CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.

41-1-1. Nuisance defined generally.

A nuisance is anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisance. The inconvenience complained of shall not be fanciful, or such as would affect only one of fastidious taste, but it shall be such as would affect an ordinary, reasonable man.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2942; Code 1868, § 2949; Code 1873, § 3000; Code 1882, § 3000; Civil Code 1895, § 3861; Civil Code 1910, § 4457; Code 1933, § 72-101.)

Cross references. - Regulation of fireworks, T. 25, C. 10.

Causes of action and remedies for injuries to real estate, T. 51, C. 9.

Law reviews. - For article, "Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia," see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963). For article discussing Georgia's practice of exposing municipalities to tort liability through the use of nuisance law, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 11 (1975). For article discussing nuisances as "Hidden Liens," see 14 Ga. St. B.J. 32 (1977). For survey article on real property law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2003). For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2005) and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (2006). For survey article on zoning and land use law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (2008). For note, "Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips: A Clarification of Georgia's Public Nuisance Law?", see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 474 (1969). For note analyzing sovereign immunity in this state and proposing implementation of a waiver scheme and creation of a court of claims pursuant to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. I, see 27 Emory L.J. 717 (1978). For comment on Collins v. Lanier, 201 Ga. 527 , 40 S.E.2d 424 (1946), see 9 Ga. B.J. 325 (1947). For comment on Gatewood v. Hansford, 75 Ga. App. 567 , 44 S.E.2d 126 (1947), see 10 Ga. B.J. 372 (1948). For comment on Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, 214 Ga. 115 , 103 S.E.2d 561 (1958), holding that as a nuisance is a continuing trespass, a court in equity will enjoin it in the county of the resident defendant even though he is only an agent or employee of the nonresident defendant, see 21 Ga. B.J. 564 (1959).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Constitutionality. - Statutory definition of a nuisance is not vague and indefinite and therefore unconstitutional. Atlanta Processing Co. v. Brown, 227 Ga. 203 , 179 S.E.2d 752 (1971).

County noise ordinance deemed unconstitutional. - Trial court declared a Effingham County, Georgia noise ordinance to be unconstitutional and the county did not appeal that decision. Effingham County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Shuler Bros., 265 Ga. App. 754 , 595 S.E.2d 526 (2004).

Effect on common-law definition. - This section was not intended to change the common-law definition of a nuisance. State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv. Co., 191 Ga. 382 , 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940).

Effect of Federal Aviation Act of 1958. - Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1506, does not abridge or alter remedies existing at common law or by statute, and the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies. Owen v. City of Atlanta, 157 Ga. App. 354 , 277 S.E.2d 338 , aff'd, 248 Ga. 299 , 282 S.E.2d 906 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972, 102 S. Ct. 2235 , 72 L. Ed. 2 d 846 (1982).

Implied private right of action under federal statute. - If the cause of action is one that is traditionally relegated to state law, such as a nuisance action which is a classic area in which state law controls, under the United States Supreme Court's four-pronged test to be applied in analyzing the propriety of allowing a case to be maintained as an implied private right of action under a federal statute not specifically creating such a right, it is inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law; this is especially true now, since the United States Supreme Court has directed the federal courts to concentrate on the second criterion of the four-pronged test, namely, the question of congressional intent to create or deny a right of recovery under the federal law. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126, 102 S. Ct. 977 , 71 L. Ed. 2 d 114 (1981).

No presumption of legislative intent to authorize nuisance. - It is never to be presumed that the General Assembly intended to authorize a corporation to erect a nuisance materially tending to destroy the life or health of others. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

This section does not legalize a nuisance. Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345 , 100 S.E. 207 (1919); Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664 , 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).

Indictable nuisances. - Former Civil Code 1910, § 4457 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 ) is not the test of indictable nuisances under former Penal Code 1910, § 681 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-1-6 ). Central of Ga. Power Co. v. State, 10 Ga. App. 448 , 73 S.E. 688 (1912).

Nuisances are anything that cause hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not keep the act from being a nuisance. A nuisance is permanent if the damage the act causes is complete when the action creating the nuisance first occurs and gives rise to a single cause of action that initiates the running of the statute of limitation. On the other hand, a nuisance is not permanent if the act causes continuing damage and is one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it. In that case, every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie and a fresh statute of limitations begins to run. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Forrister, 303 Ga. App. 271 , 693 S.E.2d 553 (2010).

Right of plaintiff must have been violated. - Act, to constitute a nuisance, must be in violation of some right of the plaintiff. Sheppard v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 31 Ga. App. 653 , 121 S.E. 868 (1924).

Expression "may otherwise be lawful" shows that the act complained of, insofar as the act causes "hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another" must be unlawful - that is a violation of some right of plaintiff - to constitute a nuisance. Southern Ry. v. Leonard, 58 Ga. App. 574 , 199 S.E. 433 (1938); Lawrence v. City of La Grange, 63 Ga. App. 587 , 11 S.E.2d 696 (1940).

Condition causing hurt or inconvenience. - Notion of "illegality" in Georgia involves much more than failure to comply with some particular directives which may or may not apply to an instrumentality at a given time. A condition may be illegal when it is objectionable only on grounds of causing "hurt or inconvenience," i.e., when it is a nuisance. This conclusion is directly authorized by the statutory definition of nuisance. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Distinction between negligence and nuisance. - In cause of action brought under nuisance exception to municipal immunity, as to a jury's questions concerning nuisance and the ordinary reasonable man standard found in O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 , the only real distinction between negligence and nuisance would seem to be that the latter involves a continued or repeating condition. One may, of course, dispute whether any negligence was involved in design and maintenance of a traffic signal. But, there would appear to be no room at all to doubt that the light was a repeating instrumentality. Thus, if there were negligence in design or maintenance, that negligence would of necessity give rise to a nuisance. Certainly a jury was authorized to so find, particularly in light of police officers' testimony that the light was a known hazard. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Conformity to general law is no defense to nuisance action. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Qualification on use of property. - Fact that the defendant's predecessor condemned a part of the plaintiff's land for railroad purposes, and used the part so condemned did not authorize it or its successor in title to maintain a nuisance to the damage of the plaintiff's other near-by property. Goble v. Louisville & N.R.R., 187 Ga. 243 , 200 S.E. 259 (1938).

Right to use one's property as one pleases implies a like right in every other person, and is qualified by the doctrine that the use in the first instance must be a reasonable one. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

When one acting solely from malevolent motives does injury to one's neighbor, to call such conduct the exercise of an absolute legal right is a perversion of terms. No statute or other rule of law in this state that confers upon an individual a right to maliciously injure another, regardless of what method may be employed to inflict such injury. On the other hand, everyone is entitled to the protection of the law against invasions of one's rights by others. The use of one's own property for the sole purpose of injuring another is not a right that a good citizen would desire nor one that a bad citizen should have. Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491 , 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941).

Nuisance is generally applied to that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use of property. Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 156 Ga. App. 209 , 274 S.E.2d 653 (1980).

Restrictive covenant prohibiting "noxious or offensive activity" or anything "which may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance" is too vague, indefinite, and uncertain for enforcement in a court of equity by injunction, except insofar as these words may be included within the definition of a nuisance. Douglas v. Wages, 271 Ga. 616 , 523 S.E.2d 330 (1999).

Nuisance and trespass distinguished. - Nuisance is an indirect tort, while a trespass usually is a direct infringement of one's property rights. The distinction between trespass and nuisance consists in the former being a direct infringement of one's right of property, while in the latter the infringement is the result of an act which is not wrongful in itself, but only in the consequences which may flow from the act. In the one case the injury is immediate, in the other it is consequential, and generally results from the commission of an act beyond the limits of the property affected. Groover v. Hightower, 59 Ga. App. 491 , 1 S.E.2d 446 (1939); Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Ga. App. 310 , 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950), later appeal, 89 Ga. App. 484 , 79 S.E.2d 816 (1954).

Violation of criminal law not necessarily a nuisance. - Violation of criminal law such as the pursuit of a business on Sunday will not be enjoined on the petition of an individual unless the violation amounts to a nuisance. Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938).

Cited in Center & Treadwell v. Davis, 39 Ga. 210 (1869); Rounsaville v. Kohlheim, 68 Ga. 668 (1882); Butler v. Mayor of Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570 (1885); Ison v. Manley, 76 Ga. 804 (1886); Horton v. Fulton, 130 Ga. 466 , 60 S.E. 1059 (1908); Williams v. Southern Ry., 140 Ga. 713 , 79 S.E. 850 (1913); Tate v. Mull, 147 Ga. 195 , 93 S.E. 212 (1917); Sanders v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 819 , 95 S.E. 695 (1918); Pitner v. Shugart Bros., 150 Ga. 340 , 103 S.E. 791 (1920); Morrison v. Slappey, 153 Ga. 724 , 113 S.E. 82 (1922); Town of Rentz v. Roach, 154 Ga. 491 , 115 S.E. 94 (1922); Harris v. Sutton, 168 Ga. 565 , 148 S.E. 403 (1929); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 40 Ga. App. 300 , 149 S.E. 305 (1929); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Farrar, 171 Ga. 371 , 155 S.E. 327 (1930); Thomoson v. Sammon, 174 Ga. 751 , 164 S.E. 45 (1932); Hall v. Moffett, 177 Ga. 300 , 170 S.E. 192 (1933); Wingate v. City of Doerun, 177 Ga. 373 , 170 S.E. 226 (1933); Georgia Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411 , 170 S.E. 520 (1933); Pittard v. Summerour, 181 Ga. 349 , 182 S.E. 20 (1935); Perkerson v. Mayor of Greenville, 51 Ga. App. 240 , 180 S.E. 22 (1935); Dickson v. Warren Co., 183 Ga. 746 , 189 S.E. 839 (1937); Warren v. Georgia Power Co., 58 Ga. App. 9 , 197 S.E. 338 (1938); Poole v. Arnold, 187 Ga. 734 , 2 S.E.2d 83 (1939); Simpson v. Blanchard, 73 Ga. App. 843 , 38 S.E.2d 634 (1946); Leonard v. State ex rel. Lanier, 204 Ga. 465 , 50 S.E.2d 212 (1948); Lankford v. Dockery, 85 Ga. App. 86 , 67 S.E.2d 800 (1951); Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161 , 71 S.E.2d 206 (1952); Seckinger v. City of Atlanta, 213 Ga. 566 , 100 S.E.2d 192 (1957); Barrow v. Georgia Lightweight Aggregate Co., 103 Ga. App. 704 , 120 S.E.2d 636 (1961); Southeastern Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Chapman, 103 Ga. App. 773 , 120 S.E.2d 651 (1961); Isley v. Little, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Dumus v. Renfroe, 220 Ga. 33 , 136 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Cronic v. State, 222 Ga. 623 , 151 S.E.2d 448 (1966); Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834 , 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968); Whitehead v. Hasty, 235 Ga. App. 331 , 219 S.E.2d 443 (1975); City of Atlanta v. Owen, 248 Ga. 299 , 282 S.E.2d 906 (1981); Columbus v. Smith, 170 Ga. App. 276 , 316 S.E.2d 761 (1984); Life for God's Stray Animals, Inc. v. New N. Rockdale County Homeowners Ass'n, 253 Ga. 551 , 322 S.E.2d 239 (1984); Meredith v. Thompson, 312 Ga. App. 697 , 719 S.E.2d 592 (2011); Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514 , 755 S.E.2d 145 (2014); Camelot Club Condo. Assoc. v. Afari-Opoku, 340 Ga. App. 618 , 798 S.E.2d 241 (2017); Handberry v. Manning Forestry Servs., LLC, 353 Ga. App. 150 , 836 S.E.2d 545 (2019).

Power of Municipality to Create Nuisance

Municipality under a legal duty to create no nuisances. Insofar as the language in a requested charge by a defendant reflects this, it is redundant. Insofar as it states otherwise, it is simply wrong. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Creating nuisance under guise of performing governmental function. - While it is true that a municipal corporation is not liable for the municipality's acts of negligence in discharging a governmental function, yet a municipal corporation cannot, under the guise of performing a governmental function, create a nuisance dangerous to life or health. Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419 , 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Effect of power to grade streets and establish drainage system. - General grant of power to grade streets and to establish in connection therewith a system of drainage does not carry with it any right on the part of the municipality to create and maintain a nuisance by causing surface water to be discharged upon the premises of a private citizen; and one may, when such a thing has been done, maintain against the city an action to recover the damages sustained in consequence thereof. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Effect of power to construct sewer and drain system. - Power to construct a system of sewers and drains does not authorize the municipal corporation to create a nuisance. In such a case the city cannot escape liability on the ground that the city is engaged in the performance of a governmental function. Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Ga. App. 310 , 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950), later appeal, 89 Ga. App. 484 , 79 S.E.2d 816 (1954); City of Rome v. Turk, 235 Ga. 223 , 219 S.E.2d 97 (1975).

County's failure to maintain a culvert. - Failure of a county to adequately maintain a culvert, resulting in property damage from flooding, was a nuisance when the county clearly knew of the flooding problems, and knew that construction developments upstream, which the county had approved, contributed to the flooding. Fulton County v. Wheaton, 252 Ga. 49 , 310 S.E.2d 910 (1984), overruled on other grounds, DeKalb County v. Orwig, 261 Ga. 137 , 402 S.E.2d 513 (1991).

Actions against municipality. - Action sounding in tort may be brought against a municipal corporation for the creation or maintenance of a nuisance, without reference to any question of negligence, if danger to health or life is involved; and an action sounding in tort may be brought against a municipal corporation for the creation or maintenance of a nuisance if the defendant is negligent, even though the act was authorized to be done. Ingram v. City of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719 , 84 S.E.2d 99 (1954).

Petition set out a cause of action for damages for the maintenance by the defendant of a sewage disposal plant in such manner as to cause a continuing nuisance dangerous to life and health, and was not subject to general demurrer on the ground that the city was at the time engaged in a governmental function. Ingram v. City of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719 , 84 S.E.2d 99 (1954).

When a petition showed an improper maintenance of a sewerage disposal plant, with resulting injury to health and property damage, the fact that the alleged improper maintenance resulted from negligent acts on the part of the defendant city did not create a misjoinder of actions, but only strengthened the action as laid on the theory of a continuing nuisance. Ingram v. City of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719 , 84 S.E.2d 99 (1954).

In a case where the property owner claimed that the city was liable in nuisance arising out of a water main break that damaged the property owner's property, the property owner failed to prove that the city was liable for a nuisance because the property owner did not present any evidence to show how long it took the city to begin work to repair the city's water main, how long it took to stop the flow of water, or that the city failed to do so in a reasonable time. Atkinson v. City of Atlanta, 325 Ga. App. 70 , 752 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

In a case where the property owner claimed that the city was liable in nuisance arising out of a water main break that damaged the property owner's property, the property owner failed to prove that the city was liable for a nuisance because the property owner failed to show that the city operated or maintained a nuisance on the property owner's property as the water main break occurred only once and caused only one incident of flooding on the property, and the water was gone within about five days. Atkinson v. City of Atlanta, 325 Ga. App. 70 , 752 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

In a case where the property owner claimed that the city was liable in nuisance arising out of a water main break that damaged the property owner's property, the property owner did not show that the city had a proactive duty to repair in a timely manner all the damage to the property owner's property rather than compensate the property owner for damages to the property. Atkinson v. City of Atlanta, 325 Ga. App. 70 , 752 S.E.2d 130 (2013).

City could not be held liable for an alleged nuisance created by the homeowners' decision to plug an underground drainage pipe because there was no evidence that the city owned the pipe or exercised direct dominion and control over the pipe. Merlino v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 186 , 657 S.E.2d 859 (2008).

Classes of Nuisances
1. In General

Classification dependent upon particular facts. - Which particular things may, and which may not, be condemned as a nuisance usually stand or fall upon their own particular facts. Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

Classes of nuisances. - There are three classes of nuisances: (1) nuisances per se, such as the obstruction of a stream; (2) nuisances dependent on circumstances, such as the conduct of a lawful business in certain surroundings. Simpson v. DuPont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465 , 85 S.E. 344 (1915); and (3) continuing nuisances which are complements of the other two, as distinguished from a permanent nuisance. City Council v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724 , 28 S.E. 994 (1897).

2. Nuisance Per Se

Definition. - Nuisance at law or a nuisance per se is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location or surroundings. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Gatewood v. Hansford, 75 Ga. App. 567 , 44 S.E.2d 126 (1947).

Structures lawfully erected. - Nothing that is lawful in its erection can be a nuisance per se. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Injunction. - Equity will not enjoin, as a nuisance per se, an act, occupation, or structure which is not a nuisance at all times or under all circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610 , 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940); Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

3. Nuisance in Fact or Per Accidens

Definition. - Nuisances in fact or per accidens are those which become nuisances by reason of circumstances and surroundings. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Larger class of nuisances are termed nuisances in fact or nuisances per accidens, and consists of those acts, occupations, or structures which are not nuisances per se but may become nuisances by reason of the circumstances or the location and surroundings. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Lawful enterprises. - Larger class of nuisances are termed nuisances in fact or nuisances per accidens. Bacon v. Walker, 77 Ga. 336 (1886); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

That which the law authorizes to be done, if done as the law authorizes, cannot be a nuisance. City of Atlanta v. Due, 42 Ga. App. 797 , 157 S.E. 256 (1931); Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610 , 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940); Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419 , 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978).

Business may be a nuisance either by reason of the business's location or by reason of the improper or negligent manner in which the business is conducted. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Lawful business cannot be a nuisance per se, although, because of surrounding places or circumstances, or because of the manner in which it is conducted, it may become a nuisance. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Lawful business may, by reason of the business's location in a residential area, cause hurt, inconvenience, and damage to those residing in the vicinity and become a nuisance per accidens by reason of circumstances and surroundings. Camp v. Warrington, 227 Ga. 674 , 182 S.E.2d 419 (1971).

Public projects as nuisances. - That which the law authorizes to be done, if done as the law authorizes, is not a nuisance. If a public project is legislatively sanctioned the project cannot be adjudged a nuisance. Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 156 Ga. App. 209 , 274 S.E.2d 653 (1980).

Improper execution of authorized act. - This section in defining a nuisance, and in saying that the lawfulness of the act does not keep the act from being a nuisance, does not mean that an act may amount to a nuisance if the act is authorized by law and then is executed in accordance with the judgment or conclusion reached by the municipal authorities in the exercise of the governmental function; but the true interpretation of this section is that an act which the law authorizes to be done may result in an actionable nuisance only when there is negligence or error in the execution of the plans and specifications adopted or prescribed by the governing authority. City of Atlanta v. Due, 42 Ga. App. 797 , 157 S.E. 256 (1931); Southland Coffee Co. v. City of Macon, 60 Ga. App. 253 , 3 S.E.2d 739 (1939).

If the act itself is legal, it only becomes a nuisance when conducted in an illegal manner to the hurt, inconvenience, or damage of another. Southern Ry. v. Leonard, 58 Ga. App. 574 , 199 S.E. 433 (1938); Southland Coffee Co. v. City of Macon, 60 Ga. App. 253 , 3 S.E.2d 739 (1939); Lawrence v. City of La Grange, 63 Ga. App. 587 , 11 S.E.2d 696 (1940).

If one does an act, of itself lawful, which being done in a particular place, necessarily tends to the damage of another's property, it is a nuisance; for it is incumbent on that one to find some other place to do that act when the act it will not be injurious or offensive. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944); Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125 , 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957).

Importance of location of enterprise. - Nuisance may consist merely of the right thing in the wrong place, regardless of other circumstances. Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

Thing that is lawful and proper in one locality may be a nuisance in another; in other words, a nuisance may consist merely of the right thing in the wrong place, regardless of other circumstances. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Though an act or thing be lawful, if, by reason of its location in a particular place it damages the property of another the act is a nuisance. Gatewood v. Hansford, 75 Ga. App. 567 , 44 S.E.2d 126 (1947).

Injunction. - Equity will not enjoin, as a nuisance per accidens, an act, business, occupation, or structure, which, not being a nuisance per se, does not become a nuisance by reason of the particular circumstances of its operation or the location and surroundings, as by some improper manner of operation or improper connected acts. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610 , 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940); Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

4. Continuing Nuisance

Definition. - Continuing nuisance does not necessarily mean a constant and unceasing nuisance, but a nuisance which occurs so often, and is so unnecessarily an incident of the use of property complained of, that it can be fairly said to be continuous, although not constant or unceasing. Farley v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 105 Ga. 323 , 31 S.E. 193 (1898); Keener v. Addis, 61 Ga. App. 40 , 5 S.E.2d 695 (1939).

Repetitive harm or inconvenience as nuisance. - Concept of nuisance involves repetition or condition causing hurt, inconvenience, or injury. The whole idea of nuisance is that of either a continuous or regularly repetitious act or condition which causes the hurt, inconvenience, or injury. A single isolated occurrence or act, which if regularly repeated would constitute a nuisance, is not a nuisance, until the act is regularly repeated. Leake v. City of Atlanta, 146 Ga. App. 57 , 245 S.E.2d 338 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 243 Ga. 20 , 252 S.E.2d 450 (1979).

Continuance gives rise to new cause of action. - Every continuance of a nuisance which is not permanent, and which could and should be abated, is a fresh nuisance for which a new action will lie. Goble v. Louisville & N.R.R., 187 Ga. 243 , 200 S.E. 259 (1938).

When one creates a nuisance, and permits the nuisance to remain, it is treated as a continuing wrong, and as giving rise, over and over again, to causes of action. But the principle upon which one is charged as a continuing wrongdoer is that one has a legal right, and is under a legal duty, to terminate the cause of the injury. Keener v. Addis, 61 Ga. App. 40 , 5 S.E.2d 695 (1939).

Continuing nuisance gives a new cause of action for each day of the nuisance's continued maintenance, and in such a case in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits a court of equity will entertain jurisdiction to enjoin the nuisance and have the nuisance abated. Harbuck v. Richland Box Co., 204 Ga. 352 , 49 S.E.2d 883 (1948), later appeal, 207 Ga. 537 , 63 S.E.2d 333 (1951).

Plaintiff's right to equitable relief was not barred by the statute of limitations on grounds that the nuisance complained of had existed for a period of more than four years prior to the institution of litigation, since when there is a continuing nuisance, a new cause of action arises daily and a court of equity takes jurisdiction in such a case to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Scott v. Dudley, 214 Ga. 565 , 105 S.E.2d 752 (1958).

When the nuisance lay in the continuing contamination, not in the leaks which originally gave rise to the nuisance, damage was not complete and suit was not barred by the applicable four-year limitations period. Hoffman v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 206 Ga. App. 727 , 426 S.E.2d 387 (1992).

When a municipality negligently constructs or undertakes to maintain a sewer or drainage system that causes the repeated flooding of property, a continuing abatable nuisance is established, for which the municipality is liable. Martin v. City of Ft. Valley, 235 Ga. App. 20 , 508 S.E.2d 244 (1998).

As the home buyers presented evidence that a developer's actions in clearing trees from the adjacent property increased the surface water flow and erosion on their land and made their drainage problem worse, these facts would support a finding of a continuing nuisance. Walker v. Johnson, 278 Ga. App. 806 , 630 S.E.2d 70 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146 , 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

Homeowner's nuisance action against a county based on the county's failure to maintain a deteriorating retaining wall was not barred by res judicata based on the owner's prior nuisance action for diminution in value arising out of a failure to maintain a storm water drainage system because the present suit was for a continuing nuisance. DeKalb County v. Heath, 331 Ga. App. 179 , 770 S.E.2d 269 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1110, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 424 (Ga. 2015).

Original nuisance always precedes continuing nuisance. - If there was no original nuisance, there could be no continuing nuisance. Southern Ry. v. Leonard, 58 Ga. App. 574 , 199 S.E. 433 (1938); Davis v. Beard, 202 Ga. App. 784 , 415 S.E.2d 522 (1992).

Duty of wrongdoer to terminate continuing nuisance. - When one creates a nuisance, and permits the nuisance to remain, the nuisance is treated as a continuing wrong, and as giving rise, over and over again, to causes of action. But the principle upon which one is charged as a continuing wrongdoer is that one has a legal right, and is under a legal duty, to terminate the cause of the injury. Keener v. Addis, 61 Ga. App. 40 , 5 S.E.2d 695 (1939).

Trial court did not err by denying a church's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a property owner's action for trespass and nuisance on the ground that there was an absence of evidence of negligence or proximate cause linking the church to the owner's injuries because the evidence showed that excess rainwater flowed from the church property onto the owner's property in a continuing manner; even though the church did not cause the initial leak, own the water that leaked, or have any responsibility for the compaction of the soil around the underground utility lines, the jury could find that the initial leak caused a condition on its property that in turn caused continued excessive flooding of the owner's property thereafter. Bailey v. Annistown Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 677 , 689 S.E.2d 62 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0669, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 468 (Ga. 2010).

Prescription does not run in favor of a continuing nuisance. Gabbett v. City of Atlanta, 137 Ga. 180 , 73 S.E. 372 (1911).

Equity jurisdiction of continuing nuisance. - If a nuisance is a continuing one, a court of equity will take jurisdiction to enjoin such a nuisance. Ford v. Crawford, 240 Ga. 612 , 241 S.E.2d 829 (1978).

When plaintiff entitled to equitable relief. - If alleged conduct constitutes a continuing nuisance, the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Accrual right of action. - Nuisance, permanent and continuing in the nuisance's character, the destruction or damage being at once complete upon the completion of the act by which the nuisance is created, gives but one right of action, which accrues immediately upon the creation of the nuisance, and against which the statute of limitations begins, from that time, to run. City of La Fayette v. Hegwood, 52 Ga. App. 168 , 182 S.E. 860 (1935).

Manner of Proof

Contents of complaint. - In a nuisance action the complainant must show the existence of the nuisance complained of, that one has suffered injury, and that the injury complained of was caused by the alleged nuisance. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Nuisance per accidens. - Petition alleging that, at a place of business located on a main thoroughfare, outside the corporate limits of any municipality, beer and wine are being sold, a juke box operated, both day and night, making a loud noise which disturbs and hinders the residents of the neighborhood from sleep, that drunk people congregate and come out of the place cursing, fighting, and making undue noise, and many people of disreputable character gather, and that beer is sold there on Sunday in violation of law, is sufficient to charge the existence of an abatable public nuisance, and therefore stated a cause of action and one which the solicitor-general (now district attorney) could bring proceedings to abate. Davis v. State ex rel. Lanham, 199 Ga. 839 , 35 S.E.2d 458 (1945) (decided, in part, under former Code 1933, § 26-6103).

See Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Information of a district attorney filed on the application of a citizen - to the effect that the defendant knowingly maintained and used a building for the purposes of gaming and had in the building a certain paper card, dice and other contents, which should also be declared to be a nuisance - were sufficient, as against the general and special grounds of the defendant's demurrer, to set forth a cause of action, to abate the place as a common nuisance. Thornton v. Forehand, 211 Ga. 658 , 87 S.E.2d 865 (1955).

DFL Indirect damage of aesthetic value. - Allegations that the appellees' actions taken on the appellees' own property have indirectly damaged the aesthetic value of the plaintiff's property fail to state a cause of action. Jillson v. Barton, 139 Ga. App. 767 , 229 S.E.2d 476 (1975).

When the allegations of the petition could be construed as sufficient to show creation of a public nuisance, there being no allegations that the abatement of the nuisance in the manner authorized by law would not afford the petitioners adequate relief, a writ of mandamus would not lie. State Hwy. Dep't v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 , 84 S.E.2d 561 (1954).

Insufficient allegations. - Allegations of the petition seeking to enjoin an alleged nuisance in operating an asphalt and cement-mixing and manufacturing plant as to the spilling of concrete and asphalt in a public street and its effect on persons walking along the street related to a public nuisance, and stating no special damage, showed no cause of action. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610 , 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940).

Petition fell short of describing a public nuisance when there was no allegation that from the points where the sewage was deposited by the defendant city the streams flowed through the lands owned by anyone other than the plaintiff, or that anyone other than the plaintiff was damaged thereby. Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476 , 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960), overruled on other grounds, City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 , 452 S.E.2d 488 (1994).

Because an Olympic Committee acted in a lawful manner in operation of an Olympic Park, and no evidence was presented to the contrary, a nuisance claim against the committee lacked merit. Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 895 , 584 S.E.2d 16 (2003), aff'd, sub nom. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116 , 598 S.E.2d 471 (2004).

Test for nuisance. - Determining factor in an alleged nuisance is not its effect upon persons who are invalids, afflicted with disease, bodily ills, or abnormal physical conditions, or who are of nervous temperament, or peculiarly sensitive to annoyances or disturbances of the character complained of. Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938).

In the determination of whether a given state of facts discloses a nuisance, the general effect of the condition shown on an ordinary person, rather than one of abnormal sensibilities and feelings, is the proper consideration. Dorsett v. Nunis, 191 Ga. 559 , 13 S.E.2d 371 (1941).

Test of whether an act or thing complained of is a nuisance is whether it would be offensive to persons of ordinary feelings and sensibilities, and not those of fastidious taste or temperament. Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

Business as nuisance. - To make a business a nuisance the business must be such to people of ordinary nature or condition; it is not sufficient if the business be simply offensive to delicate and sensitive organizations. Ruff v. Phillips, 50 Ga. 130 (1873).

Threat of inconvenience. - Mere apprehension of inconveniences arising from a filling-station in course of construction, the same being for a lawful business use, is not sufficient to authorize an injunction. Richmond Cotton Oil Co. v. Castellaw, 134 Ga. 472 , 67 S.E. 1126 (1910); Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 165 Ga. 575 , 141 S.E. 643 (1928).

Negligence not required. - Negligence is not a necessary ingredient of a cause of action growing out of a nuisance. Cannon v. City of Macon, 81 Ga. App. 310 , 58 S.E.2d 563 (1950), later appeal, 89 Ga. App. 484 , 79 S.E.2d 816 (1954).

Comfortable enjoyment of premises must be sensibly diminished. - In a nuisance action the occupants of a dwelling house must show that the comfortable enjoyment of the premises has been sensibly diminished, either by actual, tangible injury to the property itself, or by the promotion of such physical discomfort as detracts sensibly from the ordinary enjoyment of life. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Jury determination of public nuisance. - Whether or not the acts of the defendant constituted a public nuisance, as contended by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant, is an issue for the jury to determine. Scott v. Reynolds, 70 Ga. App. 545 , 29 S.E.2d 88 (1944).

While it is no longer required that the plaintiff in a nuisance case show, as the plaintiff had to do at common law, a freehold interest in the property affected by the nuisance, and while the plaintiff no longer need show damage to the realty itself, the plaintiff must still show that the condition is injurious by reason of its relationship to the plaintiff's home or property in the neighborhood where it is located, or else that it is injurious by reason of its constituting an obstruction to streets or sidewalks and like places used by the public generally for passage, which obstructions were at common law regarded as public nuisances because they interfered with the public right of passage. Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108 , 97 S.E.2d 330 (1957).

Damages

Nominal damages. - When a nuisance is shown to exist, the law imports damages for an injury to the right, and at least nominal damages may be recovered to protect the right. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Damages by public nuisance. - Private citizen specially damaged by a public nuisance may proceed in the citizen's own name and behalf to have the nuisance abated. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Gill, 118 Ga. 737 , 45 S.E. 623 (1903).

Manner of alleging damages. - General allegation of damage is sufficient to entitle a recovery of all damages that are the natural consequence of the nuisance; but when special damages are alleged, the defendant should be apprised of the items thereof. Exley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 151 F. 101 (S.D. Ga. 1907).

Recovery of damages. - In cases of nuisances which cause permanent injury to land, the ordinary rule is that the measure of damages is the depreciation in the market value; in regard to nuisances which are of a nonpermanent, abatable, or temporary nature, the depreciation in the usable or rental value ordinarily furnishes the measure. But, under some circumstances, there may also be a recovery for special damages. Ward v. Southern Brighton Mills, 45 Ga. App. 262 , 164 S.E. 214 (1932).

There can be no recovery for damage flowing merely from an improper or defective or negligent construction or maintenance of a public improvement which results in an abatable continuing nuisance on the theory that plaintiff's property has been appropriated by its erection and maintenance. Rhines v. Commissioners of Chatham County, 50 Ga. App. 844 , 179 S.E. 140 (1935).

Damages for depreciation in the market value of property are appropriate in a suit against a municipality for the taking or damaging of property for public use and also in a suit for a permanent and continuing nuisance created by the municipality, recovery of such damages must be had within four years from the date of the original injury. City of La Fayette v. Hegwood, 52 Ga. App. 168 , 182 S.E. 860 (1935).

Owner-occupant is entitled to recover damages for annoyance and discomfort temporarily depriving the owner of the unrestricted use and full enjoyment of the owner's premises, in addition to damages for permanent injury to the freehold and for pain and suffering as a result of the maintenance of a nuisance. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285 , 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

If permanent injury is sustained as the result of the maintenance of a nuisance, then the owner of the property damaged is entitled to compensation for such permanent injury, whether the nuisance is abated or abatable. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285 , 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

In the case of a private abatable nuisance, such as the operation of an asphalt mixing plant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for any direct damage to the plaintiff's person or to the plaintiff's property resulting from the nuisance, accruing within the statute of limitations and up to the filing of the petition. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285 , 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

Owner of a dwelling house which the owner occupies as a home is entitled to just compensation for the annoyance and discomfort occasioned by the maintenance, by another, of a nuisance on adjacent premises. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285 , 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

For damages for permanent injury to property for an unabatable nuisance, there can be but one recovery. "A nuisance, permanent and continuing in its character, the destruction or damage being at once complete upon completion of the act by which the nuisance is created, gives but one right of action, which accrues immediately upon the creation of the nuisance . . . Where the original nuisance to land is of a permanent character so that the damages inflicted thereby are permanent, a recovery not only may, but must, be had for the entire damages in one action; and such damages accrue from the time the nuisance is created, and from that time the statute of limitations begins to run." Price v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 132 Ga. App. 107 , 207 S.E.2d 556 (1974).

Apportionment of damages. - Court of equity, acquiring jurisdiction for the purpose of abating a nuisance, will also, upon proper averments, extend such jurisdiction to the ascertainment and determination of the damages suffered by reason of the nuisance, and in such event a court of equity may severally apportion damages among the defendants for the defendants' proportionate contribution to the injury. Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206 , 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954).

Illustrative Cases

Airplanes. - Since the evidence showed that at least 75 flights were made over the plaintiff's school building daily at altitudes of from 50 to 75 feet, just over the top of the plaintiff's trees, that the danger necessarily created thereby to the life and safety of those occupying the plaintiff's premises, the noise and vibration caused thereby, and the distracting effect on the plaintiff's students made further operation of the plaintiff's school impracticable, and that by such flights the right to enjoy freely the use of the plaintiff's property has been substantially lessened, a continuing nuisance was established which equity would enjoin. Scott v. Dudley, 214 Ga. 565 , 105 S.E.2d 752 (1958).

Private nuisance between airport and pilot not created. - LLC that declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy committed trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-9-10 when the LLC interfered with a pilot's right to use an airport the LLC owned after the LLC gave the pilot permission to do so, but the pilot's right was limited to use of the taxiways and runway and the pilot violated O.C.G.A. § 51-9-10 by entering the airport for other purposes after being told not to do so; although the court awarded the LLC $100 for the pilot's trespass and the pilot $600 for the LLC's trespass, neither party showed that the opposing party committed a private nuisance in violation of Georgia law, and the court refused to award punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 or attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 to either party. Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC v. Franck (In re Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC), 525 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).

Air pollution. - Pollution of the air, actually necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of life and indispensable to the progress of society, is not actionable; but the right must not be exercised in an unreasonable manner so as to inflict injury upon another unnecessarily. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Asphalt mixing plant. - While the operation of an asphalt mixing plant is not a nuisance per se, it may become a nuisance in fact or a nuisance per accidens by reason of the circumstances or the location and surroundings. Sam Finley, Inc. v. Russell, 75 Ga. App. 112 , 42 S.E.2d 452 (1947).

Asphalt-manufacturing and cement-mixing plant. - Operation of an asphalt-manufacturing and cement-mixing plant is not a nuisance per se. Nor does it become a nuisance per accidens, if it is conducted in a manufacturing section of a city, merely because the plant is operated by coal or some fuel discharging obnoxious smoke and cinders, or releases dust, or is accompanied by loud rattling noises during the day and night, and is within 200 feet of a residence, when it is not shown that such operation is in a residence neighborhood, or that the manner of operation is unusual in a business of this character, or unnecessary and avoidable. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Recreational use of baseball park. - Playing of ordinary games of baseball, or the operation of a park for such games, in a lawful, decent, and orderly manner, and accompanied only by the usual cheers and noise of spectators, where these contests are harmlessly played and enjoyed, is not a nuisance per se. Such games or pursuits may, however, become a nuisance per accidens, when there is indecent, disorderly, or improper conduct of the players or spectators; or when, in a residential community, there is accompanying noise, which is excessive and unreasonable, or which recurs at unusual and unreasonable hours of the night, so as to prevent the sleep of ordinary, normal, reasonable persons of the neighborhood. Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938).

Billboards. - Billboard erected by defendants on the defendants' own land, which is not otherwise a nuisance, does not become one merely because the billboard is erected maliciously or from spite or ill will, when the billboard serves a useful purpose. Campbell v. Hammock, 212 Ga. 90 , 90 S.E.2d 415 (1955).

Slaughterhouses and similar enterprises. - Certain businesses or structures, such as slaughterhouses and certain foul-smelling factories, are so offensive to the senses that they must be removed from the limits of cities and towns, and even from the neighborhood of family residences. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Business solicitation of private home. - To arbitrarily declare, without qualification, that every solicitor who goes to a private home to try to conduct an otherwise perfectly legal business is a nuisance and subject to fine or imprisonment is an unreasonable interference with a solicitor's normal legal rights, and is without due process of law. De Berry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74 , 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940).

Church in residential section. - Church though erected in a residential section is not per se a nuisance. Dorsett v. Nunis, 191 Ga. 559 , 13 S.E.2d 371 (1941).

Creating and spreading dust. - Creation and spreading of dust in such large and unusual quantities as unreasonably to contaminate the atmosphere and endanger the health and lives of the citizens is not within the actual or implied authority of an airport franchise, and those responsible therefor, despite any immunity or limited liability, may be held to full accountability for the maintenance of a nuisance. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Spread of dust upon the property of another in excessive and unreasonable quantities may amount to a physical invasion of another's property rights. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Dust is a physical substance, or an aggregation of substances, gathered from the earth. It may contain impurities and result directly in disease or physical injury; one cannot be forced to endure dust from the negligence of another even though the business from which the dust springs may be expressly authorized by law. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Fair occupying street. - Ferris wheels and other devices for amusement, which fair a company of the state militia is permitted to station on the street for a week, is a public nuisance and a court of equity has jurisdiction, at the instance of the solicitor-general (now district attorney), to restrain it by injunction. City Council v. Reynolds, 122 Ga. 754 , 50 S.E. 998 , 106 Am. St. R. 147 , 69 L.R.A. 564 (1905).

Filling station. - Filling-station is not per se a nuisance. Standard Oil Co. v. Kahn, 165 Ga. 575 , 141 S.E. 643 (1928).

Injuries and inconveniences to persons residing near filling station, such as noises, etc., which result ordinarily and from necessity in the conduct of their business of repairing cars, trucks, and tires, are not to be classed as nuisances. Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498 , 4 S.E.2d 155 (1939).

Flooding after plugging of underground drainage pipe. - In a suit involving two landowning couples, it was error to grant summary judgment to the second couple on the first couple's nuisance claim after the second couple plugged an underground drainage pipe. Although the act of plugging the pipe might not have been wrongful in itself, the potential consequence of the uphill flooding of the first couple's property after the pipe was plugged created an issue of fact as to whether the couple could be held liable for creating a continuing nuisance. Merlino v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. 186 , 657 S.E.2d 859 (2008).

Gaming house. - Maintenance of a gaming house or a gaming place is a public nuisance. Thornton v. Forehand, 211 Ga. 658 , 87 S.E.2d 865 (1955).

Veterinary hospital. - Operation of a dog and cat hospital is a lawful enterprise and is not a nuisance per se, and cannot be enjoined unless it becomes a nuisance by reason of the particular circumstances of its improper operation or improper connected acts. Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550 , 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951).

Injury to health. - All injury to health is special, and necessarily limited in its effect to the individual affected, and is, in its nature, irreparable. It matters not that others within the sphere of the operation of the nuisance, whether public or private, may be affected likewise. Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 184 Ga. 485 , 191 S.E. 919 (1937).

Livery stable. - Livery stable in a town is not necessarily a nuisance in itself; and therefore a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction either the completion of a building because intended for that purpose, or its appropriation to the use intended. Thomoson v. Sammon, 174 Ga. 751 , 164 S.E. 45 (1932).

Hog and chicken feed manufacturing plant. - Mere erection of a plant for the manufacture of hog and chicken feed from the entrails from poultry and other animals is not without more a nuisance per se, and the allegations of the petition do not show it to be such. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Noise. - When noise accompanies an otherwise lawful business or pursuit, the question whether such noise is a nuisance depends upon the nature of the locality as a residence community or otherwise, on the degree of intensity and disagreeableness of the sounds, on their times and frequency, and in all cases, under the preceding rules, on their effect, not upon peculiar and unusual individuals, but upon the ordinary, normal, reasonable persons of the locality. Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938).

Noxious trade or business as nuisance. - To constitute a nuisance, it is not necessary that a noxious trade or business should endanger the health of the neighborhood. It is sufficient if it produces that which is offensive to the senses, and which renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946); City of Macon v. Cannon, 89 Ga. App. 484 , 79 S.E.2d 816 (1954); Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125 , 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957).

Nuisance claim barred by statute of repose. - Purchaser's nuisance claims against a county, the county health department, and builders were barred by the statute of repose, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 , because the purchaser could not maintain a nuisance action under the facts asserted in the purchaser's complaint; a plaintiff cannot maintain a nuisance claim that is based upon damage to a house resulting from a defect constructed into the house that was concealed from the plaintiff by the builder and/or the seller because, instead, the applicable causes of action are fraud against the seller and/or negligent construction against the builder. Wilhelm v. Houston County, 310 Ga. App. 506 , 713 S.E.2d 660 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1745, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 219 (Ga. 2012).

Obstructing streets. - Proper authorities may entertain an application to abate a nuisance caused by the obstruction of a city street or public alley. Carlisle v. Wilson, 110 Ga. 860 , 36 S.E. 54 (1900); Robins v. McGehee, 127 Ga. 431 , 56 S.E. 461 (1907); Hendricks v. Jackson, 143 Ga. 106 , 84 S.E. 440 (1915); Hendricks v. Carter, 21 Ga. App. 527 , 94 S.E. 807 (1918).

Action to abate nuisance, caused by obstruction of a city street or public alley, may be maintained by anyone whose property will be injuriously affected. Coker v. Atlanta, K. & N. Ry., 123 Ga. 483 , 51 S.E. 481 (1905).

When there is actual obstruction of a portion of a road intended for travel, actual interference or inconvenience is immaterial. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

If a street or alley was a public street or alley, the obstruction or encroachment upon it by an adjoining landowner would constitute a public nuisance subject to abatement on petition of a user of the alley if special injury were shown to have occurred to the user by the obstruction. Henderson v. Ezzard, 75 Ga. App. 724 , 44 S.E.2d 397 (1947).

When, in an equitable petition, the only prayer for specific relief was that the defendant be temporarily restrained and permanently enjoined from maintaining a barricade or obstruction, which it had placed in a public street, or that it be required to abate the alleged nuisance, and the barricade or obstruction was fully completed and existing when the suit was instituted, it was erroneous to overrule a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition as amended, which pointed out that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief prayed for since it has an adequate and a complete remedy at law; a party who complains only of a completed existing obstruction in a public street must pursue the remedy which the statute affords that party. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628 , 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954).

Permanent obstruction of city streets. - Right to the use of the streets of a city is in the public, and any permanent obstruction thereof which materially impedes travel is a nuisance per se. Williamson v. Souter, 172 Ga. 364 , 157 S.E. 463 (1931).

Any permanent structure in a road which materially interferes with travel is a nuisance per se, and any obstruction permanent in nature or continuously maintained, which interferes with the free use of the road by the public, is a public nuisance, and it is immaterial that space may be left on either side of the obstruction for the passage of the public. The public has the right to the unobstructed use of the whole road as the road was acquired by the county or city. Harbuck v. Richland Box Co., 204 Ga. 352 , 49 S.E.2d 883 (1948), later appeal, 207 Ga. 537 , 63 S.E.2d 333 (1951).

In view of evidence that a property owner's private road impeded the necessary passage of a city's emergency personnel so as to significantly endanger the health and safety of those persons residing at apartment complexes adjacent to the road, the owner was improperly granted summary judgment in the city's suit seeking abatement of a public nuisance under O.C.G.A. § 41-1-2 . City of College Park v. 2600 Camp Creek, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 207 , 666 S.E.2d 607 (2008).

Permanent structures which do not interfere with travel. - Permanent structures which do not interfere with travel, and which are erected for public purposes, such as telegraph and telephone poles, and the like, are permissible; it is not every use by an individual of a street or highway which constitutes a public nuisance. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

Any permanent structure in a public road which materially interferes with travel therein is a nuisance per se. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

If a street or alley was a public street or alley, the obstruction or encroachment upon it by an adjoining landowner would constitute a public nuisance subject to abatement on petition of a user of the alley if special injury were shown to have occurred to the user by the obstruction. Henderson v. Ezzard, 75 Ga. App. 724 , 44 S.E.2d 397 (1947).

Since the evidence was uncontradicted that an alley had been used by the public in general for more than 20 years prior to the alley's obstruction 30 years prior to trial by the defendant, a finding was demanded that the public had acquired a prescriptive right to the free and unobstructed use of the alley and that it was a public alley, and since prescription does not run against a municipality as to land held for the benefit of the public, such as a public alley, the obstruction must be removed. Henderson v. Ezzard, 75 Ga. App. 724 , 44 S.E.2d 397 (1947).

Cellular tower was not a nuisance as the tower was lawfully constructed. Sanders v. Henry County, F.3d (11th Cir. July 17, 2012)(Unpublished).

Pavement broken by ordinary use. - Private corporation is not liable to a person injured by the crumbling of the pavement on a sidewalk which was caused by ordinary wear and tear of its trucks when crossing to enter one of its alleys. McAfee v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 26 Ga. App. 25 , 105 S.E. 631 (1920).

State prison labor on county projects. - Utilizing state prison labor on county projects is not, by itself, "nuisance" for which the county would be liable; the county could not be liable for a nuisance unless the act complained of amounted to a taking for public purposes. West v. Chatham County, 177 Ga. App. 417 , 339 S.E.2d 390 (1985).

Public institution. - Fact alone that a proposed clinic is to be operated as a public institution would not necessarily prevent the clinic from being a nuisance if located in a residential section. Benton v. Pittard, 197 Ga. 843 , 31 S.E.2d 6 (1944).

"Purpresture." - Purpresture as defined at common law, and recognized in this and other states, is when one encroaches and makes that serviceable to one which belongs to many. Thus, any encroachment upon a public street or highway is a purpresture; and if the public use is impeded or rendered less commodious, such encroachment is generally not only a purpresture, but also technically a public nuisance, regardless of the degree of interference with the common enjoyment. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

It is not true that every purpresture is a public nuisance. It may or may not be such, according to the particular facts. Although the two may coexist, either may exist without the other. The rule both in reason and by authority is that, unless the public sustain or may sustain some degree of inconvenience or annoyance in the use of a public highway or street or other public property, there is no public nuisance. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

While there may be language in some decisions indicating that a purpresture is always a public nuisance, the terms are not synonymous. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

Railroads or other quasi-public facilities. - If the relocation of the defendant's track was done under lawful authority, the act would not constitute a nuisance. If the track was relocated in a proper manner and was maintained in a proper manner there was no nuisance. Tracks are laid down for the purpose of operating trains thereon. If the trains are operated in a proper manner, such operation does not constitute a nuisance. Necessarily the running of trains makes some noise and produces some vibrations. Locomotives pulling trains emit some smoke, sparks, and cinders, but these incidental results do not necessarily constitute a nuisance, but are the necessary incidents of the franchise granted a railroad company in connection with the conduct of its business. Southern Ry. v. Leonard, 58 Ga. App. 574 , 199 S.E. 433 (1938).

Injuries and inconveniences to persons residing near railroads or other quasi-public facilities from noises of locomotives, rumbling of cars, vibrations produced thereby, and smoke, cinders, and soot, and the like, which result from the ordinary and necessary, and therefore proper, use and conduct of such works, are not nuisances, but are the necessary concomitants of the franchises granted. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Collins, 232 Ga. 790 , 209 S.E.2d 1 (1974).

What is merely a matter of convenience to a railroad company is not a necessity and may constitute a nuisance. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Collins, 232 Ga. 790 , 209 S.E.2d 1 (1974).

Sale of intoxicants. - Illegal sale of intoxicating liquors is a public nuisance, affecting the whole community in which the sale is carried on, and may be abated by process instituted in the name of the state. Lofton v. Collins, 117 Ga. 434 , 43 S.E. 708 , 61 L.R.A. 150 (1903); Walker v. McNelly, 121 Ga. 114 , 48 S.E. 718 (1904); Dispensary Comm'rs v. Hooper, 128 Ga. 99 , 56 S.E. 997 (1907).

Keeping or maintaining of any place or resort where intoxicating liquor is sold or kept for sale in a dry county, in violation of the provisions of Ch. 10 of T. 3 is a public, common nuisance, which may be abated by writ of injunction issued out of the superior court upon a bill filed by the attorney or the district attorney of the circuit, or by any citizen or citizens of such county. Ogletree v. Atkinson, 195 Ga. 32 , 22 S.E.2d 783 (1942).

Private citizen cannot maintain an action to enjoin the operation of a retail liquor business without a valid license in a "wet" county unless the citizen has sustained special injury, and its abatement must proceed for the public on information filed by the solicitor general (now district attorney). Mabry v. Shikany, 223 Ga. 513 , 156 S.E.2d 364 (1967).

Smoke. - To constitute smoke a nuisance, it must be such as to produce a visible, tangible, and appreciable injury to property, or such as to render it specially uncomfortable or inconvenient, or to materially interfere with the ordinary comfort of human existence. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Smoke, unaccompanied with noise or noxious vapor, noise alone, offensive vapors alone, although not injurious to health, may severally constitute a nuisance to the owner of adjoining or neighboring property. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877 , 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941).

Trial court erred by granting the neighbors' motion for summary judgment in a property owners' action to recover damages arising from smoke emanating from the neighbors' outdoor fireplace because the evidence was sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of whether the smoke from the neighbors' outdoor fireplace would reasonably interfere with an ordinary person's enjoyment of life; the neighbors had a fire in their outdoor fireplace approximately thirty times in a three-year period, and each time, the owners could smell the smoke in their home and suffered from itchy eyes, headaches, scratchy throats, and breathing problems. Weller v. Blake, 315 Ga. App. 214 , 726 S.E.2d 698 (2012).

Steam laundry is not a nuisance per se, and "smoke is not per se a nuisance" but a business otherwise lawful may become a nuisance in fact, or a nuisance per accidens, by reason of improper operation, or by reason of its location and the injury produced by such a lawful business is actionable if it produces that which is offensive to the senses, and which renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. Gatewood v. Hansford, 75 Ga. App. 567 , 44 S.E.2d 126 (1947).

Taxi cabs. - In a wrongful death and nuisance suit wherein the victim was killed while traveling in a taxi cab on a state highway, and the taxi cab had passed a mandatory city inspection the day prior, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the city on the nuisance claim; as a matter of law, the city had no notice of a dangerous condition within the meaning of a nuisance via its inspection as, even though there was evidence in the record that the inspector did not measure tire tread depth, there was no evidence that taxicabs with insufficient tread on their tires routinely passed city inspections and thereafter were involved in collisions that caused injury. Heller v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. App. 345 , 659 S.E.2d 617 (2008), aff'd, Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262 , 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

Decedent was killed when the taxi in which the decedent was riding spun out of control on a rain-slick road and hit a tree. An isolated incident involving a city inspector's giving the taxi a passing grade despite the taxi's extremely worn tires was insufficient to give rise to a nuisance claim against the city. Ga. DOT v. Heller, 285 Ga. 262 , 674 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

Mills. - Appeals court affirmed summary judgment for a chip mill; the mill was operated lawfully in a county location that the mill and county specifically negotiated and rezoned for the mill's operation, and the lawful operation was not conditioned on hours of operation, so the mill's operation was not a nuisance. If the act is lawful in itself, it becomes a nuisance only when conducted in an illegal manner to the hurt, inconvenience, or damage of another. Effingham County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Shuler Bros., 265 Ga. App. 754 , 595 S.E.2d 526 (2004).

Display and sale of tombstones and monuments. - Mere display and sale of tombstones and monuments designed and intended to be placed over the bodies and graves of deceased persons, such display being made on a lot in an exclusively residential section and in such manner as to present a "graveyard appearance," is not a nuisance, and may not be enjoined by residents and owners of property in the vicinity, on the grounds that it injuriously affects the values of their properties, and that the constant appearance of the spectacle would prey upon the minds and injuriously affect the health of the individuals. Grubbs v. Wooten, 189 Ga. 390 , 5 S.E.2d 874 (1939).

Increase in traffic congestion. - Increase in traffic congestion in front of property resulting from construction of townhouse on adjacent property is a fanciful assertion of harm and does not constitute a nuisance. Goddard v. Irby, 255 Ga. 47 , 335 S.E.2d 286 (1985).

Unsightliness of adjacent property. - Unsightliness of adjacent property alone, tending to devalue the adjoining property, is not such inconvenience as to amount to a nuisance for which an injunction will lie. Jillson v. Barton, 139 Ga. App. 767 , 229 S.E.2d 476 (1975).

Interference with the natural flow of surface water may amount to a nuisance, without the presence of the element of danger to health. City of Macon v. Cannon, 89 Ga. App. 484 , 79 S.E.2d 816 (1954).

Wholesale grocery business in a residential section of a city is not necessarily a nuisance of itself, and therefore a court of equity will not enjoin the construction of a building to be used for that purpose, where there is no zoning regulation or restrictive covenant inhibiting such use. Roberts v. Rich, 200 Ga. 497 , 37 S.E.2d 401 (1946).

Detention pond. - Judgment entered for plaintiffs on plaintiffs' nuisance claim was proper; although the developer's maintaining a detention pond was itself legal, it became a nuisance when conducted in an illegal manner to the damage of plaintiffs' land. The fact that the defendant did not own the pond that created the nuisance did not shield the defendant from liability, as the jury could have found from the defendant's ownership interest in the entity that maintained the detention pond that the defendant had sufficient control over the decision not to modify the pond so as to hold it liable for the damages caused by the pond. Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 256 Ga. App. 703 , 569 S.E.2d 608 (2002).

Wrongful diversion of water onto property of another. - To wrongfully turn water on the lands of another is a nuisance. Goble v. Louisville & N.R.R., 187 Ga. 243 , 200 S.E. 259 (1938).

Excess water runoff. - In two cases involving a dispute for nuisance and trespass arising out of excessive water runoff which flowed onto a landowner's land, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a construction contractor was reversed, while the denial of summary judgment to a developer was affirmed, as: (1) the testimony as to the presence of the excess runoff and its cause, presented questions of fact for a jury; (2) merely because the county approved the development activities did not mean that either the contractor or the developer or both could not be held liable for a nuisance; and (3) the landowner's action against the alleged creators of the water-runoff was authorized, regardless of the landowner having sold the property. Green v. Eastland Homes, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 643 , 644 S.E.2d 479 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 629 (Ga. 2007).

Diversion of surface water. - County is subject to suit for damages, as well as injunctive relief, for maintaining a roadway in such manner as to constitute a continuing nuisance by diverting surface water onto the owner's property, and it is no defense that the property is not adjacent to the roadway in question. Reid v. Gwinnett County, 242 Ga. 88 , 249 S.E.2d 559 (1978).

Landowners' of a lakefront property created a nuisance when the owners went onto a corporation's dam and plugged the weakened dam to prevent a lake from draining. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894 , 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Although the government required the owners of a weakened dam to take certain safety precautions to maintain the level of water in a lake at a low level, the owners' refusal to repair the dam was not a justification for creating a nuisance. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894 , 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Jury properly awarded damages against a corporation and in favor of the lakefront landowners because the corporation created a nuisance by attempting to breach the dam and drain the lake, rather than repairing and maintaining a dam so the dam could impound water. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894 , 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Railroad and city alleged to have failed to maintain a culvert and drainage pipe that caused flood damage. - Appellate court erred by reversing summary judgment to a railroad and a city in the homeowners' nuisance and negligence suit as the homeowners' permanent nuisance claim was barred by the four year statute of limitations period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 ; and the homeowners failed to show triable issues of fact on the homeowners' continuing nuisance claim that the railroad improperly maintained the culvert and drainage pipe at issue or that the city had any duty to maintain the culvert and pipe since the homeowners failed to show that the city had taken any control over the property in question. City of Atlanta v. Kleber, 285 Ga. 413 , 677 S.E.2d 134 (2009).

Electromagnetic radiation. - In an action against a utility and power company for damages on theories of trespass and nuisance arising from electromagnetic radiation, a grant of summary judgment on the trespass claim and directed verdict on the nuisance claim were proper for policy reasons since the scientific evidence was inconclusive regarding the invasive quality of magnetic fields from power lines. Jordan v. Georgia Power Co., 219 Ga. App. 690 , 466 S.E.2d 601 (1995).

Criminal attack not result of nuisance. - Church was not liable for nuisance to an injured party who was criminally attacked adjacent to its property by a third-party as a one-time occurrence did not amount to a nuisance and was an isolated occurrence or act, despite the injured party's accusations that the assailant might have been concealed in the bushes near the abandoned church building before attacking the victim. Barnes v. St. Stephen's Missionary Baptist Church, 260 Ga. App. 765 , 580 S.E.2d 587 (2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipality's potential liability for acts of a probationer working on a community service project will have to be determined from the facts in each case, which will show whether the injury was the result of a nuisance, as defined in former Code 1933, § 72-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 ), or negligence, as stated in former Code 1933, § 69-301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 ). 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-32.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, § 1-3.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 1-12.

ALR. - Trolley poles in street as nuisance, 2 A.L.R. 496 .

Proximate cause as determining landlord's liability, where injury results to a third person from a nuisance that becomes only upon tenant's using the premises, 4 A.L.R. 740 .

Pesthouse or contagious disease hospital as nuisance, 4 A.L.R. 995 ; 18 A.L.R. 122 ; 48 A.L.R. 518 .

Steam whistle as a nuisance, 4 A.L.R. 1343 .

Operation of railroad as nuisance to property, 6 A.L.R. 723 ; 69 A.L.R. 1188 .

Nuisance resulting from smoke alone as subject for injunctive relief, 6 A.L.R. 1575 .

Fire escape as an attractive nuisance, 9 A.L.R. 271 .

Necessity of knowledge by owner of real estate of a nuisance maintained thereon by another to subject him to the operation of a statute providing for the abatement of nuisances, or prescribing a pecuniary penalty therefor, 12 A.L.R. 431 ; 121 A.L.R. 642 .

Liability of purchaser of premises for nuisance thereon created by predecessor, 14 A.L.R. 1094 .

Injunction against operation of talking machine, mechanical musical device, etc., 22 A.L.R. 1200 .

Noise from operation of industrial plant as nuisance, 23 A.L.R. 1407 ; 90 A.L.R. 1207 .

Nuisance by encroachment of walls or other parts of building on another's land as permanent or continuing, 29 A.L.R. 839 .

Gas, water, or electric light plant as a nuisance, and the remedy therefor, 37 A.L.R. 800 .

Nuisance by manner of or circumstances attending performance of duty enjoined by law, 38 A.L.R. 1437 .

Attractive nuisances, 45 A.L.R. 982 ; 53 A.L.R. 1344 ; 60 A.L.R. 1444 .

Public "comfort stations", 55 A.L.R. 472 .

Induction, conduction and electrolysis, 56 A.L.R. 421 .

Tramroad or other private railroad as a nuisance, 57 A.L.R. 943 .

Newspaper or magazine as a nuisance, 58 A.L.R. 614 .

Burning of soft coal as a nuisance, 58 A.L.R. 1225 .

Oil as nuisance; liability for damage to adjoining property, 60 A.L.R. 483 .

Mosquitoes or other insect pests; conditions breeding as a nuisance, 61 A.L.R. 1145 .

Injunction against use of property for circuses, carnivals, and similar itinerant outdoor amusements, 63 A.L.R. 407 .

Pipeline as nuisance, 75 A.L.R. 1325 .

Dogs as nuisance, 79 A.L.R. 1060 .

Bakery as a nuisance, 86 A.L.R. 998 .

Liability of public contractor for damages from acts or conditions necessarily incident to work which would otherwise amount to nuisance, 97 A.L.R. 205 .

Aeroplanes and aeronautics, 99 A.L.R. 173 .

Cremation and crematories, 113 A.L.R. 1128 .

Automobile gas filling or supply station as a nuisance, 124 A.L.R. 383 .

Gas company's liability for injury or damage by escaping gas, 138 A.L.R. 870 .

Injunction against acts or conduct, in street or vicinity, tending to disparage plaintiff's business or his merchandise, 144 A.L.R. 1181 .

Use of property for production of war goods as affecting question of nuisance, and injunction to abate same, 145 A.L.R. 611 .

Supermarket, superstore, or public market as a nuisance, 146 A.L.R. 1407 .

Medical clinic as a nuisance, 153 A.L.R. 972 .

Zoning regulation as affecting question of nuisance within zoned area, 166 A.L.R. 659 .

Racing, or betting on races, as nuisance, 166 A.L.R. 1264 .

Attracting people in such numbers as to obstruct access to the neighboring premises, as nuisance, 2 A.L.R.2d 437.

Coalyard as a nuisance, 8 A.L.R.2d 419.

Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loud-speaker broadcasts in streets and other public places, 10 A.L.R.2d 627.

Animal rendering or bone-boiling plant or business as nuisance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Stockyard as a nuisance, 18 A.L.R.2d 1033.

Liability for injury to property occasioned by oil, water, or the like flowing from well, 19 A.L.R.2d 1025.

Liability for injury on parking or strip between sidewalk and curb, 19 A.L.R.2d 1053; 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Use of phonograph, loudspeaker, or other mechanical or electrical device for broadcasting music, advertising, or sales talk from business premises, as nuisance, 23 A.L.R.2d 1289.

Dust as nuisance, 24 A.L.R.2d 194; 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Tourist or trailer camp, motor court or motel, as nuisance, 24 A.L.R.2d 571.

Private school as nuisance, 27 A.L.R.2d 1249.

Quarries, gravel pits, and the like, as nuisances, 47 A.L.R.2d 490.

Cemetery or burial ground as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Public dump as nuisance, 52 A.L.R.2d 1134.

Landowner's or occupant's liability in damages for escape, without negligence, of harmful gases or fumes from premises, 54 A.L.R.2d 764; 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Automobile sales lot or used car lot as nuisance, 56 A.L.R.2d 776.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to machine or machinery in motion other than vehicles, railroad cars, or streetcars, 62 A.L.R.2d 898.

Golf course or driving range as a nuisance, 68 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defense to action for damages from nuisance - modern views, 73 A.L.R.2d 1378.

Water sports, amusements, or exhibitions as nuisance, 80 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Parking lot or place as nuisance, 82 A.L.R.2d 413.

Practice of exacting usury as a nuisance or ground for injunction, 83 A.L.R.2d 848.

Nonencroaching vegetation as a private nuisance, 83 A.L.R.2d 936.

Automobile wrecking yard or place of business as nuisance, 84 A.L.R.2d 653.

Oil refinery as a nuisance, 86 A.L.R.2d 1322.

Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of sidewalk, 88 A.L.R.2d 331.

Drive-in restaurant or cafe as nuisance, 91 A.L.R.2d 572.

Dairy, creamery, or milk distributing plant, as nuisance, 92 A.L.R.2d 974.

Drive-in theater or other outdoor dramatic or musical entertainment as nuisance, 93 A.L.R.2d 1171.

Keeping pigs as a nuisance, 2 A.L.R.3d 931.

Keeping poultry as nuisance, 2 A.L.R.3d 965.

Motorbus or truck terminal as nuisance, 2 A.L.R.3d 1372.

Electric generating plant or transformer station as nuisance, 4 A.L.R.3d 902.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance, 11 A.L.R.3d 1399.

Institution for the punishment or rehabilitation of criminals, delinquents, or alcoholics as enjoinable nuisance, 21 A.L.R.3d 1058.

Gun club, or shooting gallery or range, as nuisance, 26 A.L.R.3d 661.

Keeping horses as nuisance, 27 A.L.R.3d 627.

Children's playground as nuisance, 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Billboards and other outdoor advertising signs as civil nuisance, 38 A.L.R.3d 647.

Modern status of rules as to balance of convenience or social utility as affecting relief from nuisance, 40 A.L.R.3d 601.

Operation of incinerator as nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1009.

Laundry or drycleaning establishment as nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1236.

Automobile racetrack or drag strip as nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1273.

Residential swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 545.

Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 652.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 696.

Liability of oil and gas lessee or operator for injuries to or death of livestock, 51 A.L.R.3d 304.

Absolute liability for blasting operations as extending to injury or damage not directly caused by debris or concussion from explosion, 56 A.L.R.3d 1017.

Zoo as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Pornoshops or similar places disseminating obscene materials as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d 1134.

Interference with radio or television reception as nuisance, 58 A.L.R.3d 1142.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to trees, shrubs, and the like, 59 A.L.R.3d 848.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress, fright, and the like, resulting from blasting operations, 75 A.L.R.3d 770.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Existence of, and relief from, nuisance created by operation of air conditioning or ventilating equipment, 79 A.L.R.3d 320.

Fence as nuisance, 80 A.L.R.3d 962.

Keeping bees as nuisance, 88 A.L.R.3d 992.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury to or death of trespassing child, 88 A.L.R.3d 1197.

Liability for injury to or death of child from electric wire encountered while climbing tree, 91 A.L.R.3d 616.

Liability for overflow of water confined or diverted for public power purposes, 91 A.L.R.3d 1065.

Governmental liability from operation of zoo, 92 A.L.R.3d 832.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises, 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Bells, carillons, and the like, as nuisance, 95 A.L.R.3d 1268.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Recovery in trespass for injury to land caused by airborne pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Funeral home as private nuisance, 8 A.L.R.4th 324.

Windmill as nuisance, 36 A.L.R.4th 1159.

Computer as nuisance, 45 A.L.R.4th 1212.

Telephone calls as nuisance, 53 A.L.R.4th 1153.

Tree or limb falling onto adjoining private property: personal injury and property damage liability, 54 A.L.R.4th 530.

Liability of private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at highway or street intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th 1092.

Tort liability for pollution from underground storage tank, 5 A.L.R.5th 1.

State and local government control of pollution from underground storage tanks, 11 A.L.R.5th 388.

Nuisance as entitling owner or occupant of real estate to recover damages for personal inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance, anguish, or sickness, distinct from, or in addition to, damages for depreciation in value of property or its use, 25 A.L.R.5th 568.

Tower or antenna as constituting nuisance, 88 A.L.R.5th 641.

Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance, 90 A.L.R.5th 619.

Sewage treatment plant as constituting nuisance, 92 A.L.R.5th 517.

Nudity as constituting nuisance, 92 A.L.R.5th 593.

Hog breeding, confining, or processing facility as constituting nuisance, 93 A.L.R.5th 621.

Remedies for sewage treatment plant alleged or deemed to be nuisance, 101 A.L.R.5th 287.

Municipal liability for damage resulting from obstruction or clogging of drain or sewer, 54 A.L.R.6th 201.

41-1-2. Classes of nuisances; public and private nuisances defined.

Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance is one which damages all persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on individuals. A private nuisance is one limited in its injurious effects to one or a few individuals.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2939; Code 1868, § 2946; Code 1873, § 2997; Code 1882, § 2997; Civil Code 1895, § 3858; Civil Code 1910, § 4454; Code 1933, § 72-102.)

Cross references. - When infraction of public duty gives cause of action to individual, § 51-1-7 .

Law reviews. - For article discussing federal liability for pollution abatement in condemnation actions, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 364 (1966). For article discussing Georgia's practice of exposing municipalities to tort liability through the use of nuisance law, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 11 (1975). For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005) and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006). For note, "Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips: A Clarification of Georgia's Public Nuisance Law?," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 474 (1969). For note discussing the abatement of nonconforming uses as nuisances, see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 302 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Notice before suit not required. - Action may be maintained for damages resulting from a nuisance, without notice or request to abate the nuisance. Exley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 151 F. 101 (S.D. Ga. 1907).

Cited in Justices of Inferior Court v. Griffin & W. Point Plank Rd. Co., 15 Ga. 39 (1854); Ison v. Manley, 76 Ga. 804 (1886); Kavanagh v. Mobile & G.R.R., 78 Ga. 271 , 2 S.E. 636 (1887); Cannon v. Merry, 116 Ga. 291 , 42 S.E. 274 (1902); Lofton v. Collins, 117 Ga. 434 , 43 S.E. 708 (1903); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Gill, 118 Ga. 737 , 45 S.E. 623 (1903); Edison v. Ramsey, 146 Ga. 767 , 92 S.E. 513 (1917); Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345 , 100 S.E. 207 , 6 A.L.R. 1564 (1919); Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371 , 106 S.E. 792 , 40 A.L.R. 1132 (1921); Town of Rentz v. Roach, 154 Ga. 491 , 115 S.E. 94 (1922); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938); Harbuck v. Richland Box Co., 204 Ga. 352 , 49 S.E.2d 883 (1948); Isley v. Little, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Burgess v. Johnson, 223 Ga. 427 , 156 S.E.2d 78 (1967); Miree v. United States, 526 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976); Abee v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 169 Ga. App. 167 , 312 S.E.2d 142 (1983); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84 , 453 S.E.2d 716 (1995); Moreland v. Cheney, 267 Ga. 469 , 479 S.E.2d 745 (1997); Thompson v. City of Fitzgerald, 248 Ga. App. 725 , 548 S.E.2d 368 (2001).

Private Nuisance

Definition. - "Private nuisance" is one limited in its injurious effect to one or a few individuals, which may injure either the person or property or both, and in either case a right of action accrues. Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125 , 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957).

Mere violation of an ordinance does not create a private nuisance. Jillson v. Barton, 139 Ga. App. 767 , 229 S.E.2d 476 (1975).

Actionability of private nuisance. - Creation of a private nuisance is actionable, without regard to the question of negligence. Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849); Exley v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 151 F. 101 (S.D. Ga. 1907).

Public Nuisance

Extensive injuries not required. - Language in this section is not used in the sense that every person in the area must have been actually hurt or injured in order to show a public nuisance. Atlanta Processing Co. v. Brown, 227 Ga. 203 , 179 S.E.2d 752 (1971).

All members of public not injured. - Trial court correctly entered summary judgment against the mothers on their public nuisance count because the evidence did not show that all members of the public who came into contact with the river were injured and, thus, the mother's public nuisance cause of action was effectively erased. During the decades prior to the deaths, no other person had ever drowned when entering the river via the boat ramp, whether during power generation or otherwise, and the other six boys who accompanied the decedents into the water on the ramp that day were uninjured. White v. Ga. Power Co., 265 Ga. App. 664 , 595 S.E.2d 353 (2004).

Because there was no evidence that a sewer line backup injured more than a few individuals who came into contact with it, it did not constitute a public nuisance, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 41-1-2 , and the four-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 applied to the nuisance claim brought by the property owners against a city. Davis v. City of Forsyth, 275 Ga. App. 747 , 621 S.E.2d 495 (2005).

Gaming house. - Maintenance of a gaming house or a gaming place is a public nuisance. Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538 , 150 S.E. 825 (1929); Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Street-flow obstructions. - Any permanent structure in a street which materially interferes with travel thereon is a public nuisance. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628 , 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954).

Disposal of chemicals. - Plaintiff's disposal of the plaintiff's chemicals at a specified site did not amount to creation of a public nuisance since: (1) any contamination of the property caused by the plaintiff did not affect a common right of all members of the public, such as the right to clean air or clean water, and (2) it was not shown that the rights of more than a few individuals were affected by the contamination. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1998).

Landing and steps of a church, though allegedly so negligently constructed as to be hazardous to life and limb, do not constitute a public nuisance since there is no right common to all of the public to use the steps and landing of a church of a particular denomination. Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664 , 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).

Plate glass doors. - Maintenance and operation of plate glass doors in public civic center was not public nuisance. Zellers v. Theater of Stars, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 406 , 319 S.E.2d 553 (1984).

Barricades on a county road marking the approaches to the former site of a timber bridge spanning a railroad track did not constitute a public nuisance. Kitchen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 265 Ga. 206 , 453 S.E.2d 712 (1995).

Defective condition of private street. - In view of evidence that a property owner's private road impeded the necessary passage of a city's emergency personnel so as to significantly endanger the health and safety of those persons residing at apartment complexes adjacent to the road, the owner was improperly granted summary judgment in the city's suit seeking abatement of a public nuisance under O.C.G.A. § 41-1-2 . City of College Park v. 2600 Camp Creek, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 207 , 666 S.E.2d 607 (2008).

Repeated violations with threats of continuing violations. - Constant and repeated violations of former statutes relating to the business of buying wages or salaries, and to the small-loan business, with threats to continue the businesses, do not amount to such a public nuisance as may be abated and prevented by a suit in the name of the state. State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv. Co., 191 Ga. 382 , 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940).

Indictment for public nuisance. - Public nuisance is the subject of indictment; not of action. South Carolina R.R. v. Moore & Philpot, 28 Ga. 398 , 73 Am. Dec. 778 (1859).

Whether tree obstructed view was jury question. - In a wrongful death case, the trial court properly denied a city summary judgment as although the city could continue to assert that no nuisance existed because there was only one prior documented accident at the intersection due to the obstruction, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the tree constituted a nuisance, which had to be resolved by a jury.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Obstruction of crossing on public highway by railroad. - Public nuisance possibly occurs if a railroad blocks a crossing on a public highway for an unreasonable period of time; for such an action to lie against a railroad, it must be shown that the particular act is an interference or annoyance to the public in the common use of public highways. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-58.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 33-39.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 1, 7, 8, 9.

ALR. - Trolley poles in street as nuisance, 2 A.L.R. 496 .

Noise from operation of industrial plant as nuisance, 23 A.L.R. 1407 ; 90 A.L.R. 1207 .

Nuisance by encroachment of walls or other parts of building on another's land as permanent or continuing, 29 A.L.R. 839 .

Amusement park as nuisance, 33 A.L.R. 725 .

Gas, water, or electric light plant as a nuisance, and the remedy therefor, 37 A.L.R. 800 .

Pesthouse or contagious disease hospital as nuisance, 48 A.L.R. 518 .

Aeroplanes and aeronautics, 99 A.L.R. 173 .

Legal aspects of radio communication and broadcasting, 124 A.L.R. 982 ; 171 A.L.R. 765 .

Nuisance within contemplation of statute imposing upon municipality duty to keep streets and other public places free of "nuisance," as absolute nuisance or as qualified nuisance, dependent upon negligence, 155 A.L.R. 60 .

Racing, or betting on races, as nuisance, 166 A.L.R. 1264 .

Animal rendering or bone-boiling plant or business as nuisance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Liability for injury to property occasioned by oil, water, or the like flowing from well, 19 A.L.R.2d 1025.

Landowner's or occupant's liability in damages for escape, without negligence, of harmful gases or fumes from premises, 54 A.L.R.2d 764; 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Automobile sales lot or used car lot as nuisance, 56 A.L.R.2d 776.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

Keeping of dogs as enjoinable nuisance, 11 A.L.R.3d 1399.

Children's playground as nuisance, 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 652.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457.

Right to maintain action to enjoin public nuisance as affected by existence of pollution control agency, 60 A.L.R.3d 665.

Recovery in trespass for injury to land caused by airborne pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Carwash as nuisance, 4 A.L.R.4th 1308.

Funeral home as private nuisance, 8 A.L.R.4th 324.

Tower or antenna as constituting nuisance, 88 A.L.R.5th 641.

Keeping of domestic animal as constituting public or private nuisance, 90 A.L.R.5th 619.

Sewage treatment plant as constituting nuisance, 92 A.L.R.5th 517.

Nudity as constituting nuisance, 92 A.L.R.5th 593.

Remedies for sewage treatment plant alleged or deemed to be nuisance, 101 A.L.R.5th 287.

41-1-3. Right of action for public nuisance generally.

A public nuisance generally gives no right of action to any individual. However, if a public nuisance in which the public does not participate causes special damage to an individual, such special damage shall give a right of action.

(Orig. Code 1863, §§ 2939, 2940; Code 1868, §§ 2946, 2947; Code 1873, §§ 2997, 2998; Code 1882, §§ 2997, 2998; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3858, 3859; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4454, 4455; Code 1933, § 72-103.)

Cross references. - Penalty for maintaining house in which gaming, drinking, or other misbehavior occurs, or which presents common disturbance to neighborhood, § 16-11-44 .

When infraction of public duty gives cause of action to individual, § 51-1-7 .

Law reviews. - For article discussing Georgia's practice of exposing municipalities to tort liability through the use of nuisance law, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 11 (1975). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with environment, natural resources, and land use from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (1978). For note, "Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips: A Clarification of Georgia's Public Nuisance Law?," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 474 (1969). For note discussing the abatement of nonconforming uses as nuisances, see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 302 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Right of action grows out of special injury. - Even though a given condition may constitute a public nuisance, a citizen suffering special damage by reason of sickness of the person or family, or depreciation of the person's property, as the result thereof, has a cause of action against the party creating or maintaining the nuisance. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Even though a given condition may constitute a public nuisance, a citizen suffering special damage has a cause of action against the person creating or maintaining the condition. City of Blue Ridge v. Kiker, 189 Ga. 717 , 7 S.E.2d 237 (1940).

Pleadings in civil action. - Even though it appeared that a homeowner's operation of an elevator in violation of departmental rules and regulations gave rise to a public nuisance under O.C.G.A. § 8-2-107(a) , because the plaintiffs did not inform the defendant that the plaintiffs were relying on a nuisance theory until the plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, the court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on a ground not timely asserted. Childers v. Monson, 241 Ga. App. 70 , 524 S.E.2d 326 (1999).

All injury to health is special, and necessarily limited in its effect to the individual affected, and is, in its nature, irreparable. It matters not that others within the sphere of the operation of the nuisance, whether public or private, may be affected likewise. De Vaughn v. Minor, 77 Ga. 809 , 1 S.E. 433 (1887); Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 184 Ga. 485 , 191 S.E. 919 (1937).

Necessity of showing special damages. - In order for an individual to abate a public nuisance it is necessary that the individual show special damages. Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47 , 14 S.E.2d 481 (1941).

Interference with egress to and ingress from highway. - Landowner may maintain a suit in equity to enjoin further interference with the landowner's means of egress to and ingress from the public highway, when such interference amounts to a continuing nuisance or trespass, and when an injunction would prevent a multiplicity of suits. Barham v. Grant, 185 Ga. 601 , 196 S.E. 43 (1937).

Damages for one whose means of egress from and ingress to one's property abutting on a public highway is illegally and unnecessarily interfered with may be the depreciation in market value, if the obstruction is a permanent one, or the damage to business and loss of profits. Punitive damages may be recovered if the circumstances are such as to justify the allowance thereof. Holland v. Shackleford, 220 Ga. 104 , 137 S.E.2d 298 (1964).

Plaintiff must allege special damage within petition. - Allegations of petition seeking to enjoin an alleged nuisance in operating an asphalt and cement-mixing and manufacturing plant as to the spilling of concrete and asphalt in a public street and its effect on persons walking along the street related to a public nuisance, and stating no special damage, showed no cause of action. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610 , 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940).

Allegations of petition in which petitioners sought equitable relief "as individuals, citizens, and taxpayers" from the closing of a railroad crossing were insufficient to show special damage to petitioners, or any damage not shared equally by all other "individuals, citizens, and taxpayers," and the petition was therefore insufficient for the grant of any relief to the petitioners as individuals, citizens, and taxpayers. State Hwy. Dep't v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 , 84 S.E.2d 561 (1954).

Building of dam. - Right of a company to build a dam does not include a right to build or maintain the dam in such a negligent or improper manner as to cause a nuisance injurious to the health of the adjacent community. For damages arising from such things an action will lie. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Damages recoverable include injury to health. - In this state damages recoverable on account of a nuisance are not limited to injury to realty, but injury to health may furnish a basis for such recovery. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Municipality need not be joined as a party to an action to abate a nuisance which specially injured the plaintiff. Trust Co. v. Ray, 125 Ga. 485 , 54 S.E. 145 (1906).

Right of action if road is obstructed. - To maintain an action for an injury received from an obstruction in a highway, two things must concur: an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid the obstruction on the part of the plaintiff. Branan v. May, 17 Ga. 136 (1855).

If the owner of adjoining property suffers special damage from the unlawful running of cars in a public street, this entitled the owner to maintain an action. Kavanagh v. Mobile & G.R.R., 78 Ga. 271 , 2 S.E. 636 (1887).

If sickness results from the stagnation of a pool of water a cause of action exists. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Parish, 117 Ga. 893 , 45 S.E. 280 (1903).

Right of a municipality to grant a person the power to obstruct a street is dependent on legislative authority, hence, the unauthorized obstruction of a street furnishing an avenue of approach to one's place of business is actionable. Coker v. Atlanta, K. & N. Ry., 123 Ga. 483 , 51 S.E. 481 (1905); Hendricks v. Jackson, 143 Ga. 106 , 84 S.E. 440 (1915).

Cited in Vason v. South Carolina R.R., 42 Ga. 631 (1871); Austin v. Augusta Term. Ry., 108 Ga. 671 , 34 S.E. 852 (1899); Sammons v. Sturgis, 145 Ga. 663 , 89 S.E. 774 (1916); Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345 , 100 S.E. 207 (1919); Knox v. Reese, 149 Ga. 379 , 100 S.E. 371 (1919); Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481 , 195 S.E. 568 (1938); Poole v. Arnold, 187 Ga. 734 , 2 S.E.2d 83 (1939); Floyd v. City of Albany, 105 Ga. App. 31 , 123 S.E.2d 446 (1961); Save The Bay Comm., Inc. v. Mayor of Savannah, 227 Ga. 436 , 181 S.E.2d 351 (1971); Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga. 160 , 236 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Stephens v. Tate, 147 Ga. App. 366 , 249 S.E.2d 92 (1978); Brand v. Wilson, 252 Ga. 416 , 314 S.E.2d 192 (1984); Rea v. Bunce, 179 Ga. App. 628 , 347 S.E.2d 676 (1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 212-217.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 109-111.

ALR. - Trolley poles in street as nuisance, 2 A.L.R. 496 .

Right to enjoin threatened or anticipated nuisance, 32 A.L.R. 724 ; 55 A.L.R. 880 .

Gas, water, or electric light plant as a nuisance, and the remedy therefor, 37 A.L.R. 800 .

Automobile gas filling or supply station as a nuisance, 124 A.L.R. 383 .

Liability of private persons or corporations draining into sewer maintained by municipality or other public body for damage to riparian owners or others, 170 A.L.R. 1192 .

Attracting people in such numbers as to obstruct access to the neighboring premises, as nuisance, 2 A.L.R.2d 437.

Animal rendering or bone-boiling plant or business as nuisance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Sewage disposal plant as nuisance, 40 A.L.R.2d 1177.

Liability for property damage caused by vibrations, or the like, without blasting or explosion, 79 A.L.R.2d 966.

Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of sidewalk, 88 A.L.R.2d 331.

Statutes, ordinances, or regulations relating to private residential swimming pools, 92 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

Water distributor's liability for injuries due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer, 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Liability for injury or damage caused by rocket testing or firing, 29 A.L.R.3d 556.

Children's playground as nuisance, 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported, 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 652.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Existence of, and relief from, nuisance created by operation of air conditioning or ventilating equipment, 79 A.L.R.3d 320.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury to or death of diver allegedly resulting from hazardous condition in water, 85 A.L.R.3d 750.

Zoning regulations limiting use of property near airport as taking of property, 18 A.L.R.4th 542.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as constituting taking or damaging of property, 22 A.L.R.4th 863.

What constitutes special injury that entitles private party to maintain action based on public nuisance - modern cases, 71 A.L.R.4th 13.

Remedies for sewage treatment plant alleged or deemed to be nuisance, 101 A.L.R.5th 287.

41-1-4. Right of action for private nuisance generally.

A private nuisance may injure either a person or property, or both, and for that injury a right of action accrues to the person who is injured or whose property is damaged.

(Orig. Code 1863, §§ 2939, 2941; Code 1868, §§ 2946, 2948; Code 1873, §§ 2997, 2999; Code 1882, §§ 2997, 2999; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3858, 3860; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4454, 4456; Code 1933, § 72-104.)

Law reviews. - For note discussing nuisance action as a remedy for damage caused by sonic booms, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 83 (1967). For note, "Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips: A Clarification of Georgia's Public Nuisance Law?," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 474 (1969).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Coming to a nuisance. - Old rule, maintained by some authorities, that coming to a nuisance will prevent a person so coming from making any complaint, has long since been exploded. Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125 , 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957).

One who purchases land adjoining a private nuisance may abate it. City of Rentz v. Roach, 154 Ga. 491 , 115 S.E. 94 (1922).

Charge that plaintiffs had the right to move near a kennel though the plaintiffs knew the kennel was a nuisance, and could rely on the presumption that the nuisance would be abated and stopped, was not erroneous. Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125 , 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957).

Nonowner lacked standing. - Party could not prevail on the party's claim for continuing private nuisance since the party sold the property at issue and did not own the property during any part of the four years preceding the filing of the action. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1998).

Recovery for both personal and property damage. - Damages for discomfort and annoyance caused to the owner and the owner's family are separate and distinct from damage to the value of the realty and do not constitute a double recovery for a single injury. In an action for nuisance, the property owners may recover for both damage to person and damage to property. City of Atlanta v. Murphy, 194 Ga. App. 652 , 391 S.E.2d 474 (1990); Arvida/JMB Partners v. Hadaway, 227 Ga. App. 335 , 489 S.E.2d 125 (1997).

Since the owners' evidence of repeated flooding established an abatable nuisance, an award of both personal and property damages as well as attorney's fees was adequate; the trial court's jury charge was proper and the court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. City of Gainesville v. Waters, 258 Ga. App. 555 , 574 S.E.2d 638 (2002).

In a nuisance suit brought by a property owner against the City of Atlanta, involving the city failing to properly maintain a storm pipe that traversed and served the property owner's land which resulted in extensive flooding of the land and the home, the trial court properly awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $300,000 and that amount was not excessive, as a matter of law, as there was evidence that the property owner suffered special damages in the amount of $203,376, including loss of personal property, diminution in the value of the property, and rental expenses incurred when the property owner was forced to move from the home. There was also sufficient evidence to support an award of damages for personal injuries and damages for annoyance and discomfort. City of Atlanta v. Hofrichter, 291 Ga. App. 883 , 663 S.E.2d 379 (2008).

Homeowners could recover for both the homeowners' discomfort and annoyance caused by the alleged nuisance and for the diminution in the homeowners' property value because the former was designed to compensate the homeowners for what the homeowners had already experienced as residents of the property due to the factory, while future discomfort and annoyance is reflected in the diminished fair market value of the property. Toyo Tire N. Am. Mfg. v. Davis, 299 Ga. 155 , 787 S.E.2d 171 (2016).

Damages not excessive. - Because the jury heard evidence of the defendant's interference with plaintiff's right to enjoy possession of the plaintiff's property and the plaintiff's discomfort and annoyance and the unobjected to jury form specifically authorized general damages, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in rejecting the claim of excessiveness. Woodmen of the World v. Jordan, 231 Ga. App. 517 , 499 S.E.2d 900 (1998).

Landowners of a lakefront property created a nuisance when they went onto a corporation's dam and plugged the weakened dam to prevent a lake from draining. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894 , 613 S.E.2d 673 (2005).

Damages from nuisance alleged from energy plant noise and vibrations. - Evidence supported a jury's verdict that there was a change in the nature of the noises produced by a power plant that used gas-fired combustion turbine units, sufficient to allow nearby landowners to bring nuisance claims that were timely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30(a) ; awards of damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees were upheld. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Estate of Forrister, 332 Ga. App. 693 , 774 S.E.2d 755 (2015).

Inverse condemnation for nuisance. - Summary judgment was properly granted to a county on an inverse condemnation claim filed by four property owners as the county did not either create or maintain a construction project that allegedly created a nuisance that harmed the owners since a city owned and maintained the nuisance property, the county exercised no control over the properties, and the county could not be deemed to have performed a continuous act that caused the owners' harm; while the county bid out the construction contract, the county had no role in designing the plans for the contractor to use on the project or in supervising the contractor's work and the owners did not show that the county official performed any action beyond passing on an inquiry between the Georgia Department of Transportation and the city. Reidling v. City of Gainesville, 280 Ga. App. 698 , 634 S.E.2d 862 (2006).

Cited in Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Scott v. Reynolds, 70 Ga. App. 545 , 29 S.E.2d 88 (1944); Southeastern Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Chapman, 103 Ga. App. 773 , 120 S.E.2d 651 (1961); Turner v. Ross, 115 Ga. App. 507 , 154 S.E.2d 798 (1967).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 212-216, 226, 227.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 112-115.

ALR. - Effect of delay in seeking equitable relief against nuisance, 6 A.L.R. 1098 .

Right to enjoin threatened or anticipated nuisance, 32 A.L.R. 724 ; 55 A.L.R. 880 .

Oil as nuisance; liability for damage to adjoining property, 60 A.L.R. 483 .

Automobile gas filling or supply station as a nuisance, 124 A.L.R. 383 .

Legal aspects of radio communication and broadcasting, 124 A.L.R. 982 ; 171 A.L.R. 765 .

Nuisance as entitling owner or occupant of real estate to recover damages for personal inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance, anguish, or sickness, distinct from, or in addition to, damages depreciation in value of property or its use, 142 A.L.R. 1307 .

Injunction against acts or conduct, in street or vicinity, tending to disparage plaintiff's business or his merchandise, 144 A.L.R. 1181 .

Supermarket, superstore, or public market as a nuisance, 146 A.L.R. 1407 .

Liability of private persons or corporations draining into sewer maintained by municipality or other public body for damage to riparian owners or others, 170 A.L.R. 1192 .

When statute of limitation commences to run against damage from overflow of land caused by artificial construction or obstruction, 5 A.L.R.2d 302.

Casting of light on another's premises as constituting actionable wrong, 5 A.L.R.2d 705; 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Fire as attractive nuisance, 27 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Private school as nuisance, 27 A.L.R.2d 1249.

Liability of landowner for injury to or death of child caused by cave-in or landslide, 28 A.L.R.2d 195.

Liability of landowner for injury to or death of child resulting from piled or stacked lumber or other building materials, 28 A.L.R.2d 218.

Expense incurred by injured party in remedying temporary nuisance or in preventing injury as element of damages recoverable, 41 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Landowner's or occupant's liability in damages for escape, without negligence, of harmful gases or fumes from premises, 54 A.L.R.2d 764; 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Rule of municipal immunity from liability for acts in performance of governmental functions as applicable to personal injury or death as result of a nuisance, 56 A.L.R.2d 1415.

Liability for property damage caused by vibrations, or the like, without blasting or explosion, 79 A.L.R.2d 966.

Nonencroaching vegetation as a private nuisance, 83 A.L.R.2d 936.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises, 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Residential swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 545.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Operation of cement plant as nuisance, 82 A.L.R.3d 1004.

Recovery in trespass for injury to land caused by airborne pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Funeral home as private nuisance, 8 A.L.R.4th 324.

Zoning regulations limiting use of property near airport as taking of property, 18 A.L.R.4th 542.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as constituting taking or damaging of property, 22 A.L.R.4th 863.

Encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, 65 A.L.R.4th 603.

41-1-5. Right of action of alienee of injured property for continuance of nuisance; necessity for request to abate nuisance.

  1. The alienee of a person owning property injured may maintain an action for continuance of the nuisance for which the alienee of the property causing the nuisance is responsible.
  2. Prior to commencement of an action by the alienee of the property injured against the alienee of the property causing the nuisance, there must be a request to abate the nuisance.

    (Code 1863, § 2943; Code 1868, § 2950; Code 1873, § 3001; Code 1882, § 3001; Civil Code 1895, § 3862; Civil Code 1910, § 4458; Code 1933, § 72-105; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41.)

Cross references. - Covenants and warranties relating to land transactions generally, § 44-5-60 et seq.

Law reviews. - For article discussing nuisances as "Hidden Liens," see 14 Ga. St. B.J. 32 (1977). For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

This section is a codification of the common law. Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849); Roberts v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 151 Ga. 241 , 106 S.E. 258 (1921).

Section inapplicable when alienee induces original injury. - This section does not apply when the original injury was caused by the alienee, hence, no notice to abate is necessary. Southern Ry. v. Puckett, 121 Ga. 322 , 48 S.E. 968 (1904); Davis v. Beard, 202 Ga. App. 784 , 415 S.E.2d 522 (1992).

Duty required. - There must be a duty to abate a nuisance before liability for the maintenance of a continuing nuisance may attach. Bradford Square Condo. Ass'n v. Miller, 258 Ga. App. 240 , 573 S.E.2d 405 (2002).

Lessee of property was liable for damages from continuing contamination the lessee originally caused, and the fact that the lessee had vacated the premises would not remove the lessee's legal duty to abate the nuisance the lessee caused and which continued within four years of plaintiffs' action. Smith v. Branch, 226 Ga. App. 626 , 487 S.E.2d 35 (1997).

Cited in Phinizy v. City Council, 47 Ga. 266 (1872); Felker v. Calhoun, 64 Ga. 514 (1880); Williams v. Southern Ry., 140 Ga. 713 , 79 S.E. 850 (1913); Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry., 22 Ga. App. 572 , 96 S.E. 570 (1918); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946); Martin v. Medlin, 83 Ga. App. 589 , 64 S.E.2d 73 (1951); Shaheen v. G & G Corp., 230 Ga. 646 , 198 S.E.2d 853 (1973); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536 (11th Cir. 1997); West v. CSX Transp., Inc., 230 Ga. App. 872 , 498 S.E.2d 67 (1998); Bailey v. Annistown Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 677 , 689 S.E.2d 62 (2009).

Notice of Existence of Nuisance

Notice of existence or request for abatement must be given alienee. - Notice to an alienee that the alienee will be held responsible for any damages subsequently caused by the nuisance will suffice in lieu of a specific request to abate. Central R.R. v. English, 73 Ga. 366 (1884); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392 , 65 S.E. 855 (1909).

It is error to charge that a lessee need not receive notice when the evidence conflicted on the question of whether the lessee had increased the nuisance. Seaboard & R.R.R. v. Ambrose, 122 Ga. 47 , 49 S.E. 815 (1905).

Before a cause of action for maintenance of a nuisance arises against alienee of nuisance, there must be a notice of the existence of the nuisance, or a request to abate the nuisance, given to alienee; mere passive knowledge of the existence of the nuisance by alienee is not sufficient. Georgia Power Co. v. Fincher, 46 Ga. App. 524 , 168 S.E. 109 (1933).

While an action will lie without notice against one who erects and maintains a nuisance, notice is a prerequisite against one who merely acquires property on which there is an existing nuisance, passively permits the nuisance's continuance, and adds nothing thereto. Georgia Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411 , 170 S.E. 520 (1933).

Maintenance of the nuisance after notice is continuance of the nuisance, and the alienee of the property causing the nuisance is responsible for that continuance, if there is a request for abatement before action is filed. Hoffman v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 206 Ga. App. 727 , 426 S.E.2d 387 (1992).

Trial court correctly determined that a property owner's failure to provide ante litem notice to an apartment owner prohibited the property owner from pursuing nuisance claims because, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 41-1-5(b) , the property owner was required to provide the apartment owner with notice of the nuisance or a request to abate prior to filing suit unless it did anything to increase the nuisance; the apartment owner acquired the property after detention ponds had been built and after storm water runoff from the property had already become problematic on the property owner's land, and the property owner presented no evidence that the apartment altered the property or took any other affirmative action to increase the nuisance. Haarhoff v. Jefferson at Perimeter L.P., 315 Ga. App. 271 , 727 S.E.2d 140 (2012).

Damages prior to notice cannot be recovered. City Council v. Marks, 124 Ga. 365 , 52 S.E. 539 (1905); Roberts v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 151 Ga. 241 , 106 S.E. 258 (1921).

Any damages accruing prior to notice are not recoverable. - Macko v. City of Lawrenceville, 231 Ga. App. 671 , 499 S.E.2d 707 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146 , 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

Notice of abatement when alienee increases nuisance. - Grantee or alienee of property causing a nuisance is not liable for damages caused by its continued maintenance and accruing prior to a notice or request to abate; but it is also the rule that when the alienee of property on which is situated a nuisance does anything to increase the nuisance, the alienee may be sued without notice to abate. Savannah Elec. & Power Co. v. Horton, 44 Ga. App. 578 , 162 S.E. 299 (1932).

While notice is required to one who merely purchases land and fails to remove a nuisance created by another, yet it is not necessary to an alienee, who knowingly does some additional act to actively maintain and use a nuisance originally created by another, or does something to increase the existing nuisance or its injurious effects, and thus creates in effect a fresh nuisance. Georgia Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411 , 170 S.E. 520 (1933).

Notice not sufficient. - Letters to homeowners were legally insufficient to give the required notice to abate a nuisance caused by the allegedly undersized drainage pipes; letter stated city blamed homeowners for not maintaining pipes and that if further litigation was necessary the homeowners could be named as parties. Macko v. City of Lawrenceville, 231 Ga. App. 671 , 499 S.E.2d 707 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Kleber v. City of Atlanta, 291 Ga. App. 146 , 661 S.E.2d 195 (2008).

No duty to move away. - When a person rents land which is adjacent to a nuisance, one is under no duty to move away. Central R.R. v. English, 73 Ga. 366 (1884).

Jury instruction on imputed notice of nuisance. - Upon the trial of a suit against alienee of a nuisance to recover damages for maintenance of the nuisance, which arises out of the construction of the dam which alienee's predecessor in title had erected, and which alienee had not altered, it was error for the court to instruct jury that, if the agent of the defendant in charge of the dam as superintendent is the same person who had held the same position with the defendant's predecessor in title, and who, as superintendent for latter, had notice of the existence of the nuisance, knowledge by one of this fact constituted notice to the defendant of the existence of the nuisance. Georgia Power Co. v. Fincher, 46 Ga. App. 524 , 168 S.E. 109 (1933).

Property purchased with knowledge of nuisance. - Purchaser of property upon which there is an existing nuisance is not barred from the purchaser's right to recover damages resulting from a continuation of the nuisance by the defendant, after requesting the defendant to abate the nuisance, by the fact that the purchaser purchased the property with knowledge of the nuisance. Roughton v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 209 Ga. 577 , 74 S.E.2d 844 (1953).

Owner or lessee of land although taking with knowledge of a nuisance, has a right to presume that, being illegal, the nuisance will be abated; and, if it is not, one may sue for damages resulting to the owner or lessee therefrom. Ingram v. City of Acworth, 90 Ga. App. 719 , 84 S.E.2d 99 (1954).

Measure of damages. Mayor of Gainesville v. Robertson, 25 Ga. App. 632 , 103 S.E. 853 (1920).

Notice to the alienee cannot be set up by an amendment. Blackstock v. Southern Ry., 120 Ga. 414 , 47 S.E. 902 (1904).

Variance between allegations and proof. - Allegations that damage was caused by the erection of a nuisance by the defendant are not supported by evidence that it was erected by the predecessor in title. Southern Ry. v. Cook, 106 Ga. 450 , 32 S.E. 585 (1899); DeLoach v. Georgia C. & P.R.R., 137 Ga. 633 , 73 S.E. 1072 (1912).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 101, 103, 216.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 107, 108, 220 et seq.

ALR. - Liability for property damage caused by vibrations, or the like, without blasting or explosion, 79 A.L.R.2d 966.

Landowner's right to relief against pollution of his water supply by industrial or commercial waste, 39 A.L.R.3d 910.

"Coming to nuisance" as a defense or estoppel, 42 A.L.R.3d 344.

Residential swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 545.

Computer as nuisance, 45 A.L.R.4th 1212.

41-1-6. Erection or continuance of nuisance after notice to abate.

Any person who shall erect or continue after notice to abate a nuisance which tends to annoy the community, injure the health of the citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 817; Code 1863, § 4437; Code 1868, § 4478; Code 1873, § 4562; Code 1882, § 4562; Penal Code 1895, § 641; Penal Code 1910, § 681; Code 1933, § 72-9901.)

Cross references. - Offenses against public health and morals generally, T. 16, C. 12.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

City criminal court empowered to abate nuisances. - Fact that the General Assembly made the continuation of a nuisance after notice to abate a misdemeanor, does not preclude the criminal court of Cordele's power to abate nuisances pursuant to the legislative authorization in O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5 , and its power to enforce the court's judgments by contempt pursuant to the legislative authorization in the city charter. Horne v. City of Cordele, 254 Ga. 346 , 329 S.E.2d 134 (1985).

Cited in Vason v. City of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542 (1868); City of Atlanta v. Pazol, 95 Ga. App. 598 , 98 S.E.2d 216 (1957).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Substandard buildings in town or city. - If substandard buildings in a town or city were alleged to be a nuisance, this may be determined in accordance with former Code 1933, § 72-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5 ); this determination must be made subject to the due process provisions of the state and federal Constitutions; if a nuisance was found to exist, the court could order the nuisance's abatement; if the property owner failed to abate the nuisance, the owner may be bound over to a court having jurisdiction of misdemeanors; the municipality cannot itself demolish the offending buildings unless the municipality condemns the property and compensates the owner. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 191, 192, 300, 301.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 118-120, 200 et seq.

ALR. - Statutes, ordinances, or regulations relating to private residential swimming pools, 92 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

41-1-7. Treatment of agricultural facilities and operations and forest land as nuisances.

  1. It is the declared policy of the state to conserve, protect, and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural and forest land and facilities for the production or distribution of food and other agricultural products, including without limitation forest products. When nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural or agriculture-supporting industrial or commercial areas or forest land or when there are changed conditions in or around the locality of an agricultural facility or agricultural support facility, such operations often become the subject of nuisance actions. As a result, such facilities are sometimes forced to cease operations. Many others are discouraged from making investments in agricultural support facilities or farm improvements or adopting new related technology or methods. It is the purpose of this Code section to reduce losses of the state's agricultural and forest land resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural facilities and operations or agricultural support facilities may be deemed to be a nuisance.
  2. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Agricultural area" means any land which is, or may be, legally used for an agricultural operation under applicable zoning laws, rules, and regulations at the time of commencement of the agricultural operation of the agricultural facility at issue and throughout the first year of operation of such agricultural facility. Any land which is not subject to zoning laws, rules, and regulations at the time of commencement of an agricultural operation of an agricultural facility and throughout the first year of operation of such agricultural facility shall be deemed an "agricultural area" for purposes of this Code section.
    2. "Agricultural facility" includes, but is not limited to, any land, building, structure, pond, impoundment, appurtenance, machinery, or equipment which is used for the commercial production or processing of crops, livestock, animals, poultry, honeybees, honeybee products, livestock products, poultry products, timber, forest products, or products which are used in commercial aquaculture. Such term shall also include any farm labor camp or facilities for migrant farm workers.
    3. "Agricultural operation" means:
      1. The plowing, tilling, or preparation of soil at an agricultural facility;
      2. The planting, growing, fertilizing, harvesting, or otherwise maintaining of crops as defined in Code Section 1-3-3 and also timber and trees that are grown for purposes other than for harvest and for sale;
      3. The application of pesticides, herbicides, or other chemicals, compounds, or substances to crops, weeds, or soil in connection with the production of crops, timber, livestock, animals, or poultry;
      4. The breeding, hatching, raising, producing, feeding, keeping, slaughtering, or processing of livestock, hogs, equines, chickens, turkeys, poultry or other fowl normally raised for food, mules, cattle, sheep, goats, dogs, rabbits, or similar farm animals for commercial purposes;
      5. The production and keeping of honeybees, the production of honeybee products, and honeybee processing facilities;
      6. The production, processing, or packaging of eggs or egg products;
      7. The manufacturing of feed for poultry or livestock;
      8. The rotation of crops, including without limitation timber production;
      9. Commercial aquaculture;
      10. The application of existing, changed, or new technology, practices, processes, or procedures to any agricultural operation; and
      11. The operation of any roadside market.

      (3.1) "Agricultural support facility" means any food processing plant or forest products processing plant together with all related or ancillary activities, including trucking; provided, however, that this term expressly excludes any rendering plant facility or operation.

    4. "Changed conditions" means any one or more of the following:
      1. Any change in the use of land in an agricultural area or in an industrial or commercial area affecting an agricultural support facility;
      2. An increase in the magnitude of an existing use of land in or around the locality of an agricultural facility or agricultural support facility and includes, but is not limited to, urban sprawl into an agricultural area or into an industrial or commercial area in or around the locality of such facility, or an increase in the number of persons making any such use, or an increase in the frequency of such use; or
      3. The construction or location of improvements on land in or around the locality of an agricultural facility or agricultural support facility closer to such facility than those improvements located on such land at the time of commencement of the agricultural or agricultural support operation or the agricultural facility or agricultural support facility at issue and throughout the first year of operation of said facility.

      (4.1) "Food processing plant" means a commercial operation that manufactures, packages, labels, distributes, or stores food for human consumption and does not provide food directly to a consumer.

      (4.2) "Forest products processing plant" means a commercial operation that manufactures, packages, labels, distributes, or stores any forest product or that manufactures, packages, labels, distributes, or stores any building material made from gypsum rock.

      (4.3) "Rendering plant" has the meaning provided by Code Section 4-4-40.

    5. "Urban sprawl" means either of the following or both:
      1. With regard to an agricultural area or agricultural operation:
        1. The conversion of agricultural areas from traditional agricultural use to residential use; or
        2. An increase in the number of residences in an agricultural area which increase is unrelated to the use of the agricultural area for traditional agricultural purposes.
      2. With regard to an agricultural support facility:
        1. The conversion of industrial or commercial areas to residential use; or
        2. An increase in the number of residences in an industrial or commercial area which increase is unrelated to the use of the industrial or commercial area for traditional industrial or commercial purposes.
  3. No agricultural facility, agricultural operation, any agricultural operation at an agricultural facility, agricultural support facility, or any operation at an agricultural support facility shall be or shall become a nuisance, either public or private, as a result of changed conditions in or around the locality of such facility or operation if the facility or operation has been in operation for one year or more. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply when a nuisance results from the negligent, improper, or illegal operation of any such facility or operation.
  4. For purposes of this Code section, the established date of operation is the date on which an agricultural operation or agricultural support facility commenced operation. If the physical facilities of the agricultural operation or the agricultural support facility are subsequently expanded or new technology adopted, the established date of operation for each change is not a separately and independently established date of operation and the commencement of the expanded operation does not divest the agricultural operation or agricultural support facility of a previously established date of operation.

    (Ga. L. 1980, p. 1253, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1775, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 317, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 817, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 681, § 1; Ga. L. 2007, p. 267, § 1/SB 101.)

Cross references. - Legislative declaration of intent to encourage development and operation of new family farms through establishment of Georgia Residential Finance Authority, § 8-3-171 .

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, the correct spelling of "technology" was substituted in the second sentence of subsection (d).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2004, "however, that this" was substituted for "however, this" paragraph (b)(3.1).

Law reviews. - For article, "Agricultural Nuisances and the Georgia 'Right to Farm' Law," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 19 (1986). For article, "Agricultural Nuisances Under the Amended Georgia 'Right-to-Farm' Law," see 25 Ga. St. B.J. 36 (1988).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

"Changed conditions in the locality" construed. - Language in subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 "changed conditions in . . . the locality" of the facility refers solely to extension of nonagricultural land uses, residential or otherwise, into existing agricultural areas. Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140 , 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Changed conditions in locality. - Since the plaintiffs were making nonagricultural uses of the plaintiffs' lands prior to establishment of the defendants' farm, if the defendants' facility is a nuisance, it is not so as a result of changed conditions in locality. Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140 , 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Determination of whether facility is insulated from abatement. - In determining whether agricultural facility is insulated from abatement as a nuisance, the court must inquire: (1) whether operation is an agricultural facility within meaning of section; (2) whether a nuisance action is being brought as a result of changed conditions in locality of facility; and (3) whether facility has been in operation for one year or more prior to changed conditions in surrounding locality. Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140 , 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Nuisances not arising from urban sprawl are not covered. - That which may constitute a nuisance regardless of urban sprawl, such as polluting a stream, is never protected by O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 since such activity does not become a nuisance as a result of changed conditions in surrounding locality. Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140 , 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Abatement of facilities in operation for long periods. - O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 does not provide that a facility in operation for one year can never be abated as nuisance. Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140 , 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).

Paper mill was "forest products processing plant" protected from nuisance liability. - Georgia's right to farm statute, O.C.G.A. § 41-1-7 , barred the homeowners' nuisance claims against a recycled paper mill because the recycled paper was a "forest product" and the mill a "forest products processing plant" protected from liability by the statute; further, the mill was not being operated in a negligent manner so as to render the statutory bar inapplicable. Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 345 Ga. App. 434 , 812 S.E.2d 120 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 736, cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 725 (Ga. 2018).

Cited in Roberts v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 173 Ga. App. 757 , 328 S.E.2d 391 (1985).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Egg farm located in nonagricultural, residential area would not be entitled to protection from nuisance suits. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-51.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 153, 154, 159, 160, 163, 169.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 13-25, 50, 104.

ALR. - Hog breeding, confining, or processing facility as constituting nuisance, 93 A.L.R.5th 621.

41-1-8. Treatment of publicly owned cultural facilities as nuisances.

  1. It is declared the public policy of this state to conserve, protect, and encourage the development of publicly owned cultural facilities. In order to encourage the establishment and maintenance of publicly owned cultural facilities, it is the purpose of this Code section to limit the circumstances under which a publicly owned cultural facility may be deemed to be a nuisance.
  2. Neither a publicly owned cultural facility nor a facility operated on lease from a publicly owned cultural facility nor any of the appurtenances thereof nor the operation thereof shall be or become a nuisance, either public or private, solely as a result of changed conditions in or around the locality of such cultural facility if such cultural facility has been in operation for one year or more. (Code 1981, § 41-1-8 , enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 999, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 41.)

41-1-9. Sport shooting ranges.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Person" means an individual, proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association.
    2. "Sport shooting range" or "range" means an area designated and operated by a person for the sport shooting of firearms and not available for such use by the general public without payment of a fee, membership contribution, or dues or by invitation of an authorized person, or any area so designated and operated by a unit of government, regardless of the terms of admission thereto.
    3. "Unit of government" means any of the departments, agencies, authorities, or political subdivisions of the state, cities, municipal corporations, townships, or villages and any of their respective departments, agencies, or authorities.
  2. No sport shooting range shall be or shall become a nuisance, either public or private, solely as a result of changed conditions in or around the locality of such range if the range has been in operation for one year since the date on which it commenced operation as a sport shooting range. Subsequent physical expansion of the range or expansion of the types of firearms in use at the range shall not establish a new date of commencement of operations for purposes of this Code section.
  3. No sport shooting range or unit of government or person owning, operating, or using a sport shooting range for the sport shooting of firearms shall be subject to any action for civil or criminal liability, damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to noise generated by the operation of the range if the range remains in compliance with noise control or nuisance abatement rules, regulations, statutes, or ordinances applicable to the range on the date on which it commenced operation.
  4. No rules, regulations, statutes, or ordinances relating to noise control, noise pollution, or noise abatement adopted or enacted by a unit of government shall be applied retroactively to prohibit conduct at a sport shooting range, which conduct was lawful and being engaged in prior to the adoption or enactment of such rules, regulations, statutes, or ordinances. (Code 1981, § 41-1-9 , enacted by Ga. L. 1997, p. 796, § 1.)

Editor's notes. - Ga. L. 1997, p. 796, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, makes this Code section applicable to conduct occurring on or after July 1, 1997, and provides that this Code section shall not apply to or affect conduct occurring prior to July 1, 1997.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

No injunction as a nuisance. - Sporting clay course cannot be enjoined as a sound generating nuisance if the course does not run afoul of local noise control ordinances or ordinances aimed at the regulation of a sport shooting range. Jenkins v. Clayton, 273 Ga. 439 , 542 S.E.2d 503 (2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Citizen Suit Under the Noise Control Act, 58 POF3d 315.

41-1-10. Hunting operations not nuisances under certain conditions.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term "hunting operation" means an operation including any of the following:
    1. Lands, including the buildings and improvements thereon, which are used or which are intended for use as a hunting club, hunting preserve, or shooting preserve;
    2. Lands, including the buildings and improvements thereon, which are used or which are intended for use as a kennel, training facility, or field trial facility for the breeding, showing, raising or training of hunting and sporting dogs; or
    3. Clubs, associations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, corporations and other business and social entities whose activities or holdings include the lands and uses described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.
  2. No hunting operation shall be or shall become a nuisance, either public or private, solely as a result of changed conditions in or around the locality of such hunting operation if the hunting operation has been in operation for at least one year since the date on which it commenced activity as a hunting operation. Subsequent physical expansion of the hunting operation shall not establish a new date of commencement of activity for purposes of this Code section.
  3. No hunting operation shall be subject to any action for civil or criminal liability, damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to lawful hunting activities generated by the hunting operation if the hunting operation remains in compliance with Title 27 and the rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Natural Resources pursuant to Title 27.
  4. This Code section shall not apply to hunting operations which are conducted in violation of any provision of Title 27 or the rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Natural Resources pursuant to Title 27. (Code 1981, § 42-1-10 , enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 952, § 11/SB 474.)

Editor's notes. - This Code section formerly pertained to signs for privately owned businesses. The former Code section was based on Code 1981, § 41-1-10 , enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 5.1 and was repealed by Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 41, effective April 18, 2002.

CHAPTER 2 ABATEMENT OF NUISANCES GENERALLY

Sec.

Cross references. - Abatement of nuisances relating to manufacture, sale, and other activities concerning of distilled spirits in dry counties and municipalities, § 3-10-8 .

Institution of action for injunction, mandamus, to prevent, correct, or abate violation or threatened violation of county building, electrical, and other codes, § 36-13-10 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This chapter furnishes a summary remedy for the abatement of nuisances, public or private, and such remedy should be resorted to unless the facts make it inadequate. Powell v. Foster, 59 Ga. 790 (1877); Broomhead v. Grant, 83 Ga. 451 , 10 S.E. 116 (1889); Hendricks v. Jackson, 143 Ga. 106 , 84 S.E. 440 (1915); Simmons v. Lindsay, 144 Ga. 845 , 88 S.E. 199 (1916).

Procedure provided for in this chapter is the proper remedy when the sole relief sought by the plaintiff is the removal of obstructions in a public alley or street placed there by the defendant. Barnes v. Cheek, 84 Ga. App. 653 , 67 S.E.2d 145 (1951).

Necessity of actual existence of nuisance. - This chapter was not intended to afford a remedy against that which is not an actually existing nuisance, as distinguished from that which may or probably will become such. The statutory language seems to admit of no other construction. Fairview Cem. Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709 , 138 S.E. 88 (1927).

Cited in Haney v. Sheppard, 207 Ga. 158 , 60 S.E.2d 453 (1950); Atkinson v. Drake, 212 Ga. 558 , 93 S.E.2d 702 (1956); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 94 S. Ct. 1098 , 39 L. Ed. 2 d 367 (1974); 660 Lindbergh, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 492 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for nuisance based on air pollution, 19 A.L.R.4th 456.

41-2-1. Authorization and procedure for abatement of nuisances generally.

Upon filing of a petition as provided in Code Section 41-2-2, any nuisance which tends to the immediate annoyance of the public in general, is manifestly injurious to the public health or safety, or tends greatly to corrupt the manners and morals of the public may be abated by order of a judge of the superior court of the county in which venue is proper.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 817; Code 1863, § 3995; Code 1868, § 4023; Code 1873, § 4094; Code 1882, § 4094; Civil Code 1895, § 4760; Civil Code 1910, § 5329; Code 1933, § 72-201; Ga. L. 1980, p. 620, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 867, § 1.)

Cross references. - Abatement of hazard resulting from abandoned well or hole, § 44-1-14 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Constitutionality. - Statutory definition of a nuisance is not vague and indefinite and therefore unconstitutional. Atlanta Processing Co. v. Brown, 227 Ga. 203 , 179 S.E.2d 752 (1971).

Section defines an indictable nuisance, and was evidently intended not to authorize the abatement of an act which was not indictable, but to authorize the abatement of indictable nuisances of peculiar virulence, without waiting for an indictment. Vason v. South Carolina R.R., 42 Ga. 631 (1871).

Section applicable to public and private nuisance. - While this section, in terms, provides only for the abatement of a public nuisance, in the manner therein specified, it has been several times held that a private nuisance may be abated under its operation provided the application is made by the party injured. Ruff v. Phillips, 50 Ga. 130 (1873); Salter v. Taylor, 55 Ga. 310 (1875); Hart v. Taylor, 61 Ga. 156 (1878); Holmes v. Jones, 80 Ga. 659 , 7 S.E. 168 (1888); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Gill, 118 Ga. 737 , 45 S.E. 623 (1903).

Equitable relief. - If the nuisance is continuing in character, the remedy is inadequate, and equity will take jurisdiction and grant relief. Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 184 Ga. 485 , 191 S.E. 919 (1937).

Nuisance may be abated in equity if the hurt or damage is irreparable or continuing. Isley v. Little, 217 Ga. 586 , 124 S.E.2d 80 (1962), later appeal, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963).

Operation of lawful business as a nuisance. - While mere apprehension of injury and damage is insufficient, if it is made to appear with reasonable certainty that irreparable harm and damage will occur from the operation of an otherwise lawful business amounting to a continuing nuisance, equity will restrain the construction, maintenance, or operation of such lawful business. Isley v. Little, 217 Ga. 586 , 124 S.E.2d 80 (1962), later appeal, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963).

Cited in South Carolina R.R. v. Ells, 40 Ga. 87 (1869); Wetter v. Campbell, 60 Ga. 266 (1878); Roberts v. Harrison, 101 Ga. 773 , 28 S.E. 995 , 65 Am. St. R. 342 (1897); Western & A.R.R. v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537 , 38 S.E. 996 , 54 L.R.A. 294 (1901); Cole v. Jones, 8 Ga. App. 737 , 70 S.E. 96 (1911); Adair v. Spellman Sem., 13 Ga. App. 600 , 79 S.E. 589 (1913); Giles v. Rawlings, 148 Ga. 575 , 97 S.E. 521 (1918); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 40 Ga. App. 300 , 149 S.E. 305 (1929); De Long v. Kent, 85 Ga. App. 360 , 69 S.E.2d 649 (1952); Hagins v. Howell, 219 Ga. 276 , 133 S.E.2d 8 (1963); Sizemore v. Coker, 220 Ga. 773 , 141 S.E.2d 891 (1965).

Sufficiency of Allegations

No presumption of damages. - While petitioners were not entitled to all the relief prayed for, or to an injunction against the operation of the defendant's service station business when conducted in a normal manner accompanied by no more noises than were reasonably necessary, yet the petitioners would be entitled to injunctive relief against unusual and unnecessary noises, provided the proof showed that the operation of the business was attended with such unusual and unnecessary noises, as distinguished from those disturbances and noises which were normal and of the character usually attendant upon the operation of the business of operating a filling station and garage for repairs. Wilson v. Evans Hotel Co., 188 Ga. 498 , 4 S.E.2d 155 (1939).

Nuisance being an indirect tort, there is no presumption of damages from its maintenance; and the plaintiff, in order to recover must show the fact of the nuisance and consequent damages. Crane v. Mays, 70 Ga. App. 66 , 27 S.E.2d 347 (1943).

Petition alleging that the plaintiff purchased a described tract of land, and at the same time acquired an easement adjacent thereto over a lane as a means of ingress and egress from the public road to the plaintiff's farm, that the plaintiff had used this land without interruption since the date the land was acquired until the defendant obstructed the land by placing a "cattle gap" across the land, that such obstruction had interfered with the plaintiff's movement of cattle along that lane to a pasture, thereby causing the plaintiff much inconvenience, trouble, and injury to the plaintiff's cattle, and thereby depriving the plaintiff's family of necessary milk and food, stated a cause of action for injunctive relief. Ozbolt v. Miller, 206 Ga. 558 , 57 S.E.2d 601 (1950).

Character of proceeding under this chapter was established by the plaintiff's petition and the petition's contents, and this could not be changed into an action to try title to land by the defense sought to be interposed by the defendant. Barnes v. Cheek, 84 Ga. App. 653 , 67 S.E.2d 145 (1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, § 50 et seq.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 107-115, 182-187.

ALR. - Proximate cause as determining landlord's liability, where injury results to a third person from a nuisance that becomes such only upon tenant's using the premises, 4 A.L.R. 740 .

Fire escape as an attractive nuisance, 9 A.L.R. 271 .

Necessity of knowledge by owner of real estate of a nuisance maintained thereon by another to subject him to the operation of a statute providing for the abatement of nuisances, or prescribing pecuniary penalty therefor, 12 A.L.R. 431 ; 121 A.L.R. 642 .

Liability of purchaser of premises for nuisance thereon created by predecessor, 14 A.L.R. 1094 .

Tannery or curing of hides as a nuisance, or subject of municipal regulation, 32 A.L.R. 1358 .

Injunction against games on neighboring property, 62 A.L.R. 782 ; 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Decree abating nuisance as affecting owner not served with process, 63 A.L.R. 698 .

Dogs as nuisance, 79 A.L.R. 1060 .

Aeroplanes and aeronautics, 99 A.L.R. 173 .

Use of property for production of war goods as affecting question of nuisance, and injunction to abate same, 145 A.L.R. 611 .

Validity of provision of statute or ordinance that requires vacation of premises which do not comply with building or sanitary regulations, upon notice to that effect, without judicial proceeding, 153 A.L.R. 849 .

When statute of limitation commences to run against damage from overflow of land caused by artificial construction or obstruction, 5 A.L.R.2d 302.

Stockyard as a nuisance, 18 A.L.R.2d 1033.

Practice of exacting usury as a nuisance or ground for injunction, 83 A.L.R.2d 848.

Statutes, ordinances, or regulations relating to private residential swimming pools, 92 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

Buyer's acceptance of delayed or defective instalment of goods as waiver of similar default as to later installments, 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Modern status of rules as to balance of convenience or social utility as affecting relief from nuisance, 40 A.L.R.3d 601.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance providing for repair or destruction of residential building by public authorities at owner's expense, 43 A.L.R.3d 916.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

Nuisance: right of one compelled to discontinue business or activity constituting nuisance to indemnity from successful plaintiff, 53 A.L.R.3d 873.

Existence of, and relief from, nuisance created by operation of air conditioning or ventilating equipment, 79 A.L.R.3d 320.

Bells, carillons, and the like, as nuisance, 95 A.L.R.3d 1268.

Encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, 65 A.L.R.4th 603.

Nuisance as entitling owner or occupant of real estate to recover damages for personal inconvenience, discomfort, annoyance, anguish, or sickness, distinct from, or in addition to, damages for depreciation in value of property or its use, 25 A.L.R.5th 568.

41-2-2. Filing of complaint to abate public nuisance.

Private citizens may not generally interfere to have a public nuisance abated. A complaint must be filed by the district attorney, solicitor-general, city attorney, or county attorney on behalf of the public. However, a public nuisance may be abated upon filing of a complaint by any private citizen specially injured.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3999; Code 1868, § 4027; Code 1873, § 4098; Code 1882, § 4098; Civil Code 1895, §§ 4761, 4766; Civil Code 1910, §§ 5330, 5338; Code 1933, § 72-202; Ga. L. 1980, p. 620, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 467, § 1.)

Law reviews. - For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with environment, natural resources, and land use from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (1978). For note, "Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips: A Clarification of Georgia's Public Nuisance Law?," see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 474 (1969). For note discussing the abatement of nonconforming uses as nuisances, see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 302 (1973). For note on 1999 amendment of this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 211 (1999).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Actions by private citizens require special injury. - Private citizen specially damaged by a public nuisance may proceed in the citizen's own name and behalf to have the nuisance abated under former Civil Code 1895, §§ 4761 and 4766 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 41-2-2 and 41-2-3 ). Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Gill, 118 Ga. 737 , 45 S.E. 623 (1903); Trust Co. v. Ray, 125 Ga. 485 , 54 S.E. 145 (1906).

Private citizens cannot generally interfere to have a public nuisance enjoined. Sammons v. Sturgis, 145 Ga. 663 , 89 S.E. 774 (1916).

Generally, a public nuisance gives to any individual no right of action for injunction, but the nuisance must be abated by a process instituted in the name of the state. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

If operation of a picture show on the Sabbath amounts to a public nuisance, such nuisance may be abated in the manner provided by law, or the nuisance may be enjoined upon an information filed by the solicitor general (now district attorney), but an injunction will not be granted at the instance of a private citizen unless one has sustained special injury. American Legion v. Miller, 183 Ga. 754 , 189 S.E. 837 (1937); Crane v. Mays, 70 Ga. App. 66 , 27 S.E.2d 347 (1943).

All injury to health is special, and necessarily limited in its effect to the individual affected, and is, in its nature, irreparable. It matters not that others within the sphere of the operation of the nuisance, whether public or private, may be affected likewise. Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 184 Ga. 485 , 191 S.E. 919 (1937).

While generally a private citizen may not have a public nuisance enjoined, such nuisance may be abated on the application of a citizen specially injured. Harbuck v. Richland Box Co., 204 Ga. 352 , 49 S.E.2d 883 (1948).

Allegations of petition in which petitioners sought equitable relief "as individuals, citizens, and taxpayers" from the closing of a railroad crossing were insufficient to show special damage to petitioners, or any damage not shared equally by all other "individuals, citizens, and taxpayers," and the petition was therefore insufficient for the grant of any relief to the petitioners as individuals, citizens, and taxpayers. State Hwy. Dep't v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197 , 84 S.E.2d 561 (1954).

Cited in Coast Line R.R. v. Cohen, 50 Ga. 451 (1873); Ison v. Manley, 76 Ga. 804 (1886); Western & A.R.R. v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537 , 38 S.E. 996 , 54 L.R.A. 294 (1901); Peginis v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 302 , 63 S.E. 857 , 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 716 (1909); Aiken v. Armistead, 186 Ga. 368 , 198 S.E. 237 (1938); Poole v. Arnold, 187 Ga. 734 , 2 S.E.2d 83 (1939); Nichols v. Pirkle, 202 Ga. 372 , 43 S.E.2d 306 (1947); Kilgore v. Paschall, 202 Ga. 416 , 43 S.E.2d 520 (1947); De Long v. Kent, 85 Ga. App. 360 , 69 S.E.2d 649 (1952); Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449 , 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955); City of Dublin v. Hobbs, 218 Ga. 108 , 126 S.E.2d 655 (1962); Burgess v. Johnson, 223 Ga. 427 , 156 S.E.2d 78 (1967); Ungar v. Mayor of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613 , 163 S.E.2d 814 (1968); J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. State ex rel. Hancock, 227 Ga. 336 , 180 S.E.2d 704 (1971); Sanders v. McAuliffe, 364 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga. 160 , 236 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Stephens v. Tate, 147 Ga. App. 366 , 249 S.E.2d 92 (1978); Brand v. Wilson, 252 Ga. 416 , 314 S.E.2d 192 (1984); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Authority of District Attorney

Acting on information of citizens. - Lewd house being per se a public nuisance, a court of equity has jurisdiction to abate the nuisance on a suit brought by the district attorney on the information of a citizen as a relator, without alleging or proving special injury to property. Edison v. Ramsey, 146 Ga. 767 , 92 S.E. 513 (1917).

District attorney is not authorized to act on the information of citizens, except in case of a public nuisance. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

In order for a solicitor general (now district attorney) to proceed for the public, on information filed with the solicitor by citizens, to enjoin a nuisance, the object which it is sought to enjoin must be a public nuisance. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817 , 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

Complaint must name citizen furnishing information. - Court of equity will not entertain a bill in the name of one or more private citizens to restrain a public nuisance, no private injury or threatened injury being alleged to such citizens or to their property. In such a case, the nuisance being a purely public one, can only be restrained by the public, on information filed by a public officer, to wit: by the solicitor general (now district attorney) for the Circuit. This holding is declaratory of the common-law rule which is universally adopted and quite uniform. Mayor of Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506 (1860).

Complaint in equity filed by the district attorney to abate a public nuisance must name the citizen or citizens upon whose information the complaint is based. Chancey v. Hancock, 233 Ga. 734 , 213 S.E.2d 633 (1975).

Authority not repealed by Air Quality Control Act. - Authority granted to district attorneys to abate public nuisances relating to air pollution was not repealed to any extent by the former Georgia Air Quality Control Act. J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480 , 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970).

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction by court of equity to grant injunction. - Court of equity has jurisdiction, and in a proper case may by injunction restrain a public nuisance upon information filed by the solicitor general (now district attorney). Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538 , 150 S.E. 825 (1929).

Court of equity has jurisdiction and in a proper case will, by injunction, restrain a public nuisance. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Equity, generally, will not interfere with the administration of the criminal law. The state, however, has an interest in the welfare, peace, and good order of the state's citizens and communities and has provided in the state's laws for the abatement of nuisances when the public generally is injured. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

By clear and necessary implication, an injunction will lie in the name of the state to enjoin a public nuisance. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 212, 217, 218, 225, 226, 377, 379, 381.

C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 26. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 109 et seq., 118-120, 192 et seq.

ALR. - Injunction to prevent establishment or maintenance of garbage or sewage disposal plant, 5 A.L.R. 920 ; 47 A.L.R. 1154 .

Special injury to property interest as condition of right to enjoin diversion of dedicated property, 41 A.L.R. 1410 .

Animal rendering or bone-boiling plant or business as nuisance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Public dances or dance halls as nuisances, 44 A.L.R.2d 1381.

Statutes, ordinances, or regulations relating to private residential swimming pools, 92 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance, 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

Water distributor's liability for injuries due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer, 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported, 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 652.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

Right to maintain action to enjoin public nuisance as affected by existence of pollution control agency, 60 A.L.R.3d 665.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Existence of, and relief from, nuisance created by operation of air conditioning or ventilating equipment, 79 A.L.R.3d 320.

Carwash as nuisance, 4 A.L.R.4th 1308.

41-2-3. Filing of petition to abate private nuisance.

A private nuisance may be abated upon filing of a petition by the person injured.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3999; Code 1868, § 4027; Code 1873, § 4098; Code 1882, § 4098; Civil Code 1895, § 4766; Civil Code 1910, § 5338; Code 1933, § 72-203; Ga. L. 1980, p. 620, § 3.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Cited in Lockwood v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 122 , 17 S.E.2d 542 (1941); De Long v. Kent, 85 Ga. App. 360 , 69 S.E.2d 649 (1952); Clark v. Baety, 216 Ga. 42 , 114 S.E.2d 527 (1960).

Statute of Limitations

Statute of limitations not a bar to equitable relief. - Plaintiff's right to equitable relief was not barred by the statute of limitations on grounds that the nuisance complained of had existed for a period of more than four years prior to the institution of litigation, since when there is a continuing nuisance, a new cause of action arises daily and a court of equity takes jurisdiction in such a case to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Scott v. Dudley, 214 Ga. 565 , 105 S.E.2d 752 (1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 212, 213, 217, 226, 377-381.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 107-115, 184 et seq., 192 et seq.

ALR. - Ice manufacturing or distributing plant as nuisance, 41 A.L.R. 626 .

Injunction against games on neighboring property, 62 A.L.R. 782 ; 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Casting of light on another's premises as constituting actionable wrong, 5 A.L.R.2d 705; 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Public dances or dance halls as nuisances, 44 A.L.R.2d 1381.

Buyer's acceptance of delayed or defective instalment of goods as waiver of similar default as to later instalments, 32 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Residential swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 545.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Exhibition of obscene motion pictures as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 969.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Operation of cement plant as nuisance, 82 A.L.R.3d 1004.

Funeral home as private nuisance, 8 A.L.R.4th 324.

41-2-4. Issuance of injunction where nuisance about to be erected or commenced likely to result in irreparable damage.

Where the consequence of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable damage and such consequence is not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain, an injunction may be issued to restrain the nuisance before it is completed.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2944; Code 1868, § 2951; Code 1873, § 3002; Code 1882, § 3002; Civil Code 1895, § 3863; Civil Code 1910, § 4459; Code 1933, § 72-204; Ga. L. 1980, p. 620, § 4.)

Law reviews. - For note discussing the abatement of nonconforming uses as nuisances, see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 302 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

Injunction will lie in name of state. - By clear and necessary implication, an injunction will lie in the name of the state to enjoin a public nuisance. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Generally, a public nuisance gives to any individual no right of action for injunction, but the nuisance must be abated by a process instituted in the name of the state. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Cited in Mygatt v. Goetchins, 20 Ga. 350 (1856); Sullivan, Cabot & Co. v. Rome R.R., 28 Ga. 29 (1859); Kirtland v. Mayor of Macon, 66 Ga. 385 (1881); Wingate v. City of Doerun, 177 Ga. 373 , 170 S.E. 226 (1933); Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206 , 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954); Payne v. Terrell, 269 Ga. App. 540 , 604 S.E.2d 551 (2004); Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 285 Ga. 627 , 680 S.E.2d 411 (2009).

Basis of Injunction

Nuisance must be certain. - It is only when it is made to appear with reasonable certainty that an instrumentality in the course of construction will necessarily constitute a nuisance that a court of equity will exercise the power to restrain. Elder v. City of Winder, 201 Ga. 511 , 40 S.E.2d 659 (1946).

Court of equity will only exercise the power to restrain the erection of a building, and the maintenance therein, after construction, of a lawful business, on the ground that the operation of such business will constitute a nuisance, when it is made to appear with reasonable certainty that such operation necessarily constitutes a nuisance, the consequences of which will be irreparable in damages. Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550 , 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951).

If the injury is either irreparable or continuing, an injunction will be granted. Farley v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 105 Ga. 323 , 31 S.E. 193 (1898).

Nuisance may be abated in equity if the hurt or damage is irreparable or continuing. Isley v. Little, 217 Ga. 586 , 124 S.E.2d 80 (1962), later appeal, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963).

Nuisance per accidens by reason of circumstances and surroundings may be abated in equity if the hurt or damage is irreparable or continuing. Camp v. Warrington, 227 Ga. 674 , 182 S.E.2d 419 (1971).

Injunction will be granted when the damages can be ascertained, and all rights finally adjudicated in one action. Wheeler v. Steele, 50 Ga. 24 (1873); Powell v. Foster, 59 Ga. 790 (1877).

Continuing nuisance gives a new cause of action for each day of its continued maintenance, and in such a case, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits, a court of equity will entertain jurisdiction to enjoin the nuisance and also have the nuisance abated. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Evidence obtained by illegal search or seizure. - When the evidence in support of injunctions to abate a public nuisance is obtained by illegal searches and seizures, the portions of the judgments granting such injunctions are void. Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299 , 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).

Exclusion of opinion evidence of nonexperts. - Method of taking testimony, when an injunction had been applied for, was found in former Part 2, Art. 2, Ch. 10, T. 24; however, opinion evidence of nonexperts would be excluded. Richmond Cotton Oil Co. v. Castellaw, 134 Ga. 472 , 67 S.E. 1126 (1910).

Mere apprehension of injury and damage. - Allegation of "mere speculative or contingent injuries, with nothing to show that they will in fact happen," will not support a prayer to enjoin a nuisance. Harrison v. Brooks, 20 Ga. 537 (1856); Bailey v. Ross, 68 Ga. 735 (1882); Richmond Cotton Oil Co. v. Castellaw, 134 Ga. 472 , 67 S.E. 1126 (1910); Elder v. City of Winder, 201 Ga. 511 , 40 S.E.2d 659 (1946).

Mere apprehension of irreparable injury from an alleged nuisance, consisting of a house in course of construction for a lawful business use, is not sufficient to authorize an injunction. If it be a nuisance, the consequences must be to a reasonable degree certain. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 , 173 S.E. 817 (1934).

Mere apprehension of irreparable injury from an alleged nuisance consisting of a house in the course of construction or alteration for a lawful business is not sufficient to authorize an injunction. Roberts v. Rich, 200 Ga. 497 , 37 S.E.2d 401 (1946).

Allegations of mere speculative or contingent injuries, with nothing to show that in fact the injuries will happen, are insufficient to support a prayer for injunctive relief. Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550 , 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951).

Mere apprehension of injury, based on the assumption that a lawful business not then in operation will be operated in the future in an improper manner, so as to become a nuisance, is not sufficient to authorize equity to enjoin the erection of a building wherein such business is to be carried on. Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550 , 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951).

Mere anticipation of injury from the operation of a lawful business will not authorize the grant of an injunction. Davis v. Miller, 212 Ga. 836 , 96 S.E.2d 498 (1957).

When a petition fails to show the facts from which it appears with reasonable certainty that the operation of the business will work hurt, inconvenience, and damage, it falls just short of alleging a nuisance per accidens against which an injunction should be granted. Griffith v. Newman, 217 Ga. 533 , 123 S.E.2d 723 (1962).

While mere apprehension of injury and damage is insufficient, if it is made to appear with reasonable certainty that irreparable harm and damage will occur from the operation of an otherwise lawful business amounting to a continuing nuisance, equity will restrain the construction, maintenance, or operation of such lawful business. Isley v. Little, 217 Ga. 586 , 124 S.E.2d 80 (1962), later appeal, 219 Ga. 23 , 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Camp v. Warrington, 227 Ga. 674 , 182 S.E.2d 419 (1971).

Fears of abutting landowners that land condemned for use as a football stadium would become a nuisance were too speculative to permit the enjoining of the condemnation. Herren v. Board of Educ., 219 Ga. 431 , 134 S.E.2d 6 (1963).

Trial court properly declined to permanently enjoin the defendants from using their property as a public motocross track. The defendants closed the track to the public before the plaintiffs filed suit, and the plaintiffs did not establish to a reasonably certain degree under O.C.G.A. § 41-2-4 that the defendants would reopen it to the public; thus, the trial court was not required to issue an injunction merely because the plaintiffs apprehended a public use at some future time. Evans v. Knott, 282 Ga. 584 , 652 S.E.2d 535 (2007).

Granting and dissolution of injunctions. - Interlocutory injunction may be granted against the establishment of business until the final trial of the case before the jury. Morrison v. Slappey, 153 Ga. 724 , 113 S.E. 82 (1922).

Use of restraining order. - While an injunction which is purely mandatory in the injunction's nature cannot be granted, the court may grant an order the essential nature of which is to restrain, although in yielding obedience to the restrain the defendant may incidentally be compelled to perform some act. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392 , 65 S.E. 855 (1909).

Injunction granted enjoining escape of gases from a city sewer. - See Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392 , 65 S.E. 855 (1909).

Unlicensed obstruction of public street. - See Savannah, A. & G.R.R. v. Shields, 33 Ga. 601 (1863).

Dumping trash on another's land. - See Lowe v. Holbrook, 71 Ga. 563 (1883); Butler v. Mayor of Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570 (1885).

Obstruction of an alley. - See Murphey v. Harker, 115 Ga. 77 , 41 S.E. 585 (1902).

Diversion of a watercourse. - See Persons v. Hill, 33 Ga. 141 (1864).

Municipal license of cars in its street for private use. - See Mayor of Macon v. Harris, 73 Ga. 428 (1884).

Construction of a pond. - See De Vaughn v. Minor, 77 Ga. 809 , 1 S.E. 433 (1887).

Maintaining livery stable. - See Coker v. Birge, 10 Ga. 336 (1851). But see Rounsaville v. Kohlheim, 68 Ga. 668 , 45 Am. R. 505 (1882).

Operation of poultry houses. - See May v. Brueshaber, 265 Ga. 889 , 466 S.E.2d 196 (1995).

Grocery business in residential area. - It was not error for a trial court to dismiss a petition complaining that a proposed warehouse and wholesale grocery business in a residential section would constitute a nuisance, causing irreparable damage to the plaintiffs, and seeking an injunction to restrain the construction of the proposed building, because such a business is not necessarily a nuisance per se, even in a residential neighborhood, and mere apprehension of irreparable injury is insufficient. Roberts v. Rich, 200 Ga. 497 , 37 S.E.2d 401 (1946).

Effect of abatement of nuisance before trial. - If subsequently to the institution of the action, but prior to the trial, the defendant has practically abated the nuisance, a refusal to grant an injunction is proper. Farley v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 105 Ga. 323 , 31 S.E. 193 (1898).

Jurisdiction

Court of equity has jurisdiction and in a proper case will, by injunction, restrain a public nuisance. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Prospective or future damages not recoverable. - Equity courts have the power to abate nuisances, but, if the nuisance complained of is merely temporary, then prospective or future damages, as damages for permanent injury, are not recoverable. Ward v. Southern Brighton Mills, 45 Ga. App. 262 , 164 S.E. 214 (1932).

Application of equity to nuisance and not criminal law. - Equity, generally, will not interfere with the administration of the criminal law. The state, however, has an interest in the welfare, peace, and good order of the state's citizens and communities and has provided in the state's laws for the abatement of nuisances when the public generally is injured. Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930).

Order of Abatement

Sufficiency of order. - Order restraining the defendant from permitting any gases or vapors to escape from, or be carried beyond, the ground owned by the defendant company and upon which the company's plant was located, so as to constitute a nuisance, as defined in former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4457 and 4459 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 41-1-1 and 41-2-4 ) was sufficiently specific. Morris Fertilizer Co. v. Boykin, 149 Ga. 673 , 101 S.E. 799 (1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 51, 53, 248. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 285-292.

C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 16, 17, 20 et seq. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 209-219.

ALR. - Injunction to prevent establishment or maintenance of garbage or sewage disposal plant, 5 A.L.R. 920 ; 47 A.L.R. 1154 .

Nuisance resulting from smoke alone as subject for injunctive relief, 6 A.L.R. 1575 .

Right to enjoin threatened or anticipated nuisance, 26 A.L.R. 937 ; 32 A.L.R. 724 ; 55 A.L.R. 880 .

Institution for the punishment or rehabilitation of criminals, delinquents, or alcoholics as enjoinable nuisance, 21 A.L.R.3d 1058.

Punitive damages in actions based on nuisance, 31 A.L.R.3d 1346.

Operation of cement plant as nuisance, 82 A.L.R.3d 1004.

41-2-5. Authorization and procedure for abatement of nuisances in cities and unincorporated areas of counties.

If the existence of a nuisance is complained of in a county or city of this state, the municipal court of the city, if the nuisance complained of is in the city, shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of the existence of such nuisance and, if found to exist, to order its abatement. If the nuisance complained of is located in the unincorporated area of a county, the magistrate court of the county, unless otherwise provided by local law, shall have such jurisdiction and power to order its abatement.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 817; Code 1863, § 3996; Code 1868, § 4024; Code 1873, § 4095; Code 1882, § 4095; Ga. L. 1892, p. 64, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4762; Civil Code 1910, § 5331; Code 1933, § 72-401; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1739, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 41; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 1.)

Cross references. - Content of municipal or county ordinances relating to repair, closing, or demolition of dwellings unfit for human habitation, § 36-61-11 .

Law reviews. - For article, "Delegation in Georgia Local Government Law," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 9 (1970). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with environment, natural resources, and land use from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 75 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration

It is an exercise of judicial power, to determine what is by law a nuisance and only those things which are by the common or statute law declared to be nuisances per se, or which in their very nature are such, may be summarily suppressed. City of Atlanta v. Aycock, 205 Ga. 441 , 53 S.E.2d 744 (1949).

Mere apprehension of injury. - Nuisance law does not apply if there is a mere apprehension of an irreparable injury. Wingate v. City of Doerun, 177 Ga. 373 , 170 S.E. 226 (1933).

Any nuisance injurious to the public health is within the terms of this section. Strong v. LaGrange Mills, 112 Ga. 117 , 37 S.E. 117 (1900); Western & A.R.R. v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537 , 38 S.E. 996 , 54 L.R.A. 294 (1901); Peginis v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 302 , 63 S.E. 857 , 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 716 (1909); Griggs v. City of Macon, 154 Ga. 519 , 114 S.E. 899 (1922).

Proceedings in name of city upon application of citizen. - If the nuisance is a public one merely, and no private individual suffered special damages therefrom, then the proceedings to abate the nuisance should be in the name of the city upon the application of some citizen. Calhoun ex rel. Chapman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 189 Ga. 414 , 5 S.E.2d 902 (1939).

Cited in Spencer v. Tumlin, 155 Ga. 341 , 116 S.E. 600 (1923); City Council v. Sanders, 164 Ga. 235 , 138 S.E. 234 (1927); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 40 Ga. App. 300 , 149 S.E. 305 (1929); Albany Theater, Inc. v. Short, 171 Ga. 57 , 154 S.E. 895 (1930); O'Quinn v. Mayor of Homerville, 42 Ga. App. 628 , 157 S.E. 109 (1931); American Legion v. Miller, 183 Ga. 754 , 189 S.E. 837 (1937); Lockwood v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 122 , 17 S.E.2d 542 (1941); Foster v. Mayor of Carrollton, 68 Ga. App. 796 , 24 S.E.2d 143 (1943); De Long v. Kent, 85 Ga. App. 360 , 69 S.E.2d 649 (1952); Johnson v. Willingham, 212 Ga. 310 , 92 S.E.2d 1 (1956); Neel v. Clark, 221 Ga. 439 , 145 S.E.2d 235 (1965); Cronic v. State, 222 Ga. 623 , 151 S.E.2d 448 (1966); Shaffer v. City of Atlanta, 223 Ga. 249 , 154 S.E.2d 241 (1967); Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316 , 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967); Ford v. Crawford, 240 Ga. 612 , 241 S.E.2d 829 (1978); Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 152 Ga. App. 171 , 262 S.E.2d 481 (1979); 660 Lindbergh, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 492 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Notice

Building inspector not authorized to substitute the inspector's judgment. - Under the general law of this state and this section, the building inspector of the City of Atlanta was not authorized to substitute the inspector's judgment for that of the tribunal fixed by law, and serve notices on the property owners that the owners' property "constitutes a nuisance," or that the property had been "condemned." City of Atlanta v. Aycock, 205 Ga. 441 , 53 S.E.2d 744 (1949).

Reasonable notice of hearing on abatement. - Reasonable notice to the property owner of the time and place of hearing must precede any judgment ordering the abatement (destruction) of private property as a nuisance. City of Atlanta v. Aycock, 205 Ga. 441 , 53 S.E.2d 744 (1949).

Delegation of Power to Abate Nuisances

Lawful delegation of police power to abate nuisances. - City's agreement to cooperate with the city's local housing authority in effecting elimination of unsafe or insanitary dwellings with the approval of the United States Public Housing Administration does not contemplate or provide for an unlawful delegation of the city's police power to abate nuisances to the public housing administration but amounts only to an assurance of a proper exercise of the power by the city to the end that it will do what it ought in any event to do, namely, eliminate unsafe or unsanitary dwellings in the interest of general welfare, as it alone can lawfully do. Telford v. City of Gainesville, 208 Ga. 56 , 65 S.E.2d 246 (1951).

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction generally. - This section gives no power to justices of the peace (now magistrates); power is vested in the city government alone. South Carolina R.R. v. Ells, 40 Ga. 87 (1869).

Part of the section (formerly) relating to jurisdiction in cities of twenty thousand inhabitants confers such jurisdiction in the police court alone of the city where the nuisance exists, except in cases of nuisance per se. Western & A.R.R. v. City of Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537 , 38 S.E. 996 , 54 L.R.A. 294 (1901); Peginis v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 302 , 63 S.E. 857 , 35 L.R.A. (n.s.) 716 (1909).

Filing abatement proceedings with municipal authorities. - Proceedings to abate a nuisance, public or private, alleged to exist within an incorporated municipality, must be filed with and determined by the municipal authorities, unless there are special circumstances, requiring the intervention of equity. Waller v. Lanier, 198 Ga. 64 , 30 S.E.2d 925 (1944); Mitchell v. Green, 201 Ga. 256 , 39 S.E.2d 696 (1946).

Section provides adequate remedy. - To abate a nuisance, public or private, the remedy provided in this section should be resorted to, unless the special facts make the remedy inadequate. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

This section provides an adequate remedy for the abatement of a nuisance, public or private, which has been created and which exists within the limits of a town or city, and that remedy must be resorted to for its abatement, unless there are special facts which make the remedy inadequate. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628 , 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954).

Plaintiff must apply to city recorder for order abating nuisance. - When the city responsible for an alleged nuisance (formerly) had a population of more than 20,000, the plaintiff was required to apply to the city's recorder for an order abating the nuisance complained of. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628 , 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954).

Review of recorder's decision by certiorari in superior court. - Any decision rendered by city's recorder had to be reviewed by certiorari in the superior court. City of East Point v. Henry Chanin Corp., 210 Ga. 628 , 81 S.E.2d 812 (1954).

Writ of prohibition properly denied. - When the City of Atlanta brought a proceeding in the recorder's court to abate a nuisance, the penal features of the proceeding being abandoned, and the defendant sued out in the superior court a petition for the writ of prohibition to prevent the recorder from proceeding with the case, the writ was properly denied, the writ of prohibition is never granted when there is any other legal remedy, and this section provided an adequate and complete remedy in the case. Magbee v. City of Atlanta, 180 Ga. 733 , 180 S.E. 485 (1935).

Availability of certiorari. - Decision by the governing body of a municipality as to whether alleged acts constitute a nuisance, made after trial in which the parties at interest have participated, is a judicial determination from which certiorari will lie. Attaway v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 329 , 99 S.E.2d 154 (1957).

City criminal court empowered to abate continuing nuisance. - Fact that the General Assembly made the continuation of a nuisance after notice to abate a misdemeanor (O.C.G.A. § 41-1-6 ), does not preclude the criminal court of Cordele's power to abate nuisances pursuant to the legislative authorization in O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5 , and the court's power to enforce the court's judgments by contempt pursuant to the legislative authorization in the city charter. Horne v. City of Cordele, 254 Ga. 346 , 329 S.E.2d 134 (1985).

Proceedings not criminal in nature. - Proceeding in municipal court to determine the question of whether a nuisance existed was not criminal or quasi criminal in nature since the court cannot fine or imprison the defendant in error, and the bond required for certiorari is that provided for in former Code 1933, §§ 19-206, 19-207, and 19-208 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-4-5 ) for civil proceedings, and a bond under former Code 1933, §§ 19-214 and 19-215 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-4-20 ) would not suffice. City of Atlanta v. Pazol, 95 Ga. App. 598 , 98 S.E.2d 216 (1957).

Equitable jurisdiction. - Equity will take jurisdiction when the majority of council are disqualified. Hill v. McBurney Oil & Fertilizer Co., 112 Ga. 788 , 38 S.E. 42 , 52 L.R.A. 398 (1901).

When a municipal corporation itself is maintaining a nuisance, and a proper case exists for the nuisance's abatement, equity will take jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of this section, which prescribe the manner of abatement when the nuisance complained of shall exist in an incorporated town or city. City of Blue Ridge v. Kiker, 189 Ga. 717 , 7 S.E.2d 237 (1940).

Although a nuisance exists in a city under the government of a mayor or common council, a court of equity will in a proper case take jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin continuance of the nuisance, notwithstanding the provisions of this section, when the nuisance is a continuing one. State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv. Co., 191 Ga. 382 , 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

When there is a continuing nuisance, which plaintiffs allege will cause sickness, the remedy provided under this section does not furnish an ample and complete remedy for the plaintiffs. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

If alleged conduct constituted a continuing nuisance under former Code 1933, § 72-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 ), the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Petition alleging that a nuisance was a continuing one and injuriously affected the comfort and health of the petitioners in described particulars, and alleging that unless enjoined would cause irreparable damage to petitioners and result in a multiplicity of suits, was not subject to the ground of demurrer that it showed on its face that the petitioners had an adequate remedy at law. Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549 , 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).

Since a continuing nuisance was alleged, and since a continuing nuisance may be enjoined by a court of equity it was not error for the trial court to overrule the plea to the jurisdiction, wherein it was asserted that, by virtue of this section the mayor and city council of Springfield had jurisdiction to abate a nuisance in the form of a previously erected obstruction to a private way within the corporate limits of a city of less than 20,000 population. Rahn v. Pittman, 216 Ga. 523 , 118 S.E.2d 85 (1961).

In situations where there is a continuing nuisance, this section does not afford an adequate remedy at law and a court of equity will entertain jurisdiction to enjoin the nuisance and have the nuisance abated. City of Atlanta v. Wolcott, 240 Ga. 244 , 240 S.E.2d 83 (1977).

No conversion to equitable proceeding by use of evidentiary standard. - When a party elected to proceed under former Code 1933, 72-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5 ), it was an action at law and using the evidentiary standard contained in former Code 1933, 72-301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-1 ) did not convert the proceeding into an equitable one. Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 145 Ga. App. 172 , 244 S.E.2d 32 , cert. dismissed, 241 Ga. 593 , 247 S.E.2d 764 (1978).

Pleading and Practice

It is an action at law where a party elects to proceed under this section. Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 239 Ga. 578 , 238 S.E.2d 351 (1977).

Certiorari and not prohibition is the remedy by which officers should be forced to follow this section. Mayor of Montezuma v. Minor, 70 Ga. 191 (1883).

Failure to include the municipality as a party is not ground for dismissal. See Trust Co. v. Ray, 125 Ga. 485 , 54 S.E. 145 (1906).

This section does not confer authority to impose a fine. Healey v. City of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 736 , 54 S.E. 749 (1906).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Determination of substandard buildings as nuisance. - If substandard buildings in a town or city are alleged to be a nuisance, this may be determined in accordance with this section; this determination must be made subject to the due process provisions of state and federal Constitutions; if a nuisance is found to exist, the court can order its abatement; if the property owner fails to abate the nuisance, he may be bound over to a court having jurisdiction of misdemeanors; the municipality cannot itself demolish the offending buildings unless it condemns the property and compensates the owner. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Political Subdivisions, §§ 443-446. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 28, 50, 351, 352, 371, 372.

C.J.S. - 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 281.

ALR. - Tannery or curing of hides as a nuisance, or subject of municipal regulation, 32 A.L.R. 1358 .

Validity of municipal ordinance prohibiting or regulating keeping of livestock, 32 A.L.R. 1372 ; 40 A.L.R. 566 .

Right of abutting owner to complain of misuse of public park or violation of rights or easements appurtenant thereto, 60 A.L.R. 770 .

Right, as between state and county or municipality, to maintain action to abate a public nuisance in a street or highway, 65 A.L.R. 699 .

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance declaring plant or establishment which emits offensive odors to be a public nuisance, 141 A.L.R. 285 .

Validity of provision of statute or ordinance that requires vacation of premises which do not comply with building or sanitary regulations, upon notice to that effect, without judicial proceeding, 153 A.L.R. 849 .

Landowner's or occupant's liability in damages for escape, without negligence, of harmful gases or fumes from premises, 54 A.L.R.2d 764; 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Dairy, creamery, or milk distributing plant, as nuisance, 92 A.L.R.2d 974.

Statutes, ordinances, or regulations relating to private residential swimming pools, 92 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Gasoline or other fuel storage tanks as nuisance, 50 A.L.R.3d 209.

Recovery in trespass for injury to land caused by airborne pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054.

41-2-6. Notice of meeting to determine question of abatement.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1981, p. 1739, § 1, effective April 17, 1981.

Editor's notes. - This Code section was based on Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 817; Code 1863, § 3997; Code 1868, § 4025; Code 1873, § 4096; Code 1882, § 4096; Civil Code 1895, § 4763; Civil Code 1910, § 5332; Code 1933, § 72-402.

Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 41/HB 90, effective March 13, 2015, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, reserved the designation of this Code section.

41-2-7. Power of counties and municipalities to repair, close, or demolish unfit buildings or structures; health hazards on private property; properties affected.

  1. It is found and declared that in the counties and municipalities of this state there is the existence or occupancy of dwellings or other buildings or structures which are unfit for human habitation or for commercial, industrial, or business occupancy or use and not in compliance with the applicable state minimum standard codes as adopted by ordinance or operation of law or any optional building, fire, life safety, or other codes relative to the safe use of real property and real property improvements adopted by ordinance in the jurisdiction where the property is located; or general nuisance law and which constitute a hazard to the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state; and that a public necessity exists for the repair, closing, or demolition of such dwellings, buildings, or structures. It is found and declared that in the counties and municipalities of this state where there is in existence a condition or use of real estate which renders adjacent real estate unsafe or inimical to safe human habitation, such use is dangerous and injurious to the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state and a public necessity exists for the repair of such condition or the cessation of such use which renders the adjacent real estate unsafe or inimical to safe human habitation. Whenever the governing authority of any county or municipality of this state finds that there exist in such county or municipality dwellings, buildings, or structures which are unfit for human habitation or for commercial, industrial, or business uses due to dilapidation and not in compliance with applicable codes; which have defects increasing the hazards of fire, accidents, or other calamities; which lack adequate ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities; or where other conditions exist rendering such dwellings, buildings, or structures unsafe or unsanitary, or dangerous or detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare, or otherwise inimical to the welfare of the residents of such county or municipality, or vacant, dilapidated dwellings, buildings, or structures in which drug crimes are being committed, power is conferred upon such county or municipality to exercise its police power to repair, close, or demolish the aforesaid dwellings, buildings, or structures in the manner provided in this Code section and Code Sections 41-2-8 through 41-2-17.
  2. All the provisions of this Code section and Code Sections 41-2-8 through 41-2-17 including method and procedure may also be applied to private property where there exists an endangerment to the public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions to those persons residing or working in the vicinity. A finding by any governmental health department, health officer, or building inspector that such property is a health or safety hazard shall constitute prima-facie evidence that said property is in violation of this Code section and Code Sections 41-2-8 through 41-2-17.
  3. The exercise of the powers conferred upon counties in this Code section and in Code Sections 41-2-8 through 41-2-17 shall be limited to properties located in the unincorporated areas of such counties. (Ga. L. 1966, p. 3089, § 2; Ga. L. 1977, p. 4445, § 2; Code 1981, § 41-2-7 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 30; Ga. L. 1986, p. 10, § 41; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1508, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 1.)

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, in the first sentence of subsection (b), "property" was substituted for "proeprty" and a comma was deleted following "conditions."

Law reviews. - For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986). For article, "Local Government Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001). For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Health, §§ 25, 34, 42-44. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 132, 133, 278.

C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S., Health and Environment, §§ 30 et seq., 48, 49. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 36, 40, 41, 109 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Cited in Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 284 Ga. App. 34 , 643 S.E.2d 324 (2007).

41-2-8. Definitions for use in Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-17.

As used in Code Section 41-2-7, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-9 through 41-2-17, the term:

  1. "Applicable codes" means (A) any optional housing or abatement standard provided in Chapter 2 of Title 8 as adopted by ordinance or operation of law, or other property maintenance standards as adopted by ordinance or operation of law, or general nuisance law, relative to the safe use of real property; (B) any fire or life safety code as provided for in Chapter 2 of Title 25; and (C) any building codes adopted by local ordinance prior to October 1, 1991, or the minimum standard codes provided in Chapter 2 of Title 8 after October 1, provided that such building or minimum standard codes for real property improvements shall be deemed to mean those building or minimum standard codes in existence at the time such real property improvements were constructed unless otherwise provided by law.
  2. "Closing" means causing a dwelling, building, or structure to be vacated and secured against unauthorized entry.
  3. "Drug crime" means an act which is a violation of Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 16, known as the "Georgia Controlled Substances Act."
  4. "Dwellings, buildings, or structures" means any building or structure or part thereof used and occupied for human habitation or commercial, industrial, or business uses, or intended to be so used, and includes any outhouses, improvements, and appurtenances belonging thereto or usually enjoyed therewith and also includes any building or structure of any design. As used in Code Section 41-2-7, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-9 through 41-2-17, the term "dwellings, buildings, or structures" shall not mean or include any farm, any building or structure located on a farm, or any agricultural facility or other building or structure used for the production, growing, raising, harvesting, storage, or processing of crops, livestock, poultry, or other farm products.
  5. "Governing authority" means the board of commissioners or sole commissioner of a county or the council, board of commissioners, board of aldermen, or other legislative body charged with governing a municipality.
  6. "Interested parties" means:
    1. Owner;
    2. Those parties having an interest in the property as revealed by a certification of title to the property conducted in accordance with the title standards of the State Bar of Georgia;
    3. Those parties having filed a notice in accordance with Code Section 48-3-9;
    4. Any other party having an interest in the property whose identity and address are reasonably ascertainable from the records of the petitioner or records maintained in the county courthouse or by the clerk of the court. Interested parties shall not include the holder of the benefit or burden of any easement or right of way whose interest is properly recorded which interest shall remain unaffected; and
    5. Persons in possession of said property and premises.
  7. "Municipality" means any incorporated city within this state.
  8. "Owner" means the holder of the title in fee simple and every mortgagee of record.
  9. "Public authority" means any member of a governing authority, any housing authority officer, or any officer who is in charge of any department or branch of the government of the municipality, county, or state relating to health, fire, or building regulations or to other activities concerning dwellings, buildings, or structures in the county or municipality.
  10. "Public officer" means the officer or officers who are authorized by Code Section 41-2-7, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-9 through 41-2-17 and by ordinances adopted under Code Section 41-2-7, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-9 through 41-2-17 to exercise the powers prescribed by such ordinances or any agent of such officer or officers.
  11. "Repair" means altering or improving a dwelling, building, or structure so as to bring the structure into compliance with the applicable codes in the jurisdiction where the property is located and the cleaning or removal of debris, trash, and other materials present and accumulated which create a health or safety hazard in or about any dwelling, building, or structure.
  12. "Resident" means any person residing in the jurisdiction where the property is located on or after the date on which the alleged nuisance arose. (Code 1981, § 41-2-8 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1508, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 41; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 907, § 1.)

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2004, "Interested parties" was substituted for "Interested party" twice in paragraph (6).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2005, the quotation marks surrounding "Interested parties" were deleted in the last sentence of subparagraph (6)(D).

Law reviews. - For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).

41-2-9. County or municipal ordinances relating to unfit buildings or structures.

  1. In addition to any other remedies or enforcement mechanisms available, upon the adoption of an ordinance finding that dwelling, building, or structure conditions of the character described in Code Section 41-2-7 exist within a county or municipality, the governing body of such county or municipality is authorized to adopt ordinances relating to the dwellings, buildings, or structures within such county or municipality which are unfit for human habitation or commercial, industrial, or business uses and not in compliance with applicable codes, which are vacant and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes, or which constitute an endangerment to the public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions. Such ordinances shall include at least the following provisions:
    1. That it is the duty of the owner of every dwelling, building, structure, or property within the jurisdiction to construct and maintain such dwelling, building, structure, or property in conformance with applicable codes in force within the jurisdiction, or such ordinances which regulate and prohibit activities on property and which declare it to be a public nuisance to construct or maintain any dwelling, building, structure, or property in violation of such codes or ordinances;
    2. That a public officer be designated or appointed to exercise the powers prescribed by the ordinances;
    3. That whenever a request is filed with the public officer by a public authority or by at least five residents of the municipality or by five residents of the unincorporated area of the county if the property in question is located in the unincorporated area of the county charging that any dwelling, building, structure, or property is unfit for human habitation or for commercial, industrial, or business use and not in compliance with applicable codes; is vacant and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes; or constitutes an endangerment to the public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions, the public officer shall make an investigation or inspection of the specific dwelling, building, structure, or property. If the officer's investigation or inspection identifies that any dwelling, building, structure, or property is unfit for human habitation or for commercial, industrial, or business use and not in compliance with applicable codes; is vacant and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes; or constitutes an endangerment to the public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions, the public officer may issue a complaint in rem against the lot, tract, or parcel of real property on which such dwelling, building, or structure is situated or where such public health hazard or general nuisance exists and shall cause summons and a copy of the complaint to be served on the interested parties for such dwelling, building, or structure. The complaint shall identify the subject real property by appropriate street address and official tax map reference; identify the interested parties; state with particularity the factual basis for the action; and contain a statement of the action sought by the public officer to abate the alleged nuisance. The summons shall notify the interested parties that a hearing will be held before a court of competent jurisdiction as determined by Code Section 41-2-5, at a date and time certain and at a place within the county or municipality where the property is located. Such hearing shall be held not less than 15 days nor more than 45 days after the filing of said complaint in the proper court. The interested parties shall have the right to file an answer to the complaint and to appear in person or by attorney and offer testimony at the time and place fixed for hearing;
    4. That if, after such notice and hearing, the court determines that the dwelling, building, or structure in question is unfit for human habitation or is unfit for its current commercial, industrial, or business use and not in compliance with applicable codes; is vacant and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes; or constitutes an endangerment to the public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions, the court shall state in writing findings of fact in support of such determination and shall issue and cause to be served upon the interested parties that have answered the complaint or appeared at the hearing an order:
      1. If the repair, alteration, or improvement of the said dwelling, building, or structure can be made at a reasonable cost in relation to the present value of the dwelling, building, or structure, requiring the owner, within the time specified in the order, to repair, alter, or improve such dwelling, building, or structure so as to bring it into full compliance with the applicable codes relevant to the cited violation and, if applicable, to secure the structure so that it cannot be used in connection with the commission of drug crimes; or
      2. If the repair, alteration, or improvement of the said dwelling, building, or structure in order to bring it into full compliance with applicable codes relevant to the cited violations cannot be made at a reasonable cost in relation to the present value of the dwelling, building, or structure, requiring the owner, within the time specified in the order, to demolish and remove such dwelling, building, or structure and all debris from the property.

        For purposes of this Code section, the court shall make its determination of "reasonable cost in relation to the present value of the dwelling, building, or structure" without consideration of the value of the land on which the structure is situated; provided, however, that costs of the preparation necessary to repair, alter, or improve a structure may be considered. Income and financial status of the owner shall not be factor in the court's determination. The present value of the structure and the costs of repair, alteration, or improvement may be established by affidavits of real estate appraisers with a Georgia appraiser classification as provided in Chapter 39A of Title 43, qualified building contractors, or qualified building inspectors without actual testimony presented. Costs of repair, alteration, or improvement of the structure shall be the cost necessary to bring the structure into compliance with the applicable codes relevant to the cited violations in force in the jurisdiction;

    5. That, if the owner fails to comply with an order to repair or demolish the dwelling, building, or structure, the public officer may cause such dwelling, building, or structure to be repaired, altered, or improved or to be vacated and closed or demolished. Such abatement action shall commence within 270 days after the expiration of time specified in the order for abatement by the owner. Any time during which such action is prohibited by a court order issued pursuant to Code Section 41-2-13 or any other equitable relief granted by a court of competent jurisdiction shall not be counted toward the 270 days in which such abatement action must commence. The public officer shall cause to be posted on the main entrance of the building, dwelling, or structure a placard with the following words:

      "This building is unfit for human habitation or commercial, industrial, or business use and does not comply with the applicable codes or has been ordered secured to prevent its use in connection with drug crimes or constitutes an endangerment to public health or safety as a result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions. The use or occupation of this building is prohibited and unlawful.";

    6. If the public officer has the structure demolished, reasonable effort shall be made to salvage reusable materials for credit against the cost of demolition. The proceeds of any moneys received from the sale of salvaged materials shall be used or applied against the cost of the demolition and removal of the structure, and proper records shall be kept showing application of sales proceeds. Any such sale of salvaged materials may be made without the necessity of public advertisement and bid. The public officer and governing authority are relieved of any and all liability resulting from or occasioned by the sale of any such salvaged materials, including, without limitation, defects in such salvaged materials; and
    7. That the amount of the cost of demolition, including all court costs, appraisal fees, administrative costs incurred by the county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer, and all other costs necessarily associated with the abatement action, including restoration to grade of the real property after demolition, shall be a lien against the real property upon which such cost was incurred.
    1. The lien provided for in paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall attach to the real property upon the filing of a certified copy of the order requiring repair, closure, or demolition in the office of the clerk of superior court in the county where the real property is located and shall relate back to the date of the filing of the lis pendens notice required under subsection (c) of Code Section 41-2-12. The clerk of superior court shall record and index such certified copy of the order in the deed records of the county and enter the lien on the general execution docket. The lien shall be superior to all other liens on the property, except liens for taxes to which the lien shall be inferior, and shall continue in force until paid.
    2. Upon final determination of costs, fees, and expenses incurred in accordance with this chapter, the public officer responsible for enforcement actions in accordance with this chapter shall transmit to the appropriate county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer a statement of the total amount due and secured by said lien, together with copies of all notices provided to interested parties. The statement of the public officer shall be transmitted within 90 days of completion of the repairs, demolition, or closure. It shall be the duty of the appropriate county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer, who is responsible or whose duties include the collection of municipal taxes, to collect the amount of the lien using all methods available for collecting real property ad valorem taxes, including specifically Chapter 4 of Title 48; provided, however, that the limitation of Code Section 48-4-78 which requires 12 months of delinquency before commencing a tax foreclosure shall not apply. A county tax commissioner shall collect and enforce municipal liens imposed pursuant to this chapter in accordance with Code Section 48-5-359.1. The county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer shall remit the amount collected to the governing authority of the county or municipality whose lien is being collected.
    3. Enforcement of liens pursuant to this Code section may be initiated at any time following receipt by the county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer of the final determination of costs in accordance with this chapter. The unpaid lien amount shall bear interest and penalties from and after the date of final determination of costs in the same amount as applicable to interest and penalties on unpaid real property ad valorem taxes. An enforcement proceeding pursuant to Code Section 48-4-78 for delinquent ad valorem taxes may include all amounts due under this chapter.
    4. The redemption amount in any enforcement proceeding pursuant to this Code section shall be the full amount of the costs as finally determined in accordance with this Code section together with interest, penalties, and costs incurred by the governing authority, county tax commissioner, municipal tax collector, or city revenue officer in the enforcement of such lien. Redemption of property from the lien may be made in accordance with the provisions of Code Sections 48-4-80 and 48-4-81.
  2. The governing authority may waive and release any such lien imposed on property upon the owner of such property entering into a contract with the county or municipality agreeing to a timetable for rehabilitation of the real property or the dwelling, building, or structure on the property and demonstrating the financial means to accomplish such rehabilitation.
  3. Where the abatement action does not commence in the superior court, review of a court order requiring the repair, alteration, improvement, or demolition of a dwelling, building, or structure shall be by direct appeal to the superior court under Code Section 5-3-29.
  4. In addition to the procedures and remedies in this chapter, a governing authority may provide by ordinance that designated public officers may issue citations for violations of state minimum standard codes, optional building, fire, life safety, and other codes adopted by ordinance, and conditions creating a public health hazard or general nuisance, and seek to enforce such citations in a court of competent jurisdiction prior to issuing a complaint in rem as provided in this Code section.
  5. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to impair or limit in any way the power of the county or municipality to define and declare nuisances and to cause their removal or abatement by summary proceedings or otherwise. (Code 1981, § 41-2-9 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 30; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 41; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 41; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 3; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1347, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 3; Ga. L. 2004, p. 907, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 41/HB 95.)

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, "and" was added at the end of paragraph (a)(6).

Law reviews. - For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

County's recovery of compensatory damages not authorized. - When a county recovered, identified, and properly disposed of bodies found at a crematorium, O.C.G.A. §§ 31-5-10(d) and 41-2-9 (a)(7) did not authorize the county to recover the county's costs of doing so as compensatory damages in a tort action against the crematorium, funeral homes, and funeral directors alleging negligence and public nuisance; O.C.G.A. §§ 31-5-10 and 41-2-9 do not authorize a county to obtain compensatory damages in a tort action as a means of redress for abating a public nuisance. Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 284 Ga. App. 34 , 643 S.E.2d 324 (2007).

Construction with § 41-2-17 . - It was error to hold, based on O.C.G.A. § 41-2-17 , that landowners were not entitled under O.C.G.A. § 41-2-9(d) to directly appeal from a municipal court's demolition order because the city's nuisance ordinance predated § 41-2-9(a) . Section 41-2-9(d) was a specific statute, thereby prevailing over the general statute, § 41-2-17, and as § 41-2-9(d) was unambiguous, the court would not read any limitation onto the statute's plain meaning. Yasmine's Entm't Hall v. City of Marietta, 292 Ga. App. 114 , 663 S.E.2d 741 (2008).

Tax foreclosure sale. - Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the county as the nuisance abatement statute did not preclude the county from using a nonjudicial tax foreclosure sale, instead of a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale, to sell the property because both methods were available for collecting real property ad valorem taxes; judicial in rem tax foreclosure procedures were an alternative to nonjudicial tax foreclosure procedures, rather than a replacement for them; and the nuisance abatement statute did not require the county to use a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale when collecting on a nuisance abatement lien. Derby Props., LLC v. Watson, 346 Ga. App. 631 , 816 S.E.2d 766 (2018).

41-2-10. Determination by public officer that dwelling, building, or structure is unfit or vacant, dilapidated, and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes.

  1. An ordinance adopted by a county or municipality under Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-9, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-11 through 41-2-17 shall provide that the public officer may determine, under existing ordinances, that a dwelling, building, or structure is unfit for human habitation or is unfit for its current commercial, industrial, or business use if he finds that conditions exist in such building, dwelling, or structure which are dangerous or injurious to the health, safety, or morals of the occupants of such dwelling, building, or structure; of the occupants of neighborhood dwellings, buildings, or structures; or of other residents of such county or municipality. Such conditions may include the following (without limiting the generality of the foregoing):
    1. Defects therein increasing the hazards of fire, accidents, or other calamities;
    2. Lack of adequate ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities;
    3. Dilapidation;
    4. Disrepair;
    5. Structural defects; and
    6. Uncleanliness.

      Such ordinance may provide additional standards to guide the public officer, or his agents, in determining the fitness of a dwelling, building, or structure for human habitation or for its current commercial, industrial, or business use.

  2. An ordinance adopted by a county or municipality under Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-9 , this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-11 through 41-2-17 shall provide that the public officer may determine, under existing ordinances, that a dwelling, building, or structure is vacant, dilapidated, and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes upon personal observation or report of a law enforcement agency and evidence of drug crimes being committed. (Code 1981, § 41-2-10 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 4; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41.)

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "municipality. Such" was substituted for "municipality; such" in the introductory paragraph of the Code section.

Law reviews. - For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).

41-2-11. Powers of public officers in regard to unfit buildings or structures.

An ordinance adopted by the governing body of the county or municipality may authorize the public officer to exercise such powers as may be necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purpose and provisions of Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-10, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-12 through 41-2-17, including the following powers in addition to others granted in Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-10 and Code Sections 41-2-12 through 41-2-17:

  1. To investigate the dwelling conditions in the unincorporated area of the county or in the municipality in order to determine which dwellings, buildings, or structures therein are unfit for human habitation or are unfit for current commercial, industrial, or business use or are vacant, dilapidated, and being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes;
  2. To administer oaths and affirmations, to examine witnesses, and to receive evidence;
  3. To enter upon premises for the purpose of making examinations; provided, however, that such entries shall be made in such manner as to cause the least possible inconvenience to the persons in possession;
  4. To appoint and fix the duties of such officers, agents, and employees as he deems necessary to carry out the purposes of the ordinances; and
  5. To delegate any of his functions and powers under the ordinance to such officers and agents as he may designate. (Code 1981, § 41-2-11 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41.)

Law reviews. - For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).

41-2-12. Service of complaints or orders upon parties in interest and owners of unfit buildings or structures.

  1. Complaints issued by a public officer pursuant to an ordinance adopted under Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-11, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-13 through 41-2-17 shall be served in the following manner. At least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing, the public officer shall mail copies of the complaint by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, to all interested parties whose identities and addresses are reasonably ascertainable. Copies of the complaint shall also be mailed by first-class mail to the property address to the attention of the occupants of the property, if any, and shall be posted on the property within three business days of filing the complaint and at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing.
  2. For interested parties whose mailing address is unknown, a notice stating the date, time, and place of the hearing shall be published in the newspaper in which the sheriff's advertisements appear in such county once a week for two consecutive weeks prior to the hearing.
  3. A notice of lis pendens shall be filed in the office of the clerk of superior court in the county in which the dwelling, building, or structure is located at the time of filing the complaint in the appropriate court. Such notice shall have the same force and effect as other lis pendens notices provided by law.
  4. Orders and other filings made subsequent to service of the initial complaint shall be served in the manner provided in this Code section on any interested party who answers the complaint or appears at the hearing. Any interested party who fails to answer or appear at the hearing shall be deemed to have waived all further notice in the proceedings. (Code 1981, § 41-2-12 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 30; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1508, § 3; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 41; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1538, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 4; Ga. L. 2004, p. 907, § 3.)

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, "Code Section 41-2-13 through 41-2-17" was changed to "Code Sections 41-2-13 through 41-2-17" in subsection (a).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2004, "identities and addresses" was substituted for "identity and address" in subsection (a).

Editor's notes. - Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsection (c) is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Law reviews. - For article, "Local Government Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001).

41-2-13. Injunctions against order to repair, close, or demolish unfit buildings or structures.

Any person affected by an order issued by the public officer may petition to the superior court for an injunction restraining the public officer from carrying out the provisions of the order and the court may, upon such petition, issue a temporary injunction restraining the public officer pending the final disposition of the cause; provided, however, that such person shall present such petition to the court within 15 days of the posting and service of the order of the public officer. De novo hearings shall be had by the court on petitions within 20 days. The court shall hear and determine the issues raised and shall enter such final order or decree as law and justice may require; provided, however, that it shall not be necessary to file bond in any amount before obtaining a temporary injunction under this Code section.

(Code 1981, § 41-2-13 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 30.)

41-2-14. Taking of unfit buildings or structures by eminent domain; police power.

Nothing in Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-13, this Code section, and Code Sections 41-2-15 through 41-2-17 shall be construed as preventing the owner or owners of any property from receiving just compensation for the taking of such property by the power of eminent domain under the laws of this state nor as permitting any property to be condemned or destroyed except in accordance with the police power of this state.

(Code 1981, § 41-2-14 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41.)

41-2-15. Authority to use revenues, grants, and donations to repair, close, or demolish unfit buildings or structures.

Any county or municipality is authorized to make such appropriations from its revenues as it may deem necessary and may accept and apply grants or donations to assist it in carrying out the provisions of ordinances adopted in connection with the exercise of the powers granted under this chapter.

(Code 1981, § 41-2-15 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 41.)

41-2-16. Construction of Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-17 with county or municipal local enabling Act, charter, and other laws, ordinances, and regulations.

Nothing in Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-15, this Code section, and Code Section 41-2-17 shall be construed to abrogate or impair the powers of the courts or of any department of any county or municipality to enforce any provisions of its local enabling Act, its charter, or its ordinances or regulations nor to prevent or punish violations thereof; and the powers conferred by this article shall be in addition to and supplemental to the powers conferred by any other law.

(Code 1981, § 41-2-16 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41.)

41-2-17. Prior ordinances relating to repair, closing, or demolition of unfit buildings or structures.

Ordinances relating to the subject matter of Code Sections 41-2-7 through 41-2-16 and this Code section adopted prior to July 1, 2001, shall have the same force and effect on and after said date as ordinances adopted subsequent to and by authority of these Code sections.

(Code 1981, § 41-2-17 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 5.)

Law reviews. - For article, "Local Government Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Construction with § 41-2-9 . - It was error to hold, based on O.C.G.A. § 41-2-17 , that landowners were not entitled under O.C.G.A. § 41-2-9(d) to directly appeal from a municipal court's demolition order because the city's nuisance ordinance predated § 41-2-9 (a). Section 41-2-9(d) was a specific statute, thereby prevailing over the general statute, § 41-2-17 , and as § 41-2-9(d) was unambiguous, the court would not read any limitation onto the statute's plain meaning. Yasmine's Entm't Hall v. City of Marietta, 292 Ga. App. 114 , 663 S.E.2d 741 (2008).

CHAPTER 3 PLACES USED FOR UNLAWFUL SEXUAL AND DRUG ACTIVITIES

Sec.

Cross references. - Penalties for sodomy, prostitution, keeping place of prostitution, and other offenses, T. 16, C. 6.

Use of rooms in roadhouses, public dance halls, and other facilities for immoral purposes, § 43-21-61 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Nude dancing. - Nuisance statute had no application in the context of an action attempting to enjoin nude dancing at the defendant's establishment. Fenimore v. State, 263 Ga. 760 , 438 S.E.2d 911 (1993).

Cited in Davis v. Stark, 198 Ga. 223 , 31 S.E.2d 592 (1944); Imperial Massage & Health Studio, Inc. v. Lee, 231 Ga. 482 , 202 S.E.2d 426 (1973).

41-3-1. "Sexually related charges" defined; establishment, maintenance, or use of building, structure, or place for sexually related activities; evidence of nuisance.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term "sexually related charges" means a violation of Code Section 16-5-46, 16-6-2, 16-6-8, 16-6-9, 16-6-10, 16-6-11, 16-6-12, 16-6-15, or 16-6-16 when:
    1. Returned in an indictment by a grand jury; or
    2. Filed as an accusation by a prosecuting attorney that results in a conviction, a plea of guilty under any first offender statute, a plea of nolo contendere, adjudication in an accountability court, or a dismissal as a result of successful completion of a pretrial diversion program.
  2. Whosoever shall knowingly erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any building, structure, or place for the purposes of sexually related charges shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance; and the building, structure, or place, and the ground itself in or upon which such sexually related charges occurred or were conducted, permitted, carried on, continued, or shall exist, and the furniture, fixtures, and other contents of such building or structure shall be deemed to be a nuisance and may be enjoined or otherwise abated as provided in this chapter.
  3. The occurrence of either of the following shall be prima-facie evidence of the nuisance and the existence thereof:
    1. A conviction, a plea of guilty under any first offender statute, a plea of nolo contendere, an adjudication in an accountability court, or a dismissal as a result of successful completion of a pretrial diversion program of the owner or operator of any building, structure, or place for any sexually related charges, based on conduct or an act or occurrence in or on the premises of such building, structure, or place; or
    2. When the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the property is located notifies the owner in writing of two or more unrelated incidents of sexually related charges occurring within a 24 month period preceding such notice and, after the receipt of such notice and within 24 months of the first of the incidents resulting in a sexually related charge which is the subject of such notice, another additional unrelated incident occurs which results in a sexually related charge.
  4. Any such sexually related charges which result directly from cooperation between the property owner or his or her agent and a law enforcement agency shall not be considered as evidence of a nuisance under this Code section.
  5. The provisions of this Code section are cumulative of any other remedies and shall not be construed to repeal any other existing remedies for sexually related nuisances.

    (Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 1; Code 1933, § 72-301; Ga. L. 1975, p. 402, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1025, § 1; Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-9/SB 158.)

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, rewrote this Code section, which read: "(a) Whosoever shall knowingly erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any building, structure, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, prostitution, sodomy, the solicitation of sodomy, or masturbation for hire shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance; and the building, structure, or place, and the ground itself in or upon which such lewdness, prostitution, sodomy, the solicitation of sodomy, or masturbation for hire shall be conducted, permitted, carried on, continued, or shall exist, and the furniture, fixtures, and other contents of such building or structure are also declared to be a nuisance and may be enjoined or otherwise abated as provided in this chapter.

"(b) The conviction of the owner or operator of any building, structure, or place for any of the offenses stated in subsection (a) of this Code section, based on conduct or an act or occurrence in or on the premises of such building, structure, or place, shall be prima-facie evidence of the nuisance and the existence thereof." See Editor's notes for applicability.

Cross references. - Provisions regarding public nuisance status of premises used in violation of laws relating to obscenity, § 16-12-82 .

Editor's notes. - Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Anti-Human Trafficking Protective Response Act.'"

Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 3-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2019, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2019, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense, and any resulting conviction shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction."

Law reviews. - For article on the 2019 amendment of this Code section, see 36 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 63 (2019).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Use of evidentiary standard did not convert action to equitable proceeding. - When a party elected to proceed under former Code 1933, § 72-301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-2-5 ), it was an action at law and using the evidentiary standard contained in former Code 1933, § 72-401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-1 ) did not convert the proceeding into an equitable one. Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 145 Ga. App. 172 , 244 S.E.2d 32 , cert. dismissed, 241 Ga. 593 , 247 S.E.2d 764 (1978).

Allegations establishing cause of action. - Petition by the solicitor general (now district attorney) to abate described premises as a public nuisance, alleging that the premises are being maintained and used for the purpose of prostitution and assignation, in violation of this section, et seq., and attaching as a part of the petition affidavits by three persons who testify that the premises have been used as alleged, states a cause of action; a judgment overruling a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition is not erroneous. Carpenter v. State ex rel. Hains, 194 Ga. 395 , 21 S.E.2d 643 (1942).

Petition, alleging in substance that the defendant was operating a lewd house; was operating and maintaining a gaming house; was illegally selling beer, whiskey and other alcoholic beverages to minors; was maintaining on the defendant's premises a juke box whose loud playing was disturbing the neighborhood and people passing by on the highway; and was providing a gathering place for minors and the general public to drink, dance, and carouse, was sufficient to state a cause of action for abatement of a public nuisance by the solicitor general (now district attorney). Lee v. Hayes, 215 Ga. 330 , 110 S.E.2d 624 (1959).

Modification of judgment so as to release building and contents. - In a proceeding to abate as a nuisance a described tourist camp owned by the defendant on the ground that "said place and its contents" were being knowingly maintained and used by the defendant for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, and prostitution, when the judge, by consent trying the case, without a jury, found and decreed that all of the buildings in the tourist camp, with the personalty in each, were used by the defendant "as one plant or combine" for the purpose of lewdness and prostitution, the defendant, after an affirmance of such judgment by the Supreme Court, could not obtain a modification of the judgment so as to release one of the buildings and the building's contents, by showing that this part of the tourist camp was in no way connected with the alleged nuisance; the original finding and decree as to this matter being conclusive. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Cited in Crews v. State ex rel. Hayes, 215 Ga. 698 , 113 S.E.2d 116 (1960); Whitehead v. Hasty, 235 Ga. App. 331 , 219 S.E.2d 443 (1975); Yield, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 239 Ga. 578 , 238 S.E.2d 351 (1977); 660 Lindbergh, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 492 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Gateway Books, Inc. v. State, 247 Ga. 16 , 276 S.E.2d 1 (1981).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Disorderly Houses, § 40. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 39-53, 300.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 67, 71-73, 124.

ALR. - Disorderly character of house as affected by the number of females who reside therein or resort thereto for immoral purposes, 12 A.L.R. 529 .

Validity and construction of statute or ordinances forbidding treatment in health clubs or massage salons by persons of the opposite sex, 51 A.L.R.3d 936.

Massage parlor as nuisance, 80 A.L.R.3d 1020.

41-3-1.1. Substantial drug related activity upon real property; knowledge of owner; remedies cumulative.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Drug related charges" means a violation of Code Section 16-13-30 when:
      1. Returned in an indictment by a grand jury; or
      2. Filed as an accusation by a prosecuting attorney that results in a conviction, a plea of guilty under any first offender statute or conditional discharge pursuant to Code Section 16-13-2, a plea of nolo contendere, adjudication in an accountability court, or a dismissal as a result of successful completion of a pretrial diversion program.
    2. "Substantial drug related activity" means activity resulting in six or more unrelated incidents resulting in drug related charges involving violations occurring within a 24 month period on the same parcel of real property.
  2. Any owner of real property who has actual knowledge that substantial drug related activity is being conducted on such property shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and such real property shall be deemed a nuisance and may be enjoined or otherwise abated as provided in this chapter.
  3. Prima-facie evidence of the nuisance and the existence thereof is established when the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the property is located notifies the owner in writing of three or more unrelated incidents occurring within a 24 month period which result in drug related charges and, after the receipt of such notice and within 24 months of the first of the incidents resulting in a drug related charge which is the subject of such notice, three or more additional unrelated incidents occur which result in drug related charges.
  4. Any such drug related charges which result directly from cooperation between the property owner or his or her agent and a law enforcement agency shall not be considered as evidence of a nuisance under this Code section.
  5. The provisions of this Code section are cumulative of any other remedies and shall not be construed to repeal any other existing remedies for drug related nuisances. (Code 1981, § 41-3-1.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 666, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 467, § 2; Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-10/SB 158.)

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, rewrote subsection (a), which read: "(a) As used in this Code section, the term:

"(1) 'Drug related indictment' means an indictment by a grand jury for an offense involving violation of Code Section 16-13-30; provided, however, that any such indictments which result directly from cooperation between the property owner and a law enforcement agency shall not be considered a drug related indictment for purposes of this Code section.

"(2) 'Substantial drug related activity' means activity resulting in six or more separate incidents resulting in drug related indictments involving violations occurring within a 12 month period on the same parcel of real property."; in subsection (c), substituted "Prima-facie evidence of the nuisance and the existence thereof is established when the prosecuting attorney" for "The owner of real property shall be deemed to have actual knowledge of substantial drug related activity occurring on a parcel of real property if the district attorney" at the beginning; substituted "unrelated incidents occurring" for "separate incidents" near the middle; twice substituted "24" for "12"; substituted "charges" for "indictments" in the middle and at the end; substituted "charge which is the subject of such notice, three or more additional unrelated incidents" for "indictment which are the subject of such notice, three or more separate incidents" near the end; added subsection (d); and redesignated former subsection (d) as present subsection (e). See Editor's notes for applicability.

Editor's notes. - Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 1-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Anti-Human Trafficking Protective Response Act.'"

Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 3-1/SB 158, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2019, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2019, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense, and any resulting conviction shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction."

41-3-2. Action to enjoin nuisance perpetually; temporary restraining order or interlocutory injunction authorized.

Whenever a nuisance is kept, maintained, or exists, as defined in Code Section 41-3-1 or 41-3-1.1, the district attorney, the solicitor-general, city attorney, or county attorney, or any private citizen of the county may maintain an action in the name of the state upon the relation of such attorney or private citizen to enjoin said nuisance perpetually, the person or persons conducting or maintaining the same, and the owner or agent of the building, structure, or place, and the ground itself in or upon which such nuisance exists. In an action to enjoin a nuisance, the court, upon application therefor alleging that the nuisance complained of exists, shall order a temporary restraining order or an interlocutory injunction as provided in Code Section 9-11-65.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 2; Code 1933, § 72-302; Ga. L. 1996, p. 666, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 467, § 3.)

Law reviews. - For note on 1999 amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 211 (1999).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Cited in Carpenter v. State ex rel. Hains, 194 Ga. 395 , 21 S.E.2d 643 (1942); Gateway Books, Inc. v. State, 247 Ga. 16 , 276 S.E.2d 1 (1981).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Disorderly Houses, § 41. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 17, 248. 268-289. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 217, 218, 225.

C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 17, 20 et seq. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 188-191, 209 et seq.

ALR. - Right to enjoin threatened or anticipated nuisance, 7 A.L.R. 749 ; 26 A.L.R. 937 ; 32 A.L.R. 724 ; 55 A.L.R. 880 .

Venue of suit to enjoin nuisance, 7 A.L.R.2d 481.

41-3-3. Dismissal of complaint filed by private citizen; substitution of district attorney or another private citizen for original complainant.

If the complaint is filed by a private citizen, it shall not be dismissed except upon filing of a sworn statement by the complainant and his attorney setting forth the reasons why the action should be dismissed and upon approval of the dismissal by the district attorney in writing or in open court. If the court shall be of the opinion that the action ought not to be dismissed, it may direct the district attorney to maintain the action and, if the action is continued more than one term of court, any private citizen of the county or the district attorney may be substituted for the original complainant and directed to maintain the action.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 3; Code 1933, § 72-306.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 11. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 211.

C.J.S. - 27 C.J.S., Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 7. 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 334.

41-3-4. Notice of hearing upon application for temporary restraining order or interlocutory injunction.

Notice shall be given to the defendant of the hearing of the application for a temporary restraining order or an interlocutory injunction as provided in Code Section 9-11-65.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 2; Code 1933, § 72-303.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 246, 250. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 100, 195.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 145-148, 182, 183, 189.

41-3-5. Procedure for trial of action generally; admissibility of evidence of general reputation of building, structure, or place.

An action to enjoin a nuisance shall be triable as all other civil cases. In such action, evidence of the general reputation of the building, structure, or place shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of such nuisance.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 3; Code 1933, § 72-305.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Amendment showing abatement pending suit. - It was error to refuse to allow a verified amendment to the defendant's answer to a petition to enjoin the defendant from conducting a nuisance in violation of this statute; the allegations of the amendment showing that the nuisance had been absolutely discontinued a few days after the beginning of the proceeding for injunction, and several weeks before the trial, and that all issues in the proceeding had become moot. Yancy v. State ex rel. Kelly, 161 Ga. 138 , 129 S.E. 642 (1925).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, § 142 et seq.

C.J.S. - 27 C.J.S., Disorderly Houses, § 14. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 200 et seq.

ALR. - Venue of suit to enjoin nuisance, 7 A.L.R.2d 481.

41-3-6. Taxation of cost of action against private citizen bringing action without reasonable ground or cause.

If the action shall be brought by a private citizen and the court shall find that there was no reasonable ground or cause for the action, the cost may be taxed to such citizen.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 3; Code 1933, § 72-307.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 279.

C.J.S. - 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 252. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 38, 227, 228.

41-3-7. Order of abatement generally; breaking and entering or using closed building, structure, or place; fees for removal, sale, or closure of property.

  1. If the existence of a nuisance shall be established in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building, structure, or place of all fixtures, furniture, and chattels used in conducting the nuisance and shall direct the sale thereof in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution; provided, however, that if it shall appear to the judge that the furniture and chattels are owned by others than the occupants of the building, structure, or place, he may order the effectual closing of the building, structure, or place against its use for any purpose for a period of one year, unless sooner released.
  2. If any person shall break and enter or use a building, structure, or place directed to be closed, as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section, he shall be punished as for contempt.
  3. For removing and selling the movable property, the sheriff or other duly qualified levying officer of the court shall be entitled to charge and receive the same fees as he would for levying upon and selling like property on execution; and, for closing the premises and keeping them closed, a reasonable sum shall be allowed by the court.

    (Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 5; Code 1933, § 72-309.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Owner of the personalty is not an owner such as is intended by the phrase "owned by others than the occupants" and as against the owner the personal property shall be removed from the building or place where the nuisance was maintained, and shall be sold. In this respect the statute is mandatory, and the defendant must abide the sale and cannot prevent the sale by paying the costs directly. This, however, is only one of the penalties contemplated; for the "building or place" may itself be closed and kept "closed for a period of one year, unless sooner released." Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Reference in former Code 1933, § 72-309 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-7 ), to ownership of personalty by others than the "occupants," and the word "owner," as it appeared in former Code 1933, § 72-311 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-9 ), providing for bond, did not contemplate a situation in which the owner is personally the party who maintained the nuisance. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

First part of this section, as to what the judgment shall contain, simply declares in express terms that it shall include direction for removal and sale of the personalty, while the meaning of the proviso is, that although the personal property may be owned by others than the occupants, so that it cannot be sold under the abatement judgment, the court may still order the effective closing of the building or place. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Evidence materially affecting public interest. - If the judge has discretion to allow the building or buildings reopened within less than one year on petition of the defendant, it is not an arbitrary discretion; and before the judge could properly exercise any discretion in such matter, some new fact or condition materially affecting the public interest should be introduced. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Cited in Fuller v. Fuller, 197 Ga. 719 , 30 S.E.2d 600 (1944).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 314-318. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 324, 325, 327, 368, 374, 376, 422, 428.

C.J.S. - 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 285 et seq. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 93, 284 et seq., 347 et seq., 359 et seq., 406 et seq..

41-3-8. Disposition of proceeds of sale of personal property.

The proceeds of the sale of the personal property, as provided in Code Section 41-3-7, shall be applied in payment of the cost of the action and abatement, and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the defendant.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 6; Code 1933, § 72-310.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 209 et seq.

41-3-9. Suspension of abatement order and release of property; effect of release of property.

  1. If the owner of the building, structure, or place ordered abated shall appear and pay all costs of the proceedings and file a bond with sureties to be approved by the clerk in the full value of the property, to be ascertained by the court, conditioned that he will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent the same from being established or kept within a period of one year thereafter, the court may, if satisfied of the good faith of the owner, order the building, structure, or place closed under the order of abatement to be delivered to said owner and the order of abatement suspended so far as it may relate to said property.
  2. The release of the property under subsection (a) of this Code section shall not release it from any judgment lien, penalty, or liability to which it may be subject by law.

    (Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 7; Code 1933, § 72-311.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

"Owner." - Reference in former Code 1933, § 72-309 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-7 ), to ownership of personalty by others than the "occupants," and the word "owner," as it appeared in former Code 1933, § 72-311 (see now O.C.G.A. § 41-3-9 ), providing for bond, did not contemplate a situation in which the owner is himself the party who maintained the nuisance. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

This section does not apply to an owner who personally used the property for the purposes condemned by the statute, and against whom as the actual offender the abatement judgment was rendered. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Partial compliance with judgment. - When in a final decree it was ordered that given buildings be closed pending further order of the court, that the personal property therein be removed and sold, and that judgment be rendered against the defendant and in favor of the state for $300.00, with special lien on the premises as provided by law, the defendant, in paying the $300.00 and the cost of the proceeding, would comply with the judgment only in part, and would not thereby acquire any right to a release of the realty or personalty from the order of abatement. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 371.

41-3-10. Issuance of permanent injunction; entry and enforcement of judgment; disposition of sums arising from enforcement of judgment.

  1. Whenever a permanent injunction is issued against any person for maintaining a nuisance as described in Code Section 41-3-1 or against any owner of the building, structure, or place knowingly kept or used for the purposes prohibited by this chapter, the judge granting the injunction shall, at the same time, enter judgment against the person, firm, or corporation owning said building, structure, or place in the sum of $300.00; and said judgment shall be a special lien upon the premises complained of and the furniture and fixtures therein and shall as against the property rank from date with all other judgments or liens as provided by law.
  2. The judgment provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall issue in the name of the state and be enforced as other judgments in this state. The lien of the judgment upon the property used for the purpose of maintaining the nuisance shall not relieve the person maintaining the nuisance or the owner of the building, structure, or place from any of the other penalties provided by law.
  3. All sums arising from the enforcement of the judgment provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be paid into the treasury of the county in which said judgment is entered and become part of the general funds of said county.

    (Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 8; Code 1933, § 72-312.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Knowledge by owner as to use of building. - Knowledge on the part of the owner that the premises were being used, or that the lessee when leasing the premises intended to use the premises, for the illegal purposes set forth in the act, is essential in order to subject the owner to the burden of a permanent injunction and the penalty of the fine prescribed. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

Satisfaction of a money judgment only in part would not affect the remainder or give a new right to the defendant. Carpenter v. State, 195 Ga. 434 , 24 S.E.2d 404 (1943).

41-3-11. Injunction binding throughout judicial circuit in which issued; violation of provisions of injunction deemed contempt.

When an injunction is granted, it shall be binding on the defendant throughout the judicial circuit in which it is issued; and any violation of the provisions of the injunction shall be a contempt of court.

(Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 2; Code 1933, § 72-304.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 309, 315.

C.J.S. - 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 354.

ALR. - Reversal, modification, dismissal, dissolution, or resettlement of injunction order or judgment as affecting prior disobedience as contempt, 148 A.L.R. 1024 .

Venue of suit to enjoin nuisance, 7 A.L.R.2d 481.

Use of affidavits to establish contempt, 79 A.L.R.2d 657.

41-3-12. Contempt proceedings; punishment for contempt of court.

  1. In the event of the violation of any injunction granted under this chapter, the court may summarily try and punish the offender. The proceedings shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court an information, under oath, setting out the alleged facts constituting such violation, upon which the court or judge shall cause a warrant to be issued for the arrest of the offender. The trial may be had upon affidavits, or either party may demand the production and oral examination of witnesses.
  2. A party found guilty of violating the provisions of an injunction shall be punished as for contempt in the discretion of the judge.

    (Ga. L. 1917, p. 177, § 4; Code 1933, § 72-308.)

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 325-327.

C.J.S. - 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, § 285 et seq. 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 421 et seq.

ALR. - Reversal, modification, dismissal, dissolution, or resettlement of injunction order or judgment as affecting prior disobedience as contempt, 148 A.L.R. 1024 .

Use of affidavits to establish contempt, 79 A.L.R.2d 657.

41-3-13. Abatement of nuisance by state courts and municipal courts of municipalities having population of 15,000 or more.

In addition to the remedies provided for by Code Sections 41-3-2 through 41-3-12, state courts and the municipal courts of municipalities having a population of 15,000 or more according to the United States decennial census of 1970 or any future such census, when the nuisance exists within the corporate limits of such municipalities, shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of the existence of the nuisance defined by Code Section 41-3-1 and, if found to exist, to order its abatement, which order shall be directed to and executed by the sheriff or marshal of any such court or his deputy.

(Code 1933, § 72-313, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1025, § 2.)