p. 1917, § 1, effective January 1, 2011. L. 2014: (1)(a) amended, (HB 14-1029), ch. 252, p. 990, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2018: IP(1) amended and (2) added, (HB 18-1364), ch. 351, p. 2083, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2020: Entire section repealed, (HB 20-1392), ch. 132, p. 575, § 2, effective June 26.

42-1-228. Revocation hearings - right of driver to challenge validity of initial traffic stop.

In any administrative proceeding for a revocation of a driver's license pursuant to article 2 of this title, where the hearing officer is engaged in finding facts and applying law for an incident or offense reported directly to the department by a law enforcement officer, and where the revocation was not triggered in whole or in part by a record of a conviction, the driver may challenge the validity of the law enforcement officer's initial contact with the driver and subsequent arrest of the driver. If a driver so challenges the validity of the law enforcement officer's initial contact, and the evidence does not establish that the initial contact or arrest was constitutionally and statutorily valid, the driver is not subject to license revocation.

Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1077), ch. 196, p. 798, § 2, effective May 11. L. 2015: Entire section amended, (HB 15-1073), ch. 92, p. 263, § 2, effective August 5.

42-1-229. Report - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (SB 14-087), ch. 306, p. 1297, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2017: (2) added, (HB 17-1137), ch. 45, p. 135, § 7, effective August 9.

Editor's note: Subsection (2) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 2, 2018. (See L. 2017, p. 135 .)

42-1-230. Exceptions processing - rules.

Beginning September 1, 2014, the department of revenue shall provide the opportunity for exceptions processing in person at a minimum of four regional offices that are actually operated by the department of revenue and that issue driver's licenses. The department shall promulgate rules to implement exceptions processing for documents issued under parts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of article 2 of this title. The department shall not use exceptions processing for noncitizens to establish lawful status in the United States.

Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1543, § 5, effective June 5.

42-1-231. Kiosk program.

An authorized agent may conduct a kiosk program using a private provider to provide services concerning any function the authorized agent performs under article 2, 3, or 6 of this title 42, not including part 5 of article 2 of this title 42. The kiosk program may include mobile telephone and web solutions to provide services. An authorized agent shall:
1. Allow a resident in the county's jurisdiction to use a kiosk in another county for any purpose authorized under this section; and
2. Allow a resident of another county to use a kiosk in the county's jurisdiction for any purpose authorized under this section.
1. The authorized agent may use a competitive bid process to select the private provider.
2. The authorized agent may assess a convenience fee, as negotiated between the authorized agent and the private provider, for the services provided in the kiosk program. The authorized agent may authorize the private provider to retain a portion or all of the convenience fee.
1. The department may accept financial assistance from an authorized agent or a private party to implement this program, so long as the financial assistance is directly related to the kiosk program and does not stipulate a condition that conflicts with state law.
2. Repealed.
3. 1. The department shall transfer any money accepted under this subsection (3) to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the Colorado DRIVES vehicle services account created in section 42-1-211. The department shall use any money accepted under this subsection (3) to implement this section.
  2. Repealed.
To implement this program, the authorized agent and the department shall coordinate with each other to ensure that the program will operate successfully and in accordance with state law.
Any private provider participating in the kiosk program is not excluded from any competitive bid process associated with motor vehicle registration, issuing certificates of title, or issuing driver's licenses.
To be qualified to be a private provider, a person must:
1. Meet the security requirements established by rule by the office of information technology; and
2. Operate in accordance with a service-level agreement with the authorized agent.
1. The private provider shall not retain the information obtained from a transaction authorized under this section for any purpose other than the purposes of this section and as required in the service-level agreement with the authorized agent.
2. The private provider shall not transfer to another person or use or copy information obtained from a transaction authorized under this section for any purpose other than the purposes of this section and as required in the service-level agreement with the authorized agent.

Source: L. 2016: Entire section added, (SB 16-138), ch. 162, p. 513, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2017: (3) amended, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 366, § 8, effective August 9. L. 2018: (3)(b)(II) and (3)(c)(II) amended, (SB 18-253), ch. 293, p. 1799, § 2, effective May 29. L. 2020: (1), (2)(b), (3)(a), (4), and (5) amended and (6) and (7) added, (SB 20-035), ch. 240, p. 1160, § 1, effective July 6.

Editor's note:

Subsection (3)(b)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(b), effective July 1, 2019. (See L. 2018, p. 1799 .)
Subsection (3)(c)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (3)(c)(II), effective July 1, 2020. (See L. 2018, p. 1799 .)

42-1-232. Third-party VIN inspection program - rules - definitions.

For the purposes of this section:
1. "Chief" means the chief of the Colorado state patrol.
2. "Convicted" means a conviction of, or pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, a violation of the law.
3. "Permit" means authority for an organization to employ people to verify information, including a VIN, that may be required to register a commercial vehicle under article 3 of this title 42 or to be issued a certificate of title under article 6 of this title 42.
4. "VIN" means vehicle identification number.
The chief shall create a program that authorizes a transportation association or organization to verify commercial vehicle information, including a VIN, as a vehicle-related entity if the transportation association or organization demonstrates to the satisfaction of the chief that it and any individuals it may employ to verify information meet the requirements of this section and any rules promulgated to implement this section. Upon determining that a transportation association or organization meets the requirements of this section and any rules promulgated to implement this section, the chief may issue a permit to the applicant.
To be issued a permit to verify information, including a VIN, as a vehicle-related entity, an applicant must:
1. Employ verifiers who demonstrate knowledge of the process and standards and who have not been convicted of violating article 4 of title 18 within the last ten years;
2. Submit the name, background, experience, location of operation, contact information, and any other information required by the chief of each employed verifier;
3. Furnish evidence of a savings account or deposit in a certificate of deposit meeting the requirements of section 11-35-101 or a surety bond that:
  1. Holds harmless any person who suffers loss or damage arising from the issuance of a certificate of title that included a verification done by the permit holder; and
  2. Is in the amount of at least ten thousand dollars.
A vehicle-related entity shall not employ a verifier until the chief has approved the verifier. The permit holder shall submit to the chief the name, background, experience, location of operation, contact information, and any other information required by the chief of each verifier. Within seven days after ceasing to employ a verifier, the vehicle-related entity shall notify the chief that the individual no longer verifies information for the vehicle-related entity.
A vehicle-related entity shall not charge more than twenty-five dollars per transaction to verify information.
The chief may deny or cancel a permit for:
1. Failing to comply with this section;
2. Failing to maintain in full force the savings account, deposit in a certificate of deposit, or surety bond required by subsection (3) of this section;
3. Misrepresentations in applying for a permit;
4. Being convicted under, or employing a verifier who is convicted under, article 4 of title 18;
5. Incompetence or failing to adequately verify information, including a VIN, as a vehicle-related entity.
The chief may promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement this section, including establishing application procedures and any required forms and establishing procedures, in compliance with article 4 of title 24, for canceling a permit. The chief may summarily suspend a permit for up to sixty days pending a hearing to cancel a permit if the chief determines that irreparable harm may occur if the permit holder continues to verify information, including a VIN, as a vehicle-related entity.
For the purposes of verifying information in accordance with articles 1 to 5 of this title 42, a permit holder is a vehicle-related entity.

Source: L. 2017: Entire section added, (HB 17-1105), ch. 44, p. 130, § 4, effective March 16. L. 2020: Entire section RC&RE, (SB 20-011), ch. 7, p. 11, § 1, effective March 5.

Editor's note: Subsection (9) provided for the repeal of this section, effective January 1, 2020. (See L. 2017, p. 130 .) However, the entire section was recreated March 5, 2020.

42-1-233. Expedited registration program - private vendor providing services to register Class A commercial vehicles - rules.

Beginning January 1, 2019, the department shall create and implement an expedited registration program. The expedited registration program authorizes private providers to register commercial vehicles that are classified as Class A personal property in section 42-3-106. This includes collecting and remitting the taxes and fees for the registration to the department.
1. The department shall promulgate rules authorizing a private provider to participate in the expedited registration program if the provider:
  1. Has been approved by the department;
  2. Uses software that is approved by the department to calculate the amount of taxes and fees imposed in this title 42 and that is updated regularly to take into account any changes to the taxes and fees imposed in this title 42; and
  3. Procures and files with the department evidence of any of the following in an amount determined by rule by the department:
    1. A savings account, deposit, or certificate of deposit meeting the requirements of section 11-35-101; or
    2. A bond issued by a licensed corporate surety.
2. The financial commitment required in subsection (2)(a)(III) of this section must provide for the reimbursement of any damages caused to the state of Colorado, a political subdivision of Colorado, or the owner of personal property registered through the expedited registration program by an act or omission of the private provider.
3. A private provider may collect and retain a convenience fee for the services provided in the expedited registration program.
1. The department may accept financial assistance from a private party to implement the expedited registration program if the financial assistance is directly related to the expedited registration program and is not conditional upon an act or circumstance that conflicts with state law.
2. The department shall transfer any money accepted under this subsection (3) to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the Colorado DRIVES vehicle services account created in section 42-1-211 (2)(b)(I).
3. The department shall use any money accepted under this subsection (3) to implement this section.
To implement the expedited registration program, the department shall ensure that the expedited registration program:
1. Operates efficiently;
2. Provides additional services or increases the speed or quality of services at an overall cost savings to the state; and
3. Registers commercial vehicles and collects and remits taxes and fees in compliance with state law.
To implement this section, the department may promulgate rules in addition to the rules required under subsection (2)(a) of this section and may enter into contracts with private providers.
Subject to article 4 of title 24, the department may approve, deny approval, suspend approval, or revoke approval of a private provider who:
1. Violates the law in the provision of services approved under this section;
2. Makes a material misstatement to the department or any county in seeking approval to provide expedited registration services;
3. Fails to comply with this section or any rules promulgated under this section; or
4. Fails to satisfactorily provide expedited registration services or to collect or remit appropriate taxes and fees.

Source: L. 2018: Entire section added, (HB 18-1042), ch. 375, p. 2277, § 1, effective August 8.

42-1-234. Electronic vehicle registration and titling - electronic transmission of vehicle lien information - authority - rules - electronic transactions fund - gifts, grants, and donations - repeal.

1. The department may establish a system to allow the electronic transmission of registration, lien, and titling information for motor vehicles, off-highway vehicles, or special mobile machinery. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the department may adopt rules necessary for the implementation of this section, including rules to allow the department to:
  1. Maintain titling information electronically and to produce paper titles only upon request of a party;
  2. Accept electronic signatures on any documents, including title transfers, odometer disclosures, and powers of attorney, required to issue a certificate of title to a new owner;
  3. Eliminate any notarization requirements for document signatures;
  4. Allow all parties to electronically file and release lien information;
  5. Authorize approved third-party providers to:
    1. Electronically process registration, lien, and titling information and transmit the information to the department as authorized by the department;
    2. Order, manage, and distribute the department's license plate inventory to a client; and
    3. Access, print, and distribute the department's registration information to a client on demand.
2. The department's approval of a third-party provider to register a vehicle or special mobile machinery, file or release liens, or issue any type of certificate of title must be evidenced by an agreement between the department and the third-party provider.
3. In registering a vehicle or special mobile machinery, filing or releasing liens, or issuing any type of certificate of title, the third-party provider is acting as an agent of the department. The third-party provider shall collect and remit to the department all taxes and fees imposed by law to issue any type of certificate of title, file or release a lien, or to register the vehicle or special mobile machinery.
4. A third-party provider may charge its clients a fee for each electronic registration transaction, lien transaction, or titling transaction. The client may charge a consumer the fee the client paid to the third-party provider if the fee charged to the consumer does not exceed the fee charged to the client.
5. The department shall ensure that the addresses of program participants under part 21 of article 30 of title 24 are not released to third-party providers or the clients of third-party providers.
1. The department is authorized to seek and accept gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources, including from third-party providers, for the purposes of this section; except that the department may not accept a gift, grant, or donation that is subject to conditions that are inconsistent with this section or any other law of the state. The department shall ensure that any funds contributed to the department for the implementation of the system for the electronic transmission of registration, lien, and titling information for motor vehicles, vehicles, off-highway vehicles, and special mobile machinery are:
  1. Used only for the implementation of the system; and
  2. Transferred to the state treasurer, who shall credit the funds to the electronic transactions fund.
2. 1. In addition to the fees described in subsection (1)(c) of this section, a third-party provider shall pay the department a fee of up to three dollars for each of the following types of transactions completed by the third-party provider:
    1. Issuance of or transfer of a certificate of title for a motor vehicle or an off-highway vehicle;
    2. Issuance of or renewal of a registration for a motor vehicle, a vehicle, or special mobile machinery; and
    3. A transaction that includes both the transactions described in subsections (2)(b)(I)(A) and (2)(b)(I)(B) of this section.
  2. The third-party provider may charge its client the fee imposed in subsection (2)(b)(I) of this section.
  3. The department shall set the fee imposed in subsection (2)(b)(I) of this section to:
    1. Offset the direct and indirect costs of administering the electronic transmission of registration, lien, and titling information in accordance with this section; and
    2. Collect one million six hundred thirty-one thousand seven hundred ninety-two dollars by June 30, 2023. If the amount is not collected by June 30, 2023, the department shall set the fee to collect the remaining amount by December 31, 2023.
  4. The department shall remit all fees collected under this subsection (2)(b) to the state treasurer, who shall credit:
    1. One million six hundred thirty-one thousand seven hundred ninety-two dollars of the fees to the general fund; and
    2. All other money collected from the fees to the electronic transactions fund.
  5. The department shall specify to the state treasurer the percentage of the fees that covers the administration of electronic transmission of registration, lien, and titling information in accordance with this section, and the state treasurer shall credit that percentage of the fees to the electronic transactions fund in accordance with subsection (2)(b)(IV)(B) of this section.
  6. Subsections (2)(b)(III)(B), (2)(b)(IV)(A), and (2)(b)(V) of this section and this subsection (2)(b)(VI) are repealed, effective July 1, 2024.
1. The department need not promulgate rules, under subsection (1) of this section, that implement electronic transactions until the department has adequate money in the electronic transactions fund to implement the promulgated rules. The department shall, upon having adequate money in the fund, phase in implementation of this section as reasonable. The general assembly may appropriate money from the general fund or the highway users tax fund created in section 43-4-201 to implement this section.
2. This subsection (3) does not affect any rules promulgated, or appropriations made, before July 1, 2019.
1. The electronic transactions fund, referred to in this subsection (4) as the "fund", is hereby created in the state treasury. The fund consists of money that the general assembly may appropriate or transfer to the fund and money credited to the fund under this section.
2. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the deposit and investment of money in the fund to the fund.
3. Subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, the department may expend state money from the fund to implement and administer electronic transmission of registration, lien, and titling information in accordance with this section.
1. Subsections (2)(a) and (3) of this section and this subsection (5) will be repealed if the department fully implements this section. Upon fully implementing this section, the executive director of the department shall notify the revisor of statutes in writing of the date on which the condition specified in this subsection (5)(a) has occurred by e-mailing the notice to revisorofstatutes.ga@state.co.us.
2. Subsections (2)(a) and (3) of this section and this subsection (5) are repealed, effective upon the date identified in the notice that this section was fully implemented or, if the notice does not specify that date, upon the date of the notice to the revisor of statutes.

Source: L. 2018: Entire section added with relocations, (HB 18-1299), ch. 297, p. 1809, § 4, effective July 1, 2019. L. 2021: (2) and (3)(a) amended and (4) and (5) added, (SB 21-076), ch. 475, p. 3400, § 1, effective July 7.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-3-113.5 as it existed prior to 2019.
As of publication date, the revisor of statutes has not received the notice referred to in subsection (5).

42-1-235. Electronic records, documents, and signatures.

A record covered by article 3 of this title 42, including a signature on the record or document, may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in the form of an electronic record, document, or signature. Except as otherwise provided in article 3 of this title 42, if a rule of law requires a record to be in writing or provides consequences if it is not, an electronic record satisfies that rule of law. This section applies to and in a court of law. For a record, document, or signature to be legally effective, valid, or enforceable, a person need not obtain a written power of attorney solely because the record, document, or signature is in an electronic form.

Source: L. 2018: Entire section added with relocations, (HB 18-1299), ch. 297, p. 1811, § 6, effective July 1, 2019; entire section amended, (SB 18-255), ch. 405, p. 2387, § 3, effective July 1, 2019.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-6-102 (5)(b) as it existed prior to 2019.
Section 4 of chapter 405 (SB 18-255), Session Laws of Colorado 2018, provides that the act changing this section takes effect only if HB 18-1299 becomes law and takes effect upon the effective date of HB 18-1299. HB 18-1299 became law and has an effective date of July 1, 2019.

PART 3 GREEN TRUCK GRANT PROGRAM

42-1-301 to 42-1-305. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2012: Entire part repealed, (HB 12-1315), ch. 224, p. 984, § 55, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This part 3 was added in 2009 and was not amended prior to its repeal in 2012. For the text of this part 3 prior to 2012, consult the 2011 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.

PART 4 LICENSE PLATE AUCTIONS

42-1-401 to 42-1-407. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2016: Entire part repealed, (HB 16-1362), ch. 319, p. 1296, § 2, effective August 10.

Editor's note: This part 4 was added in 2011. For amendments to this part 4 prior to its repeal in 2016, consult the 2015 Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado statutory research explanatory note beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. This part 4 was relocated to part 22 of article 30 of title 24. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.

DRIVERS' LICENSES

ARTICLE 2 DRIVERS' LICENSES

Cross references: For disposition of fines and penalties under parts 1, 2, and 4 of this article, see § 42-1-217.

Section

PART 1 DRIVERS' LICENSES

PART 2 HABITUAL OFFENDERS

PART 3 IDENTIFICATION CARDS

PART 4 COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' LICENSES

PART 5 COLORADO ROAD AND COMMUNITY SAFETY ACT

PART 6 COMMERCIAL DRIVING SCHOOLS

PART 1 DRIVERS' LICENSES

Cross references: For the short title of this part 1 ("Uniform Safety Code of 1935"), see § 42-4-101.

Law reviews: For article, "There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License", see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).

42-2-101. Licenses for drivers required - penalty - definition.

Except as otherwise provided in part 4 of this article for commercial drivers, no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit by the department under this article.
No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state if such person's driver's or minor driver's license has been expired for one year or less and such person has not been issued another such license by the department or by another state or country subsequent to such expiration.
No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.
No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall drive a type or general class of motor vehicle upon a highway in this state for which such person has not been issued the correct type or general class of license or permit.
No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession.
A charge of a violation of subsection (2) of this section shall be dismissed by the court if the defendant elects not to pay the penalty assessment and, at or before the defendant's scheduled court appearance, exhibits to the court a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license.
A charge of a violation of subsection (5) of this section shall be dismissed by the court if the defendant elects not to pay the penalty assessment and, at or before the defendant's scheduled court appearance, exhibits to the court a currently valid license or permit issued to such person or an officially issued duplicate thereof if the original is lost, stolen, or destroyed.
The conduct of a driver of a motor vehicle which would otherwise constitute a violation of this section is justifiable and not unlawful when:
1. It is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of said driver and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by this section; or
2. The applicable conditions for exemption, as set forth in section 42-2-102, exist.
The issue of justification or exemption is an affirmative defense. As used in this subsection (9), "affirmative defense" means that, unless the state's evidence raises the issue involving the particular defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, shall present some credible evidence on that issue. If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised, then the liability of the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue as well as all other elements of the traffic infraction.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (10) is effective until March 1, 2022.] Any person who violates any provision of subsection (1) or (4) of this section is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (2), (3), or (5) of this section commits a class B traffic infraction.
(10) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (10) is effective March 1, 2022. ] Any person who violates any provision of subsection (1) or (4) of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (2), (3), or (5) of this section commits a class B traffic infraction.
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a second or subsequent conviction under subsection (1) or (4) of this section, when a person receiving such conviction has not subsequently obtained a valid Colorado driver's license or the correct type or general class of license, shall result in the assessment by the department of six points against the driving privilege of the person receiving such second or subsequent conviction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2114, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1) to (6) amended, p. 1349, § 14, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2021: (10) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3300, § 706, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

ANNOTATION

Principal purpose of this section and § 42-2-110 is the promotion of public safety by assuring that drivers are qualified to operate their vehicles. Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).

Interpretation of § 42-2-130 (3) in context of other relevant sections. § 42-2-130 (3), which authorizes the department to extend the period of suspension or revocation whenever drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked commit additional traffic offenses, should be read and considered in the context of other relevant provisions of article 2 of the uniform motor vehicle law. Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1984).

Police have authority to make custodial arrest for driving without a license under this section and § 42-4-1501 . People v. Meredith, 763 P.2d 562 ( Colo. 1988 ) (overruling People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412 , 541 P.2d 71 (1975) and People v. Stark, 682 P.2d 1240 (Colo. App. 1984)).

Police had authority under this section to arrest defendant for driving without a valid Colorado driver's license and the arrest did not violate the fourth amendment. Defendant produced a Mexican driver's license but not a valid Colorado license. Although it was unclear from the record whether the Mexican driver's license was authentic, testimony reflected that defendant had been present in the United States for more than thirty days and therefore was not exempt under § 42-2-102 from obtaining a Colorado driver's license. United States v. Rubio-Sepulveda, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (D. Colo. 2017).

Search of an automobile incident to an arrest for driving without a license under this section and § 42-4-1501 is lawful. People v. Meredith, 763 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1988).

Applied in People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304 , 546 P.2d 488 (1976); Ruth v. County Court, 198 Colo. 6 , 595 P.2d 237 (1979).

42-2-102. Persons exempt from license.

The following persons need not obtain a Colorado driver's license:
1. Any person who operates a federally owned military motor vehicle while serving in the armed forces of the United States;
2. Any person who temporarily drives or operates any road machine, farm tractor, or other implement of husbandry on a highway;
3. Any nonresident who is at least sixteen years of age and who has in his or her immediate possession a valid driver's license issued to such nonresident by his or her state or country of residence. A nonresident who is at least sixteen years of age and whose state or country of residence does not require the licensing of drivers may operate a motor vehicle as a driver for not more than ninety days in any calendar year, if said nonresident is the owner of the vehicle driven and if the motor vehicle so operated is duly registered in such nonresident's state or country of residence and such nonresident has in his or her immediate possession a registration card evidencing such ownership and registration in his or her own state or country.
4. A nonresident on active duty in the armed forces of the United States if that person has in his or her possession a valid driver's license issued by such nonresident's state of domicile or, if returning from duty outside the United States, has a valid driver's license in his or her possession issued by the armed forces of the United States in foreign countries, but such armed forces license shall be valid only for a period of forty-five days after the licensee has returned to the United States;
5. The spouse of a member of the armed forces of the United States who is accompanying such member on military or naval assignment to this state, who has a valid driver's license issued by another state, and whose right to drive has not been suspended or revoked in this state;
6. Any nonresident who is temporarily residing in Colorado for the principal purpose of furthering such nonresident's education, is at least sixteen years of age, has a valid driver's license from his or her state of residence, and is considered a nonresident for tuition purposes by the educational institution at which such nonresident is furthering his or her education.
Any person who has in his or her possession a valid driver's license issued by such person's previous state of residence shall be exempt, for thirty days after becoming a resident of the state of Colorado, from obtaining a license, as provided in section 42-2-101.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2115, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

ANNOTATION

Effect of subsection (1)(d) under § 42-2-107 (1) . Section 42-2-107 (1) only requires that the licensee be accompanied at the hearing by the person who signed the application of the minor, unless that person submits a verified statement. However, where licensees have never been required to apply for licenses in the state of Colorado, by virtue of subsection (1)(d), and since no person was required to sign their applications, no one is required to attend the hearing other than the licensees themselves. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Applied in Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

42-2-103. Motorcycles - low-power scooters - driver's license required.

1. The department shall establish a motorcycle endorsement program for driver's licenses, minor driver's licenses, and instruction permits issued pursuant to this article.
2. The department shall require an applicant for a general motorcycle endorsement to demonstrate the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and control in the operation of a motorcycle that is not an autocycle. The department shall also require an applicant for a limited three-wheel motorcycle endorsement to demonstrate the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and control in the operation of a three-wheel motorcycle that is not an autocycle.
3. Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this subsection (1), a person shall not drive a two-wheel motorcycle on a roadway without a general motorcycle endorsement, but a person who possesses a general motorcycle endorsement may drive any motorcycle on the roadway.
4. Except as provided in subsection (1)(e) of this section, a person with only a limited three-wheel motorcycle endorsement may drive a three-wheel motorcycle that is not an autocycle but shall not drive a two-wheel motorcycle on a roadway.
5. The driver of a motorcycle need not obtain a two- or three-wheel motorcycle endorsement if the motorcycle is an autocycle or if the motorcycle has:
  1. Three wheels;
  2. A maximum design speed of twenty-five miles per hour or less;
  3. A windshield; and
  4. Seat belts.
1. An operator of a low-power scooter shall possess a valid driver's license or minor driver's license.
2. No low-power scooter shall be operated on any interstate system as described in section 43-2-101 (2), C.R.S., except where a bicycle may be operated on such interstate system, on any limited-access road of the state highway system as described in section 43-2-101 (1), C.R.S., or on any sidewalk, unless such operation is specifically designated. Low-power scooters may be operated upon roadways, except as provided in this section, and in bicycle lanes included within such roadways.
(2.5) An operator of an autocycle shall possess a valid driver's license or minor driver's license.
A person who operates a motorcycle in violation of subsection (1) of this section commits the offense of driving a motor vehicle without the correct class of license in violation of section 42-2-101 (4) and shall be punished as provided in section 42-2-101 (10).

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2116, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1349, § 15, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 79, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2009: (2) amended, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1262, § 23, effective October 1. L. 2015: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) added, (HB 15-1345), ch. 330, p. 1346, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2017: (1)(b), (1)(d), and IP(1)(e) amended and (2.5) added, (HB 17-1044), ch. 72, p. 229, § 2, effective March 23.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-102.5 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-103 was relocated to § 42-2-104.

42-2-104. Licenses issued - denied.

Except as otherwise provided in this article, the department may license the following persons in the manner prescribed in this article:
1. Any person twenty-one years of age or older, as a driver;
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 1348 , § 11, effective July 1, 2001.)
3. Any person sixteen years of age or older who has not reached his or her twenty-first birthday, as a minor driver.
(1.5) Repealed.
Except as otherwise provided in this article 2, the department shall not license a person to operate any motor vehicle in this state:
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 504 , § 2, effective July 1, 2007.)
3. While the person's privilege to drive is under restraint;
4. Who has been adjudged or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have a substance use disorder, as defined in section 27-81-102 , with respect to a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5) ;
5. Who has been adjudged or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be afflicted with or suffering from any mental disability or disease and who has not at the time of application been restored to competency in the manner prescribed by law.
The department shall not issue a license to:
1. Any person required by this article to take an examination until such person has successfully passed the examination;
2. Any person required under the provisions of any motor vehicle financial safety or responsibility law to deposit or furnish proof of financial responsibility until such person has deposited or furnished such proof;
3. Any person whose license is subject to suspension or revocation or who does not have a license but would be subject to suspension or revocation pursuant to section 42-2-125, 42-2-126, or 42-2-127;
4. Any person not submitting proof of age or proof of identity, or both, as required by the department;
5. A person whose presence in the United States is in violation of federal immigration laws;
6. A person who, while under the age of sixteen, was convicted of any offense that would have subjected the person to a revocation of driving privileges under section 42-2-125 for the period of such revocation if such person had possessed a driver's license.
1. The department shall not issue a driver's license, including a temporary driver's license under section 42-2-106 (2), to a person under eighteen years of age unless the person has:
  1. Applied for, been issued, and possessed an appropriate instruction permit for at least twelve months; and
  2. Submitted a log or other written evidence on a standardized form approved by the department certifying that the person has completed not less than fifty hours of actual driving experience, of which not less than ten hours must have been completed while driving at night, which form is signed by:
    1. The person's parent or guardian or by a responsible adult;
    2. The instructor of a driver's education course approved by the department; or
    3. Any individual who is twenty-one years of age or older, who holds a valid driver's license, and who instructed the applicant if the applicant is a foster child.
2. In no event shall the department issue a minor driver's license to anyone under sixteen years of age.
The department shall not issue a driver's license to a person under sixteen years and six months of age unless the person has either:
1. Received a minimum of twelve hours of driving-behind-the-wheel training directed by a parent, a legal guardian, or an alternate permit supervisor, which training shall be in addition to the driving experience required by subsection (4) of this section, if no entity offers approved behind-the-wheel driver training at least twenty hours a week from a permanent location with an address that is within thirty miles of the permit holder's residence; or
2. Received a minimum of six hours of driving-behind-the-wheel training with a driving instructor employed or associated with an approved driver education course.
The department shall not issue a driver's license, minor driver's license, or instruction permit to an individual whose authorization to be present in the United States is temporary unless the individual applies under and complies with part 5 of this article.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2116, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (3)(f) amended, p. 1537, § 5, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(f) amended, p. 392, § 3, effective July 1; (4) amended, p. 1379, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1348, § 11, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2003: (3)(f) amended, p. 1904, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2004: IP(4)(a) and (4)(a)(I) amended, p. 1264, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3)(f) amended, p. 640, § 2, effective May 27. L. 2006: IP(4)(a) and (4)(a)(II) amended, p. 733, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (5) added, p. 588, § 2, effective April 20; IP(2), (2)(a), and (2)(b) amended and (2)(b.5) added, p. 504, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2010: IP(4)(a), (4)(a)(II), and (5) amended, (SB 10-015), ch. 60, p. 217, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2012: (2)(c) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1631, § 87, effective July 1. L. 2013: IP(3) and (3)(e) amended and (6) added, (SB 13-251), ch. 402, p. 2351, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2017: IP(2) and (2)(c) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1380, § 305, effective May 25. L. 2019: (4)(a) amended, (HB 19-1023), ch. 239, p. 2364, § 3, effective August 2. L. 2020: (2)(c) amended, (SB 20-007), ch. 286, p. 1417, § 55, effective July 13. L. 2021: IP(4)(a), IP(4)(a)(II), and (4)(a)(II)(A) amended, (HB 21-1139), ch. 177, p. 968, § 3, effective May 24.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-103 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-104 was relocated to § 42-2-105.
Subsection (1.5)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (1.5), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2000, p. 1348 .)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 334, Session Laws of Colorado 1999. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (4)(a) and subsection (4)(a)(I), see section 1 of chapter 323, Session Laws of Colorado 2004. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act enacting subsection (5), see section 1 of chapter 155, Session Laws of Colorado 2007. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation", see 18 Colo. Law. 1943 (1989).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-104 is similar to § 42-2-103 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Applied in People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 ( Colo. 1981 ); Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

42-2-105. Special restrictions on certain drivers.

A person under the age of eighteen years shall not drive any motor vehicle used to transport explosives or inflammable material or any motor vehicle used as a school vehicle for the transportation of pupils to or from school. A person under the age of eighteen years shall not drive a motor vehicle used as a commercial, private, or common carrier of persons or property unless such person has experience in operating motor vehicles and has been examined on such person's qualifications in operating such vehicles. The examination shall include safety regulations of commodity hauling, and the driver shall be licensed as a driver or a minor driver who is eighteen years of age or older.
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, no person under the age of twenty-one years shall drive a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 42-2-402 (4) except as provided in section 42-2-404 (4).
Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2117, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1355, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1034, § 73, effective June 1. L. 2010: (1) amended, (HB 10-1232), ch. 163, p. 572, § 11, effective April 28.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-104 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-105 was relocated to § 42-2-106.

Cross references: For the penalty for a class A traffic infraction, see § 42-4-1701 (3).

42-2-105.5. Restrictions on minor drivers under eighteen years of age - penalties - legislative declaration.

The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that:
1. Teenage drivers, in order to become safe and responsible drivers, need behind-the-wheel driving experience before they can begin to drive without restrictions;
2. Providing additional behind-the-wheel training with a parent, guardian, or other responsible adult before obtaining a minor driver's license is the beginning of the young driver's accumulation of experience;
3. Once a teenage driver begins to drive without a parent, guardian, or other responsible adult in the vehicle, it is necessary to place restrictions on a teenage driver who holds a minor driver's license until such driver turns eighteen years of age in order to give that driver time to exercise good judgment in the operation of a vehicle while keeping that driver, his or her passengers, and the public safe;
4. Penalties for the violation of these restrictions on minor drivers under eighteen years of age, including the assessment of points where they may not otherwise be assessed, should be sufficient to ensure that chronic violations would result in swift and severe repercussions to reinforce the importance of obeying the driving laws in order to keep the minor driver, his or her passengers, and the public safe.
Repealed.
Occupants in motor vehicles driven by persons under eighteen years of age shall be properly restrained or wear seat belts as required in sections 42-4-236 and 42-4-237.
No more than one passenger shall occupy the front seat of the motor vehicle driven by a person under eighteen years of age, and the number of passengers in the back seat of such vehicle shall not exceed the number of seat belts.
1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (5), any person who violates this section commits a class A traffic infraction.
2. A violation of subsection (3) of this section is a traffic infraction, and, notwithstanding the provisions of section 42-4-1701 (4)(a)(I)(D), a person convicted of violating subsection (3) of this section shall be punished as follows:
  1. By the imposition of not less than eight hours nor more than twenty-four hours of community service for a first offense and not less than sixteen hours nor more than forty hours of community service for a subsequent offense;
  2. By the levying of a fine of not more than sixty-five dollars for a first offense, a fine of not more than one hundred thirty dollars for a second offense, and a fine of one hundred ninety-five dollars for a subsequent offense; and
  3. By an assessment of two license suspension points pursuant to section 42-2-127 (5)(hh).

Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 1379, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2005: (2) repealed, p. 334, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2006: (1)(c), (1)(d), (3), (4), and (5) amended, p. 438, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2008: (5)(b)(II) amended, p. 2086, § 3, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 334, Session Laws of Colorado 1999.

42-2-106. Instruction permits and temporary licenses.

1. 1. A person who is sixteen years of age or older and who, except for the person's lack of instruction in operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, would otherwise be qualified to obtain a license under this article may apply for a temporary instruction permit in accordance with sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-108. The department shall issue a permit entitling an applicant, who is sixteen years of age or older but under eighteen years of age, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon the highways when accompanied by the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), who holds a valid Colorado driver's license, and who occupies the front seat in close proximity to the driver or, in the case of a motorcycle, under the immediate proximate supervision of a licensed driver, who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older, authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. In addition, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who is authorized pursuant to this section to supervise the minor driver while the minor is driving, may allow the minor, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive with an individual who holds a valid driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older for additional driving experience, but such additional driving experience shall not count toward the requirement established in section 42-2-104. The permit shall expire three years after issuance. The department shall issue a permit entitling the applicant, who is eighteen years of age or older, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon the highways when accompanied by a driver, who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older, who occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle, or if the vehicle is a motorcycle under the immediate proximate supervision of a driver, who is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. The permit shall expire three years after issuance. (1) (a) (I) A person who is sixteen years of age or older and who, except for the person's lack of instruction in operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, would otherwise be qualified to obtain a license under this article may apply for a temporary instruction permit in accordance with sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-108. The department shall issue a permit entitling an applicant, who is sixteen years of age or older but under eighteen years of age, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon the highways when accompanied by the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), who holds a valid Colorado driver's license, and who occupies the front seat in close proximity to the driver or, in the case of a motorcycle, under the immediate proximate supervision of a licensed driver, who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older, authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. In addition, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who is authorized pursuant to this section to supervise the minor driver while the minor is driving, may allow the minor, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive with an individual who holds a valid driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older for additional driving experience, but such additional driving experience shall not count toward the requirement established in section 42-2-104. The permit shall expire three years after issuance. The department shall issue a permit entitling the applicant, who is eighteen years of age or older, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon the highways when accompanied by a driver, who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older, who occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle, or if the vehicle is a motorcycle under the immediate proximate supervision of a driver, who is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. The permit shall expire three years after issuance.
  2. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent may appoint an alternate permit supervisor. An alternate permit supervisor shall hold a valid Colorado driver's license and be twenty-one years of age or older or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. A minor who is issued a permit under this paragraph (a) may drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the alternate permit supervisor if the minor has the permit in the minor's immediate possession and the alternate permit supervisor occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver.
  3. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license but holds a valid driver's license from another state and is authorized to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle and has proper military identification, then the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, shall be authorized to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who cosigned the application for the minor's instruction permit, if the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver while the minor is driving.
2. 1. A minor who is fifteen years of age or older and has completed a department-approved driver education course within the last six months may apply for a minor's instruction permit, pursuant to sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-108. Nothing in this subparagraph (I) shall require a minor who is fifteen years of age or older and in the foster care system to complete and present an affidavit of liability to register for a department-approved driver education course prior to applying for a minor's instruction permit. Upon presentation of a written or printed statement signed by the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent and the instructor of the driver education course that the minor has passed an approved driver education course, and a signed affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108, the department shall issue the permit entitling the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who cosigned the application for the minor's instruction permit, if the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent holds a valid Colorado driver's license and occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle and is in close proximity to the driver while the minor is driving. In addition, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who is authorized pursuant to this section to supervise the minor driver while the minor is driving, may allow the minor, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive with an individual who holds a valid driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older for additional driving experience, but such additional driving experience shall not count toward the requirement established in section 42-2-104. The permit shall also entitle the applicant to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, that is marked to indicate that it is a motor vehicle used for instruction and that is properly equipped for instruction, upon the highways when accompanied by or under the supervision of an approved driver education instructor who holds a valid Colorado driver's license. Driver education instructors giving instruction in motorcycle safety shall have a valid motorcycle driver's license from Colorado and shall have successfully completed an instruction program in motorcycle safety approved by the department. The permit shall expire three years after issuance.
  2. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent may appoint an alternate permit supervisor. An alternate permit supervisor shall hold a valid Colorado driver's license and be twenty-one years of age or older or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. A minor who is issued a permit under this paragraph (b) may drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the alternate permit supervisor if the minor has the permit in the minor's immediate possession and the alternate permit supervisor occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver.
  3. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license but holds a valid driver's license from another state and is authorized to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle and has proper military identification, then the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, shall be authorized to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who cosigned the application for the minor's instruction permit, if the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver while the minor is driving.
3. A person sixteen years of age or older who, except for his or her lack of instruction in operating a motorcycle would otherwise be qualified to obtain a driver's license under this article to drive a motorcycle may apply for a temporary instruction permit, pursuant to sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-108. The department shall issue the permit entitling the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motorcycle upon the highways while under the immediate supervision of a licensed driver, who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older, authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. The permit shall expire three years after issuance.
4. 1. A minor fifteen and one-half years of age but less than sixteen years of age who has completed a four-hour prequalification driver awareness program approved by the department may apply for a minor's instruction permit pursuant to sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-108. Upon presenting a written or printed statement signed by the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent of the applicant and documentation that the minor completed the driver awareness program, the department shall issue a permit entitling the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who cosigned the application for the minor's instruction permit, if the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent holds a valid Colorado driver's license and occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle and is in close proximity to the driver while he or she is driving. In addition, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who is authorized pursuant to this section to supervise the minor driver while the minor is driving, may allow the minor, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, to drive with an individual who holds a valid driver's license and is twenty-one years of age or older for additional driving experience, but such additional driving experience shall not count toward the requirement established in section 42-2-104. The permit shall expire three years after issuance.
  2. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license, the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent may appoint an alternate permit supervisor. An alternate permit supervisor shall hold a valid Colorado driver's license and be twenty-one years of age or older or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is authorized under this article to drive a motorcycle. A minor who is issued a permit under this paragraph (d) may drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the alternate permit supervisor if the minor has the permit in the minor's immediate possession and the alternate permit supervisor occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver.
  3. If the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who signed the affidavit of liability pursuant to section 42-2-108 (1)(a), does not hold a valid Colorado driver's license but holds a valid driver's license from another state and is authorized to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle and has proper military identification, then the applicant, while having the permit in the applicant's immediate possession, shall be authorized to drive a motor vehicle, including a motorcycle, under the supervision of the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent, who cosigned the application for the minor's instruction permit, if the parent, stepparent, grandparent with power of attorney, or guardian or foster parent occupies the front seat of the motor vehicle or, if the vehicle is a motorcycle, is in close proximity to the driver while the minor is driving.
5. Repealed.
6. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) to (d) of this subsection (1), a temporary instruction permit to operate a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 42-2-402 shall expire one year after issuance.
7. A person who qualifies for a permit under subsection (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), or (1)(d) of this section and who has a disability that requires the person to use a special vehicle or qualifies the person for parking privileges under section 42-3-204 may apply for an instruction permit in accordance with the subsection under which the person qualifies for a permit. Upon determining that a person is qualified for the permit, the department shall issue a permit entitling an applicant to drive a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon the highways in accordance with the requirements of the subsection under which the person qualifies for the permit and any further requirements the department may reasonably require due to the person's disability. The permit expires three years after issuance.
8. Notwithstanding subsections (1)(b) to (1)(d) of this section, a foster child, to obtain an instruction permit under subsections (1)(b) to (1)(d) of this section, may drive with any person who:
  1. Holds a valid driver's license;
  2. Is at least twenty-one years of age; and
  3. Occupies the front passenger seat, in close proximity to the foster child, for the purposes of instruction.
1. The department, in its discretion, may issue a temporary driver's license to an applicant, who is not a first time applicant in Colorado or who is under eighteen years of age and is accompanied by a responsible party meeting the requirements of section 42-2-108 (1), for a minor driver's or driver's license which will permit such applicant to operate a motor vehicle while the department completes its verification of all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive a minor driver's or driver's license.
2. The department shall issue a temporary driver's license to a first time applicant in Colorado for a minor driver's or driver's license that will permit such applicant to operate a motor vehicle while the department completes its verification of all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive a minor driver's or driver's license including the age, identity, and residency of the applicant, unless such applicant is under eighteen years of age and is accompanied by a responsible adult meeting the requirements of section 42-2-108 (1). Such verification shall include a comparison of existing driver's license and identification card images in department files with the applicant's images to ensure such applicant has only one identity.
3. A temporary license is valid for up to one year as determined by the department, unless extended by the department, and must be in such applicant's immediate possession while operating a motor vehicle. It shall be invalid when the permanent license has been issued or has been refused for good cause.
Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2118, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1355, § 2, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 1380, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2) amended, p. 1348, § 12, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (2) amended, p. 937, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended and (1)(d) and (1)(e) added, p. 1265, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2005: (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d) amended, p. 641, § 3, effective May 27. L. 2006: (1)(b) and (1)(d) amended, p. 582, § 1, effective April 24; (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d) amended, p. 733, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1)(b)(I) amended, p. 589, § 3, effective April 20. L. 2008: (1)(f) added, p. 474, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1262, § 24, effective October 1. L. 2010: (1)(b)(I) amended, (HB 10-1059), ch. 38, p. 156, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2017: (1)(g) added, (SB 17-286), ch. 388, p. 2007, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2019: (1)(h) added, (HB 19-1023), ch. 239, p. 2364, § 4, effective August 2.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-105 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-106 was relocated to § 42-2-107.
Subsection (1)(e)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(e), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2004, p. 1265 .)
Amendments to subsections (1)(b) and (1)(d) by Senate Bill 06-083 and House Bill 06-1107 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For the penalty for a class A traffic infraction, see § 42-4-1701 (3).

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act amending subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b), see section 1 of chapter 334, Session Laws of Colorado 1999. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act amending subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) and enacting subsections (1)(d) and (1)(e), see section 1 of chapter 323, Session Laws of Colorado 2004. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act amending subsection (1)(b)(I), see section 1 of chapter 155, Session Laws of Colorado 2007.

ANNOTATION

The department of motor vehicles did not violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and intentionally discriminate against blind mother when it required a "parent, stepparent, or guardian" with a valid driver's license to supervise minor daughter's driving practice, as required by minor's instruction permit. Barber v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 562 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2009) (decided under law in effect prior to the 2005 amendment).

42-2-107. Application for license or instruction permit - anatomical gifts - donations to Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund - legislative declaration - rules - annual report - repeal.

1. 1. To be acceptable, every application for an instruction permit or for a driver's or minor driver's license must be made upon forms furnished by the department and accompanied by the required fee. The department shall set the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2). The department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5 (1). Every applicant shall submit with the application proof of age or proof of identity, or both, as the department may require. (1) (a) (I) To be acceptable, every application for an instruction permit or for a driver's or minor driver's license must be made upon forms furnished by the department and accompanied by the required fee. The department shall set the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2). The department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5 (1). Every applicant shall submit with the application proof of age or proof of identity, or both, as the department may require.
  2. If an applicant is applying for an instruction permit or driver's or minor driver's license for the first time in Colorado and the applicant otherwise meets the requirements for such license or permit, the applicant shall receive a temporary license or instruction permit pursuant to section 42-2-106 (2) until the department verifies all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive an instruction permit or minor driver's or driver's license including the age, identity, and residency of the applicant.
2. 1. An applicant who submits proof of age or proof of identity issued by an entity other than a state or the United States shall also submit such proof as the department may require that the applicant is lawfully present in the United States.
  2. An applicant who submits, as proof of age or proof of identity, a driver's license or identification card issued by a state that issues drivers' licenses or identification cards to persons who are not lawfully present in the United States shall also submit such proof as the department may require that the applicant is lawfully present in the United States.
3. The department shall not issue a driver's or minor driver's license to a person who is not lawfully present in the United States.
4. The department may not issue a driver's or minor driver's license to any person who is not a resident of the state of Colorado. The department shall issue such a license only upon the furnishing of such evidence of residency as the department may require.
1. 1. Every application shall state the full name, date of birth, sex, and residence address of the applicant; briefly describe the applicant; be signed by the applicant with such applicant's usual signature; have affixed thereon the applicant's fingerprint; and state whether the applicant has ever been licensed as a minor driver or driver and, if so, when and by what state or country and whether any such license has ever been denied, suspended, or revoked, the reasons therefor, and the date thereof. These statements shall be verified by the applicant's signature thereon. (2) (a) (I) Every application shall state the full name, date of birth, sex, and residence address of the applicant; briefly describe the applicant; be signed by the applicant with such applicant's usual signature; have affixed thereon the applicant's fingerprint; and state whether the applicant has ever been licensed as a minor driver or driver and, if so, when and by what state or country and whether any such license has ever been denied, suspended, or revoked, the reasons therefor, and the date thereof. These statements shall be verified by the applicant's signature thereon.
  2. The department shall issue a new driver's license to a person who has a gender different from the sex denoted on that person's driver's license when the department receives a new birth certificate issued pursuant to section 25-2-113.8 or when the department receives:
    1. A statement, in a form or format designated by the department, from the person, or from the person's parent if the person is a minor, or from the person's guardian or legal representative, signed under penalty of law, confirming the sex designation on the person's driver's license does not align with the person's gender identity; and
    2. If the person is a minor under the age of eighteen, a statement, in a form or format designated by the department, signed under penalty of law, from a professional medical or mental health-care provider licensed in good standing in Colorado or with an equivalent license in good standing from another jurisdiction, stating that the sex designation on the driver's license does not align with the minor's gender identity. This subsection (2)(a)(II)(B) does not require a minor to undergo any specific surgery, treatment, clinical care, or behavioral health care.
  3. The department may only amend a sex designation for an individual's driver's license one time upon the individual's request. Any further requests from the individual for additional sex designation changes require the submission of a court order indicating that the sex designation change is required.
  4. In addition to the information required by subsection (2)(a)(I) of this section, every application shall include the opportunity for the applicant to self-identify his or her race or ethnicity. The race or ethnicity information that may be identified on the application shall not be printed on the driver's license but shall be maintained in the stored information as defined by section 42-2-114 (1)(b). That information must be accessible to a law enforcement officer through magnetic or electronic readers.
2. 1. [ Editor's note: This version of the introductory portion to subsection (2)(b)(I) is effective until January 1, 2022.] In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), an application shall state that:
    1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(b)(I)(A) is effective until January 1, 2022.] The applicant understands that, as a resident of the state of Colorado, any motor vehicle owned by the applicant must be registered in Colorado pursuant to the laws of the state and the applicant may be subject to criminal penalties, civil penalties, cancellation or denial of the applicant's driver's license, and liability for any unpaid registration fees and specific ownership taxes if the applicant fails to comply with such registration requirements; and
      (A) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2)(b)(I)(A) is effective January 1, 2022. ] The applicant understands that, as a resident of the state of Colorado, any motor vehicle owned by the applicant must be registered in Colorado pursuant to the laws of the state and the applicant may be subject to criminal penalties, civil penalties, and liability for any unpaid registration fees and specific ownership taxes if the applicant fails to comply with such registration requirements; and
    2. The applicant agrees, within thirty days after the date the applicant became a resident, to register in Colorado any vehicle owned by the applicant.
  2. The applicant shall verify the statements required by this paragraph (b) by the applicant's signature on the application.
  (b) (I) [ Editor's note: This version of the introductory portion to subsection (2)(b)(I) is effective January 1, 2022. ] In addition to the requirements of subsection (2)(a) of this section, an application must state that:
1. (2.5) (a) Any male United States citizen or immigrant who applies for an instruction permit or a driver's license or a renewal of any such permit or license and who is at least eighteen years of age but less than twenty-six years of age shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of section 3 of the "Military Selective Service Act", 50 U.S.C. App. sec. 453, as amended.
2. The department shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicants identified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.5) to the selective service system. The applicant's submission of an application shall serve as an indication that the applicant either has already registered with the selective service system or that he is authorizing the department to forward to the selective service system the necessary information for such registration. The department shall notify the applicant that his submission of an application constitutes consent to registration with the selective service system, if so required by federal law.
1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), an application for a driver's or minor driver's license shall include the applicant's social security number, which shall remain confidential and shall not be placed on the applicant's driver's or minor driver's license; except that such confidentiality shall not extend to the state child support enforcement agency, the department, or a court of competent jurisdiction when requesting information in the course of activities authorized under article 13 of title 26, C.R.S., or article 14 of title 14, C.R.S. If the applicant does not have a social security number, the applicant shall submit a sworn statement made under penalty of law, together with the application, stating that the applicant does not have a social security number.
2. If federal law is changed to prohibit the collection of social security numbers on driver's license applications, the department shall automatically stop its practice of including applicants' social security numbers on applications for driver's and minor driver's licenses as specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3).
3. A sworn statement that is made under penalty of perjury shall be sufficient evidence of the applicant's social security number required by this subsection (3) and shall authorize the department to issue a driver's or minor driver's license to the applicant. Nothing in this paragraph (c) shall be construed to prevent the department from canceling, denying, recalling, or updating a driver's or minor driver's license if the department learns that the applicant has provided a false social security number.
1. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2004, p. 1891 , § 4, effective August 4, 2004.)
2. 1. 1. The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the availability of human organs and tissue by voluntary designation of donors under the provisions of the "Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act", part 2 of article 19 of title 15, is critical for advancements in medical science to occur and for the successful use of various medical treatments to save and prolong lives. (b) (I) (A) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the availability of human organs and tissue by voluntary designation of donors under the provisions of the "Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act", part 2 of article 19 of title 15, is critical for advancements in medical science to occur and for the successful use of various medical treatments to save and prolong lives.
    2. The general assembly further finds, determines, and declares that state government should play a role in increasing the availability of human organs and tissue to procurement organizations, as defined in section 15-19-202 , by acting as a conduit to make money available for promoting organ and tissue donation and that this role constitutes a public purpose.
  2. There is hereby created in the state treasury the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund, which shall consist of all moneys credited thereto from all sources including but not limited to moneys collected from voluntary contributions for organ and tissue donation pursuant to subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (b) and section 42-2-118 (1)(a) (II). All moneys in the fund are hereby continuously appropriated to the department of the treasury and shall remain in the fund to be used for the purposes set forth in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b) and shall not revert to the general fund or any other fund. All interest derived from the deposit and investment of this fund shall be credited to the fund. At least quarterly, the state treasurer shall transfer all available moneys in the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund to Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, as directed by sub-subparagraph (A) of subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b).
  3. At least quarterly, the state treasurer shall transfer all available money from the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund:
    1. To Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, to provide funding for activities to promote organ and tissue donation through the creation and dissemination, by means of electronic media and otherwise, of educational information including public service announcements and information to increase awareness in the medical professions and related fields. Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, shall create, by amendment to its articles of incorporation or bylaws or otherwise, as appropriate, an advisory group to allocate moneys received pursuant to this sub-subparagraph (A). Such advisory body shall include a representative of any qualified transplant organization. Such organizations shall include those for organs, tissue, and living donations. The advisory body created under this sub-subparagraph (A) shall report in writing in a form and manner determined by the department and at such intervals as required by the department on the use of moneys received under this sub-subparagraph (A). No moneys made available pursuant to this paragraph (b) shall be used to encourage fetal tissue donation.
    2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 1172 , § 9, effective June 1, 1998.)
    3. Before any payment to Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, from the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund may be made for any purpose, to the department for the reasonable costs associated with the initial installation of the organ and tissue donor registry, the setup for electronic transfer of the donor information for the organ and tissue donor registry to the federally designated organ procurement organization, and computer programming, reprogramming, and form changes necessary as a result of the creation or modification of the organ and tissue donor registry.
    4. To Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, for the costs associated with educating the public about the organ and tissue donor registry pursuant to section 15-19-220 .
  4. Appropriations made by the general assembly pursuant to subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b) shall not exceed moneys in the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund that are available for appropriation.
  5. An applicant may make a donation of one dollar or more to the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund, created in subsection (4)(b)(II) of this section, to promote the donation of organs and tissues under the "Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act", part 2 of article 19 of title 15. The department shall collect the financial donations and transmit them to the state treasurer, who shall credit them to the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund. The donation prescribed in this subsection (4)(b)(V) is voluntary and may be refused by the applicant. The department shall make available informational booklets or other informational sources on the importance of organ and tissue donations to applicants as designed and approved by the advisory body created under subsection (4)(b)(III)(A) of this section. The department shall inquire of each applicant at the time the completed application is presented whether the applicant is interested in making a donation of one dollar or more and shall also specifically inform the applicant of the option for organ and tissue donations. The department shall also provide written information designed and approved by the advisory body created under subsection (4)(b)(III)(A) of this section to each applicant volunteering to become an organ and tissue donor. The written information shall disclose that the applicant's name shall be transmitted to the organ and tissue donor registry authorized in section 15-19-220 , and that the applicant shall notify the federally designated organ procurement organization of any changes to the applicant's donor status. The issuance of an identification card, a driver's license, or an instruction permit with a donor's designation completes the donation process and is effective unless revoked pursuant to section 15-19-206 of the "Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act", part 2 of article 19 of title 15. (V.5) Designation on a donor's driver's license or permit shall fulfill the release requirements set forth in section 24-72-204 (7)(b) , C.R.S.
  6. The provisions of article 16 of title 6, C.R.S., shall not apply to the activities of the department under this paragraph (b).
  7. By October 1, 2017, and by each October 1 thereafter, Donor Alliance, Inc., or its successor organization, shall submit to the department an annual report detailing the amounts and specific uses of all funds received by Donor Alliance, Inc., from the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund.
  8. This subsection (4)(b) is repealed, effective September 1, 2027.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (5) is effective until January 1, 2022.] (a) (I) Prior to the issuance of a driver's or minor driver's license, the department shall determine if there are any outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant pursuant to section 42-4-1709 (7).
(II) For the purposes of this subsection (5), "outstanding judgments or warrants" does not include any judgment or warrant reported to the department in violation of the provisions of section 42-4-110.5 (2)(c).

(b) If the department determines that there are no outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant and if all other conditions for issuance required by articles 1 to 4 of this title are met, the department shall issue the license.

(c) If the department determines that there are outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant and the applicant is subject to the provisions of section 42-4-1709 (7), the license shall not be issued until the applicant has complied with the requirements of that section. Any person who satisfies an outstanding judgment or warrant entered pursuant to section 42-4-1709 (7) shall pay to the court a thirty-dollar administrative processing fee for each such judgment or warrant in addition to all other penalties, costs, or forfeitures. The court shall remit fifty percent of the administrative processing fee to the department of revenue, and the other fifty percent shall be retained by the issuing court.

(5) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (5) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
Notwithstanding the amount specified for any fee in this section, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of one or more of the fees if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), C.R.S., to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of one or more of the fees is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of one or more of the fees as provided in section 24-75-402 (4), C.R.S.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2119, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (5) added, p. 1003, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(15)(b) amended, p. 1201, § 1, effective June 1; (4) amended, p. 1132, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (5)(a) amended, p. 1669, § 2, effective June 5; (2) amended, p. 1000, § 1, effective August 6. L. 98: (4)(a), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III)(B), and (4)(b)(VII) amended, p. 1172, § 9, effective June 1; (6) added, p. 1351, § 93, effective June 1; (1) amended, p. 294, § 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (4)(b)(II) amended, p. 630, § 46, effective August 4. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1715, § 11, effective July 1; (4)(b)(III)(C), (4)(b)(III)(D), and (4)(b)(V.5) added and (4)(b)(V) and (4)(b)(VII) amended, pp. 730, 731, 733, §§ 8, 9, 14, effective July 1; (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d), (2)(a), (3), and (5)(a)(I) amended, p. 1349, § 16, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (1)(a) amended, p. 938, § 2, effective July 1; (2.5) added, p. 646, § 1, effective August 8; (3)(a) amended and (3)(c) added, p. 782, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2002: (1)(b) amended, p. 171, § 1, effective April 2. L. 2004: (4)(a), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III)(C), and (4)(b)(V) amended, p. 1891, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2005: (3)(a) amended, p. 642, § 4, effective May 27. L. 2007: (4)(b)(II), IP(4)(b)(III), (4)(b)(III)(A), (4)(b)(III)(C), (4)(b)(III)(D), (4)(b)(IV), (4)(b)(V), and (4)(b)(VII) amended, p. 307, § 1, effective, March 30; (1)(a)(I) amended, p. 1570, § 2, effective July 1; (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(III)(C), (4)(b)(III)(D), and (4)(b)(V) amended, p. 799, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1)(a)(I) amended, (SB 09-274), ch. 210, p. 951, § 1, effective May 1. L. 2010: (1)(a)(I) amended, (HB 10-1387), ch. 205, p. 886, § 1, effective May 5. L. 2011: (4)(b)(II) and (4)(b)(III) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1177, § 99, effective August 10. L. 2012: (1)(a)(I) amended, (HB 12-1216), ch. 80, p. 263, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1)(c) amended, (SB 13-251), ch. 402, p. 2351, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2014: (1)(a)(I) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1543, § 6, effective June 5. L. 2016: (2)(a) amended, (HB 16-1021), ch. 322, p. 1307, § 1, effective June 10. L. 2017: (4)(b)(I)(A), (4)(b)(I)(B), IP(4)(b)(III), (4)(b)(III)(D), and (4)(b)(V) amended, (SB 17-223), ch. 158, p. 564, § 18, effective August 9; (4)(b)(II), IP(4)(b)(III), (4)(b)(III)(A), (4)(b)(III)(C), (4)(b)(IV), (4)(b)(V), and (4)(b)(VII) amended and (4)(b)(VIII) added, (HB 17-1027), ch. 329, p. 1759, § 1, effective September 15. L. 2019: (2)(a) amended, (HB 19-1039), ch. 377, p. 3405, § 3, effective January 1, 2020. L. 2020: (2)(a)(II) amended, (SB 20-166), ch. 280, p. 1371, § 2, effective July 13. L. 2021: (2)(a)(I) and (2)(a)(II)(B) amended, (SB 21-266), ch. 423, p. 2807, § 41, effective July 2; IP(2)(b)(I) and (2)(b)(I)(A) amended and (5) repealed, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3094, § 3, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-106 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-107 was relocated to § 42-2-108.
Amendments to subsection (3) by Senate Bill 00-145 and Senate Bill 00-011 were harmonized, effective July 1, 2001.
Amendments to subsections (4)(b)(III)(C), (4)(b)(III)(D), and (4)(b)(V) by Senate Bill 07-037 and House Bill 07-1266 were harmonized.
Amendments to subsections IP(4)(b)(III) and (4)(b)(V) by SB 17-223 and HB 17-1027 were harmonized.
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Organ Donation Update", see 13 Colo. Law. 612 (1984).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-107 is similar to § 42-2-106 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Subsection (3) not unconstitutional when applied to individuals whose religion prohibits the taking of photographs. Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455 , 593 P.2d 1363, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Suspension of a license is not synonymous with suspension of the privilege to drive. Therefore, failure of an applicant to disclose suspension of her driving privilege does not violate the provision that requires disclosure of any license suspension. Edge v. Dept. of Rev., 53 P.3d 652 (Colo. App. 2001).

42-2-108. Application of minors - rules.

1. 1. The application of any person under eighteen years of age for an instruction permit or minor driver's license must be accompanied by either: (1) (a) (I) The application of any person under eighteen years of age for an instruction permit or minor driver's license must be accompanied by either:
    1. An affidavit of liability signed and verified by the parent, stepparent, foster parent, grandparent with power of attorney, guardian, spouse of the applicant if the spouse is eighteen years of age or older, or any other responsible adult who assumes the obligation imposed under this article 2 by signing the affidavit of liability for a minor; or
    2. Proof of financial responsibility for the future, as defined in section 42-7-103 (14), held in the name of the minor if the minor is a foster child.
  2. When an applicant has been made a ward of any court in the state for any reason and has been placed in foster care, the foster parents or parent may sign the affidavit of liability for the minor. If the parent or foster parent is unwilling or unable to sign the affidavit of liability, a guardian ad litem, an official of the county department of human or social services having custody of the applicant, or an official of the division of youth services in the state department of human services having custody of the applicant may sign the application for an instruction permit without signing the affidavit of liability for the minor if the requirements of subsection (1)(b) of this section are met; except that, prior to signing the application for an instruction permit, the guardian ad litem or other official shall notify the court of his or her intent to sign the application, and except that the guardian ad litem or official shall not sign the application for an instruction permit for a minor who is placed in foster care and is under seventeen years of age without first obtaining the consent of the foster parent. If the minor is seventeen years of age or older and is in the care of a foster parent, in order to prepare the minor for emancipation from foster care and to assist the minor in obtaining important life skills, the guardian ad litem or official shall consult with the foster parent of the minor about the opportunity for the minor to learn driving skills under the restrictions provided in subsection (1)(b) of this section prior to signing an application for an instruction permit. The guardian ad litem or official shall solicit the opinion of the minor's foster parent concerning the minor's ability to exercise good judgment and make decisions as well as the minor's overall capacity to drive.
  3. When a minor to whom an instruction permit or minor driver's license has been issued is required to appear before the department for a hearing in accordance with this article 2, the person who signed the affidavit of liability for the minor or the guardian ad litem or official who signed the application for an instruction permit for the minor shall accompany the minor. If the person who signed the minor's affidavit of liability or application for an instruction permit is unable to attend the hearing, he or she shall submit to the department a verified signed statement certifying under oath that he or she is aware of the purpose of the hearing but cannot attend.
2. The department shall issue an instruction permit to an applicant under eighteen years of age who is otherwise eligible to obtain an instruction permit and who has been made a ward of the court and who is in out-of-home placement without the requirement of a person signing an affidavit of liability if the following requirements are met:
  1. The guardian ad litem, an official of the county department of human or social services having custody of the applicant, or an official of the division of youth services in the state department of human services having custody of the applicant signs the application for an instruction permit; and
  2. 1. If the minor is in the care of a foster parent and is under seventeen years of age, the foster parent consents to the minor learning driving skills under the restrictions provided in this subsection (1); or
    2. If the minor is in the care of a foster parent and is at least seventeen years of age, the guardian ad litem or the official has consulted with the foster parent prior to signing the application for an instruction permit.
  3. and (IV) Repealed.
1. (1.5) (a) The application of any person under the age of eighteen years for an instruction permit or minor driver's license shall include the option for a minor to be an organ or tissue donor.
2. Repealed.
3. Any person under the age of eighteen years who volunteers to donate anatomical gifts by designation on an instructional permit or minor driver's license shall include a notice of consent signed and verified by the father or the mother of the applicant, or, in the event neither parent is living, by the person or guardian having proof of legal custody of such minor, or by the spouse of the applicant if the spouse of the applicant is eighteen years of age or older.
4. If the person under the age of eighteen years who volunteers to donate anatomical gifts by designation on an instructional permit or minor driver's license is an emancipated minor, a notice of consent is not necessary for an anatomical gift to be valid.
5. Each county department of human or social services having custody of a foster child or ward of the court may implement a program that provides the services authorized under subsection (1)(b) of this section. The county department of human or social services may:
  1. Assess the child's or ward's mental, emotional, and physical ability to safely drive a motor vehicle and, based on that assessment, approve or deny the provision of services under subsection (1)(b) of this section; and
  2. Seek, accept, and expend gifts, grants, or donations from private or public sources for the purposes of this subsection (1.5).
1. Any negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under eighteen years of age who drives a motor vehicle upon a highway is imputed to the person who signed the affidavit of liability that accompanied the minor's application for an instruction permit or a minor driver's license. The person is jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the minor's negligence or willful misconduct, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
2. A guardian ad litem, an official of a county or district department of human or social services, or an official of the division of youth services in the state department of human services who signs a minor's application for an instruction permit or a minor driver's license but does not sign an affidavit of liability does not impute liability on themselves, on the county, or on the state for any damages caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the applicant.
3. Nothing in this section waives or limits the governmental immunity of a county or district department of human or social services, as described in article 10 of title 24.
1. The department shall accept the application of a qualified minor if:
  1. A minor under eighteen years of age has deposited, or there is deposited on the minor's behalf, proof of financial responsibility covering the operation of a motor vehicle owned by the minor or, if the minor is not the owner of a motor vehicle, covering the operation of another motor vehicle; and
  2. The application is accompanied by an affidavit of liability signed by one parent or the guardian of the minor unless, under subsection (1) or (1.5) of this section, the minor need not have a responsible adult sign the affidavit of liability.
2. While proof of financial responsibility is maintained, the parent, foster parent, or guardian is not subject to the liability imposed under subsection (2) of this section. Nothing in this section requires a foster parent to sign an affidavit of liability for a foster child and nothing in this section precludes a foster parent from obtaining a named driver's exclusion on the foster parent's insurance policy.
Repealed.
An individual who is in the custody of the state department of human services or a county or district department of human or social services who does not possess all of the required documents to apply for an instruction permit or a minor driver's license pursuant to this section may be eligible for exception processing pursuant to rules of the executive director of the department of revenue.
On or before November 1, 2021, the executive director of the department of revenue shall promulgate rules establishing, to the extent permissible under federal law, forms of documentation that are acceptable for the purpose of allowing individuals who are in the custody of the state department of human services or a county or district department of human or social services to verify their legal residence in the United States, establish identity, and satisfy any other prerequisites for the acquisition of an instruction permit or a minor driver's license.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2119, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1.5) added, p. 731, § 10, effective July 1; (3) and (4) amended, p. 1350, § 17, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 392, § 1, effective May 2. L. 2004: (1)(a) and IP(1)(b) amended, p. 1266, § 4, effective July 1; (1.5)(b) repealed, p. 1892, § 5, effective August 4. L. 2005: (1)(a) amended, p. 642, § 5, effective May 27. L. 2006: (1)(a) amended, p. 738, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2017: (1)(a) and (1)(b)(I) amended, (HB 17-1329), ch. 381, p. 1985, § 68, effective June 6. L. 2018: (1)(a) and (1)(b)(I) amended, (SB 18-092), ch. 38, p. 453, § 142, effective August 8. L. 2019: (1)(a), IP(1)(b), (1)(b)(I), (1)(b)(II), and (3) amended, (1)(b)(III) and (1)(b)(IV) repealed, and (1.5)(e) added, (HB 19-1023), ch. 239, p. 2361, § 2, effective August 2. L. 2021: (2) amended and (5) and (6) added, (HB 21-1084), ch. 203, p. 1069, § 2, effective September 7.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-107 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-108 was relocated to § 42-2-109.
Subsection (4)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (4), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2000, p. 1350 .)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2004 act repealing subsection (1.5)(b), see section 1 of chapter 385, Session Laws of Colorado 2004. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-092, see section 1 of chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-108 is similar to § 42-2-107 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations this section.

Legislative intent. While granting minors under the age of 18 the opportunity to gain experience in driving an automobile and granting them the privilege of using the public highways, the general assembly sought by this section to safeguard against the indiscretions of the inexperienced, youthful driver by requiring a financially responsible adult to assume the liability for accidents negligently or willfully caused by the youth. This was done, first, with the hope, that, having assumed the liability, the parent or guardian would exercise some degree of control over the minor's driving habits, and, second, to insure that the innocent victim of such negligence would be compensated for his injuries. Bilsten v. Porter, 33 Colo. App. 208, 516 P.2d 656 (1973); Lahey v. Benjou, 759 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1988).

Strict construction. This section, in derogation of the common law, is to be strictly construed. Bilsten v. Porter, 33 Colo. App. 208, 516 P.2d 656 (1973).

The statutory language of this section itself contains no express limitations on the parent's liability, and this is true whether or not the minor has disobeyed the terms of his temporary instruction license. Bilsten v. Porter, 33 Colo. App. 208, 516 P.2d 656 (1973).

Subsection (1) does not provide for notice but merely requires that the person who signed the application attend the hearing. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Effect of § 42-2-102 (1)(d) . Subsection (1) only requires that the licensee be accompanied at the hearing by the person who signed the application of the minor, unless that person submits a verified statement. However, where licensees have never been required to apply for licenses in the state of Colorado, by virtue of § 42-2-102 (1)(d) , and since no person was required to sign their applications, no one is required to attend the hearing other than the licensees themselves. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Applied in Bilsten v. Porter, 37 Colo. App. 389, 547 P.2d 255 (1976).

42-2-109. Release from liability.

Any person who has signed the affidavit of liability which accompanied the application of a minor for a minor driver's license or permit may thereafter file with the department a verified written request that the license of said minor be canceled. Upon receipt of such request, the department shall cancel the license of said minor, unless the minor has already reached the age of eighteen years, and the person who signed the affidavit of liability for such minor shall be relieved from all liability imposed by section 42-2-108 (2).
When such minor reaches the age of eighteen years, the person who signed the minor's affidavit of liability is relieved of all liability imposed by section 42-2-108 (2).

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2120, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1351, § 18, effective July 1, 2001.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-108 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-109 was relocated to § 42-2-110.

42-2-110. Revocation upon death of signer for minor.

The department, upon receipt of satisfactory evidence of the death of the person who signed the affidavit of liability which accompanied the application for a license of such minor, shall cancel such license, unless the minor has already reached the age of eighteen years, and shall not issue a new license until such time as a new application is made pursuant to the provisions of this article.
In the event of the death of the signer, a licensee under the age of eighteen years shall notify the department and secure the necessary new signer.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2120, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1351, § 19, effective July 1, 2001.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-109 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-110 was relocated to § 42-2-111.

42-2-111. Examination of applicants and drivers - when required.

1. The department shall examine every applicant for a driver's or minor driver's license. The executive director of the department, in the director's discretion, may conduct the examination in any county convenient for the applicant. The examination shall include a test of the applicant's eyesight, his or her ability to read and understand highway signs that regulate, warn, and direct traffic, and his or her knowledge of the traffic laws of this state, an actual demonstration of the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and control in the operation of a motor vehicle, and such further physical and mental examination as the department finds necessary to determine the applicant's fitness to operate a motor vehicle safely upon the highways; except that an applicant seeking renewal of a driver's license by mail under section 42-2-118 need only submit the information required by that section.
2. The department, in issuing the drivers' licenses for certain types or general classes of vehicles, may waive any examination required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) for applicants and may certify certain employers, governmental agencies, or other appropriate organizations to train and examine all applicants for such certain types or general classes of licenses, if such training and examination is equal to the training and examination of the department.
Repealed.
1. If the department has evidence that indicates that a licensed driver or minor driver is incompetent or otherwise not qualified to be licensed, it may, upon written notice of at least ten days to the licensee, require such driver to submit to an examination.
2. If a fatal motor vehicle accident involving one or more licensed drivers or minor drivers occurs, the department, if deemed appropriate, shall mail a written notice to all such drivers involved in the accident requiring such drivers to submit to examination. If the department has not mailed a written notice to any driver involved in a fatal accident within ninety days after the department receives notice regarding such accident, the department shall not require an examination of such driver based upon such accident.
3. Upon the conclusion of an examination required under this subsection (3), the department shall take such action as it deems appropriate and may deny, cancel, suspend, or revoke the license of such person or permit that person to retain such license subject to the restrictions under section 42-2-116. Refusal or failure of the licensee to submit to such examination shall be grounds for suspension or revocation of such person's license. Such decision of the department shall be reviewed by a court of record upon appeal to that court by the party aggrieved.
The department shall prepare and print rules, requirements, and regulations for the mandatory use of license examiners, and the same shall be strictly adhered to in the examination of all drivers.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2121, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (2) repealed, p. 1203, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(a) amended, p. 141, § 1, effective March 28; (3) amended, p. 135, § 1, effective January 1, 1998. L. 99: (1)(a) amended, p. 631, § 47, effective August 4. L. 2000: (1)(a), (3)(a), and (3)(b) amended, p. 1343, § 5, effective July 1, 2001.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-110 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-111 was relocated to § 42-2-113.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-111 is similar to § 42-2-110 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

Principal purpose of this section and § 42-2-101 is the promotion of public safety by assuring that drivers are qualified to operate their vehicles. Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).

42-2-112. Medical advice - use by department - provider immunity.

In order to determine whether any licensed driver or any applicant for a driver's license is physically or mentally able to operate a motor vehicle safely upon the highways of this state, the department is authorized, pursuant to this section and upon the adoption of rules concerning medical criteria for driver licensing, to seek and receive a written medical opinion from any physician, physician assistant, or optometrist licensed in this state. Such written medical opinion may also be used by the department in regard to the renewal, suspension, revocation, or cancellation of drivers' licenses pursuant to this article. No written medical opinion shall be sought pursuant to this section unless the department has reason to believe that the driver or applicant is physically or mentally unable to operate a motor vehicle safely upon the highways of this state.
In addition to the written medical opinion sought and received pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the department may consider a written medical opinion received from the personal physician, physician assistant, or optometrist of an individual driver or applicant. Any written medical opinion requested by the applicant or driver from a personal physician, physician assistant, or optometrist shall be provided to the department at the expense of the applicant or driver. Any written medical opinion required by the department shall also be at the expense of the applicant or driver.
No civil or criminal action shall be brought against any physician, physician assistant, or optometrist licensed to practice in this state for providing a written medical or optometric opinion pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of this section if the physician, physician assistant, or optometrist acts in good faith and without malice.
A written medical opinion received by the department which relates to an individual applicant or driver is for the confidential use of the department in making decisions on the individual's qualifications as a driver, and the written medical opinion shall not be divulged to any person, except to the applicant or driver, or used in evidence in any trial or proceeding except in matters concerning the individual's qualifications to receive or retain a driver's license.
Written medical opinions received by the department pursuant to this section, in addition to other sources of information, may be used by the department in the adoption of administrative rules concerning medical criteria for driver licensing.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2122, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 643, § 6, effective May 27. L. 2016: (1), (2), and (3) amended, (SB 16-158), ch. 204, p. 731, § 25, effective August 10.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-110.5 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-112 was relocated to § 42-2-114.
Although the amending clause to section 6 of Senate Bill 05-047 stated that all of § 42-2-112 was amended, only subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section were amended and appeared in the bill.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 16-158, see section 1 of chapter 204, Session Laws of Colorado 2016.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "1986 Colorado Tort Reform Legislation", see 15 Colo. Law. 1363 (1986). For article, "Advocating for Senior Drivers And Their Families", see 34 Colo. Law. 63 (Oct. 2005).

42-2-113. License examiners appointed.

The department may appoint license examiners for any county in this state to conduct local examinations for all types of drivers' licenses. The officers of the department shall conduct the examination as prescribed by law for all drivers in the county and collect the fees as provided in section 42-2-114 and remit the same to the department, which shall transfer the same to the credit of the highway users tax fund; except that, for fiscal years 2012-13 through 2014-15, to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fees to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2122, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1640, § 23, effective June 1. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (SB 09-274), ch. 210, p. 951, § 2, effective May 1. L. 2010: Entire section amended, (HB 10-1387), ch. 205, p. 886, § 2, effective May 5. L. 2012: Entire section amended, (HB 12-1216), ch. 80, p. 263, § 2, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-111 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-113 was relocated to § 42-2-115.

42-2-114. License issued - voluntary disability identifier symbol - fees - rules - report - definitions.

1. 1. The department, upon payment of the required fee and the surrender or cancellation of any previously issued Colorado identification card, shall issue to every applicant, who is not a first time applicant in Colorado or who is under eighteen years of age and is accompanied by a responsible adult meeting the requirements of section 42-2-108 (1), qualifying therefor either a driver's or minor driver's license according to the qualification for either license. (1) (a) (I) The department, upon payment of the required fee and the surrender or cancellation of any previously issued Colorado identification card, shall issue to every applicant, who is not a first time applicant in Colorado or who is under eighteen years of age and is accompanied by a responsible adult meeting the requirements of section 42-2-108 (1), qualifying therefor either a driver's or minor driver's license according to the qualification for either license.
  2. The department, after payment of the required fee and the surrender or cancellation of any previously issued Colorado identification card, shall issue an instruction permit or minor driver's or driver's license to a first time applicant in Colorado only after the department completes its verification of all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive an instruction permit or minor driver's or driver's license including the age, identity, and residency of the applicant, unless such applicant is under eighteen years of age and is accompanied by a responsible adult meeting the requirements of section 42-2-108 (1). By July 1, 2002, such verification shall utilize appropriate and accurate technology and techniques. Such verification shall include a comparison of existing driver's license and identification card images in department files with the applicant's images to ensure such applicant has only one identity. Only one fee shall be assessed for the issuance of a temporary license and a subsequent minor driver's or driver's license issued as a result of the same application.
  3. Such license shall bear thereon the following:
    1. The photograph of the licensee, which shall be taken and processed with equipment leased or owned by the department;
    2. A distinguishing number assigned to the licensee;
    3. The full name, date of birth, and residence address and a brief description of the licensee;
    4. The type or general class of vehicles the licensee may drive;
    5. Any restrictions applicable to the licensee;
    6. The expiration date of the license;
    7. The official seal of the department;
    8. A reference to the previous license issued to the licensee;
    9. The usual signature of the licensee;
    10. Repealed.
    11. One or more security features that are not visible and are capable of authenticating such license and any information contained therein.
  4. The department shall promulgate rules that shall not allow the access and use of images, unless such images are used for the following:
    1. To aid a federal, state, or local government agency in carrying out such agency's official functions pursuant to section 24-72-204 (7), C.R.S.;
    2. To aid the department to ascertain a person's correct identity; or
    3. To aid the department to prevent the issuance of multiple driver's licenses or identification cards to the same person.
  5. The department shall promulgate rules that shall not allow the access and use of image comparison technology, unless such technology is used for the following:
    1. To aid a federal, state, or local government agency in carrying out such agency's official functions pursuant to section 24-72-204 (7), C.R.S., so long as such federal, state, or local government agency has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or will be committed and a reasonable suspicion that the image requested is either the perpetrator of such crime or a victim of such crime;
    2. To aid the department to ascertain a person's correct identity when there is reasonable suspicion that the person has used a driver's license or identification card to create a false identity. Nothing in this sub-subparagraph (B) shall be construed to prohibit the department from ascertaining an applicant's correct identity upon application for a driver's license or identification card.
    3. To aid the department to prevent the issuance of multiple driver's licenses or identification cards to the same person.
  6. Nothing in subparagraph (IV) or (V) of this paragraph (a) shall be construed to require the department to purchase or implement a system that can be used by a person who is not an employee, officer, or agent of the department to access image comparison technology.
2. 1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b)(I) is effective until July 1, 2022.] In the event the department issues a driver's license that contains stored information, such license may include only the information that is specifically referenced in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and that appears in printed form on the face of the license issued by the department to the licensee and any race or ethnicity information identified on the application pursuant to section 42-2-107 (2)(a)(II); except that such stored information shall not include the licensee's social security number.
    1. The licensee's social security number; or
    2. The fact that the licensee has requested that a disability identifier symbol be placed on the licensee's driver's license in accordance with subsection (12) of this section.
  2. As used in this paragraph (b), "stored information" includes information that is stored on the driver's license by means of magnetic or electronic encoding, or by any other technology designed to store retrievable information.
  (b) (I) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b)(I) is effective July 1, 2022. ] If the department issues a driver's license that contains stored information, the department shall include in the stored information only the information that is specifically referenced in subsection (1)(a) of this section, that appears in printed form on the face of the license issued by the department to the licensee, or that is any race or ethnicity information identified on the application under section 42-2-107 (2)(a)(II); except that the department shall not include in the stored information:
1. A fee is required for the issuance of a driver's license to a person twenty-one years of age or older. The department shall set the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the license expires on the applicant's birthday in the fifth year after issuance of the license.
2. The department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fee to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this subsection (2):
  1. If the driver's license is issued by the office of a county clerk and recorder in a county with a population of at least one hundred thousand individuals, the county clerk and recorder shall retain the sum set forth in subparagraph (I.5) of this paragraph (c) and forward the remainder to the department for transmission to the state treasurer, who shall credit the remainder of the fee to the licensing services cash fund.
    (I.5) The county clerk and recorder shall retain the following amounts under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c):
    1. For a driver's license issued prior to July 1, 2016, eight dollars;
    2. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2016, but prior to July 1, 2017, ten dollars;
    3. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2017, but prior to July 1, 2018, twelve dollars; and
    4. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2018, thirteen dollars.
  2. If the driver's license is issued by an office of a county clerk and recorder in a county with a population of fewer than one hundred thousand individuals, the county clerk and recorder shall retain the sum set forth in subparagraph (II.5) of this paragraph (c) and forward the remainder to the department for transmission to the state treasurer, who shall credit the remainder of the fee to the licensing services cash fund.
    (II.5) The county clerk and recorder shall retain the following amounts under subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c):
    1. For a driver's license issued prior to July 1, 2016, thirteen dollars and sixty cents;
    2. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2016, but prior to July 1, 2017, fifteen dollars;
    3. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2017, but prior to July 1, 2018, seventeen dollars; and
    4. For a driver's license issued on or after July 1, 2018, eighteen dollars.
4. In addition to the fee established in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), a surcharge of two dollars is added for issuance of a driver's or minor driver's license with a motorcycle endorsement. The department shall transfer the surcharge to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the motorcycle operator safety training fund, created in section 43-5-504, C.R.S.
5. In addition to the fee established in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), a surcharge is added for issuance of a driver's or minor driver's license, or instruction permit, when an applicant retakes either the examination of knowledge of the traffic laws of this state or the demonstration of the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and control in the operation of a motor vehicle. The surcharge applies regardless of whether the applicant retakes the examination or demonstration with the department or a vendor approved by the department. The department shall set the surcharge by rule in an amount to offset the direct and indirect cost of giving the failed examination or demonstration. The department shall transfer the surcharge to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund, created in section 42-2-114.5.
(2.5) The department shall charge a fee for issuing any probationary license. Such fee shall be set by rule by the department.
Driver's licenses required by the "Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986", Public Law 99-570, shall expire on the birthday of the applicant in the fourth year after the issuance thereof.
1. A fee is required for the issuance of a minor driver's license, which expires twenty days after the twenty-first birthday of the licensee. The department shall set the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2). The department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5 (1). In the case of the issuance of any minor driver's license by the office of the county clerk and recorder, the fee for the minor driver's license is apportioned in the same manner as for the issuance of a driver's license in accordance with paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section.
2. Repealed.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 1571 , § 3, effective July 1, 2007.)
1. A photograph showing the full face of the licensee shall be affixed to every driver's license and minor driver's license issued under this section.
2. Every minor driver's license issued shall graphically emphasize the age group of the licensee on the face of such license, as prescribed by the department.
Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, no liability or other sanctions shall be imparted to any person who relies upon the date of birth or identification as set out on any license issued pursuant to this article if such date of birth or identification should be later proved incorrect or fraudulently entered upon said license.
Repealed.
Notwithstanding the amount specified for any fee in this section, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of one or more of the fees if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), C.R.S., to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of one or more of the fees is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of one or more of the fees as provided in section 24-75-402 (4), C.R.S.
1. At the applicant's voluntary request, the department shall issue a driver's license bearing an identifier of a branch of the United States armed forces, such as "Marine Corps", "Navy", "Army", "Air Force", "Space Force", or "Coast Guard", if the applicant possesses a currently valid military identification document, a DD214 form issued by the United States government, or any other document accepted by the department that demonstrates that the applicant is an active member or a veteran of the branch of service that the applicant has requested be placed on the driver's license. The applicant shall not be required to provide documentation that the applicant is an active member or a veteran of a branch of the United States armed forces to renew or be reissued a driver's license bearing an identifier issued pursuant to this subsection (10). The department shall not place more than one branch of the United States armed forces identifier on an applicant's driver's license.
3. Repealed.
1. Upon the applicant presenting a DD214 form issued by the United States government or any other document accepted by the department that demonstrates that the applicant is a veteran of the United States armed forces, the department shall print the word "Veteran" on the driver's license.
2. The holder of a driver's license bearing the word "Veteran" need not present documentation that the holder is a veteran of the United States armed forces to renew or reissue the driver's license.
3. The department shall not issue a driver's license bearing the word "Veteran" if the applicant's documentation shows that the applicant received a dishonorable discharge.
[ Editor's note: This subsection (12) is effective July 1, 2022.] (a) (I) At an applicant's request, and upon completion of the application pursuant to subsection (12)(a)(II)(A) of this section, the department shall issue to the applicant a driver's license bearing a disability identifier symbol if the applicant has a disability as defined in the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., and the disability interferes with the person's ability to effectively communicate with a peace officer.
(II) (A) The department shall promulgate a rule creating an application and renewal form that is signed by a professional, under penalty of perjury, to affirm that an applicant meets the eligibility requirements for a disability identifier symbol and setting out the penalties for authorizing a disability identifier symbol before verifying that the applicant has a disability that interferes with the applicant's ability to effectively communicate with a peace officer.

(B) As used in this subsection (12)(a)(II), "professional" means a physician licensed to practice medicine under article 240 of title 12 or practicing medicine under section 12-240-107 (3)(i), a physician assistant licensed under section 12-240-113, a mental health professional licensed or certified pursuant to article 245 of title 12, an advanced practice nurse registered under section 12-255-111, a person with a master's degree in rehabilitation counseling, or a physician, physician assistant, mental health professional, or advanced practice registered nurse authorized to practice professionally by another state that shares a common border with Colorado.

(b) The disability identifier symbol placed on a driver's license in accordance with this subsection (12) must be discreet and must represent all types of disabilities, including cognitive disabilities, neurological diversities, mental health disorders, sensory needs, chronic illness, chronic pain, and physical disabilities. The department shall develop the symbol by rule.

(c) The department shall not charge a fee for placing a disability identifier symbol on a driver's license.

(d) The department shall notify peace officers in Colorado about the voluntary disability identifier symbol created in this subsection (12), noting that the symbol is not the exclusive or only determination of disability, and directing peace officers to relevant P.O.S.T. curriculum resources, including training in recognizing persons with disabilities, appropriate interactions with persons with disabilities, resources available to persons with disabilities and to those interacting with persons with disabilities, and the requirements of the federal "Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq., as amended.

(e) A person may choose to no longer have the disability identifier symbol on the person's driver's license. The department shall issue a person a new driver's license without a disability identifier symbol at the request of the person. The department shall not charge a fee for the issuance of a new driver's license without the disability identifier symbol. The department shall not retain any information regarding a person's disability when the person chooses to remove the disability identifier symbol from the person's driver's license.

(f) By January 15, 2023, and each year thereafter, the department shall report to the house of representatives health and insurance committee and transportation and local government committee and the senate health and human services committee and transportation and energy committee, or their successor committees, on the percentage of persons issued a driver's license who have requested a disability identifier symbol issued in accordance with this subsection (12) in the previous calendar year.

Source: L. 94: (1) and (4) amended, p. 1452, § 1, effective May 25; (2)(a) amended, p. 539, § 1, effective July 1; entire title amended with relocations, p. 2123, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (2.5) added, p. 1101, § 21, effective June 1; (9) added, p. 1351, § 94, effective June 1. L. 2000: (1)(a), (2), (4), (5), and (6) amended, p. 1343, § 6, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (1)(a) and (2)(a)(I)(E) amended and (2)(a)(I)(F) added, p. 938, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: IP(1)(a)(IV) amended and (1)(a)(V) and (1)(a)(VI) added, p. 369, § 1, effective April 25; (2)(a)(I)(E) repealed, p. 869, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2005: (1)(a)(III)(J) and (8) repealed and (2)(a)(I)(A) and (2)(a)(I)(B) amended, p. 644, §§ 7, 8, effective May 27. L. 2006: (2)(a)(I)(F) amended, p. 656, § 1, effective April 24. L. 2007: (2)(a)(I)(A), (2)(a)(I)(C), (2)(a)(I)(D), (4)(a), and (5) amended, p. 1571, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2009: (2)(a)(I)(A), (2)(a)(I)(D), and (4)(a) amended, (SB 09-274), ch. 210, p. 952, § 3, effective May 1; (2)(a)(I)(F) amended, (SB 09-025), ch. 266, p. 1215, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2010: (2)(a)(I)(A), (2)(a)(I)(D), and (4)(a) amended, (HB 10-1387), ch. 205, p. 887, § 3, effective May 5; (10) added, (HB 10-1209), ch. 322, p. 1497, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (2)(a)(I)(A), (2)(a)(I)(D), and (4)(a) amended, (HB 12-1216), ch. 80, p. 264, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2013: (10)(b)(I) repealed, (HB 13-1011), ch. 90, p. 291, § 1, effective August 7; (11) added, (HB 13-1119), ch. 177, p. 653 § 1, effective August 7. L. 2014: (2) R&RE and (4)(a) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1543, § 7, effective June 5; (2) R&RE and (4)(b) repealed, (HB 14-1066), ch. 290, p. 1188, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2016: (2)(c) and (2)(e) amended and (2)(c)(I.5) and (2)(c)(II.5) added, (HB 16-1415), ch. 139, p. 411, § 2, effective May 4; (1)(b)(I) amended, (HB 16-1021), ch. 322, p. 1307, § 2, effective June 10. L. 2021: (10)(a) amended, (HB 21-1231), ch. 206, p. 1079, § 13, effective May 28; (1)(b)(I) amended and (12) added, (HB 21-1014), ch. 406, p. 2694, § 2, effective July 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-112 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-114 was relocated to § 42-2-116.
Amendments to subsections (1) and (4) by House Bill 94-1346 and amendments to subsection (2)(a) by House Bill 94-1028 were harmonized with Senate Bill 94-001.
Subsection (2)(a)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a)(II), effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2000, p. 1343 .)
Subsection (10)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (10)(c), effective July 1, 2011. (See L. 2010, p. 1497 .)
Subsection (10)(b)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (10)(b)(II), effective July 1, 2012. (See L. 2010, p. 1497 .)
Subsection (2) was repealed and reenacted in SB 14-194. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal and reenactment of subsection (2) in HB 14-1066, effective July 1, 2014.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1014, see section 1 of chapter 406, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Advocating for Senior Drivers And Their Families", see 34 Colo. Law. 63 (Oct. 2005).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-114 is similar to § 42-2-112 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Photograph requirement constitutional. State has compelling interest in having drivers' licenses with photographs because police officers need to be able to identify, instantly, the operators of vehicles at traffic stops. Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455 , 593 P.2d 1363, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979) (decided under former § 42-2-106 (3) ).

County clerk's authority is not personal. The authority to make registrations, give examinations, collect specific ownership taxes, and receive the statutory fees provided therefor, is conferred upon the county clerk and recorder, not in his individual capacity but by virtue of his office. The authority follows the office, and is by no means a personal right or privilege of the incumbent. Flanders v. Kochenberger, 118 Colo. 104 , 193 P.2d 281 (1948) (decided prior to § 13-4-12, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, 1973).

42-2-114.5. Licensing services cash fund - fee setting procedures - rules.

The licensing services cash fund is hereby created in the state treasury. The general assembly shall appropriate moneys in the fund to the department for the cost of implementing this article.
Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the following fees must be paid for the following functions:
1. The fee for a driving record under section 42-1-206 (2) is nine dollars;
2. The fee for a certified driving record under section 42-1-206 (2) is ten dollars;
3. The application fee for an instruction permit under section 42-2-107 is fourteen dollars;
4. The fee for a driver's license or minor driver's license under section 42-2-114 (2)(a) or (4)(a), respectively, is:
  1. Twenty-six dollars beginning July 1, 2016, but before July 1, 2017;
  2. Twenty-seven dollars beginning July 1, 2017, but before July 1, 2018; and
  3. Twenty-eight dollars beginning July 1, 2018;
5. The fee for retaking either the examination of knowledge or the demonstration of ability under section 42-2-114 (2)(e) is set by the department not to exceed fifteen dollars;
6. The fee for a duplicate permit or minor driver's license under section 42-2-117 (1) is twelve dollars for the first duplicate and fourteen dollars for a subsequent duplicate;
7. The fee for a driver's license extension under section 42-2-118 (1)(b)(I) is six dollars and fifty cents;
8. The fee for the return of a license under section 42-2-127.7 (4)(d)(II) is five dollars;
9. The fee for a replacement license under section 42-2-133 (2) is five dollars;
10. The fee for issuing or renewing an identification card under section 42-2-306 (1)(a) is ten dollars and fifty cents;
11. The fee for reissuance of an identification card that has been canceled or denied under section 42-2-306 (1)(b) is twenty dollars;
12. The fee for issuing a commercial driver's license under section 42-2-406 (1) and (2) is thirty-five dollars;
13. The fee for administering driving tests under section 42-2-406 (3) is one hundred dollars;
14. The fee for licensing testing units under section 42-2-406 (4) is three thousand ninety-four dollars for the initial license and one thousand fifty-two dollars for each subsequent annual license renewal;
15. The fee for licensing driving testers under section 42-2-406 (5) is one hundred forty-eight dollars for the initial license and one hundred forty dollars for each subsequent annual license renewal; and
16. The fee for issuing an identification document under part 5 of this article.
1. Except as set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), beginning July 1, 2015, the department may raise or lower the fees listed in subsection (2) of this section, but the department shall not increase the fee by more than twenty percent before July 1, 2016, or by more than five percent per year on or after July 1, 2016.
2. The department shall not raise or lower the fees listed in paragraphs (a), (b), (f), (g), (n), and (o) of subsection (2) of this section before July 1, 2017, and the fee listed in paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of this section before July 1, 2019.
A rule promulgated under this section that increases fees shall not take effect until thirty days after the department has issued a report to the joint budget committee. The report must:
1. List the fees being changed and the amounts of the changes; and
2. Provide an explanation of the reasons for the changes and an analysis of why the changes are needed.

Source: L. 2007: Entire section added, p. 1570, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1933, § 26, effective June 1. L. 2010: (1) amended, (HB 10-1387), ch. 205, p. 888, § 4, effective May 5. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1544, § 8, effective June 5. L. 2015: (2)(h) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 968, § 93, effective August 5. L. 2016: (1) amended, (HB 16-1415), ch. 139, p. 413, § 3, effective May 4; (2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(d), (2)(f), (2)(g), (2)(n), (2)(o), and (3) amended, (HB 16-1415), ch. 139, p. 413, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2)(o) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1723, § 86, effective May 29.

42-2-115. License, permit, or identification card to be exhibited on demand - penalty.

No person who has been issued a driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit or an identification card as defined in section 42-2-301 (2), who operates a motor vehicle in this state, and who has such license, permit, or identification card in such person's immediate possession shall refuse to remove such license, permit, or identification card from any billfold, purse, cover, or other container and to hand the same to any peace officer who has requested such person to do so if such peace officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a violation of article 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this title.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective until March 1, 2022.] Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.
(2) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective March 1, 2022. ] Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2124, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 1351, § 20, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2021: (2) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3300, § 707, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-113 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-115 was relocated to § 42-2-117.
Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-115 is similar to § 42-2-113 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

The clear intent of this section is simply to permit the officer to demand the license of the driver whose vehicle has been stopped for an otherwise proper purpose. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81 , 550 P.2d 311 (1976).

This section requires an operator of a motor vehicle to display his operator's license upon demand by a police officer. Martinez v. People, 169 Colo. 366 , 456 P.2d 275 (1969) (decided prior to § 13-4-13, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, 1973).

This section does not confer upon a police officer unlimited discretionary authority to stop any car at any time for any reason as long as he asked contemporaneously for display of a driver's license. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81 , 550 P.2d 311 (1976).

A construction of this section which would give to police officers carte blanche authority in stopping cars would be inconsistent with section 16-3-103 , which specifically limits an officer's authority to stop persons for investigation in the absence of probable cause to arrest. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81 , 550 P.2d 311 (1976).

When demand to present license proper. The demand for defendant to present his license was proper only if the officers properly stopped him in the first place. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81 , 550 P.2d 311 (1976).

There is no requirement that an individual must produce a driver's license when such individual is not the driver of a vehicle. Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo. App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977).

Applied in People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304 , 546 P.2d 488 (1976); People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624 ( Colo. 1983 ).

42-2-116. Restricted license.

The department, upon issuing a driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit, has authority, whenever good cause appears, to impose restrictions, limitations, or conditions which are suitable to the licensee's driving ability with respect to the type of special mechanical control device required on a motor vehicle which the licensee may operate or which limit the right of the licensee to drive a motor vehicle except when such licensee is required to drive to and from the licensee's place of employment or to perform duties within the course of employment or to impose such other restrictions applicable to the licensee as the department may determine to be appropriate to assure the safe operation of a motor vehicle by the licensee.
The department either may issue a special restricted license or must set forth such restrictions, limitations, or conditions upon the usual license form issued to the applicant.
The department, upon receiving satisfactory evidence of any violation of the restrictions, limitations, or conditions of such license, may cancel or suspend such restricted license, but the licensee shall be entitled to a hearing as upon a suspension or revocation under this article.
No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway or elsewhere within this state in any manner in violation of the restrictions, limitations, or conditions imposed in a special restricted license, in a driver's or minor driver's license, or in an instruction permit issued to such person by the department or by another state or country.
The department is authorized after examination to issue a restricted license to a person with a behavioral or mental health disorder or an intellectual and developmental disability, containing such restrictions as may be imposed upon said person by a court pursuant to part 3 or part 4 of article 14 of title 15 or section 27-65-109 (4) or 27-65-127.
1. A person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2012.)
and (8) Repealed.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2124, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (6) amended, p. 1357, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2000: (6) amended and (7) and (8) added, p. 1078, § 8, effective July 1; (1) and (4) amended, p. 1351, § 21, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2006: (5) amended, p. 1409, § 79, effective August 7; (6)(b) and (8) amended, p. 1368, § 4, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2010: (5) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 807, § 84, effective April 29. L. 2012: (6) amended and (7) and (8) repealed, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1482, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2017: (5) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1380, § 306, effective May 25.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-114 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-116 was relocated to § 42-2-118.

Cross references: (1) For the penalty for a class A traffic infraction and a class 1 traffic misdemeanor, see § 42-4-1701 (3).

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-116 is similar to § 42-2-114 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Motorcycle requires special licensing. Although a motorcycle is a motor vehicle, the general assembly has occasionally treated it as a class apart from other motor vehicles. This section requires a special licensing for the operators of motorcycles. Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27 , 465 P.2d 118 (1970) (decided prior to § 13-4-14, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, 1973).

Applied in Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 (Colo. 1981).

42-2-117. Duplicate permits and minor licenses - replacement licenses.

If an instruction permit or a minor driver's license issued under this article is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the person to whom it was issued, upon request and the payment of a fee to the department, may obtain a duplicate or substitute upon furnishing satisfactory proof to the department that the permit or minor license was lost, stolen, or destroyed and that the applicant is qualified to have a permit or license. The department shall set the fees for a first duplicate and for any subsequent duplicate in accordance with section 42-2-114.5. The department shall transfer either fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund created in section 42-2-114.5.
(1.5) Upon furnishing satisfactory proof to the department that a driver's license issued under this article 2 has been lost, stolen, or destroyed, the person to whom it was issued may apply for a duplicate or replacement of the license pursuant to section 42-2-118. The new driver's license expires as provided in section 42-2-114 if issued under this part 1 or as provided in section 42-2-509 (1) if issued under part 5 of this article 2.
Notwithstanding the amount specified for the fee in this section, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of the fee if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), C.R.S., to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of the fee is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of the fee as provided in section 24-75-402 (4), C.R.S.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2125, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 1351, § 95, effective June 1. L. 2000: (1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1346, § 7, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2005: (1.5) amended, p. 644, § 9, effective May 27. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 1572, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended, (SB 09-274), ch. 210, p. 953, § 4, effective May 1. L. 2010: (1) amended, (HB 10-1387), ch. 205, p. 888, § 5, effective May 5. L. 2012: (1) amended, (HB 12-1216), ch. 80, p. 265, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2014: (1) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1546, § 9, effective June 5. L. 2018: (1.5) amended, (SB 18-108), ch. 260, p. 1596, § 4, effective January 1, 2019.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-115 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-117 was relocated to § 42-2-119.

42-2-118. Renewal of license in person, by mail, or electronically - donations to Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund - rules - report - repeal.

1. 1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(a)(I) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Every license issued under section 42-2-114 or part 5 of this article 2 is renewable prior to its expiration, upon application in person, by mail as provided in subsection (1.3) of this section, or by electronic means as provided in subsection (1.5) of this section; payment of the required fee; passing of an eye test; passing of such other examinations as the applicant's physical limitations or driver's record indicates to be desirable; and payment of any penalty assessment, fine, cost, or forfeiture as prescribed by subsection (3) of this section. If a person renews his or her license pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(I) by electronic means, the person must attest under penalty of perjury that he or she has had an eye examination by an optometrist or an ophthalmologist within three years before the date of application. (1) (a) (I) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(a)(I) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Every license issued under section 42-2-114 or part 5 of this article 2 is renewable prior to its expiration, upon application in person, by mail as provided in subsection (1.3) of this section, or by electronic means as provided in subsection (1.5) of this section; payment of the required fee; passing of an eye test; passing of such other examinations as the applicant's physical limitations or driver's record indicates to be desirable; and payment of any penalty assessment, fine, cost, or forfeiture as prescribed by subsection (3) of this section. If a person renews his or her license pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(I) by electronic means, the person must attest under penalty of perjury that he or she has had an eye examination by an optometrist or an ophthalmologist within three years before the date of application.
  2. 1. An applicant may make a donation of one dollar or more to the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund, created in section 42-2-107 (4)(b)(II), to promote the donation of organs and tissues under the provisions of the "Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act", part 2 of article 19 of title 15. The department shall collect the donations and transmit them to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the Emily Keyes - John W. Buckner organ and tissue donation awareness fund. The donation prescribed in this subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) is voluntary and may be refused by the applicant. The department shall make available informational booklets or other informational sources on the importance of organ and tissue donations to applicants as designed and approved by the advisory body created under section 42-2-107 (4)(b)(III)(A). The department shall inquire of each applicant at the time the completed application is presented whether the applicant is interested in making a donation of one dollar or more to the fund. If the applicant has not already made a donor designation, the department shall also specifically inform the applicant of the option for organ and tissue donations by having a "Y" placed in the donor field on the front of the document. The department shall advise each applicant volunteering to become an organ and tissue donor that the applicant's name shall be transmitted to the organ and tissue donor registry authorized in section 15-19-220, and that the applicant shall notify the federally designated organ procurement organization of any changes to the applicant's donation.
    2. This subsection (1)(a)(II) is repealed, effective September 1, 2027.
  (1) (a) (I) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(a)(I) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Every license issued pursuant to section 42-2-114 or part 5 of this article 2 is renewable prior to its expiration, upon application in person, by mail as provided in subsection (1.3) of this section, or by electronic means as provided in subsection (1.5) of this section; payment of the required fee; passing of an eye test; and passing of such other examinations as the applicant's physical limitations or driver's record indicates to be desirable. If a person renews his or her license pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(I) by electronic means, the person must attest under penalty of perjury that he or she has had an eye examination by an optometrist or an ophthalmologist within three years before the date of application.
2. 1. 1. A license issued under section 42-2-114 that, at the time of its expiration, is held by a resident of this state who is temporarily outside of this state or is prevented by disability from complying with subsection (1)(a) of this section may be extended for a period of one year if the licensee applies to the department for an extension of the expiration date prior to the date the license expires and pays a fee set by the department in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2). (b) (I) (A) A license issued under section 42-2-114 that, at the time of its expiration, is held by a resident of this state who is temporarily outside of this state or is prevented by disability from complying with subsection (1)(a) of this section may be extended for a period of one year if the licensee applies to the department for an extension of the expiration date prior to the date the license expires and pays a fee set by the department in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2).
    2. A license issued under part 5 of this article 2 that, at the time of its expiration, is held by a resident of this state who is prevented by disability from complying with subsection (1)(a) of this section may be extended for a period of one year if the licensee applies to the department for an extension of the expiration date prior to the date the license expires and pays a fee set by the department in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2).
    3. The department shall transfer the fees paid in accordance with this subsection (1)(b) to the state treasurer, who shall credit them to the licensing services cash fund, created in section 42-2-114.5 (1). The extensions authorized in this subsection (1)(b) become null and void ninety days after the licensee renews his or her residency in the state or otherwise becomes able to comply with subsection (1)(a) of this section. The department shall grant no more than one extension under this subsection (1)(b) unless a resident of this state, other than a resident who had been issued a license under part 5 of this article 2, is temporarily residing in a foreign country, in which case the department may grant no more than two one-year extensions.
  2. A surcharge of one dollar shall be added to any extension sought for a license for which a motorcycle endorsement is requested which shall be credited to the motorcycle operator safety training fund created in section 43-5-504, C.R.S.
1. (1.3) (a) The department may, in its discretion, allow renewal of a driver's license issued under section 42-2-114 or 42-2-505 by mail subject to the following requirements:
  1. Renewal by mail shall be available only to drivers twenty-one years of age or older;
  2. Renewal by mail is available only if the photo of the person that is on file with the department is at least as recent as required by 6 CFR 37.25 (a)(1) for purposes of the federal "REAL ID Act of 2005", Pub.L. 109-13, as amended;
  3. A person who is under eighty years of age renewing by mail shall attest under penalty of law that the person has had an eye examination by an optometrist or ophthalmologist within one year before the renewal. A person who is eighty years of age or older renewing by mail shall obtain, on a form as required by the department, a signed statement from an optometrist or ophthalmologist attesting that the person has had an eye examination within the preceding six months and attesting to the results of the eye examination.
  4. A person renewing by mail who requires vision correction shall attest under penalty of law to his or her prescription for vision correction.
2. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1.3)(b) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Every applicant for renewal of a driver's license by mail shall submit the following to the department:
  1. Payment of the required fee;
  2. Repealed.
  3. Payment of any penalty assessment, fine, cost, or forfeiture as prescribed by subsection (3) of this section.
    (b) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1.3)(b) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Every applicant for renewal of a driver's license by mail shall submit payment of the required fee to the department.
3. The department may promulgate rules necessary for the implementation of this subsection (1.3).
1. (1.5) (a) The department may allow renewal of a driver's license issued under section 42-2-114 or 42-2-505 by electronic means subject to the following requirements:
  1. Electronic renewal is available only to drivers twenty-one years of age or older;
  2. A person may renew a driver's license electronically only if the photo of the person that is on file with the department is at least as recent as required by 6 CFR 37.25 (a)(1) for purposes of the federal "REAL ID Act of 2005", Pub.L. 109-13, as amended;
  3. A person who is under eighty years of age renewing electronically shall attest under penalty of law that the person has had an eye examination by an optometrist or ophthalmologist within one year before the renewal. A person who is eighty years of age or older renewing electronically shall obtain, on a form as required by the department, a signed statement from an optometrist or ophthalmologist attesting that the person has had an eye examination within the preceding six months and attesting to the results of the eye examination.
  4. A person renewing electronically who requires vision correction shall attest under penalty of law to his or her prescription for vision correction.
2. Pursuant to sections 24-19.5-103 (3) and 29-11.5-103 (3), C.R.S., the department shall not allow any third-party charges that may be assessed to complete the electronic transaction to reduce the amount of revenue that would otherwise be required to be distributed to the highway users tax fund or the licensing services cash fund.
3. Every applicant for renewal of a driver's license by electronic means shall submit the following to the department:
  1. Payment of the required fee; and
  2. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1.5)(c)(II) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Payment of any penalty assessment, fine, cost, or forfeiture as prescribed by subsection (3) of this section.
    (II) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1.5)(c)(II) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
4. To implement electronic renewal of a driver's license pursuant to this section, the department shall:
  1. Submit to the office of information technology created in the office of the governor for review and approval the department's plan for the renewal of a driver's license by electronic means;
  2. Develop and implement electronic renewal of a driver's license in a manner that is consistent with the nation's policy on national security and in conformance with federal and state law for homeland security;
  3. Develop and implement an information security program and utilize a layered security approach, which shall consist of the following:
    1. A business impact analysis that assesses the criticality of services;
    2. A risk or security assessment that identifies vulnerabilities of the system;
    3. A risk management process;
    4. A contingency plan for disaster recovery of information and services and business continuity;
    5. Procedures that identify security safeguards for asset protection;
    6. A secure architectural design;
    7. Security awareness and training programs; and
    8. Monitoring and audit systems for back-end reviews to evaluate efficiency and efficacy;
  4. Develop security policies that address, at a minimum, the following:
    1. System protection from viruses and system virus detection;
    2. Firewall security;
    3. Logging capability;
    4. Server security;
    5. Intrusion detection;
    6. Encryption;
    7. Physical security; and
    8. Secure remote access communication, if applicable; and
  5. Develop a migration plan that sets out the department's goals and objectives and establishes priorities and the department's timeline for achieving such requirements.
5. Failure to comply with the requirements of paragraph (d) of this subsection (1.5) may result in the department being removed from or denied access to the state network or mainframe computer until all of the provisions of paragraph (d) of this subsection (1.5) are demonstrated by the department.
6. Repealed.
7. The department may promulgate any necessary rules for the implementation of this subsection (1.5).
Every license referred to in this section which is at the time of its expiration, as provided in subsection (1) of this section, held by a member of the armed forces of the United States, then serving on active duty outside of this state, shall not expire as provided in subsection (1) of this section, but such expiration date shall be extended for a period of three years or until ninety days after such licensee returns to this state, whichever occurs first.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective until January 1, 2022.] (a) (I) Prior to the renewal of a permanent driver's license or the issuance or renewal of a probationary license, the department shall determine if the applicant has any outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant or if the applicant has issued a check or order to the department for the payment of a penalty assessment and such check or order was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7).
(II) For the purposes of this subsection (3), "outstanding judgments or warrants" does not include any judgment or warrant reported to the department in violation of the provisions of section 42-4-110.5 (2)(c).

(b) (I) If there are no outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant and the applicant has not issued a check or order to the department that was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and that remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7) and if all other conditions for renewal pursuant to articles 1 to 4 of this title are met, the department shall renew the applicant's permanent driver's license.

(II) If there are no outstanding judgments or warrants entered or issued against the applicant and the defendant has not issued a check or order to the department that was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and that remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7) and if all other conditions for renewal pursuant to articles 1 to 4 of this title are met, the department may issue or renew the applicant's probationary license.

(c) If the department determines that the applicant is subject to the requirements of section 42-4-1709 (7), the permanent driver's license shall not be renewed or the probationary license may not be issued or renewed until such applicant has complied with said section. Any person who pays any outstanding judgments, who has any warrants entered, or who makes payment for a check or order to the department that had been returned for insufficient funds or a closed account pursuant to section 42-4-1709 (7) shall pay to the court or to the department a thirty-dollar administrative processing cost for each such judgment, warrant, check, or order in addition to all other penalties, costs, or forfeitures. If the court collects an administrative processing fee, the court shall remit fifty percent of the administrative processing fee to the department of revenue, and the other fifty percent of that fee is to be retained by the issuing court. If the department collects an administrative processing fee, the department shall retain the fee.

(d) Beginning January 1, 1986, the executive director shall ascertain whether the administrative fee established in paragraph (c) of this subsection (3) adequately compensates the department for administration of this subsection (3).

(e) The department of revenue shall coordinate the design and implementation of the necessary delinquency notification forms, satisfaction forms, and time requirements for utilization of such forms by the courts.

(f) There shall be a twenty-day period to appeal any penalty under this section when it can be shown by the applicant or defendant that sufficient funds were in the financial institution and the error was that of the financial institution. In this event the department shall review the documentation and, if it was the fault of the financial institution that the check or order was returned, no penalty or fee shall be imposed.

(3) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective January 1, 2022. ] (a) (I) Prior to the renewal of a permanent driver's license or the issuance or renewal of a probationary license, the department shall determine if the applicant has issued a check or order to the department for the payment of a penalty assessment and such check or order was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7).

(II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)

(b) (I) If the applicant has not issued a check or order to the department that was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and that remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7) and if all other conditions for renewal pursuant to articles 1 to 4 of this title 42 are met, the department shall renew the applicant's permanent driver's license.

(II) If the defendant has not issued a check or order to the department that was returned for insufficient funds or a closed account and that remains unpaid as set forth in section 42-4-1709 (7) and if all other conditions for renewal pursuant to articles 1 to 4 of this title 42 are met, the department may issue or renew the applicant's probationary license.

(c) Any person who makes payment for a check or order to the department that had been returned for insufficient funds or a closed account pursuant to section 42-4-1709 (7) shall pay to the court or to the department a thirty-dollar administrative processing cost for each check or order in addition to all other penalties, costs, or forfeitures. If the court collects an administrative processing fee, the court shall remit fifty percent of the administrative processing fee to the department of revenue, and the other fifty percent of that fee is to be retained by the issuing court. If the department collects an administrative processing fee, the department shall retain the fee.

(d)

(e) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.)

(f) There is a twenty-day period to appeal any penalty under this section when it can be shown by the applicant or defendant that sufficient funds were in the financial institution and the error was that of the financial institution. In this event the department shall review the documentation and, if it was the fault of the financial institution that the check or order was returned, the department shall not impose a penalty or fee.
Notwithstanding the amount specified for any fee in this section, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of one or more of the fees if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), C.R.S., to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of one or more of the fees is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of one or more of the fees as provided in section 24-75-402 (4), C.R.S.
1. On or before June 1, 2022, and on or before June 1 each of the next two years thereafter, the department shall provide to the general assembly a report concerning motor vehicle accidents in Colorado, which report includes data, organized by the age of each at-fault driver, concerning:
  1. The cause of each such accident, including data related to driver actions; and
  2. The most apparent human contributing factor of each such accident.
2. This subsection (5) is repealed, effective June 30, 2024.

Source: L. 94: (1)(a) amended, p. 694, § 1, effective July 1; entire title amended with relocations, p. 2125, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (1)(a) amended, p. 1134, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(c) amended, p. 1203, § 2, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(a)(I) amended and (1.3) added, p. 141, § 2, effective March 28; (3)(a) amended, p. 1669, § 3, effective June 5; (3)(a) to (3)(c) amended and (3)(f) added, p. 1382, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 1174, § 10, effective June 1; (4) added, p. 1352, § 96, effective June 1. L. 2000: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 732, § 11, effective July 1; (1.3)(b)(II)(B) added by revision, pp. 1342, 1362, §§ 4, 49. L. 2002: (3)(d) amended, p. 869, § 2, effective August 7. L. 2004: (1)(a)(I) and (1.3)(a)(II) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1268, § 1, effective May 28. L. 2005: (1.3)(a)(I) amended and (1.3)(a)(III) and (1.3)(a)(IV) added, p. 645, § 10, effective May 27. L. 2006: (1.5)(d)(I) amended, p. 1737, § 27, effective June 6. L. 2007: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 309, § 2, effective March 30; (1.5)(d)(I) amended, p. 918, § 20, effective May 17; (1)(a)(II)(A) amended, p. 800, § 11, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1.3)(a)(I), (1.3)(a)(II), (1.3)(a)(III), and (1.5)(a) amended, p. 629, § 1, effective August 5; (1.5)(f) repealed, p. 1915, § 135, effective August 5. L. 2009: (1.5)(b) amended, (SB 09-274), ch. 210, p. 953, § 5, effective May 1. L. 2014: (1)(b)(I) and (1.5)(a)(II) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1546, § 10, effective June 5. L. 2017: (1)(a)(II)(A) amended, (SB 17-223), ch. 158, p. 565, § 19, effective August 9; (1)(a)(II) amended, (HB 17-1027), ch. 329, p. 1761, § 2, effective September 15. L. 2018: (1)(a)(I), (1)(b)(I), IP(1.3)(a), (1.3)(a)(II), IP(1.5)(a), and (1.5)(a)(II) amended, (SB 18-108), ch. 260, p. 1596, § 5, effective January 1, 2019. L. 2021: (1.3)(a)(II), (1.3)(a)(III), IP(1.5)(a), (1.5)(a)(I), (1.5)(a)(II), and (1.5)(a)(III) amended and (5) added, (HB 21-1139), ch. 177, p. 966, § 1, effective May 24; (1)(a)(I), (1.3)(b), and (3) amended and (1.5)(c)(II) repealed, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3095, § 4, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-116 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-118 was relocated to § 42-2-121.
Amendments to subsection (1)(a) by Senate Bill 94-013 were harmonized with Senate Bill 94-001.
Amendments to subsection (3)(a) by Senate Bill 97-36 and House Bill 97-1003 were harmonized.
Subsection (1.3)(b)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (1.3)(b)(II), effective July 1, 2001. (See L. 2000, pp. 1342, 1362.)
Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) by Senate Bill 07-037 and House Bill 07-1266 were harmonized.
Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) by SB 17-223 and HB 17-1027 were harmonized.
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Advocating for Senior Drivers And Their Families", see 34 Colo. Law. 63 (Oct. 2005).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-118 is similar to § 42-2-116 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

Applied in Dept. of Rev. v. A & A Auto Wrecking, 625 P.2d 1021 (Colo. 1981).

42-2-118.1. Driver restoration and payment incentive program.

[ Editor's note: This section is effective January 1, 2022. ] Beginning January 1, 2022, an outstanding judgement or warrant described in section 42-4-1709 (7) shall not serve as a basis for the department to deny an application for issuance, renewal, or reinstatement of a driver's license. The department shall not issue a license to a person with an outstanding judgement or warrant who applies for issuance, renewal, or reinstatement of a license unless the person has paid to the department a driver's license fee required by section 42-2-114 and the license reinstatement fee required by section 42-2-132.

Source: L. 2021: Entire section added, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3099, § 11, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act adding this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

42-2-119. Notices - change of address or name.

1. Whenever any person, after applying for or receiving a driver's license or identification card, moves from the address named in such application or in the license or identification card issued to such person or when the name of the licensee is changed, such person shall, within thirty days, provide notice to the department of such person's old and new address and the number of any license or identification card held by such person. Such notice shall be provided to the department in writing or in electronic form on the department's official website. A licensee who changes his or her name shall, within thirty days, apply in person to renew such license pursuant to section 42-2-118 and in compliance with sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-305 .
2. Repealed. / (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 645 , § 11, effective May 27, 2005.)
All notices and orders required to be given to any licensee or registered owner under the provisions of the motor vehicle laws shall be in writing; and, if mailed, postpaid by first-class mail, to him or her at the last-known address shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article. Such mailing shall be sufficient notice in accord with the motor vehicle laws. Any notice or order of the department mailed first-class under the provisions of this title creates a presumption for administrative purposes that such notice or order was received if the department maintains a copy of the notice or order and maintains a certification that the notice or order was deposited in the United States mail by an employee of the department. Evidence of a copy of the notice mailed to the last-known address of the licensee as shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article and a certification of mailing by a department employee, or evidence of delivery of notice in person to the last-known address of the licensee as shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article, or evidence of personal service upon the licensee or upon any attorney appearing on the licensee's behalf of the order of denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of the license by the executive director of the department, or by the executive director's duly authorized representative, is prima facie proof that the licensee received personal notice of said denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation.
(2.5) Repealed.
Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section commits a class B traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2126, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 1102, § 23, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(b) amended, p. 996, § 2, effective May 29. L. 2000: (2) amended, p. 1640, § 24, effective June 1. L. 2005: (1) and (2) amended, p. 645, § 11, effective May 27; (1)(b) repealed, p. 1172, § 6, effective August 8. L. 2010: (1)(a) amended and (2.5) added, (HB 10-1045), ch. 317, p. 1479, § 3, effective July 1, 2011. L. 2017: (2.5) repealed, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 366, § 9, effective August 9.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-117 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-119 was relocated to § 42-2-122.
Amendments to subsection (1)(b) by Senate Bill 05-047 and House Bill 05-1107 were harmonized.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-119 is similar to § 42-2-117 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Constitutionality. The notification provisions of Colorado's traffic code are no more burdensome on nonresidents than residents and do not treat similarly situated classes of drivers differently. Accordingly, a nonresident driver is not denied equal protection of the laws by these provisions. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 ( Colo. 1983 ).

The methods used to notify purported nonresident traffic offenders are not so unconstitutionally deficient as to violate due process rights. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

Conviction under this section does not constitute an "offense committed while operating a motor vehicle" for purposes of § 42-2-130. Lathe v. State, 691 P.2d 356 (Colo. App. 1984).

There is no requirement that the order of suspension be sent to the licensed driver or be received by him. People v. Neal, 191 Colo. 302 , 552 P.2d 508 (1976).

Term "registered mail" includes certified mail. There is nothing in context of subsection (2) which requires that the term registered mail not be construed to include certified mail. Tobias v. State, 41 Colo. App. 444, 586 P.2d 669 (1978).

No evidence of actual notice required when notice is not of final action. Notice by certified mail of plaintiff's driver's license revocation hearing under the former version of the implied consent law is sufficient under this statute. Ault v. Dept. of Rev., 697 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1985).

Applied in People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 ( Colo. 1981 ); People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362 ( Colo. 1983 ).

42-2-120. Methods of service.

Any notice or order required to be served under the provisions of the motor vehicle laws may be served in any manner reasonably designed to notify the person to be served of the material provisions of such notice or order. A person has been served with a notice or order when such person has knowledge of the material provisions of such notice or order, regardless of the manner in which such knowledge was acquired. Any irregularity in the form or manner of service or documentation of the proof of service or the means by which knowledge of the material provisions of a notice or order is acquired shall not affect the validity of such notice or order.
For purposes of notices or orders relating to driving restraints only, "material provisions" means those provisions which identify the affected person, and those provisions which state that a restraint against the person's license or privilege to drive in this state has been, or will be, entered on the records of the department, or those provisions which advise the person that he or she has a right to request a hearing regarding the imposition of a restraint against such person's license or privilege to drive.
The department shall develop proof of service forms which may be used to document proof of service under this subsection (3). Such forms shall include but need not be limited to the following:
1. The name and date of birth of the person served;
2. The date and time of service;
3. The identification number of the notice or order served, if any, or, in the event the notice or order is not available, a description of the information relayed to the person served;
4. The name, title, signature, and employing agency of the person making service;
5. The signature of the person served; and
6. The right index fingerprint of the person served.
In addition to service by mail or any other means, service of notices or orders may be personally made by any employee of the department, any peace officer, any municipal, county, or state prosecutor, or any municipal, county or district court judge, magistrate, or judicial officer. If service is personally made under this subsection (4), proof of such service of any notice or order may be made by sending a written notification of service in any form to the department. Such notification shall be an official record of the department under section 42-2-121. It shall not be necessary that the written notification is on a form supplied by the department, but the department may refuse to accept as an official record a written notification which does not provide substantially the same information as specified in subsection (3) of this section.
Peace officers and employees of the department shall serve notices and orders relating to driving restraints upon the affected person anytime the affected person is contacted by a peace officer or employee of the department, when such peace officer or employee believes that the affected person may not have been previously personally served with any notice or order affecting such person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this state.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2127, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-117.5 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-120 was relocated to § 42-2-123.

42-2-121. Records to be kept by department - admission of records in court.

The department shall file every completed application for a license received by it and shall maintain suitable indexes containing in alphabetical order:
1. All applications denied and on each thereof note the reasons for such denial;
2. All applications granted; and
3. The name of every licensee whose license has been suspended or revoked by the department and after each such name note the reasons for such action in each case.
1. The department shall also file all accident reports, abstracts of court records of convictions received by it under the laws of this state, departmental actions, suspensions, restrictions, revocations, denials, cancellations, reinstatements, and other permanent records and, in connection therewith, maintain a driver's history by making suitable notations in order that an individual record of each licensee showing the convictions of such licensee, the departmental actions, and the traffic accidents in which the licensee has been involved, except those accidents not resulting in a conviction and those traffic violations which occur outside of the boundaries of this state, shall be readily ascertainable and available for the consideration of the department upon any application for renewal of license and at other suitable times.
2. The department shall also keep a separate file of all abstracts of court records of dismissals of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, and UDD charges and all abstracts of records in cases where the original charges were for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, and UDD and the convictions were for nonalcohol- or nondrug-related traffic offenses. This file shall be made available only to criminal justice agencies, as defined in section 24-72-302 (3), C.R.S.
3. 1. The following records and documents filed with, maintained by, or prepared by the department are official records and documents of the state of Colorado:
    1. Accident reports;
    2. Abstracts of court records of convictions received by the department under the laws of the state of Colorado;
    3. Records of and documents relating to departmental actions pertaining to the driving privileges of any person concerning licensing, restrictions, probationary conditions, suspensions, revocations, denials, cancellations, or reinstatements of such driving privileges;
    4. Records of and documents relating to the status of any person's privilege to drive a vehicle in the state of Colorado on a specific date or dates;
    5. Drivers' histories;
    6. Records of and documents relating to the identification of persons, including, but not limited to, photographs, fingerprints, handwriting, physical features, physical characteristics, dates of birth, and addresses;
    7. Records of and documents relating to the ownership, registration, transfer, and licensing of vehicles;
    8. All other records and documents required by law or rule and regulation to be kept by the department;
    9. Written summaries and data compilations, if prepared by the department from records and documents filed with, maintained by, or prepared by the department, as defined in sub-subparagraphs (A) to (H) of this subparagraph (I);
    10. Written guidelines, procedures, policies, and rules and regulations of the department.
  2. In any trial or hearing, all official records and documents of the state of Colorado, as defined in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), shall be admissible in all municipal, county, and district courts within the state of Colorado without further foundation, shall be statutory exceptions to rule 802 of the Colorado rules of evidence, and shall constitute prima facie proof of the information contained therein, if such record or document is accompanied by a certificate stating that the executive director of the department or the executive director's appointee has custody of such record or document and is accompanied by and attached to a cover page which:
    1. Specifies the number of pages, exclusive of such cover page, which constitutes the record or document being submitted; and
    2. Bears the signature of the executive director of the department or the executive director's appointee attesting to the genuineness of such record or document; and
    3. Bears the official seal of the department or a stamped or printed facsimile of such seal.
  3. For purposes of subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c), "official records and documents" shall include any mechanically or electronically reproduced copy, photograph, or printout of any record or document or any portion of any record or document filed with, maintained by, or prepared by the department pursuant to this paragraph (c). The department may also permit the electronic transmission of information for direct recording in the department's records and systems. Information transmitted by an electronic means that is approved by the department constitutes an official record for the purposes of this section whether or not an original source document for such information exists or ever existed.
    (III.5) The certificate and cover page and its contents required by subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c) may be electronically produced and transmitted. An electronic reproduction of the certificate and cover page, including an electronic signature of the executive director of the department or of the executive director's appointee and an electronic reproduction of the official seal of the department, shall be admissible in court as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c).
  4. For purposes of subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (c), a record or document shall not be required to include every page of a record or document filed with, maintained by, or prepared by the department pursuant to this paragraph (c) to be an official record or document, if such official record or document includes all of those portions of such record or document relevant to the trial or hearing for which it is prepared. There shall be a presumption that such official record or document contains all that is relevant to such trial or hearing.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), the department shall not maintain records of convictions of traffic offenses defined in this title for which no points are assessed pursuant to section 42-2-127 (5) other than convictions pursuant to sections 42-2-134, 42-2-138, 42-2-206, and 42-7-422.
5. Records or documents filed with, maintained by, or prepared by another state that are equivalent to the records maintained in Colorado under paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall be admissible in a trial or hearing in accordance with this section.
The department seal required under subsection (2) of this section and under section 42-1-205 may also consist of a rubber stamp producing a facsimile of the seal stamped upon the document.
1. The department shall place a confidentiality notice on any driver's license application form under section 42-2-107 , driver's license renewal application under section 42-2-118 , duplicate driver's license application under section 42-2-117 , commercial driver's license application under section 42-2-404 , identification card application form under section 42-2-302 , motor vehicle title application form under section 42-6-116 , or motor vehicle registration application form under section 42-3-113 . The department shall indicate in such notice that, unless the person waives his or her confidentiality, the information contained in the person's motor vehicle or driver record shall not be used for any purpose other than a purpose authorized by law.
2. The department shall prepare a confidentiality waiver form and shall provide the form to the designated agents of the department. The department and the designated agents shall make such form available to any person on request. The department and the designated agents shall be the sole distributors of such form. The form shall contain instructions for filing the form with the department.
  1. to (IV) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2000, p. 1341 , § 3, effective May 30, 2000.)
3. Any person executing a waiver under this subsection (4) that information in motor vehicle or driver records may be used for any purpose shall provide the information requested by the department in the confidentiality waiver form and file the form directly with the department. The department shall process such forms and shall notify the designated agents regarding which motor vehicle and driver records are subject to confidentiality waivers.
4. A confidentiality waiver expires upon a request by the person to rescind the confidentiality waiver or upon the renewal of the motor vehicle or driver record; except that a confidentiality waiver form filed in connection with a motor vehicle registration application shall remain in force until the motor vehicle is transferred or the person requests that the confidentiality waiver be rescinded.
5. The department shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that confidential records are not visible or accessible to the public and shall establish procedures to protect the contents of the records against inadvertent disclosure.
1. Upon application by a person, the department shall expunge all records concerning a conviction of a person for UDD with a BAC of at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 and any records concerning an administrative determination resulting in a revocation under section 42-2-126 (3)(b) or (3)(e) if:
  1. Such person presents a request for expungement to the department and provides all information required by the department to process such request;
  2. Such person is over twenty-one years of age and any department action regarding the offense or administrative determination has been concluded;
  3. The person has not been convicted for any other DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD offense that was committed while such person was under twenty-one years of age and is not subject to any other administrative determination resulting in a revocation under section 42-2-126 for any other occurrence while such person was under twenty-one years of age;
  4. Such person pays the fine and surcharge for such conviction and completes any other requirements of the court with regard to such conviction, including, but not limited to, any order to pay restitution to any party;
  5. Such person has never held a commercial driver's license as defined in section 42-2-402; and
  6. Such person was not operating a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 42-2-402.
2. Upon receiving a request for expungement, the department may delay consideration of the request until sufficient time has elapsed to ensure that the person is not convicted for any additional offense under section 42-4-1301 committed while the person was under twenty-one years of age and that there is no additional administrative determination resulting in a revocation under section 42-2-126 (3)(b) or (3)(e) for actions taken while the person was under twenty-one years of age.
The department shall electronically transmit the name, address, telephone number, date of birth, and gender of each individual who has volunteered to donate organs or tissue upon death on an instructional permit, a minor driver's license, a driver's license, an identification card, or any other license application received by it to the organ and tissue donor registry authorized in section 15-19-220.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2128, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (2)(c)(III) amended, p. 637, § 1, effective May 1. L. 97: (5) added, p. 1459, § 1, effective July 1; (4) added, p. 1052, § 4, effective September 1. L. 98: IP(5)(a) and (5)(a)(III) amended, p. 173, § 1, effective April 6. L. 2000: (4) amended, p. 1341, § 3, effective May 30; (6) added, p. 732, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2001: (4)(a) amended, p. 1283, § 66, effective June 5. L. 2004: (2)(c)(III.5) added, p. 1379, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2005: (2)(e) added, p. 646, § 12, effective May 27; (4)(a) amended, p. 1173, § 7, effective August 8. L. 2007: (6) amended, p. 800, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2008: (2)(b), IP(5)(a), (5)(a)(III), and (5)(b) amended, p. 244, § 5, effective July 1; IP(5)(a) amended and (5)(a)(V) and (5)(a)(VI) added, p. 474, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2013: (2)(b) and (5)(a)(III) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1879, § 5, effective May 28. L. 2017: (4)(e) added, (SB 17-286), ch. 388, p. 2007, § 2, effective August 9; (6) amended, (SB 17-223), ch. 158, p. 565, § 20, effective August 9.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-118 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-121 was relocated to § 42-2-124.
Amendments to the introductory portion to subsection (5)(a) by House Bill 08-1121 and House Bill 08-1166 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1997 act enacting subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 201, Session Laws of Colorado 1997.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Hearsay in Criminal Cases Under the Colorado Rules of Evidence: An Overview", see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277 (1979).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-121 is similar to § 42-2-118 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

The language of subsection (2) is mandatory. People v. Yount, 174 Colo. 462 , 484 P.2d 1203 (1971) (decided under similar provisions of repealed § 13-4-18, C.R.S. 1963).

Driver's history record prima facie proof of its contents. A driver's history record, as an official record under this statute, can be offered as prima facie proof of its contents, including convictions, without the necessity of looking behind the records to the underlying tickets, and formalities of attestation and certification are not necessary at hearings conducted by the motor vehicle division, since the hearing officer can take official notice of the division's own records. Gillespie v. Dir. of Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 561, 592 P.2d 418 (1978).

Department's driving records presumed correct. The mere absence of any notation on traffic tickets concerning their disposition does not overcome the presumption of correctness of the department's driving records. A driving record is prima facie proof of its contents, including convictions, without the necessity of looking behind the records to the underlying tickets. People v. Anadale, 674 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1984).

Alternate methods of proving records. While this section provides one specific method to self-authenticate motor vehicle records, it does not alter the rule that official records may also be proved by any method authorized by law. People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1983).

Hearsay exception for official state records does not extend to hearsay within the record. Subsection (2)(c)(II) does not allow the admission of hearsay statements within official state reports unless those statements independently satisfy a hearsay exception. Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106 , 471 P.3d 1234.

Applied in People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981).

42-2-121.5. Emergency contact information - website form - license application - driver's license database.

1. No later than January 1, 2009, the department shall create and make available on its official website an electronic form that allows a person with a driver's license, minor driver's license, instruction permit, or temporary driver's license issued pursuant to this part 1 or an identification card issued pursuant to part 3 of this article to input the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of up to two persons to be contacted in an emergency pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. The form shall include a statement that the information may be disclosed only to authorized law enforcement or public safety personnel for the purpose of notifying the persons listed in an emergency and a place for the person entering the information to assent to the use of the information for this purpose.
2. The department shall add the emergency contact information received from a person in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) to the person's record in the driver's license database.
1. On and after January 1, 2009, the department shall include on the application form for a driver's license, minor driver's license, or instruction permit used pursuant to section 42-2-107, the driver's license renewal application used pursuant to section 42-2-118, the duplicate driver's license application used pursuant to section 42-2-117, and the identification card application form used pursuant to section 42-2-302 a place for the applicant to specify the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of up to two persons to be contacted in an emergency pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. The application shall include a statement that the information will be disclosed only to authorized law enforcement or public safety personnel for the purpose of notifying the persons listed in an emergency and a place for the person providing the information to assent to the use of the information for this purpose.
2. The department shall add the emergency contact information specified on an application in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) to the person's record in the driver's license database.
An officer of a law enforcement or public safety agency who is authorized to access the driver's license database may obtain a person's emergency contact information from the database if the person is injured or killed as a result of an accident, criminal act, or other emergency situation. The officer may contact the persons listed in the emergency contact information and notify them of the emergency situation and the condition and location of the person who has been injured or killed.
The department shall not disclose the information received in accordance with this section to any person except as authorized by subsection (3) of this section and section 24-72-204 (7)(d), C.R.S.

Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1519, § 1, effective May 28.

42-2-122. Department may cancel license - limited license for physical or mental limitations - rules.

The department has the authority to cancel, deny, or deny the reissuance of any driver's or minor driver's license upon determining that the licensee was not entitled to the issuance for any of the following reasons:
1. Failure to give the required or correct information in an application, or commission of any fraud in making such application or in submitting any proof allowed under this section;
2. Inability to operate a motor vehicle because of physical or mental incompetence;
3. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(c) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Permission of an unlawful or fraudulent use or conviction of misuse of license, titles, permits, or license plates;
  (c) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(c) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
4. That such license would have been subject to denial under the provisions of section 42-2-104;
5. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(e) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Failure of the licensee to register in Colorado all vehicles owned by the licensee under the requirements of section 42-3-103;
  (e) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(e) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
6. The person is not lawfully present in the United States;
7. The person is not a resident of the state of Colorado;
8. 1. (h) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(h) is effective until January 1, 2022.] (I) The person has an outstanding judgment or warrant referred to in section 42-4-1709 (7) issued against such person; except that, as used in this paragraph (h), "judgment or warrant" shall not include any judgment or warrant reported to the department in violation of section 42-4-110.5 (2)(c).
  2. Upon receipt of a judgment or warrant from a court clerk on or after September 1, 2000, the department shall send written notice to the person identified in the court order that such person is required to provide the department with proof that the judgment or warrant is no longer outstanding within thirty days after the date such notice is sent or such person's driver's license shall be canceled or any application for a new license shall be denied. Proof that the judgment or warrant is no longer outstanding shall be in the form of a certificate issued by the clerk of the court entering the judgment or issuing the warrant in a form approved by the executive director.
  3. If acceptable proof is not received by the department within thirty days after notice was sent, the department shall cancel the driver's license or deny any application for a license of the person against whom the judgment was entered or the warrant was issued.
  4. The general assembly finds that the department currently has record of a large number of outstanding judgments and warrants and that it does not know whether such judgments and warrants are still outstanding. All outstanding judgments and warrants that are in the department's records as of August 31, 2000, shall be deemed void for purposes of this section effective September 1, 2005.
    (h) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(h) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
9. Failure of the person to complete a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3, as required by section 42-2-126 (4)(d)(II)(A) or 42-2-132 (2)(a)(II). The failure must be documented pursuant to section 42-2-144.
The department has the authority to cancel any driver's or minor driver's license if, subsequent to the issuance of such license, the department has authentic information that a condition developed or an act was committed which places such licensee in one of the categories for which cancellation is authorized.
1. (2.5) (a) Any person who has had a driver's or minor driver's license or driving privilege canceled pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section who is receiving or has received therapy treatment for physical or mental incompetence or an evaluation for such incompetence through a rehabilitation provider or licensed physician certified by the department to provide rehabilitative driving instruction may receive a limited license with such limitations as the department deems necessary after consultation with and upon the recommendation of the rehabilitation provider or licensed physician.
2. 1. Any person licensed pursuant to this subsection (2.5) shall be subject to the examination requirements set forth in section 42-2-111.
  2. Rehabilitation providers and licensed physicians shall be subject to the provisions governing medical advice in section 42-2-112.
3. The department shall adopt rules as necessary to carry out this subsection (2.5).
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Upon such cancellation, the licensee must surrender the license so canceled to the department, and thereafter such licensee shall be entitled to a hearing by the department if such license is returned and if such request is made within thirty days from the date of such cancellation; except that a denial or cancellation under paragraph (h) or (i) of subsection (1) of this section shall be deemed to be final agency action for judicial review purposes under section 24-4-104, C.R.S. Such hearing, if requested, shall be held no later than thirty days from the date of such cancellation. Notification of such cancellation shall be given as provided in section 42-2-119.
(3) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Upon such cancellation, the licensee shall surrender the license so cancelled to the department, and thereafter such licensee is entitled to a hearing by the department if such license is returned and if such request is made within thirty days from the date of such cancellation; except that a denial or cancellation pursuant to subsection (1)(i) of this section is deemed to be final agency action for judicial review purposes pursuant to section 24-4-104. Such hearing, if requested, must be held no later than thirty days from the date of such cancellation. Notification of such cancellation must be given as provided in section 42-2-119.
1. Upon the holding of a hearing as provided in subsection (3) of this section or upon determination by the department, the license shall be returned if the licensee is able to prove that cancellation should not have been made. When the original cancellation is sustained by the department, such licensee may apply for and receive a new license whenever the licensee can show that the reason for the original cancellation no longer applies. The licensee may also appeal the decision of the department after the hearing to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135.
2. A licensee who has proved that cancellation should not have been made shall not be required to give proof of financial responsibility pursuant to article 7 of this title.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2130, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (2.5) added and (4) amended, p. 707, § 2, effective May 23. L. 97: (1)(e) added, p. 1001, § 2, effective August 6. L. 98: (1)(f) and (1)(g) added, p. 295, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(a) and (3) amended and (1)(h) added, p. 804, § 1, effective August 2; IP(1), (2), and (2.5)(a) amended, p. 1352, § 22, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (1)(i) added and (3) amended pp. 786, 787, §§ 2, 3, effective June 1. L. 2002: (1)(i) amended, p. 1921, § 16, effective July 1. L. 2005: (4)(a) amended, p. 646, § 13, effective May 27. L. 2008: (1)(i) amended, p. 245, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2011: (1)(i) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1178, § 100, effective August 10. L. 2017: IP(1) and (1)(i) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1257, § 19, effective May 25. L. 2021: (1)(c), (1)(e), and (1)(h) repealed and (3) amended, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3092, § 1, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-119 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-122 was relocated to § 42-2-125.
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act enacting subsection (1)(i) and amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

42-2-123. Suspending privileges of nonresidents and reporting convictions.

The privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this state given to a nonresident is subject to suspension or revocation by the department in like manner and for like cause as a driver's license may be suspended or revoked.
The department is further authorized, upon receiving a record of the conviction in this state of a nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense under the motor vehicle laws of this state, to forward a certified copy of such record to the motor vehicle administrator in the state wherein the person so convicted is a resident.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2131, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-120 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-123 was relocated to § 42-2-127.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-123 is similar to § 42-2-120 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

Applied in Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

42-2-124. When court to report convictions.

1. Except as otherwise provided, whenever any person is convicted of any offense for which this article makes mandatory the revocation or suspension of the driver's or minor driver's license of such person by the department, the court in which such conviction is had shall require the offender to immediately surrender such driver's or minor driver's license or any instruction permit to the court at the time of conviction, and the court shall, not later than ten days after such conviction, forward the license to the department, together with a record of such conviction on the form prescribed by the department. Any person who does not immediately surrender such person's license or permit to the court commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, unless such person swears or affirms under oath administered by the court and subject to the penalties of perjury that the license or permit has been lost, destroyed, or is not in said person's immediate possession. Any person who swears or affirms that the license or permit is not in the immediate possession of said person shall surrender said license or permit to the court within five days of the sworn or affirmed statement, and if not surrendered within such time, said person commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.
2. Whenever the driver's history of any person shows that such driver is required to maintain financial responsibility for the future and is unable to show to the court that the driver is maintaining the required financial responsibility for the future, the court shall require the immediate surrender to it of the driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit held by such person, and the court, within forty-eight hours after receiving the license, shall forward the license to the department with the form prescribed by the department.
Every court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under this article or any other law of this state regulating the operation of motor vehicles on highways and every military authority having jurisdiction over offenses substantially the same as those set forth in section 42-2-127 (5) which occur on a federal military installation in this state shall forward to the department a record of the conviction of any person in said court or by said authority for a violation of any said laws not later than ten days after the day of sentencing for such conviction and may recommend the suspension or retention of the driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit of the person so convicted.
For the purposes of this section, the term "convicted" or "conviction" means a sentence imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury, or an adjudication of a delinquency under title 19, C.R.S. The payment of a penalty assessment under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 shall also be considered a conviction if the summons states clearly the points to be assessed for that offense. Whenever suspension or revocation of a license is authorized or required for conviction of any offense under state law, a final finding of guilty of a violation of a municipal ordinance governing a substantially equivalent offense in a city, town, or city and county shall, for purposes of such suspension or revocation, be deemed and treated as a conviction of the corresponding offense under state law. A stay of sentence, pending appeal, shall not deprive the department of the authority to suspend, revoke, or deny a driver's or minor driver's license pending any final determination of a conviction on appeal.
An expungement of an adjudication of delinquency shall not result in a rescission of the revocation or suspension of the driving privilege unless said expungement is a result of a reversal of the adjudication on appeal.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2131, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (4) amended, p. 1538, § 6, effective July 1. L. 98: (4) amended, p. 1436, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1), (2), and (3) amended, p. 1352, § 23, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2002: (1)(a) and (4) amended, p. 1585, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2004: (4) amended, p. 1131, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) and (4) amended, p. 646, § 14, effective May 27.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-121 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-124 was relocated to § 42-2-132.

Cross references: For collateral attacks of traffic convictions, see §§ 42-4-1702 and 42-4-1708.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation", see 18 Colo. Law. 1943 (1989).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-124 is similar to § 42-2-121 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to § 13-4-21 as it existed prior to its repeal in 1963, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Primary purpose of this section and §§ 42-2-122 and 42-2-123 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).

This section imposes a duty upon the courts of the state to forward records of convictions for traffic offenses to the division of motor vehicles. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Due process standard for using penalty assessment as conviction. Through the provisions of subsection (3), the general assembly has mandated a minimum standard of due process which must be followed before payment of a penalty assessment may be used as a conviction for purposes of suspension or revocation of a driver's license pursuant to § 42-2-123 (1)(a). Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

The term "convicted" is specifically defined by statute as meaning "a sentence imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury." Rogers v. Dept. of Rev., 841 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1992).

Number of assessed points on summons deemed minimum standard of due process. The requirement that the number of points to be assessed be stated in the summons is a minimum standard of due process established by the general assembly and applies to a municipal summons when a fine was paid before the municipal traffic violations bureau. Dunn v. Tice, 43 Colo. App. 55, 598 P.2d 530 (1979).

Failure of penalty assessment to contain statement of number of points to be assessed for a traffic violation in no way invalidates the penalty assessment, or a guilty plea entered thereon. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Inadequate notices. Where there is no statement in the penalty assessment notices advising defendant that his signature and payment of the fine constitute a plea of guilty or an acknowledgment of guilt, the notices do not comply with the mandatory requirements of this section, and defendant's acceptance of the notices in the form tendered and his payment of the fines stated therein may not be considered a conviction for which points may be assessed. Cave v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 31 Colo. App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972).

The records of the division of motor vehicles prepared in accordance with the statutory requirements are to be presumed correct. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Court must state points assessable before guilty plea. A traffic violation conviction is insufficient for the purpose of assessing points against the licensee where municipal court summons fails to state the number of points which could be assessed upon a plea of guilty. Dunn v. Tice, 43 Colo. App. 55, 598 P.2d 530 (1979).

When points not assessable. If a traffic violation does not appear on the summons, and the offender is not advised by the arresting officer in reference to the points chargeable for the traffic violation, points cannot be assessed against him for that offense. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Factors considered in suspension of motorist's license. The department of revenue did not err in considering both the municipal court conviction and the traffic points resulting therefrom in determining whether the motorist's license should be suspended, the length of that suspension, and whether a probationary license should be granted. Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979).

Question of the validity of this section was ripe for determination where court stayed its surrender of defendant's license pending appeal after convicting defendant of drug use under § 18-18-406. People v. Smith, 944 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1997).

Applied in Purcell v. Tomasi, 43 Colo. App. 540, 608 P.2d 844 (1980).

42-2-125. Mandatory revocation of license and permit.

The department shall immediately revoke the license or permit of any driver or minor driver upon receiving a record showing that the driver has:
1. Been convicted of vehicular homicide or vehicular assault as described in sections 18-3-106 and 18-3-205 , C.R.S., or of criminally negligent homicide as described in section 18-3-105 , C.R.S., while driving a motor vehicle;
2. Been convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5) , C.R.S.;
3. In the case of a driver twenty-one years of age or older, been convicted of an offense described in section 42-4-1301 (1)(a) or (2)(a). Except as provided in section 42-2-132.5 , the period of revocation based upon this paragraph (b.5) shall be nine months. The provisions of this paragraph (b.5) shall not apply to a person whose driving privilege was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-126 (3)(a)(I) for a first offense based on the same driving incident.
4. Been convicted of any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used;
5. Been convicted of failing to stop and render aid as required by section 42-4-1601 ;
6. Been convicted of perjury in the first or second degree or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department under any law relating to the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle;
7. Been three times convicted of reckless driving of a motor vehicle for acts committed within a period of two years;
8. 1. Been twice convicted of any combination of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI for acts committed within a period of five years;
  2. In the case of a minor driver, been convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI committed while such driver was under twenty-one years of age;
9. In the case of a minor driver, been convicted of UDD committed when such driver was under twenty-one years of age;
10. Been determined to be mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction and for whom a court has entered, pursuant to part 3 or part 4 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S., or section 27-65-109 (4) or 27-65-127 , C.R.S., an order specifically finding that the mental incompetency is of such a degree that the person is incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle;
11. Been convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI and has two previous convictions of any of those offenses. The department shall revoke the license of any driver for an indefinite period and only reissue it upon proof to the department that the driver has completed a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3 and that the driver has demonstrated knowledge of the laws and driving ability through the regular motor vehicle testing process. The department shall not reissue the license in less than two years.
12. Been required to file and maintain proof of financial responsibility for the future as provided by section 42-4-1410 or article 7 of this title and who, at the time of a violation of any provision of this title, had not filed or was not maintaining such proof;
13. Repealed.
14. Been found to have knowingly and willfully left the scene of an accident involving a commercial motor vehicle driven by the person;
15. 1. (m) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(m) is effective until January 1, 2022.] (I) Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and having failed to complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program ordered by the court in connection with such conviction; or
  2. Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and has a previous conviction for such offenses; (m) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(m) is effective January 1, 2022. ] (I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.) (II) Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and having failed to complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program ordered by the court in connection with the present conviction, and has a previous conviction for such offenses.
16. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)
17. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(o) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Been:
  1. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)
  2. Convicted of, or has received a deferred judgment for, an offense described in section 18-4-409 or 18-4-503 (1)(c) , C.R.S., or a comparable municipal charter or ordinance offense.
  3. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 504 , § 3, effective July 1, 2007.) (o) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(o) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Repealed.
Unless otherwise provided in this section, the period of revocation shall be not less than one year; except that the period of revocation based on paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of this section involving a commercial motor vehicle transporting hazardous materials as defined under section 42-2-402 (7) shall result in a revocation period of three years. (2.3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 504 , § 3, effective July 1, 2007.)
(2.4) After the expiration of the period of revocation pursuant to this section and any subsequently imposed periods of revocation, any person whose license is revoked under subparagraph (I) of paragraph (g) or paragraph (i) of subsection (1) of this section shall be required to have a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-132.5 .

(2.5) The period of revocation under paragraph (g.5) of subsection (1) of this section for a person who is less than twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense and who is convicted of driving with an alcohol content of at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 under section 42-4-1301 (2)(d) is as follows:
1. Except as provided in subsection (2.7) of this section, three months for a first offense;
2. Six months for a second offense;
3. One year for a third or subsequent offense.
1. (2.7) (a) A person whose license is revoked for a first offense under paragraph (g.5) of subsection (1) of this section may request that, in lieu of the three-month revocation, the person's license be revoked for a period of not less than thirty days, to be followed by a suspension period of such length that the total period of revocation and suspension equals three months. If the hearing officer approves such request, the hearing officer may grant such person a probationary license that may be used only for the reasons provided in section 42-2-127 (14)(a).
2. The hearing to consider a request under paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.7) may be held at the same time as the hearing held under subsection (4) of this section; except that a probationary license may not become effective until at least thirty days have elapsed since the beginning of the revocation period.
(2.8) Repealed.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Upon revoking the license of any person as required by this section, the department shall immediately notify the licensee as provided in section 42-2-119 (2). Where a minor driver's license is revoked under paragraph (m) of subsection (1) of this section, such revocation shall not run concurrently with any previous or subsequent suspension, revocation, cancellation, or denial that is provided for by law.
(3) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Upon revoking the license of any person as required by this section, the department shall immediately notify the licensee as provided in section 42-2-119 (2). Where a minor driver's license is revoked pursuant to subsection (1)(m) of this section, such revocation may run concurrently with any previous or subsequent suspension, revocation, cancellation, or denial that is provided for by law.
Upon receipt of the notice of revocation, the licensee or the licensee's attorney may request a hearing in writing, if the licensee has returned said license to the department in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-133. The department, upon notice to the licensee, shall hold a hearing at the district office of the department closest to the residence of the licensee; except that, at the discretion of the department, all or part of the hearing may be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5. The department shall hold the hearing not less than thirty days after receiving such license and request through a hearing commissioner appointed by the executive director of the department, which hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, C.R.S. After such hearing, the licensee may appeal the decision of the department to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135. Should a driver who has had his or her license revoked under this section be subsequently acquitted of such charge by a court of record, the department shall immediately, in any event not later than ten days after the receipt of such notice of acquittal, reinstate said license to the driver affected.
Except where more than one revocation occurs as a result of the same episode of driving, license revocations made pursuant to this section shall not run concurrently with any previous or subsequent revocation or denial in lieu of revocation which is provided for by law. Any revocation unused pursuant to this section shall not preclude other actions which the department is required to take pursuant to the provisions of this title, and unless otherwise provided by law, this subsection (5) shall not prohibit revocations from being served concurrently with any suspension or denial in lieu of suspension of driving privileges.
1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (6)(a) is effective until January 1, 2022.] Any person who has a license revoked pursuant to paragraph (m) of subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the following revocation periods:
  1. After a first conviction and failure to complete an ordered evaluation, assessment, or program, three months;
  2. After a second conviction, six months;
  3. After any third or subsequent conviction, one year. (6) (a) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (6)(a) is effective January 1, 2022. ] Any person who has a license revoked pursuant to subsection (1)(m) of this section is subject to the following revocation periods: (I) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2021.) (II) After a second conviction and failure to complete an ordered evaluation, assessment, or program, six months; (III) After any third or subsequent conviction and failure to complete an ordered evaluation, assessment, or program, one year.
2. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 504 , § 3, effective July 1, 2007.)
3. Repealed.
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)
If a suspension or revocation of a license is authorized or required for conviction of an offense under state law, a final finding of guilt for a violation of a municipal ordinance governing a substantially equivalent offense in a municipality, county, or another state for purposes of a suspension or revocation shall be deemed as a conviction of the corresponding offense under state law. A stay of sentence or a pending appeal shall not deprive the department of the authority to suspend, revoke, or deny a driver's license or minor driver's license pending a final determination of a conviction on appeal.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2133, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1)(m) amended, p. 314, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(j) amended, p. 1207, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(g) and (1)(i) amended and (1)(g.5), (2.5), and (2.7) added, p. 1460, §§ 3, 2, effective July 1; (1)(m) amended, p. 305, § 22, effective July 1; (1)(n) and (7) added and (3) amended, p. 1537, §§ 3, 4, effective July 1. L. 98: IP(2.5) amended, p. 173, § 2, effective April 6; (1)(k), (3), and (6) amended, p. 1434, § 3, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(n) amended, p. 391, § 2, effective July 1; (2.3) and (2.4) added, p. 1158, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(g) and (2.4) amended, p. 1075, § 2, effective July 1; IP(1), (1)(g)(II), (1)(g.5), (1)(k)(II), (3), and (7) amended, p. 1353, § 24, effective July 1, 2001; (6)(c)(II) added by revision, pp. 1353, 1362, §§ 24, 49. L. 2001: (4) amended, p. 553, § 3, effective May 23. L. 2002: (1)(i) amended, p. 1921, § 17, effective July 1; (1)(k) repealed, p. 1585, § 16, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1)(n) amended, p. 1905, § 5, effective July 1; (1)(o) and (2.8) added, pp. 1845, 1846, §§ 3, 5, effective July 1. L. 2005: IP(1)(o) amended and (8) added, p. 647, § 15, effective May 27. L. 2007: (1)(d), (1)(o), (2), (2.3), (2.8), (3), IP(6)(a), (6)(b), and (8) amended, p. 504, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1)(g), (1)(g.5), and (1)(i) amended, p. 245, § 7, effective July 1; (1)(b.5) added and (1)(g)(I) and (2) amended, p. 832, § 2, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (1)(m), (1)(n), (1)(o)(I), (3), (6)(a), and (7) amended, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1)(h) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 807, § 85, effective April 29. L. 2011: (1)(i) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1179, § 101, effective August 10. L. 2012: (1)(b) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1631, § 88, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1)(b), (1)(g), and (1)(i) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1880, § 7, effective May 28. L. 2014: (1)(m) amended, (SB 14-129), ch. 387, p. 1939, § 11, effective June 6. L. 2015: IP(2.5) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 997, § 6, effective August 5. L. 2016: (2.8) repealed, (SB 16-065), ch. 277, p. 1143, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2017: IP(1) and (1)(i) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1257, § 20, effective May 25. L. 2018: (1)(m) amended, (HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1082, § 23, effective October 1. L. 2021: (1)(m), (3), and (6)(a) amended and (1)(o) repealed, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3093, § 2, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-122 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-125 was relocated to § 42-2-133.
Amendments to subsection (1)(g)(II) by Senate Bill 00-018 and Senate Bill 00-011 were harmonized, effective July 1, 2001. Amendments to subsection (1)(g)(I) by House Bill 08-1166 and House Bill 08-1194 were harmonized, effective January 1, 2009.
Subsection (6)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(c), effective July 1, 2001. (See L. 2000, pp. 1353, 1362.)
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act enacting subsection (1)(b.5) and amending subsections (1)(g)(I) and (2), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session -- Criminal Law and Procedure", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69 (1955). For article, "Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceedings: Where Does Colorado Stand?", see 46 Den. L.J. 516 (1969). For article, "The New Colorado Per Se DUI Law", see 12 Colo. Law. 1451 (1983). For article, "Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation", see 18 Colo. Law. 1943 (1989). For article, "There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License", see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-125 is similar to 42-2-122 as it existed prior to the amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to § 13-4-22 as it existed prior to its repeal, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

There is no denial of equal protection in imposition of statutory sanctions on habitual offender. Charnes v. Kiser, 617 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1980).

The failure of the implied consent statute to provide for a probationary license does not violate equal protection of the laws. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).

Disparity in eligibility for probationary license held constitutional. Although under the implied consent law a person refusing to submit to a chemical test is subject to a mandatory revocation without any opportunity for a probationary license, while a person actually convicted of driving under the influence is subject to a mandatory revocation but nonetheless may apply for a probationary license, this disparity in treatment does not violate equal protection of the laws. Drake v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 674 P.2d 359 ( Colo. 1984 ).

Revocation of license no burden on right to travel interstate. While the right to travel interstate is without question a fundamental right under the United States constitution, revocation of a driver's license pursuant to this section does not burden this fundamental right. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Primary purpose of this section and §§ 42-2-121 and 42-2-123 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).

The implied consent statute serves the distinct governmental purpose of facilitating citizen cooperation in achieving traffic safety by the use of the administrative sanction of revocation upon a refusal to submit to a test, while the statutory authorization for a probationary license is expressly directed towards the "alcohol and drug traffic driving education or treatment" of the convicted traffic offender. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).

Laws aimed at drivers under influence of alcohol. The traffic laws and the revocation procedures contained in this section and § 42-2-203 are aimed at all drivers who operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while their ability is impaired, regardless of their status as alcoholics or problem drinkers. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Proceeding not barred by one-year delay. A one-year delay in commencing these administrative proceedings pursuant to § 42-2-123 does not ipso facto constitute a bar to the hearing. Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).

Issuance of driver's license does not confer upon licensee right that is independently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference or restriction. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses reasonably related to governmental interest. To the extent that one might consider as a classification the categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses in subsections (1)(g) and (1)(i), and § 42-2-202 (2)(a)(I) , such classification is reasonably related to the expressed governmental interest of providing maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highway. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980) (decided prior to the 1981 amendment to subsections (1)(g) and (1)(i)).

Where a driver's license has been revoked, it continues revoked until a new license has been granted, and such revocation does not terminate with the expiration date of the license. People v. Lopez, 143 Colo. 523 , 354 P.2d 491 (1960).

Completion of alcohol education program was not mitigating factor to be considered in granting or denial of probationary driver's license, but rather was prerequisite for application. Hoth v. Charnes, 736 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1987).

Former subsection (4) of this section required the completion of a Level II alcohol treatment program as a prerequisite to the issuance of a probationary license for a driver twice convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol within a five-year period. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 793 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 repeal and reenactment of subsection (4)).

Probationary license sought pursuant to former subsection (4) was properly denied since the original revocation period expired for driver twice convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol within five years and driver was eligible for reinstatement, notwithstanding the fact the revocation remained in effect until the driver completed Level II alcohol treatment. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 793 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 repeal and reenactment of subsection (4)).

The application of the 1990 amendments to deny a probationary license was not unlawful as being retroactive in operation or in violation of defendant's vested rights because the revocation and probationary license issues were not triggered until defendant's criminal convictions occurred after the effective date of the 1990 amendments. Rogers v. Dept. of Rev., 841 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1992).

Indefinite revocation is a remedial action designed to assure the general public safety in the use of its highways and is not cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Notice need not give facts warranting revocation to be adequate. The notice received from the division of motor vehicles is not defective because it does not give adequate notice of the facts warranting revocation unless the driver was genuinely surprised. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

The function of the hearing examiner under this statute is purely ministerial. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Revocation proper even though offenses occurred prior to amendment. Application of the mandatory revocation provision of subsection (1)(g) is not improper even though only one of the offenses upon which the revocation of the license is based occurred after the effective date of the 1981 amendment. Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Rev., 667 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1983).

Only the triggering offense must occur after the effective date of the act. Zaragoza v. Dept. of Rev., 702 P.2d 274 ( Colo. 1985 ); Sommer v. Dept. of Rev., 714 P.2d 901 ( Colo. 1986 ).

There is no due process violation in suspending the driver's license of any person convicted of any felony drug offense. The sanction is reasonably related to the governmental objective of preventing the possession, use, or sale of controlled substances. People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1993).

Revocation of license proper for driver who was properly requested to take urine test to detect presence of drugs but refused to provide requisite sample. Halter v. Dept. of Rev., 857 P.2d 535 (Colo. App. 1993).

Requirement to surrender license to the court upon conviction under § 18-18-406 is simply an additional sanction specifically authorized by the general assembly to be imposed. Since the imposition of that sanction has received proper legislative approval, no double jeopardy problems arise. People v. Smith, 944 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1997).

Due process not violated where police report concerning basis of conclusion that driver was under the influence of marijuana was admitted into evidence but officer who prepared report was not present at revocation hearing since report was available for discovery before hearing and driver could have called officer to testify. Halter v. Dept. of Rev., 857 P.2d 535 (Colo. App. 1993).

Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review the suspension or revocation of a driver's license when the driver-defendant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).

Remedy for driver who has had his driver's license revoked or suspended may be available pursuant to § 24-4-105 (10) where the Colorado department of revenue does not hold an administrative hearing prior to the expiration of 60 days as the department is under statutory obligation to hold an administrative hearing within 60 days under either this section or § 42-2-126 . Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).

Applied in People v. Heinz, 195 Colo. 71 , 589 P.2d 931 (1979); Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325 , 592 P.2d 402 (1979); Reasoner v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 187 (Colo. App. 1981); Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 ( Colo. 1983 ).

42-2-126. Revocation of license based on administrative determination.

Legislative declaration. The purposes of this section are:
1. To provide safety for all persons using the highways of this state by quickly revoking the driver's license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a safety hazard by driving with an excessive amount of alcohol in his or her body and any person who has refused to submit to an analysis as required by section 42-4-1301.1;
2. To guard against the potential for any erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for a full hearing; and
3. Following the revocation period, to prevent the relicensing of a person until the department is satisfied that the person's alcohol problem is under control and that the person no longer constitutes a safety hazard to other highway users.
Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Excess BAC" means that a person had a BAC level sufficient to subject the person to a license revocation for excess BAC 0.08, excess BAC underage, excess BAC CDL, or excess BAC underage CDL.
2. "Excess BAC 0.08" means that a person drove a vehicle in this state when the person's BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving.
3. "Excess BAC CDL" means that a person drove a commercial motor vehicle in this state when the person's BAC was 0.04 or more at the time of driving or at any time thereafter.
4. "Excess BAC underage" means that a person was under the age of twenty-one years and the person drove a vehicle in this state when the person's BAC was in excess of 0.02 but less than 0.08 at the time of driving or within two hours after driving.
5. "Excess BAC underage CDL" means that a person was under the age of twenty-one years and the person drove a commercial motor vehicle in this state when the person's BAC was in excess of 0.02 but less than 0.04 at the time of driving or at any time thereafter.
6. "Hearing officer" means the executive director of the department or an authorized representative designated by the executive director.
7. "License" includes driving privilege.
8. "Refusal" means refusing to take or complete, or to cooperate in the completing of, a test of the person's blood, breath, saliva, or urine as required by section 18-3-106 (4) or 18-3-205 (4), C.R.S., or section 42-4-1301.1 (2).
9. "Respondent" means a person who is the subject of a hearing under this section.
Revocation of license.
1. Excess BAC 0.08. (I) The department shall revoke the license of a person for excess BAC 0.08 for:
  1. Nine months for a first violation committed on or after January 1, 2009; except that such a person may apply for a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-132.5 ;
  2. One year for a second violation; and
  3. Two years for a third or subsequent violation occurring on or after January 1, 2009, regardless of when the prior violations occurred; except that such a person may apply for a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-132.5 . (II) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 833 , § 3, effective January 1, 2009.)
2. Excess BAC underage. (I) The department shall revoke the license of a person for excess BAC underage for three months for a first violation, for six months for a second violation, and for one year for a third or subsequent violation. (II) (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), a person whose license is revoked for a first offense under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) and whose BAC was not more than 0.05 may request that, in lieu of the three-month revocation, the person's license be revoked for a period of not less than thirty days, to be followed by a suspension period of such length that the total period of revocation and suspension equals three months. If the hearing officer approves the request, the hearing officer may grant the person a probationary license that may be used only for the reasons provided in section 42-2-127 (14)(a). (B) The hearing to consider a request under this subparagraph (II) may be held at the same time as the hearing held under subsection (8) of this section; except that a probationary license may not become effective until at least thirty days have elapsed since the beginning of the revocation period.
3. Refusal. (I) Except as provided in section 42-2-132.5 (4) , the department shall revoke the license of a person for refusal for one year for a first violation, two years for a second violation, and three years for a third or subsequent violation; except that the period of revocation shall be at least three years if the person was driving a commercial motor vehicle that was transporting hazardous materials as defined in section 42-2-402 (7) . (II) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c), such a person whose license has been revoked for two years for a second violation or for three years for a third or subsequent violation may apply for a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-132.5.
4. Excess BAC CDL. The department shall revoke for the disqualification period provided in 49 CFR 383.51 the commercial driving privilege of a person who was the holder of a commercial driver's license or was driving a commercial motor vehicle for a violation of excess BAC 0.08, excess BAC CDL, or refusal.
5. Excess BAC underage CDL. The department shall revoke the commercial driving privilege of a person for excess BAC underage CDL for three months for a first violation, six months for a second violation, and one year for a third or subsequent violation.
Multiple restraints and conditions on driving privileges.
1. 1. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (a), a revocation imposed pursuant to this section for an offense committed before January 1, 2014, shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any other revocation imposed pursuant to this section.
  2. If a license is revoked for excess BAC and the person is also convicted on criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, both the revocation under this section and any suspension, revocation, cancellation, or denial that results from the conviction shall be imposed, but the periods shall run concurrently, and the total period of revocation, suspension, cancellation, or denial shall not exceed the longer of the two periods.
  3. 1. If a license is revoked for refusal for an offense committed before January 1, 2014, the revocation shall not run concurrently, in whole or in part, with any previous or subsequent suspensions, revocations, or denials that may be provided for by law, including but not limited to any suspension, revocation, or denial that results from a conviction of criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence for a violation of section 42-4-1301.
    2. If a license is revoked for refusal for an offense committed on or after January 1, 2014, and the person is also convicted on criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, both the revocation under this section and any suspension, revocation, cancellation, or denial that results from the conviction shall be imposed, but the periods shall run concurrently. The total period of revocation, suspension, cancellation, or denial shall not exceed the longer of the two periods.
  4. The revocation of the commercial driving privilege under excess BAC CDL may run concurrently with another revocation pursuant to this section arising out of the same incident.
  5. Any revocation for refusal shall not preclude other action that the department is required to take in the administration of this title.
2. 1. The periods of revocation specified in subsection (3) of this section are intended to be minimum periods of revocation for the described conduct. Except as described in section 42-2-132.5, a license shall not be restored under any circumstances, and a probationary license shall not be issued, during the revocation period.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), a person whose privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle has been revoked because of excess BAC CDL and who was twenty-one years of age or older at the time of the offense may apply for a driver's license of another class or type as long as there is no other statutory reason to deny the person a license. The department may not issue the person a probationary license that would authorize the person to operate a commercial motor vehicle.
3. Upon the expiration of the period of revocation under this section, if a person's license is still suspended on other grounds, the person may seek a probationary license as authorized by section 42-2-127 (14) subject to the requirements of paragraph (d) of this subsection (4).
4. 1. Following a license revocation, the department shall not issue a new license or otherwise restore the driving privilege unless the department is satisfied, after an investigation of the character, habits, and driving ability of the person, that it will be safe to grant the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways to the person; except that the department may not require a person to undergo skills or knowledge testing prior to issuance of a new license or restoration of the person's driving privilege if the person's license was revoked for a first violation of excess BAC 0.08 or excess BAC underage.
  2. 1. If a person was driving with excess BAC and the person had a BAC that was 0.15 or more or if the person's driving record otherwise indicates a designation as a persistent drunk driver as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5), the department shall require the person to complete a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3 as a condition to restoring driving privileges to the person and, upon the restoration of driving privileges, shall require the person to hold a restricted license requiring the use of an ignition interlock device pursuant to section 42-2-132.5 (1)(a)(II).
    2. If a person seeking reinstatement is required to complete, but has not yet completed, a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program, the person shall file with the department proof of current enrollment in a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3, on a form approved by the department.
Actions of law enforcement officer.
1. If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person should be subject to license revocation for excess BAC or refusal, the law enforcement officer shall forward to the department an affidavit containing information relevant to the legal issues and facts that shall be considered by the department to determine whether the person's license should be revoked as provided in subsection (3) of this section. The executive director of the department shall specify to law enforcement agencies the form of the affidavit to be used under this paragraph (a) and the types of information needed in the affidavit and may specify any additional documents or copies of documents needed by the department to make its determination in addition to the affidavit. The affidavit shall be dated, signed, and sworn to by the law enforcement officer under penalty of perjury, but need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person.
2. 1. A law enforcement officer, on behalf of the department, shall personally serve a notice of revocation on a person who is still available to the law enforcement officer if the law enforcement officer determines that, based on a refusal or on test results available to the law enforcement officer, the person's license is subject to revocation for excess BAC or refusal.
  2. When a law enforcement officer serves a notice of revocation, the law enforcement officer shall take possession of any driver's license issued by this state or any other state that the person holds. When the law enforcement officer takes possession of a valid driver's license issued by this state or any other state, the law enforcement officer, acting on behalf of the department, shall issue a temporary permit that is valid for seven days after the date of issuance.
  3. A copy of the completed notice of revocation form, a copy of any completed temporary permit form, and any driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit taken into possession under this section shall be forwarded to the department by the law enforcement officer along with an affidavit as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (5) and any additional documents or copies of documents as described in said paragraph (a).
  4. The department shall provide to law enforcement agencies forms for notice of revocation and for temporary permits. The law enforcement agencies shall use the forms for the notice of revocation and for temporary permits and shall follow the form and provide the information for affidavits as provided by the department pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (5).
  5. A law enforcement officer shall not issue a temporary permit to a person who is already driving with a temporary permit issued pursuant to subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b).
Initial determination and notice of revocation.
1. Upon receipt of an affidavit of a law enforcement officer and the relevant documents required by paragraph (a) of subsection (5) of this section, the department shall determine whether the person's license should be revoked under subsection (3) of this section. The determination shall be based upon the information contained in the affidavit and the relevant documents submitted to the department, and the determination shall be final unless a hearing is requested and held as provided in subsection (8) of this section. The determination of these facts by the department is independent of the determination of a court of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. The disposition of the criminal charges shall not affect any revocation under this section.
2. 1. If the department determines that the person is subject to license revocation, the department shall issue a notice of revocation if a notice has not already been served upon the person by the law enforcement officer as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (5) of this section. A notice of revocation shall clearly specify the reason and statutory grounds for the revocation, the effective date of the revocation, the right of the person to request a hearing, the procedure for requesting a hearing, and the date by which a request for a hearing must be made.
  2. In sending a notice of revocation, the department shall mail the notice in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-119 (2) to the person at the last-known address shown on the department's records, if any, and to any address provided in the law enforcement officer's affidavit if that address differs from the address of record. The notice shall be deemed received three days after mailing.
3. If the department determines that the person is not subject to license revocation, the department shall notify the person of its determination and shall rescind any order of revocation served upon the person by the law enforcement officer.
4. A license revocation shall become effective seven days after the person has received the notice of revocation as provided in subsection (5) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice of revocation by mail as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (6). If the department receives a written request for a hearing pursuant to subsection (7) of this section within that same seven-day period and the department issues a temporary permit pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection (7) of this section, the effective date of the revocation shall be stayed until a final order is issued following the hearing; except that any delay in the hearing that is caused or requested by the person or counsel representing the person shall not result in a stay of the revocation during the period of delay.
Request for hearing.
1. A person who has received a notice of revocation may make a written request for a review of the department's determination at a hearing. The request may be made on a form available at each office of the department.
2. A person must request a hearing in writing within seven days after the day the person receives the notice of revocation as provided in subsection (5) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice by mail as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (6) of this section. If the department does not receive the written request for a hearing within the seven-day period, the right to a hearing is waived, and the determination of the department that is based on the documents and affidavit required by subsection (5) of this section becomes final.
3. If a person submits a written request for a hearing after expiration of the seven-day period and if the request is accompanied by the person's verified statement explaining the failure to make a timely request for a hearing, the department shall receive and consider the request. If the department finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the revocation or due to factors of physical incapacity such as hospitalization or incarceration, the department shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter, and grant the hearing request. In such a case, the department shall not grant a stay of the revocation pending issuance of the final order following the hearing.
4. At the time a person requests a hearing pursuant to this subsection (7), if it appears from the record that the person is the holder of a valid driver's or minor driver's license or of an instruction permit or of a temporary permit issued pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (5) of this section and that the license or permit has been surrendered, the department shall stay the effective date of the revocation and issue a temporary permit that shall be valid until the scheduled date for the hearing. If necessary, the department may later extend the temporary permit or issue an additional temporary permit in order to stay the effective date of the revocation until the final order is issued following the hearing, as required by subsection (8) of this section. If the person notifies the department in writing at the time that the hearing is requested that the person desires the law enforcement officer's presence at the hearing, the department shall issue a written notice for the law enforcement officer to appear at the hearing. A law enforcement officer who is required to appear at a hearing may, at the discretion of the hearing officer, appear in real time by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5.
5. At the time that a person requests a hearing, the department shall provide to the person written notice advising the person:
  1. Of the right to subpoena the law enforcement officer for the hearing and that the subpoena must be served upon the law enforcement officer at least five calendar days prior to the hearing;
  2. Of the person's right at that time to notify the department in writing that the person desires the law enforcement officer's presence at the hearing and that, upon receiving the notification, the department shall issue a written notice for the law enforcement officer to appear at the hearing;
  3. That, if the law enforcement officer is not required to appear at the hearing, documents and an affidavit prepared and submitted by the law enforcement officer will be used at the hearing; and
  4. That the affidavit and documents submitted by the law enforcement officer may be reviewed by the person prior to the hearing.
6. Any subpoena served upon a law enforcement officer for attendance at a hearing conducted pursuant to this section shall be served at least five calendar days before the day of the hearing.
Hearing.
1. 1. The hearing shall be scheduled to be held as quickly as practicable but not more than sixty days after the date the department receives the request for a hearing; except that, if a hearing is rescheduled because of the unavailability of a law enforcement officer or the hearing officer in accordance with subsection (8)(a)(III) or (8)(a)(IV) of this section, the hearing may be rescheduled more than sixty days after the date the department receives the request for the hearing, and the department shall continue any temporary driving privileges held by the person until the date to which the hearing is rescheduled. At least ten days prior to the scheduled or rescheduled hearing, the department shall provide in the manner specified in section 42-2-119 (2) a written notice of the time and place of the hearing to the respondent unless the parties agree to waive this requirement. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 42-1-102 and 42-2-119, the last-known address of the respondent for purposes of notice for any hearing pursuant to this section is the address stated on the hearing request form.
  2. A law enforcement officer who submits the documents and affidavit required by subsection (5) of this section need not be present at the hearing unless the hearing officer requires that the law enforcement officer be present and the hearing officer issues a written notice for the law enforcement officer's appearance or unless the respondent or the respondent's attorney determines that the law enforcement officer should be present and serves a timely subpoena upon the law enforcement officer in accordance with paragraph (f) of subsection (7) of this section.
  3. If a law enforcement officer, after receiving a notice or subpoena to appear from either the department or the respondent, is unable to appear at the original or rescheduled hearing date due to a reasonable conflict, including but not limited to training, vacation, or personal leave time, the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement officer's supervisor shall contact the department not less than forty-eight hours prior to the hearing and reschedule the hearing to a time when the law enforcement officer will be available. If the law enforcement officer cannot appear at the original or rescheduled hearing because of medical reasons, a law enforcement emergency, another court or administrative hearing, or any other legitimate, just cause as determined by the department, and the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement officer's supervisor gives notice of the law enforcement officer's inability to appear to the department prior to the dismissal of the revocation proceeding, the department shall reschedule the hearing following consultation with the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement officer's supervisor at the earliest possible time when the law enforcement officer and the hearing officer will be available.
  4. If a hearing officer cannot appear at an original or rescheduled hearing because of medical reasons, a law enforcement emergency, another court or administrative hearing, or any other legitimate, just cause, the hearing officer or the department may reschedule the hearing at the earliest possible time when the law enforcement officer and the hearing officer will be available.
2. The hearing shall be held in the district office nearest to where the violation occurred, unless the parties agree to a different location; except that, at the discretion of the department, all or part of the hearing may be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5.
3. The department shall consider all relevant evidence at the hearing, including the testimony of any law enforcement officer and the reports of any law enforcement officer that are submitted to the department. The report of a law enforcement officer shall not be required to be made under oath, but the report shall identify the law enforcement officer making the report. The department may consider evidence contained in affidavits from persons other than the respondent, so long as the affidavits include the affiant's home or work address and phone number and are dated, signed, and sworn to by the affiant under penalty of perjury. The affidavit need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person.
4. The hearing officer shall have authority to:
  1. Administer oaths and affirmations;
  2. Compel witnesses to testify or produce books, records, or other evidence;
  3. Examine witnesses and take testimony;
  4. Receive and consider any relevant evidence necessary to properly perform the hearing officer's duties as required by this section;
  5. Take judicial notice as defined by rule 201 of article II of the Colorado rules of evidence, subject to the provisions of section 24-4-105 (8), C.R.S., which shall include:
    1. Judicial notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within the hearing officer's knowledge;
    2. Judicial notice of appropriate and reliable scientific and medical information contained in studies, articles, books, and treatises; and
    3. Judicial notice of charts prepared by the department of public health and environment pertaining to the maximum BAC levels that people can obtain through the consumption of alcohol when the charts are based upon the maximum absorption levels possible of determined amounts of alcohol consumed in relationship to the weight and gender of the person consuming the alcohol;
  6. Issue subpoenas duces tecum to produce books, documents, records, or other evidence;
  7. Issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses;
  8. Take depositions or cause depositions or interrogatories to be taken;
  9. Regulate the course and conduct of the hearing; and
  10. Make a final ruling on the issues.
5. When an analysis of the respondent's BAC is considered at a hearing:
  1. If the respondent establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent consumed alcohol between the time that the respondent stopped driving and the time of testing, the preponderance of the evidence must also establish that the minimum required BAC was reached as a result of alcohol consumed before the respondent stopped driving; and
  2. If the evidence offered by the respondent shows a disparity between the results of the analysis done on behalf of the law enforcement agency and the results of an analysis done on behalf of the respondent, and a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the blood analysis conducted on behalf of the law enforcement agency was properly conducted by a qualified person associated with a laboratory certified by the department of public health and environment using properly working testing devices, there shall be a presumption favoring the accuracy of the analysis done on behalf of the law enforcement agency if the analysis showed the BAC to be 0.096 or more. If the respondent offers evidence of blood analysis, the respondent shall be required to state under oath the number of analyses done in addition to the one offered as evidence and the names of the laboratories that performed the analyses and the results of all analyses.
6. The hearing shall be recorded. The hearing officer shall render a decision in writing, and the department shall provide a copy of the decision to the respondent.
7. If the respondent fails to appear without just cause, the right to a hearing shall be waived, and the determination of the department which is based upon the documents and affidavit required in subsection (5) of this section shall become final.
8. Pursuant to section 42-1-228, a driver may challenge the validity of the law enforcement officer's initial contact with the driver and the driver's subsequent arrest for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. If a driver so challenges the validity of the law enforcement officer's initial contact, and the evidence does not establish that the initial contact or arrest was constitutionally and statutorily valid, the driver is not subject to license revocation.
Appeal.
1. Within thirty-five days after the department issues its final determination under this section, a person aggrieved by the determination has the right to file a petition for judicial review in the district court in the county of the person's residence.
2. Judicial review of the department's determination shall be on the record without taking additional testimony. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.
3. A filing of a petition for judicial review shall not result in an automatic stay of the revocation order. The court may grant a stay of the order only upon a motion and hearing and upon a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the person will prevail upon the merits.
Notice to vehicle owner. If the department revokes a person's license pursuant to paragraph
1. , (c), or (d) of subsection (3) of this section, the department shall mail a notice to the owner of the motor vehicle used in the violation informing the owner that:
  (a) The motor vehicle was driven in an alcohol-related driving violation; and
2. Additional alcohol-related violations involving the motor vehicle by the same driver may result in a requirement that the owner file proof of financial responsibility under the provisions of section 42-7-406 (1.5).
Applicability of "State Administrative Procedure Act". The "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., shall apply to this section to the extent it is consistent with subsections (7), (8), and (9) of this section relating to administrative hearings and judicial review.

Source: L. 94: (9)(b) and (9)(c)(II) amended, p. 2807, § 580, effective July 1; entire title amended with relocations, p. 2135, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (6)(b)(VI) and (6)(b)(VII) added and (7)(a) amended, p. 1303, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 96: (7)(a)(I) amended, p. 272, § 1, effective April 8. L. 97: (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(III), (3)(b), (5)(a), (6)(c)(I), (7)(a)(I), (9)(c)(I), and (9)(c)(III) amended and (2)(a)(I.5), (2)(a)(IV), (6)(b)(II.5), (6)(b)(VIII), and (6)(b)(IX) added, pp. 1461, 1464 §§ 4, 5, effective July 1; (7)(c) amended, p. 334, § 1, effective August 6. L. 98: (6)(b)(IX)(A) amended, p. 174, § 3, effective April 6; (2.5) added, p. 1239, § 3, effective July 1. L. 99: (2)(a)(II), (8)(e)(II), (8)(e)(III), and (8)(e)(V) amended and (8)(e)(II.5) added, p. 90, § 1, effective July 1; (6)(c)(III) added, p. 1158, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2)(a)(I.5), (2)(a)(IV), (5)(a), (9)(c)(I), and (9)(c)(III) amended and (2)(a)(I.7) added, p. 512, § 1, effective May 12; (5)(c) and (8)(d) amended, p. 1354, § 25, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (8)(e)(II), (8)(f), and (9)(a) amended, p. 553, § 4, effective May 23; (7)(c) amended, p. 787, § 4, effective June 1; (7)(a)(II) repealed, p. 1284, § 67, effective June 5. L. 2002: (1)(a), (2)(a)(I.7), (2)(a)(II), (2)(a)(IV), (3)(a), (5)(a), (7)(c)(II), (7)(c)(III), (9)(c)(I), and (9)(c)(III) amended, p. 1915, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2003: (6)(b)(I) and (6)(b)(IX)(B) amended and (6)(b)(IX)(A.5) added, p. 2429, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(I.5), (5)(a)(I), (7)(a)(I), (9)(c)(I), and (9)(c)(II) amended, p. 782, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) amended, p. 647, § 16, effective May 27. L. 2006: (5)(a)(I), (5)(a)(II), (6)(b)(III), and (6)(b)(V) amended and (6)(b)(III.5) added, p. 260, § 1, effective March 31; (6)(b)(IX)(A.5) and (7)(c)(II) amended, p. 1366, § 2, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2007: (2)(a)(I.5), (2)(a)(I.7), (6)(b)(IX)(A.5), and (9)(c)(I) amended, p. 502, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2008: Entire section R&RE, p. 232, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(a) and (3)(c) amended, p. 833, § 3, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2011: (4)(d)(II) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1179, § 102, effective August 10. L. 2012: (4)(d)(II)(A) and (9)(c) amended, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1482, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2013: (8)(h) added, (HB 13-1077), ch. 196, p. 798, § 1, effective May 11; (3)(c)(I), (4)(a)(I), (4)(a)(III), (4)(b) (I), and (4)(d)(II)(A) amended and (4)(a)(V) added, (HB 13-1240), ch. 361, pp. 2114, 2112, §§ 5, 3, effective January 1, 2014. L. 2015: (4)(d)(II)(A) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 998, § 8, effective August 5; (8)(h) amended, (HB 15-1073), ch. 92, p. 263, § 1, effective August 5; (9)(a) amended, (HB 15-1021), ch. 25, p. 63, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2017: (4)(d)(II) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1258, § 21, effective May 25; (8)(a)(I) amended, (HB 17-1107), ch. 101, p. 367, § 10, effective August 9.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-122.1 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-126 was relocated to § 42-2-134.
Subsections (9)(b) and (9)(c)(II) were originally numbered as § 42-2-122.1 (8)(b) and (8)(c)(III), and the amendments to them in House Bill 94-1029 were harmonized with Senate Bill 94-001.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1998 act enacting subsection (2.5), see section 1 of chapter 295, Session Laws of Colorado 1998. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (7)(c), see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending subsections (3)(a) and (3)(c), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "The New Colorado Per Se DUI Law", see 12 Colo. Law. 1451 (1983). For article, "DUI Defense Under the Per Se Law", see 14 Colo. Law. 2155 (1985). For article, "Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation", see Colo. Law. 1943 (1989). For article, "Driver's License Considerations in DUI Cases - Part I", see 28 Colo. Law. 85 (May 1999). For article, "Driver's License Considerations in DUI Cases - Part II", see 28 Colo. Law. 91 (July 1999). For article "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test Evidence in Colorado — The Framework under Campbell v. People", see 49 Colo. Law. 23 (June 2020).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-126 is similar to § 42-2-122.1 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

Due process not violated. This section affords an opportunity to be heard consistent with the requirements of due process. Falbo v. Rev. Motor Veh. Div., 738 P.2d 43 (Colo. App. 1987).

This section does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law, even though a person whose driver's license was suspended administratively through § 42-2-122.1 could not receive a probationary license and a person whose license was suspended under § 42-2-123 as a result of a criminal conviction could receive a probationary license, because the court, after making a determination of whether persons allegedly subject to disparate treatment by these sections were in fact similarly situated, found that no classification of persons similarly situated exists since this section involved an administrative suspension as opposed to a suspension resulting from a criminal conviction. Bath v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1381 ( Colo. 1988 ); Hancock v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1372 ( Colo. 1988 ).

The phrase "without additional testimony" precludes a judgment on the grounds that the department of revenue failed to file a brief. In addition, the standard of review requires certain finding. Without such findings, a court may not overturn a driver's license suspension on review on procedural grounds. Myers v. Dept. of Rev., 126 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005).

Statute proscribing driving with a blood alcohol content in excess of set limit provides sufficient notice of proscribed conduct and is not unconstitutionally vague or violative of due process. The fact of having consumed a quantity of alcohol notifies a person he is in jeopardy of violating the law. Abundant available information tells amount of alcohol consumption necessary to reach specific blood alcohol content levels. Smith v. Charnes, 728 P.2d 1287 ( Colo. 1986 ); Hancock v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1372 ( Colo. 1988 ).

Notice given licensees through publication of express consent statute satisfies due process; licensee is presumed to know law regarding operation of motor vehicles, including consequences of refusing request for chemical testing. Dikeman v. Charnes, 739 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1987).

Driver was not entitled to advisement of consequences of refusing chemical test to determine blood alcohol level before he was requested by officer to submit to test. Dikeman v. Charnes, 739 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1987).

Department's failure to instruct motorist to obtain duplicate license to surrender after revocation does not violate motorist's equal protection rights. Haynes v. Charnes, 772 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1989).

The state does not violate the double jeopardy clause by subjecting individuals to criminal prosecution pursuant to the DUI or DUI per se statutes subsequent to subjecting them to an administrative license revocation proceeding. Deutschendorf v. People, 920 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1996).

Statute is remedial not punitive, and double jeopardy protection does not apply. Revocation occurred because defendant refused to take the test for blood alcohol and not because of the level of alcohol in his bloodstream. Consequently, defendant was arrested for conduct different from the conduct giving rise to the license revocation, that is, driving a motor vehicle while impaired by the consumption of alcohol, as opposed to a refusal to take the test. People v. Olson, 921 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1996).

This section is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in the public interest. Cordova v. Mansheim, 725 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1986).

Legality of initial stop and arrest for DUI are proper issues in proceedings under this section. Although the validity of the initial stop and the subsequent DUI arrest may not be necessary elements to a revocation action, a driver may properly raise such issues as a defense in such proceedings. Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992). But see Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 110 , 411 P.3d 693, aff'd, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111, and Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 2012 COA 143 , 411 P.3d 1, aff'd, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122 (both decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment), annotated below.

Legality of initial contact between driver and police not relevant in civil proceeding. A hearing officer or court is not required or allowed to determine in a revocation proceeding under this section the lawfulness of the initial contact. Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 110 , 411 P.3d 693, aff'd, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111 (declining to follow Peterson v. Tipton, 883 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992)); Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 2012 COA 143 , 411 P.3d 1, aff'd, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122 (both decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment).

"Probable cause" in the context of this section as it existed before the 2013 amendment refers to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary for a law enforcement officer to issue a notice of driver's license revocation, not whether the officer's initial contact with the driver was lawful. Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111; Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 2012 COA 143 , 411 P.3d 1, aff'd, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122 (both decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment).

The exclusionary rule does not apply to license revocation hearings because an administrative hearing is remedial not criminal in nature. Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 110 , 411 P.3d 693, aff'd, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111; Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 2012 COA 143 , 411 P.3d 1, aff'd, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122 (both decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment).

But a court may elect to exclude evidence acquired through misconduct of a law enforcement officer if the misconduct is in bad faith or shocks the conscience of the court. Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122.

Officer is not authorized to request and to direct an arrested driver to submit to testing absent probable cause for the DUI arrest and, by implication, absent reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992). But see Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 110 , 411 P.3d 693, aff'd, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111 (decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment), annotated above.

In determining validity of an investigatory stop, the first inquiry is whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the police officer which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992).

Officer need not include reasons for driver's erratic driving behavior in report but only that the driving was erratic and thus the officer had probable cause to stop the auto. Kollodge v. Charnes, 741 P.2d 1260 (Colo. App. 1987).

Jurisdiction is acquired in a license revocation proceeding under this section when affidavits and other documents forwarded by the arresting officer contain sufficient information of a reliable character to make a revocation determination. Duckett v. Tipton, 826 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Although arresting officer's failure to swear to the affirmation on a revocation form under penalty of perjury violated statutory requirement, such violation does not prevent department of revenue from acquiring jurisdiction in license revocation proceeding and does not warrant reversal of revocation. Duckett v. Tipton, 826 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Where arresting officer swore to validity of documents submitted at revocation hearing, any error in the verification procedure before a notary public was not prejudicial to motorist. Duckett v. Tipton, 826 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).

Statute does not require arresting officer to have personal knowledge of every fact stated within verified report required by subsection (2)(a). Sheldon v. Dept. of Rev., 742 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1987).

Reasonable suspicion justifying initial stop was furnished by nonverbal signal of gas station clerk who had called to report intoxicated customer preparing to drive away. Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992).

Arresting officer had reasonable grounds for determining that driver was driving under the influence, even though he did not actually see the driver driving but relied on information provided to him by fellow officer and on his own observation of driver exiting the vehicle. Sheldon v. Dept. of Rev., 742 P.2d 968 (Colo. App. 1987).

Investigating officer's hearsay report as to the time that the driver was behind the wheel of the motor vehicle could be used to establish timeliness of blood alcohol test without violating due process because such report was reliable, trustworthy, and possessed probative value. Colo. Div. of Rev. v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 ( Colo. 1987 ); Charnes v. Olona, 743 P.2d 36 ( Colo. 1987 ).

Revocation of driver's license upheld where substantial evidence in record supported such revocation, even though the hearing officer erred by applying the so-called "20% rule" to resolve differences between two intoxilyzer test results. Charnes v. Robinson, 772 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1989).

Invalidity of "20% rule". Use of rule which provides that a second intoxilyzer test result within 20% of the first test result supports and does not refute the first test result was invalid as a standard or guide in adjudicatory hearings under this article, since it had the effect of an agency rule or regulation, but was not promulgated according to the rule-making authority delegated to the director of the department of revenue. Charnes v. Robinson, 772 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1989).

Retest is not the only method of refuting intoxilyzer results. Where undisputed testimony showed the machine consistently read .005% too high, and the margin by which driver allegedly exceeded the statutory limit was only .003%, the department's prima facie case was nullified, and retest could serve no valid purpose. Scherr v. Dept. of Rev., 49 P.3d 1217 (Colo. App. 2002).

Revocation of a driver's license under the "per se" statute requires a properly supported finding that the licensee was driving, not a finding that the officer who requested that the licensee submit to a blood alcohol test had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol. Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987).

The term "drove a vehicle", for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(I), means a person has actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway. Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Rev., 720 P.2d 564 ( Colo. 1986 ); Smith v. Charnes, 728 P.2d 1287 ( Colo. 1986 ); Nefzger v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 224 ( Colo. 1987 ); Hancock v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1372 ( Colo. 1988 ).

"Actual physical control" does not require that the vehicle be moving on its own power or that the vehicle travel a particular distance. Therefore, licensee was in actual physical control of the vehicle when he was seated behind the wheel, with the engine running and the car in gear, as the vehicle was towed out of a snowbank. Colo. Div. of Rev. v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 ( Colo. 1987 ).

Person who was in the driver's seat of an automobile which had its motor running and its parking lights on and which was located in a private lot was in actual physical control of the automobile and thus was driving a motor vehicle. Therefore, refusal to consent to testing violates "express consent" statute and justifies revocation of license under this section. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Warman, 763 P.2d 558 (Colo. 1988).

Specific criminal charge is not required for a valid administrative license revocation. Irey v. Nielson, 716 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1986).

The department's determination of the facts with respect to administrative revocation is independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. When the statutory text evidences a legislative intent to treat separately the administrative and criminal consequences of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the statute should be interpreted in the manner that gives effect to the entire legislative scheme. Nefzger v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1987).

Issue preclusion does not bar revocation despite different outcome in criminal case. In a revocation proceeding, the department of revenue may make findings "independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence". Accordingly, given the substantial differences in the purposes and procedures in a revocation hearing and a criminal case, issue preclusion does not prevent the independent resolution of the same issue in each proceeding. Meyer v. Dept. of Rev., 143 P.3d 1181 (Colo. App. 2006) (decided prior to 2008 repeal and reenactment).

Hearsay evidence alone may be used to establish an element at a revocation hearing if such evidence is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and the evidence possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Kirke, 743 P.2d 16 ( Colo. 1987 ); Colo. Div. of Rev. v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 ( Colo. 1987 ); Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987); Heller v. Velasquez, 743 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1987); Charnes v. Olona, 743 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1987).

Burden of proof. At a driver's license revocation hearing, the state must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the licensee drove a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Schocke v. St. Dept. of Rev., 719 P.2d 361 (Colo. App. 1986).

State did not meet burden with regard to driver's breath alcohol concentration where two different tests, each conducted by a certified operator on a certified machine which had been verified as operating properly prior to the test, gave different results as to whether the driver exceeded acceptable breath alcohol concentration level. Schocke v. St. Dept. of Rev., 719 P.2d 361 (Colo. App. 1986).

State did not meet its burden of proof where undisputed testimony showed the machine used to test driver's breath consistently read .005% too high, and the margin by which driver allegedly exceeded the statutory limit was only .003%. Scherr v. Dept. of Rev., 49 P.3d 1217 (Colo. App. 2002).

Revocation of driver's license is not reversible upon review based upon nonjurisdictional statutory violation unless substantial rights of licensee have been prejudiced. Alford v. Tipton, 822 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1991).

A field test on a portable breath testing device given to the suspect prior to arrest did not constitute a chemical test within the meaning of the express consent statute, and so a revocation for refusal to submit to additional testing is supported. Davis v. Carroll, 782 P.2d 884 (Colo. App. 1989).

Chemical test for alcohol relied upon for revocation of license requested more than one hour after the alleged driving offense but within a reasonable time of that offense will support the revocation of a driver's license for refusal to submit to the test. Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1988).

"Within one hour thereafter" means up to and including the entire sixtieth minute after the commission of the alleged offense. Bath v. State Dept. of Rev., 762 P.2d 767 (Colo. App. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1987 amendment changing the one hour to two hours).

In civil revocation proceedings based on blood alcohol breath test results, subsection (2)(b) requires the test to be taken within two hours after driving. Edwards v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2016 COA 137 , 406 P.3d 347.

Therefore, a driver's license cannot be revoked based on a test taken more than two hours after driving. Edwards v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2016 COA 137 , 406 P.3d 347.

Motorist's expert witness showing test results conflicting with the state's results must show that health department regulations were followed in performing the test and establish that the machine performing the test was operating correctly. Davis v. Charnes, 740 P.2d 534 (Colo. App. 1987).

Hearing officer cannot refuse to accept into evidence the result of an independently tested breath test sample because driver would be denied due process by being deprived of any chance to rebut results of the state's test. Mameda v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 698 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1985).

Subsections (1)(a) and (8)(c) indicate legislative intent that license revocation be based on the results of the chemical analysis at least to the extent that the test can be considered prima facie proof that blood alcohol concentration was in excess of the statutory standard. Swain v. State Dept. of Rev., 717 P.2d 507 (Colo. App. 1985).

Subsections (1)(a)(I) and (8)(c) are not inconsistent, and thus evidence of excessive blood alcohol concentration obtained pursuant to subsection (8)(c) was sufficient to sustain revocation of driver's license. Harvey v. Charnes, 728 P.2d 373 (Colo. App. 1986) (decided prior to 1987 amendments to subsections (1)(a) and (8)(c)).

Margin of error may be considered in determining weight accorded to blood alcohol test, but hearing officer did not abuse discretion in finding blood alcohol in excess of statutory standard where there was no showing that the machine was inaccurate. Swain v. State Dept. of Rev., 717 P.2d 507 (Colo. App. 1985).

Hearing officer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in revoking defendant's license upon finding that he had blood alcohol content of .159, despite contention that there was a margin of error in the test so that blood alcohol content could have been less than .15. Nefzger v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1987).

Presumption in subsection (8)(e)(II) does not apply to determination of whether a person is a "persistent drunk driver", as that term is defined in § 42-1-102. Presumption that favors the accuracy of a blood alcohol content analysis done on behalf of a law enforcement agency when a driver submits conflicting test results applies only to revocation determinations. Garcia v. Huber, 252 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2010).

"Verified report" is not necessarily a notarized report. The department of revenue had jurisdiction to revoke commercial driver's license for one year where police officer's report contained all necessary information, was sworn to under penalty of perjury, and used form supplied by department. Dept. of Rev. v. Hibbs, 122 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2005) (decided under this section as it existed prior to 2005 amendment).

A blood alcohol content test report does not have to comply with affidavit requirements. Subsection (8)(c) requires affidavits to be dated, signed, and sworn under penalty of perjury, but the BAC report is not an affidavit. Subsection (8)(c)'s requirements are triggered only when someone other than a police officer or the respondent submits an affidavit. This interpretation is in harmony with the rest of the statute and is consistent with § 22-4-105 of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Dept. of Rev. v. Rowland, 2018 CO 1, 408 P.3d 458.

Although failure of arresting officer to date notice of revocation form violated requirements of this section, department of revenue acquired jurisdiction over revocation proceedings when submittal of affidavit and other documents forwarded by arresting officer contained sufficient information of a reliable character to permit department to make revocation determination. Alford v. Tipton, 822 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1991).

Objective standard of driver's external manifestations of willingness or unwillingness to submit to testing for purposes of this section is sole basis for determination of whether driver refused to take test. Alford v. Tipton, 822 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1991).

The two-hour standard in § 42-4-1301.1 does not apply to a refusal to take a test. The refusal to take a blood alcohol test is an independent cause for revoking driver's license. Therefore, so long as the request is within a reasonable time, a refusal to take the test may result in loss of a driver's license. Stumpf v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 231 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2009).

Arresting officer's failure to serve driver personally with notice of revocation of his driver's license does not affect department of revenue's jurisdiction to serve the driver with such notice and to enter revocation order. Kenney v. Charnes, 717 P.2d 1020 (Colo. App. 1986); Potter v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 908 (Colo. App. 1987).

Driver could not be deemed to have received notice of revocation of his license where mailed notice was returned by postal authorities as unclaimed; return was evidence of fact that notice was not served, rebutting presumption indicated in subsection (3)(b) that service of notice would be effective three days after mailing. Potter v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 908 (Colo. App. 1987).

After mailed notice of revocation was returned by postal authorities as unclaimed, driver's written request for hearing, together with affidavit setting forth reasons for late filing of request, were sufficient. Potter v. Dept. of Rev., 739 P.2d 908 (Colo. App. 1987).

Waiver of notice. Although motorist did not make an express waiver, the fact that he and his attorney appeared and argued the merits of his driver's license revocation but did not object to the timeliness of notice demonstrated his willingness to forego receipt of timely notice and constituted a waiver. Mattingly v. Charnes, 700 P.2d 927 (Colo. App. 1985); Hendrickson v. State Dept. of Rev., M.V.D., 716 P.2d 489 (Colo. App. 1986).

Since the motorist failed to surrender his driver's license as required by this section, such refusal gave the department of revenue grounds to deny his request for a revocation hearing. Haynes v. Charnes, 772 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1989).

This section provides that the APA applies to license revocation hearings. Nye v. State Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).

License was not revoked when notice was never served on plaintiff pursuant to either of the prescribed statutory methods. Knaus v. Dept. of Rev., 844 P.2d 1318 (Colo. App. 1992).

Plaintiff not entitled to be given credit toward three-month revocation period for period he was under mistaken belief that his license had been revoked. He had not yet received notice of the revocation as required by statute, and the misunderstanding was not the fault or responsibility of the department. Knaus v. Dept. of Rev., 844 P.2d 1318 (Colo. App. 1992).

The 60-day time limit of subsection (8) is jurisdictional. Emmons v. Dept. of Rev., 2020 COA 17 , 459 P.3d 784.

Sixty-day period for a license revocation hearing begins to run at the time the department receives the written request. Ellis v. Charnes, 722 P.2d 436 (Colo. App. 1986).

If the sixtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the 60-day period is automatically extended to the end of the next business day. Perez v. Dept. of Rev., 778 P.2d 326 (Colo. App. 1989).

The date of filing of request for a hearing is not included for purposes of computing the 60-day period. Perez v. Dept. of Rev., 778 P.2d 326 (Colo. App. 1989).

Revocation hearing must not only be scheduled but held within 60 days. The time limit is jurisdictional and the department's failure to hold the hearing requires dismissal of the action against plaintiff. Wilson v. Hill, 782 P.2d 874 (Colo. App. 1989) (decided under law in effect prior to 1989 amendment).

In a license revocation proceeding, the department has the burden to prove that it met the earliest possible time requirement in order to retain jurisdiction to revoke a license. The power of administrative agencies extends only so far as the authority conferred on them by statute. Emmons v. Dept. of Rev., 2020 COA 17 , 459 P.3d 784.

Unlike the time limit for hearings under § 42-2-122.1 (7)(e), the 60-day time limit in § 42-2-123 (12) is not mandatory. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993) (decided under law in effect prior to the 1994 amendment).

Subsection (7)(c) provides the exclusive grounds on which an untimely request for a license revocation hearing may be granted. Baulsir v. Dept. of Rev., 702 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1985); Kelley v. Dept. of Rev., 780 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1989).

When the grounds for an untimely request for a license revocation hearing is attorney negligence in failing to request a hearing within the statutorily designated time period, the trial court erred in ordering the department to grant the request. Baulsir v. Dept. of Rev., 702 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1985).

Due process clause was not violated since adequate advance notice and an opportunity for an appropriate hearing before the license revocation became effective was given. Baulsir v. Dept. of Rev., 702 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1985).

Statutory notice provisions require driver to request hearing within seven days of time notice is deemed by statute to be received, not from time of actual notice. Kelley v. Dept. of Rev., 780 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1989).

Written notice of right to subpoena law enforcement officer is jurisdictional requirement. Where respondent never received such notice and department nevertheless held revocation hearing in absence of officer over respondent's objection, order of revocation was invalid. Kress v. Dept. of Rev., 834 P.2d 268 (Colo. App. 1992).

If respondent requests that the law enforcement officer be present, the officer cannot fulfill this statutory requirement by appearing via two-way video conference. The term "presence" requires actual presence not video presence. Barnes v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 23 P.3d 1235 (Colo. App. 2000).

Department's policy of never granting a rescheduling request by a licensee or counsel for an alternative date within the 60-day limit is arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the statutory obligation to provide a meaningful opportunity for a fair hearing. Such policy effectively violated licensee's right to counsel of her own choosing when counsel made the request due to a scheduling conflict. However, the department is not required to accommodate every request for rescheduling; it must take the circumstances surrounding the request into consideration. Erbe v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 51 P.3d 1096 (Colo. App. 2002).

Subsection (9)(c) provides the grounds for reversing a DMV revocation order. Where analysis of licensee's blood alcohol content was conflicting, it was the hearing officer's role, not the role of the reviewing court, to determine which test result was more reliable and deserved greater weight. Therefore, the hearing officer's decision to rely on one of two conflicting test results did not constitute grounds for reversal under the statute. Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1987).

The presumption of accuracy described in subsection (9)(c)(II) applies only to revocation hearings and not to "persistent drunk driver" determinations. Given the clear statutory language, it is apparent that the general assembly intended the presumption of accuracy in blood alcohol content to apply to the limit required for license revocation. Conversely, there is no indication that it intended the presumption of accuracy in blood alcohol content to apply to the "persistent drunk driver" section of the statute. Wiesner v. Huber, 228 P.3d 973 (Colo. App. 2010) (decided under law in effect prior to 2008 amendment).

Statute vests authority to review administrative revocations exclusively in district court in county of driver's residence, and a petition filed by a nonresident of the county must be dismissed. Dept. of Rev. v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1988).

Absence of transcript. Under this section the record does not include the transcript. Destruction of transcript due to administrative practice, standing alone, does not require reversal of department's decision. Cop v. Charnes, 738 P.2d 1200 (Colo. App. 1987).

Nor does absence of transcript due to accidental erasure of the tape, standing alone, require reversal of the department's decision. Guynn v. Dept. of Rev., 939 P.2d 526 (Colo. App. 1997).

The hearing officer is the trier of fact. Determinations concerning witness credibility, evidentiary weight, and the resolution of any evidentiary conflicts are factual matters solely within the province of the hearing officer as the trier of fact. Haney v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 2015 COA 125 , 361 P.3d 1093.

A reviewing court may not disturb a hearing officer's factual findings unless the findings are "clearly erroneous on the whole record". Neppl v. Dept. of Rev., 2019 COA 29 , 439 P.3d 76.

District court erred in substituting its judgment for hearing officer's determination as to plaintiff's unjustified refusal to submit to testing when hearing officer's finding was based upon resolution of conflicting evidence. Alford v. Tipton, 822 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1991).

Department of revenue is not bound in administrative revocation under the collateral estoppel doctrine by the resolution of the same issues in criminal proceedings arising out of the same occurrence. Wallace v. Dept. of Rev., 787 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1989).

A request for extraordinary relief in the form of mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106 was improper to challenge arbitrary action by the department of revenue in revoking a person's driver's license, even though petition was filed on the basis that the department refused to conduct a revocation hearing. The APA provides the proper mechanism for seeking relief based on arbitrary action by an executive agency. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 802 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1990).

Questions as to legality of initial motor vehicle stop and subsequent arrest of driver for driving under the influence may properly be raised as issues in driver's license revocation proceedings. Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1992). But see Francen v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 110 , 411 P.3d 693, aff'd, 2014 CO 54, 328 P.3d 111, and Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., 2012 COA 143 , 411 P.3d 1, aff'd, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122 (both decided under law in effect prior to 2013 amendment), annotated above.

The department's authority is limited by pertinent statutory provisions in a driver's license revocation proceeding and, absent any statutory authorization for a "reopening", the asserted right thereto was a nullity and plaintiff was not required to "exhaust" such an invalid administrative "remedy" as a condition precedent to his statutory right to seek judicial review of the department's final order of revocation. Foos v. State, 888 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1994).

Under the applicable statutory scheme, the final agency action of the department that is subject to judicial review in express consent revocation proceedings is the issuance of the final order of revocation by the hearing officer at the conclusion of the revocation hearing. Foos v. State, 888 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1994).

Judicial review is only available from a final agency determination. District court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with agency's setting of hearing date. State Dept. of Rev. v. District Court, 908 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1995).

On remand, the district court's disposition of the judicial review proceedings must be governed solely by the standards of the applicable provisions of this section and the APA. Foos v. State, 888 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1994).

Failure to file a petition for judicial review within 30 days after issuance of a revocation order is a jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal of the action where, as here, the statute does not mandate the filing of a petition for reconsideration; therefore, it was error for the district court to affirm the revocation order. Jeffries v. Fisher, 66 P.3d 218 (Colo. App. 2003).

Remedy for driver who has had his driver's license revoked or suspended may be available pursuant to § 24-4-105 (10) where the Colorado department of revenue does not hold an administrative hearing prior to the expiration of 60 days as the department is under statutory obligation to hold an administrative hearing within 60 days under either this section or § 42-2-125 . Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).

Prior to enactment of § 42-2-122.1 (7)(e)(II), police officers did not have authority to absent themselves from revocation hearings. People v. Attorney A., 861 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1993) (decided under law in effect prior to the 1994 amendment).

The failure to notify a licensee of the correct location of a revocation hearing is not a jurisdictional defect. Wunder v. Dept. of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 867 P.2d 178 (Colo. App. 1993).

The statutory grounds for delay of the license revocation hearing must be strictly construed. The exception that arises when a police officer is unavailable must be limited to situations involving the same degree of urgency as covered by the other enumerated exceptions. A bare notation that the officer had to teach school is insufficient to establish the applicability of the statutory exception. Rule v. Dept. of Rev., 868 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1994).

Officer who submitted the documentation for a DUI arrest was the proper officer to appear at the driver's license revocation hearing even though the officer was not the arresting officer. Herman v. Dept. of Rev., 870 P.2d 628 (Colo. App. 1994).

Driver's license revocation based on refusal to submit to alcohol testing is supported by substantial evidence. Probable cause existed for DUI arrest based on evidence of speeding, alcohol odor, bloodshot eyes, blank stare, slurred speech, and staggered walk. Herman v. Dept. of Rev., 870 P.2d 628 (Colo. App. 1994).

Reversal of a driver's license revocation is warranted where the agency failed to comply with written request to issue a subpoena and this failure caused prejudice to the driver's substantial right to engage in cross-examination of witnesses. Nye v. State Dept. of Rev., 902 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1995).

Nevertheless, the department has discretion over whether to issue a subpoena. The issuance of a subpoena is not merely a ministerial duty. The department may issue rules to establish criteria for the issuance, such as relevance. Fallon v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 250 P.3d 691 (Colo. App. 2010).

Revocation of license may not be reversed based on nonjurisdictional statutory violation unless substantial rights of licensee are prejudiced by the error. Mitchek v. Dept. of Rev., 911 P.2d 715 (Colo. App. 1996).

Applied in Miller v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Rev., 706 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1985); Kelln v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 719 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1986); Franklin v. Dept. of Rev., 728 P.2d 391 (Colo. App. 1986); McClellan v. State Dept. of Rev., 731 P.2d 769 (Colo. App. 1986); Shafron v. Cooke, 190 P.3d 812 (Colo. App. 2008).

42-2-126.1. Probationary licenses for persons convicted of alcohol-related driving offenses - ignition interlock devices - fees - interlock fund created - violations of probationary license - repeal. (Repealed)

Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 1304, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(2) amended and (2)(a.5) added, p. 1204, § 3, effective July 1. L. 97: (2)(a.7) added and (2)(a), (2)(a.5), (2)(e), (2.5), (6)(a), (7), and (8) amended, pp. 1383, 1384, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (2.5) amended, p. 1352, § 97, effective June 1. L. 99: IP(1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 1162, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1.5) and (8) amended, p. 1075, § 1, effective July 1; IP(1) amended, p. 1354, § 26, effective July 1, 2001.

Editor's note: Subsection (8) provided for the repeal of this section, effective January 1, 2001. (See L. 2000, p. 1075 .)

42-2-126.3. Tampering with an ignition interlock device. (Repealed)

Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 1304, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1079, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1284, § 68, effective June 5. L. 2002: (3) amended, p. 1560, § 362, effective October 1. L. 2012: Entire section repealed, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1482, § 3, effective August 8.

42-2-126.5. Revocation of license based on administrative actions taken under tribal law - repeal.

As used in this section:
1. "Indian" means a person who is a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe.
2. "Reservation" means the Southern Ute Indian reservation, the exterior boundaries of which were confirmed in the Act of May 21, 1984, Pub.L. 98-290, 98 Stat. 201, 202 (found at "Other Provisions" note to 25 U.S.C. sec. 668).
3. "Reservation driving privilege" means the driving privilege of an Indian that arises under and is governed by the tribal code when the Indian is operating a motor vehicle within the boundaries of the reservation.
4. "Tribal code" means the laws adopted by the tribe pursuant to the tribe's constitution.
5. "Tribe" means the Southern Ute Indian tribe.
Legislative declaration.
1. The general assembly finds that:
  1. The tribal code, including traffic provisions, governs the conduct of Indians within the reservation;
  2. The tribal code grants reservation driving privileges to Indians based on possession of a state-issued driver's license but does not authorize application of state driver's license revocation laws based on the conduct of Indians within the reservation; and
  3. When Indians drive outside of the reservation, state and municipal traffic laws apply to their state driving privileges.
2. In enacting this section, the general assembly intends to provide safety for all persons using the highways of the state by authorizing a process whereby the state shall revoke the Colorado driving privileges of a person after the tribe has entered a final order under the tribal code revoking the reservation driving privileges of that person, in a manner similar to how the state revokes the state driving privileges of a Colorado licensee whose driving privileges are revoked for an action occurring and adjudicated in a foreign jurisdiction.
When the tribe initially revokes the reservation driving privilege of an Indian pursuant to the tribal code pending a tribal hearing, the tribe shall take possession of the person's Colorado driver's license. The tribe is authorized to issue a temporary permit which shall provide temporary Colorado driving privileges to the person until the tribe enters a final order of revocation of the person's reservation driving privileges.
If the tribe enters a final order of revocation of the person's reservation driving privileges, the tribe shall send notice of such revocation to the department via fax, mail, or electronic means.
The state shall give full faith and credit to a tribal administrative or judicial determination related to the tribe's revocation of the reservation driving privileges of an Indian.
Upon receiving notice of revocation from the tribe pertaining to any Indian, the department shall immediately revoke the Colorado driving privileges of that person. The period of the state revocation shall run concurrently with the revocation action taken by the tribe. The state's driver record for the revoked individual shall indicate concurrent dates for the revocation period. The department shall send notice of revocation by first-class mail to the person at the address last shown on the department's records.
The department's revocation of the person's Colorado driving privileges shall be a final agency action of the department. Any appeal of the state's final revocation action may be taken in accordance with section 42-2-135 and section 24-4-106, C.R.S. Because the state is giving full faith and credit to the tribal determination, the department's revocation action shall be affirmed if, upon review, the reviewing court determines that the tribe's revocation of tribal driving privileges met both of the following conditions:
1. The revocation occurred after providing the person whose driving privilege was revoked reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard sufficient to protect due process rights; and
2. The tribal administrative or judicial tribunal that made the determination had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter.
When a person whose license is revoked under this section has completed the terms and conditions of the tribal revocation order, the tribe shall provide the person with written notification of the completion and shall also send written notice to the department. When the department receives the tribe's written notification of the completion, the person may seek reinstatement of his or her Colorado driving privileges. The person must comply with sections 42-2-126 (4)(d), 42-2-132, and 42-7-406 to obtain a new license or otherwise restore his or her Colorado driving privileges.
The provisions of this section do not apply to the department's revocation, suspension, cancellation, or denial of a Colorado driver's license of an Indian for any driving offense that occurs while operating a motor vehicle outside the boundaries of the reservation.
This section shall automatically repeal on the occurrence of any one or more of the following events:
1. The tribe repeals the express consent law of the tribal code;
2. Either the tribe or the state terminates any intergovernmental agreement between the parties pertaining to driver's license revocations of Indians; or
3. A repeal of this section by the general assembly acting by separate bill.

Source: L. 2001: Entire section added, p. 320, § 1, effective April 12. L. 2008: (8) amended, p. 246, § 8, effective July 1.

42-2-127. Authority to suspend license - to deny license - type of conviction - points.

1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of subsection (8) of this section, the department has the authority to suspend the license of any driver who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points or more within any twelve consecutive months or eighteen points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or, in the case of a minor driver eighteen years of age or older, who has accumulated nine points or more within any twelve consecutive months, or twelve points or more within any twenty-four consecutive months, or fourteen points or more for violations occurring after reaching the age of eighteen years, or, in the case of a minor driver under the age of eighteen years, who has accumulated more than five points within any twelve consecutive months or more than six points for violations occurring prior to reaching the age of eighteen years; except that the accumulation of points causing the subjection to suspension of the license of a chauffeur who, in the course of employment, has as a principal duty the operation of a motor vehicle shall be sixteen points in one year, twenty-four points in two years, or twenty-eight points in four years, if all the points are accumulated while said chauffeur is in the course of employment. Any provision of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, the license of a chauffeur who is convicted of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, UDD, or leaving the scene of an accident shall be suspended in the same manner as if the offense occurred outside the course of employment. Whenever a minor driver under the age of eighteen years receives a summons for a traffic violation, the minor's parent or legal guardian or, if the minor is without parents or guardian, the person who signed the minor driver's application for a license shall immediately be notified by the court from which the summons was issued.
2. If any applicant for a license to operate a motor vehicle has illegally operated a motor vehicle in this state prior to the issuance of a valid driver's or minor driver's license or instruction permit or in violation of the terms of any instruction permit within thirty-six months prior to said application, the department has the authority to deny the issuance of said license for not more than twelve months.
3. For the purpose of this section, any points accumulated by a minor under an instruction permit shall apply to the minor driver's license subsequently issued to or applied for by such minor.
4. No suspension or denial shall be made until a hearing has been held or the driver has failed to appear for a hearing scheduled in accordance with this section. This section shall not be construed to prevent the issuance of a restricted license pursuant to section 42-2-116.
1. The time periods provided in subsection (1) of this section for the accumulation of points shall be based on the date of violation, but points shall not be assessed until after conviction for any such traffic violation.
2. The accumulation of points within the time periods provided in subsection (1) of this section shall not be affected by the issuance or renewal of any driver's or minor driver's license issued under the provisions of this article or the anniversary date thereof.
Nothing in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall affect or prevent any proceedings to suspend any license under the provisions of law existing prior to July 1, 1974.
Statutory provisions for cancellation and mandatory revocation of drivers' licenses shall take precedence over this section.
Point system schedule: Type of conviction Points
1. Leaving scene of accident .................... 12
2. 1. DUI or DUI per se .................... 12
  2. Repealed.
  3. DWAI .................... 8
  4. UDD .................... 4
3. 1. Engaging in a speed contest in violation of section 42-4-1105 (1) .................... 12
  2. Aiding or facilitating engaging in a speed contest in violation of section 42-4-1105 (3) .................... 12
  3. Engaging in a speed exhibition in violation of section 42-4-1105 (2) .................... 5
  4. Aiding or facilitating engaging in a speed exhibition in violation of section 42-4-1105 (3) .................... 5
4. Reckless driving .................... 8
5. Careless driving .................... 4
6. Careless driving resulting in death .................... 12
7. Serious bodily injury to a vulnerable road user .................... 12
8. Speeding:
  1. One to four miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or one to four miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour .................... 0
  2. Five to nine miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or five to nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour .................... 1
  3. Ten to nineteen miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or ten to nineteen miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour .................... 4
  4. Twenty to thirty-nine miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or twenty to thirty-nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour .................... 6 (IV.5) Forty or more miles per hour over the reasonable and prudent speed or forty or more miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of seventy-five miles per hour .................... 12
  5. Failure to reduce speed below an otherwise lawful speed when a special hazard exists .................... 3
  6. One to four miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter .................... 0
  7. Five to nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter .................... 2
  8. Greater than nine miles per hour over the maximum lawful speed limit of forty miles per hour driving a low-power scooter .................... 4
9. Failure to stop for school signals .................... 6
10. Driving on wrong side of road or driving on wrong side of divided or controlled-access highway in violation of section 42-4-1010 .................... 4
11. Improper passing .................... 4
12. Failure to stop for school bus .................... 6
13. Following too closely .................... 4
14. Failure to observe traffic sign or signal, except as provided in paragraph (ff) of this subsection (5) .................... 4
15. Failure to yield to emergency vehicle .................... 4
16. Failure to yield right-of-way, except as provided in subsections (5)(y) to (5)(bb.5) of this section .................... 3
17. Improper turn .................... 3
18. Driving in wrong lane or direction on one-way street .................... 3
19. Driving through safety zone .................... 3
20. Conviction of violations not listed in this subsection (5) while driving a moving vehicle, which are violations of a state law or municipal ordinance other than violations classified as class B traffic infractions under section 42-4-1701 or having an equivalent classification under any municipal ordinance .................... 3
21. Failure to signal or improper signal .................... 2
22. Improper backing .................... 2
23. Failure to dim or turn on lights .................... 2
24. 1. Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (v), operating an unsafe vehicle .................... 2
  2. Operating a vehicle with defective head lamps .................... 1
25. Eluding or attempting to elude a police officer .................... 12
26. Alteration of suspension system .................... 3
27. Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian .................... 4
28. Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian at walk signal .................... 4
29. Failure to yield right-of-way to pedestrian upon emerging from alley, driveway, or building in a commercial or residential area .................... 4
30. Failure to yield right-of-way to person with a disability pursuant to section 42-4-808 .................... 6 (bb.5) Failure to yield right-of-way to a bicyclist or other authorized user in a bicycle lane that is the proximate cause of a bodily injury .................... . 4
31. Failure to exercise due care for pedestrian pursuant to section 42-4-807 .................... 4
32. A second or subsequent violation of section 42-2-101 (1) and (4) .................... 6
33. Failure to maintain or show proof of insurance pursuant to section 42-4-1409 .................... 4
34. Failure to observe high occupancy vehicle lane restrictions pursuant to section 42-4-1012 .................... 0
35. (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 334 , § 2, effective July 1, 2005.)
36. Driving a motor vehicle while not wearing a seat belt in violation of section 42-2-105.5 (3) .................... 2
37. Driving with more passengers than seat belts in violation of section 42-2-105.5 (4) .................... 2
38. A violation of section 42-4-239 (2) .................... 1 (jj.5) A violation of section 42-4-239 (3) .................... 4
39. Driving with a passenger who is under twenty-one years of age or driving between 12 midnight and 5 a.m. in violation of section 42-4-116 .................... 2
40. (I) Except as provided in subsection (5)(ll)(II) or (5)(ll)(III) of this section, failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle pursuant to section 42-4-705 (2) .................... 3 (II) Failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle resulting in bodily injury .................... 6 (III) Failure to exercise due care when approaching a stationary vehicle resulting in death .................... 8
41. Driving under restraint in violation of section 42-2-138 (1.5) .................... 3
(5.5) If a person receives a penalty assessment notice for a violation under section 42-4-1701 (5) and such person pays the fine and surcharge for the violation on or before the date the payment is due, the points assessed for the violation are reduced as follows:
1. For a violation having an assessment of three or more points under subsection (5) of this section, the points are reduced by two points;
2. For a violation having an assessment of two points under subsection (5) of this section, the points are reduced by one point.
1. (5.6) (a) Any municipality may elect to have the provisions of subsection (5.5) of this section apply to penalty assessment notices issued by the municipality pursuant to counterpart municipal ordinances. Whenever a municipality reduces a traffic offense, the reduced offense and the points assessed for such reduced offense shall conform to the point assessment schedule under subsection (5) of this section.
2. Any county may elect to have the provisions of subsection (5.5) of this section apply to penalty assessment notices issued by the county pursuant to counterpart county ordinances. Whenever a county reduces a traffic offense, the reduced offense and the points assessed for such reduced offense shall conform to the point assessment schedule under subsection (5) of this section.
(5.7) Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes to the contrary, if a penalty assessment for a traffic infraction is not personally served on the defendant or the defendant has not accepted the jurisdiction of the court for such penalty assessment, then the traffic infraction is a class B traffic infraction and the department has no authority to assess any points under this section upon entry of judgment for such traffic infraction.

(5.8) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department may not assess any points for a violation if such assessment of points is prohibited under section 42-4-110.5 (3) .
1. "Convicted" and "conviction", as used in this section, include conviction in any court of record or municipal court, or by the Southern Ute Indian tribal court, or by any military authority for offenses substantially the same as those set forth in subsection (5) of this section which occur on a military installation in this state and also include the acceptance and payment of a penalty assessment under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or under the similar provisions of any town or city ordinance and the entry of a judgment or default judgment for a traffic infraction under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 or 42-4-1710 or under the similar provisions of any municipal ordinance.
2. For the purposes of this article, a plea of no contest accepted by the court or the forfeiture of any bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court or the failure to appear in court by a defendant charged with DUI, DUI per se, or UDD who has been issued a summons and notice to appear pursuant to section 42-4-1707 as evidenced by records forwarded to the department in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-124 shall be considered as a conviction.
3. The provisions of paragraph (r) of subsection (5) of this section shall not be applicable to violations of sections 42-2-115, 42-3-121, and 42-4-314.
Upon the accumulation by a licensee of half as many points as are required for suspension, the department may send such licensee a warning letter in accordance with section 42-2-119 (2) or order a preliminary hearing, but the failure of the department to send such warning letter or hold such preliminary hearing shall not be grounds for invalidating the licensee's subsequent suspension as a result of accumulating additional points as long as the suspension is carried out under the provisions of this section. Should a preliminary hearing be ordered by the department and should the licensee fail to attend or show good cause for failure to attend, the department may suspend such license in the same way as if the licensee had accumulated sufficient points for suspension and had failed to attend such suspension hearing.
1. Whenever the department's records show that a licensee has accumulated a sufficient number of points to be subject to license suspension, the department shall notify the licensee that a hearing will be held not less than twenty days after the date of the notice to determine whether the licensee's driver's license should be suspended. The notification shall be given to the licensee in writing by regular mail, addressed to the address of the licensee as shown by the records of the department.
2. 1. If the department's records indicate that a driver has accumulated a sufficient number of points to cause a suspension under subsection (1) of this section and the driver is subject to a current or previous license restraint with a determined reinstatement date for the same offense or conviction that caused the driver to accumulate sufficient points to warrant suspension, the department may not order a point suspension of the license of the driver unless the license or driving privilege of the driver was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-126 (3)(c).
  2. If the department does not order a point suspension against the license of a driver because of the existence of a current or previous license restraint with a determined reinstatement date under the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), the department shall utilize the points that were assessed against the driver in determining whether to impose any future license suspension if the driver accumulates any more points against the driver's license.
Repealed.
Suspension hearings when ordered by the department shall be held at the district office of the department closest to the residence of the licensee; except that all or part of the hearing may, at the discretion of the department, be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5. A hearing delay shall be granted by the department only if the licensee presents the department with good cause for such delay. Good cause shall include absence from the state or county of residence, personal illness, or any other circumstance which, in the department's discretion, constitutes sufficient reason for delay. In the event that a suspension hearing is delayed, the department shall set a new date for such hearing no later than sixty days after the date of the original hearing.
Upon such hearing, the department or its authorized agent may administer oaths, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers, apply to the district court for the enforcement thereof by contempt proceedings, and require a reexamination of the licensee.
If at the hearing held pursuant to subsection (8) of this section it appears that the record of the driver sustains suspension as provided in this section, the department shall immediately suspend such driver's license, and such license shall then be surrendered to the department. If at such hearing it appears that the record of the driver does not sustain suspension, the department shall not suspend such license and shall adjust the accumulated-point total accordingly. In the event that the driver's license is suspended, the department may issue a probationary license for a period not to exceed the period of suspension, which license may contain such restrictions as the department deems reasonable and necessary and which may thereafter be subject to cancellation as a result of any violation of the restrictions imposed therein. The department may also order any driver whose license is suspended to take a complete driving reexamination. After such hearing, the licensee may appeal the decision to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135.
If the driver fails to appear at such hearing after proper notification as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section and a delay or continuance has not been requested and granted as provided in subsection (10) of this section, the department shall immediately suspend the license of the driver. A driver who failed to appear may request a subsequent hearing, but the request shall not postpone the effectiveness of the restraint.
1. 1. If there is no other statutory reason for denial of a probationary license, any individual who has had a license suspended by the department because of, at least in part, a conviction of an offense specified in subsection (5)(b) of this section may be entitled to a probationary license pursuant to subsection (12) of this section for the purpose of driving for reasons of employment, education, health, or alcohol and drug education or treatment, but: (14) (a) (I) If there is no other statutory reason for denial of a probationary license, any individual who has had a license suspended by the department because of, at least in part, a conviction of an offense specified in subsection (5)(b) of this section may be entitled to a probationary license pursuant to subsection (12) of this section for the purpose of driving for reasons of employment, education, health, or alcohol and drug education or treatment, but:
    1. If ordered by the court that convicted the individual, the individual shall enroll in a program of driving education or alcohol and drug education and treatment certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services; and
    2. If the individual is an interlock-restricted driver or is a persistent drunk driver, as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5), any probationary license shall require the use of an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 42-2-132.5 (9)(a), and the time that the individual holds a probationary license under this section shall be credited against the time that the individual may be required to hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to section 42-2-132.5.
  2. A probationary license issued pursuant to this subsection (14) shall contain any other restrictions as the department deems reasonable and necessary, shall be subject to cancellation for violation of any such restrictions, including but not limited to absences from alcohol and drug education or treatment sessions or failure to complete alcohol and drug education or treatment programs, and shall be issued for the entire period of suspension.
2. The department may refuse to issue a probationary license if the department finds that the driving record of the individual is such that the individual has sufficient points, in addition to those resulting from the conviction referred to in this subsection (14), to require the suspension or revocation of a license to drive on the highways of this state, or if the department finds from the record after a hearing conducted in accordance with subsection (12) of this section that aggravating circumstances exist to indicate the individual is unsafe for driving for any purpose. In refusing to issue a probationary license, the department shall make specific findings of fact to support such refusal.
3. No district attorney shall enter into, nor shall any judge approve, a plea bargaining agreement entered into solely for the purpose of permitting the defendant to qualify for a probationary license under this subsection (14).
Repealed.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2144, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1)(a), (8), and (9)(a) amended, p. 1307, § 4, effective July 1. L. 96: (5)(f)(I) amended, p. 637, § 2, effective May 1; (5)(f)(I), (5)(f)(II), (5)(f)(III), and (5)(f)(IV) amended, p. 577, § 1, effective May 25; (5)(h) and (5)(l) amended and (5)(ff) added, p. 1357, § 4, effective July 1; (14)(a) amended, p. 1204, § 4, effective July 1. L. 97: (5.8) added, p. 1670, § 4, effective June 5; (5)(b)(IV) added and (9)(a) amended, p. 1465, §§ 6, 7, effective July 1; (5)(v) amended and (5.5) to (5.7) added, p. 1385, § 4, effective July 1 L. 98: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 174, § 4, effective April 6. L. 99: (5)(gg), (5)(hh), and (5)(ii) added, p. 1381, § 5, effective July 1; (5.6) amended, p. 368, § 4, effective August 4. L. 2000: (5)(f)(I), (5)(f)(II), (5)(f)(III), and (5)(f)(IV) amended and (5)(f)(IV.5) added, p. 683, § 3, effective July 1; (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (2)(b) amended, p. 1355, § 27, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (9)(c) and (10) amended, p. 554, § 5, effective May 23; (14)(a) amended, p. 787, § 5, effective June 1. L. 2002: (15) added, p. 1131, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(gg) amended and (5)(kk) added, p. 334, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(jj) added, p. 268, § 2, effective August 8; (6)(c) amended, p. 1173, § 8, effective August 8. L. 2006: (5)(c) amended, p. 173, § 6, effective July 1; (14)(a) amended, p. 1367, § 3, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2008: (1)(a), (5)(b), (6)(b), (8)(b)(I), and (9)(a) amended, p. 246, § 9, effective July 1; (9) repealed, p. 834, § 4, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (1)(d) and (13) amended, (HB 09-1234), ch. 91, p. 352, § 1, effective August 5; (5)(f)(VI), (5)(f)(VII), and (5)(f)(VIII) added, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1266, § 25, effective October 1. L. 2010: (5)(e.5) added, (SB 10-204), ch. 243, p. 1080, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2011: (1)(d), (8)(a), and (14)(a)(I)(A) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1180, § 103, effective August 10. L. 2012: (14)(a)(I)(B) amended, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1483, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(a) and (6)(b) amended and (5)(b)(II) repealed, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1881, § 8, effective May 28; (15) repealed, (HB 13-1160), ch. 373, p. 2201, § 12, effective June 5. L. 2017: IP(14)(a)(I) and (14)(a)(I)(A) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1258, § 22, effective May 25; (5)(jj) amended and (5)(jj.5) added, (SB 17-027), ch. 279, p. 1524, § 2, effective June 1; (5)(mm) added, (HB 17-1162), ch. 208, p. 811, § 2, effective August 9; (5)(ll) added, (SB 17-229), ch. 278, p. 1521, § 3, effective September 1. L. 2019: (5)(e.7) added, (SB 19-175), ch. 331, p. 3070, § 1, effective May 29. L. 2020: (5)(n) amended and (5)(bb.5) added, (SB 20-061), ch. 30, p. 102, § 3, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-123 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-127 was relocated to § 42-2-135.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1999 act enacting subsections (5)(gg), (5)(hh), and (5)(ii), see section 1 of chapter 334, Session Laws of Colorado 1999. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (14)(a), see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act repealing subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

(2) For the short title ("Move Over for Cody Act") in SB 17-229, see section 1 of chapter 278, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "The Effect of Land Use Legislation on the Common Law of Nuisance in Urban Areas", see 36 Dicta 414 (1959). For article, "The New Colorado Per Se DUI Law", see 12 Colo. Law. 1451 (1983). For article, "There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License", see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-127 is similar to 42-2-123 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to repealed § 13-4-23, C.R.S. 1963, and to § 13-3-24, CRS 53, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Portion of section authorizing suspension of license held constitutional. Portion of this section which grants the motor vehicle division authority to suspend the driver's license of any operator who has accumulated "twelve points within any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months" is not overbroad, vague, or indefinite. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

Portion of section severable. The portion of this section dealing with suspension of licenses is complete in itself and independent of the portion of the statute dealing with probationary licenses; the two provisions are severable. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

Classification of 18- to 21-year-olds not violative of equal protection. Where licensees assert that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment because Colorado allows drivers in the age group of 18 to 21 years to accumulate only eight points prior to suspension, while drivers over 21 years are allowed 12 points before their licenses are suspended, and further assert that there is no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare of Colorado in the different treatment, statistical analyses of all accidents in Colorado in 1973, analyzed by age, fully justifies the different treatment mandated by the general assembly, and these figures clearly support the determination by the general assembly that drivers in the lower age groups demand closer supervision, to protect the public health and safety. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Nonresident licensees assert that it is unreasonable for Colorado to treat them differently from their states of residence where they are allowed the same driving privileges as older drivers, but, as repeatedly pointed out, the use of Colorado highways is a privilege strictly governed by statute, and it has not been demonstrated that the general assembly was in any way unreasonable or arbitrary in its classification. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Subsection (1)(a) of this section is constitutional. Keegan v. State, 194 Colo. 325 , 571 P.2d 1110 (1977).

Higher point allocation for chauffeurs not unconstitutional. The legislative decision to accord chauffeurs as a class a higher point allocation than that given to the "regular driver" cannot be viewed as so lacking a reasonable basis in fact as to render the statutory classification constitutionally flawed. Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1982).

Statutes enacted by the general assembly in the exercise of its police power must be strictly construed and are not to be extended by implication; accordingly, an operator's license, once issued, is not to be revoked arbitrarily but only in the manner provided by law. Cave v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 31 Colo. App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972).

Revocation proceeding is civil. The administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license of a habitual offender is a civil proceeding. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

This section does not constitute an unreasonable exercise of the police power, since an individual's right to use the highways of the state is an adjunct of the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and protect property. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

This section does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. Since the overall statutory scheme, of which the probationary license provision is a part, provides sufficient general standards to guide its application and contains adequate safeguards against administrative abuse, this section is not on its face an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

The words of this section are plain and unambiguous. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

This section is not unconstitutionally vague. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The obvious purpose of this section is to protect the safety of the public. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The primary purpose of this section and sections §§ 42-2-121 and 42-2-122 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).

This section is designed to protect the welfare and safety of the public and must be construed to further that legislative purpose. Livengood v. Dept. of Rev., 44 Colo. App. 431, 614 P.2d 908 (1980).

Legislative intent. Legislative history clearly demonstrates that it was the intent of the general assembly to authorize the motor vehicle division to consider that period of time ending with the date of the last violation involved. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973); Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The general assembly did not intend by this section to empower the motor vehicle division to delve back into the driving history of any operator for the purpose of suspending his license. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

The legislative intent was to authorize two suspensions in an instance where during the first year the driver accumulated 12 points and in the second year the driver accumulated 6 more points. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev., 191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

Suspension of license authorized upon accumulation of 12 points in one year. Subsection (1) authorizes the department of revenue to suspend the license of any operator who has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in accumulation of 12 points in one year. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961); Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

The word "year" must be interpreted as a year tied to the expiration date of the license, this being referred to as an "anniversary license year". Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

Suspension of license authorized. This section establishes a basic rule that any operator or chauffeur is subject to license suspension if he is convicted of traffic violations which result in the accumulation of 12 points within any 12 consecutive months. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Section contains a limited exception for chauffeurs which allows them to accumulate a maximum of 16 points in one year subject, however, to the proviso that "all such points are accumulated while said chauffeur is in the course of his employment". Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Where all of the violations and the resulting points did not occur within the course of chauffeur's employment, the 16-point exception is not applicable. Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div., 33 Colo. App. 382, 520 P.2d 598 (1974).

Thus, suspension of license not subject to abuse of discretion. Where evidence is clear and demonstrates that chauffeur has more than enough points to justify suspension of license, suspension of license is ministerial act, discharge of which is not subject to abuse of discretion. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973); Mitchell v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 719 (Colo. App. 1982).

The suspension of drivers' licenses, being based on a point system, involves no discretion on the part of an administrator and therefore is not subject to abuse of discretion. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

Suspension of license based upon the point system is not subject to abuse of discretion. Ryan v. Charnes, 738 P.2d 1175 (Colo. 1987).

The department is authorized to suspend the driver's license of any person who has been "convicted" of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of excessive points, but points cannot be assessed until after "conviction" for such traffic violations. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

Department is vested with discretionary authority to determine length of period of suspension and whether to grant a probationary license. Elkins v. Charnes, 682 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1984).

No violation of due process. Section 42-4-1510 and this section give a licensee notice of the ramifications of his failure to appear, and the forfeiture of his bond for traffic violation charge and due process requirements are satisfied. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

Violation of § 42-4-1406 included in term "leaving scene of accident". The general assembly intended that a violation of § 42-4-1406 be included within the meaning of the term "leaving scene of accident" as used in this section. Gammon v. State Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 437, 513 P.2d 748 (1973).

Notification of nonresident offenders constitutional. The methods used to notify purported nonresident traffic offenders are not so unconstitutionally deficient as to violate equal protection or due process rights. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

Minimum standard mandated for use of penalty assessment as conviction. Through the provisions of § 42-2-121 (3) , the general assembly has mandated a minimum standard of due process which must be followed before payment of a penalty assessment may be used as a conviction for purposes of suspension or revocation of a driver's license pursuant to subsection (1)(a). Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Points not assessable. If a traffic violation does not appear on the summons, and the offender is not advised by the arresting officer in reference to the points chargeable for the traffic violation, points cannot be assessed against him for that offense. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Summons need not reflect assessable points. Where a conviction is the result of a court appearance, not of a penalty assessment, the summons need not reflect the number of points to be assessed for the offense charged; the statutory provision which requires that a summons reflect the number of points relates only to penalty assessments under § 42-4-1501(4)(a). Purcell v. Tomasi, 43 Colo. App. 540, 608 P.2d 844 (1980).

Due process requirements. Due process requires that the department of revenue promulgate rules or regulations to guide hearing officers in their decisions regarding requests for probationary licenses. These rules and regulations must be sufficiently specific to inform the public what factors will be considered relevant by department hearing officers, and they must require that hearing officers specifically state, in each case where a probationary license is denied, the reason for the denial. Elizondo v. State, Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 113 , 570 P.2d 518 (1977).

This section does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law, even though a person whose driver's license was suspended administratively through § 42-2-122.1 could not receive a probationary license and a person whose license was suspended as a result of a criminal conviction in accordance with this section could receive a probationary license, because the court, after making a determination of whether persons allegedly subject to disparate treatment by these sections were in fact similarly situated, found that no classification of persons similarly situated exists since § 42-2-122.1 involved an administrative suspension as opposed to a suspension resulting from a criminal conviction. Hancock v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1372 ( Colo. 1988 ); Bath v. State Dept. of Rev., 758 P.2d 1381 ( Colo. 1988 ).

The date of conviction is the decisive date from which the accumulated points are to be counted. Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540 , 383 P.2d 791 (1963).

The language of subsection (8) is mandatory. People v. Yount, 174 Colo. 462 , 484 P.2d 1203 (1971).

Notice to nonresident offenders. The state is not required to ascertain an out-of-state traffic offender's permanent address prior to sending him notification under subsection (8). Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

One-year delay not bar to proceedings. A one-year delay in commencing these administrative proceedings pursuant to this section does not ipso facto constitute a bar to the hearing. Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).

The right to jury trial and the right to confront witnesses are inapplicable in an administrative hearing to determine whether a driver's license should be revoked for accumulated traffic violations. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Hearing officer is not required to make findings as to validity of each conviction since these are matter of record. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

Findings of fact necessary are that sufficient points have accumulated to warrant revocation of permit, that evidence offered in mitigation of permit is not deemed sufficient to justify exception, and that petitioner is not fit person to operate motor vehicle. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

This provision is mandatory, and function of hearing examiner in such situation is purely ministerial. Michels v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 32 Colo. App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973).

The function of the hearing examiner in suspension proceeding is purely ministerial, and the strict rules of evidence followed in civil and criminal actions are not applicable. Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975).

A suspension order under this section is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 42-2-127 . Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Sole issue at revocation hearing is whether requisite number of convictions are sustained. The only issue to be determined at the license revocation hearing is whether the licensee has sustained the requisite number of convictions for specified traffic offenses within the prescribed period of time, all as established by statute. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

The issues to be determined at the suspension hearing pursuant to subsection (11) are whether the defendant has accumulated the requisite number of convictions within the time period established in the statute to require suspension and whether he would be granted a probationary license. Thurber v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1983).

Hearing officer must ensure record indicates existence of requisite convictions. While a hearing officer need not determine the validity of a respondent's convictions, he must nevertheless, pursuant to his statutory authority under subsection (1)(a), ensure that the record on its face indicates the existence of the requisite convictions. Gurule v. State Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 295, 558 P.2d 587 (1976).

Driver's history record is prima facie evidence of conviction. The driver's history record maintained by the department constitutes prima facie evidence of conviction for the offenses therein noted. Anadale v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 674 P.2d 372 ( Colo. 1984 ).

In determining length of suspension and whether to grant a probationary license, it was not an error for hearing officer to follow regulation which required hearing officer to base his determination solely on driver's driving record and on the presence or absence of factors specified in the regulation. Elkins v. Charnes, 682 P.2d 70 (Colo. App. 1984).

This initial presumption may be overcome by evidence indicating that the official records are insufficient to establish guilt. Anadale v. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 674 P.2d 372 ( Colo. 1984 ).

Licensee may challenge mistakes in records but not relitigate guilt. At the administrative hearing, it is the licensee's responsibility to challenge alleged mistakes in the records of the department as to his driving history, but he may not relitigate the issue of guilt as to the offenses shown on his record. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

The defendant may not relitigate factual issues of his guilt or the validity of his traffic convictions. Thurber v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1983).

Hearing officer may not ignore challenged conviction. Even if a licensee has a meritorious claim that an underlying conviction is not valid, the department hearing officer cannot ignore the conviction until it has been ruled invalid and set aside by a court. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

Where driving record clearly shows convictions in a court of law, licensee has had his day in court, and in no case may he relitigate the issue of guilt in the suspension hearing. Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

Separate suspensions may be imposed for violations committed during the same period where, at the time the first suspension was imposed, other charges were still being litigated and had not resulted in convictions, since points may be assessed and suspensions imposed only following convictions. Howell v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 631 P.2d 1198 (Colo. App. 1981).

Proof of payment of money did not prove conviction. Where plaintiff's driving privileges were suspended because she had allegedly accumulated 12 points against her driving record within a 12-month period, but of these points, four were based on an alleged conviction of a charge of driving 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone in the city of Golden, a four-point offense, and with respect to this charge, the record indicated only that $15 was paid on September 26, 1974, to the Golden municipal court clerk, proof of payment of $15, even if it were assumed that it had been to pay a fine, did not prove that there was a conviction of the offense for which plaintiff was ticketed. Troutman v. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 417, 571 P.2d 726 (1976).

Mere acceptance of penalty assessment is not "conviction" within the meaning of subsection (6)(a). Gillespie v. Dir. of Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 561, 592 P.2d 418 (1978).

The general assembly decriminalized various state law traffic violations in 1982, and, in doing so, subsection (6)(a) was amended to include as a "conviction" the entry of a judgment or default judgment for a traffic infraction under the provisions of § 42-4-1501 or 42-4-1505.7. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

A default judgment entered by a municipal court for a civil traffic infraction under municipal law does not constitute a "conviction" for purposes of assessing points and authorizing a license suspension. The clause "or under the similar provisions of any town or city ordinance," which follows the provisions regarding penalty assessments under state law in subsection (6)(a), does not follow the provisions added in 1982 regarding judgments for civil traffic infractions under state law. It cannot be presumed that this omission was unintentional or without significance. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 amendment).

Proof of knowledge of revocation order. The prosecution is required to prove the element of knowledge of the revocation order in a driving after judgment prohibited case, as mailing notice of the order is only prima facie proof of its receipt under subsection (12), and is not conclusive. People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1983).

The 60-day time limit under subsection (12) is, on its face, directory and does not create a mandatory requirement which, if not met, will deprive the Department of all jurisdiction to act. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

Construing the pertinent time limitation to be mandatory would divest the Department of jurisdiction to suspend or revoke any license if that limitation were violated, even if no prejudice was occasioned by such violation and, absent explicit language revealing such, we decline to assume that the general assembly intended that an agency's procedural mistake should defeat the prime objective of the statute. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).

Unlike the time limit for hearings under § 42-2-122.1 (7)(e), the 60-day time limit in § 42-2-123 (12) is not mandatory and, consequently, if no claim of actual prejudice resulting from the delay is established, the department does not lose jurisdiction over the habitual offender revocation proceedings or the points suspension proceedings simply because the requested hearing is scheduled beyond the 60-day period. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993) (decided under law in effect prior to 1994 amendment).

Probationary license must be issued unless department makes finding of unfitness. Where the department makes no finding that the applicant for a probationary license is "unsafe for driving for any purpose", and the basis for the suspension is, at least in part, an alcohol-related offense, subsection (13) requires the department to grant the probationary license. In re Quay, 647 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1982).

Applicability of subsection (13). Subsection (13) applies only to traffic offenses committed on or after October 1, 1979, and not to acts of the department in revoking or suspending a license. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

Subsection (13) inapplicable to plea-bargained non-alcohol-related offense. A driver may not plea-bargain an alcohol-related offense to a non-alcohol-related offense, and thereafter successfully assert the inconsistent position that he is entitled to the protection of subsection (13)(a), when seeking a probationary license. Schmidt v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982).

In determining whether motorist's license should be suspended, the length of that suspension, and whether a probationary license should be granted, the department of revenue did not err in considering both the municipal court conviction and the traffic points resulting therefrom. Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979).

Enforcement of violations of municipal traffic laws is separate and distinct from enforcement of violations of state traffic laws, although a municipal ordinance may be patterned after comparable state law provisions. Jackson v. Dept. of Rev., 791 P.2d 1206 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applicant's need for probationary license is one factor. The need of an applicant for a probationary license during a period of suspension is only one factor to be considered by the hearing officer, and it was not error for hearing officer to deny a probationary license based on applicant's repeated driving convictions. Fisher v. Jorgensen, 674 P.2d 1003 (Colo. App. 1983).

The benefits of amendatory legislation do not apply to driver's license revocation proceedings because revocation of a driver's license is a civil, not criminal, matter. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

The general rule in civil proceedings regarding amendatory legislation is that civil liability already incurred may not be changed by statute unless specifically so provided by the general assembly. Dellovade v. Charnes, 633 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1981).

Basis for suspensions. Where, in the 24-month period preceding April 16, 1972, the date on which appellant committed traffic violations for which he was subsequently convicted, the only points accumulated by him were during the four months ending with April 16, 1972, the only possible basis for his first suspension was the acquisition of 12 points during the 12-month period ending with April 16, 1972, and where, during the year immediately succeeding April 16, 1972, he was awarded 7 more points, he was subject to a second suspension of his license for 18 or more points resulting from violations occurring in a 24-month period. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Rev.,191 Colo. 517 , 554 P.2d 691 (1976).

The language of subsection (13)(a) is unambiguous and the denial by the department of revenue of plaintiff's application for a second probationary license was proper because issuance of a second probationary license within a five-year period is prohibited regardless of whether alcohol-related offenses were involved. Howard v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 680 P.2d 1336 (Colo. App. 1984).

Section permits no "grace period" within which a person whose license has previously been suspended may operate a motor vehicle without concern for the effect such earlier violations may have on his right to continue to drive. Livengood v. Dept. of Rev., 44 Colo. App. 431, 614 P.2d 908 (1980).

Only in original suspension hearing may department grant probationary license, and such discretion may not be exercised under proceedings concerned with the renewal or extension of a period of suspension under § 42-2-130 (3). Ewing v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 353 (Colo. App. 1980).

Suspensions ending seven years prior in time not considered in probationary license hearing. For the purpose of examining one's driving history in appraising an application for a probationary license, the department may not consider any suspension in which the ordered period has ended prior to seven years before the hearing. Edwards v. State, Dept. of Rev., 42 Colo. App. 52, 592 P.2d 1345 (1978).

Department may allow review of seven-year record when processing probationary license. The department has not exceeded its authority by allowing the hearing officer to consider the licensee's record for a period of seven years when processing a probationary license request even though this section sets 24 months as the maximum period for which point accumulations are to be examined in determining whether a license should be suspended. Peshel v. Motor Vehicle Div., 43 Colo. App. 58, 602 P.2d 875 (1979).

Validity of probationary license. A probationary license, issued during a period of suspension, is valid until the licensee pays the restoration fee to get back his driver's license because the period of suspension continues until the restoration fee is paid, unless the expiration date of the probationary license is noted on that license. Seigneur v. Motor Vehicle Div., 674 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1983).

Review of denial of probationary license limited. Where there is competent evidence to support the hearing officer's findings of aggravating circumstances and lack of mitigating circumstances and, therefore, to sustain the denial of a probationary license, further review of the soundness of that denial is precluded. Sonoda v. State, 664 P.2d 259 (Colo. App. 1983).

Failure to make findings of fact relating to denial of application for probationary license for work-related driving is improper. Isberg v. State, Dept. of Rev., 670 P.2d 29 (Colo. App. 1983).

"Employment", as used in subsection (13), means a compensated position is applied in Braddock v. State, 679 P.2d 120 (Colo. App. 1984).

Where the evidence before the motor vehicle division did not support its findings, it abused its discretion. Gurule v. State Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 295, 558 P.2d 587 (1976).

When decision reversed. Where the hearing officer made his decision without the guidance of any articulated standards in the form of rules or regulations, there is no basis upon which a reviewing court can determine whether or not the officer abused his discretion, and decision must be reversed. Friedman v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Dept. of Rev., 194 Colo. 228 , 571 P.2d 1086 (1977).

Applied in Duenas-Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm'n, 199 Colo. 95 , 606 P.2d 437 (1980); People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486 , 617 P.2d 1178 (1980); People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 ( Colo. 1980 ); Briner v. Charnes, 10 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981 ); Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 ( Colo. 1981 ); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 632 P.2d 1044 (Colo. App. 1981); Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ); City of Greenwood Vill. v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 ( Colo. 1982 ); Downey v. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1982); Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 ( Colo. 1983 ); DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 ( Colo. 1983 ).

42-2-127.3. Authority to suspend license - controlled substance violations. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 1583, § 15, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1)(b) amended, p. 2690, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1817, § 9, effective August 5.

42-2-127.4. Authority to suspend license - forgery of a penalty assessment notice issued to minor under the age of eighteen years. (Repealed)

Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 1330, § 1, effective July 1, 2005. L. 2006: (1)(a) amended, p. 1509, § 63, effective June 1. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1818, § 10, effective August 5.

42-2-127.5. Authority to suspend license - violation of child support order.

The department shall suspend the license of any driver who is not in compliance with a child support order pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Upon receipt of a notice of failure to comply from the state child support enforcement agency pursuant to section 26-13-123 (4), C.R.S., the department shall send written notice to the person identified in the court order that such person shall be required to provide the department with proof of compliance with the child support order. Such proof shall be in the form of a notice of compliance as defined in section 26-13-123 (1)(c), C.R.S.
1. If a notice of compliance is not received by the department within thirty days after the date written notice is sent pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the department shall suspend the driver's license of the person from whom proof is required and may not reinstate such license until proof in the form of a notice of compliance is provided.
2. The driver shall not have a right to a hearing before license suspension pursuant to this subsection (3), and the driver's right to any hearing shall be limited to the rights set forth in section 26-13-123, C.R.S.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (4) is effective until January 1, 2022.] In the event that a driver's license is suspended pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the department may issue a probationary license for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date of issuance, which probationary license shall restrict the driver to driving to and from the place of employment or to performing duties within the course of the driver's employment. The department is authorized to charge a fee for such probationary license that covers the direct and indirect costs of issuing the license. The department may not issue a probationary license to an individual unless at the time of license restraint such individual has a valid driver's privilege and has no outstanding judgments or warrants issued against such individual pursuant to the requirements of section 42-2-118 (3).
(4) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (4) is effective January 1, 2022. ] In the event that a driver's license is suspended pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the department may issue a probationary license for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date of issuance, which probationary license restricts the driver to driving to and from the place of employment or to performing duties within the course of the driver's employment. The department is authorized to charge a fee for such probationary license that covers the direct and indirect costs of issuing the license.
Repealed.

Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 588, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: (4) amended, p. 1205, § 5, effective July 1. L. 98: (5) repealed, p. 768, § 20, effective July 1. L. 2021: (4) amended, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3100, § 12, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

42-2-127.6. Authority to suspend license - providing alcohol to an underage person.

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until January 1, 2022.]

1. Whenever the department receives notice that a person, other than a business licensed pursuant to article 3, 4, or 5 of title 44, or an employee or agent of the business acting in the scope of his or her employment, has been convicted of an offense pursuant to section 44-3-901 (1)(b) or (1)(l), the department shall immediately suspend the license of the person for a period of not less than six months.
2. For purposes of this subsection (1), a person has been convicted when the person has been found guilty by a court or a jury, entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or received a deferred sentence for an offense.
1. Upon suspension of a person's license as required by this section, the department shall immediately notify the person as provided in section 42-2-119 (2).
2. Upon receipt of the notice of suspension, the person or the person's attorney may request a hearing in writing. The department shall hold a hearing not less than thirty days after receiving the request through a hearing commissioner appointed by the executive director of the department, which hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, C.R.S. The hearing shall be held at the district office of the department closest to the residence of the person; except that all or part of the hearing may, at the discretion of the department, be conducted in real time by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5, unless the person requests to appear in person at the hearing. After the hearing, the person may appeal the decision of the department to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135. If a person who has had a license suspended under this section is subsequently acquitted of the conviction that required the suspension by a court of record, the department shall immediately, in any event not later than ten days after the receipt of the notice of acquittal, reinstate said license to the person affected, unless the license is under other restraint.
1. If there is no other statutory reason for denial of a probationary license, a person who has had a license suspended by the department because of, in whole or in part, a conviction of an offense specified in subsection (1) of this section shall be entitled to a probationary license for the purpose of driving for reasons of employment, education, health, or compliance with the requirements of probation. Such a probationary license shall:
  1. Contain any other restrictions the department deems reasonable and necessary;
  2. Be subject to cancellation for violation of any such restrictions; and
  3. Be issued for the entire period of suspension.
2. The department may refuse to issue a probationary license if the department finds that the driving record of the person is such that the person has sufficient points to require the suspension or revocation of a license to drive on the highways of this state pursuant to section 42-2-127 or if the department finds from the record after a hearing conducted in accordance with this section that aggravating circumstances exist to indicate the person is unsafe for driving for any purpose. In refusing to issue a probationary license, the department shall make specific findings of fact to support the refusal.

42-2-127.6. Authority to suspend license - providing alcohol to an underage person. (Repealed)

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective January 1, 2022. ]

Source: L. 2005: Entire section added, p. 602, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2018: (1)(a) amended, (HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1082, § 24, effective October 1. L. 2021: Entire section repealed, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3097, § 5, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act repealing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

42-2-127.7. Authority to suspend driver's license - uninsured motorists - legislative declaration.

The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the purpose of this section is to induce and encourage all motorists to provide for their financial responsibility for the protection of others and to assure the widespread availability to the insuring public of insurance protection against financial loss caused by negligent, financially irresponsible, motorists.
1. The department may suspend the driver's license of any person upon its determination that the person drove a vehicle in this state without having in full force and effect a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S., as follows:
  1. Upon the first determination that a person operated a motor vehicle in this state without having in full force and effect a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required pursuant to section 10-4-619 or 10-4-624, C.R.S., the department shall suspend the driver's license of a person until the person furnishes proof of financial responsibility, as defined in section 42-7-103 (14), in the manner contemplated by section 42-7-301 (1), in the amount specified in section 10-4-620, C.R.S.
  2. Upon the second determination that the person operated a motor vehicle in this state without having in full force and effect a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S., within five years, the department shall suspend the person's driver's license for a period of four months.
  3. Upon the third or subsequent determination that the person operated a motor vehicle in this state without having in full force and effect a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S., the department shall suspend the person's driver's license for a period of eight months.
2. The department shall make a determination of such facts on the basis of the documents and affidavit of a law enforcement officer as specified in subsection (3) of this section, and this determination shall be final unless a hearing is requested and held as provided in subsection (7) of this section.
3. The determination of the facts specified in this subsection (2) by the department is independent of the suspension taken under article 7 of this title.
4. For purposes of this section, "license" includes any driving privilege.
Whenever a law enforcement officer determines, by checking the motorist insurance identification database created in section 42-7-604, and by any other means authorized by law, that a driver violates section 42-4-1409 by not having a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance in full force and effect as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S., the law enforcement officer making such determination shall forward to the department an affidavit that includes a statement of the officer's probable cause that the person committed such violation, and a copy of the citation and complaint, if any, filed with the court. The affidavit shall be dated, signed, and sworn to by the law enforcement officer under penalty of perjury, but need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person.
1. Upon receipt by the department of the affidavit of the law enforcement officer and the relevant documents required by subsection (3) of this section, the department shall make the determination described in subsection (2) of this section. The determination shall be based upon the information contained in the affidavit and the relevant documents. If the department determines that the person is subject to license suspension, the department may issue a notice of suspension if such notice has not already been served upon the person by the law enforcement officer as required in subsection (5) of this section.
2. The notice of suspension sent by the department shall be mailed in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-119 (2) to the person at the last-known address shown on the department's records, if any, and to any address provided in the law enforcement officer's affidavit if that address differs from the address of record. The notice shall be deemed received three days after mailing.
3. The notice of suspension shall clearly specify the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, the effective date of the suspension, the right of the person to request a hearing, the procedure for requesting a hearing, and the date by which that request for a hearing must be made. The notice shall also state that the person may avoid suspension by filing with the department proof of financial responsibility for the future, or by compliance with section 42-7-302 on the first determination. For subsequent offenses, a person's driver's license shall be suspended in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. If the person files proof of financial responsibility for the future, such proof of financial responsibility for the future shall be maintained for three years from the date such proof of financial responsibility for the future is received by the department and after any applicable suspension period.
4. If the department determines that the person is not subject to license suspension:
  1. The department shall notify the person of its determination and shall rescind any order of suspension served upon the person by the law enforcement officer;
  2. The person whose driver's license was taken possession of by a law enforcement officer under this section may obtain the license by the payment of a fee to the department. The department shall determine the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5.
1. Whenever a law enforcement officer determines, by checking the motorist insurance identification database created in section 42-7-604, and by any other means authorized by law, that a driver violates section 42-4-1409 by not having a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S., the officer, acting on behalf of the department, may serve the notice of suspension personally on such driver. If the law enforcement officer serves the notice of suspension, the officer shall take possession of any driver's license issued by this state or any other state that is held by the person. When the officer takes possession of a valid license, the officer, acting on behalf of the department, shall issue a temporary permit that is valid for seven days after its date of issuance.
2. A copy of the completed notice of suspension form, a copy of any completed temporary permit form, and any driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit taken into possession under this section shall be forwarded to the department by the law enforcement officer along with the affidavit and documents required in subsections (2) and (3) of this section.
3. The department shall provide forms for notice of suspension and for temporary permits to law enforcement agencies. The department shall establish a format for the affidavits required by this section and shall give notice of such format to all law enforcement agencies which submit affidavits to the department. Such law enforcement agencies shall follow the format determined by the department.
4. A temporary permit may not be issued to any person who is already driving with a temporary permit issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (5).
1. The license suspension shall become effective seven days after the subject person has received the notice of suspension as provided in subsection (5) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice of suspension by mail as provided in subsection (4) of this section unless the person files with the department proof of financial responsibility for the future or complies with section 42-7-302 prior to the effective date of the suspension. If the person files proof of financial responsibility for the future, such proof of financial responsibility for the future must be maintained for three years from the date such proof of financial responsibility for the future is received by the department. If a written request for a hearing and evidence of current liability insurance in the respondent's name is received by the department within that same seven-day period, the effective date of the suspension shall be stayed until a final order is issued following the hearing; except that any delay in the hearing that is caused or requested by the subject person or counsel representing that person shall not result in a stay of the suspension during the period of delay.
2. The period of license suspension under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section shall be for an indefinite period. The person may reinstate at any time by complying with section 42-7-302 or by filing with the department proof of financial responsibility for the future and paying the required reinstatement fee pursuant to section 42-2-132. If the person files proof of financial responsibility for the future, such proof of financial responsibility for the future must be maintained for three years from the date such proof of financial responsibility for the future is received by the department.
1. Any person who has received a notice of suspension may make a written request for a review of the department's determination at a hearing. The request may be made on a form available at each office of the department. Evidence of current liability insurance in the respondent's name and the person's driver's license, if the license has not been previously surrendered, shall be submitted at the time the request for a hearing is made.
2. The request for a hearing shall be made in writing within seven days after the day the person received the notice of suspension as provided in subsection (5) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice by mail as provided in subsection (4) of this section. If written request for a hearing and evidence of current liability insurance in the respondent's name is not received within the seven-day period, the right to a hearing is waived, and the determination of the department that is based upon the documents and affidavit required by subsections (2) and (3) of this section becomes final.
3. If a written request for a hearing is made after expiration of the seven-day period and if it is accompanied by the applicant's verified statement explaining the failure to make a timely request for a hearing, the department shall receive and consider the request. If the department finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension or due to factors of physical incapacity such as hospitalization or incarceration, the department shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter, and grant the hearing request upon receipt of evidence of current liability insurance in the respondent's name. In such a case, a stay of the suspension pending issuance of the final order following the hearing shall not be granted.
4. At the time the request for a hearing is made, if it appears from the record that the person is the holder of a valid driver's or minor driver's license or any instruction permit issued by this state or temporary permit issued pursuant to subsection (5) of this section and that the license has been surrendered as required pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the department shall issue a temporary permit upon the receipt of evidence of current liability insurance in the respondent's name. The temporary permit will be valid until the scheduled date for the hearing. If necessary, the department may later issue an additional temporary permit or permits in order to stay the effective date of the suspension until the final order is issued following the hearing, as required by subsection (6) of this section.
5. 1. The hearing shall be scheduled to be held as quickly as practicable but not more than sixty days after the day that the request for a hearing is received by the department; except that, if a hearing is rescheduled because of the unavailability of the hearing officer in accordance with subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (e), the hearing may be rescheduled more than sixty days after the day that the request for the hearing is received by the department, and the department shall continue any temporary driving privileges held by the respondent until the date that such hearing is rescheduled. The department shall provide a written notice of the time and place of the hearing to the respondent in the manner provided in section 42-2-119 (2) at least ten days prior to the scheduled or rescheduled hearing, unless the parties agree to waive this requirement. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 42-2-119, the last-known address of the respondent for purposes of notice for any hearing pursuant to this section shall be the address stated on the hearing request form.
  2. If a hearing officer cannot appear at any original or rescheduled hearing because of medical reasons, another administrative hearing, or any other legitimate just cause, such hearing officer or the department may reschedule the hearing at the earliest possible time when the hearing officer will be available.
6. If a hearing is held pursuant to this subsection (7), the department shall review the matter and make a final determination on the basis of the documents and affidavit submitted to the department pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) of this section. The law enforcement officer who submitted the affidavit need not be present at the hearing. The department shall consider all other relevant evidence at the hearing, including the reports of law enforcement officers that are submitted to the department. The reports of law enforcement officers shall not be required to be made under oath, but such reports shall identify the officers making the reports. The department may consider evidence contained in affidavits from persons other than the respondent, so long as such affidavits include the affiant's home or work address and telephone number and are dated, signed, and sworn to by the affiant under penalty of perjury. The affidavit need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person. The respondent must present evidence in person.
1. The hearing shall be held in the district office of the department closest to the residence of the driver; except that all or part of the hearing may, at the discretion of the department, be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5. The person requesting the hearing may be referred to as the respondent.
2. The presiding hearing officer shall be the executive director of the department or an authorized representative designated by the executive director. The presiding hearing officer shall have authority to administer oaths and affirmations; to consider the affidavit of the law enforcement officer filing such affidavit as specified in subsection (3) of this section; to consider other law enforcement officers' reports that are submitted to the department, which reports need not be under oath but shall identify the officers making the reports; to examine and consider documents and copies of documents containing relevant evidence; to consider other affidavits that are dated, signed, and sworn to by the affiant under penalty of perjury, which affidavits need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person but shall contain the affiant's home or work address and telephone number; to take judicial notice as defined by rule 201 of article II of the Colorado rules of evidence, subject to the provisions of section 24-4-105 (8), C.R.S., which shall include judicial notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within the hearing officer's knowledge; to compel witnesses to testify or produce books, records, or other evidence; to examine witnesses and take testimony; to receive and consider any relevant evidence necessary to properly perform the hearing officer's duties as required by this section; to issue subpoenas duces tecum to produce books, documents, records, or other evidence; to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses; to take depositions, or cause depositions or interrogatories to be taken; to regulate the course and conduct of the hearing; and to make a final ruling on the issues.
3. 1. When a license is suspended under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, the sole issue at the hearing shall be whether by a preponderance of the evidence the person drove a vehicle in this state without having in force a complying policy or certificate of self-insurance as required by sections 10-4-619 and 10-4-624, C.R.S. If the presiding hearing officer finds the affirmative of the issue, the suspension order shall be sustained. If the presiding hearing officer finds the negative of the issue, the suspension order shall be rescinded.
  2. Under no circumstances shall the presiding hearing officer consider any issue not specified in this paragraph (c).
4. The hearing shall be recorded. The decision of the presiding hearing officer shall be rendered in writing, and a copy shall be provided to the person who requested the hearing.
5. If the person who requested the hearing fails to appear without just cause, the right to a hearing shall be waived, and the determination of the department which is based upon the documents and affidavit required in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall become final.
1. Within thirty-five days of the issuance of the final determination of the department under this section, a person aggrieved by the determination has the right to file a petition for judicial review in the district court in the county of the person's residence.
2. The review shall be on the record without taking additional testimony. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination which is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.
3. The filing of a petition for judicial review shall not result in an automatic stay of the suspension order. The court may grant a stay of the order only upon motion and hearing and upon a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner will prevail upon the merits and that the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not stayed.
The "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., shall apply to this section to the extent it is consistent with subsections (7), (8), and (9) of this section relating to administrative hearings and judicial review.
This section shall take effect when the motorist insurance identification database, created in section 42-7-604, has been developed and is operational, but not later than January 1, 1999.

Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 1452, § 9, effective July 1. L. 98: (4)(d)(II) amended, p. 1353, § 98, effective June 1. L. 2000: (5)(b) and (7)(d) amended, p. 1356, § 28, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (8)(a) amended, p. 555, § 6, effective May 23. L. 2003: (2)(a), (3), (5)(a), and (8)(c)(I) amended, p. 1572, § 11, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(a) and (4)(c) amended, p. 792, § 2, effective January 1, 2005. L. 2014: (4)(d)(II) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1547, § 11, effective June 5. L. 2015: (9)(a) amended, (HB 15-1021), ch. 25, p. 63, § 2, effective August 5.

Editor's note: Section 11 of Senate Bill 14-194 incorrectly states that it amends subsection (4)(b)(II) when the actual provision it amends is subsection (4)(d)(II).

42-2-127.9. Authority to suspend driver's license - leaving the scene of an accident.

1. The department may suspend the driver's license of any person upon the department's determination that there is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person was the driver of a vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of any person and failed to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close to the scene as possible, or immediately return to the scene of the accident, as required by section 42-4-1601.
2. The department shall make a determination of the facts on the basis of the documents and affidavit of an officer as specified in subsection (2) of this section, and this determination shall be final unless a hearing is requested and held as provided in subsections (6) and (7) of this section.
3. For purposes of this section:
  1. "License" includes any driving privilege.
  2. "Officer" means a law enforcement officer.
Whenever an officer determines that a person has violated section 42-4-1601, the officer making the determination shall forward to the department an affidavit that includes a statement of the officer's probable cause that the person committed the violation and a copy of the citation and complaint, if any, filed with the court. The affidavit shall be dated, signed, and sworn to by the officer under penalty of perjury, but need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person.
1. Upon receipt by the department of the affidavit of the officer and the relevant documents required by subsection (2) of this section, the department shall make the determination described in subsection (1) of this section based upon the information contained in the affidavit and the relevant documents. If the department determines that the person is subject to license suspension, the department may issue a notice of suspension if such notice has not already been served upon the person by the officer in accordance with subsection (4) of this section.
2. The department shall mail the notice of suspension in accordance with section 42-2-119 (2) to the person at the last-known address shown on the department's records, if any, and to any address provided in the officer's affidavit if that address differs from the address of record. The notice is deemed received three days after mailing.
3. The notice of suspension must clearly specify the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, the effective date of the suspension, the right of the person to request a hearing, the procedure for requesting a hearing, and the date by which that request for a hearing must be made.
4. If the department determines that the person is not subject to license suspension:
  1. The department shall notify the person of its determination and shall rescind any order of suspension served upon the person by the officer;
  2. If the person's license was confiscated by an officer under subsection (4) of this section, the person may obtain the license by the payment of a fee to the department pursuant to subsection (5)(b) of this section. The department shall determine the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5.
1. If an officer determines that a person has violated section 42-4-1601, the officer, acting on behalf of the department, may serve the notice of suspension personally on the person. If the law enforcement officer serves the notice of suspension, the officer shall confiscate any driver's license issued by this state or any other state that is held by the person. When the officer takes possession of a valid license, the officer, acting on behalf of the department, shall issue a temporary permit that is valid for seven days after its date of issuance.
2. The officer shall forward a copy of the completed notice of suspension form, a copy of any completed temporary permit form, and any driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit taken into possession under this section along with the affidavit and documents required in subsections (1) and (2) of this section.
3. The department shall provide forms for notice of suspension and for temporary permits to law enforcement agencies. The department shall establish a format for the affidavits required by this section and shall give notice of such format to all law enforcement agencies that submit affidavits to the department. Law enforcement agencies shall follow the format determined by the department.
4. A temporary permit shall not be issued to any person who is already driving with a temporary permit issued pursuant to subsection (4)(a) of this section.
1. A license suspension is effective seven days after the subject person has received the notice of suspension as provided in subsection (4) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice of suspension by mail as provided in subsection (3) of this section. If a written request for a hearing is received by the department within that same seven-day period, the effective date of the suspension is stayed until a final order is issued following the hearing; except that any delay in the hearing that is caused or requested by the subject person or counsel representing that person shall not result in a stay of the suspension during the period of delay.
2. The period of license suspension under subsection (1)(a) of this section is one year. After the suspension period is complete, the person may have his or her driver's license restored by paying the required restoration fee pursuant to section 42-2-132 (4).
1. Any person who has received a notice of suspension may make a written request for a review of the department's determination at a hearing. The request may be made on a form available at each office of the department. A person who has received a notice of suspension may also request a hearing for a probationary license issued in accordance with subsection (9) of this section.
2. The request for a hearing must be made in writing within seven days after the day the person received the notice of suspension as provided in subsection (4) of this section or is deemed to have received the notice by mail as provided in subsection (3) of this section. If written request for a hearing is not received within the seven-day period, the right to a hearing is waived, and the determination of the department that is based upon the documents and affidavit required by subsections (1) and (2) of this section becomes final.
3. At the time that a person requests a hearing, the department shall provide to the person written notice advising the person:
  1. Of the right to subpoena the law enforcement officer for the hearing and that the subpoena must be served upon the law enforcement officer at least five calendar days prior to the hearing;
  2. Of the person's right to notify the department in writing that the person desires the law enforcement officer's presence at the hearing and that, upon receiving the notification, the department shall issue a written notice for the law enforcement officer to appear at the hearing;
  3. That, if the law enforcement officer is not required to appear at the hearing, documents and an affidavit prepared and submitted by the law enforcement officer will be used at the hearing; and
  4. That the affidavit and documents submitted by the law enforcement officer may be reviewed by the person prior to the hearing.
4. If a written request for a hearing is made after expiration of the seven-day period and is accompanied by the person's verified statement explaining the failure to make a timely request for a hearing, the department shall receive and consider the request. If the department finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension, factors of physical incapacity such as hospitalization, or incarceration, the department shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter, and grant the hearing request. In such case, a stay of the suspension pending issuance of the final order following the hearing shall not be granted.
5. 1. The hearing shall be scheduled to be held as soon as practicable but not more than sixty days after the day that the request for a hearing is received by the department; except that, if a hearing is rescheduled because of the unavailability of a hearing officer in accordance with subsection (6)(e)(II) of this section, the hearing may be rescheduled more than sixty days after the day that the request for the hearing is received by the department, and the department shall continue any temporary driving privileges held by the person who requested the hearing until the date that such hearing is rescheduled. The department shall provide a written notice of the time and place of the hearing to the person who requested the hearing in the manner provided in section 42-2-119 (2) at least ten days before the scheduled or rescheduled hearing unless the parties agree to waive this requirement. Notwithstanding section 42-2-119, the last-known address of the person who requested the hearing for purposes of notice for any hearing pursuant to this section is the address stated on the hearing request form.
  2. If a hearing officer cannot appear at any original or rescheduled hearing because of medical reasons, a conflicting obligation to conduct another administrative hearing, or any other legitimate just cause, the hearing officer or the department may reschedule the hearing at the earliest possible time when the hearing officer will be available.
6. If a hearing is held pursuant to this subsection (6), the department shall review the matter and make a final determination on the basis of the documents and affidavit submitted to the department pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section. The officer who submitted the affidavit need not be present at the hearing unless requested in accordance with subsection (6)(c) of this section. The department shall consider all other relevant evidence at the hearing, including the reports of other officers that are submitted to the department. The reports of other officers are not required to be made under oath, but each such report must identify the officer making the report. The department may consider evidence contained in affidavits from persons other than the person requesting the hearing, so long as each such affidavit includes the affiant's home or work address and telephone number and is dated, signed, and sworn to by the affiant under penalty of perjury. The affidavit need not be notarized or sworn to before any other person. The person requesting the hearing must present evidence in person.
1. The hearing shall be held in the district office of the department closest to the residence of the person; except that all or part of the hearing may, at the discretion of the department, be conducted by telephone or other electronic means, in real time, in accordance with section 42-1-218.5.
2. The presiding hearing officer shall be the executive director of the department or an authorized representative designated by the executive director. The presiding hearing officer may administer oaths and affirmations; consider the affidavit of the officer filing such affidavit as specified in subsection (2) of this section; consider other officers' reports submitted to the department pursuant to subsection (6)(f) of this section; examine and consider documents and copies of documents containing relevant evidence; consider other affidavits submitted pursuant to subsection (6)(f) of this section; take judicial notice as defined by rule 201 of article II of the Colorado rules of evidence, subject to section 24-4-105 (8), including judicial notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within the hearing officer's knowledge; compel witnesses to testify or produce books, records, or other evidence; examine witnesses and take testimony; receive and consider any relevant evidence necessary to properly perform the hearing officer's duties as required by this section; issue subpoenas duces tecum to produce books, documents, records, or other evidence; issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses; take depositions, or cause depositions or interrogatories to be taken; regulate the course and conduct of the hearing; and make a final ruling on the issues.
3. 1. When a license is suspended under subsection (1)(a) of this section, the sole issue at the hearing shall be whether, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the person was the driver of a vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of any person and failed to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close to the scene as possible, or immediately return to the scene of the accident as required by section 42-4-1601. If the presiding hearing officer finds in the affirmative on that issue, the suspension order shall be sustained and the presiding hearing officer shall then consider whether or not to issue a probationary license in accordance with subsection (9) of this section. If the presiding hearing officer finds in the negative on that issue, the suspension order shall be rescinded.
  2. The presiding hearing officer shall not consider any issue not specified in this subsection (7)(c).
4. The hearing shall be recorded. The presiding hearing officer shall render an opinion in writing, and a copy shall be provided to the person who requested the hearing.
5. If the person who requested the hearing fails to appear without just cause, the right to a hearing is waived, and the determination of the department based upon the documents and affidavit required in subsections (1) and (2) of this section is final.
1. Within thirty-five days after the issuance of the final determination of the department under this section, a person aggrieved by the determination has the right to file a petition for judicial review in the district court in the county of the person's residence.
2. Judicial review shall be based on the record without taking additional testimony. If the court finds that the department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination that is unsupported by the evidence in the record, the court may reverse the department's determination.
3. The filing of a petition for judicial review does not result in an automatic stay of the suspension order. The court may grant a stay of the order only upon motion and hearing and upon a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the person will prevail on the merits and that the person will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not stayed.
A presiding hearing officer may issue a probationary license for a period not to exceed the period of suspension for the purpose of driving for reasons of employment, education, health, or other necessities as determined by the presiding hearing officer, which license may contain such restrictions as the department deems reasonable and necessary and which may thereafter be subject to cancellation as a result of any violation of the restrictions imposed therein. The presiding hearing officer may refuse to issue a probationary license if the department finds that aggravating circumstances exist to indicate the individual is unsafe for driving for any purpose. In refusing to issue a probationary license, the department shall make specific findings of fact to support such refusal. Such aggravating circumstances must be matters other than the facts and circumstances of the case giving rise to suspension under this section.
The "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, applies to this section to the extent it is consistent with subsections (6), (7), and (8) of this section relating to administrative hearings and judicial review.

Source: L. 2017: Entire section added, (HB 17-1277), ch. 337, p. 1797, § 1, effective January 1, 2018.

42-2-128. Vehicular homicide - revocation of license.

The department shall revoke the driver's license of any person convicted of vehicular homicide, including the driver's license of any juvenile who has been adjudicated a delinquent upon conduct which would establish the crime of vehicular homicide if committed by an adult.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2151, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-4-1201 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-128 was relocated to § 42-2-136.

Cross references: For vehicular homicide, see § 18-3-106; for provision that the operation of vehicles and the movement of pedestrians pursuant to this section apply upon streets and highways and elsewhere throughout the state, see § 42-4-103 (2)(b).

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-128 is similar to § 42-4-1201 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

Applied in State, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Dayhoff, 199 Colo. 363 , 609 P.2d 119 (1980).

42-2-129. Mandatory surrender of license or permit for driving under the influence or with excessive alcoholic content.

Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury, to DUI or DUI per se, or, for a person under twenty-one years of age, to DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, the court shall require the offender to immediately surrender the offender's driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or instruction permit to the court. The court shall forward to the department a notice of plea or verdict, on the form prescribed by the department, together with the offender's license or permit, not later than ten days after the surrender of the license or permit. Any person who does not immediately surrender the license or permit to the court, except for good cause shown, commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2151, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1465, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1356, § 29, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 248, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1880, § 6, effective May 28.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-123.3 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-129 was relocated to § 42-2-137.

Cross references: For the penalty for a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, see § 42-4-1701 (3)(a)(II).

42-2-130. Mandatory surrender of license or permit for drug convictions. (Repealed.)

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2151, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 1436, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1356, § 30, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1586, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1819, § 11, effective August 5.

42-2-131. Revocation of license or permit for failing to comply with a court order relating to nondriving alcohol convictions.

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until January 1, 2022. ] Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury to an offense under section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such section and upon a failure to complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program ordered by the court in connection with such plea or verdict, the court shall forward to the department a notice of plea or verdict or the failure to complete on the form prescribed by the department. Any revocation pursuant to section 42-2-125 (1)(m) shall begin when the department gives notice of the revocation to the person in accordance with section 42-2-119 (2).

42-2-131. Revocation of license or permit for failing to comply with a court order relating to nondriving alcohol convictions. (Repealed)

[ Editor's note: This version of this section is effective January 1, 2022. ]

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2152, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 928, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1820, § 12, effective August 5. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (SB 14-129), ch. 387, p. 1939, § 12, effective June 6. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1083, § 25, effective October 1. L. 2021: Entire section repealed, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3100, § 13, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-123.7 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-131 was relocated to § 42-2-139.
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act repealing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

42-2-131.5. Revocation of license or permit for convictions involving defacing property. (Repealed)

Source: L. 97: Entire section added, p. 1538, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1357, § 31, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2009: Entire section repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1820, § 13, effective August 5.

42-2-132. Period of suspension or revocation.

The department shall not suspend a driver's or minor driver's license to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways for a period of more than one year, except as permitted under section 42-2-138 and except for noncompliance with the provisions of subsection (4) of this section or section 42-7-406, or both.
1. 1. Any person whose license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways has been revoked is not entitled to apply for a probationary license, and, except as provided in sections 42-2-125, 42-2-126, 42-2-132.5, 42-2-138, 42-2-205, and 42-7-406, the person is not entitled to make application for a new license until the expiration of one year from the effective date of the revocation; then the person may make application for a new license as provided by law. (2) (a) (I) Any person whose license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways has been revoked is not entitled to apply for a probationary license, and, except as provided in sections 42-2-125, 42-2-126, 42-2-132.5, 42-2-138, 42-2-205, and 42-7-406, the person is not entitled to make application for a new license until the expiration of one year from the effective date of the revocation; then the person may make application for a new license as provided by law.
  2. 1. Following the period of revocation set forth in this subsection (2), the department shall not issue a new license unless and until it is satisfied that the person has demonstrated knowledge of the laws and driving ability through the appropriate motor vehicle testing process, and that the person whose license was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-125 for a second or subsequent alcohol- or drug-related driving offense has completed not less than a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3.
    2. If the person was in violation of section 42-2-126 (3)(a) and the person had a BAC that was 0.15 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving, or if the person's driving record otherwise indicates a designation as a persistent drunk driver as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5), the department shall require the person to complete a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3, and, upon the restoration of driving privileges, shall require the person to hold a restricted license requiring the use of an ignition interlock device pursuant to section 42-2-132.5 (1)(a)(II).
    3. If a person seeking reinstatement has not completed the required level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program, the person shall file with the department proof of current enrollment in a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3, on a form approved by the department.
  3. In the case of a minor driver whose license has been revoked as a result of one conviction for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, the minor driver, unless otherwise required after an evaluation made pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3, must complete a level I alcohol and drug education program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services.
  4. Any person whose license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways has been revoked under section 42-2-125 (1)(g)(I) or (1)(i) or 42-2-203 where the revocation was due in part to a DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI conviction shall be required to present an affidavit stating that the person has obtained at the person's own expense a signed lease agreement for the installation and use of an approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 42-2-132.5 (9)(a), in each motor vehicle on which the person's name appears on the registration and any other vehicle that the person may drive during the period of the interlock-restricted license.
  5. The department shall take into consideration any probationary terms imposed on such person by any court in determining whether any revocation shall be continued.
2. Repealed.
3. A person whose driving privilege is restored prior to a hearing on the merits of any driving restraint waives the person's right to a hearing on the merits of the driving restraint.
Any person making false application for a new license before the expiration of the period of suspension or revocation commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. The department shall notify the district attorney's office in the county where such violation occurred, in writing, of all violations of this section.
1. 1. Any person whose license or other privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended, canceled, or revoked, pursuant to either this article or article 4 or 7 of this title, shall pay a restoration fee of ninety-five dollars to the executive director of the department prior to the issuance to the person of a new license or the restoration of the license or privilege. (4) (a) (I) Any person whose license or other privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended, canceled, or revoked, pursuant to either this article or article 4 or 7 of this title, shall pay a restoration fee of ninety-five dollars to the executive director of the department prior to the issuance to the person of a new license or the restoration of the license or privilege.
  2. Notwithstanding the amount specified for the fee in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a), the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of the fee if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3), C.R.S., to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of the fee is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the executive director of the department by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of the fee as provided in section 24-75-402 (4), C.R.S.
2. The department shall transmit the restoration fees collected under this subsection (4) to the state treasurer, who shall credit:
  1. 1. Seventy-three dollars to the driver's license administrative revocation account in the highway users tax fund, which account is hereby created and referred to in this subparagraph (I) as the "account".
    2. The moneys in the account shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the direct and indirect costs incurred by the department in the administration of driver's license restraints pursuant to either this article or article 4 or article 7 of this title, including, but not limited to, the direct and indirect costs of providing administrative hearings under this title, without the use of moneys from the general fund. At the end of each fiscal year, any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the account shall be transferred out of the account, credited to the highway users tax fund, and allocated and expended as specified in section 43-4-205 (5.5)(c), C.R.S.; and
  2. 1. Twenty-two dollars to the first time drunk driving offender account in the highway users tax fund, which account is hereby created and referred to in this subparagraph (II) as the "account".
    2. The moneys in the account shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly on and after January 1, 2009, first to the department of revenue to pay its costs associated with the implementation of House Bill 08-1194, as enacted in 2008, and to pay its costs associated with the implementation of House Bill 13-1240, enacted in 2013; second, to the department of revenue to pay a portion of the costs for an ignition interlock device as described by section 42-2-132.5 (4)(a)(II)(C) for a first time drunk driving offender who is unable to pay the costs of the device; third, to the department of revenue to pay a portion of the costs for an ignition interlock device for a persistent drunk driver who is unable to pay the costs of the device and who installs the ignition interlock device on his or her vehicle on or after January 1, 2014; and then to provide two million dollars to the department of transportation for high visibility drunk driving enforcement pursuant to section 43-4-901, C.R.S. Any moneys in the account not expended for these purposes may be invested by the state treasurer as provided by law. All interest and income derived from the investment and deposit of moneys in the account shall be credited to the account. At the end of each fiscal year, any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the account shall remain in the account and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund, the highway users tax fund, or another fund.
[ Editor's note: This subsection (5) is effective January 1, 2022.] (a) In addition to any other fee imposed pursuant to this section, a person whose license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the public highways has been revoked because of a DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD conviction shall pay a fee of twenty-five dollars to the department prior to the issuance to the person of a new license or the restoration of the license or privlege. The department may waive the fee upon a satisfactory showing that the person subject to the fee is indigent.
(b) The department shall transmit the fee collected pursuant to this subsection (5) to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the first time drunk driving offender account in the highway users tax fund.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2152, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (4)(a) amended, p. 1353, § 99, effective June 1. L. 99: (2)(a) amended, p. 1162, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2)(a)(IV) amended, p. 1076, § 3, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 1357, § 32, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (2)(a)(II) amended, p. 788, § 6, effective June 1; (2)(a)(IV) amended, p. 1284, § 69, effective June 5. L. 2002: (2)(a)(III) amended, p. 1034, § 74, effective June 1; (2)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(III) amended, p. 1922, § 18, effective July 1; (2)(b) amended, p. 1586, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2003: (4)(a)(I) and (4)(b) amended, p. 448, § 1, effective March 5. L. 2005: (4)(b) amended, p. 142, § 7, effective April 5. L. 2006: (2)(a)(II)(B) amended, p. 1368, § 5, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2008: (2)(a)(II)(B), (2)(a)(II)(C), (2)(a)(III), and (2)(a)(IV) amended, p. 248, § 11, effective July 1; (4)(a)(I) and (4)(b) amended, p. 837, § 7, effective September 1; (1), (2)(a)(I), and (2)(a)(II)(A) amended and (2)(c) added, p. 835, § 5, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (2)(b) repealed, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1820, § 14, effective August 5. L. 2011: (2)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(III) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1180, § 104, effective August 10. L. 2012: (2)(a)(IV) and (4)(b)(II)(B) amended, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1483, § 6, effective August 8. L. 2013: (2)(a)(III) and (2)(a)(IV) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1882, § 9, effective May 28; (4)(b)(II)(B) amended, (HB 13-1240), ch. 361, p. 2114, § 6, effective May 28, and (2)(a)(II)(B) and (4)(b)(II)(B) amended, (HB 13-1240), ch. 361, p. 2113, § 4, effective January 1, 2014. L. 2014: IP(4)(b), (4)(b)(I)(A), and (4)(b)(II)(A) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1547, § 12, effective June 5. L. 2015: (2)(a)(II)(B) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 998, § 9, effective August 5. L. 2017: (2)(a)(II) and (2)(a)(III) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1258, § 23, effective May 25. L. 2021: (5) added, (HB 21-1314), ch. 460, p. 3100, § 14, effective January 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-124 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-132 was relocated to § 42-2-140.
Amendments to subsection (2)(a)(III) by Senate Bill 02-159 and Senate Bill 02-057 were harmonized.
Amendments to subsection (4)(b)(II)(B) by sections 4 and 6 of House Bill 13-1240 were harmonized, effective January 1, 2014.
Section 22 of chapter 460 (HB 21-1314), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed and applications submitted on or after January 1, 2022.

Cross references: (1) For the penalty for a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, see § 42-4-1701 (3)(a)(II).

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (2)(a)(II), see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending subsections (1), (2)(a)(I), and (2)(a)(II)(A) and enacting subsection (2)(c), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-132 is similar to § 42-2-124 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to repealed § 13-3-25, CRS 53, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Residents and nonresidents subject to same requirements. The general assembly intended for residents and nonresidents alike to be subject to the same requirements for reacquiring driving privileges in this state after suspension. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

Suspension of Colorado driving privileges applies to nonresident licensed elsewhere. A nonresident with a valid driver's license issued by his state of residence, whose Colorado driver's license or privilege to drive has been suspended, is not extended a privilege to drive in Colorado until the period of suspension has expired and the restoration fee has been paid. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

Driving status of "denied" continues until conditions met. Before a person against whom an order of denial has been entered is entitled to operate a motor vehicle, he must reapply for a new license at the end of the period of denial, pay the restoration fee required by subsection (3), file proof of financial responsibility as required by § 42-7-406(1), and must be in receipt and possession of the new license. Unless and until these conditions are satisfied, his driving status as "denied" continues and he is subject to prosecution under § 42-2-130(1)(a) for driving under denial. People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981).

Right to drive does not automatically return following suspension. Upon suspension, a person's right to Colorado driving privileges or a driver's license does not automatically spring to life at the end of the period of ineligibility. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

Restoration fee must be paid. Suspension will continue indefinitely unless the required restoration fee is paid. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

For purposes of extending the suspension of a Colorado driver's license pursuant to § 42-2-130(3), the initial suspension is not terminated until the driver has paid the restoration fee required by subsection (3) of this section. Conway v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1982).

Suspension does not continue for all purposes until payment. Although subsection (3) requires that a restoration fee be paid before a license is reinstated, this does not mean that, for all purposes, the "period of suspension" continues until the fee is paid. Edwards v. State, Dept. of Rev., 42 Colo. App. 52, 592 P.2d 1345 (1978).

This section contemplates a new application by a respondent following the expiration of one year after revocation. City & County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27 , 342 P.2d 687 (1959).

Revocation differs from suspension in that a license is not automatically restored at the end of a year after revocation. City & County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27 , 342 P.2d 687 (1959).

Expired revocation order continued in effect until driver's application for license approved pursuant to subsection (2). Donelson v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 354, 561 P.2d 345 (1976).

Local legislation void. The offense of driving a motor vehicle while the driver's license is suspended or revoked is a matter of general statewide importance, and the attempt of a city to legislate on the subject is ultra vires and void. City & County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27 , 342 P.2d 687 (1959).

This section requires the completion of both Level II alcohol education and Level II alcohol treatment as a prerequisite for reinstating a driver whose license was revoked for an alcohol-related offense. "Therapy", as used in the department's regulation, is synonymous with "treatment" as used in this section. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 793 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applied in Lopez v. Motor Vehicle Div., 189 Colo. 133 , 538 P.2d 446 (1975); Marr v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 36, 598 P.2d 155 (1979); Thompson v. Tomasi, 635 P.2d 558 (Colo. App. 1979); Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 ( Colo. 1983 ).

42-2-132.5. Mandatory and voluntary restricted licenses following alcohol convictions - rules.

Persons required to hold an interlock-restricted license.
1. The following persons shall hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this section for at least one year following reinstatement prior to being eligible to obtain any other driver's license issued under this article:
  1. A person whose license has been revoked for excess BAC pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-126 when the person's BAC was 0.15 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving or whose driving record otherwise indicates a designation of persistent drunk driver as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5);
  2. A person whose privilege to drive was revoked as an habitual offender under section 42-2-203 in which the revocation was due in part to a DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI conviction; or
  3. A person whose privilege to drive was revoked for interlock circumvention pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (7) of this section.
2. A person whose privilege to drive was revoked for multiple convictions for any combination of a DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI pursuant to section 42-2-125 (1)(g)(I) or (1)(i) shall hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this section for at least two years, but not more than five years, following reinstatement prior to being eligible to obtain any other driver's license issued under this article.
Posting the interlock restriction to driving record prior to reinstatement of driving privileges. As soon as a person meets the conditions of subsection (1) of this section, the department shall note on the driving record of a person required to hold an interlock-restricted license under this section that the person is required to have an approved ignition interlock device. A person whose driving record contains the notation required by this subsection (2) shall not operate a motor vehicle without an approved ignition interlock device until the restriction is removed pursuant to this section.
Minimum interlock restriction requirement for persistent drunk drivers. A person required to hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this section who is a persistent drunk driver as defined in section 42-1-102 (68.5), based on an offense that occurred on or after July 1, 2004, shall be required to hold the interlock-restricted license for at least two years following reinstatement before being eligible to obtain any other driver's license issued under this article.
Persons who may acquire an interlock-restricted license prior to serving a full-term revocation.
1. 1. A person whose privilege to drive has been revoked for one year or more because of a DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI conviction or has been revoked for one year or more for excess BAC under any provision of section 42-2-126 may apply for an early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license under the provisions of this section after the person's privilege to drive has been revoked for one month; except that a person who is less than twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense may not apply for early reinstatement until his or her license has been revoked for one year. A person whose privilege to drive has been revoked for one year or more because of a refusal may apply for an early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license under the provisions of this section after the person's privilege to drive has been revoked for two months; except that a person who is less than twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense may not apply for early reinstatement until his or her license has been revoked for one year. Except for first-time offenders as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a) or for persistent drunk drivers as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the restrictions imposed pursuant to this section shall remain in effect for the longer of one year or the total time period remaining on the license restraint prior to early reinstatement.
  2. 1. First-time offender eligibility. For revocations for convictions for DUI or DUI per se under section 42-2-125 (1)(b.5) or for excess BAC 0.08 under section 42-2-126 (3)(a)(I) for a first violation that requires only a nine-month revocation, a person twenty-one years of age or older at the time of the offense may apply for an early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license under the provisions of this section after the person's privilege to drive has been revoked for at least one month. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section and sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (II), the restrictions imposed pursuant to this subparagraph (II) shall remain in effect for at least eight months.
    2. First-time offender interlock removal. A person with an interlock-restricted license issued pursuant to sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (II) shall be eligible for a license without the restriction required by this section if the department's monthly monitoring reports required in subsection (6) of this section show that, for four consecutive monthly reporting periods, the approved ignition interlock device did not interrupt or prevent the normal operation of the motor vehicle due to an excessive breath alcohol content or did not detect that there has been tampering with the device, there have been no other reports of circumvention or tampering, and there are no grounds to extend the restriction pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection (7) of this section. If the department determines that a person is eligible for a license without the restriction required by this section pursuant to this sub-subparagraph (B), the department shall serve upon the person a notice of such eligibility. A person who has not been served but who believes he or she is eligible for a license without the restriction required by this section pursuant to this sub-subparagraph (B) may request a hearing on his or her eligibility. The provisions of this sub-subparagraph (B) do not apply to a person covered by subsection (3) of this section.
    3. Financial assistance for first-time offenders and persistent drunk drivers. The department shall establish a program to assist persons who apply for an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this subparagraph (II) or pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) and who are unable to pay the full cost of an approved ignition interlock device. The program shall be funded from the first time drunk driving offender account in the highway users tax fund established pursuant to section 42-2-132 (4)(b)(II).
2. Early reinstatement eligibility requirement. (I) To be eligible for early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this subsection (4), a person shall have satisfied all conditions for reinstatement imposed by law including time periods for non-alcohol-related restraints; except that a person whose license was also restrained for driving under restraint pursuant to section 42-2-138 may be eligible for early reinstatement under this section so long as the restraint was caused in part by driving activity occurring after an alcohol-related offense and the length of any license restriction under this section includes the period of restraint under section 42-2-138.
  (II) Before being eligible for early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license under this section, a person shall provide proof of financial responsibility to the department pursuant to the requirements of the "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act", article 7 of this title. The person shall maintain such proof of financial responsibility with the department for the longer of three years or the period that the person's license is restricted under this section; except that, for an offender subject to section 42-7-408 (1)(c)(I), the period of time that the person must maintain such proof of financial responsibility is the period of time that the person's license is restricted under this section.
3. In order to be eligible for early reinstatement pursuant to this subsection (4), a person who has been designated an habitual offender under the provisions of section 42-2-202 must have at least one conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI under section 42-4-1301 and no contributing violations other than violations for driving under restraint under section 42-2-138 or reckless driving under section 42-4-1401.
Requirements for issuing the interlock-restricted license.
1. The department may issue an interlock-restricted license under this section if the department receives from a person described in this section an affidavit stating that the person has obtained:
  1. A signed lease agreement for the installation and use of an approved ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle on which the person's name appears on the registration and any other vehicle that the person may drive during the period of the interlock-restricted license; and
  2. The written consent of all other owners, if any, of each motor vehicle in which the approved ignition interlock device is installed.
2. 1. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (5), the department may issue an interlock-restricted license to any person not seeking early reinstatement but who is required to hold an interlock-restricted license pursuant to subsection (1) of this section who is not the registered owner or co-owner of a motor vehicle if the person submits an affidavit stating that the person is not the owner or co-owner of a motor vehicle and has no access to a motor vehicle in which to install an approved ignition interlock device.
  2. If a person holding an interlock-restricted license issued pursuant to this paragraph (b) becomes an owner or co-owner of a motor vehicle or otherwise has access to a motor vehicle in which an approved ignition interlock device may be installed, he or she shall enter into a lease agreement for the installation and use of an approved ignition interlock device on the vehicle for a period equal to the remaining period of the interlock-restricted license and submit the affidavit described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (5).
3. The terms of the interlock-restricted license shall prohibit the person from driving a motor vehicle other than a vehicle in which an approved ignition interlock device is installed.
4. The department shall not issue a license under this section that authorizes the operation of a commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 42-2-402 (4) during the restriction required by this section.
Interlock monitoring device - reports. The leasing agency for any approved ignition interlock device shall provide monthly monitoring reports for the device to the department to monitor compliance with the provisions of this section. The leasing agency shall check the device at least once every sixty days to ensure that the device is operating and that there has been no tampering with the device. If the leasing agency detects that there has been tampering with the device, the leasing agency shall notify the department of that fact within five days of the detection.
Licensing sanctions for violating the interlock restrictions.
1. Due to circumvention - conviction. Upon receipt of notice of a conviction under subsection (10) of this section, the department shall revoke any interlock-restricted license issued to the convicted person pursuant to this section. The department shall not reinstate the interlock-restricted license for a period of one year or the remaining period of license restraint imposed prior to the issuance of an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this section, whichever is longer. A person is entitled to a hearing on the question of whether the revocation is sustained and the calculation of the length of the ineligibility.
2. Due to circumvention - administrative record. Upon receipt of an administrative record other than a notice of a conviction described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (7) establishing that a person who is subject to the restrictions of this section has operated a motor vehicle without an approved ignition interlock device or has circumvented or attempted to circumvent the proper use of an approved ignition interlock device, the department may revoke any license issued to the person pursuant to this section and not reinstate the license for a period of one year or the remaining period of license restraint imposed prior to the issuance of an interlock-restricted license pursuant to this section, whichever is longer. A person is entitled to a hearing on the question of whether the license should be revoked and the calculation of the length of the ineligibility.
3. Due to a lease violation. If a lease for an approved ignition interlock device is terminated for any reason before the period of the interlock restriction expires and the licensee provides no other such lease, the department shall notify the licensee that the department shall suspend the license until the licensee enters into a new signed lease agreement for the remaining period of the interlock restriction.
4. Extending the interlock license restriction. If the monthly monitoring reports required by subsection (6) of this section show that the approved ignition interlock device interrupted or prevented the normal operation of the vehicle due to excessive breath alcohol content in three of any twelve consecutive reporting periods, the department shall extend the interlock restriction on the person's license for an additional twelve months after the expiration of the existing interlock restriction. The department shall notify the person that the ignition interlock restriction is being extended and that his or her license shall be suspended unless the person enters into a new signed lease agreement for the use of an approved ignition interlock device for the extended period. The person is entitled to a hearing on the extension of the restriction. Based upon findings at the hearing, including aggravating and mitigating factors, the hearing officer may sustain the extension, rescind the extension, or reduce the period of extension.
Rules. The department may promulgate rules to implement the provisions of this section.
Approved ignition interlock device definition - rules.
1. For the purposes of this section, "approved ignition interlock device" means a device approved by the department of public health and environment that is installed in a motor vehicle and that measures the breath alcohol content of the driver before a vehicle is started and that periodically requires additional breath samples during vehicle operation. The device may not allow a motor vehicle to be started or to continue normal operation if the device measures an alcohol level above the level established by the department of public health and environment.
2. The state board of health may promulgate rules to implement the provisions of this subsection (9) concerning approved ignition interlock devices.
Operating vehicle after circumventing interlock device.
1. A person whose privilege to drive is restricted to the operation of a motor vehicle equipped with an approved ignition interlock device and who operates a motor vehicle other than a motor vehicle equipped with an approved ignition interlock device or who circumvents or attempts to circumvent the proper use of an approved ignition interlock device commits a class 1 traffic misdemeanor.
2. If a peace officer issues a citation pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (10), the peace officer shall immediately confiscate the offending driver's license, shall file an incident report on a form provided by the department, and shall not permit the driver to continue to operate the motor vehicle.
3. A court shall not accept a plea of guilty to another offense from a person charged with a violation of paragraph (a) of this subsection (10); except that the court may accept a plea of guilty to another offense upon a good-faith representation by the prosecuting attorney that the attorney could not establish a prima facie case if the defendant were brought to trial on the offense.
Tampering with an approved ignition interlock device.
1. A person shall not intercept, bypass, or interfere with or aid any other person in intercepting, bypassing, or interfering with an approved ignition interlock device for the purpose of preventing or hindering the lawful operation or purpose of the approved ignition interlock device required under this section.
2. A person whose privilege to drive is restricted to the operation of a motor vehicle equipped with an approved ignition interlock device shall not drive a motor vehicle in which an approved ignition interlock device is installed pursuant to this section if the person knows that any person has intercepted, bypassed, or interfered with the approved ignition interlock device.
3. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (11)(c) is effective until March 1, 2022.] A person violating any provision of this subsection (11) commits a class 1 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501, C.R.S.
  (c) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (11)(c) is effective March 1, 2022. ] A person violating any provision of this subsection (11) commits a class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501.

Source: L. 99: Entire section added, p. 1160, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) and (2) amended, (3)(a.5) added, and (4)(a) and (4)(b) repealed, pp. 1076, 1077, §§ 4, 5, 6, effective July 1; (1.5), (6), and (7) added and (3), (4)(c), and (5) amended, p. 1079, § 10, effective January 1, 2001. L. 2002: (1)(a) amended, p. 1918, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2004: (5)(b) amended, p. 170, § 1, effective March 23; (1.7) added and (3)(a) amended, p. 1130, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (1)(b.5) and (1.8) added, p. 1368, §§ 6, 7, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2008: (1)(a), (1)(b.5), (1)(c), and (1.5)(a) amended, p. 249, § 12, effective July 1; (1.5)(a) and (3)(a) amended, p. 835, § 6, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2012: Entire section R&RE, (HB 12-1168), ch. 278, p. 1476, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(a), (1)(c), and (4)(c) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1882, § 10, effective May 28; (1)(b), (4)(a)(I), and (4)(a)(II)(C) amended, (HB 13-1240), ch. 361, p. 2111, § 1, effective January 1, 2014. L. 2015: (1) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 995, § 3, effective August 5. L. 2021: (11)(c) amended, (HB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3300, § 708, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note: Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

42-2-133. Surrender and return of license.

The department, upon suspending or revoking a license, shall require that such license be surrendered to the department.
At the end of the period of suspension, the licensee may apply for and receive a replacement license upon payment of a fee. The department shall set the fee in accordance with section 42-2-114.5 (2). The department shall transfer the fee to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the licensing services cash fund created by section 42-2-114.5 (1).

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2153, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2005: Entire section amended, p. 649, § 18, effective May 27. L. 2014: (2) amended, (SB 14-194), ch. 346, p. 1548, § 13, effective June 5.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-125 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-133 was relocated to § 42-2-141.

42-2-134. Foreign license invalid during suspension.

No resident or nonresident whose driver's license or right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this article shall operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or after such revocation until a new license is obtained when and as permitted under this article.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2153, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-126 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-134 was relocated to § 42-2-142.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-134 is similar to § 42-2-126 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

Applied in Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 ( Colo. 1982 ).

42-2-135. Right to appeal.

Every person finally denied a license or identification card, whose identification card has been finally canceled, or whose license has been finally canceled, suspended, or revoked by or under the authority of the department may, within thirty-five days thereafter, obtain judicial review in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S.; except that the venue for such judicial review shall be in the county of residence of the person seeking judicial review.
The district attorney of the judicial district in which review is applied for pursuant to this section, upon request of the attorney general, shall represent the department.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2154, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (1) amended, p. 203, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2015: (1) amended, (HB 15-1021), ch. 25, p. 63, § 3, effective August 5.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-127 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-135 was relocated to § 42-2-143.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-135 is similar to 42-2-127 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to repealed § 13-4-27, C.R.S. 1963, and to § 13-3-28, CRS 53, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Administrative procedure act governs appellate review of revocation. Appellate review by the district court of a department of revenue order revoking a driver's license is governed by the administrative procedure act. Donelson v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 38 Colo. App. 354, 561 P.2d 345 (1976).

A suspension order under § 42-2-123 is subject to judicial review pursuant to this section. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Until the agency makes a determination, action of the judiciary is premature. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court ex rel. County of Adams, 172 Colo. 144 , 470 P.2d 864 (1970).

Court may not nullify limitation on right to postpone suspension. Where the general assembly, in the interest of public safety, has provided a reasonable limitation upon the right to secure postponement of the effective date of suspension of a driver's license by the director of revenue, requiring a showing of irreparable injury, the courts have no power to nullify by procedural rule the limitations so imposed, the function of the courts being limited to a review of the acts of the directors. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Court's discretion limited to determination of irreparable injury. Under Rule 106(a)(4), C.R.C.P., the district court has no discretion whatever to determine that a driver has a right to a postponement of the effective date of a suspension order even though he makes no showing of irreparable injury. The only discretion the district court has under these circumstances is to determine whether "irreparable injury" would result if the director's order remains in effect pending review. Where no showing whatever is made on this question, there is nothing before the district court upon which its discretion could operate. Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466 , 366 P.2d 563 (1961).

Court's allowance of injunction would be in derogation of department's constitutional authority. By virtue of the authority of the constitution, it is the duty of the department of revenue to carry into effect the provisions of the revenue law which it is required to execute. They are of a governmental character. The sole object of the action commenced in the district court is to obtain an injunction to restrain the department from performing its duties. If this should be permitted in a direct proceeding, the result would be to directly subject executive officials to the jurisdiction of the courts when acting within their province and strip them of their constitutional powers. This is an authority that the judicial department cannot exercise in this manner, for the obvious reason that to concede it would be an assumption that the judicial was of superior authority to the executive department. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. District Court ex rel. County of Adams, 172 Colo. 144 , 470 P.2d 864 (1970).

There is no specific statutory provision allowing for award of costs where an individual pursues his right to judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's actions under § 24-4-106 and this section; such an award is erroneous because Rule 54(d), C.R.C.P., limits the imposition of costs against the state to "the extent permitted by law". Lucero v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 73, 607 P.2d 405 (1980).

Finality of order of revocation. An order of revocation issued at the conclusion of a hearing is final. Judicial review must be perfected within thirty days after the date of that hearing as specified in this section. If an appeal is not perfected within the statutory time limit, dismissal is mandated. Houston v. Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1985).

Applied in Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., Motor Vehicle Div., 195 Colo. 325 , 578 P.2d 229 (1978); Arnold v. Charnes, 41 Colo. App. 338, 589 P.2d 1373 (1978); Marin v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 41 Colo. App. 557, 591 P.2d 1336 (1978); People v. District Court, 200 Colo. 65 , 612 P.2d 87 (1980); Tomasi v. Thompson, 635 P.2d 538 ( Colo. 1981 ); Croker v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 652 P.2d 1067 ( Colo. 1982 ); Thurber v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 702 ( Colo. 1983 ); Dept. of Rev. v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639 ( Colo. 1988 ).

42-2-136. Unlawful possession or use of license.

1. No person shall have in such person's possession a lawfully issued driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or instruction permit, knowing that such license or permit has been falsely altered by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, transposition of matter, or any other means so that such license or permit in its thus altered form falsely appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic and lawfully issued license or permit.
2. No person shall fraudulently obtain a driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or an instruction permit.
No person shall have in such person's possession a paper, document, or other instrument which falsely appears or purports to be in all respects a lawfully issued and authentic driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or instruction permit, knowing that such instrument was falsely made and was not lawfully issued.
No person shall display or represent as being such person's own any driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit which was lawfully issued to another person.
No person shall fail or refuse to surrender to the department upon its lawful demand any driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction or temporary permit issued to such person which has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the department. The department shall notify the district attorney's office in the county where such violation occurred, in writing, of all violations of this subsection (4).
No person shall permit any unlawful use of a driver's license issued to such person.
(5.5) No person shall photograph, photostat, duplicate, or in any way reproduce any driver's license or facsimile thereof for the purpose of distribution, resale, reuse, or manipulation of the data or images contained in such driver's license unless authorized by the department or otherwise authorized by law.
[ Editor's note: This version of subsection (6) is effective until March 1, 2022.] (a) Any person who violates any provision of subsections (1) to (5) of this section commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (5.5) of this section commits a class 3 misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501, C.R.S.

(6) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (6) is effective March 1, 2022. ] (a) Any person who violates any provision of subsections (1) to (5) of this section commits a class 2 misdemeanor.

(b) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (5.5) of this section commits a petty offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-503.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2154, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (5.5) added and (6) amended, p. 354, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2000: (1) to (4) amended, p. 1357, § 33, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 941, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2002: (6)(b) amended, p. 1560, § 363, effective October 1. L. 2021: (6) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3300, § 709, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-128 as it existed prior to 1994.
Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

Cross references: (1) For the penalty for a class 2 misdemeanor, see § 18-1.3-501.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (6)(b), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-136 is similar to § 42-2-128 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, a relevant case construing that provision has been included with the annotations to this section.

This statute forbids possession of a "fictitious" operator's license. People v. LaRocco, 178 Colo. 196 , 496 P.2d 314 (1972) (decided under repealed § 13-4-28, C.R.S. 1963).

42-2-137. False affidavit - penalty.

Any person who makes any false affidavit or knowingly swears or affirms falsely to any matter or thing required by the terms of this part 1 to be sworn to or affirmed commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. The department shall notify the district attorney's office in the county where such violations occurred, in writing, of all violations of this section.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2154, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-129 as it existed prior to 1994.

Cross references: For the penalty for a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, see § 42-4-1701 (3)(a)(II).

42-2-138. Driving under restraint - penalty - definitions.

1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(a) is effective until March 1, 2022.] Except as provided in subsection (1.5) of this section, any person who drives a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this state with knowledge that the person's license or privilege to drive, either as a resident or a nonresident, is under restraint for any reason other than conviction of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD is guilty of a misdemeanor. A court may sentence a person convicted of this misdemeanor to imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six months and may impose a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
  (1) (a) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(a) is effective March 1, 2022. ] Except as provided in subsection (1.5) of this section, any person who drives a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this state with knowledge that the person's license or privilege to drive, either as a resident or a nonresident, is under restraint for any reason other than conviction of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD is guilty of a class A traffic infraction.
2. Upon a second or subsequent conviction under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) within five years after the first conviction thereunder, in addition to any penalty imposed pursuant to said paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), except as may be permitted by section 42-2-132.5, the defendant shall not be eligible to be issued a driver's or minor driver's license or extended any driving privilege in this state for a period of three years after such second or subsequent conviction.
3. This subsection (1) shall apply only to violations committed on or after July 1, 1974.
4. 1. [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(d)(I) is effective until March 1, 2022.] A person who drives a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this state with knowledge that the person's license or privilege to drive, either as a resident or nonresident, is restrained under section 42-2-126 (3), is restrained solely or partially because of a conviction of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, or is restrained in another state solely or partially because of an alcohol-related driving offense is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than one year and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than two years and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than three thousand dollars. The minimum county jail sentence imposed by this subparagraph (I) shall be mandatory, and the court shall not grant probation or a suspended sentence thereof; but, in a case where the defendant is convicted although the defendant established that he or she had to drive the motor vehicle in violation of this subparagraph (I) because of an emergency, the mandatory jail sentence, if any, shall not apply, and, for a first conviction, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one year and, in the discretion of the court, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, and, for a second or subsequent conviction, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than two years and, in the discretion of the court, a fine of not more than three thousand dollars.
  2. In any trial for a violation of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d), a duly authenticated copy of the record of the defendant's former convictions and judgments for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD or an alcohol-related offense committed in another state from any court of record or a certified copy of the record of any denial or revocation of the defendant's driving privilege under section 42-2-126 (3) from the department shall be prima facie evidence of the convictions, judgments, denials, or revocations and may be used in evidence against the defendant. Identification photographs and fingerprints that are part of the record of the former convictions, judgments, denials, or revocations and the defendant's incarceration after sentencing for any of the former convictions, judgments, denials, or revocations shall be prima facie evidence of the identity of the defendant and may be used in evidence against the defendant.
  (d) (I) [ Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(d)(I) is effective March 1, 2022. ] A person who drives a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this state with knowledge that the person's license or privilege to drive, either as a resident or nonresident, is restrained under section 42-2-126 (3), is restrained solely or partially because of a conviction of DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, or is restrained in another state solely or partially because of an alcohol-related driving offense commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, the person shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than three thousand dollars. The minimum county jail sentence imposed by this subsection (1)(d)(I) shall be mandatory, and the court shall not grant probation or a suspended sentence thereof; but, in a case where the defendant is convicted although the defendant established that the defendant had to drive the motor vehicle in violation of this subsection (1)(d)(I) because of an emergency, the mandatory jail sentence, if any, shall not apply, and, for a first conviction, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one year and, in the discretion of the court, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, and, for a second or subsequent conviction, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than two years and, in the discretion of the court, a fine of not more than three thousand dollars.
5. Upon a second or subsequent conviction under subparagraph (I) of paragraph (d) of this subsection (1) within five years after the first conviction thereunder, in addition to the penalty prescribed in said subparagraph (I), except as may be permitted by section 42-2-132.5, the defendant shall not be eligible to be issued a driver's or minor driver's license or extended any driving privilege in this state for a period of four years after such second or subsequent conviction.
6. Upon a verdict or judgment of guilt for a violation of subsection (1)(a) or (1)(d) of this section, the court shall require the offender to immediately surrender the offender's driver's license, minor driver's license, temporary driver's license, or instruction permit issued by this state, another state, or a foreign country. The court shall forward to the department a notice of the verdict or judgment of guilt on the form prescribed by the department, together with the offender's surrendered license or permit. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection (1)(f) by failing to surrender his or her license or permit to the court commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.
(1.5) Any person who drives a motor vehicle or off-highway vehicle upon any highway of this state with knowledge that the person's license or privilege to drive, either as a resident or a nonresident, is under restraint for an outstanding judgment is guilty of a class A traffic infraction as defined in section 42-4-1701 (3).
1. In a prosecution for a violation of this section, the fact of the restraint may be established by certification that a notice was mailed by first-class mail pursuant to section 42-2-119 (2) to the last-known address of the defendant, or by the delivery of such notice to the last-known address of the defendant, or by personal service of such notice upon the defendant.
2. In a prosecution for a violation of this section, the fact of restraint in another state may be established by certification that notice was given in compliance with such state's law.
(2.5) A municipality may enforce violations of subsection (1.5) of this section in municipal court. A municipal court shall not waive or reduce the three-point penalty.
The department, upon receiving a record of conviction or accident report of any person for an offense committed while operating a motor vehicle, shall immediately examine its files to determine if the license or operating privilege of such person has been restrained. If it appears that said offense was committed while the license or operating privilege of such person was restrained for a reason other than an outstanding judgment, except as permitted by section 42-2-132.5, the department shall not issue a new license or grant any driving privileges for an additional period of one year after the date such person would otherwise have been entitled to apply for a new license or for reinstatement of a suspended license and shall notify the district attorney in the county where such violation occurred and request prosecution of such person under subsection (1) of this section.
For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
1. "Knowledge" means actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint. "Knowledge" does not mean knowledge of a particular restraint or knowledge of the duration of restraint.
2. "Restraint" or "restrained" means any denial, revocation, or suspension of a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this state or another state.
It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of this section, based upon a restraint in another state, that the driver possessed a valid driver's license issued subsequent to the restraint that is the basis of the violation.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2155, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2000: (1)(f) added, p. 683, § 2, effective July 1; (1)(b), (1)(e), and (3) amended, p. 1082, § 12, effective January 1, 2001; (1)(b) and (1)(e) amended, p. 1358, § 34, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2005: (1)(d), (2), (3), and (4)(b) amended and (5) added, p. 648, § 17, effective May 27. L. 2008: (1)(a) and (1)(d) amended, p. 249, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(f) amended, (HB 10-1090), ch. 45, p. 171, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2013: (1)(a) and (1)(d) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1882, § 11, effective May 28. L. 2017: (1)(a) and (3) amended and (1.5) and (2.5) added, (HB 17-1162), ch. 208, p. 810, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2020: (1)(f) amended, (SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 299, § 53, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(a) and (1)(d)(I) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3300, § 710, effective March 1, 2022.

Editor's note:

This section is similar to former § 42-2-130 as it existed prior to 1994.
Amendments to subsections (1)(b) and (1)(e) by Senate Bill 00-018 and Senate Bill 00-011 were harmonized, effective July 1, 2001.
Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.

Cross references: (1) For the penalty for a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, see § 42-4-1701 (3)(a)(II).

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-128 is similar to § 42-2-130 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to repealed § 13-3-31, CRS 53, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Driver may collaterally attack constitutionality of uncounseled prior traffic offense convictions underlying the administrative order of suspension when prosecuted for driving under suspension. People v. Gandy, 685 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1984)(case arose prior to enactment of § 42-4-1505.3).

This section deals with the subject of driving while license is suspended or revoked. Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30 , 342 P.2d 674 (1959).

Municipal ordinance dealing with such penalty is invalid. Power to establish a licensing system carries with it authority to revoke and to penalize the driving of a motor vehicle while the license of the operator has been suspended or revoked, and the subject being predominately statewide and general, a municipal ordinance dealing with the identical subject is invalid. Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30 , 342 P.2d 674 (1959).

Notwithstanding § 43-5-207 , recognizing the power of municipalities to regulate particular areas of traffic --as parking, signal control, one-way streets, speed and traffic at intersections--does not specifically authorize such municipalities to punish the operator of a vehicle driving without a license, this authority has been preempted by the state and withheld from a municipality. Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30 , 342 P.2d 674 (1959).

Renewing suspension pending hearing where suspension terminated violates due process. The practice of renewing the suspension of a license, pending a hearing at which vacation of the renewed suspension is a certainty, violates due process of law. Harris v. Colo., 516 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Colo. 1981).

Knowledge of fact of revocation is an essential element of crime of driving while license revoked. Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1987).

Driving while license is denied, suspended, or revoked pursuant to this section and driving after revocation pursuant to § 42-2-206 proscribe the same act, and defendant may not be convicted or punished under both statutes. People v. Rodriguez, 849 P.2d 799 (Colo. App. 1992).

Driving while license denied, suspended, or revoked under this section does not merge with § 42-2-206 . A person is liable to be convicted under both provisions. The elements are different because "operating" is a different standard than "driving" and "highways" do not include private ways. People v. Zubiate, 2013 COA 69 , 411 P.3d 757, aff'd, 2017 CO 17, 390 P.3d 394, (disagreeing with People v. Rodriguez cited above) (disapproved by supreme court in People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, 402 P.3d 472).

Driving under restraint under this section is a lesser included offense of driving after revocation under § 42-2-206 . Although a person may commit driving after revocation without committing driving under restraint, a person could not commit driving under restraint without committing driving after revocation. People v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 , 431 P.3d 681; People v. Tun, 2021 COA 34 , 486 P.3d 490.

The "drive" element of driving under restraint is included within the "operate" element of driving after revocation because a person who drives a car necessarily operates it. People v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 , 431 P.3d 681.

The department of revenue can impose an additional period of revocation under subsection (3) upon receiving an accident report for a person who is driving under revocation and after finding that the person was driving under restraint at the time of the accident. The statute authorizes such additional time without a conviction of driving under restraint, and such authorization is consistent with the remedial nature of the statute. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Garner, 66 P.3d 106 ( Colo. 2003 ).

Driving under restraint charges may be prosecuted only for those whose licenses have been suspended, denied, or revoked in the state of Colorado. Therefore, charge of driving under restraint was dismissed against driver whose Massachusetts license was under restraint. Driving without a valid license is a lesser included offense of driving under restraint and the violation notice could proceed on the charge of driving without a license. United States v. Rogers, 865 F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1994)(decided prior to 1994 repeal and reenactment).

Statute authorizes only a permissive inference of the licensee's knowledge of fact of revocation and not a conclusive presumption and, therefore, comports with due process of law. Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1987).

Subsection (3) furthers a legitimate governmental purpose by penalizing drivers under denial, suspension, or revocation who commit additional traffic offenses and does not violate equal protection guarantees. Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1984).

Driving under restraint is a public welfare offense that requires actual knowledge or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license to drive was under restraint. People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034 ( Colo. 2000 ); People v. Boulden, 2016 COA 109 , 381 P.3d 454.

The second part of the driving under restraint statute that requires a reasonable person standard does not violate due process of law under the federal and Colorado Constitutions. People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034 ( Colo. 2000 ).

Requiring "knowledge" limits punishment to those who are subjectively aware of circumstances that would lead a responsible driver to realize his or her license was under restraint. Thus the "knowledge" requirement encourages a driver to monitor his or her infractions on the driving privilege hereby advancing the state interest in promoting driver responsibility. People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034 (Colo. 2000).

Section merely permits department to exercise power to renew or extend period of suspension. Ewing v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 353 (Colo. App. 1980).

Section includes power to extend denials. The power to extend suspensions or revocations in subsection (3) also includes the power to extend denials. Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1984).

It does not mandate exercise of discretion by the department. Ewing v. Motor Vehicle Div., 624 P.2d 353 (Colo. App. 1980).

No distinction between revocation under implied consent and order of denial. There is no real distinction, for purposes of a prosecution under subsection (1)(a), between a driver whose license has been revoked under the implied consent law and a person against whom an order of denial has been entered. People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981).

Five-day jail sentence set forth in subsection (1)(a). Subsection (1)(a) sets forth, in unmistakable terms, that a five-day jail sentence must be imposed when a defendant is convicted of violating this section. People v. Burke, 185 Colo. 19 , 521 P.2d 783 (1974).

The general assembly did not intend to repeal the mandatory sentencing provision of this section, sub silentio, by implication, or otherwise by enactment of § 16-11-201 . People v. Burke, 185 Colo. 19 , 521 P.2d 783 (1974).

Such provision was retained as additional exception to general probation provisions. The driving under suspension sentencing requirements in subsection (1)(a) were retained by the general assembly as an additional exception to the general Colorado statutory probation provisions. People v. Burke, 185 Colo. 19 , 521 P.2d 783 (1974).

County court could not grant probation. Where defendant was convicted under this section for driving while his license was suspended, and subsection (1)(a) mandated a five-day minimum jail sentence to which general statutory probation provisions did not apply, a county court could neither impose a probationary sentence nor grant probation. People v. Burke, 185 Colo. 19 , 521 P.2d 783 (1974).

Conviction of any motor vehicle offense authorizes extension of suspension. Conviction of any motor vehicle offense prior to the expiration of a period of suspension is sufficient to support an extension of that suspension period by the department, pursuant to subsection (3). Conway v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1982).

The general assembly did not intend to limit the provisions of subsection (3) to persons charged or convicted of the offense of driving while license suspended. Conway v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1982).

Driving status of "denied" continues until conditions met. Before a person against whom an order of denial has been entered is entitled to operate a motor vehicle, he must reapply for a new license at the end of the period of denial, pay the restoration fee required by § 42-2-124 (3), file proof of financial responsibility as required by § 42-7-406 (1), and must be in receipt and possession of the new license. Unless and until these conditions are satisfied, his driving status as "denied" continues, and he is subject to prosecution under subsection (1)(a) for driving under denial. People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981).

An order of denial entered pursuant to the implied consent law will subject a driver to prosecution for driving under denial, when that person operates a motor vehicle after the expiration of the temporal term of the denial order but without having obtained a license in accordance with the conditions of the order. People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981).

For purposes of extending the suspension of a Colorado driver's license pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the initial suspension is not terminated until the driver has paid the restoration fee required by § 42-2-124 (3) . Conway v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 653 P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1982).

A person's driving status of "suspended" continues unless and until the driver obtains removal of the suspension at the end of the designated period of suspension by paying the restoration fee and providing the requisite proof of insurance. Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Brakhage, 735 P.2d 195 ( Colo. 1987 ).

Section 42-2-123 hearing not required. The requirements for a hearing in § 42-2-123 cannot be extended to this section. Harris v. Colo., 516 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Colo. 1981).

Statute as basis for jurisdiction. See People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304 , 546 P.2d 488 (1976).

Applied in People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 ( Colo. 1980 ); People v. Mascarenas, 632 P.2d 1028 ( Colo. 1981 ); Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Smith, 640 P.2d 1143 (