Administrative rules and regulations. —

Rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-1 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Quasi-Municipal Tort Liability in Georgia,” see 6 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (1955).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality of condemnation procedures. —

Procedures for taking property established by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation are adequate for the protection of the rights of condemnees, and the procedures do not offend the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution or the Georgia Constitution. Coffee v. Atkinson County, 236 Ga. 248 , 223 S.E.2d 648 (1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Highway contractor’s liability to highway user for highway surface defects, 62 A.L.R.4th 1067.

Application of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Anti-segmentation Principle to Highway Projects, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 3.

CHAPTER 1 General Provisions

32-1-1. Short title.

This title shall be known as the “Georgia Code of Public Transportation.”

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-1-2. Purpose and legislative intent.

The purpose of this title is to provide a code of statutes for the public roads and other transportation facilities of the state, the counties, and municipalities of Georgia. The legislative intent is to provide an effective legal basis for the organization, administration, and operation of an efficient, modern system of public roads and other modes of transportation.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-102, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Purpose of the Georgia Code of Public Transportation is organization, administration, and operation of an efficient, modern system of public roads as between the state, counties, and municipalities; the statute’s purpose is not to ascertain and fix the status of the public right of use of every road in Georgia. Jordan v. Way, 235 Ga. 496 , 220 S.E.2d 258 (1975).

Sign permits. —

Although ground had not been broken on a proposed interchange as of the date an applicant submitted applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs, the Georgia Department of Transportation’s denial of the applications comported with O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-2 , 32-6-74(a) , and 32-6-75(a)(18) because the interchange project had progressed to a point such that it constituted an interchange for purposes of § 32-6-75(a)(18) and the proposed sign locations were within the 500-foot blocked out zone established by § 32-6-75(a)(18). Eagle West, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 312 Ga. App. 882 , 720 S.E.2d 317 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0593, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 731 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012).

State DOT not liable for failing to erect road closure signs on county road. —

Because an accident occurred on a county-owned road and did not occur on a part of the state highway system upon which the DOT owed a duty to motorists, and the couple’s expert’s affidavit could not establish a legal duty to erect signs or to take other steps to inform drivers of the closure of the county-owned road, summary judgment for the DOT was proper. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189 , 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0999, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 648 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014).

County’s duty to maintain dedicated roads in subdivision. —

Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all of the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697 , 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways, 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

32-1-3. Definitions.

As used in this title, the term:

  1. “Abandon” means to close permanently to public travel or to relinquish jurisdiction of a preexisting public road by official action as required by Chapter 7 of this title, thereby foreclosing the duty of future maintenance on such preexisting public road.
  2. “Board” means the State Transportation Board.
  3. “Borrow pit” means land from which dirt, gravel, rock, or related material will be excavated and used for a public road purpose. Such land need not be immediately adjacent or contiguous to the road or project under construction, repair, or reconstruction.
  4. “Bridge” means a structure, including the approaches thereto, erected in order:
    1. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage over any obstruction in any public road, including, but not limited to, rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, bays, ravines, gullies, railroads, public highways, and canals; or
    2. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage under or over existing railroads and public roads.
  5. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of transportation.
  6. “Construction” means the planning, location, surveying, designing, supervising, inspecting, and actual building of a new road; or the paving, striping, restriping, modifying for safety purposes, grading, widening, relocation, reconstruction, or other major improvement of a substantial portion of an existing public road together with all activities incident to any of the foregoing.
  7. “County” means either one of the several counties, any division, department, agency, authority, instrumentality, or branch thereof, or the county governing authority, that is, the judge of the probate court, board of county commissioners, county commissioner, or other county officers in charge of the roads, bridges, and revenues of the county.
  8. “Dedication” means the donation by the owner, either expressly or impliedly, and acceptance by the public of property for public road purposes, in accordance with statutory or common-law provisions.
  9. “Department” means the Department of Transportation.
  10. “Federal-aid systems” means those public roads in Georgia comprised of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways and the National Highway System, as those terms are defined in Section 103 of Title 23 of the United States Code.
  11. “Grade crossing” means a crossing at grade of a public road intersecting a track or tracks of a railroad.
  12. “Grade separation structure” means an underpass or overpass as defined in this Code section.

    (12.1) “Interstate highways” means any highway which constitutes a part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways as used in Section 103 of Title 23 of the United States Code.

  13. “Let” means to award a contract to one of several persons who have submitted competitive bids therefor in response to advertisement.
  14. “Limited-access road” means a public highway, road, or street for through traffic, over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, view, or air by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited-access highway, road, or street or for any other reason.
  15. “Maintenance” means the preservation of a public road, including repairs and resurfacing not amounting to construction as defined in this Code section.
  16. “Municipality” means an incorporated city, the governing body of which holds at least six regular meetings each year and which for a period of one year has levied and collected an ad valorem tax on the real property in such city or has for a one-year period performed at least two of the following municipal activities and services:
    1. Furnished water service;
    2. Furnished sewage service;
    3. Furnished garbage collection;
    4. Furnished police protection;
    5. Furnished fire protection;
    6. Assessed and collected business licenses;
    7. Furnished street lighting facilities.

      The term may also refer to any division, department, agency, authority, instrumentality, or branch of a municipality. Where the context requires or otherwise indicates, the term “municipality” may also mean the municipal governing authority, that is, the mayor and council, board of aldermen, board of commissioners, or other chief legislative body of a municipality.

  17. “Negotiated contract” means a contract made without formal advertising for competitive bids.
  18. “Other transportation purposes” or “other public transportation purposes” means any transportation facility designed to transport people or goods, including but not limited to railroads, port and harbor facilities, air transport and airport facilities, mass transportation facilities, as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-9-1, transportation projects, as defined by subsection (h) of Section 2 of an Act approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended, and transportation enhancement activities, as defined in Section 101 of Title 23 of the United States Code, as amended by Public Law 102-240 as it existed on January 1, 1993.  However, in no event and for no purpose shall the term “other transportation purposes” or “other public transportation purposes” be deemed to include coal slurry pipelines.
  19. “Overpass” means a bridge, including the approaches thereto and all appurtenances thereof, for carrying public road traffic over a railroad or another public road or for providing pedestrian walkways over a public road.
  20. “Person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or private organization of any character.
  21. “Private road” means a privately owned road or way, including any bridge thereon, which is only open for the benefit of one or more individuals and not for the general public. This term also means a road which lies on privately owned land.
  22. “Proposal guaranty” means acceptable surety furnished by a bidder as a guaranty that he will enter into a contract and will furnish contract performance and payment bonds if a contract is awarded to him.
  23. “Protective devices” means gates, flashing light signals, and similar devices or combinations thereof, together with necessary appurtenances, to be installed or in operation at any grade crossing and which comply with the safety standards determined by the department as being adequate at that time for the protection of traffic.
  24. “Public road” means a highway, road, street, avenue, toll road, tollway, drive, detour, or other way that either is open to the public or has been acquired as right of way, and is intended to be used for enjoyment by the public and for the passage of vehicles in any county or municipality of Georgia, including but not limited to the following public rights, structures, sidewalks, facilities, and appurtenances incidental to the construction, maintenance, and enjoyment of such rights of way:
    1. Surface, shoulders, and sides;
    2. Bridges;
    3. Causeways;
    4. Viaducts;
    5. Ferries;
    6. Overpasses;
    7. Underpasses;
    8. Railroad grade crossings;
    9. Tunnels;
    10. Signs, signals, markings, or other traffic control devices;
    11. Buildings for public equipment and personnel used for or engaged in administration, construction, or maintenance of such ways or research pertaining thereto;
    12. Wayside parks;
    13. Parking facilities;
    14. Drainage ditches;
    15. Canals and culverts;
    16. Rest areas;
    17. Truck-weighing stations or check points; and
    18. Scenic easements and easements of light, air, view, and access.
  25. “Right of way” means, generally, property or any interest therein, whether or not in the form of a strip, which is acquired for or devoted to a public road.
  26. “Scenic easement” means a servitude devised to permit land to remain in private ownership for its normal agricultural, residential, or other use consistent with public road purposes but at the same time placing a control over the future uses of the area to maintain its scenic, landscape, sightly, or safety values for the public road which the land adjoins.
  27. “State agency” means any division, department, instrumentality, branch, or other body of the state to which state governmental functions have been delegated.

    (27.1) “State roads” or “state routes” means those roads which are defined under paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-4-1.

  28. “Subcontract” means a contract by which one agrees with a party to another contract to perform all or a part of such other contract.
  29. “Underpass” means a bridge, including the approaches thereto and all appurtenances thereof, which provides access for a public road underneath a railroad or another public road or for a pedestrian walkway underneath a public road.
  30. “Utility” means any publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned line, facility, or system for producing, transmitting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, oil products, water, steam, clay, waste, storm water not connected with highway drainage, and other similar services and commodities, including publicly owned fire and police signals and street lighting systems, which directly or indirectly serve the public. This term also means a person, municipal corporation, county, state agency, or public authority which owns or manages a utility as defined in this paragraph.
  31. “Vehicle” means a device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public road.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-104, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 775, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 267, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 590, § 4; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 23; Ga. L. 1993, p. 914, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 1/SB 160; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 1/HB 137.

Law reviews. —

For survey article on construction law for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2003).

For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 684; former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, §§ 748, 761, 768; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Delegation to contractor permitted. —

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(J) or O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(3) prevents the Georgia Department of Transportation from delegating the responsibility for designing and implementing a traffic control plan to a private contractor. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766 , 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1330, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 600 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Sidewalk is included in term “public roads.” Broadnax v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 611 , 255 S.E.2d 86 (1979).

Unopened, undeveloped, proposed roads in a subdivision do not become “public roads” solely by virtue of the process of implied dedication and acceptance. Chatham County v. Allen, 261 Ga. 177 , 402 S.E.2d 718 (1991).

County, which had accepted dedication of a subdivision road in 1962 but had not completed the road or maintained it for 50 years, due to the county’s mistaken belief that the road was private, was ordered to complete and maintain the road; the county’s failure to complete the road was arbitrary and capricious, given the county’s acceptance of subdivision plats requiring the road. As to unopened roads in the subdivision, the roads were not public under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b) , and the county had no obligation to maintain those unopened roads. Burke County v. Askin, 294 Ga. 634 , 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

Word “bridge,” in this section giving a right of action against a county for defective construction, means a bridge used as an instrumentality for travel along a highway and for crossing streams or ravines. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363 , 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717 , 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Public bridge. —

Bridge which constitutes a portion of the public road is necessarily a public bridge. Early County v. Fain, 2 Ga. App. 288 , 58 S.E. 528 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603).

Public bridge includes toll bridge owned by individual. —

If a person owning land on both sides of a stream built a bridge across the stream for the use of the public, and charged tolls, such a bridge is a public bridge. Dougherty County v. Tift, 75 Ga. 815 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 684).

Public bridge includes all abutments and approaches. —

Term “bridges” includes all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge’s proper use and embraces the bridge’s abutments and approaches, and that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself. Howington v. Madison County, 126 Ga. 699 , 55 S.E. 941 (1906); Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722 , 168 S.E. 897 (1933); Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, § 748; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Public bridge includes fill or embankment in a road which constitutes the approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580 , 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridge includes contiguous embankments necessary for access, which county must repair. —

Contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass over the bridge, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment, but if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep the bridge in repair. Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722 , 168 S.E. 897 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridge does not include culverts. —

Culvert and a bridge are not the same even though the culvert and bridge may serve the same purpose. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363 , 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717 , 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Floyd County v. Stewart, 97 Ga. App. 67 , 101 S.E.2d 879 (1958) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Alley and adjoining culvert were “public roads.” —

Alley and an adjoining drainage culvert and ditch in which a child drowned fell within the definition of “public road” under O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(N), (O). Walden v. City of Hawkinsville, No. 5:03-CV-0398, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21694 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2005).

Public bridges do not include piping and water boxes. —

Piping and water boxes and culverts for drainage purposes across the public roads are not “bridges” within the meaning of the law. Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 41 Ga. App. 130 , 152 S.E. 261 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridges do not include road leading to bridge. —

Word “bridge” does not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Definition of defects in bridge. —

Defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580 , 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 does not create liability for counties for defects in bridges. Coweta County v. Adams, 221 Ga. App. 868 , 473 S.E.2d 558 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C1702, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 1016 (Ga. Oct. 11, 1996).

City dock qualified as “other way”. —

Although a city could be liable under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) for failure to maintain a dock that collapsed, injuring the plaintiffs, because the dock fell within the definition of “public road” in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 , there was no evidence that the city had notice of any defect in the dock, and the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit did not identify any defect. Therefore, the city was properly granted summary judgment on immunity grounds. Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197 , 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019).

Road striping falls under definition of construction. —

Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county’s action to recover money had and received by the contractor after the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64 ; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330 , 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

Construction involving moderate road improvement. —

Plans or designs for striping or widening a road need only be in conformity with then existing standards for striping and widening. Plans or designs do not need to address design issues outside the scope of the moderate improvements. Murray v. DOT, 240 Ga. App. 285 , 523 S.E.2d 367 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0200, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 114 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2000).

County, not Department of Transportation, liable for bridges. —

County is liable for damages resulting from a defect in a bridge, although it may appear that jurisdiction over the highway on which the bridge was located had been assumed by the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) under the terms of the law, and that the department and not the county was guilty of negligence in the maintenance and construction of the bridge or its approaches, which caused the injury. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

County’s duty to maintain dedicated roads in subdivision. —

Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all of the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697 , 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

Jury question as to effect of limited-access road on existing business. —

Court erred in limiting a property owner’s right to present evidence to show that the owner’s access had been substantially restricted when the road on which the business fronted was changed by construction to a limited-access road. Whether a property owner has “reasonable access” to the property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was “substantially interfered with” are questions of fact to be decided by the jury. Circle K Gen., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 196 Ga. App. 616 , 396 S.E.2d 522 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C1564, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 514 (Ga. Nov. 9, 1990).

Incumbrance known at time of purchase. —

Public road running through a tract of land, which was known to the purchaser at the time of purchase, is not such an incumbrance on the land as would constitute a breach of a covenant of warranty against incumbrances. Hood v. Spruill, 242 Ga. App. 44 , 528 S.E.2d 565 (2000).

Railroad grade crossings. —

Georgia Code of Public Transportation precluded a common-law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623 , 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988), overruled, Evans Timber Co. v. Central of Ga. R.R., 239 Ga. App. 262 , 519 S.E.2d 706 (1999).

Railroad was entitled to summary judgment in a survivor’s action claiming damages from the survivor’s decedent’s fatal collision with a train because the survivor failed to show that the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance and although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 , and the scope of those provisions encompassed railroads. Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507 , 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003), rev'd, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004), vacated, 274 Ga. App. 586 , 618 S.E.2d 26 (2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 102-103, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Street or road presumed to include bridges. — Bridges may be a part of city streets, county roads, or the State Aid Highways System; in each case the street or road is defined as including bridges, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-64 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

Merely deeding privately owned road or driveway to county will not necessarily turn it into a public road. 1980 Op. Atty Gen. No. U80-37.

Department of Transportation’s use of motor fuel tax funds. — Department of Transportation may not utilize motor fuel tax funds to construct walkways on bridges for fishing. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-96 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

No expenditure of money on historic preservation if not for transportation. — Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances where the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) when such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Establishment by user of highway running longitudinally on railroad right of way, 46 A.L.R. 893 .

Extent of rights in right of way acquired for power or light line, 46 A.L.R. 1463 .

Power of public utility commission to require railroad company to grant or renew leases or other privileges on its right of way, 47 A.L.R. 109 .

Construction or maintenance of sewers, water pipes, or the like by public authorities in roadway, street, or alley as indicating dedication or acceptance thereof, 52 A.L.R.2d 263.

Conveyance of right of way, in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement, 89 A.L.R.3d 767.

32-1-4. Institution and prosecution of criminal proceedings relating to criminal acts against department’s property.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “property of the department” means any property, whether real or personal, which is owned by or in which there is an interest held by the department.
  2. Whenever it may appear to the commissioner that any person or corporation has committed, is committing, has attempted to commit, or is attempting to commit any act which is prohibited by the criminal laws of this state against, or involving in any manner whatsoever, property of the department, he may, in his discretion, transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such act to the Attorney General or to the appropriate prosecuting attorney who may, in his discretion, institute and prosecute the necessary criminal proceedings.

History. — Ga. L. 1980, p. 590, § 1.

32-1-5. Powers and duties of Attorney General under Code Section 32-1-4.

In carrying out the duties imposed by Code Section 32-1-4, the Attorney General is vested, in addition to and cumulative of the rights, powers, and duties otherwise appertaining to his office, with all of the rights, powers, duties, privileges, obligations, and immunities held by or inuring to any prosecuting attorney.

History. — Ga. L. 1980, p. 590, § 2.

Cross references. —

District attorneys, T. 15, C. 18.

Attorney General, T. 45, C. 15.

32-1-6. Effect of Code Sections 32-1-4 and 32-1-5 on other laws.

Nothing in Code Sections 32-1-4 and 32-1-5 shall limit any statutory or common-law right of the state to punish any person or corporation for the violation of any provision of any law.

History. — Ga. L. 1980, p. 590, § 3.

32-1-7. Disbursement of fines and forfeitures.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-1, effective July, 1, 2001.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-1, provided for the repeal of this Code section. Section 13-1 of that Act, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act becomes fully effective July 1, 2001, but authorizes certain administrative action commencing April 28, 2000, for purposes of appointing certain officials, adopting rules and regulations, employing personnel, and preparing for and phasing in full implementation; provided, however, that the Governor may by executive order extend the date for full implementation of the Act to no later than July 1, 2003. In accordance with an executive order issued June 29, 2001, by the Governor, the repeal of this Code section by Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, became fully effective July 1, 2001.

This Code section was based on Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 4; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1236, § 1.

32-1-8. Construction and maintenance of private roads.

It shall be unlawful for any official, officer, or employee of the department, the State Road and Tollway Authority, the Georgia Highway Authority, or any similar authority or of any county or municipality to authorize the construction or maintenance of any private road.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1102, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 2-1.

Cross references. —

Georgia Highway Authority, § 32-10-1 et seq.

State Road and Tollway Authority, § 32-10-60 et seq.

Conflicts of interest, § 45-10-20 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Compensated work on private property not prohibited. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-1-8 does not prohibit a county from performing grading work on private property with county equipment and materials at rates established in a published schedule. Woodard v. Smith, 254 Ga. 39 , 325 S.E.2d 377 (1985).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Remuneration does not render work on private property lawful. — Even for payment, a county may not lawfully scrape privately-owned driveways; the county’s collection of a fee for providing this service would not, given the plain language of the statute, make the transaction lawful. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-24.

32-1-9. Enforcement of title by law enforcement officers.

It shall be the duty of all state and local law enforcement officers to enforce any provision of this title which states that any act or omission is unlawful.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1103, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-1-10. Penalty.

  1. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this title for which no specific penalty is provided, whether or not such act or omission is expressly declared elsewhere in this title to be unlawful, or who violates any of the rules and regulations issued under authority of and in accord with the provisions of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, however, that a violation of Code Sections 32-6-26 and 32-6-27 shall not be considered a crime.
  2. In addition to the penalty provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, the department shall have the right to enjoin any act or omission so punishable as a misdemeanor or punished otherwise as provided elsewhere in this title.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1101, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 4.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Promotion of safety and protection of public investment. — O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-10 , 32-6-23 , 32-6-24 , 46-7-61 (now repealed) and 46-7-78 (now repealed) are intended to promote the safety of the traveling public and protect the public’s investment in the public’s roads and highways. 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

When Department of Transportation officers may selectively stop vehicles. — Department of Transportation enforcement officers may not selectively stop vehicles unless the officers have an articulate and reasonable suspicion that the operator is violating, or the vehicle is in violation of, the law. 1987 Op. Atty Gen. No. U87-31.

32-1-11. Construction of title.

This title shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-103, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

CHAPTER 2 Department of Transportation

Cross references. —

Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, T. 50, C. 32.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2004, p. 898, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The department will form a pilot program that will provide a state level flow through point for any available federal funding or other forms of financial and development sources and assistance for local, regional, and public-private streetcar projects. Any funding through bonds for such pilot and grant program shall be administered by the State Road and Tollway Authority.” This provision for a pilot program was repealed by Ga. L. 2006, p. 498, § 5/SB 150.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Rules of general applicability, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. Trials. —

Actions Against Road Contractors for Inadequate Warning of Construction Hazards, 72 Am. Jur. Trials 215.

Article 1 General Provisions

32-2-1. Composition of department.

The Department of Transportation shall consist of the State Transportation Board, the commissioner of transportation, the director of planning, the deputy commissioner of transportation, the chief engineer, the treasurer and the assistant treasurer of transportation, and such subordinate employees as may be deemed necessary by the commissioner or the director of planning.

History. — Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, § 1; Ga. L. 1925, p. 208, § 1; Code 1933, § 95-1503, enacted by Ga. L. 1963, p. 3, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-301, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 1/SB 200.

32-2-2. Powers and duties of department generally.

  1. The powers and duties of the department, unless otherwise expressly limited by law, shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. The department shall plan, designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain a state highway system and shall have control of and responsibility for all construction, maintenance, or any other work upon the state highway system and all other work which may be designated to be done by the department by this title or any other law. However, on those portions of the state highway system lying within the corporate limits of any municipality, the department shall be required to provide only substantial maintenance activities and operations, including but not limited to reconstruction and major resurfacing, reconstruction of bridges, erection and maintenance of official department signs, painting of striping and pavement delineators, furnishing of guardrails and bridge rails, and other major maintenance activities; and, furthermore, the department may by contract authorize and require any rapid transit authority created by the General Assembly to plan, design, and construct, at no cost to the department and subject to the department’s review and approval of design and construction, segments of the state highway system necessary to replace those portions of the system which the rapid transit authority and the department agree must be relocated in order to avoid conflicts between the rapid transit authority’s facilities and the state highway system;
    2. Except for appropriations to authorize the issuance of general obligation debt for public road work, or to pay such debt, the department shall be the state agency to receive and shall have control and supervision of all funds appropriated for public road work by the state and activities incident thereto from the net proceeds of motor fuel tax, as provided in Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia and any other funds appropriated or provided for by law for such purposes or for performing other functions of the department.  If the General Assembly fails to appropriate all of the net proceeds of the motor fuel tax to the department, to the State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund, and to counties for public road work and activities incident thereto, any such unappropriated part of such funds, exclusive of those proceeds required by law to be provided as grants to counties for the construction and maintenance of county roads, shall be made available to the department by the state treasurer, notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in Part 1 of Article 4 of Chapter 12 of Title 45, the “Budget Act”;
    3. The department shall provide for surveys, plans, maps, specifications, and other things necessary in designating, supervising, locating, abandoning, relocating, improving, constructing, or maintaining the state highway system or any part thereof, or any activities incident thereto, or in doing such other work on public roads as the department may be given responsibility for or control of by law;
    4. The department shall reimburse the Department of Law for expenses incurred when the Attorney General of Georgia assigns any assistant attorney general or any deputy assistant attorney general to perform specific legal services in connection with the validation of any bonds as authorized by Code Section 45-15-16 or in connection with contract lawsuits and the acquisition of rights of way for any project on the state highway system constructed or to be constructed by the department and when such services are designated by the Attorney General to include specific items of legal services involving the trial or preparation for trial of individual condemnation cases, contract lawsuits, and related matters on such project or projects, or a group or series of condemnation cases, contract lawsuits, and related matters in connection with a specific project or projects; provided, however, that no such reimbursement shall be made until the Attorney General has submitted a statement of the expenses of such legal services to the department, which statement shall include the name of the assistant attorney general performing such services, the items of legal services performed and the cost thereof, and, further, that no reimbursement shall be made for the expenses of legal services for contract lawsuits unless such services had the advance approval of the commissioner;
    5. The department shall have the authority to negotiate, let, and enter into contracts with the Georgia Highway Authority, the State Road and Tollway Authority, any person, any state agency, or any county or municipality of the state for the construction or maintenance of any public road or any other mode of transportation or for the benefit of or pertaining to the department or its employees in such manner and subject to such express limitations as may be provided by law;
    6. The department shall have the authority to negotiate and enter into reciprocal agreements and contracts with other states or agencies or subdivisions thereof concerning public roads and other modes of transportation and activities incident thereto;
    7. The department and the State Road and Tollway Authority shall be the proper agencies of the state to discharge all duties imposed on the state by any act of Congress allotting federal funds to be expended for public road and other transportation purposes in this state. The department shall have the authority to accept and use federal funds; to enter into any contracts or agreements with the United States or its agencies or subdivisions relating to the planning, financing, construction, improvement, operation, and maintenance of any public road or other mode or system of transportation; and to do all things necessary, proper, or expedient to achieve compliance with the provisions and requirements of all applicable federal-aid acts and programs. Nothing in this title is intended to conflict with any federal law; and, in case of such conflict, such portion as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict;
    8. The department shall have the authority to exercise the right and power of eminent domain and to purchase, exchange, sell, lease, or otherwise acquire or dispose of any property or any rights or interests therein for public road and other transportation purposes or for any activities incident thereto, subject to such express limitations as are provided by law;
    9. The department and its authorized agents and employees shall have the authority to enter upon any lands in the state for the purpose of making such surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations as the department may deem necessary or desirable to accomplish the purposes of this title; and such entry shall not be deemed a trespass, nor shall it be deemed an entry which would constitute a taking in a condemnation proceeding, provided that reasonable notice is given the owner or occupant of the property to be entered and that such entry shall be done in a reasonable manner with as little inconvenience as possible to the owner or occupant of the property;
    10. In locating, relocating, constructing, improving, or maintaining any road on the state highway system, the department shall have the authority to control or limit access thereto, including the authority to close off or regulate access from any part of any public road on a county road system or municipal street system to the extent necessary in the public interest;
    11. The department shall have the authority to construct and to perform substantial maintenance of public roads within the boundaries of state parks and on main access roads leading into such parks;
      1. The department shall have the authority to formulate, promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations setting minimum safety standards for bridges on federal-aid public roads and to inspect and close any bridge on any such public road which does not comply with the minimum standards set by the department and which the department determines is unsafe for public travel. No new bridge shall be constructed on any such public road without there first having been obtained a permit for its construction from the department, such permit to be issued only where the proposed bridge will meet the minimum standards set by the department.
      2. The department may inspect and determine the maximum load, weight, and other vehicular dimensions which can be safely transported over each bridge on the state highway system and may post on each such bridge a legible notice showing such maximum safe limits. It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, drive, or bring onto any bridge any vehicle, load, or weight which in any manner exceeds the maximum limits so ascertained and posted on such bridge;
    12. The department shall have the authority to establish, maintain, and operate ferries as part of a public road and to authorize and issue permits for any state agency, any county or municipality, or any private person to establish, maintain, and operate ferries as part of a public road whenever, in the discretion of the department, such ferries are reasonably necessary and in the best interest of the public. All such ferries shall be operated subject to such rules and regulations as the department may adopt to protect the public interest, and the authorization of any such ferry may be revoked whenever, in the discretion of the department, its continued operation is no longer necessary or in the best interest of the public;
    13. The department shall have those duties and powers in regard to programs relating to the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority established by subsection (i) of Section 8 of an Act approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), particularly as amended by Section 5 of an Act approved March 16, 1971 (Ga. L. 1971, p. 2092);
    14. Reserved;
    15. Reserved;
      1. Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department is authorized to plan for and establish a long-term policy in regard to the establishment, development, and maintenance of aviation and aviation facilities in the state; to promote and encourage the use of aviation facilities of the state for air commerce in the state, between the state and other states, and between the state and foreign countries; to cooperate with, counsel, and advise political subdivisions of the state and other departments, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies, or establishments, whether federal, state, local, public, or private, for the purpose of promoting and obtaining coordination in the planning for and in the establishment, development, construction, maintenance, and protection of a system of air routes, airports, landing fields, and other aviation facilities in the state.
      2. Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department is authorized to construct or to contract with any state agency, political subdivision, authority, or person for the construction of airports and of facilities and appurtenances incident to their operation. The authority and limitations of Article 4 of this chapter pertaining to department contracts and subcontracts for construction of public roads shall likewise apply to such airport construction contracts; provided, however, that such a contract when negotiated with a political subdivision shall not be subject to the limitation of subparagraph (d)(1)(A) of Code Section 32-2-61 pertaining to the average bid price for the 60 day period preceding the making of the contract. Article 1 of Chapter 3 and Chapter 7 of this title shall apply to the acquisition or disposition of land or interests therein for such airport construction.
      3. Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department is authorized to establish air markers at appropriate locations throughout the state to facilitate air navigation within the state. Said markers shall consist of painting on appropriately located roofs of buildings the names of towns or cities within which such buildings are located, such names to be painted in sufficient size to be legible under good visibility conditions from a height of at least 3,000 feet. The department is authorized to obtain roof releases from the owners of buildings upon which air markers are to be painted or otherwise to obtain permission from such owners to use such roofs for such purposes and to pay the owners reasonable and nominal rentals therefor if such payment is necessary in order to obtain the appropriate permission for the use of such roofs for such purposes.
      4. Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department is authorized to maintain or to control for the maintenance of department owned or department leased airports, their facilities, and appurtenances incident to their operation. The authority and limitations of Article 4 of this chapter pertaining to contracts and subcontracts for maintenance of public roads shall likewise apply to such contracts for the maintenance of such department owned or department leased airports, provided that such a contract when negotiated with a political subdivision shall not be subject to the limitation of subparagraph (d)(1)(A) of Code Section 32-2-61 pertaining to the average bid price for the 60 day period preceding the making of the contract;
      1. Subject to general appropriations and any provisions of Chapter 5 of this title to the contrary notwithstanding, the department is authorized within the limitations provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph to provide to municipalities, counties, authorities, and state agencies financial support by contract for clearing, dredging, or maintaining free from obstructions and for the widening, deepening, and improvement of the ports, seaports, or harbors of this state.
        1. Municipalities, counties, authorities, or state agencies may, by formal resolution, apply to the department for financial assistance provided by this paragraph.
        2. The department shall review the proposal and, if satisfied that the proposal is in accordance with the purposes of this paragraph, may enter into a contract for expenditure of funds.
        3. The time of payment and any conditions concerning such funds shall be set forth in the contract.
      2. In addition to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department with its own forces or by contract may clear, dredge, or maintain free from obstruction and may widen, deepen, and improve the ports, seaports, or harbors of this state;
    16. Code Sections 32-3-1 and 32-6-115 notwithstanding, the department may by contract grant to any rapid transit authority created by the General Assembly, under such terms and conditions as the department may deem appropriate, the right to occupy or traverse a portion of the right of way of any road on the state highway system by or with its mass transportation facilities. Furthermore, the department may by contract lease to the rapid transit authority, under such terms and conditions as the department may deem appropriate, the right to occupy, operate, maintain, or traverse by or with its mass transportation facilities any parking facility constructed by the department. Notwithstanding Code Section 48-2-17, all net revenue derived from the lease shall be utilized by the department to offset the cost of constructing any parking facility. Regardless of any financial expenditures by the rapid transit authority, no right of use or lease granted under this paragraph shall merge into or become a property interest of the rapid transit authority. Upon the transfer of the title of the mass transportation facilities to private ownership or upon the operation of the rapid transportation facilities for the financial gain of private persons, such rights granted by the department shall automatically terminate and all rapid transportation facilities shall be removed from the rights of way of the state highway system; and
    17. The department, in consultation with the Georgia Technology Authority, shall have the authority to plan for, establish, and implement a long-term policy with regard to the use of the rights of way of the interstate highways and state owned roads for the establishment, development, and maintenance of the deployment of broadband services and other emerging communications technologies throughout the state by public or private providers, or both. The department shall be authorized to promote and encourage the use of such rights of way of the interstate highways and state owned roads for such purposes to the extent feasible and prudent. All net revenues from the use, lease, or other activities in such rights of way in excess of any project costs, that are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Highway Administration or that are not otherwise restricted by any federal laws, rules, or regulations, shall be paid into the general fund of the state treasury subject to any restrictions imposed by the Federal Highway Administration. It is the intention of the General Assembly, subject to the appropriation process, that a portion of the amount so deposited into the general fund of the state treasury be appropriated each year to programs to be administered by the Georgia Technology Authority, the Department of Community Affairs, and other state agencies as provided in Chapter 40 of Title 50 to be used to promote and provide broadband services throughout the state.
  2. In addition to the powers specifically delegated to it in this title, the department shall have the authority to perform all acts which are necessary, proper, or incidental to the efficient operation and development of the department and of the state highway system and of other modes and systems of transportation; and this title shall be liberally construed to that end. Any power vested by law in the department but not implemented by specific provisions for the exercise thereof may be executed and carried out by the department in a reasonable manner pursuant to such rules, regulations, and procedures as the department may adopt and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

History. — Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, art. 3, §§ 3, 5; Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, art. 4, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, art. 6, § 3; Ga. L. 1922, p. 176, § 1; Ga. L. 1929, p. 260, § 2; Code 1933, §§ 95-1502, 95-1504, 95-1701, 95-1702, 95-1703, 95-1710, 95-1715, 95-1724; Code 1933, §§ 95A-302, 95A-303, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 6-9; Ga. L. 1975, p. 98, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 416, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 775, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1980, p. 773, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56; Ga. L. 1986, p. 10, § 32; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1355, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1402, § 18; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-2; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 848, § 2/SB 85; Ga. L. 2010, p. 863, § 3/SB 296; Ga. L. 2018, p. 629, § 2-1/SB 402.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 7, 2018, deleted “and” at the end of subparagraph (a)(18)(C), substituted “; and” for the period at the end of paragraph (a)(19), and added paragraph (a)(20).

Cross references. —

Aviation authority, T. 6, C. 5.

Further provisions regarding powers and duties of department as regards aviation, §§ 6-1-1 , 6-1-2 .

Powers and duties of department with regard to construction of bicycle trails and bikeways, § 12-3-115 .

Erosion and sediment control plan prepared, § 12-7-7.1 .

Motor fuel and road taxes, T. 48, C. 9.

Powers and duties of department regarding welcome centers on federal highways, and installation and operation of vending machines at such centers, § 50-7-12 et seq.

Powers and duties of department with regard to intracoastal waterway, T. 52, C. 3.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, periods were substituted for semicolons at the end of subparagraphs (a)(12)(A), (a)(17)(A)-(a)(17)(C), (a)(18)(A) and subdivisions (a)(18)(B)(i)-(a)(18)(B)(iii); and “subparagraph (d)(1)(A)” was substituted for “subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a)” in subparagraphs (a)(17)(B) and (a)(17)(D).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, “property” was substituted for “porperty” in paragraph (a)(9) and, in subparagraph (a)(17)(A), “and aviation” was added following the first “aviation” and “and aviation” was deleted following the second “aviation”.

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, in subsection (a), “contract lawsuits,” was substituted for “contract lawsuits” near the middle of paragraph (a)(4) and “or private,” was substituted for “or private” near the end of subparagraph (a)(17)(A).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2018, “Chapter 40” was substituted for “Chapter 39” near the end of paragraph (a)(20).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2018, p. 629, § 1-1/SB 402, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Achieving Connectivity Everywhere (ACE) Act.’ ”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 672; former Code 1873, § 671; former Code 1882, §§ 684, 690; former Civil Code 1895, §§ 616, 622; former Civil Code 1910, § 748; and former Code 1933, §§ 95-302, 95-1504, 95-1701, 95-1715 and 95-1724, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Georgia DOT is an arm of the state and thus may have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because any recovery would have been paid out of state funds and the fact that Georgia DOT can allocate the DOT’s funds in DOT’s own discretion and without intervention by the state legislature does not change the fact that these funds are state funds. Robinson v. Georgia DOT, 966 F.2d 637 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660 , 121 L. Ed. 2 d 586 (1992).

Under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 , the legislature has delegated to DOT the authority to exercise the right and power of eminent domain for public road and transportation purposes. It follows that DOT is an “arm of the State” for eminent domain purposes, and the trial court correctly held that an action brought against DOT under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not be maintained for losses occasioned by pre-condemnation publicity. Thompson v. DOT, 209 Ga. App. 353 , 433 S.E.2d 623 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1635, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 964 (Ga. Oct. 12, 1993).

Georgia DOT has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. —

Georgia DOT, which may receive immunity under the eleventh amendment, did not waive the DOT’s immunity when plaintiffs sought relief for inverse condemnation of property that was an ancestral cemetery because DOT had consented to suit in state court; the Georgia Constitution expressly reserves the state’s immunity in federal court and a waiver in state court does not constitute a waiver in federal court. Robinson v. Georgia DOT, 966 F.2d 637 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660 , 121 L. Ed. 2 d 586 (1992).

Negligent design. —

Contractors were not liable for the negligent design of a ramp as the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) had responsibility for the design of the ramp, notwithstanding the fact that DOT gave the contractors no drawings, that the contractors made suggestions for changes to the ramp, and that the contractors implemented the DOT’s design; there was no evidence that the DOT relinquished control of the design to the contractors or that the contract specified that the design of the ramp was the contractors’ responsibility. Fraker v. C.W. Matthews Contr. Co., 272 Ga. App. 807 , 614 S.E.2d 94 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1342, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 596 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Negligence suit involving paving company. —

Trial court erred by granting a paving company summary judgment in a negligence suit based on the affidavit of the company’s president because the business records referred to and relied upon by the paving company’s president were not attached to the president’s affidavit; thus, the affidavit could not be used to support the company’s motion for summary judgment. Brown v. Seaboard Constr. Co., 317 Ga. App. 667 , 732 S.E.2d 325 (2012).

Department failed to properly apply for discretionary review. —

In a case involving a white supremacist organization being denied a permit for the Adopt-A-Highway program administered by the Georgia Department of Transportation (Department), the court dismissed the Department’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Department sought review of a decision of a state administrative agency and was required under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) to bring the Department’s appeal by way of an application for discretionary review, but failed to do so. State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392 , 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016).

Authority of Department

Enforcement authority granted by O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 is neither overbroad nor an illegal delegation of legislative functions. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

Delegation to contractor permitted. —

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(J) or O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(3) prevents the Georgia Department of Transportation from delegating the responsibility for designing and implementing a traffic control plan to a private contractor. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766 , 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1330, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 600 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Department’s duties in connection with state highway system. —

When the charge in question does in fact state that the Department of Transportation has “general responsibility to design, manage and improve the state highway system,” it seems to capture the essence of the sections the defendant relies upon, which are in fact very broad, general descriptions of the duties of the DOT. The additional material used by the court is drawn from the more specific statutory description of the respective duties of the DOT and municipalities. Thus, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 does indeed mention the general duty of the DOT to “designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain.” Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Authority to maintain state-aid highways. —

Court of equity will not interfere with the discretionary action of the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) in locating, grading, or improving a state-aid highway, within the area of their legally designated powers, unless such action is arbitrary and amounts to an abuse of the court’s discretion. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785 , 102 S.E.2d 3 (1958).

There is no general duty imposed on the counties to maintain state highways. Christian v. Monroe County, 203 Ga. App. 342 , 417 S.E.2d 37 (1992); Hardy v. Candler County, 214 Ga. App. 627 , 448 S.E.2d 487 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0120, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 268 (Ga. Jan. 26, 1995).

Authority to take property to relocate gas line. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) was authorized to take property for the relocation of the gas company’s interstate gas line since it was in the interest of safety and prevented inconvenience to the public using the gas line and since the acquisition was in furtherance of and reasonably for a public state highway use. Benton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 111 Ga. App. 861 , 143 S.E.2d 396 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1715, and 95-1724).

Authority to construct public highway through municipalities or cities. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may construct public highways through municipalities or cities of this state without their consent. City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga. 505 , 111 S.E.2d 79 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1504).

Extending roads through towns without consent. —

State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board), on the board’s own initiative or acting through a county, has the legal right to extend and improve a state-aid road through the streets of a municipality without the consent of the municipality and even against the municipality’s will. Perkerson v. Mayor of Greenville, 51 Ga. App. 240 , 180 S.E. 22 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1504).

General regulatory power to approve erection of traffic signals. —

When the additional portion of the charge objected to here similarly drew from specific applicable statutory language, the court properly noted the general regulatory power of the Department of Transportation to approve the erection of traffic signals. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Department lacks exclusive responsibility for all aspects of highway system. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(1) does not place exclusive responsibility for all aspects of the state highway system in the Department of Transportation. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Maintenance of highways within city limits. —

When the Department of Transportation fails to maintain those portions of the state highway system lying within a municipality’s corporate limits as required by law and when the municipality agreed to perform the necessary maintenance, a municipality can be held liable for such failure under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(b) . City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Authority to remove obstructions. —

Management and control of the right of way of the state’s system of roads is vested in the Department of Transportation and the department can require the removal of any obstruction placed thereon without express permission. Crider v. Kelley, 232 Ga. 616 , 208 S.E.2d 444 (1974).

No authority to maintain overgrown area bordering intersection. —

In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err in finding the Georgia Department of Transportation immune from suit from liability to the decedent’s estate and survivors for failing to maintain an overgrown area of shrubbery that bordered an intersection, as neither O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 , when read in concert with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 , nor O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) imposed liability on the Department; hence, maintenance of the area did not constitute a “substantial” or “other major” maintenance activity. Welch v. Ga. DOT, 283 Ga. App. 903 , 642 S.E.2d 913 (2007).

Condemnation of public property. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(b) does not constitute specific authority to Department of Transportation to condemn public property. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

Bridges
1.Liability of County

Duties of county authorities in maintaining and repairing bridges. —

County authorities are not insurers of the safety of county bridges, but must only exercise ordinary care in maintaining and repairing the bridges. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Definition of “bridge” includes approaches. —

While the word “bridge,” as used in former Civil Code 1910, § 748 did not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder, the statute did include “all the appurtenances necessary to its proper use, and embraces its abutments and approaches and that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself.” Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

In an action against a county for damages from the falling of truck through an opening where a public bridge had been into a ravine below, the petition was not subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss), and the verdict for the plaintiff was not contrary to law or without evidence to support the verdict, under the defendant’s contention that the injury was not caused by reason of a “defective bridge” within the meaning of the statute, but from the entire removal of the bridge, for which the county was not liable, since the petition and the evidence showed that at the time of the injury at least a part of the bridge, i.e., the sills constituting a portion of its “approaches,” still remained, and the rest of the bridge was then being repaired. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

2.Liability of Individual Owners

Standard of care required for private toll bridges. —

Owner of a bridge franchise is bound to exercise only such care and diligence in the construction of a bridge and keeping the bridge in proper order which every prudent man would exert in relation to the same property in view of the object and purpose for which the bridge was erected and used by the prudent man. Tift v. Towns, 53 Ga. 47 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 671).

Nonliability during repairs. —

While the proprietor of a toll bridge is having the bridge repaired, in accordance with the proprietor’s duty, the floor being taken up and no toll charged, the proprietor’s role as a proprietor of a toll bridge is discontinued; and the proprietor is not liable under this section to one injured by reason of the condition of the bridge. Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538 (1874) (decided under former Code 1873, § 671).

Private toll bridge without permit prohibited. —

This section did not contemplate a case where a public road crossed a bridge, and where a few people obtained possession by a transfer of a mechanic’s lien and proceeded to charge a toll without authority granted to the people from some proper source. Whelchel v. State ex rel. Wiley, 76 Ga. 644 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 684).

Ferries

Liability for ferry kept for own use. —

One who keeps a ferry for one’s own use is not liable except for gross neglect unless one is in the habit of charging a toll. Self v. Dunn & Brown, 42 Ga. 528 (1871) (decided under former Code 1863, § 672).

When ferry loses private character. —

While the owner of a private ferry may lawfully charge and collect a toll from persons incidentally crossing thereat, should the owner maintain the ferry for use by the public at large or seek public patronage, or pursue the business of keeping up the ferry for the public, the ferry loses the ferry’s character as a private ferry. Hudspeth v. Hall, 111 Ga. 510 , 36 S.E. 770 (1900) (decided under former Code 1895, § 616).

Suits against public ferry operators for loss of property. —

Since public ferry operators are common carriers, no allegation of negligence was necessary in suits brought to recover damages for loss of property accepted for shipment. Deen v. Wheeler, 7 Ga. App. 507 , 67 S.E. 212 (1910) (decided under former Code 1895, § 622).

Landowner liability. —

Under this section, the owner of the land on which a public ferry is situated, unless the ownership of the ferry be separated from that of the land, is liable for negligent torts committed by the ferry operator in the performance of the operator’s duties as such, whether the owner objects to the use of the ferry or not. Printup v. Patton & Jackson, 91 Ga. 422 , 18 S.E. 311 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 690).

Amendment to petition showing liability as landowner permissible. —

Petition originally basing liability on ownership of the ferry may be amended to include liability as owner of the land and proof of either will sustain the action. Deen v. Wheeler, 7 Ga. App. 507 , 67 S.E. 212 (1910) (decided under former Code 1895, § 622).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1715 and 95-1724, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Department of Transportation control over contemplated tree cutting operations. — Given the Department of Transportation’s authority and obligation to control the state highway system, it seems imperative that the department maintain rigid and absolute control over any contemplated tree cutting operations, particularly if those operations are undertaken by private individuals on rights-of-way. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

Authorization to formulate rules related to, and issuance of permits for, cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way does not impinge upon the Department of Transportation’s authority and legal obligation to control the state highway system. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

Department lacks authority to fund county airport project. — Department of Transportation may not help fund completion of airport master planning project for county airport because it would constitute a forbidden assumption of county debt. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-126.

Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with financial backing from State Road and Tollway Authority. — Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with all or a portion of the financial backing for the contracts coming from a contractual promise from the State Road and Tollway Authority to borrow and provide money to DOT as and when needed to expend on projects that are the subjects of the construction contracts. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-10.

Department may not contract with individual to maintain federal highways. — Since the state is obligated to follow federal law with reference to interstate highways, the state’s making a contract for supplying to an individual the hay cut from rights of way of interstate highways in return for the individual’s cutting it would not be acceptable since the federal government requires maintenance contracts to be made with governmental instrumentalities only. 1973 Op. Atty Gen. No. U73-71.

Authority to issue license for rail line. — Department of Transportation has authority to issue a revocable license to a company constructing and operating a rapid rail passenger service line to cross the rights-of-way of several state routes so long as consideration is received which represents a substantial benefit to the public. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-45.

Department may buy litter bags for distribution. — Department of Transportation may lawfully spend motor fuel tax funds for the purchase of litter bags to be distributed free of charge to motorists at Georgia’s welcome stations. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-145.

Carriage upon state aircraft must be limited to state officials and employees on official business of the state and those non-employees from whose carriage the state derives some benefit. The only exceptions may be in those areas exempted from Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI(a), the gratuities provision of the Constitution, by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI(b). 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-19.

Use of state-owned aircraft. — If the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Speaker of the House must travel on personal or political business, such travel must be accomplished by private means unless the Commissioner of Public Safety has determined that travel on state aircraft is necessary for personal security; otherwise, when any public officer uses a state aircraft for a personal or political reason, the use of the aircraft is contrary to the prohibitions of the gratuities clause and state statutes authorizing the use of state aircraft, even were the official to reimburse the state for the direct costs associated with the trip. 2004 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 04-3.

Department’s powers and duties on funding strictly construed. — Powers and duties delegated to the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), especially those concerning appropriations and expenditures of state funds, must be strictly construed. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-85 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1715 and 95-1724).

Department may not fund road outside of state highway system. — Specific powers mentioned in this section do not authorize the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) to match federal funds or to purchase rights of way on roads which are not on the official state highway system. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-85 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1715 and 95-1724).

Department may not reimburse subdivision for rights of way bought outside highway system. — State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) has no legal authority to reimburse a political subdivision for the cost of any rights of way they may buy for a federal-aid highway improvement project on a road not on the official state highway system. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-85 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1715 and 95-1724).

Lapse of appropriations that become deobligated. — Appropriated state funds which become deobligated during a subsequent fiscal year are subject to lapse, and may not be applied to contracts for which motor fuel tax appropriations were previously committed. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-9.

Department may not expend money on historic preservation if not for transportation. — Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances where the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) where such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3 (decided prior to 1993 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 ).

Applicability of Fair and Open Grants Act of 1993 to funds expended from funds. — Fair and Open Grants Act of 1993, O.C.G.A. § 28-5-120 et seq., does not apply to disbursements made by the Department of Transportation pursuant to contracts entered into with private entities, nor to intergovernmental contracts with counties for harbor maintenance; but the Act does apply when funds are disbursed by the department on an unrestricted basis to, or for the benefit of, local governments for public road and other transportation purposes. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 12 et seq.

C.J.S. —

39A C.J.S., Highways, § 73 et seq.

ALR. —

Duty and liability as to lighting bridge, 47 A.L.R. 355 .

Constitutionality and construction of statute relating to location or relocation of highways, 63 A.L.R. 516 .

Duty as regards barriers for protection of automobile travel, 86 A.L.R. 1389 ; 173 A.L.R. 626 .

Personal liability of highway officers for damage to or trespass upon land in connection with construction or maintenance of highway, 90 A.L.R. 1481 .

Power and duty of highway officers as regards location or routes of roads to be constructed or improved, 91 A.L.R. 242 .

Validity and applicability of statutes relating to use of highway by private motor carriers and contract motor carriers for hire, 175 A.L.R. 1333 .

Construction of highway through park as violation of use to which park property may be devoted, 60 A.L.R.3d 581.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from ice or snow on surface of highway or street, 97 A.L.R.3d 11.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from failure to repair pothole in surface of highway or street, 98 A.L.R.3d 101.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

Highways: Governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings, 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.

32-2-3. Development of transportation plans; public hearings; approval of plans by board; promulgation of rules and regulations.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Comprehensive plan” means the major transportation facilities described in this Code section as well as collectors and interconnecting routes within or between standard metropolitan areas, urban areas, and rural areas.
    2. “Local governing body” means the governing body of the city, town, municipality, county, or other local governing unit or authority in the area in which the transportation facility will be located.
    3. “Major transportation facility” means:
      1. Any facility primarily designed to transport people or goods rapidly and efficiently, including but not limited to air transport facilities, railroads, bus services, terminals, freeways, expressways, arterial highways, belt highways, and port facilities; or
      2. Any facility or facilities utilized in providing a mass transit system for a standard metropolitan area or urban area.
    4. “Standard metropolitan area” means a county or group of contiguous counties or parts thereof as designated by the department which contains at least one central city of 50,000 inhabitants or more as determined by the latest available federal census or such other population estimate as may be provided by law.
    5. “Transportation corridor” means a strip of land between two termini or central points within which travel, topography, land uses, environment, and other characteristics are evaluated for transportation purposes.
    6. “Urban area” means an area including and adjacent to a municipality and other urban centers having a population of 5,000 or more as determined by the latest available federal census or such other population estimates as may be provided by law within boundaries to be fixed by the department.
    1. The department in conjunction with the affected local governmental bodies, regional planning agencies, and other appropriate state and federal agencies shall develop:
      1. A comprehensive, state-wide, 20 year transportation plan;
      2. A comprehensive transportation plan for all standard metropolitan areas and those areas which the department determines, based upon population projections, will become a standard metropolitan area within 20 years, such plan to supplement and be compatible with the state-wide transportation plan; and
      3. Comprehensive plans for regions and urban areas as such plans are deemed necessary by the department.
    2. Priority for developing comprehensive plans shall be given to areas in which the need for construction of major transportation facilities is anticipated.
    3. In developing comprehensive transportation plans, the department shall take into account:
      1. Future as well as present needs;
      2. All possible alternative modes of transportation;
      3. The joint use of transportation corridors and major transportation facilities for alternate transportation and community uses;
      4. The integration of any proposed system into all other types of transportation facilities in the community or region;
      5. The coordination with other development plans in the community and region so as to facilitate and synchronize growth; and
      6. The total environment of the community and region including land use, state and regional development goals and decisions, population, travel patterns, traffic control features, ecology, pollution effects, esthetics, safety, and social and community values.
  2. In order to ensure an integrated transportation system, the planning, location, and design of transportation facilities shall be coordinated with the appropriate planning agencies and the affected local governmental bodies.
    1. The department may adopt local or regional transportation plans as part of or in lieu of the department’s plan.
    2. The department may develop and design plans for arterial and collector roads and streets, vehicular parking areas, other transportation modes and facilities, and other support facilities which are consistent with the department’s comprehensive transportation plans. The department may render to local governmental bodies or their planning agencies such technical assistance and services as are necessary so that local plans and facilities are coordinated with the department’s plans and facilities.
  3. The department shall develop systematic techniques for considering those factors to be used in developing comprehensive plans pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section so that all transportation facilities are so planned that they will function as integral parts of the overall plan for community, regional, and state development as portrayed in the comprehensive plans; and these plans shall be updated at reasonable intervals so as to maintain a viable plan for a 20 year planning period.
    1. The department shall, pursuant to its rules and regulations, hold planning hearings at the appropriate state, regional, or local level, at which time the comprehensive transportation plans included in subsection (b) of this Code section shall be presented for discussion and comment.
    2. The department shall, pursuant to its rules and regulations, hold hearings at the appropriate regional or local level for major transportation facilities, or as required by federal law, as follows:
      1. A facility, site, or project corridor hearing, at a time after the selection of the type or types of transportation facility or facilities to be constructed and prior to the final selection of the specific site or corridor of the proposed facility; and
      2. A design hearing, at a time prior to the department’s commitment to a specific design proposal for the facility or facilities.
    3. These public hearings shall be conducted so as to provide an opportunity for effective participation by interested persons in transportation policy decisions, the process of transportation planning, modal selections, and site and route selection, and the specific location and design of major transportation facilities. The various factors involved in the decision or decisions and any alternative proposals shall be clearly presented so that the persons attending the hearing may present their views relating to the decision or decisions which will be made. The facility, site, or project corridor hearing and the design hearing for a proposed facility or facilities may be held simultaneously to satisfy the requirements of this subsection.
      1. The department may satisfy the requirements for a public hearing by holding a public hearing or by publishing two notices of opportunity for public hearing in a newspaper having general circulation in the vicinity of the proposed undertaking and holding a public hearing if any written requests for such a hearing are received. The procedure for requesting a public hearing shall be explained in the notice. The deadline for submission of such a request may not be less than 21 days after the publication of the first notice of opportunity for public hearing and no less than 14 days after the date of publication of the second notice of opportunity for public hearing.
      2. A copy of the notice of opportunity for public hearing shall be furnished at the time of publication to the United States Department of Transportation, the appropriate departments of state government, and affected local governments and planning agencies. If no requests are received in response to a notice within the time specified for the submission of requests, the department shall be deemed to have met the hearing requirements.
      3. The opportunity for another public hearing shall be afforded in any case when proposed locations or designs are changed from those presented in the notices specified in this paragraph or at a public hearing so as to have a substantially different transportation service, social, economic, or environmental effect.
      4. The opportunity for a public hearing shall be afforded in each case in which the department is in doubt as to whether a public hearing is required.
      1. When a public hearing is to be held, two notices of such hearing shall be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the vicinity of the proposed undertaking. The first notice shall be published no less than 30 days prior to the date of the hearing and the second notice shall be published no less than five days prior to the date of the hearing.
      2. Copies of the notice for public hearing shall be mailed to the United States Department of Transportation, appropriate departments of state government, and affected local governments and planning agencies.
  4. All long-range comprehensive transportation plans developed pursuant to this Code section shall be submitted to the board for its approval or disapproval.
  5. The department shall promulgate any rules and regulations, consistent with its practices, that it deems necessary in order to implement this title.

History. — Ga. L. 1972, p. 1215, §§ 1-7; Code 1933, § 95A-205, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1986, p. 796, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, periods have been substituted for semicolons at the end of subparagraph (b)(1)(C) and paragraph (b)(2).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1986, “shall” was substituted for “will” following “Code section” in paragraph (f)(1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Construed with Environmental Policy Act and § 27-3-132 . — Factors enumerated in the Environmental Policy Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-16-1 et seq., must be considered when evaluating environmental concerns under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-3 . The provisions of O.C.G.A. § 27-3-132 are not repealed by implication by the Georgia Environmental Policy Act. 1991 Op. Atty Gen. No. 91-29.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

Right of private citizen to complain of re-routing of highway or removal or change of route or directional signs, 97 A.L.R. 192 .

32-2-4. Information for traveling public.

In order to provide information in the specific interest of the traveling public, the department is authorized to maintain maps and to permit informational directories and advertising pamphlets to be made available at safety rest areas and to establish information centers at safety rest areas for the purpose of informing the public of places of interest within the state and providing such other information as may be considered desirable.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 14; Code 1933, § 95A-933, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Camping at rest areas, § 32-6-6 .

Installation and operation of vending machines in safety rest areas, § 32-6-116 .

32-2-4.1. Gateway Center safety rest area and information center.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the department may acquire, construct, operate, and maintain a demonstration safety rest area and information center in Cobb County. For purposes of this Code section, the safety rest area and information center shall be known as the “Gateway Center,” but the State Transportation Board may name or designate the center in its discretion. In addition to the powers provided in this Code section, cumulatively, the department shall have the same powers with respect to Gateway Center which the department otherwise enjoys with respect to safety rest areas, information centers, and welcome centers.
  2. The purpose of Gateway Center shall be to act as a “gateway” to all of Georgia. Toward that end it shall provide information, goods, and services which assist road travelers and tell them about Georgia. The center may have any facility and provide any service which furthers those purposes, including by way of illustration, but not limitation:
    1. Playground equipment;
    2. Recreation areas;
    3. Indoor and outdoor eating areas;
    4. Restaurant, snack bar, and other facilities for purveying food and beverage;
    5. Vending machines;
    6. Gift, novelty, and souvenir shops;
    7. Advertising;
    8. Information kiosks;
    9. Multimedia displays;
    10. Communication services, such as computer Internet connections;
    11. Parking; and
    12. Markets.

      The prices charged for any service or product shall approximate the prevailing rate within the area for similar items so as not to compete unfairly with private enterprise.

  3. The department may establish a business plan for self-sufficient operation of Gateway Center and may retain for its improvement, maintenance, and operation all miscellaneous funds generated by its operation. Funds not expended for this purpose in the fiscal year in which they are generated shall be deposited in the state treasury. Further, nothing in this Code section may be construed to allow the department to retain any funds required by the Constitution of Georgia to be paid into the state treasury. Except with respect to Code Section 45-12-92 concerning miscellaneous funds, the department must also comply with Part 1 of Article 4 of Chapter 12 of Title 45, the “Budget Act,” in regard to the fiscal operation of the center.
  4. By competitive process or negotiation, in its discretion, the department may contract, rent, license, allow, delegate, or otherwise act to cause private persons, public instrumentalities, and entities and units of state and local government to conduct the activities of the center. The department may accept monetary payments in return for rights and privileges, and it may also accept in-kind consideration, which supports the purposes of this Code section. The agreements under this Code section may allow the second parties to produce and retain revenue and may have a term not exceeding 50 years, whether the party is public or private. However, in no event may the department abrogate its ultimate responsibility or convey the fee, an estate for years, or any other interest in the real property of Gateway Center for the purposes of this Code section.
  5. Gateway Center may be a “welcome center, tourist center, and safety rest area” for purposes of Code Section 49-9-42, and the preference given by Code Sections 49-9-41 and 49-9-42 shall apply to and affect Gateway Center.
  6. Gateway Center shall be a “safety rest area and welcome center” for purposes of Code Section 35-2-32, and the Uniform Division of the Department of Public Safety may have jurisdiction to patrol Gateway Center for the purposes stated in that Code section.
  7. The department may pay the costs of Gateway Center from any lawful fund source, if it can comply with requirements of the fund source and this Code section. Possible sources may include, without limitation, miscellaneous funds from operation, gift, appropriation, proceeds of general obligation debt, funds of cooperating local governments and authorities, and grants by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-4.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1675, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1153, § 6; Ga. L. 2012, p. 303, § 6/HB 1146.

32-2-5. Actions by or against department.

  1. The department shall have the authority to bring actions; and it may be sued in such actions as are permitted by law. In addition, the department may adjust and make settlement of any and all claims presented to it under oath.
  2. All actions brought ex contractu by or against the department shall be brought in a county where any part of the work is to be or has been performed. All other actions by or against the department shall be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose. Service upon the department shall be sufficient by serving a second original process issued from the county where the action is filed upon the commissioner personally or by leaving a copy of the same in the office of the commissioner in the Department of Transportation Building, Atlanta, Georgia.

History. — Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, art. 6, § 3; Ga. L. 1925, p. 208, § 4; Code 1933, § 95-1505; Code 1933, § 95A-304, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 10.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying contracts — legislation, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 71 (1982).

For note analyzing sovereign immunity in this state and proposing implementation of a waiver scheme and creation of a court of claims, pursuant to the Georgia Constitution, see 27 Emory L.J. 717 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Constitutionality. —

See Andrews v. Department of Transp., 133 Ga. App. 78 , 210 S.E.2d 30 (1974).

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1710, and 95-1720, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Actions Against Department

Section does not waive department’s immunity. —

Only under certain limited and previously recognized circumstances may suits be maintained against the Department of Transportation; there was no intent by the General Assembly to waive immunity and permit suits for torts against the department. Andrews v. Department of Transp., 133 Ga. App. 78 , 210 S.E.2d 30 (1974).

Department of Transportation of the State of Georgia may rely on the defense of sovereign immunity in suits seeking to recover damages for breach of contract. National Distrib. Co. v. Department of Transp., 248 Ga. 451 , 283 S.E.2d 470 (1981).

There was no intent by the General Assembly in enacting subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5 to waive immunity and permit suits for torts against the Department of Transportation. Huggins v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 165 Ga. App. 178 , 300 S.E.2d 195 (1983).

Suit is permissible in several situations. —

Suit can be maintained against the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) for breach of contract and for recovery of just compensation if private property is taken or damaged for public purposes. Andrews v. Department of Transp., 133 Ga. App. 78 , 210 S.E.2d 30 (1974).

Sovereign immunity of the Department of Transportation is pierced by the constitutional right insofar as required by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I); but no support exists for the argument that a waiver of sovereign immunity exists for an ex contractu action against the Department of Transportation which is not predicated upon Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I). National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789 , 278 S.E.2d 648 , aff'd, 248 Ga. 451 , 283 S.E.2d 470 (1981).

Personal service by authorized person required. —

Language in O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5 authorizing service “by leaving a copy [of process] in the office of the commissioner” contemplates that service may be accomplished by personally serving a person in the Department of Transportation building who is authorized or otherwise qualified to receive service; such service must be made by an authorized person, and employing a private delivery service to deliver a package containing the summons and complaint failed to accomplish the required personal service. DOT v. Marks, 219 Ga. App. 738 , 466 S.E.2d 273 (1995).

Effect of motor vehicle liability insurance. —

Department of Transportation, as a state agency, does not come within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) , which provides for waiver of governmental immunity to the extent of the amount of motor vehicle liability insurance purchased by “a municipal corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision of this state . . ..” Huggins v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 165 Ga. App. 178 , 300 S.E.2d 195 (1983).

Not all actions ex contractu are authorized. —

Fact that an action ex contractu is a correct procedural form by which to assert a constitutionally authorized action against the Department of Transportation does not permit an inference that all actions ex contractu are thus authorized. National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789 , 278 S.E.2d 648 , aff'd, 248 Ga. 451 , 283 S.E.2d 470 (1981).

Who may sue and be sued in permitted actions. —

Department of Transportation, consisting of the State Transportation Board, the commissioner of transportation, the deputy commissioner of transportation, the state highway engineer, the treasurer and the assistant treasurer of transportation, and such subordinate employees as may be deemed necessary by the commissioner, may sue and be sued in such actions as are permitted by law. National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789 , 278 S.E.2d 648 , aff'd, 248 Ga. 451 , 283 S.E.2d 470 (1981).

State department as joint tortfeasor. —

State department or agency can be considered a joint tortfeasor with other resident defendants for venue purposes. Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134 , 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993).

Venue against an employee of the DOT may be had in a county only if the employee is an alleged joint tortfeasor with a defendant resident in that county. Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134 , 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993).

Section is venue statute only. —

An action wherein grantors sought to recover against the Department of Transportation for alleged breach of conditions contained in an agreement delineated a “Soil Easement” could not be maintained under the authority of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-5 which is a venue statute only. National Distrib. Co. v. DOT, 157 Ga. App. 789 , 278 S.E.2d 648 , aff'd, 248 Ga. 451 , 283 S.E.2d 470 (1981).

Special venue statutes cumulative of other venue statutes. —

It appears that there is no authority that special venue statutes are exclusive and the inference in the cases is that the special venue statutes are cumulative of other venue statutes. Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106 , 213 S.E.2d 150 (1975).

Venue of action against department and joint tortfeasor. —

In an action by a landowner against the Department of Transportation (DOT) and a corporation for abatement of a nuisance, the county in which the cause of action against DOT arose was the residence of DOT for purposes of the action; this allowed the corporation, as a resident joint tortfeasor, to be joined, even though the corporation resided in a separate county. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Barnett, 219 Ga. App. 763 , 466 S.E.2d 657 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C0714, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 603 (Ga. Apr. 12, 1996).

State’s Capacity to Sue

Authority to sue. —

State has complete power over the state’s internal highway system, including bridges, and in the state’s corporate capacity as sovereign may sue for any injury or interference with the state’s highway system. State Hwy. Dep't v. Florence, 73 Ga. App. 852 , 38 S.E.2d 628 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1720).

Legislative intent to let Department of Transportation protect state’s interests. —

General Assembly intended to confer upon the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), as one of the state’s public agencies, not only the duty of constructing, maintaining, and repairing the highways and bridges of the state-aid system of roads, but also to confer on the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) the right to protect the state’s interest in matters growing out of the maintenance of the state’s state-aid system of roads. State Hwy. Dep't v. Florence, 73 Ga. App. 852 , 38 S.E.2d 628 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1720).

Legislative intent illustrated by giving Department of Transportation right to sue. —

State has delegated the right to sue to the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), which is financially responsible for the state-aid road system. State Hwy. Dep't v. Florence, 73 Ga. App. 852 , 38 S.E.2d 628 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1720).

Department as bailee for damaged bridge. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) was holding a bridge, as part of the state-aid system of roads under the department’s jurisdiction, in trust for the use of the public and with the duty to replace the bridge; and, in this capacity considered as a bailee, the department may bring an action for the allegedly negligent destruction of the bridge. State Hwy. Dep't v. Florence, 73 Ga. App. 852 , 38 S.E.2d 628 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1720).

Use of damages to restore destroyed bridge. —

Logical disposition of any money recovered in an action for the destruction of a bridge on a public highway which is to continue in use would be to use the money for the purpose of restoring the destroyed bridge, or where the bridge has already been rebuilt, to use the money to replace, as nearly as possible, those funds which the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) expended in restoring the bridge. State Hwy. Dep't v. Florence, 73 Ga. App. 852 , 38 S.E.2d 628 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1709, 95-1720).

State’s Liability to Suit

Effect of department’s acts. —

Acts of Department of Transportation are the acts of the State of Georgia and the state performs a governmental function when the state constructs and maintains highways through the Department of Transportation. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Extent of Department’s powers. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) has no power and no function except those expressly authorized by the state. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Department not suable without state consent. —

Department of Transportation is a part of the sovereign state, an agent or servant of the state, and the department cannot be sued without the express consent of the sovereign. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

State consent given only in limited situations. —

Department of Transportation is authorized by the state to sue and to be sued, but the power to sue and to be sued in the case of the department is only for special purposes. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Situations in which county originally liable. —

This section refers to claims for damages against a county which must have originated under laws existing when the highway is taken over as a state-aid road by the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), and when the department “ultimately may be liable,” not primarily liable. Tounsel v. State Hwy. Dep't, 180 Ga. 112 , 178 S.E. 285 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

No consent for suits for personal injuries. —

Right to “make settlement of all claims presented to it under oath,” certainly does not include the right to sue the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) for damages for personal injuries due to negligence of the department’s engineers, but refers to such matters as are expressly provided in statute. Tounsel v. State Hwy. Dep't, 180 Ga. 112 , 178 S.E. 285 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Consent for suits for personal injuries given where employee sues for workers’ compensation. —

An employee of the Department of Transportation has a right to bring an action directly against the department under the workers’ compensation law for compensation for an injury arising out of and during the course of employment by the department. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former law are included in the annotations of this Code section.

Necessity for retaining highway project file for 20-year period. — It is necessary to retain an entire highway project file for a 20-year period; retaining the release, final voucher, and contract for this period will not adequately protect the state’s interest in compliance with state law because highway construction contracts are sealed contracts and are therefore subject to a 20-year statute of limitations. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-89 (decided under former law).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of private citizen to complain of re-routing of highway or removal or change of route or directional signs, 97 A.L.R. 192 .

Liability and suability, in negligence action, of state highway, toll road, or turnpike authority, 62 A.L.R.2d 1222.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from ice or snow on surface of highway or street, 97 A.L.R.3d 11.

Measure and elements of damages for injury to bridge, 31 A.L.R.5th 171.

32-2-6. Liability of department for actions against counties; procedure to institute actions.

  1. The department shall defend any action and be responsible for all damages awarded therein in any court of this state against any county under existing laws whenever the cause of action accrues on a public road which at the time of accrual had been designated by the department as a part of the state highway system; provided, however, that no action may be brought under this Code section until the construction of the public road on which the injury complained of occurred has been completed and such public road has been officially opened to traffic as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section. When any such action is brought against a county in any court of this state, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to provide for service of notice of the pendency of such action against the county upon the department by providing for service of a second original process, issued from the court where the action is filed, upon the commissioner personally or by leaving a copy of the same in the office of the commissioner in the Department of Transportation Building, Atlanta, Georgia. The service of process in such action upon the county shall not be perfected until such second original process has been served as provided in this Code section. The department shall also have the right and authority to defend, adjust, and settle in the name of such county and on its behalf any claim for damages for which the department ultimately may be liable under this Code section.
  2. A public road shall be officially opened to traffic within the meaning of this Code section on the date that the department gives written notice of final acceptance of such work to the contractor or political subdivision performing the work on such road or otherwise in writing acts so as to open the road to traffic by the general public.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-305, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying developments in Georgia local government law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1981).

For article surveying developments in Georgia torts law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 247 (1981).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1505, 95-1710, and 95-1712, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

County’s immunity from liability not waived. —

This section specifically limits responsibility to those damages awarded against any county “under existing laws” and is not a waiver of the county’s immunity from liability. Williams v. Georgia Power Co., 233 Ga. 517 , 212 S.E.2d 348 (1975).

No sovereign immunity from inverse condemnation action. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-2-6 applies only to actions when sovereign immunity exists and must be statutorily waived. No sovereign immunity exists when a cause of action for inverse condemnation lies because the Constitution itself affords the right. Powell v. Ledbetter Bros., 251 Ga. 649 , 307 S.E.2d 663 (1983), overruled, David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 Ga. 557 , 398 S.E.2d 191 (1990).

Joint State-County Suits

County need not be plaintiff in suit by board. —

When the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) brings an action for declaratory judgment there is no statute which requires that the county where the subject matter of the suit is located be named a party plaintiff in the case. Woodside v. State Hwy. Dep't, 216 Ga. 254 , 115 S.E.2d 560 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

County could “vouch” in the Department of Transportation in an action brought against the county for personal injuries and wrongful death arising out of a collision at a highway intersection. DOT v. Land, 181 Ga. App. 94 , 351 S.E.2d 470 (1986), aff’d except as to that part of the opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the Department of Transportation as a named party, 257 Ga. 657 , 362 S.E.2d 372 (1987), and vacated insofar as it is inconsistent, 185 Ga. App. 630 , 366 S.E.2d 242 (1988).

County not proper party when suit lies against Department of Transportation. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-2-6 does not make the county in which roads and bridges are located a proper and necessary party by operation of law when suit lies against the Department of Transportation. The section requires suit be brought against the county and the Department of Transportation shall defend, not vice versa. Powell v. Ledbetter Bros., 251 Ga. 649 , 307 S.E.2d 663 (1983), overruled, David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 Ga. 557 , 398 S.E.2d 191 (1990).

State Liability

Department defends suits originating on state highways. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) shall defend all suits and be responsible for all damages awarded against any county whenever the cause of action originates on highways, jurisdiction over which has been assumed by the department under the terms of the law. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Department defends suits after highway has been opened. —

Language of this section is confined to suits brought against the county for causes of action originating on highways, placing ultimate liability upon the Department of Transportation which is to be made a defendant in such actions, and prohibiting the bringing of such actions until the highway is opened to traffic by the department. Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316 , 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1710, 95-1712).

Department defends suits even when plaintiff sold land before highway opened. —

While the authority of the property owner to institute a suit against a county for damages to property arising from construction of a state-aid road by the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) is restricted until the state-aid road involved is completed and opened to traffic; the fact that the property owner has divested oneself of title to the property allegedly damaged before the state-aid road involved had been formally opened to traffic and the cause of action had thereby accrued does not defeat the owner’s cause of action. Dougherty County v. Pylant, 104 Ga. App. 468 , 122 S.E.2d 117 (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1712).

Department as defendant in claim against its insured employees. —

When a claim is covered to the extent of insurance provided to employees of the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the employees are named as defendants in the complaint, it is proper to name DOT as a party defendant, even though DOT carries no liability insurance as to such actions. DOT v. Land, 257 Ga. 657 , 362 S.E.2d 372 (1987).

Limits on State Liability

Department’s acts are acts of the State of Georgia, and the state, in the construction and maintenance of highways through the Department of Transportation, performs a governmental function. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1505, 95-1710).

Department cannot be sued without state consent. —

Department of Transportation is a part of the sovereign state, an agent or servant of the state, and the department cannot be sued without the express consent of the sovereign. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1505, 95-1710).

Department may sue or be sued for only limited purposes. —

Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) has no powers and no functions except those expressly authorized by the state; although the Department of Transportation is authorized by the state to sue and to be sued, the power to sue and to be sued in the case of the department is only for special purposes. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1505, 95-1710).

Negligent severance of building and negligent relocation of trunk sewer. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may be sued for the negligent severance of a building and the negligent relocation of a trunk sewer for the purpose of clearing a right of way for the construction of a state-aid road, which is sufficient to show a cause of action which originates on a highway. Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316 , 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1710, 95-1712).

Remedies for damages off highway not actions against department. —

Procedure for bringing an action against the Department of Transportation is inapplicable to a case where the injury does not originate on a highway; if there has been an independent taking of private property for public use, the injured party is relegated either to the remedy of injunction or mandamus, when such a remedy is appropriate, or else to an action at law. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Exception for employee suing department for workers’ compensation. —

Employee of the Department of Transportation may bring an action directly against the department under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an injury arising out of and during the course of employment; this is the sole exception under which the legislature has granted authority for the department to be sued other than the method provided for in statute. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1505, 95-1710).

County Liability

No waiver of immunity. —

County was not liable because the county had no liability insurance and thus retained the county’s sovereign immunity; under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-6 , there was nothing which the DOT must have defended or for which DOT must have been responsible for on behalf of the county. DOT v. Price, 208 Ga. App. 320 , 430 S.E.2d 602 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1104, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 762 (Ga. July 15, 1993).

Department of Transportation’s waiver of DOT’s own immunity by the purchase of liability insurance for employees could not have created a “total” or “partial waiver” of the county’s immunity. DOT v. Price, 208 Ga. App. 320 , 430 S.E.2d 602 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1104, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 762 (Ga. July 15, 1993).

No liability for county. —

When there is no liability for the county, the mechanism for holding the DOT responsible for damages under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-6 does not create such liability. Christian v. Monroe County, 203 Ga. App. 342 , 417 S.E.2d 37 (1992).

Damage off highway. —

When the department takes rock from land not on a highway, and uses the rock in the construction of a road, the owner’s cause of action does not originate on a highway, and the owner’s remedy is an action against the board in the county of the residence of a member at the time the suit is brought. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 , 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Liability of Other Parties

Section not applicable to other defendants. —

Provisions of this section do not include common-law tort actions against parties other than a county and the Department of Transportation simply because the alleged negligent act “originated on a highway.” Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316 , 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1710, 95-1712).

Actions against contractors. —

Proceeding against a private contractor although based upon a cause of action “originating on a highway” could be maintained without adherence to the provisions of this section. Fulton County v. Woodside, 223 Ga. 316 , 155 S.E.2d 404 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1710, 95-1712).

Section on necessary parties not applicable to declaratory judgments. —

When the suit was for a declaratory judgment and was not brought under former Code 1933, § 95-1710, a provision of that statute relating to necessary parties was inapplicable to the case made by the petition. Woodside v. State Hwy. Dep't, 216 Ga. 254 , 115 S.E.2d 560 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

32-2-7. Compensation for employees injured in line of duty.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “external violence, accident, or injury” means any act of violence, an accident, or an injury that is caused by a person other than:
    1. One who is an employee of the department; or
    2. One who is an employee of a contractor or subcontractor performing duties under a contract with the department.
  2. Any employee of the department who, on or after July 1, 1987, is injured in the line of duty by an act of external violence, accident, or injury shall be entitled to receive compensation as provided in this Code section. Going to and from work shall not be considered in the line of duty. For the purposes of this Code section, “line of duty” means working in the proximity of traffic movements or equipment movements doing maintenance, construction, or other activities which may be construed as hazardous.
  3. An employee injured in the line of duty as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section shall continue to receive his regular compensation for the period of time that the employee is physically unable to perform the duties of his employment; provided, however, that such benefits provided in this Code section shall not be granted for injuries resulting from a single incident for more than a total of 180 working days. An employee shall be required to submit to his department head satisfactory evidence of such disability.
  4. Benefits made available under this Code section shall be subordinate to any workers’ compensation benefits for which the employee is eligible and shall be limited to the difference between the amount of available workers’ compensation benefits and the amount of the employee’s regular compensation.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-7 , enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 390, § 1.

32-2-8. Department to fly POW-MIA flag at interstate rest areas.

The Department of Transportation shall fly the POW-MIA flag year-round at each of the rest areas along interstate highways in this state. The department is authorized to place a plaque at each rest area to indicate Georgia’s appreciation of the sacrifices of prisoners of war and those missing in action and their families.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-8 , enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 485, § 1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, “year-round” was substituted for “year round” in the first sentence.

Article 2 State Transportation Board

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2001, p. 1215, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “No state agency shall name or rename any state road, bridge, interchange, or any part of a road in honor of, or with the name of, any person unless such action is approved by a joint resolution or Act of the General Assembly which is approved by the Governor or becomes law without such approval. This Code section shall not apply to a political subdivision of the state naming any road which is under the jurisdiction of such political subdivision.”

Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32A/SB 465, not codified by the General Assembly, provided for the repeal of Ga. L. 2001, p. 1215, § 2, which section has been codified as and superceded by Code Section 32-4-3, relating to naming state roads, bridges, or interchanges, and which Code section shall remain effective.

32-2-20. Composition of board; qualifications of members; terms of office; selection of members; filling of vacancies; officers; meetings; compensation.

  1. The State Transportation Board shall be composed of one member to be chosen from each congressional district of the state in the manner provided in subsection (b) of this Code section. Each member of the board shall be a resident of the congressional district which he or she represents. In the event any person who is an officer, agent, official, or employee of the state or of any county, municipality, or other political subdivision thereof or who is a member of the General Assembly is appointed or elected as a member of the board, such person must resign as such officer, agent, official, employee, or member prior to taking office as a member of the board.
  2. Each member shall be elected to serve for a term of five years and until his or her successor is duly elected and certified. The member of the board from each congressional district shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the House of Representatives and Senate whose respective districts are embraced or partly embraced within such congressional district, meeting in caucus at the regular session of the General Assembly immediately preceding the expiration of the term of office of each such board member. Said caucus shall be called at the state capitol by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate within the first ten days of the convening of the General Assembly in regular session by mailing to the members of the General Assembly who are affected written notice at least four days before the caucus, which notice shall state the time, place, and purpose of said caucus. Within 15 days after each such election, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate shall jointly transmit a certificate of such election to the Secretary of State who, upon receipt thereof, shall immediately issue his or her commission thereon, with the great seal of the state affixed thereto. Any member of the board shall be subject to recall at any time by a majority vote of the legislative caucus that elected the member.
  3. In the event that any vacancy for any cause shall occur in the membership of the board during any regular session of the General Assembly, the remainder of the unexpired term shall be filled by a member elected by a majority vote of those members of the General Assembly whose respective districts are embraced or partly embraced within the congressional district where the vacancy occurred, in the same manner as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section for the election of board members. In the event that any vacancy for any cause shall occur in the membership of the board while the General Assembly is not in session, the remainder of the unexpired term shall be filled by a member elected by a majority vote of those members of the General Assembly whose respective districts are embraced or partly embraced within the congressional district where the vacancy occurred, at a meeting which shall be called by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate at some convenient location and in the manner provided in subsection (b) of this Code section for the election of board members.
  4. The board shall, by majority vote of those members present and voting at regular sessions, elect from their number a chairman and vice-chairman who shall serve at the pleasure of the board. In like manner, the board shall also elect a secretary, who need not necessarily be a member of the board, and who shall also serve at the pleasure of the board.
  5. The board shall meet in regular session at least one day each month, at least nine of which regular sessions are to be held at the headquarters of the Department of Transportation in Atlanta, and at such other special meetings as may be called by the commissioner, by the chairman, or by a majority of the members of the board upon reasonable written notice to all members of the board. Further, the chairman of the board or the commissioner is authorized from time to time to call meetings of committees of the board which are established by board policy; and to require the attendance of a member or members of the board at places inside or outside the state when, in the opinion of the chairman or the commissioner, the member or members of the board are needed to attend properly to the department’s business. A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of all business including election or removal of the commissioner. Except as otherwise provided in this title, any power of the board may be exercised by a majority vote of those members present at any meeting at which there is a quorum.
  6. The members of the board shall receive no salary but shall receive for each day of actual attendance at meetings of the board and the committee meetings the per diem and transportation costs prescribed in Code Section 45-7-21. A like sum shall be paid for each day actually spent in studying the transportation needs of the state or attending other functions as a representative of the board, not to exceed 60 days in any calendar year. No per diem shall be paid for meetings of the board conducted by conference call. In addition, they shall receive actual transportation costs while traveling by public carrier or the legal mileage rate for the use of a personal automobile in connection with such attendance and road study. Such per diem and expense shall be paid from funds appropriated to the department upon presentation, by members of the board, of vouchers approved by the chairperson and signed by the secretary.

History. — Ga. L. 1919, p. 242, art. 3, § 2; Ga. L. 1921, p. 199, §§ 6, 7; Code 1933, §§ 95-1601, 95-1602, 95-1603, 95-1605; Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, § 4; Ga. L. 1951, p. 31, § 1; Ga. L. 1958, p. 624, § 1; Ga. L. 1963, p. 3, § 1; Ga. L. 1963, p. 282, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 151, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1055, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-306, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 11; Ga. L. 1975, p. 833, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 296, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1041, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 2/SB 200; Ga. L. 2010, p. 818, § 1/SB 520; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 32/HB 142.

Cross references. —

State Transportation Board, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. IV.

Legal mileage rate, § 50-19-7 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

No action for unlawful appropriation. —

Without constitutional or statutory authorization, no action lies directly and primarily against the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) for unlawful appropriation of private property for road construction purposes. Edmonds v. State Hwy. Bd., 37 Ga. App. 812 , 142 S.E. 214 (1928).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 21-2-4.1 applicable to State Transportation Board. — O.C.G.A. § 21-2-4.1 applies to whatever appointments must be made to the State Transportation Board as a result of congressional redistricting. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-9.

Lapse of appropriations that become deobligated. — Appropriated state funds which become deobligated during a subsequent fiscal year are subject to lapse and may not be applied to contracts for which motor fuel tax appropriations were previously committed. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-9.

Expenses for attendance at out-of-state meetings. — Members of the State Transportation Board of Georgia are entitled to receive, as the daily expense allowance allocated to the members by O.C.G.A. § 45-7-21 , their actual expenses for attendance at board and committee meetings which are held out-of-state. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. —

39A C.J.S., Highways, § 219 et seq.

32-2-21. Powers and duties of board generally.

The board shall be charged with the general control and supervision of the department. In the exercise of such general control and supervision, the board shall have such duties, powers, and authority as are expressly vested in it by this title, including but not limited to:

  1. Designation of public roads on the state highway system;
  2. Approval of negotiated construction contracts, of authority lease agreements, or of the advertising of nonnegotiated construction contracts; and
  3. Approval of all long-range plans and programs of the department.

History. — Ga. L. 1925, p. 208, § 3; Code 1933, § 95-1606; Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-307, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 2; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 3/SB 200.

Cross references. —

State Transportation Board, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. IV.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Voluntary dismissal of claims with prejudice was not a contract and, thus, O.C.G.A. §§ 23-2-20 and 32-2-21 did not apply to authorize setting aside of the dismissal. Kent v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Ga. App. 564 , 504 S.E.2d 710 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1833, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1239 (Ga. Dec. 4, 1998).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Lapse of appropriations that become deobligated. — Appropriated state funds which become deobligated during a subsequent fiscal year are subject to lapse and may not be applied to contracts for which motor fuel tax appropriations were previously committed. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-9.

32-2-22. Definitions; responsibilities of director and Planning Division; approval of program and plan.

  1. As used in this chapter and in Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title, the term:
    1. “Director” means the director of planning provided for by Code Section 32-2-43.
    2. “Division” means the Planning Division of the department provided for by paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of Code Section 32-2-41.
    3. “Metropolitan planning organization” means the forum for cooperative transportation decision making for a metropolitan planning area.
    4. “Metropolitan transportation plan” means the official intermodal transportation plan that is developed and adopted through the metropolitan transportation planning process for a metropolitan planning area.
    5. “Nonmetropolitan area” means a geographic area outside the designated metropolitan planning areas.
    6. “State-wide strategic transportation plan” means the official, intermodal, comprehensive, fiscally constrained transportation plan which includes projects, programs, and other activities to support implementation of the state’s strategic transportation goals and policies. This plan and the process for developing the plan shall comply with 23 C.F.R. Section 450.104.
    7. “State-wide transportation improvement program” means a state-wide prioritized listing of transportation projects covering a period of four years that is consistent with the state-wide strategic transportation plan, metropolitan transportation plans, and transportation improvement programs and required for multi-modal projects to be eligible for funding under Title 23 U.S.C. and Title 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53.
    8. “Transportation improvement program” means a prioritized listing of transportation projects covering a period of four years that is developed and formally adopted by a metropolitan planning organization as part of the metropolitan transportation planning process, consistent with the metropolitan transportation plan, and required for projects to be eligible for funding under Title 23 U.S.C. and Title 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53.
  2. The director and the division shall:
    1. Review and make recommendations to the Governor concerning all proposed regional land transportation plans and transportation improvement programs and negotiate with the propounder of the plans concerning changes or amendments which may be recommended by the department or the Governor, consistent with applicable federal law and regulation;
    2. Review any transportation projects proposed by the department and adopt, remove, or otherwise include such projects as all or a portion of department plans, consistent with applicable federal law and regulation;
    3. Develop the state-wide strategic transportation plan and the state-wide transportation improvement program and support the various transportation improvement programs;
    4. Develop an annual capital construction project list to be reviewed by the Governor and submitted to the General Assembly for consideration in the budget;
    5. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out its duties under the provisions of this title. The division shall report the content of such rules or regulations to the Transportation Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives for their approval by majority vote prior to the promulgation thereof; and
    6. Do all things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly given in this Code section.
  3. After review and approval by the Governor, the state transportation improvement program and the state-wide strategic transportation plan shall be submitted to the State Transportation Board for approval.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-22 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 4/SB 200.

Article 3 Officers

32-2-40. Selection of commissioner of transportation; term; vacancy; bond; other elective office.

  1. The commissioner of transportation shall be the chief executive officer of the department.
  2. The commissioner, his successor, and each succeeding commissioner thereafter shall be selected by a vote of the majority of the total number of members of the board. At the time of said vote, the board shall stipulate the term the commissioner shall serve, and said commissioner shall serve during the stipulated term and until his successor is selected by the board and duly qualified. The board shall stipulate one of the following to be the term of the commissioner:
    1. The commissioner shall serve at the pleasure of the board; or
    2. The commissioner shall serve any term specified by the board up to and including a maximum of four years; however, the board shall not specify a term of office that extends beyond the end of the term of the Governor in office at the time the commissioner’s term is scheduled to begin.
  3. If the board stipulates that the commissioner shall serve under the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, upon a vote of the majority of the total members of the board, the commissioner shall be subject to removal by the board for just cause after reasonable notice, copy of charge, hearing, and opportunity for presentation of evidence. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the commissioner by reason of resignation, removal, death, or permanent incapacity and inability to perform the duties of the office, the deputy commissioner shall become acting commissioner to serve until such time as the board at any regular or called meeting selects a new commissioner to fill the unexpired term of office created by such vacancy.
  4. The commissioner shall qualify, upon selection, by executing a bond in the amount of $100,000.00 with a corporate surety licensed to do business in this state and payable to the Governor and his successors in office, such bond to be approved by the Governor and conditioned on the faithful discharge of his duties as commissioner. The premium of such bond shall be paid from funds of the department.
  5. The commissioner shall devote full time and attention to the duties and responsibilities of his office. No person who serves as commissioner shall be eligible, except as hereinafter provided in this subsection, to qualify as a candidate in any primary, special, or general election for any state or federal elective office nor to hold any such office, except as hereinafter provided in this subsection, during the time he serves as commissioner and for a period of 12 months after the date he ceases to serve as commissioner. However, nothing contained in this subsection shall prevent the commissioner from being appointed to any other office nor disqualify him from running in any election to succeed himself in any office to which he was appointed nor to hold such office in the event he is elected thereto and otherwise qualified therefor; provided, however, that the commissioner shall resign as commissioner of transportation before accepting any such appointive office.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-308, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 400, § 1.

Cross references. —

Official bonds generally, T. 45, C. 4.

32-2-41. Powers, duties, and authority of commissioner; establishment of divisions.

  1. As the chief executive officer of the department, the commissioner shall have direct and full control of the department. He or she shall possess, exercise, and perform all the duties, powers, and authority which may be vested in the department by law, except those duties, powers, and authority which are expressly reserved by law to the board or the director of planning. The commissioner’s principal responsibility shall be the faithful implementation of transportation plans produced by the director of planning and approved by the Governor and the State Transportation Board, subject to the terms of such appropriations Acts as may be adopted from time to time. The commissioner shall also be responsible for the duties and activities assigned to the commissioner in Article 5 of Chapter 8 of Title 48. When the board is not in regular or called session, the commissioner shall perform, exercise, and possess all duties, powers, and authority of the board except:
    1. Approval of the advertising of nonnegotiated construction contracts; and
    2. Approval of authority lease agreements.

      The commissioner shall also have the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and to execute all contracts, authority lease agreements, and all other functions except those that cannot legally be delegated to him or her by the board.

    1. The commissioner shall have the authority to employ, discharge, promote, supervise, and determine the compensation of such personnel as he or she may deem necessary or useful to the effective operation and administration of the department except that the commissioner shall not employ a person who is related within the second degree of consanguinity to the commissioner or any member of the board, provided that such prohibition shall not be applied so as to terminate the employment of persons employed before said prohibited relationship was created by the subsequent election of a board member or appointment of a commissioner.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-29, the commissioner shall have the authority to appoint and employ five nonuniformed investigators who shall be certified peace officers pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 8 of Title 35, the “Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.” The investigators shall have full arrest powers in cases involving internal affairs of the department and in cases involving obstruction of, encroaching on, or injury to public roads or rights of way. In such cases, the investigators shall be authorized:
      1. To investigate Department of Transportation related crimes committed anywhere in the state;
      2. To arrest any person violating the criminal laws of this state;
      3. To serve and execute warrants after notifying the law enforcement agency of the local jurisdiction of the intent to serve such warrant or warrants;
      4. To enforce in general the criminal laws of this state;
      5. To issue citations for civil damage to any person found to be violating the laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to vegetation management; and
      6. To carry firearms while performing their duties but only if such investigators have been certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council as having successfully completed the course of training required by Chapter 8 of Title 35, the “Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.”
    3. The power granted to the commissioner in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be subject to and limited by Article 1 of Chapter 20 of Title 45 establishing a merit system for department employees, to the extent that the same or any amendments thereto are now or may be hereafter applicable to department personnel.
    4. There shall be a Planning Division of the department, directed and staffed by the director of planning, which shall be the department’s principal unit for developing the state transportation improvement program and the state-wide strategic transportation plan and coordinating transportation policies, planning, and programs related to design, construction, maintenance, operations, and financing of transportation, under the supervision of the director. The division and the director shall not have jurisdiction over the funds allocated for the local maintenance and improvement grant program pursuant to subsection (d) of Code Section 32-5-27 except as expressly provided by said subsection.
    5. There shall be an Engineering Division of the department to be supervised by the chief engineer, a Finance Division of the department to be supervised by the treasurer, an Administration Division of the department to be supervised by the deputy commissioner, an Intermodal Division to be supervised by an appointee serving at the pleasure of the commissioner, and a Local Grants Division to be supervised by an appointee serving at the pleasure of the commissioner. The duties, responsibilities, and personnel of each such division shall be as established by the commissioner.
    6. The commissioner may establish a Construction Division, an Operations and Maintenance Division, a Permitting Division, and a Public-Private Initiatives Division of the department. The commissioner shall assign to such divisions, except as otherwise provided by law, such personnel and such duties and responsibilities as may be necessary and appropriate for the proper functioning of the department.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-309, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 12; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 3; Ga. L. 2004, p. 898, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 5/SB 200; Ga. L. 2010, p. 396, § .1/SB 305; Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 1.1/HB 277; Ga. L. 2010, p. 818, § 2/SB 520.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, “authority lease agreements” was substituted for “authority-lease agreements” in paragraph (a)(2) and in the undesignated language at the end of subsection (a).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 1/HB 277, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Investment Act of 2010.’ ”

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of law on administrative law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2010).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Regulation of outdoor advertising. —

Since former paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-41 expressly forbade the commissioner from exercising the board’s power concerning the approval of “long-range plans and programs of the department,” and the adoption, amendment, or repeal of departmental rules and regulations concerning outdoor advertising in Georgia was a long-range program, the commissioner was not empowered to adopt proposed amendments to such rules and regulations sua sponte. Outdoor Adv. Ass'n v. DOT, 186 Ga. App. 550 , 367 S.E.2d 827 (1988).

32-2-41.1. State-wide strategic transportation plan.

The director shall prepare a state-wide strategic transportation plan. Such plan shall be updated and delivered in coordination with the state-wide, intermodal transportation plan as defined in 23 C.F.R. Section 450.104. The director shall prepare the state-wide strategic transportation plan for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the chairpersons of the Senate Transportation Committee and House Committee on Transportation.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-41.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 528, § 1/HB 1189; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 6/SB 200; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 1/HB 774; Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 1/HB 1098.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, rewrote this Code section.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2008, Code Section 32-2-41.1, as enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 806, § 1/SB 417, was redesignated as Code Section 32-2-41.2.

32-2-41.2. Development of benchmarks; reports; value engineering studies.

  1. The commissioner shall develop and publish in print or electronically benchmarks, based upon the type and scope of a construction project, that detail a realistic time frame for completion of each stage of a construction project, including preliminary engineering and design, environmental permitting and review, and right of way acquisition.
  2. The director shall submit an annual report to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the chairpersons of the House and Senate Transportation Committees detailing the progress of every construction project valued at $10 million or more against the benchmarks. This report shall include an analysis explaining the discrepancies between the benchmarks and actual performance on each project as well as an explanation for delays. This report shall also be published on the website of the department.
  3. The department shall create and maintain on its website a detailed status report on each project under planning or construction. This status report shall include, but not be limited to, the name and contact information of the project manager, if applicable.
  4. Value engineering studies shall be performed on all projects whose costs exceed $50 million, except for any project procured in accordance with Code Sections 32-2-79, 32-2-80, and 32-2-81, and the director shall submit an annual report to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the chairpersons of the House and Senate Transportation Committees detailing the amount saved due to the value engineering studies. This report shall also be published on the website of the department.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-41.2 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 806, § 1/SB 417; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 7/SB 200; Ga. L. 2010, p. 838, § 10/SB 388; Ga. L. 2013, p. 67, § 1/HB 202; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 2/HB 774.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2008, Code Section 32-2-41.1, as enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 806, § 1/SB 417, was redesignated as Code Section 32-2-41.2.

32-2-41.3. Georgia Freight Railroad Program.

  1. For purposes of this Code section, the term “short line railway” means any carrier designated as a Class III by the Surface Transportation Board.
  2. The Georgia Freight Railroad Program shall be administered, subject to appropriations, at the discretion of the commissioner, in order to enhance the state’s investment in freight rail projects for public benefit and to support a safe and balanced transportation system for the state.
  3. Eligible projects under the Georgia Freight Railroad Program shall include rail enhancement projects to acquire, lease, or improve railways or railroad equipment, including rail crossings, rolling stock, rights of way, or rail facilities; rail preservation projects to acquire, lease, or improve short line railways or assist other appropriate entities to acquire, lease, or improve short line railways; and rail industrial projects to build, construct, restructure, or improve industrial access to railroad tracks and related facilities.
  4. In administering the program, the commissioner shall make every effort to balance such program among all regions of this state and among the various applicants.
  5. Following the end of each fiscal year, the commissioner or his or her designee shall submit an annual report on the activities of the Georgia Freight Railroad Program to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and shall make such report available to the members of the General Assembly.
  6. Prior to the expenditure of state funds, the commissioner shall make a determination whether such expenditure is ample consideration for a substantial public benefit in compliance with Article III, Section VI, Paragraph VI(a) of the Georgia Constitution. Such substantial public benefit must constitute a benefit accrued to the public in the form of enhanced public safety, enhanced mobility of goods, congestion mitigation, enhanced trade and economic development, improved air quality or land use, reduction of public expenditures due to improved transportation efficiency or infrastructure preservation, or other public benefits identified and approved by a majority of the board. Such public benefit shall also align with goals in the state-wide strategic transportation plan as defined in Code Section 32-2-41.1 or the state’s freight plan as defined in 49 U.S.C. 70202.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-41.3 , enacted by Ga. L. 2020, p. 816, § 1/HB 820; Ga. L. 2020, p. 817, § 1/SB 371; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 1/HB 588.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective January 1, 2021.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection (f), substituted “VI(a)” for “VI (a)” near the end of the first sentence, and added the second and third sentences.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2020, the enactment of subsection (c) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2020, p. 816, § 1/HB 820, was treated as impliedly repealed and superseded by Ga. L. 2020, p. 817, § 1/SB 371, due to irreconcilable conflict.

32-2-42. Deputy commissioner of transportation; chief engineer; treasurer and assistant treasurer.

  1. The commissioner shall appoint a deputy commissioner of transportation to serve at the pleasure of the commissioner. Before assuming the duties of his or her office, the deputy commissioner shall qualify by giving bond with a corporate surety licensed to do business in this state, such bond to be in the amount of $500,000.00 and payable to the Governor and his or her successors in office. The bond shall be subject to the approval of the Governor and shall be conditioned on the faithful discharge of the duties of the office, including any duties of the office of the commissioner which the deputy commissioner may be required to perform as acting commissioner. The premium for the bond shall be paid out of the funds of the department. The deputy commissioner shall be the assistant commissioner and shall be empowered to act in his or her own name for the commissioner. The deputy commissioner may exercise to the extent permitted by law only such powers and duties of the commissioner as have been previously assigned to him or her in writing by the commissioner. In the event of the commissioner’s temporary incapacity which causes his or her absence from the offices of the Department of Transportation in Atlanta, Georgia, for 30 consecutive days, the deputy commissioner shall assume all the powers and duties of the commissioner, to be exercised until such time as the commissioner’s temporary absence or incapacity shall cease. In the event of the commissioner’s permanent incapacity, the deputy commissioner shall become acting commissioner, as provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 32-2-40.
  2. The commissioner shall appoint a chief engineer to serve at the pleasure of the commissioner. The chief engineer shall be the chief engineer of the department and shall be a professional engineer registered in accordance with Chapter 15 of Title 43 and who shall be experienced in highway engineering.
  3. The commissioner shall appoint a treasurer of the department to serve at the pleasure of the commissioner. Before assuming the duties of his or her office, the treasurer shall qualify by giving bond with a corporate surety licensed to do business in this state, such bond to be in the amount of $500,000.00 and payable to the Governor and his or her successors in office. The bond shall be subject to the approval of the Governor and shall be conditioned on the faithful discharge of the duties of the office. The premium for the bond shall be paid out of the funds of the department. The duties of the treasurer shall be to receive all funds from all sources to which the department is entitled, to account for all funds received by the department, to adjust for additional appropriations or balances brought forward from previous years with the prior approval of the Office of Planning and Budget, and to perform such other duties as may be required of him or her by the commissioner. The commissioner shall have the authority to appoint an assistant treasurer in the same manner and under the same conditions as set forth in this subsection for the appointment of the treasurer, including the qualifying in advance by giving bond of the same type, amount, and paid for in the same manner as required of the treasurer. The assistant treasurer shall assume the duties of office of treasurer upon the incapacity or death of the treasurer and shall serve until a new treasurer is appointed as provided in this subsection.
  4. Any provision of this title or of any other statute or of any rule or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, the commissioner or the deputy commissioner may, in addition to serving as commissioner or deputy commissioner, also simultaneously serve as chief engineer, provided that he or she shall be appointed and shall possess the qualifications as prescribed in subsection (b) of this Code section. A commissioner or deputy commissioner simultaneously serving as chief engineer shall be paid for the discharge of all his or her duties the sum to which he or she is entitled as commissioner or deputy commissioner.

History. — Ga. L. 1925, p. 208, § 2; Code 1933, § 95-1607; Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, § 7; Code 1933, § 95A-310, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 102, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 4; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 8/SB 200; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 2/HB 137.

Cross references. —

Official bonds generally, T. 45, C. 4.

32-2-43. Director of planning; appointment; responsibilities.

  1. There shall be a director of planning appointed by the Governor subject to approval by a majority vote of both the House Transportation Committee and the Senate Transportation Committee. The director shall serve during the term of the Governor by whom he or she is appointed and at the pleasure of the Governor. If the Governor’s term expires and the incoming Governor has not made an appointment, the current director of planning may serve until a replacement is appointed by the incoming Governor and confirmed by the House and Senate Transportation Committees.
  2. The director of planning’s principal responsibility shall be the development of transportation plans, including the development of the state-wide strategic transportation plan and state-wide transportation improvement program and other comprehensive plans pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-3 and Code Section 32-2-22, strategic transportation plans pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-41.1, and benchmarks and value engineering studies pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-41.2, in consultation with the board, the Governor, and the commissioner. The director shall also be responsible for the duties and activities assigned to the director in Article 5 of Chapter 8 of Title 48. The director shall be the director of the Planning Division of the department and shall possess, exercise, and perform all the duties, powers, and authority which may be vested in such division by law and are necessary or appropriate for such purpose, except those duties, powers, and authority which are expressly reserved by law to the board or the commissioner.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-43 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 9/SB 200; Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 2/HB 277; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 3/HB 137.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2009, “the” was deleted following “may be vested in” in the last sentence of subsection (b).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 1/HB 277, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Investment Act of 2010.’ ”

Article 4 Exercise of Power to Contract

Cross references. —

Applicability of article to airport construction contracts, § 32-2-2(a)(17).

State purchasing contracts generally, § 50-5-50 et seq.

Applicability of State Properties Code to department, § 50-16-38 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Construction and effect of “changed conditions” clause in public works or construction contract with state or its subdivision, 56 A.L.R.4th 1042.

PART 1 General Contracting Provisions

Effective date. —

This part became effective July 1, 2021.

32-2-60. Authority to contract; form and content of construction contracts; bonds.

  1. The department shall have the authority to contract as set forth in this article and in Code Section 32-2-2. All department construction contracts shall be in writing. Any contract entered into by the department for the construction of a public road shall include, as a cost of the project, provisions for sowing vegetation, if appropriate, on all banks, fills, cuts, ditches, and other places where soil erosion is likely to result from the necessary incidents to road work along the right of way of the road project.
  2. Persons, firms, or corporations submitting bids on department construction contracts are required to examine the site of the proposed work and determine for themselves the anticipated subsurface and latent physical conditions at the site prior to submitting a bid on the project. The submission of a bid shall be prima-facie evidence that the bidder has made such examination and is satisfied as to the conditions to be encountered in performing the work. The department does not in any way guarantee the amount or nature of subsurface materials which may be encountered and which must be excavated, graded, or driven through in performing the work on the project. The contractor shall not plead deception or misunderstanding because of variations from quantities of work to be performed or materials to be furnished as shown on the plans or minor variations from the locations or character of the work. Payment will be made only for actual quantities of work performed in accordance with the plans and specifications. The department shall not provide compensation above the amount bid on such project solely due to the encountering of subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which are different from those anticipated by the bidder.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section, the department reserves the right to make, at any time during the progress of work, such increases or decreases in quantities and such alterations in the details of construction as necessary or desirable to satisfactorily complete the work. Such increases or decreases shall not invalidate the contract nor release the surety and the contractor agrees to perform the work as altered.
    2. Whenever an alteration materially increases or decreases the scope of the work specified in the contract, a supplemental agreement acceptable to both parties shall be made.  In the absence of a supplemental agreement acceptable to both parties, the department may direct that the work be done either by force account or at existing contract prices.  Any force account agreement shall be in writing, specifying the terms of payment signed by the chief engineer, and agreed to in writing by the contractor.
    3. Changes made by the engineer will not be considered to waive any of the provisions of the contract, nor may the contractor make any claim for loss of anticipated profits because of the changes, or by reason of any variation between the approximate quantities and the quantities of work as done.
    1. When the estimated amount of any department construction contract exceeds $300 million, performance and payment bonds shall be required in the amount of at least the total amount payable by the terms of the contract unless the department, after public notice, makes a written determination supported by specific findings that single bonds in such amount are not reasonably available, and the board approves such determination in a public meeting. In such event, the estimated value of the construction portion of the contract, excluding right of way acquisition and engineering, shall be guaranteed by a combination of security including, but not limited to, the following:
      1. Payment, performance, surety, cosurety, or excess layer surety bonds;
      2. Letters of credit;
      3. Guarantees of the contractor or its parent companies;
      4. Obligations of the United States and of its agencies and instrumentalities; or
      5. Cash collateral;

        provided, however, that the aggregate total guarantee of the project may not use a corporate guarantee of more than 35 percent. The combination of such guarantees shall be determined at the discretion of the department, subject to the approval of the board; provided, however, that such aggregate guarantees shall include not less than $300 million of performance and payment bonds and shall equal not less than 100 percent of the contractor’s obligation under the construction portion of the contract.

    2. Payment guarantees approved pursuant to this subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of Code Section 13-10-61. Contractors requesting payment under construction contracts guaranteed pursuant to this subsection shall provide the following certification under oath with each such request: “All payments due to subcontractors and suppliers from previous payment received under the contract have been made, and timely payments will be made from the proceeds of the payment covered by this certification.”

History. — Ga. L. 1965, p. 628, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-801, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1908, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 5; Ga. L. 2006, p. 663, § 1/HB 1177; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 32/SB 103; Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 1/SB 445.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, deleted former subsection (d), which read: “The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section shall be applicable only to federal-aid highway contracts.”; and redesignated former subsection (e) as present subsection (d).

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, “limited to, the following:” was substituted for “limited to the following:” near the end of the introductory paragraph of subsection (e) (now subsection (d)), “Guarantees” was substituted for “Guaranties” in paragraph (e)(3) (now subparagraph (d)(1)(C)), and in paragraph (e)(5) (now subparagraph (d)(1)(E)), “collateral; provided, however,” was substituted for “collateral. (6) Provided however” and “percent” was substituted for “%”.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 1988, p. 1908, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to or affect existing contracts in effect on the effective date of this Act.” This Act became effective April 14, 1988.

Ga. L. 1988, p. 1908, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “No provision of this Act shall prohibit any court of law or equity from reforming a contract or awarding damages based upon a mutual mistake of fact or fraud in the inception of a contract or its performance.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Necessity for retaining highway project file for 20-year period. — It is necessary to retain an entire highway project file for a 20-year period; retaining the release, final voucher, and contract for this period will not adequately protect the state’s interests in compliance with state law because highway construction contracts are sealed contracts and are therefore subject to a 20-year statute of limitations. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-89.

32-2-61. Limitations on power to contract.

  1. The department is expressly prohibited from making or contracting any debts or entering into any contract for which it does not have sufficient funds appropriated at the time of making said debt or entering into said contract to enable it to meet such debt or such contract obligation. However, such prohibition shall not apply to contracts entered into pursuant to Article IX, Section III, Paragraph I and Article VII, Section IV, Paragraph IV of the Constitution of Georgia; and the department is expressly authorized to enter into such contracts and to obligate the department in connection therewith. For the purpose of paying obligations imposed by any such contract, such funds as may be appropriated to the department for activities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads in the state and the cost incident thereto may be pledged by the department.
    1. The board shall not enter into any lease contract if:
      1. The aggregates of all lease rentals from that and all other such lease contracts including the contract or contracts proposed to be entered into exceed $19,900,000.00 per annum or 15 percent of the funds appropriated to the department in the fiscal year immediately preceding entering into any such lease rental contract, whichever is greater; or
      2. Such lease contract constitutes security for bonds or other obligations issued by the lessor.
    2. The execution of any lease contract is prohibited until the General Assembly has specifically provided funds in an appropriations Act for the payment of at least one year’s rental under such contract.
  2. Except as authorized by Article 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 50, the department is prohibited from entering into any contract for the purchase of supplies, materials, equipment, or services, except those services ancillary to the construction and maintenance of a public road.
    1. The department is prohibited from negotiating any contract for the construction or maintenance of a public road involving the expenditure of $200,000.00 or more except any contract:
      1. With counties, municipalities, and state agencies, provided that such negotiated contract shall be made at the average bid price of the same kind of work let to contract after advertisement during a period of 60 days prior to the making of the contract;
      2. With a railroad company or utility concerning relocation of its tracks or facilities where the same are not then located on a public road and such relocation is necessary as an incident to the construction or improvement of a public road. However, nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as requiring the department to furnish a site or right of way for railroad or railway lines or tracks or utility facilities required to be removed from a public road. Furthermore, this subsection shall not prevent the department from assisting in the removal and relocation of publicly owned utilities from locations on public roads as provided in Code Section 32-6-170;
      3. For emergency construction or maintenance involving the expenditure of $200,000.00 or more when the public interest requires that the work be done without the delay of advertising for public bids;
      4. For the procurement of business, professional, or other services from any person, firm, or corporation as an independent contractor;
      5. With the State Road and Tollway Authority; or
      6. Through the provisions of a design-build contract as provided for in Code Section 32-2-81.
    2. A department contract negotiated and made with a political subdivision, as authorized by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of this subsection, may be subcontracted to any person or political subdivision. It may be performed with inmate labor, except in the case of a public work constructed with federal aid, or the forces of such political subdivision or those of a political subdivision to which such contract has been subcontracted. However, the department shall have the authority to furnish planning, contract plans, specifications, and engineering supervision over a public road being constructed by a political subdivision or by its subcontractor. Any subcontract made under authority of this subsection shall not constitute the basis of any claim against the department, nor shall such subcontract be considered an assignment of the rights of the political subdivision under its contract with the department.
  3. Except for public roads within and leading to state parks, the department is prohibited from maintaining any public road not on the state highway system. Any department contract with a state agency or political subdivision for construction of a public road not then, nor to become upon completion of the contract, part of the state highway system or a road within or leading to a state park shall not relieve the agency or the political subdivision of the responsibility for maintaining such public road as such duty is imposed by this Code section and by Code Sections 32-4-41 and 32-4-91.

History. — Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, § 12; Ga. L. 1951, p. 31, § 3; Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 81, § 1; Ga. L. 1955, p. 249, § 1; Ga. L. 1961, p. 22, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 382, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1055, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-802, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 19; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1159, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56; Ga. L. 1989, p. 356, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 699, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 905, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 117, § 30A/HB 312; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 1/HB 192; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 1/HB 817.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, “subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1)” was substituted for “subparagraph (1)(A)” in the first sentence of paragraph (d)(2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Effect of transfer of state road. —

Department of Transportation is prohibited from maintaining a road after the road is transferred from the state highway system and the department owed no duty to plaintiff who was injured in an accident on the road. Georgia DOT v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 741 , 437 S.E.2d 811 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0250, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994).

When an injured party sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) for injuries received in a single-car accident on a county road, the party could not maintain a negligent maintenance claim against DOT because the road on which the accident occurred was not part of the state highway system, nor did the road lead to a state park; thus, under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41(1) , the county was obligated to maintain the road and, under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-61(e) , DOT’s contract with the county to improve the road did not relieve the county of this responsibility. Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22 , 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0792, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. July 14, 2006).

State DOT not liable for failing to erect road closure signs on county road. —

Because an accident occurred on a county-owned road and did not occur on a part of the state highway system upon which the DOT owed a duty to motorists, and the couple’s expert’s affidavit could not establish a legal duty to erect signs or to take other steps to inform drivers of the closure of the county-owned road, summary judgment for the DOT was proper. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189 , 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0999, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 648 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with financial backing from State Road and Tollway Authority. — Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with all or a portion of the financial backing for the contracts coming from a contractual promise from the State Road and Tollway Authority to borrow and provide money to DOT as and when needed to expend on projects that are the subjects of the construction contracts. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-10.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

32-2-62. Advertising of nonnegotiated construction contracts; approval of negotiated construction contracts; factors to be considered by board for priority of projects.

The advertising of all nonnegotiated department construction contracts shall have the prior approval of the board. When the board is not in session, the commissioner may approve negotiated construction contracts. In determining public roads most in need of work and also the type, class, width, location, and order of priority of each project, the board shall take into consideration such factors as the use of the public road in question; the present need and anticipated development of the area traversed by it; whether or not it is a school bus or mail route; and its use for agricultural or industrial purposes. The board shall also take into consideration the information disclosed by the records required by Code Section 32-4-2 to be maintained by the department.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-803, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-2-63. Authority of commissioner to execute contracts and authority lease agreements.

The commissioner shall have full authority to execute contracts and authority lease agreements on behalf of the department whenever such contracts or agreements have been approved in accordance with this title.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-804, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-2-64. Required letting of contracts by public bid; posting bid on department website sufficient.

Except as authorized by subsection (d) of Code Section 32-2-61, all department construction and maintenance contracts shall be let by public bid. For purposes of this Code section, posting a bid on the department’s website shall satisfy the public bid requirement.

History. — Ga. L. 1949, p. 372, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-805, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 2/HB 817.

Cross references. —

Letting of contracts by Department of Administrative Services by public bid, § 50-5-67 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, as amended, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Judicial notice that construction be done by independent contractor not required. —

In a suit by a property owner for damage to property caused by highway construction, the requirement that competitive bids be taken on highway maintenance and construction contracts does not require the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the construction was done by an independent contractor. Richmond County v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 670 , 137 S.E.2d 343 (1964) (decided under former Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, as amended).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

Authority of state, municipality, or other governmental entity to accept late bids for public works contracts, 49 A.L.R.5th 747.

32-2-65. Advertising for bids.

  1. On all contracts required to be let by public bid, the commissioner shall advertise for competitive bids for at least two weeks; the public advertisement shall be inserted once a week in such newspapers or other publications, or both, as will ensure adequate publicity, the first insertion to be at least two weeks prior to the opening of bids, the second to follow one week after the publication of the first insertion; provided, however, that the advertisement requirement provided in this Code section shall be satisfied by posting the required information on the department’s website for the required time period.
  2. Such advertisement shall include but not be limited to the following items:
    1. A description sufficient to enable the public to know the approximate extent and character of the work to be done;
    2. The time allowed for performance;
    3. The terms and time of payment, including a statement that final payment of amounts withheld or deposited in escrow need not be made until the issuance of the chief engineer’s certification of satisfactory completion of work and acceptance thereof, as provided in Code Sections 32-2-75 through 32-2-77;
    4. Where and under what conditions and costs the detailed plans and specifications and proposal forms may be obtained;
    5. The amount of the required proposal guaranty, if one is required;
    6. The time and place for submission and opening of bids;
    7. The right of the department to reject any one or all bids; and
    8. Such further notice as the department may deem advisable as in the public interest.

History. — Ga. L. 1949, p. 373, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-806, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 6; Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 2/SB 445; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 2/HB 577.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added the proviso at the end of subsection (a).

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, added “, if one is required” at the end of paragraph (b)(5).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, as amended, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Judicial notice that construction be done by independent contractors. —

In a suit by a property owner for damage to property caused by highway construction, the requirement that competitive bids be taken on highway maintenance and construction contracts does not require the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the construction was done by an independent contractor. Richmond County v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 670 , 137 S.E.2d 343 (1964) (decided under former Ga. L. 1950, p. 62, as amended).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Letting one-bid projects, limited negotiation with certain bidders, and letting to second-low bidders are now legal under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-69 and can be included in the “advertised specifications,” whether that term can be applied to the standard specifications themselves or whether the three identified circumstances must be specifically referenced in the actual advertisement of the project. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-21.

32-2-66. Prequalifications of contractors and subcontractors.

In order to establish a list of reliable persons qualified to bid on a department contract or to subcontract with such persons and to ensure that the contract may be awarded to the lowest reliable bidder, the department may adopt and publish in print or electronically uniform and reasonable rules and regulations which may include but not be limited to the following:

  1. A requirement that every contractor desiring to be qualified to bid or subcontract file with the department an application including, among other information: a financial statement; a complete questionnaire regarding the contractor’s organization and the work performed by such contractor; and a statement of equipment owned or leased by such contractor;
  2. Conditions under which a contractor or subcontractor may become disqualified to bid or to subcontract;
  3. Procedures for assigning maximum capacity ratings to contractors and subcontractors; and
  4. Provisions for waiving prequalification of contractors for construction of specialty items. For the purpose of this paragraph, “specialty items” means work that requires highly specialized knowledge, craftsmanship, or equipment not ordinarily available in the type of contracting organizations qualified and expected to bid on the contract as a whole.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-807, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 838, § 10/SB 388.

32-2-67. Payment by bidder to cover costs.

A bidder shall be required to pay to the department a reasonable sum sufficient to cover the cost to the department of copies of the bid proposal form of the department, the standard specifications of the department, and the plans of the contract if such plans are required because the particular contract calls for construction.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-808, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-2-68. Proposal guaranty by bidder.

  1. No bid for capital construction or capital maintenance will be considered by the department unless it is accompanied by a proposal guaranty in the form of a certified check or other acceptable security payable to the treasurer of the department for an amount deemed by the department to be in the public interest and necessary to ensure that the successful bidder will execute the contract bid upon.
  2. A proposal guaranty will be returned to a bidder upon receipt by the department of the bidder’s written withdrawal of his bid if such receipt is before the time scheduled for the opening of bids. Upon the determination by the department of the lowest reliable bidder, the department will return the proposal guaranties to all bidders except that of the lowest reliable bidder. If no contract award is made within 30 days after the date set for the opening of bids, all bids shall be rejected and all proposal guaranties shall be returned unless the department and the successful bidder agree in writing to a longer period of time.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-809, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 3/HB 577.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection (a), inserted “for capital construction or capital maintenance” near the beginning, and substituted “contract bid upon” for “contract on which he bid” at the end.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Forfeiture of bid bond. —

Contractor’s bid bond was required to be forfeited since the contractor first attempted to withdraw the contractor’s bid after all bids submitted were opened and then declined to execute the contract awarded to the contractor. DOT v. American Ins. Co., 268 Ga. 505 , 491 S.E.2d 328 (1997).

32-2-69. Bidding process and award of contract.

  1. Except as authorized by Code Sections 32-2-79, 32-2-80, and 32-2-82, the department shall award contracts to the lowest reliable bidder, provided that the department shall have the right to reject any and all such bids whether such right is reserved in the public notice or not and, in such case, the department may readvertise, perform the work itself, or abandon the project.
  2. If only one bid is received, the department shall open and read the bid. If the bid is at or below the department’s cost estimate for the project as certified by the chief engineer, such cost estimate shall be read immediately and publicly. If the bid exceeds the department’s cost estimate for the project, the department may negotiate with the bidder to establish a fair and reasonable price for the contract, provided that the resulting negotiated contract price is not greater than the bid and that the department’s cost estimate is disclosed to the bidder prior to the beginning of the negotiations. For purposes of this Code section, posting of a bid on the department’s website shall be equivalent to having read the bid.
  3. If the department made errors in the bidding documents which resulted in an unbalanced bid, the department may negotiate with the lowest reliable bidder to correct such errors, provided that the lowest reliable bidder is not changed.
  4. If the lowest reliable bidder is released by the department because of an obvious error or if the lowest reliable bidder refuses to accept the contract and thereby forfeits the bid bond, the department may award the contract to the next lowest reliable bidder, readvertise, perform the work itself, or abandon the project.
  5. The signed, notarized affidavit required in subsection (b) of Code Section 13-10-91 shall be submitted to the department prior to the award of any contract.
  6. The department shall provide by rule and regulation for a procedure to appeal the rejection of any bid for contracts the department is authorized to enter into under this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-810, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 153, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 7; Ga. L. 2003, p. 905, § 3; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 3/HB 817; Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 3/SB 445; Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 2/HB 1098; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 2/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 4/HB 577.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added subsection (f).

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, substituted “award contracts” for “award the contract” in the beginning of subsection (a); added the last sentence to subsection (b); deleted former subsection (e), which read: “For the purposes of this Code section, posting a bid on the department’s website shall be equivalent to having read the bid.”; redesignated former subsection (f) as present subsection (e); and added subsection (f).

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “32-2-79, 32-2-80, and 32-2-82,” for “32-2-79 and 32-2-80” in subsection (a). The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 170 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Forfeiture of bid bond. —

Contractor’s bid bond was required to be forfeited after the contractor first attempted to withdraw the contractor’s bid after all bids submitted were opened and then declined to execute the contract awarded to the contractor. DOT v. American Ins. Co., 268 Ga. 505 , 491 S.E.2d 328 (1997).

Department of Transportation was not obligated to release a bidder from the bidder’s contractual obligations due to an obvious error in the bid. DOT v. American Ins. Co., 268 Ga. 505 , 491 S.E.2d 328 (1997).

Reliable bidder. —

Even if a contractor’s claim that a state transportation department violated the contractor’s U.S. Const., amend. 14 equal protection rights by subjecting the contractor’s paving work to testing and by preventing the contractor’s lowest bid for a repaving project from being accepted was cognizable as a class of one claim, the contractor’s complaint did not meet the tightened Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requirements for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims; the contractor did not identify similarly situated contractors who were treated more favorably with regard to defect testing, and the comparator cited by the contractor with regard to the failure to facilitate acceptance of the contractor’s repaving bid was not properly alleged to have been similarly situated in the absence of an allegation of performance problems, particularly when O.C.G.A. § 32-2-69(a) did not require that the lowest bidder be chosen, but that the lowest reliable bidder be chosen. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Letting one-bid projects, limited negotiation with certain bidders, and letting to second-low bidders are now legal under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-69 and can be included in the “advertised specifications,” whether that term can be applied to the standard specifications themselves or whether the three identified circumstances must be specifically referenced in the actual advertisement of the project. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Public contracts: authority of state or its subdivision to reject all bids, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

Public contracts: low bidder’s monetary relief against state or local agency for nonaward of contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93.

32-2-70. (See Editor’s notes.) Bonds of successful bidder.

  1. Where the contract price exceeds $100,000.00, no department construction contract shall be valid unless the contractor first gives:
    1. The performance and payment bonds in accordance with Chapter 10 of Title 13; and
    2. Such other bonds or insurance policies required by the department in its proposal forms, including but not limited to public liability and property damage insurance bonds or policies.
  2. Public procurement officers shall accept electronic signatures and electronic corporate seals on bonds issued pursuant to this Code section so long as such signatures and seals comply with the provisions of Chapter 12 of Title 10 and Code Section 33-24-14.

    A listing of Executive Orders issued in 2020 can be found at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-811, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 2; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 2/HB 192; Ga. L. 2021, p. 459, § 2-1/SB 169.

Editor’s notes. — For application of this statute in 2020 and 2021, see Executive Orders 06.11.20.01, 06.29.20.02, 07.15.20.01, 07.31.20.02, 08.15.20.01, 08.31.20.02, 09.15.20.01, 09.30.20.02, 10.15.20.01, 10.30.20.02, 11.13.20.01, 11.30.20.02, 12.08.20.01, 12.30.20.02, 01.15.21.01, 01.29.21.02, 02.15.21.01, 02.26.21.02, 03.12.21.01, 03.31.21.03, 04.30.21.01, and 05.28.21.02.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-811, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 2; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 2/HB 192; Ga. L. 2021, p. 459, § 2-1/SB 169.

The 2021 amendment, effective May 4, 2021, designated the existing provisions as subsection (a) and added subsection (b).

Code Commission notes. —

The amendment of this Code section by Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 2. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).

Editor’s notes. —

For application of this statute in 2020 and 2021, see Executive Orders 06.11.20.01, 06.29.20.02, 07.15.20.01, 07.31.20.02, 08.15.20.01, 08.31.20.02, 09.15.20.01, 09.30.20.02, 10.15.20.01, 10.30.20.02, 11.13.20.01, 11.30.20.02, 12.08.20.01, 12.30.20.02, 01.15.21.01, 01.29.21.02, 02.15.21.01, 02.26.21.02, 03.12.21.01, 03.31.21.03, 04.30.21.01, and 05.28.21.02.

A listing of Executive Orders issued in 2020 and 2021 can be found at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Failure of public authorities to take contractor’s bond as required by law, as rendering them liable to laborers or materialmen, 64 A.L.R. 678 .

Validity of statute or ordinance which requires liability or indemnity insurance or bond as condition of license for conducting business or profession, 120 A.L.R. 950 .

State or local government’s liability to subcontractors, laborers, or materialmen for failure to require general contractor to post bond, 54 A.L.R.5th 649.

32-2-71. Failure of successful bidder to sign contract or furnish bonds.

If the successful bidder fails to sign the contract or furnish the bonds or policies required by Code Section 32-2-70, the proposal guaranty will become the property of the department as liquidated damages. The contract then may be readvertised or the project may be abandoned.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-812, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Forfeiture of bid bond. —

Contractor’s bid bond was required to be forfeited after the contractor first attempted to withdraw the contractor’s bid after all bids submitted were opened and then declined to execute the contract awarded to the contractor. DOT v. American Ins. Co., 268 Ga. 505 , 491 S.E.2d 328 (1997).

32-2-72. Oath by successful bidder.

A successful bidder, before commencing the work, shall execute a written oath, as required by subsection (e) of Code Section 36-91-21, stating that he or she has not violated such Code section which makes it unlawful to restrict competitive bidding.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-813, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 7; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 3.

32-2-73. Supplemental and extension agreements.

The department shall be authorized to execute supplemental agreements to the original contract covering changes or revised or new unit prices and items and supplementing the original contract not to exceed a 20 percent increase in cost of the project and to execute extension agreements affecting the length of the project which may be increased by adding sections to said project or by relocation of said project not to exceed 20 percent of the total length of the project or 20 percent of total contract cost.

History. — Ga. L. 1949, p. 373, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-814, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Transportation professional service contracts. — While the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-73 do not apply to contracts for professional services, which are governed by O.C.G.A. § 50-22-1 et seq., legislation is required to allow the Department of Transportation to exceed the limitations of such professional services contracts found in O.C.G.A. § 50-6-25(b) . 1994 Op. Atty Gen. No. U94-14.

32-2-74. Effect of federal laws on Code Sections 32-2-60 through 32-2-73; power of department to secure benefits of federal-aid program.

  1. Nothing in Code Sections 32-2-60 through 32-2-73 is intended to conflict with any federal law; and, in case of such conflict, such portion of those Code sections as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict.
  2. The department is authorized to take the necessary steps to secure the full benefit of the federal-aid program and to meet any contingencies not provided for in Code Sections 32-2-60 through 32-2-73, abiding at all times by a fundamental purpose to plan, survey, construct, reconstruct, maintain, improve, and pave as economically as possible those public roads of Georgia which, under the terms of Code Sections 32-2-60 through 32-2-73, are most in need of such construction or work in such a manner as will best promote the interest, welfare, and progress of the citizens of Georgia.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-815, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-2-75. Contract clauses for retainage of amounts constituting a percentage of gross value of completed work; time of final payment of retained amounts to contractor.

  1. As used in this Code section and Code Sections 32-2-76 and 32-2-77, the term:
    1. “Engineer” means the chief engineer or the engineer designated by the Georgia Highway Authority or the State Road and Tollway Authority.
    2. “Escrow account” means the certificates of deposit issued by a state or national bank in Georgia and any uninvested cash held in escrow.
    3. “State” means the Department of Transportation, the Georgia Highway Authority, or the State Road and Tollway Authority.
    4. “Treasurer” means the treasurer of the Department of Transportation, the treasurer of the Georgia Highway Authority, or the treasurer of the State Road and Tollway Authority.
  2. The state is authorized to insert a clause in the specifications of all contracts let and awarded as a result of public lettings for the construction, improvement, maintenance, or repair of any road, highway, bridge, or appurtenance thereto providing for the retainage of amounts constituting a percentage of the gross value of the completed work as may be provided for in the contract.
  3. Final payment of the retained amounts to the contractor under the contract to which the retained amount relates will be made after certification by the engineer that the work has been satisfactorily completed and is accepted in accordance with the contract, plans, and specifications.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, p. 635, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 8; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 2-1.

Cross references. —

Authorization and procedure for retention of contractual payments by state or political subdivisions; procedure for final payment, § 13-10-81 .

Georgia Highway Authority, § 32-10-1 et seq.

State Road and Tollway Authority, § 32-10-60 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, § 22.

C.J.S. —

17B C.J.S., Contracts, § 583.

ALR. —

Right and duty of highway contractor as to barricading or obstructing street or highway, 104 A.L.R. 955 .

32-2-76. Contract clauses providing for escrow agreements; mandatory provisions of escrow agreements.

  1. In lieu of the retained amounts provided for in Code Section 32-2-75, the state is authorized to insert a clause in the specifications of all contracts let and awarded as a result of public lettings for the construction, improvement, maintenance, or repair of any road, highway, bridge, or appurtenance thereto providing for the maintenance of an escrow account in an amount at least equal to the amount of the retainage authorized by the contract, in accordance with such rules and regulations as are authorized to be promulgated by the state.
  2. Any such escrow agreement entered into pursuant to this Code section must contain as a minimum the following provisions:
    1. Only state or national banks chartered within this state may serve as an escrow agent;
    2. The escrow agent must limit the investment of funds of the contractor held in escrow in lieu of retained amounts provided for in Code Section 32-2-75 to negotiable certificates of deposits issued by any state or national bank in this state, including but not limited to certificates of deposit issued by the bank acting as escrow agent, registered in the name of the escrow agent as such under escrow agreement with the contractor;
    3. As interest on certificates of deposits held in escrow becomes due, it shall be collected by the escrow agent and paid to the contractor;
    4. The escrow agent shall promptly acknowledge to the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority the amount and value of the escrow account held by the escrow agent, and any additions to the escrow account shall be reported immediately. Withdrawals from the escrow account shall only be made subject to the written approval of the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority;
    5. Upon default or overpayment, as determined by the state, of any contract subject to this procedure and upon the written demand of the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority, the escrow agent shall within ten days deliver a certified check to the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority in the amount of the escrow account balance relating to the contract in default;
    6. The escrow account may be terminated upon completion and acceptance of the contract(s) as provided in Code Section 32-2-75;
    7. All fees and expenses of the escrow agent shall be paid by the contractor to the escrow agent and if not paid shall constitute a lien on the interest accruing to the escrow account and shall be paid therefrom;
    8. The escrow account shall constitute a specific pledge to the state, and the contractor shall not, except to his surety, otherwise assign, pledge, discount, sell, or transfer his interest in said escrow account, the funds in which shall not be subject to levy, garnishment, attachment, or any other process whatsoever; and
    9. The form of the escrow agreement and provisions thereof in compliance with this Code section as well as such other provisions as the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority shall from time to time prescribe shall be subject to written approval of the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority. The approval of the escrow agreement by the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority shall authorize the escrow agent to accept appointment in such capacity.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, p. 635, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, § 22.

C.J.S. —

17B C.J.S., Contracts, § 583.

32-2-77. Liability of treasurer of the department or other appropriate authority and state to contractor or surety.

Neither the treasurer of the department or the appropriate authority nor the state shall be liable to the contractor or his surety for the failure of the escrow agent to perform under the escrow agreement, or for the failure of any bank to honor certificates of deposits issued by it which are held in the escrow account.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, p. 635, § 3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. —

30A C.J.S., Escrows, § 15 et seq.

PART 2 Other Contracting Methods

Effective date. —

This part became effective July 1, 2021.

32-2-78. Definitions.

As used in this part, the term:

  1. “Alternative contracting method” means a method of contracting authorized by Code Section 32-2-82.
  2. “Construction manager/general contractor” means a person the department has selected to perform project delivery pursuant to Code Section 32-2-82.
  3. “Participating local governing authority” includes the governing authority of any county or municipality whose geographical jurisdiction includes the project.
  4. “Project” means an undertaking, including intermodal rail-related and multimodal transportation solutions, which the department deems appropriate for pursuing or letting based upon the authority granted in this part.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-78 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 10/SB 200; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577.

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “part” for “Code section and Code Sections 32-2-79 and 32-2-80” in the introductory language; added paragraphs (1) and (2); redesignated former paragraphs (1) and (2) as present paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and substituted the present provisions of paragraph (4) for the former provisions, which read: “ ‘Project’ means a project which the department deems appropriate for letting pursuant to the procedures of Code Section 32-2-79 and Code Section 32-2-80.” The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

Editor’s notes. —

Former Code Section 32-2-78 , concerning definitions, was based on Code 1981, § 32-2-78 , enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 905, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 902, § 1/SB 270, and was repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 1/SB 200, effective May 11, 2009.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Projects pending at time of amendment. — Georgia Department of Transportation’s authority to enter a binding contract pursuant to the former Public Private Initiatives law was revoked by the 2009 Public Private Partnership law; those projects or portions of projects which were not formalized by an executed contract with the selected firm before May 11, 2009, must be re-procured under the authority and provisions of the 2009 law. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-7.

32-2-79. Biennial reporting of potential undertakings best suited for public-private partnership.

At a minimum, the staff of the department shall jointly identify and report to the board by July 31 of each odd-numbered year those potential undertakings best suited for delivery under the procedures of Code Section 32-2-80 and that are expected to provide the greatest public benefit through enhanced public safety, enhanced mobility of goods, congestion mitigation, enhanced trade and economic development, improved air quality or land use, or reduction of public expenditures due to improved transportation efficiency or infrastructure preservation as aligned with the state-wide strategic transportation plan as defined in Code Section 32-2-41.1.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-79 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 10/SB 200; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577.

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, rewrote this Code section. The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

Editor’s notes. —

Former Code Section 32-2-79 , concerning requirements for solicited and unsolicited proposals for public-private initiative, was based on Code 1981, § 32-2-79 , enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 905, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 902, § 2/SB 270; Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32/SB 465, and was repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 1/SB 200, effective May 11, 2009.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Governing public-private partnerships, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-17.

32-2-80. Public-private partnerships (P3s).

    1. The department shall evaluate a potential project to determine, in the judgment of the department, appropriate or desirable levels of state, local, and private participation in financing such project.  In making such determination, the department shall be authorized and encouraged to seek the advice and input of the affected local governing authorities, applicable metropolitan planning organizations, and the private financial and construction sectors.
    2. No constitutional officer or member of the board shall serve as an agent, lobbyist, or board member for any entity directly or indirectly under contract with or negotiating a contract with the department under this Code section for one year after leaving his or her position as a constitutional officer or member of the board.
    1. For projects that are funded or financed in part or in whole by private sources, the department shall be authorized to issue a written request for proposal indicating in general terms the scope of the project, the proposed financial participations in the project, and the factors that will be used in evaluating the proposal and containing or incorporating by reference other applicable contractual terms and conditions, including any unique capabilities or qualifications that will be required of the contractor. Public notice of such request for proposal shall be made at least 90 days prior to the date set for receipt of proposals by posting the legal notice on a single website that shall be procured and maintained for such purposes by the Department of Administrative Services or in substantially the same manner utilized by the department to solicit requests for proposals.
    2. For every project undertaken pursuant to this Code section, the department shall accept written public comment, solicited in the same manner as provided for in the request for proposal, for a period of 30 days beginning at least ten days after the public notice of the request for proposal is made pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.  In addition, the department shall hold at least one public hearing, which may be held by teleconference, not later than the conclusion of the period for public comment.
    3. The department shall select two or more respondents deemed fully qualified, responsible, and suitable to engage for interview and discussion based upon responses on professional competence and ability to meet the level of private financial participation called for by the department.  Multiple interviews shall be permissible.  In the event that any local governing authority has agreed to consider financial participation in the project, a representative of such local governing authority, appointed by such local governing authority, may participate in such discussions and interviews.  During this stage, the department may discuss estimates of total project costs, including, but not limited to, life cycle costing and nonbinding estimates of price for services. Proprietary information from competing respondents shall not be disclosed to the public or to competitors.
    4. Upon conclusion of discussions described in paragraph (3) of this subsection, the department shall rank respondents on the basis of the evaluation criteria set forth in the request for proposal.  The department shall select in the order of preference two or more respondents whose qualifications and proposed services are deemed most meritorious and shall conduct negotiations with those respondents.  Negotiations conducted under this paragraph can include, but are not limited to, one-on-one meetings or requests for proposals.
    5. Upon approval by the department, the commissioner shall select the respondent for project implementation based upon contract terms that are the most satisfactory and advantageous to the state and to the department based upon a thorough assessment of value and the ability of the final project’s characteristics to meet state strategic goals and investment policies as provided for by Code Section 32-2-41.1.  Before making such selection, the commissioner shall consult with any participating local governing authority or authorities.
    6. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the terms and conditions for multiple awards are included in the request for proposal, the department may award contracts to more than one respondent. Should the department determine in writing and in its sole discretion that only one respondent is fully qualified, or that one respondent is clearly more highly qualified and suitable than the others under consideration, a contract may be negotiated and awarded to that respondent after the respondent is determined to be responsible.
  1. Nothing in this Code section shall require the department to continue negotiations or discussions arising out of any request for proposal.
  2. The department shall be authorized to promulgate reasonable rules or regulations to assist in proposal evaluations and to implement the purposes of this Code section.  The department shall report the content of such rules or regulations to the Transportation Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives for their approval by majority vote prior to the promulgation thereof and shall make quarterly reports to the same chairpersons of all of its activities undertaken pursuant to the provisions of this Code section.
  3. Any contracts entered into pursuant to this Code section may authorize funding to include tolls, fares, or other user fees and tax increments for use of the project that is the subject of the proposal.  Such funding may be distributed by contract among the participants in the project as may be provided for by contract.  The department may take any action to obtain federal, state, or local assistance for a qualifying project that serves the public purpose of this Code section and may enter into any contracts required to receive such assistance. The department may determine that it serves the public purpose of this Code section for all or any portion of the costs of a qualifying project to be paid, directly or indirectly, from the proceeds of a grant or loan made by the federal, state, or local government or any instrumentality thereof.  The department may agree to make grants or loans to the operator from time to time from amounts received from the federal, state, or local government or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
  4. The commissioner shall be authorized to delegate such duties and responsibilities under this Code section as he or she deems appropriate from time to time; provided, however, that the final approval of contracts provided for in this Code section shall be by action of the board.
  5. The power of eminent domain shall not be delegated to any private entity with respect to any project commenced or proposed pursuant to this Code section.
  6. Any contract entered into pursuant to this Code section shall require the private partner or each of its prime contractors to provide performance and payment security.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the penal sum or amount of such security may be less than the price of the contract involved, such as the value of the construction elements of the contract, based upon the department’s determination on a project-by-project basis of what sum may be required to adequately protect the department, the state, and the contracting and subcontracting parties.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-80 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 10/SB 200; Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 3/HB 1098; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577; Ga. L. 2021, p. 922, § 32/HB 497.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, deleted “paragraphs (1) through (10) of subsection (a) of” preceding “Code Section 32-2-41.1” in the seventh sentence of paragraph (a)(4).

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “board” for “State Transportation Board” near the middle and at the end of paragraph (a)(2) and at the end of subsection (f); inserted “potential” near the beginning of the first sentence of paragraph (a)(1); designated the existing provisions of paragraph (a)(1.1) as present paragraph (a)(2); redesignated former paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4) as present paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3), respectively; in paragraph (b)(2), in the first sentence, substituted “For every project undertaken pursuant to this Code section” for “Upon receipt of a proposal or proposals responsive to the request for proposals” at the beginning, substituted “in the request for proposal” for “notice of proposals” in the middle, and substituted “public notice of the request for proposal is made pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection” for “date set for receipt of proposals” at the end, and substituted “, which may be held by teleconference,” for “on such proposals” in the second sentence; in paragraph (b)(3), substituted “select two or more respondents deemed fully qualified, responsible, and suitable to engage for interview and discussion based upon responses” for “engage in individual discussions with two or more respondents deemed fully qualified, responsible, and suitable on the basis of initial responses and with emphasis” in the first sentence, substituted “Multiple” for “Repetitive informal” at the beginning of the second sentence, and substituted “During this” for “At the discussion” at the beginning of the fourth sentence; designated the sixth and seventh sentences of former paragraph (a)(4) as paragraph (b)(4), and rewrote; designated the eighth and ninth sentences of former paragraph (a)(4) as present paragraphs (b)(5) and (b)(6), respectively; added “after the respondent is determined to be responsible” at the end of paragraph (b)(6); redesignated former paragraphs (a)(5) and (a)(6) as present subsections (c) and (d), respectively; substituted “proposal evaluations” for “its evaluation of the proposal” in the middle of the first sentence of subsection (d); redesignated former subsections (b) through (e) as present subsections (e) through (h), respectively; in subsection (h), substituted “entered into pursuant to this Code section” for “for a public-private partnership” near the beginning of the first sentence, and inserted “such as the value of the construction elements of the contract,” in the middle of the second sentence. The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes. The third 2021 amendment, effective May 10, 2021, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted “board” for “State Transportation Board” twice in paragraph (a)(1.1) (now paragraph (a)(2)).

Editor’s notes. —

Former Code Section 32-2-80 , concerning authority to contract with proposer for public-private initiative, was based on Code 1981, § 32-2-80 , enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 905, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 902, § 3/SB 270, and was repealed by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 1/SB 200, effective May 11, 2009.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

O.C.G.A. § 32-2-80(a)(2) authorizes a single method of procurement for contracts for a newly defined form of contract: a contract for public-private partnerships. While the former Public Private Initiatives law permitted both solicited and unsolicited proposals, the 2009 Public Private Partnership law, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-78 et seq., requires, that a solicited proposal be utilized. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-7.

Qualification for consideration under public-private partnership. — The 2009 Public Private Partnership law, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-78 et seq., now contemplates that only those “projects that are funded or financed in part or in whole by private sources” qualify for consideration under the public-private partnership provisions of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-80 , whereas the former Public Private Initiatives law authorized private financial contribution as one of three permissible legal foundations for the contract. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-7.

Projects pending at time of amendment. — Georgia Department of Transportation’s authority to enter a binding contract pursuant to the former Public Private Initiatives law was revoked by the 2009 Public Private Partnership law, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-78 et seq.; those projects or portions of projects which were not formalized by an executed contract with the selected firm before May 11, 2009, must be re-procured under the authority and provisions of the 2009 law. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-7.

32-2-81. Design-build procedure.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “design-build procedure” means a method of contracting under which the department contracts with another party for the party to both design and build the structures, facilities, systems, and other items specified in the contract.
  2. The department may use the design-build procedure for projects that include buildings, bridges and approaches, rail corridors, technology deployments, and limited or controlled access projects or projects that may be constructed within existing rights of way where the scope of work can be clearly defined or when a significant savings in project delivery time can be attained.
  3. When the department determines that it is in the best interests of the public, the department may combine any or all of the environmental services, utility relocation services, right of way services, design services, and construction phases of a public road or other transportation purpose project into a single contract using a design-build procedure. Design-build contracts may be advertised and awarded notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of Code Section 32-2-61; provided, however, that construction activities shall not begin on any portion of such projects until title to the necessary rights of way and easements for the construction of that portion of the project has vested in the state or a local governmental entity and all railroad crossing and utility agreements have been executed.
  4. The department shall adopt by rule procedures for administering design-build contracts. Such procedures shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. Prequalification requirements;
    2. Public advertisement procedures;
    3. Request for qualification requirements;
    4. Request for proposal requirements;
    5. Criteria for evaluating technical information and project costs;
    6. Criteria for selection and award process, provided that the rules shall specify that the criteria for selection shall consist of the following minimum two components for any two-step procurement process:
      1. A statement of qualifications from which the department will determine a list of qualified firms for the project, provided that, if the department determines it is in the state’s best interest, it may omit this requirement and move directly to a one-step procurement process through the issuance of a request for proposal from which the department may select the lowest qualified bidder; and
      2. From the list of qualified firms as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a technical proposal and a price proposal from each firm from which the department shall select the lowest qualified bidder or, in the event the department uses the best value procurement process, the request for proposal shall specify the requirements necessary for the selection of the best value proposer which shall include, at a minimum, a weighted cost component and a technical component. A proposal shall only be considered nonresponsive if it does not contain all the information and level of detail requested in the request for proposal. A proposal shall not be deemed to be nonresponsive solely on the basis of minor irregularities in the proposal that do not directly affect the ability to fairly evaluate the merits of the proposal. Notwithstanding the requirements of Code Section 36-91-21, under no circumstances shall the department use a “best and final offer” standard in awarding a contract in order to induce one proposer to bid against an offer of another proposer. The department may provide for a stipulated fee to be awarded to the short list of qualified proposers who provide a responsive, successful proposal. In consideration for paying the stipulated fee, the department may use any ideas or information contained in the proposals in connection with the contract awarded for the project, or in connection with a subsequent procurement, without obligation to pay any additional compensation to the unsuccessful proposers;
    7. Identification of those projects that the department believes are candidates for design-build contracting; and
    8. Criteria for resolution of contract issues. The department may adopt a method for resolving issues and disputes through negotiations at the project level by the program manager up to and including a dispute review board procedure with final review by the commissioner or his or her designee. Regardless of the status or disposition of the issue or dispute, the design-builder and the department shall continue to perform their contractual responsibilities. The department shall have the authority to suspend or provide for the suspension of Section 108 of the department’s standard specifications pending final resolution of such contract issues and disputes. This paragraph shall not prevent an aggrieved party from seeking judicial review.
  5. In contracting for design-build projects, the department shall be limited to contracting for no more than 50 percent of the total amount of construction projects awarded in the previous fiscal year.
  6. Not later than 90 days after the end of the fiscal year, the department shall provide to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and chairpersons of the House and Senate Transportation Committees a summary containing all the projects awarded during the fiscal year using the design-build contracting method. Included in the report shall be an explanation for projects awarded to other than the low-bid proposal. This report shall be made available for public information.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-81 , enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 905, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 950, § 1/HB 530; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46; Ga. L. 2010, p. 396, § 1/SB 305; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 4/HB 817; Ga. L. 2013, p. 68, § 1/SB 70; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577.

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, inserted “projects that include” near the middle of subsection (b); substituted “Code Section 32-2-61; provided, however, that” for “Code Section 32-2-61. However,” at the end of the second sentence of subsection (c); and substituted “low-bid proposal” for “low bid proposal” near the end of the second sentence in subsection (f). The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

32-2-82. Alternative contracting method.

  1. The department shall be authorized to utilize an alternative contracting method for project delivery that includes one of the following:
    1. An agreement in which a construction manager/general contractor performs two phases of work as follows:
      1. The first phase, in which the construction manager/general contractor performs in the capacity of a construction manager, consisting of preconstruction services for a project which may be paid in lump sum, cost-plus fixed fee, cost per unit of work, specific rates of compensation, or other comparable payment method permitted by law; and
      2. The second phase, in which the construction manager/general contractor performs in the capacity of a general contractor, consisting of construction services for a project that may be performed under the same contract as that of the first phase, subject to agreement by the department as to the terms for payment for such services and using any method of payment permitted by law; provided that the construction manager/general contractor self-performs at least 30 percent of the total original price for construction work on the project;
    2. A predevelopment agreement, pursuant to which one or more contractors collaborate with the department on one or more projects:
      1. For the conceptual, preliminary, and final planning for such projects, which may include predevelopment services, financial planning, environmental studies, engineering, and assistance with public outreach; and
      2. To perform, at the department’s election, the construction work for any such project, subject to agreement as to the basis of payment for construction services; or
    3. A comprehensive development agreement that allows for expedited project delivery through the concurrent design and construction of a project under a single multiphase contract, pursuant to which a contractor shall:
      1. Collaborate with the department to advance development of the project concept;
      2. Perform both the design and construction services; and
      3. Perform any operations or maintenance work required for the project.
  2. The department shall consider at least the following factors in assessing a project’s suitability and feasibility for delivery through an alternative contracting method: public interest, innovation, risk, design complexity, cost control, and construction schedule optimization.
  3. When the department determines, in accordance with subsection (b) of this Code section, that the public interest is best served by delivering the project utilizing an alternative contracting method, the department shall submit to the board a written request to proceed in delivering a project using an alternative contracting method.  The department shall not proceed with the project using an alternative contracting method without prior approval by the board.
  4. Upon approval of a request pursuant to subsection (c) of this Code section, the department shall be authorized to issue a written solicitation identifying the scope of the project, the factors to be used to evaluate responses to the solicitation, and the basis for award of the contract to perform work on the project utilizing an alternative contracting method.
  5. For any project for which an alternative contracting method is elected, the department shall utilize the procurement procedures under either Code Section 32-2-80 or 32-2-81 to competitively solicit proposals.
  6. The department shall be authorized to utilize the alternative contracting method to deliver no more than two projects during any single fiscal year and no more than seven projects over a single ten year period.  Solely as it relates to a project delivered using an alternative contracting method under this Code section, the department shall not encumber in any one fiscal year an amount greater than 5 percent of the department’s capital budget in the previous fiscal year.
  7. Not later than 90 days after the end of a fiscal year in which the department has executed a contract to deliver a project using an alternative contracting method, the department shall provide to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and chairpersons of the House and Senate Transportation Committees a summary containing all contracts that utilized an alternative contracting method. This report shall be made available to the public.
  8. The department shall adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Code section.
  9. Not later than July 1, 2026 and then once every five years thereafter, the department shall submit a report to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the members of the House and Senate Transportation Committees detailing all contracts executed to deliver a project using an alternative contracting method and the benefits of using an alternative contracting method compared with other contracting methods for review and consideration as to the effectiveness of this Code section and any necessary amendments.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-2-82 , enacted by Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective July 1, 2021.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2021, “July 1, 2026,” was substituted for “five years after the effective date of this Code section” near the beginning of subsection (i).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 3/HB 588 and Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 5/HB 577 both enacted identical versions of this Code section, effective July 1, 2021.

CHAPTER 3 Acquisition of Property for Transportation Purposes

Cross references. —

Power of condemnation, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II.

Exercise by Department of Transportation of power of eminent domain to acquire property for construction of welcome centers, § 50-7-12 .

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of law of real property, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 319 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Effect of § 32-8-1 on relocation expenses. —

Enactment of O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 does not alter the fact that relocation expenses, whether awarded judicially or administratively, are still a part of the “just and adequate compensation” guaranteed to condemnees under the Constitution. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Relocation expenses may be recovered by administrative proceeding. —

Under O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 , a condemnee whose property is being acquired for federally assisted highway projects may, but is not required to, seek payment of relocation expenses directly from the Department of Transportation in an administrative action. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Seeking administrative payment of relocation expenses precludes a separate judicial determination of the same relocation expenses in the statutorily authorized condemnation proceedings. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Article 1 General Provisions

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Procedure for taking property comports with due process. —

Procedure for taking property under O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 3, T. 32 does not offend the due process guarantees of either the state or federal constitutions; however, to ensure due process to the property owner, the statute must be strictly conformed to by the condemning body. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Notice pleading does not apply to condemnation proceedings. —

General notion of notice pleading under O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9 does not apply to condemnation proceedings. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

32-3-1. Authority to acquire property for present or future public road or other transportation purposes.

  1. Any property may be acquired in fee simple or in any lesser interest, including scenic easements, airspace, and rights of access, by a state agency or a county or municipality through gift, devise, exchange, purchase, prescription, dedication, eminent domain, or any other manner provided by law for present or future public road or other transportation purposes.
  2. Public road purposes shall include rights of way; detours; bridges; bridge approaches; ferries; ferry landings; overpasses; underpasses; viaducts; tunnels; fringe parking facilities; borrow pits; offices; shops; depots; storage yards; buildings and other necessary physical facilities of all types; roadside parks and recreational areas; the growth of trees and shrubbery along rights of way; scenic easements; construction for drainage, maintenance, safety, or esthetic purposes; the elimination of encroachments, private or public crossings, or intersections; the establishment of limited-access public roads; the relocation of utilities; and any and all other purposes which may be reasonably related to the development, growth, or enhancement of the public roads of Georgia.
  3. Property or interests shall not be acquired for “future public road purposes,” as that term is used in this Code section, unless:
    1. Construction will be commenced on the property to be acquired within a period of not less than two years nor more than ten years following the end of the fiscal year in which the secretary of transportation of the United States approves an advance of all the necessary funds to the department for the acquisition of rights of way for such construction under authority of Title 23, Section 108, United States Code, as amended; or
    2. The intended acquisition is part of a specific plan of highway development, and the acquisition will assist in accomplishing one or more of the following:
      1. A substantial monetary savings;
      2. The enhancement of the integration of highways with public or private urban redevelopment; or
      3. The forestalling of the physical or functional obsolescence of highways.
  4. In the process of acquiring property or interests for any public road purpose, an entire lot, block, or tract of land may be acquired if by so doing the interest of the public will be best served.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-601, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 878, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 4/HB 1098.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, substituted “or” for “and” at the end of paragraph (c)(1).

Cross references. —

Municipal street improvements, T. 36, C. 39.

Easements generally, T. 44, C. 9.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying real property law in 1984-1985, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 343 (1985).

For comment on Southern Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep’t., 219 Ga. 435 , 134 S.E.2d 12 (1963), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 242 (1964).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1910, § 640; former Code 1933, §§ 36-1001, 95-1701, 95-1710, 95-1715, 95-1721, 95-1724, and Chs. 23-6, 95-2, and 95-17; former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, and former Ga. L. 1961, p. 517, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Condemnation Act requirements override all Civil Practice Act provisions. —

Requirements of the Condemnation Act override all provisions of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, in conflict with the Condemnation Act’s special purposes. DOT v. Defoor, 173 Ga. App. 218 , 325 S.E.2d 863 (1984).

Service of process requirement. —

Property owner’s motion to dismiss for improper service of process was properly denied in a city’s in rem forfeiture action because the service requirements of the Civil Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(a) , did not apply and a property owner was informed of the owner’s appellate rights as required by O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq., Acquisition of Property for Transportation Purposes. Whigham v. City of Atlanta, 262 Ga. App. 742 , 586 S.E.2d 412 (2003).

No power to damage property without taking property interest. —

People, in adopting the Constitution, and the General Assembly, in enacting O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 , did not intend to allow a public body to condemn the right to damage property without also taking a property interest. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148 , 273 S.E.2d 859 (1981).

No statutory requirement for simultaneous land acquisition. —

Because there is no statutory provision that all land for a project must be acquired simultaneously, the Department of Transportation did not abuse the department’s condemnatory powers by taking appellant’s property to construct an allegedly private roadway without acquiring the adjacent property necessary to complete the project. Texaco, Inc. v. DOT, 165 Ga. App. 338 , 301 S.E.2d 59 (1983).

Property upon which construction will commence within two years is not acquired for “future” public road purposes and is not subject to the restrictions of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 upon acquisitions for “future” public road purposes. Citizens Coalition for Planned Growth, Inc. v. Glynn County, 249 Ga. 664 , 292 S.E.2d 847 (1982).

For purposes of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 , “present road purposes” refers to construction to begin in less than two years, while “future public road purposes” refers to construction that will commence within a period of not less than two nor more than ten years. Fulton County v. Davidson, 253 Ga. 734 , 325 S.E.2d 135 (1985).

Subdivision lot owners have easement in roads. —

Where the owners of a tract of land subdivide the tract into lots, record a map or plat showing such lots, with designated streets and a public park, and sell lots with reference to such map or plat, the owners are presumed to have irrevocably dedicated such streets and park for the use of all of the lot owners in the subdivision. The owners of lots in the subdivision have an easement in these public areas whether or not there has ever been an acceptance of the dedication by public authorities or the public generally. Northpark Assocs. No. 2 v. Homard Dev. Co., 262 Ga. 138 , 414 S.E.2d 214 (1992).

Dedication in plat transfers only easement. —

There is a presumption that the dedication of roads to a county, whether express or implied, transfers only an easement. Northpark Assocs. No. 2 v. Homard Dev. Co., 262 Ga. 138 , 414 S.E.2d 214 (1992).

Governing authority can acquire fee-simple title to a county road only through condemnation or an express grant in a deed or other instrument. When a road is established by dedication and there is no express grant of fee-simple title, an easement results. Northpark Assocs. No. 2 v. Homard Dev. Co., 262 Ga. 138 , 414 S.E.2d 214 (1992).

An easement was a compensable property interest in a condemnation action. Lee v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. App. 264 , 464 S.E.2d 879 (1995).

Municipally owned property. —

Department of Transportation may not exercise eminent domain powers over municipally owned property as the legislature has not clearly granted such authority or created a procedure therefore, and as such grant may not be implied from statutory provisions generally establishing a procedure for state agencies to condemn “private property.” DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

Anticipated condemnation uncompensable. —

Trial court correctly granted the Department of Transportation’s motion for summary judgment as to restaurant owner’s claim sounding in inverse condemnation since DOT was not even permitted to acquire property interests for future road building until the federal agency had approved in advance all the requisite funding. Thompson v. DOT, 209 Ga. App. 353 , 433 S.E.2d 623 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1635, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 964 (Ga. Oct. 12, 1993).

Compensation for interests. —

Department of Transportation was required to compensate adjoining landowner in action in which the department sought to condemn a strip of land in order to widen a highway for interference with the landowner’s access to a public road but not for the revocation of a license allowing the landowner to maintain a driveway over an existing right of way. Harper Invs., Inc. v. DOT, 251 Ga. App. 521 , 554 S.E.2d 619 (2001).

Counterclaim. —

After the Department of Transportation initiated condemnation proceedings against a property owner, the owner was not permitted to file a counterclaim to recover damages for unauthorized use of the remainder because the subject of the counterclaim was outside the bounds of this type of condemnation. DOT v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 194 Ga. App. 185 , 390 S.E.2d 99 (1990).

Striking valuation testimony proper. —

Trial court did not manifestly abuse the court’s discretion by striking certain testimony of the condemnee’s expert witness regarding valuation on the ground that the testimony was without sufficient foundation since the testimony was based on an assumption of the value as if the subject property had already been subdivided, which it had not; in making the court’s ruling, the trial court properly discerned that, even though a different use of the property was shown to have been reasonably probable, a jury cannot evaluate the property as though the new use were an accomplished fact. Woodland Partners Ltd. P'ship v. DOT, 286 Ga. App. 546 , 650 S.E.2d 277 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1767, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 698 (Ga. Sept. 24, 2007).

Authority to Condemn

Condemnation not required when no prior right of access. —

Condemnor creating a limited access highway does not have to condemn a purported “right of access” where none has previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Condemnation authorized when relocating gas line. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) is authorized to take property for the relocation of a gas company’s interstate gas line since it was in the interest of safety and prevented inconvenience to the public using the gas line and since the acquisition was in furtherance of and reasonably for a public state highway use. Benton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 111 Ga. App. 861 , 143 S.E.2d 396 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 36-1301, 95-1701, 95-1715, 95-1724).

Condemnation authorized in fee simple. —

City was not attempting to acquire a greater interest in the property than that authorized by law by seeking to acquire the land in fee simple. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

All interests may be condemned, whether acquired by easement or by fee simple title to the property. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Permanent construction easement. —

Under the facts of this case, assertions that the condemnation of a permanent construction easement was an abuse and misuse of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) powers of condemnation were without merit. Skipper v. DOT, 197 Ga. App. 634 , 399 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

So long as general public not excluded from road, power of eminent domain could be exercised. —

Trial court properly denied a condemnee’s petition to set aside a declaration of taking filed by a county under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 because the road at issue was open for use by the general public despite only a few private citizens most likely using the road; but, so long as the general public was not excluded, the power of eminent domain could be exercised. Emery v. Chattooga County, 325 Ga. App. 587 , 753 S.E.2d 149 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0776, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. May 19, 2014).

Legislative Intent

Section strictly construed. —

In statutory proceedings, where persons may be deprived of property, this section must be strictly construed. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559.

Any agency in joint project can acquire land. —

Under former Code 1933, § 95-1704a, it was the legislative intent that, when a limited access highway was to be constructed by the joint action of several governmental agencies, the rights of way for the highway could be acquired, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, by any of the governmental authorities of this state cooperating in the project. Martin v. Fulton County, 213 Ga. 761 , 101 S.E.2d 716 (1958) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Trial
1.Preliminary Procedure

Ordinance needed to condemn where required by municipal charter. —

If the charter of a municipality requires the adoption of a valid ordinance as a prerequisite to the condemnation of private property, and such requirement is not complied with prior to the condemnation proceedings, the action will be enjoined. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Condemnation proceedings are in rem. —

Citations of authority that a suitor cannot join in one action in personam a number of persons and causes of action have no application to a condemnation proceeding in rem against described lands. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Condemnor can join several tracts of land in proceeding. —

Condemnor can, in one proceeding, condemn a right of way over several tracts of land owned by different persons. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Exhausting administrative remedies. —

In an action in which the plaintiff landowners filed suit against the defendant county alleging a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and inverse condemnation under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I, in connection with the county’s recreational development of the county’s adjoining property, because the landowners failed to avail themselves of Georgia’s inverse condemnation procedure, the Fifth Amendment takings claim was premature, and the county’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was granted. Carney v. Gordon County, No. 4:06-CV-36-RLV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82634 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2006).

2.Burden of Proof

Condemnor cannot just abandon condemnation proceedings. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Condemnee’s burden of proof in city condemnation proceeding. —

In the absence of proof that the city is asserting a right to abandon the project, or that the condemnation proceedings were not in good faith, the condemnation of lands for highways will not be enjoined on the theory that the city is authorized by the city’s charter to disapprove an award for the value of the land. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Burden of showing amount and property interest claimed. —

It is the duty of persons claiming an interest in property sought to be condemned to establish the amount and character of the interest claimed. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Burden of showing how and what damage occurred. —

In an action for damages to private property instituted under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. L. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II) and former Code 1933, § 95-1710, allegations showing the nature of the cause, describing the property damaged, and relating the manner in which the property was damaged in the construction of a designated state highway were proper and necessary to set forth the plaintiff’s case. Bartow County v. Darnell, 95 Ga. App. 193 , 97 S.E.2d 610 (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1710).

Trial court erred in denying an agency’s motion for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 in a condemnation proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq.; the property owner’s appraiser failed to provide adequate evidence that the owner suffered consequential damages based on damage to a fence. DOT v. Morris, 263 Ga. App. 606 , 588 S.E.2d 773 (2003).

Burden of showing taking for public purpose. —

In order to recover from a county for a taking, the plaintiff must show that the taking was done for a public purpose of the county; however, nothing appearing to the contrary, the allegation that the county took the property as part of a right of way for a road and street within the municipality and while acting in the conduct of the county’s business sufficiently alleged the right of the county to condemn the land in question. McGhee v. Floyd County, 95 Ga. App. 221 , 97 S.E.2d 529 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, Chs. 23-6, 95-2).

Taking need not be for public necessity. —

It is not necessary to show that the proposed alteration in the road is a public necessity; it is sufficient to show that it is of public utility. Barnard v. Durrence, 22 Ga. App. 8 , 95 S.E. 372 (1918) (decided under former Code 1910, § 640).

3.Verdict and Appeal

Proper to exclude evidence of price paid for nearby land. —

It was not error to exclude from evidence a deed offered by the condemnee to show the price the condemnor paid for land located in alleged close proximity to that of the condemnee. Garden Parks v. Fulton County, 88 Ga. App. 97 , 76 S.E.2d 31 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 36-1001).

No instructions about condemnation benefits if evidence shows only damage. —

When the condemnee introduced evidence to show that, because of the condemnation, the condemnee would be required to expend certain amounts on fences, screening hedges, and grading, and thus would be consequentially damaged, and there was no evidence as to any consequential benefits resulting from the improvement, the evidence did not authorize a charge on consequential benefits. Garden Parks v. Fulton County, 88 Ga. App. 97 , 76 S.E.2d 31 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 36-1001).

No double award for taking and access loss. —

When the state has specifically condemned access rights to a proposed highway, and when the highway will result in a loss of access to part of the condemnee’s land, a charge which designates the condemnation of access rights as an element of compensation for the taking and the loss of access as an element of consequential damages, does not authorize a double award for the same thing. State Hwy. Dep't v. Price, 123 Ga. App. 655 , 182 S.E.2d 175 (1971) (decided under former Ga. L. 1961, p. 517).

Equity court, not jury, determines legality of condemnation. —

In condemnation proceedings, the only issue before the assessors or a jury on appeal is the amount of compensation to be paid, and neither the assessors nor a jury can determine whether the condemnor is proceeding legally; the remedy of the landowners is to apply to a court of equity to enjoin the illegal proceedings. Garden Parks v. Fulton County, 88 Ga. App. 97 , 76 S.E.2d 31 (1953) (decided under former Ga. L. 1961, p. 517).

Prerequisites for vacating judgment for property value. —

Affirmative action seeking to set aside judgment in favor of condemnor, and payment of all expenses and damages accrued to the condemnee, are essential to the vacating and setting aside of a judgment for the value of property condemned. Marist Soc'y v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. 115 , 90 S.E.2d 564 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

Previous donation by condemnee. —

Since previous donation by condemnee had no relevance to the determination of the amount of just and adequate compensation for the property taken, references by condemnee’s president to that previous donation as having been “forced” and “coerced” implied that condemnor had acted in bad faith; thus, the testimony by condemnee’s president was both irrelevant and prejudicial. DOT v. Ultima-Trimble, Ltd., 204 Ga. App. 309 , 418 S.E.2d 820 (1992).

Comparable sales properly considered. —

Jury was authorized to determine that evidence of comparable sales in the area of a landowner’s land, even though higher than the landowner’s expert’s opinion of the market value of the acreage, reasonably established the value of the land, and it could fix the market value of the land higher or lower than that amount asserted by an expert, provided that the jury’s verdict was not so disparate as to justify an inference of gross mistake or undue bias; thus, when the evidence supported the jury’s award, there was no inference that it was the result of gross mistake or undue bias. DOT v. Brannan, 278 Ga. App. 717 , 629 S.E.2d 481 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1484, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 720 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2006).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-2904 and 95-2907, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

No expenditure of money on historic preservation if not for transportation. — Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances where the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) when such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3 (decided prior to 1993 amendment of § 32-1-3 ).

License for department to build retaining wall on slope easement. — Department of Transportation is responsible for acquiring the proper permission from a property owner in the form of a license to erect a retaining wall upon a slope easement; after permission is acquired, a wall may be erected and the original license is converted into an easement by operation of law; permission for the erection of retaining walls should be in writing so that a court need not make a factual determination as to whether permission was granted. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-165 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-2904, 95-2907).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

Eminent domain: possibility of overcoming specific obstacles to contemplated use as element in determining existence of necessary public use, 22 A.L.R.4th 840.

32-3-2. Acquisition procedure generally; recording order and judgment or instrument of conveyance; filing order and judgment or instrument in records of department.

All acquisition of property or interests for public road and other transportation purposes shall proceed under the methods set out in this article and in Title 22. Any instrument which conveys such property or interest to or any order and judgment which vests such property or interest in a state agency, county, or municipality shall be recorded in the name of the agency, county, or municipality in each county wherein the property or interest may lie, notwithstanding Code Section 50-16-3. In the case of property or interests acquired by the department, the instrument or order and judgment shall also be kept in the records of the department. Article 1 of Chapter 6 of Title 48 shall not apply to property or interests acquired under the authority of this article.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-602, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For comment on Southern Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep’t, 219 Ga. 435 , 134 S.E.2d 12 (1963), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 242 (1964).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

32-3-3. Acquisition of property by devise, exchange, prescription, or dedication; acquisition by county or municipality on behalf of department.

  1. The department or any county or municipality is authorized to accept donations, transfers, or devises of land from private persons, from the federal government, or from other state agencies, counties, or municipalities, provided that such land is suitable for present or future public road purposes. Any property may be so acquired in fee or any lesser interest, provided that the state agency, county, or municipality thereby obtains an interest sufficient to ensure reasonable protection of the public investment which it may thereafter make in such land. The instrument which conveys such property or interest shall be recorded in the county or counties where such property or interest lies and, in the case of property or interests acquired by the department, shall also be kept in the records of the department.
  2. Any state agency, county, or municipality is authorized, for public road purposes, to enter into agreements with other state agencies, counties, or municipalities, with the federal government, and with private persons for the exchange of real property or interests therein for public road purposes. Such exchange shall not be consummated unless the exchange serves the best interest of the public and unless the property or interest to be acquired in exchange is appraised as being of equal value to, or of greater value than, the property or interest to be exchanged.
  3. Notwithstanding Code Section 44-5-163, any state agency, county, or municipality is authorized to acquire by prescription and to incorporate into its system of public roads any road on private land which has come to be a public road by the exercise of unlimited public use for the preceding seven years or more.
  4. Any state agency, county, or municipality may acquire rights of way or other real property or interests therein by dedication, provided that the property or interests are adequate for public road purposes and serve the best interests of the public; provided, further, that the agency, county, or municipality receives a warranty deed, except where the property or interest is acquired from a state or federal agency, a county, or a municipality, in which case, where legally possible, a warranty deed shall be received; but, if it is not legally possible to receive a warranty deed, then a quitclaim deed shall be received.
  5. When a road is approved as part of the state highway system, it shall be the duty of the county or municipality through which the road will pass to assist the department in procuring the necessary rights of way as economically as possible; and all expenses thereof shall be paid as provided in Code Section 32-5-25, provided that, whenever the county or municipality acquires property or interests for the department, title to such property or interest may be acquired in the name of the department.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-602, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 509 and former Code 1933, §§ 85-410 and 95-1721, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Intergovernmental exchanges not governed by disposal provisions. —

An exchange of condemned property between the Department of Transportation and a county did not require application of the notice requirements and repurchase rights of O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4 . Swims v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 94 , 475 S.E.2d 597 (1996).

Construction. —

Phrase “adequate for public road purposes” in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3(d) did not mean that the property presently had to have a road constructed on it that met certain engineering standards, but that, in a general sense, the property to be acquired must have been suitable or adequate for accommodating a public road. Rabun County v. Mt. Creek Estates, LLC, 280 Ga. 855 , 632 S.E.2d 140 (2006).

Prescription

Creation of public road. —

Under the common law, a public road may come into existence by prescription. Southern Ry. v. Combs, 124 Ga. 1004 , 53 S.E. 508 (1906) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 509).

Since a private road had been blocked and impassable for more than 10 years, there could not have been continuous use of the road for 7 years and, therefore, there could be no prescriptive rights in the road. Chandler v. Robinson, 269 Ga. 881 , 506 S.E.2d 121 (1998), overruled in part, Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 281 Ga. 385 , 637 S.E.2d 679 (2006).

Road obtained by prescription becomes public. —

Public road can come into existence by public use and public work, and when such use and work are continuous for 20 years, it is certainly a public road, so far as the right of the people to use the road as a highway is concerned. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Mandamus to require county to maintain road. —

Group of landowners were properly granted mandamus relief requiring a county to maintain an adjacent road as the county acquired title to the road by prescriptive acquisition, abandonment was not an issue, and compliance with O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3(c) did not need to be shown when a roadway was otherwise acquired by prescription; moreover, urging that a county’s failure to meet the county’s obligation to maintain public roads was an acceptable method of abandoning a roadway would encourage counties to disregard their public duty. Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 281 Ga. 385 , 637 S.E.2d 679 (2006).

Dedication

Highway may come into existence by dedication. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Highway may under certain circumstances be implied. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Owner’s intention to dedicate property to public use must be shown, whether express or implied. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Dedication may be written, by parol, inferred, or implied. —

Dedication may be made in writing, or by parol; or dedication may be inferred from acts, or implied, in certain cases, from long use. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Dedication by acts showing assent to public use. —

Intention to dedicate property to public use is essential to a dedication, but this may be proved by acts showing an assent that property should be so used and enjoyed. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Acts must show unambiguous intent to abandon. —

When an established dedication is claimed, the acts relied on to establish the dedication must be such as to clearly and satisfactorily indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon the owner’s personal dominion over the property and to devote the property to a definite public use. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

In order to constitute a dedication of land to public uses, an intention on the part of the owner to abandon the use of the land to the public must be shown by proof of unequivocal and unambiguous words or acts of such owner; the circumstances must be such as to show a clear assent to such dedication. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Inference from owner’s acquiescence implies knowledge of public claim. —

While an intention to dedicate need not be shown by an express declaration to that effect, but may be inferred under certain circumstances from an acquiescence by the owner in the use of the owner’s property by the public, such acquiescence is in the nature of an estoppel in pais, and implies a knowledge on the part of the owner of the claim by the public to the right to appropriate the owner’s property to the public use. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Occasional public roadwork does not prove presumptive dedication. —

Occasional road-working of property by public authorities, there being no other evidence of maintenance, is not of itself sufficient to create the presumption of an intention to dedicate; the use and maintenance must be of the character and for the length of time sufficient to create a presumptive right of the public therein. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Retention of dominion despite public use. —

Mere fact that the public uses the property of a private individual is not necessarily inconsistent with the retention of dominion by the owner. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Mere use of one’s property by a small portion of the public, even for an extended period of time, is not sufficient to authorize an inference that the property has been dedicated to a public use, unless it clearly appears that there was an intention to dedicate, and that this dedication was accepted by the public authorities, either in express terms or by implication resulting from the maintenance of a way public in its nature. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Failure to act in isolated instances. —

Acquiescence cannot be effective to deprive the owner of the owner’s property when the claimed acquiescence amounts to no more than a failure to protest in isolated instances when some members of the public travel over the owner’s land. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Period must be long enough to presume gift. —

In every case of an implied dedication it must appear that the property has been in the exclusive control of the public for a period long enough to raise the presumption of a gift. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Differences Between Dedication and Prescription

Dedication implies conveyance and acceptance, while prescription requires unbroken possession or use under claim of right. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Prescription requires public use for 20 years. —

Before a highway can be established by prescription, it must appear that the general public, under a claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner, used some defined way without interruption or substantial change, for a period of 20 years or more; the use must not only be adverse, but the use must be continuous and uninterrupted, although it is not every slight or occasional use of the land by the owner that will constitute an interruption of the public use. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Uninterrupted adverse use under claim of right. —

When there is no other evidence against the owner to support a dedication but the mere fact of such use, so that the right claimed by the public is purely prescriptive, it is essential, to maintain it, that the use or enjoyment should be adverse, that is with a claim of right, and uninterrupted and exclusive for the requisite length of time. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Less use needed for dedication than for prescription. —

Since there was no intention to dedicate, but the public has taken possession of the property of an individual, and used and maintained the property as a highway for a period of 20 years or more, a highway by prescription becomes complete; when there was an intention to dedicate, the maintenance of a way for a less time will bring into existence a completed highway by dedication. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705 , 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 85-410).

Procuring Rights of Way

County must negotiate with owner. —

Negotiations by a county authority, procuring rights-of-way for roads in the name of the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) in an effort to agree with the owner of the property to be taken are not only authorized, but are required. Miller v. State Hwy. Dep't, 200 Ga. 485 , 37 S.E.2d 365 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1721).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

No transfer tax on property acquired by Department of Transportation. — Tax on transfer of real property does not apply to property acquired by Department of Transportation. 1974 Op. Atty Gen. No. U74-56.

What property may be exchanged. — DOT may only exchange real property for real property and may not include any exchange of money or other personal property in such an exchange. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Reservation of right of way for railroad or street railway in dedicating property for highway, 43 A.L.R. 766 ; 131 A.L.R. 1472 .

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

Validity and effect of conditions or covenants in deed of property for streets relating to the use of the property or the street, 69 A.L.R. 1047 .

Dedication: acceptance of some of streets, alleys, and the like appearing on plat as acceptance of all, 32 A.L.R.2d 953.

Width and boundaries of public highway acquired by prescription or adverse use, 76 A.L.R.2d 535.

Relative rights and liabilities of abutting owners and public authorities in parkways in center of street, 81 A.L.R.2d 1436.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

32-3-3.1. Relocation or reconstruction of outdoor advertising sign; requirements.

  1. When rights of way or real property or interests therein are acquired by a state agency, county, or municipality for public road purposes and an outdoor advertising sign permitted by the state in accordance with Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 6 of this title and a local county or municipal ordinance, which has not lapsed and is in good standing, is located upon such property, the outdoor advertising sign may be relocated or reconstructed and relocated through agreement of the owner of the property and owner of the outdoor advertising sign, if such owners do not refer to the same person, so long as the new location:
    1. Is within 250 feet of its original location, provided that the new location meets the requirements for an outdoor advertising sign provided in Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 6 of this title;
    2. Is available to the owner of the outdoor advertising sign and is comparable to the original location, as agreed upon by the owner of the outdoor advertising sign and the department;
    3. Does not result in a violation of federal or state law; and
    4. Is within zoned commercial or industrial areas or unzoned commercial or industrial areas as defined in Code Section 32-6-71.
  2. An outdoor advertising sign relocated as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, or the visibility of which is otherwise obstructed by the construction of a sound wall, noise barrier, or other transportation related improvement, may be adjusted in height or angle or both in order to restore the visibility of the sign to the same or a comparable visibility which existed prior to acquisition by a state agency, county, or municipality, provided that the height of such relocated sign shall not exceed the greater of the height of the existing sign or 75 feet, as measured from the base of the sign or the crown of the adjacent roadway to which the sign is permitted, whichever is greater.
  3. For any federal aid project or any project financed in whole or in part with federal funds, the actual costs of relocation or reconstruction and relocation of an outdoor advertising sign relocated as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be paid by the department. For any project not financed in whole or in part with federal funds, the actual costs of relocation or reconstruction and relocation shall be paid by the owner of the outdoor advertising sign.
  4. If no relocation site that meets the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section exists, just and adequate compensation shall be paid by the department to the owner of the outdoor advertising sign.
  5. If a sign is eligible to be relocated as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, or the visibility of which is otherwise obstructed by the construction of a sound wall, noise barrier, or other transportation related improvement, but such new location would result in a conflict with local ordinances in the city or county of applicable jurisdiction and no variance or other exception is granted to allow relocation as requested by the owner of the outdoor advertising sign, just and adequate compensation shall be paid by the local governing authority to the owner of the outdoor advertising sign. However, no compensation resulting from the denial of a variance or exception by a local governing authority for an outdoor advertising sign eligible for relocation under this Code section shall be paid either directly or indirectly by the department.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-3-3.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2015, p. 1072, § 5/SB 169; Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 5/HB 1098.

The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, inserted “, or the visibility of which is otherwise obstructed by the construction of a sound wall, noise barrier, or other transportation related improvement,” in subsections (b) and (e).

32-3-3.2. Procedure when documented conflict.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Acquisition” means the acquisition of rights of way or right of way easements in lieu of condemnation.
    2. “Condemnation” means condemnation of rights of way or right of way easements pursuant to this title.
    3. “Documentation of a conflict” means documentation produced by a condemning authority to a property owner revealing a proposed cure for an alleged damage that resulted as part of a condemnation or from acquisition through negotiations, of which the cure proposed to the property owner by the condemning authority would result in a violation of a local government land use ordinance or land disturbance regulation.
  2. When rights of way or real property or interests therein are acquired or condemned by a state agency, county, or municipality for public road purposes and a documentation of a conflict has been issued to a property owner, the local jurisdiction shall:
    1. Grant a minimum degree of variance from land use or land disturbance permitting standards for the remaining parcel to the property owner or any successor in interest. Such variance shall be granted upon satisfactory production of proof of the transfer of title of the acquired or condemned property or interests in property to the condemning authority and the documentation of a conflict; provided, however, that application for any such variance has been made no later than five years after the transfer of property or interests in property; or
    2. Provide to the property owner or any successor in interest just and adequate compensation for damages related to a conflict with local land use ordinances or regulations as identified by documentation of a conflict and upon denial of a variance sought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection; provided, however, that no compensation shall be paid either directly or indirectly by the acquirer or condemnor.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-3-3.2 , enacted by Ga. L. 2020, p. 371, § 6/HB 1098.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective July 29, 2020.

32-3-4. Authority to bring condemnation proceedings.

  1. Whenever any state agency, county, or municipality desires to take or damage private property, including scenic easements, air rights, rights of access, and other interests in land for public road purposes or for any other public transportation purposes and shall find or believe, concerning which the decision of the condemning authority shall be final and conclusive, that the title of the apparent or presumptive owner of such property is defective, doubtful, incomplete, or in controversy, or that there are or may be unknown persons or nonresidents who have or may have some claim or demand thereon or some actual or contingent interest or estate therein, or that there are minors or persons under disability who are or may be interested therein, or that there are taxes due or that should be paid thereon, or shall for any reason conclude that it is desirable to have a judicial ascertainment of any question connected with the matter, such state agency, county, or municipality, through any authorized representative, may file a proceeding in rem in the superior court of the county having jurisdiction condemning the property or interests to the use of the petitioner upon payment of just and adequate compensation therefor to the person or persons entitled to such payment.
  2. When the acquisition of public property or an interest therein is necessary for public road purposes, including limited-access roads provided for by Article 4 of Chapter 6 of this title, the department may acquire such public property or interest therein by condemnation and the power of eminent domain when such acquisition is approved by the State Commission on the Condemnation of Public Property as provided in Code Section 50-16-183. The procedures for the condemnation of property provided for in this Code section and Code Sections 32-3-5 through 32-3-19 of this article and the procedures provided for the condemnation of property in Article 3 of Chapter 2 of Title 22 and the procedures provided for the condemnation of property in Article 2 of Chapter 2 of Title 22 when the property sought is a public cemetery shall apply to the condemnation of public property or an interest therein by the department. As used in this subsection, the term “public property” has the meaning provided for in Code Section 50-16-180.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-603, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 4; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1187, § 4.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986).

For article, “Condemning Local Government Condemnation,” see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 11 (1987).

For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Choice of condemnation procedures. —

Even though the title to property to be condemned for transportation purposes was not in question, a city could choose to use procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-4 and, although the city could have done so, was not required to use the procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 22-2-1 et seq. Back v. City of Warner Robins, 217 Ga. App. 326 , 457 S.E.2d 582 (1995).

Definition of “owners.” —

Word “owners” as used in this statutory scheme means all parties having an interest in the subject land, whether their claims be based on a warranty deed, security deed, filed lis pendens notice, or other statutory lien. DOT v. Olshan, 237 Ga. 213 , 227 S.E.2d 349 (1976).

Land condemnable in one proceeding. —

If the ownership rights of any one with an interest in the land attaches to one tract of land in its entirety, regardless of the extent of the claims of the other “owners,” the tract of land can be condemned in a single in rem action. DOT v. Olshan, 237 Ga. 213 , 227 S.E.2d 349 (1976); DOT v. Kenney, 238 Ga. 173 , 231 S.E.2d 767 (1977).

No compensation for traffic pattern change. —

Compensation for a change in the traffic pattern on the road adjacent to the condemnees’ property is not recoverable. DOT v. Katz, 169 Ga. App. 310 , 312 S.E.2d 635 (1983).

Consideration of other factors impacting deprivation. —

In a condemnation case, the jury instructions as a whole were correct in informing the jury that when the owner’s access to a public road was taken, the deprivation should be compensated, but the jury could consider whether the owner had any alternative access when determining the amount of damages due to the deprivation of access. Curry v. DOT, 341 Ga. App. 482 , 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C1786, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 905 (Ga. Oct. 16, 2017).

Department of Transportation’s exercise of eminent domain powers. —

Department of Transportation may not exercise eminent domain powers over municipally owned property as the legislature has not clearly granted such authority or created a procedure therefore, and as such grant may not be implied from statutory provisions generally establishing a procedure for state agencies to condemn “private property.” DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985) (decided prior to the 1986 amendment, which added subsection (b)).

Admission of deeds of sale on other properties as direct evidence of valuation. —

In a condemnation action wherein a county challenged the valuation placed on the landowner’s property, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by allowing the admission of four deeds of sale on other properties as direct evidence of the condemned property’s value since a proper foundation was laid for the deeds and dissimilarities in the land went to the weight of the evidence of the deeds, not the admissibility of the deeds. Henry County v. RJR Mgmt. One, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 241 , 659 S.E.2d 676 (2008).

Trial court erred in dismissing the Georgia Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) condemnation petition for the department’s failure to submit a properly attested affidavit with the department’s petition as the condemnees were estopped from challenging the taking of the condemnees’ property because the condemnees withdrew the money deposited by DOT in the court registry. Ga. DOT v. Bowles, 292 Ga. App. 829 , 666 S.E.2d 92 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2033, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 999 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 54, 69, 70.

C.J.S. —

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 32, 33, 100, 101, 107 et seq.

32-3-5. Contents of condemnation petition; notice.

  1. The petition referred to in Code Section 32-3-4 shall set forth:
    1. The facts showing the right to condemn;
    2. The property or interests to be taken or damaged;
    3. The names and residences of the persons whose property or interests are to be taken or otherwise affected, so far as known;
    4. Descriptions of the persons or classes of unknown persons whose rights therein are to be excluded or otherwise affected;
    5. Such other facts as are necessary for a full understanding of the cause;
    6. A prayer for the judgment of the court in accordance with Code Section 32-3-13 or 32-3-19; and
    7. The date of the approval of the original location of the highway.
  2. If any of the persons referred to in the petition are, so far as may be known, minors or under disability, that fact shall be stated.
  3. It shall be the duty of the condemning authority, within 30 days from the date of the original approval and designation of said location as a highway, to cause the location of said highway in said county to be advertised once each week for four consecutive weeks in the newspaper of the county in which the sheriff’s advertisements are carried; and said advertisement shall designate the land lots or land districts of said county through which such highway will be located. Said advertisement shall further show the date of the original location of such highway as provided for in this subsection. Said advertisement shall further state that a plat or map of the project showing the exact date of the original location is on file at the office of the Department of Transportation and that any interested party may obtain a copy of same by writing to the Department of Transportation and paying a nominal cost therefor.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-604, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1539, § 10.

Law reviews. —

For review of 1998 legislation relating to eminent domain, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (1998).

For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Necessity of taking is presumed. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-5 does not require the condemnor in its condemnation to establish the necessity of condemning the particular property taken; necessity is presumed, and the presumption is rebutted only by a showing by the condemnee of fraud or bad faith by the condemnor in its decision to condemn the land. West v. DOT, 176 Ga. App. 806 , 338 S.E.2d 45 (1985).

Descriptions sufficiently clear to allow proof of damages. —

When the notice clearly described and depicted the easement areas and specified the permanent nature of the easements, the descriptions were sufficiently clear to allow proof of damages. Skipper v. DOT, 197 Ga. App. 634 , 399 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

Property or interests to be taken or damaged. —

Court did not abuse the court’s discretion when the court directed the Department of Transportation as condemnor to recast the department’s declaration of taking to include reasonably foreseeable personalty and fixtures. DOT v. Whitfield, 233 Ga. App. 747 , 505 S.E.2d 247 (1998).

32-3-6. Declaration of taking; Order of condemnation by condemning authority.

  1. In addition to the petition filed pursuant to Code Section 32-3-4, the petitioner shall also file with the court a declaration of taking signed by:
    1. The commissioner or the deputy commissioner of the Department of Transportation if the petitioner is seeking to acquire property or interests on behalf of the department;
    2. The county governing authority if the petitioner is seeking to condemn for county road system purposes or any other public transportation purpose; or
    3. The municipal governing authority if the petitioner is seeking to condemn for municipal street system purposes or any other public transportation purpose.
  2. The declaration of taking shall declare that the lands are being taken for the use of the condemnor, subject to the order of the court provided for in Code Section 32-3-12. The declaration shall contain or have annexed thereto:
    1. A statement of the authority under which, and the public use for which, such lands are taken;
    2. A description of the lands taken sufficient for the identification thereof;
    3. A statement of the estate or interest in the lands taken for public use;
    4. A plat showing the lands taken;
    5. A statement of the sum of money estimated by the condemning authority to be just compensation for the land taken, including consequential damages to land not taken, accompanied by a sworn copy as an exhibit of the appraiser’s statement justifying the sum; and
    6. A certified copy of an order by the commissioner if the property or interest is being condemned for the department or by the county or municipality if the property or interest is being condemned for a county or municipality, finding that the circumstances are such that it is necessary to proceed in the particular case under this article, and specifically authorizing condemnation under this article.
  3. Such an order of the commissioner or governing authority shall be conclusive as to the use of the property or interest condemned and as to the authority of the commissioner or governing authority to condemn under this article.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-605, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 15; Ga. L. 1975, p. 813, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 5.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Condemnor must prove just and adequate compensation. —

Condemnor has the burden of proving just and adequate compensation in condemnation cases, but once the condemnor has established a prima facie case, the burden is on the condemnee to produce overcoming evidence when the condemnor asserts greater value or damage. West v. DOT, 176 Ga. App. 806 , 338 S.E.2d 45 (1985).

Condemnor must show declaration of taking method was necessary. —

City’s declaration of taking violated O.C.G.A. § 32-3-6(b)(6) and, consequently, could not vest title in the city; the declaration of taking method could not have been necessary or essential, as required by the statute, when the city council also contemplated and specifically authorized use of an alternative method. City of Atlanta v. Yusen Air & Sea Serv. Holdings Inc., 263 Ga. App. 82 , 587 S.E.2d 230 (2003).

Easement not adequately described. —

When the Department of Transportation filed a declaration of taking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq., which included the taking of a temporary work easement to be used in the demolition of a building on condemned property, the department did not adequately describe the easement as the department’s plat attached to the department’s declaration did not describe the easement, and there was no description of the easement’s width nor any limitation regarding a pathway which had to be used when traversing land not condemned; the issue was not rendered moot by the fact that the condemnees did not obtain a stay pending appeal and the work was completed during the appeal’s pendency because O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 authorized a trial court to order a condemnor to amend a defective declaration of taking. Ga. 400 Indus. Park, Inc. v. DOT, 274 Ga. App. 153 , 616 S.E.2d 903 (2005).

Affidavit as to just compensation not an admission of fact. —

Department of Transportation’s affidavit filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(5) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-6 did not constitute an admission of fact which would be admissible against the Department of Transportation in the condemnee’s appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 . Aiken v. Department of Transp., 171 Ga. App. 154 , 319 S.E.2d 58 (1984).

Failure to allow impeachment of state appraiser warrants new trial. —

Condemnees were entitled to a new trial in a Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) condemnation proceeding; the trial court erred in refusing to allow impeachment of the DOT expert with the disparity between the expert’s pretrial estimate of just compensation (JC) and the higher estimate the expert gave at trial as impeachment might have convinced the jury to award JC closer to the higher JC estimate of the condemnees’ expert. Steele v. DOT, 295 Ga. App. 244 , 671 S.E.2d 275 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0655, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 271 (Ga. Apr. 28, 2009).

Condemnor not bound by original estimate upon condemnee’s appeal. —

If a condemnee is dissatisfied with the compensation originally estimated by the condemnor and elects to appeal that issue to a jury, the condemnor is not bound by the condemnor’s original estimate but can present evidence de novo as to fair market value and consequential damages. Morrison v. DOT, 166 Ga. App. 144 , 303 S.E.2d 501 (1983); Aiken v. Department of Transp., 171 Ga. App. 154 , 319 S.E.2d 58 (1984).

Right to attorney fees in condemnation proceeding. —

Party in condemnation proceeding acquired no vested right in attorney fees awarded to the attorney through the judgment of the trial court. DOT v. Kendricks, 244 Ga. 613 , 261 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Right to interest in condemnation proceeding. — Right to receive interest as part of just and adequate compensation vests on date of taking, which is the day the declaration of taking, accompanied by the payment of just and adequate compensation, is filed in a superior court. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

32-3-7. Deposit of estimated compensation; vesting of title in condemning authority; protection of due process rights.

  1. Upon the filing of the declaration of taking and the deposit into court, which deposit shall be made at the time the declaration of taking is filed to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the sum of money estimated in the declaration by the condemning authority to be just compensation, title to the property in fee simple absolute or such lesser interest as is specified in the declaration shall vest in the condemnor; the land shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the condemnor; and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto.
  2. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to deprive the owner of the property or interest of due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-605, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Effect of petition. —

Petition is not mere pleading but instrument which passes title when filed and just and adequate compensation is paid into the court under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-7 . Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Standing. —

Temporary administratrix, who was also the wife of the decedent landowner, had standing as a party to the action for the recovery of just compensation for land taken by the Department of Transportation in a condemnation proceeding. DOT v. Foster, 262 Ga. App. 524 , 586 S.E.2d 64 (2003).

Open Records Law. —

“Property has been acquired” for purposes of the Open Records Law, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., exemption only after condemnation proceedings, including any litigation, have been completed. Black v. Georgia DOT, 262 Ga. 342 , 417 S.E.2d 655 (1992).

Effect of omission of commencement date. —

Department of Transportation’s omission of the commencement date of the temporary construction easement the department sought to condemn did not render the declaration of taking invalid; as a matter of law, the commencement date for the temporary construction easement is the date of the taking. Habersham Downs Homeowners' Ass'n v. DOT, 212 Ga. App. 686 , 442 S.E.2d 868 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1155, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 796 (Ga. June 27, 1994).

Nonconforming declaration of taking cannot vest title in condemnor. —

Declaration of taking which does not conform to the dictates of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-7 cannot vest title to the land in the condemnor. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Vesting of title by amended declaration. —

Amended declaration can only vest title in condemnor at time of amendment, and does not relate vesting back to the time of the original declaration. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Amendment to justification of just and adequate compensation. —

Along with amendment to declaration, amendment to justification of just and adequate compensation should be filed by condemnor. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Date of taking for determining land value or consequential damages. —

For the purpose of determining the value of the land taken or consequential damages to land not taken, the condemnee shall have the right to elect whether the date of taking is the date of the filing of the original declaration of taking or the date of the filing of the amendment. Dorsey v. DOT, 248 Ga. 34 , 279 S.E.2d 707 (1981).

Condemnee has no vested right in attorney fees granted by court. —

Party in condemnation proceeding acquired no vested right in the attorney fees awarded to the party through the judgment of the trial court. DOT v. Kendricks, 244 Ga. 613 , 261 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Trial court does not have authority, under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-7 , to require payment of reasonable and necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation for proceedings before an appellate court of this state. DOT v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 723 , 409 S.E.2d 281 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1541, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 636 (Ga. Sept. 13, 1991).

Condemnation not required when no prior right of access. —

Condemnor creating a limited access highway need not condemn a purported “right of access” where none has previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 559).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Right to interest in condemnation proceeding. — Right to receive interest as part of just and adequate compensation vests on date of taking, which is the day the declaration of taking, accompanied by the payment of just and adequate compensation, is filed in a superior court. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

Surplus property, not to be placed in court registry. — Legislature intended that only money, and not surplus property, be placed into the court registry for satisfaction of any judgment resulting from a condemnation action. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

32-3-8. Service of process in condemnation proceedings generally.

  1. Upon the filing of the petition and declaration, where the owner or owners of the property sought to be condemned or any person having a claim against or interest in the same are residents of this state, the petition and declaration shall be served upon such persons personally. In cases where such persons are residents of this state but not of the county in which such property or interest is located, such service shall be by second original, as in other cases.
  2. If the owner, or any of the owners, or any person having a claim against or interest in the property is a minor or under any disability whatsoever, such notice shall be served:
    1. Upon his or her guardian; and, if such guardian is a nonresident of this state, upon the judge of the probate court of the county in which the property or interest is located, who shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent such minors or persons under disability in the litigation, provided that, if the nonresident guardian intervenes, he or she shall serve in lieu of the guardian ad litem; or
    2. If there is no guardian, personally upon the minor, where such minor is a resident of this state. If such minor is not a resident of the county where the property or interest is located, service shall be by second original, as is provided by law in other cases, and upon the judge of the probate court of the county where the property or interest is located, who shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor in the litigation.
  3. In subsection (b) of this Code section, if the judge of the probate court is disqualified, for reason of interest or other cause, notice shall be served upon the clerk of the superior court of the county, who shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor or person under disability.
  4. If the property or interest sought to be condemned is held in trust or if the condemnation is directed toward property in which remainders have been created, notice shall be served upon the trustee and also upon such persons as have an interest under the conveyance and who are of age, provided that, where any of the persons to be served are not residents of the county, such service shall be by second original, as in other cases.
  5. A copy of the petition and declaration shall be served upon the tax collecting authority of any county or municipality in which the property or interest may be located, who shall make known in writing the taxes due on the property or interest; and the court shall give such direction as will satisfy the same and discharge the lien thereon.
  6. In all instances, and in addition to the service provided for in this Code section, the condemnor shall, at the time of filing the petition and declaration of taking, cause a copy of such proceedings to be posted on the bulletin board at the courthouse. In addition thereto, such advertisement shall be published in the official newspaper of the county in which the property or interest is located, which notice shall describe the property or interest taken so as to identify the same and shall give the name or names of the owner or owners of such property or interest or persons having claims against such property or interest so far as the same may be known. Such notice shall be published in such newspaper once each week for two weeks subsequent to the filing of such petition and declaration.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-606, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 7.1.

Cross references. —

Service of process generally, § 9-11-4 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 606; former Civil Code 1895, § 520; and former Civil Code 1910, §§ 640 — 642, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Effect of section on other section’s definition of personal service. —

Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8 ) requires that the petition and declaration shall be served personally, but personal service as defined in Ga. L. 1972, p. 689, §§ 1-3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 ) is not in conflict with this requirement. Department of Transp. v. Ridley, 244 Ga. 49 , 257 S.E.2d 511 (1979).

Condemnee’s right to proper service until voluntary waiver. —

Condemnees have a perfect right to waive service and come in, but until the condemnees are properly served, and unless the record shows this fact by a proper return of service, the right remains until the right is voluntarily waived. Knight v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 332 , 214 S.E.2d 418 (1975).

Extension for late-filed affidavits of service in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) did not apply in condemnation case. —

In a condemnation case, the trial court did not err in dismissing the property owners’ notice of appeal as untimely under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 , which allowed 30 days from the date of service to appeal; although the affidavits of service were filed more than five business days from the date of service, which would trigger a tolling of the deadline under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) , the rule of civil procedure conflicted with the special eminent domain statute and therefore did not apply. Bryde v. City of Atlanta, 350 Ga. App. 129 , 828 S.E.2d 122 (2019).

No presumption of compliance. —

Order of the commissioner authorizing the widening of a public road and reciting “that notice of such widening had been published as required by law” furnishes no evidence by presumption or otherwise that persons or agents, residing on the land through which such road goes, were notified in writing as required. Fulton County v. Amorous, 89 Ga. 614 , 16 S.E. 201 (1892) (decided under former Code 1882, § 606).

Notice mandatory in condemnation. —

If no notice is given as required, a petition to enjoin the condemnation of the land for the road should be sustained. Commissioners of Decatur County v. Curry, 154 Ga. 378 , 114 S.E. 341 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 642).

Injunction proper if notice not given. —

It is error for the court to refuse to enjoin the county authorities from proceeding to condemn the land, there having been no compliance with former Civil Code 1910, § 640 et seq. Ainslee v. County of Morgan, 151 Ga. 82 , 105 S.E. 836 (1921); Mitchell County v. Hudspeth, 151 Ga. 767 , 108 S.E. 305 (1921); Commissioners of Decatur County v. Curry, 154 Ga. 378 , 114 S.E. 341 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 640).

Notice to agent insufficient. —

When one purporting to be an agent of the owner of lands signs the application for establishing a road with the letters “agt.” after the individual’s name, this is an individual signature and will not deprive the owner of the owner’s right to notice. Commissioners of Decatur County v. Curry, 154 Ga. 378 , 114 S.E. 341 (1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 642).

Lessee entitled to notice. —

Lessee of property which was subjected to a partial taking was entitled to notice from the condemnor, not the lessor. Sims v. Foss, 201 Ga. App. 345 , 411 S.E.2d 59 (1991).

Widening condemned property requires notice. —

Since the evidence was undisputed that the road through the plaintiff’s premises was originally marked and laid out by the road commissioners, 20 feet in width, and that the county authorities were attempting to widen the road so as to embrace land of the plaintiff without first acquiring, in the manner prescribed by law, the right to do so, the court erred in refusing to enjoin the taking of a strip of the plaintiff’s land so as to widen the road beyond the limits originally marked out. Buchanan v. James, 130 Ga. 546 , 61 S.E. 125 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 520).

Clerical error in notice not ground for dismissal. —

Words in a notice, “said road to be 50 feet in length,” clearly appeared to be a clerical error, and, the length of the road otherwise appearing therein, it was proper to overrule a motion to dismiss the proceeding, based on the ground that the notice showed that the road was to be only 50 feet long, and for that reason could not be of public utility. Anderson v. Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292 , 129 S.E. 567 (1925) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 642).

Timeliness of appeal. —

Since the appeal was filed more than 30 days from the date of personal service, although less than 30 days from the completion of advertising as provided for in subsection (f) of this section, the appeal was not timely. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 143 Ga. App. 872 , 240 S.E.2d 163 (1977); DOT v. Massengale, 141 Ga. App. 70 , 232 S.E.2d 608 (1977); Department of Transp. v. Harrison, 154 Ga. App. 118 , 267 S.E.2d 651 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S. Ct. 125 , 66 L. Ed. 2 d 51 (1980); Blonder v. Department of Transp., 156 Ga. App. 711 , 275 S.E.2d 762 (1980).

Final order and judgment was improperly set aside based on a finding that the property owner was disabled and that, as a result of the owner’s status, service of process was improper because the owner’s notice of appeal was untimely as it was filed approximately four months after the petition for condemnation and declaration; in the notice of appeal, the owner failed to plead defective service; the owner’s motion raising the issue of improper service was filed approximately five months after the notice of appeal; the owner’s motion should have been made pursuant to a motion to set aside under the condemnation act; and the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., could not be used to extend specific periods of time fixed in special statutory proceedings. DOT v. Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. 855 , 841 S.E.2d 228 (2020).

32-3-9. Service of nonresidents in condemnation proceedings.

  1. If a nonresident of this state owns the property condemned or any interest therein, whether such interest is as the owner of the fee or some lesser interest, or any easement, or as a guardian for a minor or a person non compos mentis, or as a trustee, or growing out of similar facts, such nonresident, in the event that his or her address is known, shall be served with a true and correct copy of the petition and declaration, together with any orders of the court thereon. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the superior court for the county wherein such condemnation proceeding is pending to enclose a copy of the petition and declaration in an envelope, properly addressed to the nonresident at his or her last known address, and to deposit the same in the United States mail, properly registered or certified and with a return receipt requested, or deliver the same by statutory overnight delivery; and the clerk shall make a return service, showing these facts, upon the original petition and declaration in such matter for which he or she shall be paid the fee he or she receives for like service for each service made, the same to be taxed against the costs in the case. Such certificate of service shall be final and conclusive as to service of the petition upon the nonresident and shall become a part of the record in the matter.
  2. Where the address of the nonresident is unknown, whether such nonresident is the owner of the property, a minor, or the trustee or guardian of such minor or has any other lawful interest in the property, the method of advertising the condemnation of the particular property, as provided for in subsection (c) of Code Section 32-3-5, shall be sufficient service upon such nonresidents and shall be final and conclusive; provided, however, that, in that event, it shall be the duty of the condemnor, in filing the petition for condemnation, to certify that the address of such person or persons is unknown to the condemnor; provided, further, that it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the county wherein the condemnation is pending to inquire into the truth of such allegation and to enter a certificate upon the condemnation proceeding, within three days from the filing of the same, verifying the truth of the allegation. This certificate, together with the method of advertising of such condemnation proceedings provided for in the laws and statutes described above, shall be final and conclusive as to lawful service of the petition for condemnation upon the nonresident. For each such certificate, the sheriff shall receive the fee the sheriff receives for like service for each such certificate, the same to be taxed as other costs in the case.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-606, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1539, § 11; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 7.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2000 amendment was applicable to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Law reviews. —

For review of 1998 legislation relating to eminent domain, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Statutory construction. —

Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 requires that the petition and declaration shall be served personally, but personal service as defined in Ga. L. 1972, p. 689, §§ 1-3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 ) is not in conflict with this requirement. Department of Transp. v. Ridley, 244 Ga. 49 , 257 S.E.2d 511 (1979).

Condemnee’s right to proper service remains until waived. —

Condemnees have a perfect right to waive service and come on in, but until the condemnees are properly served, and unless the record shows this fact by a proper return of service, the right remains until the right is voluntarily waived. Knight v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 332 , 214 S.E.2d 418 (1975).

Waiver of improper service. —

Pretermitting whether the property owner could have challenged the final judgment of condemnation via O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(b) on the ground that the owner was not properly served, the trial court abused the court’s discretion by granting the motion to set aside the final judgment because the property owner waived the issue of improper service when the motion was not filed at the time the owner filed the notice of appeal and the owner failed to plead improper service of the petition for condemnation and declaration of taking in the notice of appeal. DOT v. Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. 855 , 841 S.E.2d 228 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C1149, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 791 (Ga. Oct. 19, 2020).

Timeliness of appeal. —

When the appeal was filed more than 30 days from the date of personal service, although less than 30 days from the completion of advertising as provided for in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8 , the appeal was not timely. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 143 Ga. App. 872 , 240 S.E.2d 163 (1977).

32-3-10. Substantial compliance with Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9.

  1. The proceeding described in this article being in rem, no provision in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9 as to service shall be so construed as to invalidate the intent of the condemnor or as to delay the taking of the property or interest described in the declaration of taking and in the petition or in any manner as to delay the progress of the work for which the taking was made; and a substantial compliance with the provisions for service as heretofore set out in this article shall be deemed sufficient.
  2. At any stage of the cause before final verdict and judgment, the judge of the superior court may order such additional service to be made or such additional parties to be named as may be required by equity and justice; but this shall not be so construed as to invalidate the taking or delay the progress of the work.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-606, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1985, § 520 and former Civil Code 1910, § 640, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Statutory construction. —

Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 requires that the petition and declaration be served personally, but personal service as defined in Ga. L. 1972, p. 689, §§ 1-3 does not conflict with this requirement. Department of Transp. v. Ridley, 244 Ga. 49 , 257 S.E.2d 511 (1979).

No injunction in advance of hearing if ample legal remedy. —

As the landowner’s remedy at law was ample, it was not erroneous to refuse to enjoin the county from continuing a proceeding in advance of the hearing provided for in former Civil Code 1895, § 641. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Redwine, 123 Ga. 736 , 51 S.E. 724 (1905); Hutchinson v. Lowndes County, 131 Ga. 637 , 62 S.E. 1048 (1908); Ballard v. Jones, 148 Ga. 513 , 97 S.E. 443 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 520 and former Civil Code 1910, § 640).

Condemnee’s right to service unless voluntarily waived. —

Condemnees have a perfect right to waive service and come in, but until the condemnees are properly served, and unless the record shows this fact by a proper return of service, the right remains until the right is voluntarily waived. Knight v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 332 , 214 S.E.2d 418 (1975).

Timeliness of appeal. —

When the appeal was filed more than 30 days from the date of personal service, although less than 30 days from the completion of advertising as provided for in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1, the appeal was not timely. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 143 Ga. App. 872 , 240 S.E.2d 163 (1977).

32-3-11. Power of judge to set aside, vacate, and annul declaration of taking; issuance and service on condemnor of rule nisi; hearing.

  1. Upon proper pleadings and evidence, under the applicable rules of law, the judge of the superior court shall have the authority to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking, together with any title acquired thereby, in the same way and manner and for the same reasons as are provided by Code Sections 23-2-60 and 9-11-60. The power of the court in this respect shall not be construed as extending to a determination of questions of necessity, but there shall be a prima-facie presumption that the property or interest condemned is taken for and is necessary to the public use provided for in this article.
  2. The power of the court as described in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be restricted to the following questions:
    1. Fraud or bad faith, as contemplated by Code Sections 23-2-60 and 9-11-60;
    2. The improper use of the powers of this article, such as are not contemplated by this article;
    3. The abuse or misuse of the powers of this article; and
    4. Such other questions as may properly be raised, including the question of whether or not this article has been invoked in some respect beyond the privileges conferred by this article or by an unauthorized agency, county, or municipality.
  3. If the condemnee desires to raise such questions as are outlined in subsection (b) of this Code section, the same shall be done by proper pleadings, in the form of a petition addressed to the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction thereof, filed in the same proceedings not later than 30 days subsequent to the date of service upon the condemnee of the declaration of taking. The presiding judge shall thereupon cause a rule nisi to be issued and served upon the condemnor, requiring him to show cause at a time and place designated by the judge why the title acquired by the declaration of taking should not be vacated and set aside in the same way and manner as is now provided for setting aside deeds acquired by fraud. Such hearing shall be had not earlier than 15 days from the time of service of the rule nisi upon the condemnor, nor later than 60 days from the date of filing of the declaration of taking, and with the right of appeal by either party, as in other cases.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-607, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2005).

For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (2006).

For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012).

For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Issue must be raised within 30 days. —

Condemnees waived any challenge to the legality of a condemnor’s declaration of taking and any right to urge that the taking is ineffective in order to commence proceedings which are otherwise subject to the five-year dismissal rule under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e) by failing to raise any issue of a defective declaration of taking within the 30-day period mandated under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 . Parker v. Department of Transp., 184 Ga. App. 882 , 363 S.E.2d 156 (1987).

Subsection (c) hearing requirement. —

Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 requires that a hearing be held, not that a ruling be made, within the 60-day time period. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305 , 380 S.E.2d 265 (1989).

Georgia legislature did not intend to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion to set aside if the hearing was not held within 60 days because, once the condemnee had fulfilled the obligation to file a timely motion to set aside, O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c) contemplates action by the court, not by the condemnee. As such, the trial court did not err when the court refused to dismiss the motion to set aside. Cobb County v. Robertson, 314 Ga. App. 455 , 724 S.E.2d 478 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1096, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 702 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012).

Transfer set aside. —

When, in a proceeding to condemn property for highway purposes, the evidence was that the Department of Transportation by this taking would create a grave and unusual risk to the safety of the public, the transfer of defendant’s property to the department was set aside unless or until the department became bound to implement a plan of construction that would provide adequate protection against ice falling from defendant’s broadcasting tower and guy wires under which the property condemned lies. Cox Communications, Inc. v. DOT, 256 Ga. 455 , 349 S.E.2d 450 (1986).

Remedy for bad faith finding. —

Although the trial court properly found that Georgia Department of Transportation acted in bad faith in issuing the department’s declaration of taking regarding the condemnees’ land, the department erred in setting aside, on the condemnees’ motion, only the limited access portion of the declarations of taking as the proper remedy was to set aside the declarations of taking in their entirety. DOT v. Bunn, 268 Ga. App. 712 , 603 S.E.2d 2 (2004).

Association failed to prove that the proposed road was unsafe; thus, the taking was not an improper use of the Department of Transportation’s condemnation powers. Habersham Downs Homeowners' Ass'n v. DOT, 212 Ga. App. 686 , 442 S.E.2d 868 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1155, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 796 (Ga. June 27, 1994).

Superior court erred by not setting aside a declaration of taking on the basis of a county’s bad faith exercise of the county’s power of eminent domain, since the condemnees’ property was condemned to avoid inconveniencing a lumber company which was the owner of adjacent land. Brannen v. Bulloch County, 193 Ga. App. 151 , 387 S.E.2d 395 (1989).

No abuse or misuse of powers found. —

Under the facts of this case, assertions that the condemnation of a permanent construction easement was an abuse and misuse of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) powers of condemnation were without merit. Skipper v. DOT, 197 Ga. App. 634 , 399 S.E.2d 538 (1990).

Compensation limited. —

Department of Transportation would not be required both to provide compensation for a diminution in the value of the amenities package and to construct a barrier so as to eliminate such diminution in value. Habersham Downs Homeowners' Ass'n v. DOT, 212 Ga. App. 686 , 442 S.E.2d 868 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1155, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 796 (Ga. June 27, 1994).

Recovery of attorney’s fees and costs by condemnee. —

Condemnee’s claim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses based on the fraud and bad faith that condemnor allegedly exhibited during the condemnor’s acquisition of the property in question could only be raised in a proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 and not in an action seeking to establish just and reasonable compensation only. Department of Transp. v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 497 , 297 S.E.2d 72 (1982).

Action in which landowners sought to vacate a condemnation and requested attorney fees for litigation spawned from the misuse and improper use of the powers of the department of transportation was a “proper case” for the recovery of attorney fees. DOT v. B & G Realty, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 613 , 398 S.E.2d 762 (1990).

Requirement that a request for fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 be made in the complaint is consistent with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 . DOT v. Georgia TV Co., 244 Ga. App. 750 , 536 S.E.2d 773 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1799, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 4 (Ga. Jan. 5, 2001).

Error to apportion damages without evidence in support of claim. —

Award for condemned land utilized for a road right-of-way was just and adequate compensation, but the trial court erred in apportioning damages to one plaintiff without receiving evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Whitfield v. DOT, 248 Ga. App. 172 , 546 S.E.2d 308 (2001), cert. denied, No. S01C0933, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 610 (Ga. July 16, 2001).

Pending valuation issue in trial court results in no appellate court jurisdiction. —

Appellate court had to dismiss the company’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of the company’s motion to set aside, vacate, and annul the county’s declaration of taking in a condemnation action as the issue of the property’s valuation was still pending before the trial court; accordingly, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the record did not show that the company followed the procedures for bringing an interlocutory appeal and the trial court had not issued a final judgment from which the company could appeal. TJW Enters. v. Henry County, 261 Ga. App. 547 , 583 S.E.2d 144 (2003).

Rule nisi. —

Trial court erred in dismissing the Georgia Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) condemnation petition for the department’s failure to submit a properly attested affidavit with the department’s petition as the condemnees were estopped from challenging the taking of their property because the condemnees withdrew the money deposited by DOT in the court registry. Ga. DOT v. Bowles, 292 Ga. App. 829 , 666 S.E.2d 92 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C2033, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 999 (Ga. Nov. 17, 2008).

Application of 60-day requirement. —

Pursuant to the clear language of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c) , it is the duty of the court, not the condemnee, to issue a rule nisi and schedule the required hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia disapproves of the portion of Lopez-Aponte v. City of Columbus, 267 Ga. App. 65 (2004), which places the burden of issuing a rule nisi and obtaining a timely hearing upon the condemnee. Adkins v. Cobb County, 291 Ga. 521 , 731 S.E.2d 665 (2012).

Petition to set aside properly denied. —

Trial court properly denied a condemnee’s petition to set aside a declaration of taking filed by a county under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 because the road at issue was open for use by the general public despite only a few private citizens most likely using the road, but so long as the general public was not excluded, the power of eminent domain could be exercised. Emery v. Chattooga County, 325 Ga. App. 587 , 753 S.E.2d 149 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0776, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. May 19, 2014).

Petition to set aside improperly granted. —

Final order and judgment was improperly set aside based on a finding that the property owner was disabled and that, as a result of the owner’s status, service of process was improper because the owner’s notice of appeal was untimely as the notice was filed approximately four months after the petition for condemnation and declaration; in the notice of appeal, the owner failed to plead defective service; the owner’s motion raising the issue of improper service was filed approximately five months after the notice of appeal; the owner’s motion should have been made pursuant to a motion to set aside under the condemnation act; and the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., could not be used to extend specific periods of time fixed in special statutory proceedings. DOT v. Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. 855 , 841 S.E.2d 228 (2020).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

32-3-12. Orders of court for payment of award in condemnation proceedings, for surrender of property, and as to other charges.

  1. Upon the application of the parties in interest, and not earlier than 15 days subsequent to the date of the last advertisement in the official newspaper of the county as provided for in subsection (f) of Code Section 32-3-8, the court shall order that the money deposited in the court, or any part thereof applied for, be paid forthwith to the parties found to be entitled thereto, for the just compensation to be awarded in the proceedings; provided, however, that, where the validity of the proceedings has been placed in issue as provided for in Code Section 32-3-11, the court shall not order the payment of the fund to the condemnee pending a final determination of such questions.
  2. Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall have power to fix the time, the same to be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the declaration of taking as provided in Code Section 32-3-6, within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession to the petitioner. The court shall have power to make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-608, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Taking hearing distinguished from appeal from offered compensation. —

Taking hearing, as provided in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1, is a right that is separate and apart from an appeal from the offered compensation, and does not in any way affect the right of appeal. Department of Transp. v. Palmer, 152 Ga. App. 630 , 263 S.E.2d 514 (1979).

Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 applies only to possession, while time for filing a notice of appeal is contained in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 and is controlling in all cases where an appeal is desired. Department of Transp. v. Harrison, 154 Ga. App. 118 , 267 S.E.2d 651 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S. Ct. 125 , 66 L. Ed. 2 d 51 (1980).

32-3-13. Self-executing nature of declaration of taking; court costs; entry of judgment; transfer of case to closed docket; effect of Code section on condemnor’s title.

  1. No judgment of any court and no order or ruling of the judge thereof shall be necessary to give effect to the declaration of taking provided for in Code Section 32-3-6; but the same shall be self-executing, subject, however, to the power of the court as provided for in Code Section 32-3-11.
  2. If no appeal is filed as provided for in Code Section 32-3-14, the condemnor shall, at the next term of the superior court convening not earlier than 30 days subsequent to the date of service, as provided for in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, or at any time thereafter, pay all accrued court costs in the case to the clerk of the superior court in which the same is pending, at which time the judge of the superior court shall enter judgment in favor of the condemnee and against the condemnor for the sum of money deposited by the condemnor with the declaration of taking. If such sum has been withdrawn from the court by the condemnee as provided for in Code Section 32-3-12, the clerk of the superior court shall mark such judgment satisfied; and if the condemnee has not withdrawn such sum the clerk shall immediately apply the same to the payment of the judgment and either transmit the same to the condemnee or cause the condemnee to be notified that he, the clerk, holds the same subject to the demand of the condemnee.
  3. In any event, the case shall be transferred, under the conditions set out in this Code section, to the closed docket.
  4. Nothing provided for in this Code section shall be construed as in any way affecting the title acquired by the condemnor by virtue of the declaration of taking, as provided for in Code Section 32-3-7.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-609, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Provision for opening default inapplicable. —

Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 24 does not apply to a condemnation proceeding. DOT v. Forrester, 149 Ga. App. 647 , 255 S.E.2d 115 (1979).

32-3-14. Filing notice of appeal.

If the owner, or any of the owners, or any person having a claim against or interest in the property is dissatisfied with the amount of compensation as estimated in the declaration of taking and deposited in court, as provided for in Code Section 32-3-7, such person or persons, or any of them, shall have the right, at any time subsequent to the filing of the declaration and the deposit of the fund into court, but not later than 30 days following the date of the service as provided for in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, to file with the court a notice of appeal, the same to be in writing and made a part of the record in the proceedings.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-610, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on zoning and land use law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 427 (2009).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Taking hearing distinguished from appeal from offered compensation. —

Taking hearing, as provided in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1, is a right that is separate and apart from an appeal from the offered compensation as provided in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1, and does not in any way affect the right of appeal under that section. Department of Transp. v. Palmer, 152 Ga. App. 630 , 263 S.E.2d 514 (1979).

Automatic dismissal under § 9-11-41(e) . —

Automatic dismissal provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e) , whereby any action in which no written order is taken for five years is automatically dismissed, applies to condemnation proceedings. Adams v. Cobb County, 184 Ga. App. 879 , 363 S.E.2d 260 (1987), aff'd, 258 Ga. 352 , 370 S.E.2d 748 (1988).

Condemnee who appeals deemed “plaintiff”. —

For every practical purpose and for every substantive issue, a condemnee who appeals a determination of value to a jury under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 is a “plaintiff.” Adams v. Cobb County, 258 Ga. 352 , 370 S.E.2d 748 (1988).

Doctrine of equitable estoppel is unavailable to extend a property owner’s time for filing a notice of appeal under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 ; thus, a property owner could not rely on the doctrine. Moreover, the owner did not show that counsel for the state made intentional misstatements or was grossly negligent, and it was not shown that the owner exercised reasonable diligence. Cedartown North P'ship, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 296 Ga. App. 54 , 673 S.E.2d 562 (2009).

Partial taking condemnation order not final judgment. —

Because a partial taking condemnation order was not otherwise a final appealable judgment within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) , and the parties could have appealed by complying with the relevant interlocutory appeal requirements, but did not do so, the appeals court lacked jurisdiction to consider either the appeal or the cross-appeal; moreover, the superior court’s rulings on the admissibility of certain evidence constituted no judgment on the merits of any part of the appealing party’s claim for just and adequate compensation. Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga. App. 219 , 633 S.E.2d 623 (2006).

Time Limitation on Appeals

Civil practice provisions inapplicable. —

Provisions of the Civil Practice Act (O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) which deal with time frames do not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes such as O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 . Bates & Assocs. v. Department of Transp., 186 Ga. App. 828 , 368 S.E.2d 544 (1988).

Extension for late-filed affidavits of service in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) did not apply. —

In a condemnation case, the trial court did not err in dismissing the property owners’ notice of appeal as untimely under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 , which allowed 30 days from the date of service to appeal; although the affidavits of service were filed more than five business days from the date of service, which would trigger a tolling of the deadline under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) , the civil procedure rule conflicted with the special eminent domain statute and therefore did not apply. Bryde v. City of Atlanta, 350 Ga. App. 129 , 828 S.E.2d 122 (2019).

Period for appeal fixed by section. —

Granting extensions of time as permitted under certain circumstances by the Civil Practice Act (O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) does not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes. McClure v. Department of Transp., 140 Ga. App. 564 , 231 S.E.2d 532 (1976).

Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 applies only to possession, while time for filing a notice of appeal is contained in Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 and is controlling in all cases where an appeal is desired. Department of Transp. v. Harrison, 154 Ga. App. 118 , 267 S.E.2d 651 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S. Ct. 125 , 66 L. Ed. 2 d 51 (1980).

Effect of failure to timely file. —

When the lessee of a portion of property being condemned did not file a timely notice of appeal, the lessee was not entitled to a jury trial on the valuation of the lessee’s interest in the property and could not raise the issue of business losses. Lil Champ Food Stores, Inc. v. DOT, 230 Ga. App. 715 , 498 S.E.2d 94 (1998).

Thirty-day period under this section cannot be extended. Department of Transp. v. Palmer, 152 Ga. App. 630 , 263 S.E.2d 514 (1979).

Time for appeal. —

Trial court has no authority or discretion to extend the period of time for filing a notice of appeal. McClure v. Department of Transp., 140 Ga. App. 564 , 231 S.E.2d 532 (1976).

Right to appeal to a jury from a declaration of taking is absolutely conditional upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal in the superior court, and not even the trial court is empowered to extend the period of time for filing the notice of appeal. Department of Transp. v. Rudeseal, 156 Ga. App. 712 , 276 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

Final order and judgment was improperly set aside based on a finding that the property owner was disabled and that as a result of the owner’s status service of process was improper because the owner’s notice of appeal was untimely as the notice was filed approximately four months after the petition for condemnation and declaration; in the notice of appeal, the owner failed to plead defective service; the owner’s motion raising the issue of improper service was filed approximately five months after the notice of appeal; the owner’s motion should have been made pursuant to a motion to set aside under the condemnation act; and the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., could not be used to extend specific periods of time fixed in special statutory proceedings. DOT v. Szenczi, 354 Ga. App. 855 , 841 S.E.2d 228 (2020).

Statute tolling filing time in cases of fraud not applicable. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 sets forth a mandatory time period for filing an appeal in a condemnation action, not a statute of limitation for commencing a particular type of action; thus, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 did not apply to extend a property owner’s time for filing an appeal. Moreover, the owner did not show that the Department of Transportation committed actual fraud involving moral turpitude or that the owner itself exercised reasonable diligence. Cedartown North P'ship, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 296 Ga. App. 54 , 673 S.E.2d 562 (2009).

What constituted “service” for purposes of calculating 30 days. —

“Personal service” required under Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 includes all the variations provided in the Civil Practice Act and does not mandate that the condemner be handed the petition individually. Department of Transp. v. Ridley, 244 Ga. 49 , 257 S.E.2d 511 (1979).

Filing by cocondemnee. —

Condemnee’s notice of appeal is untimely despite the fact that the cocondemnee filed a timely answer because the cocondemnee’s answer was not a notice of appeal where the answer did not express dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation but merely sought to clarify its name. Howard v. Department of Transp., 184 Ga. App. 116 , 361 S.E.2d 7 (1987).

Condemnee’s statutory period for filing a notice of appeal is not extended by late service on a cocondemnee. Howard v. Department of Transp., 184 Ga. App. 116 , 361 S.E.2d 7 (1987).

Code Section 32-3-17, allowing intervention, inapplicable to named condemnee. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17 makes provision for parties whose claims were unknown at the time the petition was filed and who were not named therein, or for taxpayers seeking to intervene in a condemnation proceeding, and is inapplicable to the situation of a condemnee named in the petition who files an appeal more than 30 days after being served with the petition. Bates & Assocs. v. Department of Transp., 186 Ga. App. 828 , 368 S.E.2d 544 (1988).

Appeals less than 30 days after advertising can still be untimely. —

When the appeal was filed more than 30 days from the date of personal service, although less than 30 days from the completion of advertising as provided for in subsection (f) of Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1, the appeal was not timely. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 143 Ga. App. 872 , 240 S.E.2d 163 (1977).

Personal Service

Applicability of thirty-day provision. —

Thirty-day provision in this section refers only to period following personal service on condemnee as shown by the return of service. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 143 Ga. App. 872 , 240 S.E.2d 163 (1977).

Joint Owners

Appeal allowed when some joint owners not properly served. —

Since the record failed to show service on some of the parties named as joint owners in each of several cases, a notice of appeal to a jury on the questions of value and consequential damages was not too late, although filed more than 30 days after the filing of the declaration of taking, since the condemnees were not properly served and did not waive service until the actual filing of the appeal. Knight v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 332 , 214 S.E.2d 418 (1975).

Issue of personal service to be disposed of as whole. —

When a joint notice of appeal is filed by all condemnees, the court should not dismiss the appeal as to some of the appellants who were served in the first instance while allowing it as to others, but the issue should be taken and disposed of as a whole. Knight v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 332 , 214 S.E.2d 418 (1975).

Issues on Appeal

Affidavit as to just compensation not an admission of fact. —

Department of Transportation’s affidavit filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-6(b)(5) did not constitute an admission of fact which would be admissible against the Department of Transportation in condemnee’s appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 . Aiken v. Department of Transp., 171 Ga. App. 154 , 319 S.E.2d 58 (1984).

Original estimate not binding in jury appeal. —

When a condemnee is dissatisfied with the compensation originally estimated and elects to appeal that issue to a jury, the condemnor is not bound by the condemnor’s original estimate and can present evidence de novo as to fair market value and consequential damages. Aiken v. Department of Transp., 171 Ga. App. 154 , 319 S.E.2d 58 (1984).

Business loss damages need not be specifically pled in notice of appeal. —

Because there was no legislative requirement that, in a condemnation proceeding, a party seeking business loss damages had to specifically and separately plead for such in the notice of appeal, in accordance with the consent judgment that the Georgia Department of Transportation was bound by, a lessee’s appeal was to proceed to trial on the lessee’s claims for business loss, damages to trade fixtures, and relocation expenses. DOT v. Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321 , 644 S.E.2d 171 (2007).

32-3-15. Interlocutory hearing on amount of compensation.

  1. An appeal having been filed as provided in Code Section 32-3-14, the appellant or appellants, at any time before the beginning of the trial of the issue formed on such appeal, but not later than 90 days after the date of service as provided in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, may file in the case a petition for an interlocutory hearing on the issue of whether the amount deposited in court as just and adequate compensation is sufficient. Such petition shall be served as may be directed by the court. The petition shall be verified and shall state the amount which is claimed by the petitioner to represent just and adequate compensation, together with a sworn, written statement of the facts upon which the claim is based.
  2. Upon the presentation of the interlocutory petition to the judge of the court in which the case is pending, the court shall make such order as to the appointment of assessors as shall conform most nearly to Article 1 of Chapter 2 of Title 22 and shall give all interested persons equal rights in the selection thereof. If by reason of conflicting interests or otherwise such equality of right cannot be preserved, the judge shall make such order on the subject as shall secure a fair and impartial assessment. The board of assessors so appointed shall determine from all evidence offered by the parties, from personal inspection of the premises, and from its own professional judgment whether the condemnor should be required to deposit any additional amount as estimated compensation and shall, within 30 days of the date of reference to such board, make an interlocutory award based upon such determination.
  3. Upon approval of the interlocutory award by the court and service of a copy upon the condemnor, as may be directed by the court, the condemnor shall within 15 days pay into court any additional amount required to be paid pursuant to the interlocutory award.
  4. Upon the application of the party or parties in interest at any time before a jury verdict on the appeal, the court shall order that the additional money deposited in court be paid forthwith to the parties found to be entitled thereto; provided, however, that any party or parties receiving any payment of any amount paid into court pursuant to an interlocutory award shall, before receiving such payment, file in the case a bond in the amount of such payment conditioned for the repayment of any amount so received by such party which may be in excess of the amount awarded by the jury upon the trial of the appeal. Such bond shall be executed by a surety company authorized to do business in this state; and, in the event the amount awarded by the jury on final trial of the appeal is less than the total amount paid into court by the condemnor, judgment may be entered against the principal and surety on the bond for the amount by which the total amount paid into court exceeds the amount awarded by the jury; and, if the amount awarded by the jury is less than the original deposit, judgment may be entered against the condemnee for that part of the judgment not covered by the bond.
  5. The assessors shall be compensated as provided in Code Section 22-2-84.
  6. The interlocutory award provided for in this Code section shall not be subject to exceptions to any higher court.
  7. If the condemnee notifies the court in writing to dismiss the appeal filed by the condemnee pursuant to Code Section 32-3-14 within 15 days following the date the interlocutory award is approved by the court, that interlocutory award shall become the final judgment in the proceeding and shall not be vacated or modified, and that appeal shall be dismissed unless the condemnor files with the court a notice objecting to such dismissal within 15 days following the date the condemnee notified the condemnor of the notice to dismiss such appeal.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-611, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 332, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1539, § 12.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 1991, p. 332, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment shall be applicable to those proceedings in which the declaration of taking is filed with the court on or after July 1, 1991.

Law reviews. —

For review of 1998 legislation relating to eminent domain, see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

For discussion of the constitutionality of this section, see Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560 , 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977).

Legislative intent to make interlocutory award available. —

That the interlocutory award is not subject to being vacated or modified after 15 days indicates a legislative intent to make the interlocutory award quickly available to the condemnee without further protracted dispute over the interlocutory amount. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560 , 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977).

No intent to make interlocutory award of estimated compensation unappealable. —

Interpretation of this section which would allow interlocutory awards of estimated compensation to become nonappealable final judgments is contrary to the legislative scheme. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560 , 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977).

Court appointment of special master to hear all issues improper. —

Trial court’s sua sponte appointment of a special master and the court’s submission of all issues to that master was contrary to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-15 , which contemplates that only the condemnee can petition for an appointment of a special master and that such a master can consider only the issue of compensation. Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784 , 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984).

Condemnee required to post bond. —

Same requirements pertaining to a condemnee’s obligation to post bond apply to a condemnee who seeks a greater award, whether the condemnee pursues an interlocutory hearing before a special master, or appeals directly to a jury, the sum initially awarded by the court. Kellett v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 214 , 329 S.E.2d 514 (1985).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Surplus property not to be placed in court registry. — Legislature intended that only money, and not surplus property, be placed into the court registry for satisfaction of any judgment resulting from a condemnation action. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Referee’s failure to file report within time specified by statute, court order, or stipulation as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.

32-3-16. Appeal to jury; evidence to be heard on appeal; subsequent review of issues not brought before jury.

  1. After the notice of appeal has been filed as provided in Code Section 32-3-14, it shall be the duty of the court at the next term thereof, which shall convene not earlier than 30 days subsequent to the date of service, as provided for in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, to cause an issue to be made and tried by a jury as to the value of the property or interest taken and the consequential damages to property or interests not taken, with the same right to move for a new trial and file a notice of appeal as in other cases at law, provided that an interlocutory award has not become final pursuant to Code Section 32-3-15.
  2. When an appeal has been filed pursuant to Code Section 32-3-14, all subsequent proceedings thereon shall have the nature of a de novo investigation with the right of either party, under the rules of evidence as provided for in the general laws of this state, to introduce evidence concerning:
    1. The fair market value of the property or interest taken or other evidence of just and adequate compensation;
    2. The prospective and consequential damages to the remaining property or interests by reason of the taking and use of the property or interest for the purposes for which taken; and
    3. The consequential benefits accruing to such remaining property or interests by reason of such taking and use,

      provided that such consequential benefits, if any, may be offset against such consequential damages, if any; but, in no event, shall consequential benefits be offset against the value of the property or interest actually taken.

  3. If, for any reason, the issues made by the filing of the notice of appeal provided for in this Code section are not tried by a jury as to the value of the property or interest taken and the consequential damages to the property or interests not taken, at the next term of the court after the filing of such appeal, such fact shall not be cause for dismissal of the appeal and the issues made by such appeal shall be subject to trial at any future term of the court.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-612, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Further provisions regarding evidence to be considered in determining just and adequate compensation, §§ 22-2-109 , 22-2-137 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Interlocutory awards of estimated compensation appealable. —

Any interpretation of this section allowing interlocutory awards of estimated compensation to become nonappealable final judgments is contrary to the legislative scheme. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560 , 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977).

Failure to make issue at trial of alleged error. —

If alleged error was never made an issue at trial, no question is presented for review on appeal. DeKalb County v. Cowan, 151 Ga. App. 753 , 261 S.E.2d 478 (1979).

Issue of whether or not property is unique is a jury question. DOT v. 19.646 Acres of Land, 178 Ga. App. 287 , 342 S.E.2d 760 (1986).

Condemnor not bound by original estimate upon condemnee’s appeal to jury. —

When a condemnee is dissatisfied with the compensation originally estimated by the condemnor and elects to appeal that issue to a jury, the condemnor is not bound by the condemnor’s original estimate but can present evidence de novo as to the fair market value and consequential damages. Morrison v. DOT, 166 Ga. App. 144 , 303 S.E.2d 501 (1983).

Evidence of sales of comparable property in condemnation proceedings which is not too remote in point of time could become relevant as the basis of an expert’s explanation as to how the expert arrived at the valuation and, when such use is made of evidence of comparable sales, no foundation need be laid concerning the similarity of the property. Panos v. Department of Transp., 162 Ga. App. 53 , 290 S.E.2d 295 (1982).

Improper exclusion of expert opinion. —

Expert’s opinion as to what the expert would pay for condemned land was probative of the land’s fair market value and improperly excluded by the trial court. Jotin Realty Co. v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 809 , 331 S.E.2d 605 (1985).

Expert appraiser previously employed by another condemning authority. —

In a condemnation action where the issue was just and adequate compensation, and the condemnees’ expert appraiser testified to having previously been employed by another condemning authority to appraise the same property, but the Department of Transportation did not object to the witness at trial, the issue may not be raised on appeal. DOT v. Bennett, 194 Ga. App. 789 , 391 S.E.2d 724 (1990).

Greater difficulty in ingress and egress which is occasioned by changing traffic patterns is not an appropriate item of damages in eminent domain proceedings. DOT v. Coley, 184 Ga. App. 206 , 360 S.E.2d 924 (1987).

Consequential damages provable. —

In condemnation proceedings, the condemnee is entitled to prove every element of consequential damage that is relevant. DOT v. Coley, 184 Ga. App. 206 , 360 S.E.2d 924 (1987).

Because a condemnee did not claim lost profits or business losses, the trial court properly limited the condemnee’s evidence to the value of the property taken and consequential damages to the remainder; because the jury’s valuation was within the range of the evidence, the trial court properly denied the condemnee’s motion for a new trial. Thornton v. DOT, 275 Ga. App. 401 , 620 S.E.2d 621 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0194, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 139 (Ga. Feb. 13, 2006).

Business loss damages need not be specifically pled in notice of appeal. —

Because there was no legislative requirement that, in a condemnation proceeding, a party seeking business loss damages had to specifically and separately plead for such in the notice of appeal, in accordance with the consent judgment that the Georgia Department of Transportation was bound by, a lessee’s appeal was to proceed to trial on the lessee’s claims for business loss, damages to trade fixtures, and relocation expenses. DOT v. Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321 , 644 S.E.2d 171 (2007).

Use of “condemnee” rather than “condemnor” in burden of proof instruction. —

When, in a condemnation action, the use of “condemnees” rather than “condemnor” in the charge explaining the burden of proof is clearly inadvertent, a slip of the tongue, the error is not likely to confuse or mislead the jury and, thus, is not so substantial as to require reversal. Morrison v. DOT, 166 Ga. App. 144 , 303 S.E.2d 501 (1983).

Jury charges constituting reversible error. —

Jury charge that limited jury’s use of the replacement- cost-less-depreciation method for establishing fair market value to situations where the market or income approaches were not suitable was incorrect and constituted reversible error. Jotin Realty Co. v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 809 , 331 S.E.2d 605 (1985).

Attorney’s fees and costs recoverable only in § 32-3-11 action. —

Condemnee’s claim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses based on the fraud and bad faith that the condemnor allegedly exhibited during the condemnor’s acquisition of the property in question could only be raised in a proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 and not in an action seeking to establish just and reasonable compensation only. Department of Transp. v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 497 , 297 S.E.2d 72 (1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of separate properties sufficient to allow damages for diminished value of parcel remaining after taking of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308.

32-3-17. Right to intervene in proceedings; effect of subsequent proceedings on rights of condemnor.

  1. No provision of this article in reference to any rule or order, or time for responding thereto, shall be held or construed to exclude any person by way of default from making known his rights or claims in the property or interests or in the fund arising therefrom. Any such person claiming an interest or any rights therein may file appropriate pleadings or intervention at any time before verdict and be fully heard thereon. If any person, at any time during the pendency of such proceeding, desires to come in and be heard on any claim to the fund or interest therein, he shall be allowed to do so.
  2. After the filing of the declaration of taking and the payment of the fund into the registry of the court as provided for in Code Section 32-3-7, the petitioner shall not be concerned with or affected by any subsequent proceedings except as to the appeal and interlocutory petition provided for in Code Sections 32-3-14 and 32-3-15 respectively and concerning which the sole issue shall be as to the amount of just and adequate compensation.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-613, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

All claimants to one piece of condemned property are to be joined in one action for resolution of all issues by trial. DOT v. McLaughlin, 163 Ga. App. 1 , 292 S.E.2d 435 , cert. denied, 250 Ga. 10 , 297 S.E.2d 217 (1982).

Public possesses “an interest” in public property and, therefore, taxpayers possess the right to intervene in condemnation actions against land owned by the entity to which the taxpayers pay their taxes. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

Code section inapplicable to named condemnee. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17 is inapplicable to the situation of a condemnee named in the petition who files an appeal more than 30 days after being served with the petition. Bates & Assocs. v. Department of Transp., 186 Ga. App. 828 , 368 S.E.2d 544 (1988).

Validity of taking not affected by dispute over funds. —

Dispute between two condemnees over the ownership of the funds paid into the registry of the court and the manner in which the funds were paid out did not affect the validity of the taking itself. Brown v. Department of Transp., 191 Ga. App. 321 , 381 S.E.2d 532 (1989).

32-3-17.1. Decisions upon questions of law; power of judge to give necessary orders and directions; jury trial in open court only.

All questions of law arising upon the pleadings or in any other way arising from the cause, subsequent to the filing of the declaration of taking and the deposit of the fund, and subsequent to the filing of notice of appeal, if any, shall be passed on by the presiding judge who may, from time to time, make such orders and give such directions as are necessary to speed the cause, and as may be consistent with justice and due process of law; but no jury trial shall be had except in open court.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-3-17.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Consolidation of condemnation cases when entire property has common use. —

Whether it is appropriate to consolidate two condemnation proceedings depends upon the use of the property, and when the entire property had a common use so as to entitle the landowners to the consequential damages calculated as resulting to the whole of the property rather than to separate parcels, the trial court’s order consolidating the two cases was not in error — especially where to allow two different actions to be brought regarding the one property could have resulted in great harm and injustice to the condemnees’ substantive rights. DOT v. Defoor, 173 Ga. App. 218 , 325 S.E.2d 863 (1984).

Restriction on court’s power to appoint special master. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 does not give the superior court the authority to make a sua sponte appointment of a special master to resolve all issues in the proceedings as if the issues had been brought under O.C.G.A. § 22-2-100 et seq. Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784 , 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984).

Evidentiary hearing required for mixed questions of law and fact. —

In a proceeding by a lessor for compensation for an easement on condemned property, the issue of the lessor’s interest involved mixed questions of law and fact and could only be dealt with by the court on evidentiary hearing, trial on non-value issues, or summary judgment and not under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 . S & S Food Servs., Inc. v. DOT, 222 Ga. App. 579 , 475 S.E.2d 197 (1996).

Amendment of defective declaration of taking. —

When the Department of Transportation filed a declaration of taking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq., which included the taking of a temporary work easement to be used in the demolition of a building on the condemned property, the department did not adequately describe the easement as the department’s plat attached to the department’s declaration did not describe the easement, and there was no description of the easement’s width nor any limitation regarding a pathway which had to be used when traversing land not condemned; the issue was not rendered moot by the fact that the condemnees did not obtain a stay pending appeal and the work was completed during the appeal’s pendency because O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 authorized a trial court to order a condemnor to amend a defective declaration of taking. Ga. 400 Indus. Park, Inc. v. DOT, 274 Ga. App. 153 , 616 S.E.2d 903 (2005).

Business loss damages need not be specifically pled in notice of appeal. —

Because there was no legislative requirement that, in a condemnation proceeding, a party seeking business loss damages had to specifically and separately plead for such in the notice of appeal, in accordance with the consent judgment that the Georgia Department of Transportation was bound by, a lessee’s appeal was to proceed to trial on the lessee’s claims for business loss, damages to trade fixtures, and relocation expenses. DOT v. Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321 , 644 S.E.2d 171 (2007).

Condemnee has no vested right in attorney fees granted by court. —

Trial court does not have authority, under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 , to require payment of reasonable and necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation for proceedings before an appellate court of this state. DOT v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 723 , 409 S.E.2d 281 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1541, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 636 (Ga. Sept. 13, 1991).

32-3-18. Prevention or delay of vesting of title in condemnor.

No appeal in any cause under this article and no bond or undertaking given shall operate to prevent or delay the vesting of title to such lands in the condemnor, subject, however, to the power of the court as provided in Code Section 32-3-20.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-615, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

32-3-19. Jury verdict; entry of judgment; award; effect on condemnor’s title.

  1. The verdict of the jury shall have respect to the lands described in the declaration of taking as set forth in Code Section 32-3-6, or such interest therein as may be described in said declaration, or to any separate claim against the property or interest therein as may be ordered and may be molded under the direction of the court so as to do complete justice and avoid confusion of interest. The court shall give such direction as to the disposition of the fund as shall be proper according to the rights of the several respondents.
  2. After the verdict of the jury, the court shall, in instances where no motion for new trial or notice of appeal is filed within the time provided for by law or where such verdict has been affirmed by a proper appellate court and the remittitur from such court has been made the judgment of the superior court, enter judgment in favor of the condemnee and against the condemnor in the amount of such verdict, together with the accrued court costs, which judgment shall be immediately credited with the sum of money deposited by the condemnor with the declaration of taking and which shall bear interest as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section; and, upon the failure or refusal of the condemnor immediately to deposit such increase in such sum into the registry of the court, as well as the accrued court costs, it shall be the duty of said clerk to issue execution therefor.
  3. After just and adequate compensation has been ascertained and established by judgment, the judgment shall include, as part of the just and adequate compensation awarded, interest from the date of taking to the date of payment pursuant to final judgment at the rate of 7 percent per annum on the amount awarded by final judgment as the value of the property as of the date of taking; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court and was subject to withdrawal by the condemnee without the requirement of posting a bond as required by Code Section 32-3-15. However, if the condemnee posted the bond and withdrew the additional deposit made after the special master’s award and is later awarded a sum greater than the original deposit but less than the special master’s award, the condemnee shall not be entitled to interest on this additional deposit for the time he had use of the money; but he shall be entitled to receive the percentage of the reasonable cost of the bond that the sum awarded over the original deposit bears to the sum of the special master’s award over the original deposit. If the condemnee is later awarded a sum that exceeds the special master’s award and he has posted bond and withdrawn the additional deposit, he shall not be entitled to interest on this additional deposit for the time he had use of the money but he shall be entitled to the reasonable cost of the bond.
  4. No sum so paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or poundage.
  5. In any event, the case shall be transferred, under the conditions set out in this Code section, to the closed docket. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed as in any way affecting the title acquired by the condemnor by virtue of the declaration of taking as provided for in Code Section 32-3-7.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-616, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Interest on judgments generally, § 7-4-12 .

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016).

For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Entry of judgment. —

Language of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 , which explicitly directs the entry of judgment in three enumerated instances, is meaningless or mere surplusage, and that language does not implicitly prohibit the entry of judgment in unenumerated instances. DOT v. Petkas, 189 Ga. App. 633 , 377 S.E.2d 166 (1988).

Legislative determination of prejudgment interest rate constitutional. —

Prejudgment interest rate specified by subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 compensates the condemnee for the use of funds generated in a condemnation action, not for the use of the property condemned; thus, this interest rate is not part of “just compensation,” and legislative determination of the rate does not involve improper exercise of a judicial function. Brooks v. DOT, 254 Ga. 60 , 327 S.E.2d 175 (1985).

Different percentages for prejudgment and postjudgment interest. —

If no suspect class of condemnees is involved, application of different statutory percentages to prejudgment and postjudgment interest in condemnation cases is not unconstitutional. Brooks v. DOT, 254 Ga. 60 , 327 S.E.2d 175 (1985).

Interest on award. —

O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-12 and 32-3-19 are to be construed together so that interest to the condemnee payable under these eminent domain proceedings is 7 percent between the date of taking and the final judgment and 12 percent thereafter until paid. Department of Transp. v. Cochran, 160 Ga. App. 583 , 287 S.E.2d 599 (1981); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 162 Ga. App. 252 , 291 S.E.2d 104 (1982).

Property owner was entitled to interest under the statute since the lump sum estimate of just and adequate compensation, when paid into the court by the defendant city, was not immediately subject to withdrawal by the property owner as the sum had not been apportioned among the property owner and the owner’s tenants. Chouinard v. City of E. Point, 237 Ga. App. 266 , 514 S.E.2d 220 (1999).

In a condemnation action, the trial court erred in denying a lessor’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the lessor’s entitlement to statutory pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 because the fact that the trial court could later instruct the jury to disregard irrelevant evidence was not a reason to allow the jury to hear the irrelevant evidence; under the statutory framework of § 32-3-19 , the amount of pre-judgment interest due a condemnee is determined after the jury enters a verdict. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511 , 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010).

Trial court erred by failing to award prejudgment interest on $1.27 million from the date of the taking through the date that amount was deposited into court as that amount was not initially deposited by the Department of Transportation. Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Ga. DOT, 336 Ga. App. 804 , 784 S.E.2d 134 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1456, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 720 (Ga. Oct. 31, 2016).

Term “just and adequate compensation” in subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 does not include prejudgment interest as an integral part which would make prejudgment interest subject to postjudgment interest. DOT v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 181 Ga. App. 672 , 353 S.E.2d 603 (1987).

Post-judgment interest in condemnation actions is to be awarded in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 at 12 percent per annum rather than at 7 percent under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 , as the former is the more recent of the statutes. DOT v. Vest, 160 Ga. App. 368 , 287 S.E.2d 85 (1981).

When jury’s award is less than condemnor’s deposit. —

In a condemnation case in which the jury awarded the property owner $86,000, because the DOT had initially paid $118,250 into the court’s registry, the trial court properly entered judgment against the owner in the amount of $32,250. Curry v. DOT, 341 Ga. App. 482 , 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C1786, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 905 (Ga. Oct. 16, 2017).

Jury verdict establishes value. —

Last word on value is the jury’s verdict; the jury establishes the value. If the jury finds as a fact that the condemnor underestimated the value of the land, the condemnor must pay more; if it finds as a fact that the condemnor overestimated the value, the condemnee is not entitled to the proceeds of the government agency’s mistake. Kellett v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 214 , 329 S.E.2d 514 (1985).

Appeals. —

Mere filing of a timely motion for new trial or a notice of appeal, both of which contemplate the prior entry of a judgment on the jury’s verdict, do not destroy the underlying viability of that prior judgment as a final appealable order in the case. DOT v. Petkas, 189 Ga. App. 633 , 377 S.E.2d 166 (1988).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Just and adequate compensation interest vests on date of taking. — Right to receive interest as part of just and adequate compensation vests on date of taking, which is the day the declaration of taking, accompanied by the payment of just and adequate compensation, is filed in a superior court. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

Interest on amount recovered in condemnation cases. — Condemnation cases filed before the effective date of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 bear interest at 7 percent on the amount recovered from the date of taking. Cases filed on and after the effective date of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 bear interest at 7 percent from the date of taking to the date of final judgment and at 12 percent from the date of final judgment. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

Surplus property not to be placed in court registry. — Legislature intended that only money, and not surplus property, be placed into the court registry for satisfaction of any judgment resulting from a condemnation action. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-8.

32-3-20. Effect of article on other methods of condemnation.

In cases involving condemnation of private property for public road purposes or any other public transportation purpose, this article shall be supplementary to and cumulative of the methods of procedure for condemnation of private property prescribed in Chapter 2 of Title 22.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-617, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 6.

Article 2 Acquisition of Rights of Way and Easements for Federal Parkways

Cross references. —

Limited access roads generally, § 32-6-110 et seq.

32-3-30. Power of department to acquire rights of way and easements.

The department shall have the authority and is empowered to acquire, either by condemnation, purchase, gift, or other methods, rights of way and easements necessary to comply with the laws, rules, and regulations of the United States government for the construction of federal parkways in Georgia.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

Cross references. —

Easements generally, T. 44, C. 9.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 99, 209, 210, 259. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 784 et seq.39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, §§ 191, 192.

C.J.S. —

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 146, 180.

32-3-31. Method of acquisition.

The authority delegated by this article to the department to acquire rights of way and easements for federal parkways shall be the same authority as hereinbefore provided by law for the acquisition of rights of way for present or future public road or other transportation purposes in Georgia; and the department shall exercise such authority in the same manner and under the same Code sections which provide for the construction of state-aid roads in this state.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 2; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 14 et seq.26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 87, 95, 294. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, §§ 32, 33, 191 et seq.

C.J.S. —

28A C.J.S., Easements, § 21 et seq. 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 65, 118, 133, 146, 180 et seq. 39A C.J.S., Highways, §§ 1, 2, 3, 27, 178, 195 et seq.

32-3-32. Acquisition of fee simple title; designation on official county map.

The rights of way acquired by the department may, at the option of the department, be a fee simple title; and the nature and extent of the rights of way and easements so acquired shall be designated upon an official county map showing the location of the rights of way across each county in this state.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 5; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 12. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 87, 101. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 770 et seq.

C.J.S. —

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 630. 39A C.J.S., Highways, § 203.

32-3-33. Inclusion of scenic easements in rights of way.

The department may acquire scenic easements; and these may be included as part of the rights of way to be acquired by the department for federal parkways in those cases mutually acceptable to the department and the United States government or its appropriate agency.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 3; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 7. 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 135, 137, 156, 157. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, §§ 200 et seq., 208, 350.

C.J.S. —

28A C.J.S., Easements, §§ 53, 82, 114. 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 133, 139, 151. 39A C.J.S., Highways, § 211.

32-3-34. Amount of land to be acquired for rights of way.

  1. The lands and interest in lands to be acquired in fee simple for federal parkway rights of way shall average not more than 125 acres per mile plus not more than 25 acres per mile in scenic easements; and in no case shall the width of the fee simple rights of way for federal parkway land be less than 300 feet. It is the intent of this Code section that in using the acreage per mile method there will be permitted the balancing of the total acreage over the entire length of the federal parkway project within the state and that such usage will provide for flexibility to narrow or widen the fee simple lands acquired for federal parkways to meet specific conditions.
  2. The variance of the width of the lands to be acquired by the department for federal parkways is to be dependent upon topographical conditions; requirements of federal parkway design; acquisition of acreage adjacent to the federal parkway at designated locations of scenic, historic, or recreational value or significance; simplicity and ease of rights of way acquisition; cost of rights of way acquisition; and other conditions considered by the department to be controlling; but in no case shall the width of the fee simple rights of way to be acquired for federal parkways be less than the 300 feet provided for in this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 4; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses in Real Property, §§ 54, 55, 70. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 788. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 193.

C.J.S. —

28A C.J.S., Easements, § 93 et seq. 39A C.J.S., Highways, § 206 et seq.

ALR. —

Width of way created by express grant, reservation, or exception not specifying width, 28 A.L.R.2d 253.

32-3-35. Access for private roads.

The acquisition of rights of way by the department for federal parkways shall permit no reservations or interests of access for private roads connecting to or crossing the federal parkways; and the department shall acquire, as part of the rights of way for federal parkways, the rights and interests of access for private roads.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 7; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 69, 70.

C.J.S. —

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 33.

32-3-36. Conveyance of title to rights of way to United States government or its appropriate agency.

The department is authorized and empowered to convey such title or interest as is acquired for federal parkway rights of way to the United States government or its appropriate agency, free and clear of all claims for compensation.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 6; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 17, 88, 90, 112, 223 et seq., 241, 269. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 365, 366, 381 et seq.

C.J.S. —

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 20, 93, 100, 101, 133, 213 et seq.

32-3-37. Use of property before final condemnation; enforcement of Code section.

  1. When areas of land or interests in land have been tentatively designated by the United States government to be included within federal parkways but the final survey and plans necessary for the construction of federal parkways as provided by law have not yet been made, no person shall cut or remove any timber from such areas as so designated pending the completion and finalization of such survey and plans after receiving notice from the department that such area is under investigation. Any property owner who suffers loss or damage by reason of the restraint upon his right to use the timber upon his land pending such investigation and the finalization of survey and plans for the construction of federal parkways shall be entitled to recover compensation from the department for the temporary appropriation of his property and for any damage to his property caused by such temporary appropriation, in the event the same is not finally included within the area designated as a federal parkway.
  2. The provisions of this Code section may be enforced under the same law now applicable for the adjustment and payment of compensation in the acquisition of rights of way for present or future public road or other transportation purposes.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 9; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

32-3-38. Advertisement restrictions near parkways.

  1. No advertisement or advertising structure shall be erected, constructed, installed, maintained, or operated within 500 feet of the boundary of any federal parkway rights of way acquired by the department under this article except as follows:
    1. Advertisements which are securely attached to a place of business or residence which does not exceed one advertising structure with a total area not to exceed 100 square feet may be erected or maintained or caused to be erected or maintained by the owner or lessee of such place of business or residence within 150 feet of such place of business or residence if and only if the advertisement or advertising structure relates solely to merchandise, services, or entertainment sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished at such place of business or residence;
    2. Signs may be erected or maintained or caused to be erected or maintained on any farm by the owner or lessee of such farm if and only if such signs relate solely to farm produce, merchandise, services, or entertainment sold, produced, manufactured, or furnished on such farm and when the signs so erected or maintained do not exceed two in number with a combined total area not to exceed 150 square feet;
    3. Signs may be posted or displayed upon real property by the owner, or by the authority of the owner, stating that the property upon which the sign is located, or a part of such property, is for sale or rent; and such signs, when so posted or displayed, may state any data pertaining to such property and its appurtenances and the name and address of the owner and the agent of such owner;
    4. Notice of any railroad, bridges, ferries, or other transportation or transmission company may be posted or displayed when found necessary in the discretion of the commissioner;
    5. A sign containing 16 square feet or less and bearing an announcement of any county, town, village, or city, or historic place or shrine, which is situated in this state, advertising itself or local industries, meetings, buildings, or attractions, may be posted or displayed, provided that the sign is maintained wholly at public expense or at the expense of such historic place or shrine;
    6. Historic markers erected by duly constituted and authorized public authorities may be posted or displayed; and
    7. Highway markers and signs erected or caused to be erected by the commissioner or other authorities, in accordance with the law, may be posted or displayed.
  2. Any person who violates the advertising restrictions of this Code section or any lawful regulation promulgated by the department under authority of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in Code Section 32-6-91. The department is authorized to use the remedies set forth in Code Sections 32-6-93, 32-6-94, and 32-6-96, in order to enforce the advertising restrictions set forth in this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 10; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

Cross references. —

Control of advertising, informational, directional, and other signs generally, § 32-6-50 et seq.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Granting, renewal, and revocation of permits for outdoor advertising, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations for the State of Georgia, Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-6 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, §§ 2, 6 et seq., 15 et seq., 27 et seq.40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 324.

C.J.S. —

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 332.

ALR. —

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk, 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

32-3-39. Concurrent jurisdiction conceded to United States government; taxing power of state reserved.

The State of Georgia, by this article, does concede concurrent jurisdiction to the United States government or its appropriate agency for rights of way and the lands or interest in lands conveyed to the United States government for federal parkway purposes under this article. However, the State of Georgia expressly reserves the taxing power as applied to all persons, property, or operations within the federal parkway rights of way except as applied to the property of and the operations of the United States government and its agencies.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 604, § 8; Ga. L. 1969, p. 982, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 17 et seq., 88, 90, 105, 109. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, United States, § 34 et seq.

C.J.S. —

91 C.J.S., United States, § 8 et seq.

CHAPTER 4 State, County, and Municipal Road Systems

Cross references. —

Toll road and toll bridge licenses issued by counties and municipalities, § 36-60-21 .

Public works bidding, § 36-91-1 et seq.

Public bridge franchise issued by state, § 44-8-10 .

Law reviews. —

For annual survey article on local government law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (1998).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. Trials. —

Actions Against Road Contractors for Inadequate Warning of Construction Hazards, 72 Am. Jur. Trials 215.

Article 1 General Provisions

32-4-1. Classification of public roads.

For purposes of jurisdiction and administration, the public roads of Georgia shall be divided and classified in accordance with the three types of classifications provided in this Code section:

  1. State highway system.    The state highway system shall consist of those public roads which on July 1, 1973, are shown by the records of the department to be “state-aid roads,” those public roads thereafter designated by the department as part of the state highway system, and all of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways within the state;
  2. County road systems.    Each county road system shall consist of those public roads within that county, including county roads extending into any municipality within the county, which are shown to be part of that county road system by the department records on July 1, 1973, and any subsequent additions to such county road system made by the county;
  3. Municipal street systems.    Each municipal street system shall consist of those public roads within the limits of that municipality which are not in any other classification under this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-201, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 69-301, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Road may become public without department recording road in county road system. —

Failure of the Department of Transportation to record a particular road as being a part of the county road system does not determine whether such road becomes a public road by prescription. Jordan v. Way, 235 Ga. 496 , 220 S.E.2d 258 (1975).

Circular airport roadway not street. —

Roadway in the form of a circle, situated wholly within the limits of a municipal airport, is not a city “street.” Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661 , 189 S.E. 63 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 69-301).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Deeding privately-owned road or driveway to county. — Merely deeding privately owned road or driveway to county will not necessarily turn that private property into a public road. 1980 Op. Atty Gen. No. U80-37.

When county must maintain roads annexed into municipalities. — Because the county must maintain roads on the county road system and because public roads are not removed from the system by mere annexation into a municipality where the road lies, the county must continue to maintain roads on the county road system which are in areas annexed into a municipality until the governing authority of the county removes the roads from the county road system by appropriate action. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-21.

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 3.

C.J.S. —

39A C.J.S., Highways, § 1.

ALR. —

Responsibility of county for injury from defect in highway, 2 A.L.R. 721 .

Term “highway” in statutory provision relative to vehicle traffic as including street, 54 A.L.R. 1250 .

Jurisdiction and power in respect of street road which is part of, or touches upon, a state or federal highway, 144 A.L.R. 307 .

32-4-2. Official map, list, and records; rules and regulations.

    1. The department shall prepare an official map showing all public roads on the state highway system. Changes to the state highway system shall be recorded on this map as soon as is reasonably possible; and such map, as it is periodically revised, shall be filed with the Secretary of State and shall be open for public inspection. As often as reasonably possible but not less than once every five years, the department shall also prepare and distribute to each county a map showing all the public roads on its county road system including extensions into municipalities.
      1. The department shall prepare an official list of all portions or features of the state highway system, including without limitation public roads, bridges, or interchanges, which have been named by Act or resolution of the General Assembly or by resolution of the State Transportation Board. The department shall update the list to reflect any additions or changes as soon as is reasonably possible; and such list, as periodically revised, shall be open for public inspection. For each such named portion or feature of the state highway system, the list shall specify without limitation the official name; the state highway system route number; the name of each county wherein the named portion or feature is located; a citation to the Act or resolution of the General Assembly or the resolution of the State Transportation Board officially naming such portion or feature; and a brief biographical, historical, or other relevant description of the person, place, event, or thing commemorated by such naming.
      2. The department may contract with a state historical society to make such list available in electronic format free of charge to Internet users, provided that any web page providing such list pursuant to this subparagraph shall be searchable without limitation by county name.
  1. The department shall keep written records of the mileage on all public roads on the state highway system and on all public roads on each of the county road systems. These written records shall be revised as soon as is reasonably possible after any changes to the above public road systems. They shall indicate whether roads are paved or unpaved and shall contain information as to the condition, status, type, and use of all such public roads and such other information as deemed necessary for sound, long-range planning of public road construction and maintenance. These records shall be made available to each county and to the public.
  2. The department may provide reasonable rules and regulations for keeping accurate and up-to-date, between official measurements, the mileage record called for in this Code section. Each county shall comply with such rules and regulations.
  3. Not more often than every four years, a county may request an official measurement of its county road system under the rules and regulations of the department; and the department shall comply with such a request if properly made. Whenever a mileage measurement is to be made in any county, whether in response to a request or in the regular course of measurement for the records of the department, the county shall furnish a representative to accompany the representatives of the department in its measurement. In case of disagreement between the department representative and the county representative as to their findings, the matter shall be referred to the commissioner, whose decision as to the facts thereof shall be final and conclusive. The distribution of the county grants based on public road mileage of the county road system shall be made on the basis of the latest official mileage record for each county as shown by department records at the end of the preceding fiscal year.
  4. The official record of the state highway system shall consist of an official map, as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, and a written record, as provided for in subsection (b) of this Code section, the written record to have priority in case of conflict between the two. Resolutions of the board designating a road as part of the state highway system, as provided for in Code Section 32-4-21, and certifications of abandonment, as provided for in subsection (a) of Code Section 32-7-2, shall serve as the official record until such changes are recorded on the official map and in the written record.
  5. The official record of a county road system shall consist of an official map, as provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, and a written record, as provided for in subsection (b) of this Code section, the written record to have priority in case of conflict between the two. The minutes of the county containing resolutions designating roads as a part of a county road system, as provided for in Code Section 32-4-40, and certifications of abandonment, as provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-7-2, shall serve as the official record until such changes are recorded on the official map and in the written record.
  6. For purposes of this chapter, state maps and written records shall only be maintained on public roads which are open to public travel.

History. — Orig. Code 1863, § 578; Code 1868, § 642; Code 1873, § 603; Code 1882, § 603; Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 134, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 516; Civil Code 1910, § 636; Code 1933, § 95-108; Code 1933, § 95A-204, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1304, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 4/HB 137.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Width of road determinations. —

When the county has no road register, and the road at issue has never been laid out by the county, registered, or classified, the road’s width must be determined by the prescriptive use of the road. Turner v. Brown, 234 Ga. 605 , 216 S.E.2d 853 (1975).

Removal of road from official map. —

After the Department of Transportation removed a road from the official map for the state highway system and placed the road on the official map for the county road system and the county adopted a resolution accepting the road, the evidence established that the department had no obligation to maintain the road. Georgia DOT v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 741 , 437 S.E.2d 811 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0250, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When county must maintain roads annexed into municipalities. — Because the county must maintain roads on the county road system and because public roads are not removed from the system by mere annexation into a municipality where the road lies, the county must continue to maintain roads on the county road system which are in areas annexed into a municipality until the governing authority of the county removes the roads from the county road system by appropriate action. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-21.

32-4-3. Naming state roads, bridges, or interchanges.

No state agency shall name or rename any state road, bridge, interchange, or any part of a road in honor of, or with the name of, any person unless such action is approved by a joint resolution or Act of the General Assembly which is approved by the Governor or becomes law without such approval. This Code section shall not apply to a political subdivision of the state naming any road which is under the jurisdiction of such political subdivision.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-4-3 , enacted by Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 32.

Cross references. —

Specific powers of General Assembly, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II.

Editor’s notes. —

The provisions of this Code section were previously enacted in substantially similar form by Ga. L. 2001, p. 1215, § 2.

Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32A/SB 465, not codified by the General Assembly, provided for the repeal of Ga. L. 2001, p. 1215, § 2, which section has been codified as and superceded by Code Section 32-4-3, relating to naming state roads, bridges, or interchanges, and which Code section shall remain effective.

32-4-4. Abandonment of utility facilitles containing asbestos pipe.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “entity” means a county, a municipality, a consolidated government, or a local authority.
  2. Whenever existing utility facilities owned and operated by an entity contain asbestos pipe and such facility exists in the public rights of way of any highway, road, or street authorized pursuant to this title, and the entity determines that such facility should no longer be utilized, the entity that owns and operates the utility facility shall file a notice of abandonment with the department if the facility is located upon the public rights of way under the authority of the department. Upon abandonment, the entity shall have the discretion to:
    1. Remove and dispose of the asbestos pipe in accordance with federal laws and regulations;
    2. Leave the asbestos pipe in place and fill it with grout or other similar substance designed to harden within the pipe; or
    3. Allow the pipe to remain undisturbed in the ground and take no further action.
  3. At the request of the department or entity, any asbestos pipe left in the right of way as authorized by subsection (b) of this Code section shall be marked so as to be locatable.
  4. The entity shall not relinquish the ownership of said facility as stated in subsection (h) of Code Section 25-9-7 and Code Section 32-6-174. The facility shall be deemed abandoned and out of service.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-4-4 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 302, § 1/HB 101; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 5/HB 137.

Article 2 State Highway System

32-4-20. Composition of state highway system.

The state highway system shall consist of an integrated network of arterials and of other public roads or bypasses serving as the major collectors therefor. No public road shall be designated as a part of the state highway system unless it meets at least one of the following requirements:

  1. Serves trips of substantial length and duration indicative of regional, state-wide, or interstate importance;
  2. Connects adjoining county seats;
  3. Connects urban or regional areas with outlying areas, both intrastate and interstate; or
  4. Serves as part of the principal collector network for the state-wide and interstate arterial public road system.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-202, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 5/HB 817; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1072, § 1/SB 169.

Cross references. —

Giving of notice of intention to condemn road constituting part of state highway system for purpose of constructing electric power plant, § 22-3-42 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Road not part of state highway system. —

Trial court did not err in granting the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) summary judgment in a driver’s action alleging that the department negligently maintained a dirt road because the road was not a part of the state highway system since the road did not meet any of the four requirements of O.C.G.A. § 32-4-20 , and the DOT had no duty to maintain the road; the dirt road was a dead-end loop that led back to a county road and was part of a right-of-way that was fenced off from the travel lanes of an interstate, and at some point before the incident, access to the road had been restricted by a gate. Barrett v. Ga. DOT, 304 Ga. App. 667 , 697 S.E.2d 217 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1813, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 918 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2010).

32-4-21. Designation of roads as part of state highway system.

Whenever the board, or the commissioner when the board is not in session, deems it necessary and in the public interest to have a new or existing public road designated as part of the state highway system, whether as additional mileage or as part of a substitution or relocation, the board, by resolution, or the commissioner, by written notice to the board, may designate such road to be a part of the state highway system. If the road proposed to be designated is a part of either a county road system or a municipal street system, the department shall give written notice to the county or municipality of the effective date that such road shall become part of the state highway system. Any change on the state highway system by designation shall be recorded on the official map and in the written records of the state highway system, as provided for in subsections (a) and (b) of Code Section 32-4-2.

History. — Laws 1818, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 947; Code 1863, §§ 579, 580; Code 1868, §§ 643, 644; Code 1873, §§ 604, 605; Code 1882, §§ 604, 605; Civil Code 1895, §§ 520, 521; Civil Code 1910, §§ 640, 641; Code 1933, §§ 95-201, 95-202; Code 1933, § 95A-202, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Removal of road from official map. —

After the Department of Transportation removed a road from the official map for the state highway system and placed the road on the official map for the county road system and the county adopted a resolution accepting the road, the evidence established that the department had no obligation to maintain the road. Georgia DOT v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 741 , 437 S.E.2d 811 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0250, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994).

Liability for maintenance of road when written notice not given. —

Georgia Department of Transportation was responsible for maintaining a bypass on a road because the department had taken over maintenance of the road even though the department had not yet given the statutory written notice of the road becoming a part of the state highway system. DOT v. Carr, 254 Ga. App. 781 , 564 S.E.2d 14 (2002), cert. denied, No. S02C1224, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 774 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2002).

32-4-22. Creation of Developmental Highway System.

  1. There is created as a part of the state highway system a system of public roads to be known as the Developmental Highway System which shall consist of the following road corridors (not in order of priority):
    1. Appalachian;
    2. The South Georgia Parkway;
    3. U.S. 27;
    4. U.S. 82;
    5. Golden Isles;
    6. Savannah River;
    7. U.S. 441;
    8. Fall Line;
    9. U.S. 319;
    10. U.S. 19;
    11. U.S. 84;
    12. U.S. 1/SR 17;
    13. SR 72;
    14. Northern Arc further identified as the North Georgia Connector between the U.S. Highway 411 and U.S. Highway 41 interchange in Bartow County to State Highway 316 in Gwinnett County;
    15. East-west Highway from I-59 North to I-85 North;
    16. Truck access routes, including without limitation:
      1. SR 133 from Albany to Valdosta;
      2. SR 40 from Folkston to St. Marys; and
      3. SR 125 from Fitzgerald to I-75;
    17. SR 32;
    18. Power Alley, U.S. 280 from Columbus to Savannah;
    19. SR 125 from its intersection with SR 107 in Ben Hill County (Fitzgerald Bypass) to its intersection with SR 32 in Irwin County; and
    20. SR 15 from its intersection with US 441/SR 24 at Watkinsville to its intersection with US 1 in Toombs County.

      Without limiting the foregoing, said system is further identified as including those roads and corridors referred to as “the Governor’s Road Improvement Program” in that resolution adopted by the State Transportation Board dated November 17, 1988.

  2. The location and mileage of the Developmental Highway System shall be as generally described in subsection (a) of this Code section, with the power of the State Transportation Board to make such variances therein as shall be dictated by sound engineering and construction practices.
  3. The Developmental Highway System shall be under the control and supervision of the board, subject to the provisions of this Code section or any other Act of the General Assembly; provided, however, that the State Road and Tollway Authority is authorized to construct all or any part of such system and to enter into agreements with the department, pursuant to Code Section 32-2-61, for such purpose. Any project the cost of which is paid from the proceeds of garvee bonds as defined in Code Section 32-10-90.1 shall be, pursuant to a contract or agreement between the authority and the department, planned, designed, and constructed by the Department of Transportation or a contractor contracting with the Department of Transportation.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-4-22 , enacted by Ga. L. 1989, p. 221, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 701, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1215, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-3; Ga. L. 2005, p. 320, § 1/SB 107.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2009, a punctuation change was made at the beginning of paragraph (a)(2).

Law reviews. —

For note on 1989 enactment of this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 257 (1989).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Road part of state highway system. —

Trial court did not err by denying the Georgia Department of Transportation’s motion to dismiss a wrongful death action filed by the decedents’ parents based on sovereign immunity because it was undisputed that the road in question was part of the state highway system. DOT v. Delor, 351 Ga. App. 414 , 830 S.E.2d 519 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0086, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. Mar. 26, 2020).

32-4-23. Council on Rural Transportation and Economic Development; creation and membership; powers, duties, and authority; funding; expense allowances; repeal.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1997, p. 976, § 1, effective March 31, 2000.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2007, this Code section number was designated as reserved.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Code 1981, § 32-4-23 , enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1512, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 976, § 1.

32-4-24. Alternative tourism routes; welcome centers authorized.

  1. The board shall designate as alternative tourism routes roads that are a part of the state highway system that traverse the state and pass through or in close proximity to historic sites or tourist attractions in the state. Interstate highways that traverse the state shall not be eligible for designation as an alternative tourism route. The initial alternative tourism routes shall be U.S. Highway 27 and U.S. Highway 441.
  2. The board shall consult with the Department of Economic Development, county governing authorities, and historical sites and tourist attractions located in this state in the selection of additional alternative tourism routes. The Department of Economic Development shall promote such routes and sites and attractions along such routes to the motoring public.
  3. Subject to the appropriation process, the department may within five years of the designation of an alternative tourism route construct within 20 miles of the state line on each end of such route a welcome center. Subject to the appropriation process, if the department decides to construct such a center, it shall negotiate and contract with the local governing authorities where the welcome center is located for the maintenance and operation of such center.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-4-24 , enacted by Ga. L. 2007, p. 291, § 1/SB 282.

Article 3 County Road Systems

Cross references. —

Application for and issuance of writ of mandamus against county board of commissioners or probate judge to compel building, repair, and maintenance of county roads, § 9-6-21 .

Grants to counties for road construction and maintenance, as such grants relate to relief of ad valorem taxation on tangible property in county, § 36-17-20 et seq.

PART 1 General Powers and Duties of Counties

32-4-40. Designation of roads as part of county road system; designation of system on maps and written records of county.

Each county shall, by resolution, designate roads to be a part of its county road system; and such resolutions shall be recorded in the minutes of the county. All such roads shall be laid out on the shortest and best route to their intended destination and with as little injury to private property as possible. When a road has been designated as a part of a county road system, this change shall be recorded on the official map of the county road system, as provided for in subsection (a) of Code Section 32-4-2, and in the written record of the county road system, as provided for in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-4-2.

History. — Laws 1818, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 951; Code 1863, § 584; Code 1868, § 648; Code 1873, § 609; Code 1882, § 609; Civil Code 1895, § 529; Civil Code 1910, § 645; Code 1933, § 95-205; Code 1933, § 95A-203, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Acceptance of transfer of state road. —

After the Department of Transportation removed a road from the official map for the state highway system and placed the road on the official map for the county road system and the county adopted a resolution accepting the road, the evidence established that the department had no obligation to maintain the road. Georgia DOT v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 741 , 437 S.E.2d 811 (1993), cert. denied, No. S94C0250, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 167 (Ga. Jan. 21, 1994).

32-4-41. Duties.

The duties of a county with respect to its county road system, unless otherwise expressly limited by law, shall include but not be limited to the following:

  1. A county shall plan, designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain an adequate county road system and shall have control of and responsibility for all construction, maintenance, or other work related to the county road system. Such work may be accomplished through the use of county forces, including inmate labor, by contract as authorized in paragraph (5) of Code Section 32-4-42, or otherwise as permitted by law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent a county from entering into a contract providing for a municipality to maintain an extension of the county road system within the municipal limits;
  2. A county shall control, administer, and account for funds received for the county road system and activities incident thereto from any source whatsoever, whether federal, state, county, municipal, or any other; and it shall expend such funds for and on behalf of the county in connection with the county road system and for any purpose in connection therewith which may be authorized in this title or by any other law;
  3. A county shall inspect and determine the maximum load, weight, and other vehicular dimensions which can be safely transported over each bridge on the county road system and shall post on each bridge and on each approach thereto on the county road a sign containing a legible notice showing such maximum safe limits, each such sign to conform to the department regulations promulgated under authority of Code Section 32-6-50. However, the department is authorized to give technical assistance to counties, when so requested, in carrying out this paragraph. It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, drive, or bring on any bridge any vehicle, load, or weight which in any manner exceeds the maximum limits so ascertained and posted on such bridge; and any person hauling, driving, or otherwise bringing on such bridge any load or weight exceeding the maximum limits so ascertained and posted shall do so at his own risk; and the county shall not be liable for any damages to persons or property that may result therefrom;
  4. A county shall keep on file in the office of the county clerk, available for public inspection, the map of the county road system prepared by the department as provided for in subsection (a) of Code Section 32-4-2. In addition to keeping on file a map of the county road system, the county shall notify the department within three months after a county road is added to the local road or street system and shall further notify the department within three months after a local road or street has been abandoned. This notification shall be accompanied by an appropriate digital file, map, or plat depicting the location of the new or abandoned road;
  5. A county shall procure the necessary rights of way for public roads of the state highway system within the county in compliance with subsection (e) of Code Section 32-3-3 and Code Section 32-5-25; and
  6. In acquiring property for rights of way for federal-aid highway projects on its county road system, the county shall comply with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV of Public Law 100-17, and in general shall be guided by the policies applicable to the department as set forth in Code Section 32-8-1.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-401, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 5; Ga. L. 1981, p. 953, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1206, § 1; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 6/HB 137.

Cross references. —

Weight of vehicle and load, § 32-6-26 .

Designated local truck route signs, § 32-6-50 .

U.S. Code. —

The Uniform Relocation System and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, referred to in this Code section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on local government law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2014).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-9 and § 95-1721, and former Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, as amended, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutional to require county authorities to maintain roads. —

Requiring county authorities to maintain roads did not violate state constitutional provisions dealing with the creation of debts since counties are granted authority to build and maintain roads and to levy taxes for such purposes. State v. Georgia Rural Rds. Auth., 211 Ga. 808 , 89 S.E.2d 204 (1955) (decided under former Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, as amended).

Constitutional to require county to build and maintain bridges. —

It is the duty of county authorities to construct and maintain bridges across streams in a workmanlike and proper manner so that any person may use the bridges in safety in ordinary travel. DeKalb County v. Brewer, 107 Ga. App. 231 , 129 S.E.2d 540 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-9).

Judicial review of abandonment decision. —

In a mandamus action, a trial court erred by reversing a decision of a county board of commissioners to abandon a road as the trial court failed to give proper deference to the board’s decision to abandon the road and substituted the court’s own judgment for that of the board. Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431 , 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).

No liability for defective bridges. —

There is no language in O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41 specific enough to waive sovereign immunity and make a county liable for the county’s defective bridges. Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga. App. 848 , 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C1191, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 796 (Ga. May 31, 1996).

Duty to install signs. —

In a personal injury action, contractor had no duty to protect the plaintiff from dangerous or defective conditions caused by others; the county, not the contractor, had the obligation to install the signs which the plaintiff claimed were necessary. Purvis v. Virgil Barber Contractor, 205 Ga. App. 13 , 421 S.E.2d 303 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C1353, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 732 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1992).

When an injured party sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) for injuries received in a single-car accident on a county road, the party could not maintain a negligent maintenance claim against DOT because the road on which the accident occurred was not part of the state highway system, nor did the road lead to a state park; thus, under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41(1) , the county was obligated to maintain the road and, under O.C.G.A. § 32-2-61(e) , DOT’s contract with the county to improve the road did not relieve the county of this responsibility. Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22 , 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0792, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. July 14, 2006).

State DOT not liable for failing to erect road closure signs on county road. —

Because an accident occurred on a county-owned road and did not occur on a part of the state highway system upon which the DOT owed a duty to motorists, and the couple’s expert’s affidavit could not establish a legal duty to erect signs or to take other steps to inform drivers of the closure of the county-owned road, summary judgment for the DOT was proper. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189 , 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0999, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 648 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014).

Duty to maintain dedicated roads in subdivision. —

Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all of the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county’s decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697 , 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

County, which had accepted dedication of a subdivision road in 1962 but had not completed the road or maintained the road for 50 years, due to the county’s mistaken belief that the road was private, was ordered to complete and maintain the road; the county’s failure to complete the road was arbitrary and capricious, given the county’s acceptance of subdivision plats requiring the road. As to unopened roads in the subdivision, the roads were not public under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b) , and the county had no obligation to maintain those roads. Burke County v. Askin, 294 Ga. 634 , 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

Constitutional to require county to secure rights of way. —

In the construction of state-aid roads by the State Highway Board (now Transportation Board), it is the duty of the county authorities having control of county roads to assist in procuring the necessary rights of way. Martin v. Fulton County, 213 Ga. 761 , 101 S.E.2d 716 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1721).

Extent of right-of-way. —

County could only acquire by prescription a right-of-way over that which was actually used as a roadway, and the standard 30 foot width on which the county relied was applicable only to roads which were formally acquired by the county. Clack v. Henry County, 261 Ga. 623 , 409 S.E.2d 647 (1991).

Only the right-of-way actually acquired could be included in the roadway. Clack v. Henry County, 261 Ga. 623 , 409 S.E.2d 647 (1991).

Authority to develop asphalt facilities. —

Given the general and broad powers of counties authorized by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) and this section to levy taxes and expend funds for the construction and maintenance of roads, it is reasonable to imply that the authority can develop facilities for the production of asphalt for use in the county road system. Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22 , 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976).

Historical use as public road. —

County’s right to the roadway depends on the historical use of the roadway as a public road, not on any express grant of the property to the county or on any express dedication of the property for use as a roadway. Clack v. Henry County, 261 Ga. 623 , 409 S.E.2d 647 (1991).

Assumption of duty. —

After the trial court correctly interpreted contract provisions as only requiring the defendant to install traffic control devices, or to take preventative or corrective action when traffic related problems were caused from preexisting hazards or by the defendant’s construction activities, the defendant did not undertake to perform the duties under paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. §§ 32-4-41 and 32-6-50(c) . Adams v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 215 , 511 S.E.2d 581 (1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-101, 95-102, and 95-801, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Board of education may not maintain roads. — Board of education may not use the board’s funds for laying out, altering, maintaining, and improving a public, county-maintained road even though school transportation would be facilitated thereby; it is the sole duty and responsibility of the local officials in charge of county matters to lay out, alter, maintain, and improve the road in the manner the officials deem best suited to the needs of the county. 1962 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 189 (rendered under former Code 1933, §§ 95-101, 95-102, and 95-801).

When county must maintain roads annexed into municipalities. — Because the county must maintain roads on the county road system and because public roads are not removed from the system by mere annexation into a municipality where the road lies, the county must continue to maintain roads on the county road system which are in areas annexed into a municipality until the governing authority of the county removes the roads from the county road system by appropriate action. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-21.

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Responsibility of county for injury from defect in highway, 2 A.L.R. 721 .

Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highways, 2 A.L.R. 746 ; 123 A.L.R. 1462 .

Right of way at street or highway intersections, 37 A.L.R. 493 ; 47 A.L.R. 595 .

Duty as regards barriers for protection of automobile travel, 86 A.L.R. 1389 ; 173 A.L.R. 626 .

Personal liability of highway officers for damage to or trespass upon land in connection with construction or maintenance of highway, 90 A.L.R. 1481 .

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.

Liability of private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at highway or street intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th 1092.

32-4-42. Powers.

The powers of a county with respect to its county road system, unless otherwise expressly limited by law, shall include but not be limited to the following:

  1. A county shall have the authority to negotiate, let, and enter into contracts with any person or any agency, county, or municipality of the state for the construction, maintenance, administration, or operation of any public road or activities incident thereto in such manner and subject to such express limitations as may be provided by Part 2 of this article or any other provision of law. A county shall also have the authority to perform such road work with its own forces or with a combination of its own forces and the work of a contractor, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of Chapter 91 of Title 36;
  2. A county shall have the authority to accept and use federal and state funds and to do all things necessary, proper, or expedient to achieve compliance with the provisions and requirements of all applicable federal-aid or state-aid acts and programs in connection with the county’s public roads. Nothing in this title is intended to conflict with any federal law and, in case of such conflict, such portion as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict;
    1. A county shall have the authority to acquire and dispose of real property or any interest therein for public road purposes, as provided in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title and in Chapter 7 of this title. In any action to condemn property or interests therein for such purposes, notice thereof shall be signed by the condemning county; and such notice shall be deemed to be the official action of the county in regard to the commencement of such condemnation proceedings. For good cause shown a county, at any time after commencement of condemnation proceedings and prior to final judgment therein, may dismiss its condemnation action, provided that (i) the condemnation proceedings have not been instituted under Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title, and (ii) the condemnor has first paid to the condemnee all expenses and damages accrued to the condemnee up to the date of the filing of the motion for dismissal of the condemnation action.
    2. Pursuant to the requirements of Part 2 of this article, a county shall have the power to purchase, borrow, rent, lease, control, manage, receive, and make payment for all personal property, such as equipment, machinery, vehicles, supplies, material, and furniture, which may be needed in the operation of its county road system; to lease, rent, lend, or otherwise transfer temporarily county property used for road purposes, as authorized by law; to sell or otherwise dispose of all personal property owned by the county and used in the operation of the county road system which is unserviceable; and to execute such instruments as may be necessary in connection with the exercise of the powers described in this subparagraph;
  3. A county and its authorized agents and employees may enter upon any lands in the county for the purpose of making such surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations as the county may deem necessary or desirable to accomplish the purposes of this title; and such entry shall not be deemed a trespass nor shall it be deemed an entry which would constitute a taking in a condemnation proceeding, provided that reasonable notice of such entry shall be given the owner or occupant of such property, such entry shall be done in a reasonable manner with as little inconvenience as possible to the owner or occupant of the property, and the county shall make reimbursement for any actual damages resulting from such entry;
  4. A county shall have the authority to employ, discharge, promote, set and pay the salaries and compensation of its personnel, and determine the duties, qualifications, and working conditions for all persons whose services are needed in the construction, maintenance, administration, operation, and development of its county road system; to work inmates maintained in the county correctional institution or inmates hired from the Department of Corrections and maintained by the latter; and to employ or contract with such engineers, surveyors, attorneys, consultants, and all other employees as independent contractors whose services may be required, subject to the limitations of existing law;
  5. A county may grant permits and establish reasonable regulations for the installation, construction, maintenance, renewal, removal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables, wires, poles, towers, traffic and other signals, and other equipment, facilities, or appliances of any utility in, on, along, over, or under the public roads of the county which are a part of the county road system lying outside the corporate limits of a municipality. However, such regulations shall not be more restrictive with respect to utilities affected thereby than are equivalent regulations promulgated by the department with respect to utilities on the state highway system under authority of Code Section 32-6-174. As a condition precedent to the granting of such permits, the county may require application in writing specifically describing the nature, extent, and location of the portion of the utility affected and may also require the applicant to furnish an indemnity bond or other acceptable security conditioned to pay any damages to any part of the county road system or to any member of the public caused by work of the utility performed under authority of such permit. At all times it shall be the duty of the county to ensure that the normal operation of the utility does not interfere with the use of the county road system. The county may also order the removal or discontinuance of the utility, equipment, facility, or appliances where such removal and relocation are made necessary by the construction or maintenance of any part of the county road system lying outside the corporate limits of a municipality. In so ordering the removal and relocation of a utility or in performing such work itself, the county shall conform to the procedure set forth for the department in Code Sections 32-6-171 and 32-6-173, except that when the removal and relocation have been performed by the county, it shall certify the expenses thereof for collection to its county attorney;
  6. A county shall have the power to purchase supplies for county road system purposes through the state as authorized by Code Sections 50-5-100 through 50-5-102;
  7. In addition to any taxes authorized by Article 4 of Chapter 5 of Title 48 to be levied and collected for the construction and maintenance of its county road system and activities incident thereto, a county is authorized to levy and collect any millage as may be necessary for such purposes;
  8. A county may provide for surveys, maps, specifications, and other things necessary in designating, supervising, locating, abandoning, relocating, improving, constructing, or maintaining the county road system, or any part thereof, or any activities incident thereto or necessary in doing such other work on public roads as the county may be given responsibility for or control of by law;
  9. In addition to the powers specifically delegated to it in this title and except as otherwise provided by Code Section 12-6-24, a county shall have the authority to adopt and enforce rules, regulations, or ordinances; to require permits; and to perform all other acts which are necessary, proper, or incidental to the efficient operation and development of the county road system; and this title shall be liberally construed to that end. Any power vested in or duty placed on a county but not implemented by specific provisions for the exercise thereof may be executed and carried out by a county in a reasonable manner subject to such limitations as may be provided by law;
  10. In all counties of this state having a population of 550,000 or more according to the United States decennial census of 1970 or any future such census, the county governing authority shall be empowered by ordinance or resolution to assess against any property the cost of reopening, repairing, or cleaning up from any public way, street, road, right of way, or highway any debris, dirt, sediment, soil, trash, building materials, and other physical materials originating on such property as a result of any private construction activity carried on by any developer, contractor, subcontractor, or owner of such property. Any assessment authorized under this paragraph, the interest thereon, and the expense of collection shall be a lien against the property so assessed coequal with the lien of other taxes and shall be enforced in the same manner as are state and county ad valorem property taxes by issuance of a fi. fa. and levy and sale as set forth in Title 48, known as the “Georgia Public Revenue Code”; and
  11. Municipalities whose incorporating Acts became of full force and effect on or after May 1, 2017, but prior to January 1, 2019, shall not establish or maintain restrictions on access by commercial motor vehicles as defined in paragraph (8.1) of Code Section 40-1-1 to portions of the road system providing access to commercial driveways as defined in Code Section 32-6-130, except as to the applicable road system, exceeding any county restrictions in effect on such portions on the date of incorporation unless such county by ordinance or resolution concurs on such restriction.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-402, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 13; Ga. L. 1981, p. 3259, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 28; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 23; Ga. L. 1985, p. 283, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 8; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1126, § 2; Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 4/SB 445.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, deleted “and” at the end of paragraph (10); substituted “Code’; and” for “Code.”’ at the end of paragraph (11); and added paragraph (12).

Cross references. —

Authority of counties to erect bridges across navigable streams, T. 36, C. 14.

Use of parking meter receipts to pay principal, interest, and other expenses of revenue bonds issued to finance public parking areas or public parking buildings, § 36-82-62 .

Promulgation of rules and regulations governing hiring out of inmates to Department of Transportation, municipalities, counties, and others, § 42-5-60 .

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1982, “coequal” was substituted for “co-equal” in the last sentence of paragraph (11).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2019, “paragraph (8.1)” was substituted for “paragraph (8.3)” near the middle of paragraph (12).

Law reviews. —

For annual survey article on real property law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (2000).

For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004).

For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 602 and former Civil Code 1910, § 640, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Utility right of way fee. —

County was not entitled to extract from power company a tax, franchise fee, rental fee, or other charge in return for permission to use county road rights of way outside of municipalities for erection, maintenance, and use of power transmission lines. DeKalb County v. Georgia Power Co., 249 Ga. 704 , 292 S.E.2d 709 (1982).

County had authority to grant permits and establish reasonable regulations for the installation of pipes, conduits, cables, and wires on the county’s public roads; thus, the county had the “necessarily implied authority” to charge companies, such as the telecommunication company, a permit fee for the company’s application to use the county’s public rights-of-way. Accordingly, the county had the authority to enforce the county’s ordinance imposing that fee and furthermore the telecommunication company did not show that the ordinance was unconstitutional. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Cobb County, 277 Ga. 314 , 588 S.E.2d 704 (2003).

Control over water mains. —

There was nothing in the 1979 Act creating the Coweta County Water and Sewer Authority that extended the county’s control over water mains not belonging to the county authority. The county’s authority to regulate the City of Newnan’s Water, Sewerage and Light Commission’s progress into the county was limited only by paragraph (6) of O.C.G.A. § 32-4-42 . Coweta County v. City of Newnan, 253 Ga. 457 , 320 S.E.2d 747 (1984).

When privately built bridge is county bridge. —

Bridge constructed by private citizens, part of the material being furnished by the citizens, in accordance with an agreement with county officials, is a county bridge. County of Tattnall v. Newton, 112 Ga. 779 , 38 S.E. 47 (1901) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 602).

County right to acquire land for state. —

County authorities in charge of laying out and constructing public highways can accept lands dedicated by their owners for public roads, and can open and build new public roads therein in cooperation with the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) under contract with the federal government. Lee County v. Mayor of Smithville, 154 Ga. 550 , 115 S.E. 107 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 640).

County liable to power company for movement of power lines from private property easement. —

Trial court properly found that a power company was entitled to compensation from a county for the taking of the company’s private property easements, including the costs of relocating the electrical power and distribution poles, when the county widened a road because a 1929 franchise agreement did not apply to situations where the power company was forced by the county to relocate power transmission lines and poles that the company originally erected on private property easements. Clayton County v. Ga. Power Co., 340 Ga. App. 60 , 796 S.E.2d 16 (2017).

Authorization to enter arbitration. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-4-42 is to be liberally construed to promulgate the efficient operation and development of the county road system; the county was authorized to consent to arbitration as a means of resolving road construction contract disputes. Bryan County v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 251 Ga. App. 441 , 554 S.E.2d 584 (2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

Sheriff authorized to enforce traffic regulations. — Counties have authority to regulate amount of weight which may be carried over specific county roads by ordinances which amount to establishment of truck routes. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

Any city or county ordinances purporting to regulate vehicular weights must not exceed maximum weights permitted by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 . 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

County sheriff’s department may enforce ordinances prohibiting trucks over ten wheels from using residential roads within county except when making temporary deliveries. 1996 Op. Atty Gen. No. U96-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

PART 2 Exercise by Counties of Power to Contract Generally

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Construction and effect of “changed conditions” clause in public works or construction contract with state or its subdivision, 56 A.L.R.4th 1042.

32-4-60. “Contract” defined.

As used in this part, the term “contract” means a contract or subcontract entered into by a county with any person, with the state or federal government or an agency of either, with another county or counties, with a municipality or municipalities, or with any combination of the foregoing entities for the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of all or part of a public road, including but not limited to a contract for the purchase of materials, for the hiring of labor, for professional services, or for other things or services incident to such work.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-816, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For survey article on construction law for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2003).

32-4-61. Authority of county to contract; form of contracts; approval of contracts by resolution.

A county shall have the authority to contract as set forth in this part and in paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-4-42. Any contract for work on all or part of the county road system shall be in writing and shall be approved by resolution which shall be entered on the minutes of such county.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-817, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1937, p. 912, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

When petition for relief sufficient. —

Petition alleging that county commissioners had entered into contracts with one of the commissioner’s members for the construction of roads in the county without contracts being in writing and entered on the minutes of the board, and in violation of the contracts between the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) and the county was sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to show that the plaintiffs were entitled to some of the substantial relief prayed for. Ferguson v. Randolph County, 211 Ga. 103 , 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937, p. 912).

32-4-62. Contracts with state, state agencies, adjoining counties, and incorporated municipalities of county.

  1. Subject to the limitations of this Code section, in addition to the authority to contract with a private contractor, a county may enter into a contract with the state, a state agency, another county or municipality, or with any combination or number of the foregoing entities for work on any public road system of Georgia.
  2. Such a contract with a state agency is subject to the limitations of Code Section 32-2-61, including the cost of the negotiated contract, and the right of the department to supervise performance of the contract.
  3. A county shall have authority to enter into a contract with adjoining counties for the joint work on a road constituting a part of the county road system of those counties which are parties to such contract.
  4. A county shall have the authority provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-4-112 to contract with a municipality and expend funds for work on public roads within a municipality in the county.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-818, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Provision that county treasurer or other county official shall not receive commission on funds received or disbursed in connection with county contracts with Department of Transportation for construction or repair of roads, § 36-6-13 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

32-4-63. Limitations on power to contract; at least two estimates required for certain expenditures.

  1. A county is prohibited from negotiating a contract except a contract:
    1. Involving the expenditure of less than $200,000.00;
    2. With a state agency or county or municipality with which a county is authorized to contract in accordance with the provisions of Code Sections 32-4-61 and 32-4-62;
    3. For the purchase of those materials, supplies, and equipment necessary for the county’s construction and maintenance of its public roads and for the support and maintenance of the county’s forces used in such work, as authorized by Chapter 91 of Title 36;
    4. Subject to Article 6 of Chapter 6 of this title, with a railroad or railway company or a publicly or privately owned utility concerning relocation of its line, tracks, or facilities where the same are not then located in a public road and such relocation or grade-crossing elimination is necessary as an incident to the construction of a new public road or to the reconstruction or maintenance of an existing public road. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall be construed as requiring a county to furnish a site or right of way for railroad or railway lines or tracks of public utility facilities required to be removed from a public road;
    5. For engineering or other kinds of professional or specialized services;
    6. For emergency maintenance requiring immediate repairs to a public road, including but not limited to bridge repairs, snow and ice removal, and repairs due to flood conditions; or
    7. Otherwise expressly authorized by law.
  2. No contract involving an expenditure of more than $20,000.00 but less than $200,000.00 shall be awarded under this Code section without the submission of at least two estimates.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-819, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 356, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 9; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 3/HB 774.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Specialized services. —

Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county’s action to recover money had and received by the contractor, since the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64 ; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330 , 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

No power to enter contract. —

County was properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 in the county’s action to recover money received by the contractor for applying stripes to the county’s roads, where the county commissioner awarded the contract without public bidding, the contract was oral, and the contract was for over $190,000; a belated objection under O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 did not prevent the county from recovering the funds because the contract was beyond the county’s authority to enter as O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(1) barred counties from negotiating contracts in excess of $20,000, and the contract was not exempt from competitive bidding under § 32-4-63(5). Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330 , 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

32-4-64. Required letting of contracts by public bid.

Except as authorized by Code Section 32-4-63, all contracts shall be let by public bid.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-820, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1937, p. 912, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Public bidding was required. —

Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county’s action to recover money had and received by the contractor, after the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64 ; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330 , 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

Petition sufficient against motion to dismiss. —

Petition alleging that the county commissioners had entered into contracts with one of the commissioner’s members for the construction of roads in the county without the contracts being in writing and entered on the minutes of the board, and in violation of the contracts between the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) and the county, was sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to show that the plaintiffs were entitled to some of the substantial relief prayed for. Ferguson v. Randolph County, 211 Ga. 103 , 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937, p. 912).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

32-4-65. Advertising for bids.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of Chapter 91 of Title 36 and of any other provision of law to the contrary, on all contracts to be let by public bid a county shall advertise for competitive sealed bids for at least two weeks. The public advertisement shall be inserted once a week for two weeks in such newspaper wherein the county sheriff’s sales are advertised or in such other newspapers or publications, or both, as will ensure adequate publicity, the first insertion to be two weeks prior to the opening of the sealed bids, the second to follow one week after the publication of the first insertion.
  2. Such advertisement shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. A description sufficient to enable the public to know the approximate extent and character of the work to be done;
    2. The time allowed for performance;
    3. The terms and time of payment;
    4. Where and under what conditions and costs the detailed plans and specifications and proposal forms may be obtained;
    5. The amount of the proposal guaranty, if one is required;
    6. The time and place for submission and opening of bids;
    7. The right of the county to reject any one or all bids; and
    8. Such further notice as the county may deem advisable as in the public interest.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-821, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 10.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

32-4-66. Payment by bidder to cover costs.

A county may require each bidder to pay a reasonable sum sufficient to cover the cost to the county, where applicable, of the bid proposal form, the contract, and its specifications.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-822, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-4-67. Proposal guaranty by bidder.

  1. No bid, other than a bid solely for engineering or other kinds of professional services, will be considered by a county unless it is accompanied by a proposal guaranty in the form of a certified check or other acceptable security payable to the county for an amount deemed by the county in the public interest necessary to ensure that the successful bidder will execute the contract on which he bid.
  2. A proposal guaranty will be returned to a bidder upon receipt by the county of the bidder’s written withdrawal of his bid if such receipt is before the time scheduled for the opening of bids. Upon the determination by a county of the lowest reliable bidder, the county will return the proposal guaranties to all bidders except that of the lowest reliable bidder. If no contract award is made within 30 days after the date set for the opening of bids, all bids shall be rejected and all proposal guaranties shall be returned unless the county and the successful bidder agree in writing to a longer period of time.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-823, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 3/HB 192.

32-4-68. Award of contract to lowest reliable bidder; procedure upon rejection of bids.

Where a contract has been let for bid, the county, by resolution entered in its minutes, shall award the contract to the lowest reliable bidder, provided that the county shall have the right to reject any and all such bids whether such right is reserved in the public notice or not and, in such case, may readvertise, perform the work itself, or abandon the project.

History. — Ga. L. 1922, p. 37, § 1c; Code 1933, § 95-1105; Code 1933, § 95A-824, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

Public contracts: low bidder’s monetary relief against state or local agency for nonaward of contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93.

32-4-69. Bonds of successful bidder generally.

Notwithstanding any provision of Chapter 91 of Title 36 to the contrary, when the price of a contract let to bid, other than a contract solely for engineering or other kinds of professional services, is $5,000.00 or more, no contract of a county shall be valid unless the contractor first gives:

  1. A performance bond that meets the requirements established in Parts 1 and 3 of Article 3 of Chapter 91 of Title 36 in the amount of the bid, with one good and solvent surety, for the faithful performance of the contract and to indemnify the county for any damages occasioned by a failure to perform the same within the prescribed time;
  2. A payment bond that meets the requirements established in Parts 1 and 4 of Article 3 of Chapter 91 of Title 36; and
  3. Such other bonds required by the county in its advertisement for bids, including but not limited to public liability and property damage insurance bonds.

History. — Ga. L. 1922, p. 37, § 1b; Code 1933, § 95-1104; Code 1933, § 95A-825, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 11; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 4; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 4/HB 192.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Contract amount. — Performance bonds are required on all county contracts in the amount of $5,000.00 or more for the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of public roads. Payment bonds are required on these type of contracts if the contract amount is in excess of $20,000.00. 1988 Op. Atty Gen. No. U88-32.

32-4-70. Bridge repair bonds.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “bridge” shall include the approaches to such bridge within 50 feet of either end except when the bridge itself measures 100 feet or more, in which case the term “bridge” shall include the approaches within 100 feet of either end of the bridge.
  2. Where the contract relates to the construction or reconstruction of all or a part of a bridge, the county or counties affected may require the successful contractor to add to the conditions of the performance bond required under paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-4-69 the following condition: to keep the bridge in good condition for a period of not less than seven years.

History. — Laws 1888, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 39; Code 1863, § 649; Code 1868, § 711; Code 1873, § 671; Code 1882, § 671; Civil Code 1895, § 603; Civil Code 1910, § 748; Code 1933, § 95-1001; Code 1933, § 95A-826, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Authority of counties to erect bridges across navigable streams, T. 36, C. 14.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Bridge includes fill or embankment in road of approach. —

Fill or an embankment in a road which constitutes the approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge is a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580 , 171 S.E. 220 (1933).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 102-103, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Bridges assumed to be part of connected roads, streets, and highways. — Bridges may be a part of city streets, county roads, or the state-aid highway system; in each case, the street or road is defined as including bridges, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-64 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

32-4-71. Failure to take bonds; liability of county.

  1. If the payment bond required by paragraph (2) of Code Section 32-4-69 is not taken, the county shall be liable to subcontractors, laborers, materialmen, and other persons, as provided in Part 4 of Article 3 of Chapter 91 of Title 36, for losses to them resulting from failure to take such bond.
  2. If the condition of bridge repair authorized by Code Section 32-4-70 to be added to the performance bond is not taken, the contracting county or counties shall be primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridge for damages occurring within seven years of the contractor’s work on the bridge and its acceptance by the county or counties, provided that the county shall be discharged from all liability upon the inclusion in the performance bond of the aforesaid bridge repair condition.
  3. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to impose personal liability on the county governing authority.

History. — Laws 1888, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 39; Code 1863, § 669; Code 1868, § 731; Code 1873, § 691; Code 1882, § 691; Civil Code 1895, § 603; Civil Code 1910, § 748; Code 1933, § 95-1001; Code 1933, § 95A-827, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 12; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, §§ 623, 748; former Civil Code 1910, §§ 757, 768; and former Code 1933, §§ 23-1901 through 23-1905, 95-1001, 95-1210, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Bridges

Definition of bridge. —

Word “bridge” in this section, which gives a right of action against a county for defective construction, means a bridge used as an instrumentality for travel along a highway and for crossing streams or ravines. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363 , 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717 , 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).

Bridge includes necessary approaches. —

Term “bridge” includes all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge’s proper use, and embraces the bridge’s abutments and approaches; that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself. Howington v. Madison County, 126 Ga. 699 , 55 S.E. 941 (1906); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).

Fill or embankment in road of approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge is a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580 , 171 S.E. 220 (1933).

Contiguous embankments necessary for access, which county must repair. —

Contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass teams and wagons over the bridge, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment; but if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep the bridge in repair. Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722 , 168 S.E. 897 (1933).

Road leading to bridge. —

While the word “bridge” does not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder, it does include all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge’s proper use, and embraces the bridge’s abutments and approaches and that which is necessary as an approach to connect the bridge with the highway is an essential part of the bridge itself. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934).

Culverts. —

Culvert and a bridge are not the same, even though the culvert and bridge may serve the same purpose. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363 , 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717 , 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Floyd County v. Stewart, 97 Ga. App. 67 , 101 S.E.2d 879 (1958).

Piping and water boxes. —

Piping and water boxes for drainage purposes across the public roads are not “bridges” within the meaning of the law. Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 41 Ga. App. 130 , 152 S.E. 261 (1930).

Defects

Definition of defects in bridge. —

Defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580 , 171 S.E. 220 (1933).

Includes approaches left during repairs. —

When in action against a county for damages from the falling of a truck through an opening where a public bridge had been, into a ravine below, the petition was not demurrable (now motion to dismiss), and the verdict for the plaintiff was not contrary to law or without evidence to support the verdict since the petition and the evidence showed that at the time of the injury at least a part of the bridge, i.e., the sills constituting a portion of its “approaches,” still remained, and the rest of the bridge was being repaired. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240 , 172 S.E. 673 (1934).

Road machinery left on approaches. —

When the county, or State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) negligently leaves road machinery on the abutment or approach to a bridge which causes injuries to a person undertaking to cross the bridge in an automobile, such dangerous condition in the bridge is a defect in the bridge, which makes a county liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).

Liability

County liability. —

County is primarily liable for injuries caused by defective bridges, whether erected by contractors or county authorities. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863 , 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).

County authorities are bound to exercise ordinary care; county authorities are not insurers of the safety of county bridges. Warren County v. Evans, 118 Ga. 200 , 44 S.E. 986 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 623).

County liability for failure to take contractor’s bond. —

For a county to be liable for injuries resulting from defective bridge repairs there must have been a failure to take a bond from a contractor when such a bond was required, and the injury complained of must have occurred within the time which would have been covered by the contractor’s bond, if such a bond had been given. Wolf v. Upson County, 44 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, §§ 757, 768).

Bridges adjoining county lines. —

Since a public bridge was constructed under contract with the authorities of one county across a stream dividing that county from another (the authorities of the latter refusing to participate therein), it was the duty of the county authorities causing the construction of such bridge to take bond in accordance with this section. Cook v. County of DeKalb, 95 Ga. 218 , 22 S.E. 151 (1894). See also Laurens County v. McLendon, 19 Ga. App. 246 , 91 S.E. 283 (1917); Wells v. Jefferson County, 19 Ga. App. 455 , 91 S.E. 943 (1917) (decided under former Code 1882, § 691 and former Civil Code 1910, § 768.

Either county or contractor may be sued. —

Action may be brought either against the contractor or against the county; it is not necessary that the plaintiff should sue the contractor to insolvency before suing the county. Arnold, Estes & Co. v. Henry County, 81 Ga. 730 , 8 S.E. 606 (1888) (decided under former Code 1882, § 691).

County not liable after seven years. —

Liability of the contractor is to keep the bridge in good repair for seven years, whether a bond is given for that purpose or not and the liability of the county does not extend beyond that. Monroe County v. Flint, 80 Ga. 489 , 6 S.E. 173 (1888).

Built without bond. —

After a county let out the contract for building a bridge to the lowest bidder, but took no bond from the contractor, and the injury complained of occurred ten years after the time of building the bridge, there was no legal liability on the part of the county because of such injury. Monroe County v. Flint, 80 Ga. 489 , 6 S.E. 173 (1888).

Bond limited to three years. —

When the bond and security required and taken limited the period to three years, this may be treated as a “sufficient guarantee” so as to exempt the county from liability for damages sustained within such period of three years. Mappin v. County of Washington, 92 Ga. 130 , 17 S.E. 1009 (1893).

No county liability when bridge rebuilt without contract. —

Liability for defects in a county-line bridge attaches only for failure of the county to take a sufficient bond from the contractor. Thus, since the petition showed that such a bridge was rebuilt by the county without a contract, and without taking a bond, no liability for injuries caused by defects in such a bridge attached against the county. Jones v. Appling County, 90 Ga. App. 386 , 83 S.E.2d 53 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 23-1901 through 23-1905, 95-1001, 95-1210).

When county itself undertakes bridge work, O.C.G.A. § 32-4-71 is inapplicable and provides for no county liability for defective bridges. Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga. App. 848 , 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996), cert. denied, No. S96C1191, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 796 (Ga. May 31, 1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Measure and elements of damages for injury to bridge, 31 A.L.R.5th 171.

32-4-72. Failure of successful bidder to sign contract or furnish bonds.

If the successful bidder fails to sign the contract or furnish the bonds required under authority of Code Section 32-4-71, his proposal guaranty, if one had been required by the county, will become the property of the county as liquidated damages. The contract then may be readvertised, performed with county forces, or the project abandoned.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-828, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-4-73. Oath by successful bidder.

A successful bidder, before commencing the work, shall execute a written oath, as required by subsection (e) of Code Section 36-91-21, stating that he or she has not violated such Code section, which makes it unlawful to restrict competitive bidding.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-829, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 13; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 6.

32-4-74. Applicability of other laws to this part.

Except as indicated to the contrary in this part, Chapter 91 of Title 36 shall not apply to this part.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-830, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 14; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 7.

Code Commission notes. —

The amendment of this Code section by Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 7. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).

Article 4 Municipal Street Systems

PART 1 General Powers and Duties of Municipality

Law reviews. —

For article, “Revisionist Municipal Liability,” see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 375 (2018).

32-4-90. Acquisition of rights of way.

Acquisition of rights of way for public roads on the state highway system located within the corporate limits of a municipality shall be made in compliance with subsection (e) of Code Section 32-3-3 and Code Section 32-5-25.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-501, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highways, 2 A.L.R. 746 ; 123 A.L.R. 1462 .

32-4-91. Construction and maintenance of systems; acquisition of labor; maximum bridge weight; notification of department about new streets and abandoned streets.

  1. A municipality shall plan, designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain an adequate municipal street system and shall have control of and responsibility for all construction, maintenance, or other work related to the municipal street system. Such work may be accomplished through the use of municipal forces, including inmate labor, by contract as authorized in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-4-92, or otherwise as permitted by law.

    (a.1) A municipality shall post on each bridge on the municipal street system and on each approach thereto on the municipal street a sign containing a legible notice showing the maximum safe weight limit for such bridge, each such sign to conform to the department regulations promulgated under authority of Code Section 32-6-50.

  2. A municipality shall notify the department within three months after a municipal street is added to the municipal street system and shall further notify the department within three months after a municipal street is abandoned. This notification shall be accompanied by an appropriate digital file, map, or plat depicting the location of the new or abandoned street.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-502, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 953, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1206, § 2; Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 7/HB 137.

Cross references. —

Weight of vehicle and load, § 32-6-26 .

Promulgation of rules and regulations governing hiring out of inmates, § 42-5-60 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-15; and former Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20 ), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Municipal regulation and control of state highway use. —

This section does not give municipalities power to regulate and control use of state highways. Mayor of Woodbury v. State Hwy. Dep't, 225 Ga. 723 , 171 S.E.2d 272 (1969) (decided under former Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Construction of state highway through municipality. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may construct public highway through municipality without the municipality’s consent. City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga. 505 , 111 S.E.2d 79 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-15).

State Highway Department’s control of traffic signals on state highways. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), instead of the municipalities of the state, has the power to place and operate traffic control devices on state highways within the limits of the municipalities. Mayor of Woodbury v. State Hwy. Dep't, 225 Ga. 723 , 171 S.E.2d 272 (1969) (decided under former Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

State DOT not liable for failing to erect road closure signs on county road. —

Because an accident occurred on a county-owned road and did not occur on a part of the state highway system upon which the DOT owed a duty to motorists, and the couple’s expert’s affidavit could not establish a legal duty to erect signs or to take other steps to inform drivers of the closure of the county-owned road, summary judgment for the DOT was proper. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189 , 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0999, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 648 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014).

Photographs of roadway taken after accident insufficient to show city’s notice of defect. —

In a driver’s action against a city under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-91 , alleging that an accident occurred because an area of broken pavement around a manhole caused the driver’s vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic, photographs of the area taken two weeks after the accident did not constitute evidence of the city’s notice of the defect under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) . City of Macon v. Brown, 343 Ga. App. 262 , 807 S.E.2d 34 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

County must maintain roads in county road system. — Because the county must maintain roads on the county road system and because public roads are not removed from the system by mere annexation into a municipality where the road lies, the county must continue to maintain roads on the county road system which are in areas annexed into a municipality until the governing authority of the county removes the roads from the county road system. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-21.

Truck routes. — By establishing truck routes, a city may effectively regulate the amount of weight which may be carried on designated streets on a municipal street system. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

Any city or county ordinances purporting to regulate vehicular weights must not exceed maximum weights permitted by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 . 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 86.

ALR. —

Liability of municipal corporations and their licensees for the torts of independent contractors, 52 A.L.R. 1012 .

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Relative rights and liabilities of abutting owners and public authorities in parkways in center of street, 81 A.L.R.2d 1436.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from ice or snow on surface of highway or street, 97 A.L.R.3d 11.

32-4-92. Powers.

  1. The powers of a municipality with respect to its municipal street system, unless otherwise expressly limited by law, shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. Subject to the limitations of subparagraph (d)(1)(A) of Code Section 32-2-61, a municipality has the authority to contract with any person, the federal government or its agencies, the state or its agencies, other municipalities, a county in which the municipality lies, or any combination of the foregoing entities for the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of any public road located within the municipality;
    2. A municipality may accept and use federal and state funds for municipal street purposes and do all things necessary, proper, or expedient to achieve compliance with the provisions and requirements of all applicable federal-aid acts and programs. Nothing in this title is intended to conflict with any such federal-aid law and, in case of such conflict, such portion as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict;
    3. A municipality may acquire, manage, and dispose of real property or any interests therein for public roads on its municipal street system under the procedures provided in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title and in Chapter 7 of this title. In acquiring property for rights of way for federal-aid highway projects on its system, the municipality shall comply with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV of Public Law 100-17, and in general be guided by the policies applicable to the department as set forth in Code Section 32-8-1. For good cause shown, a municipality, at any time after commencement of condemnation proceedings and prior to final judgment therein, may dismiss its condemnation action, provided that (A) the condemnation proceedings have not been instituted under Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title and (B) the condemnor has first paid to the condemnee all expenses and damages accrued to the condemnee up to the date of the filing of the motion for dismissal of the condemnation action;
    4. Subject to the requirements of Part 2 of this article, a municipality may purchase, borrow, rent, lease, control, manage, receive, and make payment for all personal property such as equipment, machinery, vehicles, supplies, material, and furniture which may be needed in the operation of the municipal street system and may sell or otherwise dispose of all personal property owned by the municipality and used in the operation of said municipal street system which is no longer necessary or useful in connection with the operation of said system; and it may execute such instruments as may be necessary in connection with the exercise of the foregoing powers in this paragraph;
    5. A municipality and its authorized agents and employees shall have the authority to enter upon any lands in the municipality for the purpose of making such surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations as the municipality may deem necessary or desirable to accomplish the purposes of this title; and such entry shall not be deemed a trespass, nor shall it be deemed an entry which would constitute a taking in a condemnation proceeding. However, reasonable notice shall be given the owner or occupant of the property to be entered; such entry shall be done in a reasonable manner with as little inconvenience as possible to the owner or occupant of the property; and the municipality shall make reimbursement for any actual damages resulting from such entry;
    6. A municipality may employ, discharge, promote, set and pay the salaries and compensation of its personnel, and determine the duties, qualifications, and working conditions for all persons whose services are needed in the construction, maintenance, administration, operation, and development of its municipal street system; and may employ or contract as independent contractors with such engineers, surveyors, attorneys, consultants, and all other employees whose services may be required, subject to the limitations of existing law;
    7. Except as otherwise provided by Code Section 12-6-24, a municipality may regulate and control the use of the public roads on its municipal street system and on portions of the county road systems extending within the corporate limits of the municipality. Any municipality may regulate the parking of vehicles on any such roads in order to facilitate the flow of traffic and to this end may require and place parking meters on or immediately adjacent to any or all of such roads for the purpose of authorizing timed parking in designated spaces upon the payment of a charge for such privilege. A municipality also may place such parking meters on or adjacent to any public road on the state highway system located within the corporate limits of the municipality when authorized by the department pursuant to Code Section 32-6-2;
    8. A municipality may purchase supplies for municipal street system purposes through the state, as authorized by Code Sections 50-5-100 through 50-5-102;
    9. A municipality may provide lighting and maintenance thereof on any public road located within its limits;
    10. A municipality may grant permits and establish reasonable regulations for the installation, construction, maintenance, renewal, removal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables, wires, poles, towers, traffic and other signals, and other equipment, facilities, or appliances of any utility in, on, along, over, or under any part of its municipal street system and of a county road system lying within its municipal limits. However, such regulations shall not be more restrictive with respect to utilities affected thereby than are equivalent regulations promulgated by the department with respect to utilities on the state highway system under authority of Code Section 32-6-174. As a condition precedent to the granting of such permits, the municipality may require application in writing specifically describing the nature, extent, and location of the portion of the utility affected. The municipality may also require the applicant to furnish an indemnity bond or other acceptable security conditioned to pay for any damage to any part of a public road or to any member of the public caused by the work of the utility performed under authority of such permit. However, it shall be the duty of the municipality to ensure that the normal operation of the utility does not interfere with the use of any portion of the municipal street system or of a municipal extension of a county public road. The municipality may also order the removal and relocation of the utility, equipment, facilities, or appliances where such removal and relocation is made necessary by the construction and maintenance of any part of the municipal street system or municipal extension of a county public road. In so ordering the removal and relocation of a utility or in performing such work itself, the municipality shall conform to the procedure set forth for the department in Code Sections 32-6-171 and 32-6-173, except that when the removal and relocation have been performed by the municipality, it shall certify the expenses thereof for collection to its city attorney; and
    11. A municipality may provide for surveys, maps, specifications, and other things necessary in supervising, locating, abandoning, relocating, improving, constructing, or maintaining the municipal street system, or any part thereof, or any activities incident thereto or necessary in doing such other work on public roads as the municipality may be given responsibility for or control of by law.
  2. In addition to the powers specifically delegated to it in this title, a municipality shall have the authority to perform all acts which are necessary, proper, or incidental to the efficient operation and development of the municipal street system; and this title shall be liberally construed to that end. Any such power vested by law in a municipality, but not implemented by specific provisions for the exercise thereof, may be executed and carried out by a municipality in a reasonable manner pursuant to such rules, regulations, and procedures as a municipality may adopt and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

History. — Code 1933, §§ 95A-503, 95A-504, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 6; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1126, § 3.

Cross references. —

Assessments by municipalities for street improvements, T. 36, C. 39.

Use of parking meter receipts to pay principal, interest, and other expenses of revenue bonds issued to finance public parking areas or public parking buildings, § 36-82-62 .

U.S. Code. —

The Uniform Relocation System and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, referred to in this Code section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. Ch. 61.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004).

For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Police power of municipalities. —

State law has not preempted police power authority of municipalities to regulate location and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs within their territorial jurisdictions. City of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp., 236 Ga. 385 , 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976).

City’s ordinances prohibiting the use of amphibious vehicles as tour vehicles in parts of the city were not preempted by the state law giving the Public Service Commission the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity; the ordinances fall within the constitutional exception to the doctrine of preemption since the General Assembly enacted general laws authorizing the local government to exercise its police powers and enact the local laws at issue. Old South Duck Tours, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869 , 535 S.E.2d 751 (2000).

No municipal liability for lighting. —

City’s failure to add supplemental lighting to crossing was not actionable for negligence as O.C.G.A. § 32-4-92 provides that a municipality “may” provide lighting on any public road located within the municipality’s limits, but is under no duty to provide lighting if the municipality does not choose to do so. Biggers ex rel. Key v. Southern Ry., 820 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1993). but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

Court’s authority to review. —

Federal appellate court determined that whether an amendment to Macon, Ga., Code of Ordinances art. VII, § 18-153 that increased the annual permit fee that the City of Macon charged a telecommunications company for placement of the company’s fiber optic cable on utility poles from $2.00 to $4.50 per linear foot was preempted by O.C.G.A. § 32-4-92(a)(10), or otherwise invalid because it exceeded the fees charged by the Georgia Department of Transportation for its rights of way, was an issue appropriate for resolution by the Supreme Court of Georgia through a certified question. Alltel Communs., Inc. v. City of Macon, 345 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Scope of municipal regulation of state highway system. — Municipality may not, by ordinance, seek to regulate streets which are a part of the state highway system, except when the municipality is placing parking meters on or adjacent to a road which is a part of the system, and has been first authorized by the department to place such parking meters; or the municipality may also erect or maintain a traffic-control device on a road which is a part of the system, if written approval has first been obtained from the department. 1974 Op. Atty Gen. No. U74-94.

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

Truck routes. — By establishing truck routes, a city may effectively regulate the amount of weight which may be carried on designated streets on the municipal street system. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

Any city or county ordinances purporting to regulate vehicular weights must not exceed maximum weights permitted by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 . 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

Use of cameras to enforce traffic laws. — Municipalities are not prohibited by Georgia’s Constitution or laws from enacting ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Atty Gen. No. U2000-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. —

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 263 et seq.

ALR. —

Validity of restrictions as to points at which jitney bus passengers may be taken on and discharged, 6 A.L.R. 110 .

Validity of statute or ordinance giving right of way in streets or highways to certain classes of vehicles, 38 A.L.R. 24 .

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property owners to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883 .

Liability of municipal corporations and their licensees for the torts of independent contractors, 52 A.L.R. 1012 .

Duty as regards barriers for protection of automobile travel, 86 A.L.R. 1389 ; 173 A.L.R. 626 .

Personal liability of highway officers for damage to or trespass upon land in connection with construction or maintenance of highway, 90 A.L.R. 1481 .

Validity, construction, and application of municipal ordinances relating to loading or unloading passengers by interurban busses on streets, 144 A.L.R. 1119 .

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Liability of private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at highway or street intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th 1092.

32-4-93. Liability of municipalities for defects in public roads.

  1. A municipality is relieved of any and all liability resulting from or occasioned by defects in the public roads of its municipal street system when it has not been negligent in constructing or maintaining the same or when it has no actual notice thereof or when such defect has not existed for a sufficient length of time for notice thereof to be inferred.
  2. A municipality is relieved of any and all liability resulting from or occasioned by defective construction of those portions of the state highway system or county road system lying within its corporate limits or resulting from the failure of the department or the county to maintain such roads as required by law unless the municipality constructed or agreed to perform the necessary maintenance of such road.

History. — Civil Code 1895, § 749; Civil Code 1910, § 898; Code 1933, § 69-303; Ga. L. 1961, p. 469, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-505, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Liability of municipal corporations for acts or omissions of officers, T. 36, C. 33.

Law reviews. —

For article discussing necessity of liability insurance for Georgia counties and municipalities, and constitutional authority of the units to provide such insurance, see 25 Ga. B.J. 35 (1962).

For article discussing Georgia’s practice of exposing municipalities to tort liability through the use of nuisance law, see 12 Ga. St. B. J. 11 (1975).

For article discussing origin and construction of Georgia statute concerning municipal liability for street defects, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 239 (1980).

For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986).

For annual survey article discussing local government law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (1999).

For survey article on local government law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 353 (2003).

For annual survey of local government law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006).

For note discussing state liability for highway defects and waiver of sovereign immunity under U.S. Const., amend. 11, see 27 Emory L.J. 337 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Analysis

General Consideration

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1895, p. 306, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Recreational Property Act. —

Applying the Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., to a municipal sidewalk does not place the RPA in conflict with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 , which sets forth circumstances in which a city may be liable for defects in its streets and sidewalks; simply stated, the RPA will control when the sidewalk is used for a “recreational purpose” and the other requirements of the RPA are satisfied, and § 32-4-93 will apply in other cases. City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567 , 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999), overruled in part, Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116 , 598 S.E.2d 471 (2004).

Ordinance denying liability unconstitutional. —

Insofar as charter provisions relieve a city from liability for negligence in the maintenance of the city’s streets, such provision is inconsistent with general law in this state, and the inhibition contained in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. IV, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) against the passage of special laws conflicting with existing general law precluded raising such charter provisions as a defense to a personal injury action against the city. City of Macon v. Harrison, 98 Ga. App. 769 , 106 S.E.2d 833 (1958).

When legal duty exists in favor of third persons, city may by ordinance regulate the matter of the duty’s performance. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) applies to sidewalks and constructive notice of a defect may be imputed through the knowledge of the city’s employees or agents, or may be shown by testimony as to how long the defect existed prior to the injury, objective evidence that the defect existed over time, or evidence that others were injured as a result of the same condition over a period of years. Clark v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. App. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 122 (2013).

Duty to maintain streets and sidewalks. —

Municipal corporation has the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the municipality’s streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition so that a person can pass along the streets and sidewalks in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety. City of E. Point v. Christian, 40 Ga. App. 633 , 151 S.E. 42 (1929); City of Silvertown v. Harcourt, 51 Ga. App. 160 , 179 S.E. 772 (1935); City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27 , 197 S.E. 342 (1938); Harris v. City of Rome, 59 Ga. App. 279 , 200 S.E. 337 (1938).

Municipalities generally have a ministerial duty to keep their streets in repair, and municipalities are liable for injuries resulting from defects after actual notice, or after the defect has existed for a sufficient time to infer notice. Bush v. City of Gainesville, 105 Ga. App. 381 , 124 S.E.2d 667 (1962).

Obligation of a city to maintain portions of the state highway system within the city’s corporate limits if the city has “constructed or agreed to perform the necessary maintenance of such roads” applies to public sidewalks. Williams v. City of Social Circle, 225 Ga. App. 746 , 484 S.E.2d 687 (1997).

Constructive notice of uneven sidewalk pavers. —

Trial court erred by granting a city summary judgment in a pedestrian’s negligence suit seeking damages for a slip and fall on uneven sidewalk pavers because the evidence showed that the uneven and defective condition existed at least seven months prior to the fall; thus, a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the city had constructive notice. Clark v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. App. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 122 (2013).

City was liable for defect in sidewalk. —

Since a victim was injured on the city’s sidewalk, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city as the pleadings were sufficient to raise the inference that the city, having repaired the sidewalk, had implied knowledge of the defect therein. English v. City of Macon, 259 Ga. App. 766 , 577 S.E.2d 837 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C0944, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 693 (Ga. July 14, 2003).

Tree limb crashing onto pedestrian. —

City was not entitled to summary judgment on the pedestrian’s claims for injuries suffered when a tree limb crashed on the pedestrian as the pedestrian walked on a city street because maintenance of the streets was a ministerial duty, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b) , required by O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) , and there was evidence that the tree was visibly decayed or dying. City of Fitzgerald v. Caruthers, 332 Ga. App. 731 , 774 S.E.2d 777 (2015).

City was not liable for injuries to plaintiff who stepped in a hole in a grassy area about nine feet from the edge of the paved street since the evidence showed that the hole was not located on a city street or sidewalk. City of Vidalia v. Brown, 237 Ga. App. 831 , 516 S.E.2d 851 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C1243, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 754 (Ga. Sept. 17, 1999).

City was relieved of liability for the injuries sustained by the injured parties when the parties were hit by a motor vehicle at an intersection that was dark due to a loose hinge on a streetlight, under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) , as the city did not have actual notice of the problem, and the problem had not existed for any appreciable length of time so as to give the city constructive notice of the problem. Roquemore v. City of Forsyth, 274 Ga. App. 420 , 617 S.E.2d 644 (2005).

After the plaintiff fell over an 18-foot retaining wall, which had no barrier on top, the trial court erred in denying the city’s motion for directed verdict because there was no evidence showing the retaining wall was part of the physical road on which the general public traveled; the testimony showed that the retaining wall itself was not a sidewalk, and the expert admitted that there was no path along the side of the retaining wall for public use; and there was no evidence that the city intended for the area near the retaining wall to be used by the public. City of Alpharetta v. Hamby, 352 Ga. App. 511 , 835 S.E.2d 366 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0480, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 371 (Ga. May 18, 2020).

No evidence of city liability. —

Trial court did not err by dismissing a pedestrian’s slip and fall claims against a city because there was no evidence that the city owned any part of the sidewalk and no evidence that the city performed any maintenance, repairs, or renovations to the sidewalk; thus, the pedestrian presented no evidence to support the contention that the city had or breached a duty to maintain the sidewalk. Hagan v. Ga. DOT, 321 Ga. App. 472 , 739 S.E.2d 123 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1258, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 749 (Ga. Sept. 23, 2013).

City had no notice or knowledge of drainage problem. —

Motorist’s failure to show a city’s knowledge or notice of a roadway drainage problem, which caused a traffic accident, defeated the motorist’s negligence and nuisance claims against the city. Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. App. 1 , 616 S.E.2d 219 (2005).

City immune for operation of a fountain. —

City was entitled to sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 in a pedestrian’s claim against the city for negligent maintenance of a fountain which the pedestrian argued resulted in ice forming on a sidewalk where the pedestrian slipped and fell. The pedestrian failed to point to specific evidence of the city’s actual or constructive notice of any defect in the fountain. Naraine v. City of Atlanta, 306 Ga. App. 561 , 703 S.E.2d 31 (2010).

Duty exists as to travel both by day and by night. —

General rule of law is that a municipal corporation must keep the municipality’s streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel in the ordinary mode by night as well as by day. If the municipality fails to do so, the municipality is liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48 , 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

City responsible for maintaining annexed highways. —

Where a territory is lawfully annexed to a city, the new area becomes a part of the city for all municipal purposes, the public highways therein become streets of the city, and the city becomes chargeable with the duty of using reasonable diligence in seeing that the streets are placed and kept in such condition as will make passage thereon reasonably safe. Bush v. City of Gainesville, 105 Ga. App. 381 , 124 S.E.2d 667 (1962).

Maintenance of portions of state highway system. —

When the Department of Transportation fails to maintain those portions of the state highway system lying within a municipality’s corporate limits as required by law, a municipality can be held liable for such failure where the municipality agreed to perform the necessary maintenance. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Even though a city agreed to maintain a portion of a state highway, the city was not responsible for correcting design and construction deficiencies. Duncan v. City of Macon, 221 Ga. App. 710 , 472 S.E.2d 455 (1996).

City was not responsible for maintenance of a traffic signal device at the intersection of a city street and a state highway, where the Department of Transportation engineered, constructed, maintained, and set the timing sequence for the device and the city had no discretion or decision-making power with regard to the device’s location, sequencing, or timing. McPherson v. City of Fort Oglethorpe, 200 Ga. App. 129 , 407 S.E.2d 99 (1991).

No authority to maintain overgrown area bordering intersection. —

In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err in finding the Georgia Department of Transportation immune from suit from liability to the decedent’s estate and survivors for failing to maintain an overgrown area of shrubbery that bordered an intersection, as neither O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 , when read in concert with O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 , nor O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(8) imposed liability on the department; hence, maintenance of the area did not constitute a “substantial” or “other major” maintenance activity. Welch v. Ga. DOT, 283 Ga. App. 903 , 642 S.E.2d 913 (2007).

Failure of city to erect a stop sign at an intersection was not a “defect” which would exempt the city from claiming immunity under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 . McKinley v. City of Cartersville, 232 Ga. App. 659 , 503 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

Defects for which liability arises generally. —

Defects in the municipality’s streets for which a municipal corporation may be held liable have been held to include objects adjacent to, and suspended over, the municipality’s streets and sidewalks, the presence of which renders the use of these thoroughfares more hazardous. City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453 , 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951); Richards v. Mayor of Americus, 158 Ga. App. 693 , 282 S.E.2d 122 (1981).

Liability for gradual defects. —

Municipal corporation is liable for defects which are gradually brought about by the forces of nature, and for defects or obstructions created in or placed on a public street by strangers which render such street unsafe for normal travel, where the municipality had notice of such defect or obstruction and failed to exercise ordinary care in remedying or removing the defect or obstruction, or where the defect or obstruction had existed for a sufficient length of time, and when taken in connection with the nature of the defect or obstruction, it could be reasonably said that the city should have known, and had reasonable time to repair or remove the defect or obstruction. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27 , 197 S.E. 342 (1938).

Municipality is bound to keep the municipality’s streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel by night as well as by day, and is responsible if the municipality fails to exercise ordinary care to accomplish safety, where the municipality knows or should know that the street is in an unsafe condition. Where a defect in a street has existed for so long a time that the city in the exercise of ordinary diligence ought to have discovered and remedied the defect, actual notice is unnecessary. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48 , 197 S.E. 494 (1938); Mason v. Crowe, 88 Ga. App. 191 , 76 S.E.2d 432 (1953).

Notice of defective condition. —

Where the defective condition of a sidewalk is due to the failure to repair the sidewalk or due to the negligent acts of third persons, a city is not liable unless it had actual notice of the defect, or unless the city appears from the facts in the case that the defect could have been ascertained by the exercise of ordinary care, as when the defect existed for such a length of time that notice will be implied. City of Rome v. Stone, 46 Ga. App. 259 , 167 S.E. 325 (1933).

Liability for minor defects. —

Defect in a city sidewalk, as described in a petition suing a municipality for personal injuries, although of a size and nature ordinarily classed as a “minor defect,” was not minor enough to require holding as a matter of law on demurrer (now motion to dismiss) that the defendant was not negligent in performing the defendant’s legal duty to keep the defendant’s public streets and sidewalks reasonably safe enough for passage, when it appeared that the defendant knew or should have known of the defect in time to repair the defect or set up warning signals. City of Rome v. Richardson, 62 Ga. App. 85 , 7 S.E.2d 927 (1940).

Liability for acts of agents and employees. —

Municipal corporation is liable for defects and obstructions existing in one of the municipality’s public streets created in or placed thereon by the municipality’s own agents or employees, which renders such street unsafe to persons passing along such street. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27 , 197 S.E. 342 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 69-301).

Agency relationship between municipality and state. —

Where a municipal corporation selected and paid a contractor to grade the municipality’s streets although the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) agreed to pay part of the costs, and the work was to be performed under an engineer appointed by the municipality, whose selection, plans, and specifications had to be approved by the department, and the department was to inspect the work only in a general way to see that the plans and specifications were complied with, the municipality, in performing the work, was an independent contractor, and not the agent of the department, regardless of whether the portion of the street graded, within the municipality, had become a state-aid road. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89 , 155 S.E. 214 (1930) (decided under former Code 1910, § 828).

City liable although state prescribed specifications for grading. —

When the owner of property abutting upon the street graded by a municipality sustained damage to the value of the owner’s property because the municipality changed the grade of the street in accordance with plans and specifications prescribed by the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) the municipality is not relieved of liability to the property owner merely because the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) prescribed the plans and specifications. Gaines v. City of Calhoun, 42 Ga. App. 89 , 155 S.E. 214 (1930) (decided under former Code 1910, § 828).

Distinction between discretionary nonfeasance and negligent maintenance by city. —

Clear line is drawn between discretionary nonfeasance and negligent maintenance of something erected by the city, in the city’s discretion, in such manner as to create a dangerous nuisance, and which amounts to misfeasance. Christensen v. Floyd County, 158 Ga. App. 274 , 279 S.E.2d 723 (1981).

Deciding whether to erect or not to erect a traffic control sign or to maintain the sign after installation is an exercise of a governmental function by a municipality, and the municipality is not liable for any negligent performance of this function. Christensen v. Floyd County, 158 Ga. App. 274 , 279 S.E.2d 723 (1981).

Traffic controls which are government functions for safety. —

Operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices is a governmental function conducted on behalf of the public safety and for the negligent performance of which municipal corporations are not liable. Barnett v. City of Albany, 149 Ga. App. 331 , 254 S.E.2d 481 (1979).

Driver’s allegations of negligence against a city for negligent maintenance of a stop sign, which was allegedly obscured by foliage, were subject to summary judgment based on the city’s sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b) . The driver’s nuisance claim was barred because the driver failed to show the city’s awareness of a problem with the stop sign. Albertson v. City of Jesup, 312 Ga. App. 246 , 718 S.E.2d 4 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0398, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 245 (Ga. Feb. 27, 2012).

Traffic controls which are unrelated to street maintenance. —

Operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices are not related to the maintenance of the streets as such, and liability of a municipality for the negligent failure to maintain a stop sign after the stop sign is once erected cannot be predicated on the theory that the stop sign is a part of street maintenance. Barnett v. City of Albany, 149 Ga. App. 331 , 254 S.E.2d 481 (1979).

City liable for defect despite franchise granted to power company. —

After a bus passenger is injured when the passenger’s arm, which is propped in an open bus window, is wedged between the bus window frame and a power pole installed by an electric company under a franchise agreement with a city, and the city asserts that the city granted the franchise an exercise of the city’s legislative powers for which the city cannot be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 , the city’s claim of governmental immunity is not the issue; the issue instead is the liability of the city under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 for the alleged defect in a public road in the city’s municipal street system. Kicklighter v. Savannah Transit Auth., 167 Ga. App. 528 , 307 S.E.2d 47 (1983).

City not liable when railroad negligently placed warning device. —

City was not liable in public nuisance action for injuries to plaintiff arising out of train and car collision allegedly due to negligent placement of warning device at railroad where the road and warning device in question were constructed and maintained by the county or railroad company and where there was no evidence that the city had assumed responsibility for maintenance of that section of the road in question. Peluso v. Central of Ga. R.R., 165 Ga. App. 215 , 299 S.E.2d 51 (1983).

Liability of owner whose property abuts street on highway. —

Owner of property abutting upon a street or highway is not, by virtue thereof, liable for defects in the streets or highways. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

If a city ordinance can be taken and construed as meaning that the owner of any improved or vacant premises of whatever character and size, within the limits of a city, becomes instantly liable for injuries to third persons from the moment any trash, banana peeling, ice, snow, or other object falls upon the abutting sidewalk, without fault or knowledge on the part of such owner, it would manifestly be a rule so harsh and unconscionable as would render such municipal ordinance unconstitutional and void as violative of Ga. Const. 1877, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. III (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I). Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

When abutting property owner owes no duty to third person because of a defective condition of the sidewalk against which the property abuts, unless, the defect was brought about by such owner personally, the city could not by ordinance, under guise of police regulation, impose the city’s own liability upon such property owner or make the owner liable to third persons for acts other than the owner’s own. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Rule that an owner of property abutting upon a street or highway is not, because of ownership, liable for defects in the street or highway does not apply when the owner of abutting property creates a defect or nuisance in a street or highway. In this event the owner is liable, not because the owner owns the abutting property, but because the owner creates or maintains the things from which injury results. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Liability for injury sustained during punitive road work. —

City is not liable in damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff after the plaintiff had been convicted of a penal offense in the city’s police court and sentenced to work on the city’s public streets, although the plaintiff’s injury occurred while the plaintiff was thus engaged in such work, and resulted solely from the city’s negligence, as keep and maintenance of the convict and the work the convict was required to perform upon the city’s public streets is a governmental function, for the negligent performance of which the city is not liable to the convict/plaintiff in damages for a resulting injury. Hurley v. City of Atlanta, 208 Ga. 457 , 67 S.E.2d 571 (1951).

Removal of warning devices by third persons. —

If proper guards are erected or proper lights or signals are placed by city to give warning of danger caused by excavation or obstruction in a street, and such guards or signals are removed or rendered ineffective by third parties, or from causes over which the city has no control, the city is absolved from resultant damage unless the city fails, after notice of the removal of such warnings, to replace the warnings within a reasonable time. City of Rome v. Alexander, 63 Ga. App. 301 , 11 S.E.2d 52 (1940).

Defect where street abuts state highway. —

Notwithstanding that a city was not negligent in construction of an asphalt street, it would, if negligent in maintaining a dangerous hole or defect where the asphalt pavement joined cement state highway, be responsible for any injury sustained by an occupant of an automobile if the hole or defect caused the car to go out of control and to swerve along the asphalt street, although the street was reasonably safe for automobile travel in the usual and ordinary mode. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48 , 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

Lighting of streets. —

In the absence of any statutory requirement, a municipal corporation need not light the municipality’s streets with lamps, and no liability results from the municipality’s decision whether or not to light the municipality’s streets. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655 , 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

If a city performs the city’s duty to keep the city’s streets in a reasonably safe condition, the mere absence of an ordinary street light at a given point will not constitute such negligence as to render the city liable. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655 , 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

Operation of a traffic light conducted in behalf of the public safety is a governmental function in the exercise of the police power for the negligent performance of which a city is not liable. Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108 , 97 S.E.2d 330 (1957).

Street used for school access only. —

Street situated entirely on property owned by a municipal corporation and devoted entirely by the municipality to school purposes, which street serves only as an entrance to the school buildings situated thereon, and which exists for the use of the general public only in the sense that any member of the general public desiring access to the school buildings and grounds could use the street, is not such a public street that the city will be held liable for the street’s negligent construction and maintenance. City of Atlanta v. Keiser, 50 Ga. App. 600 , 179 S.E. 192 (1935).

Planning and construction of safety zone. —

In the planning and the construction of a safety zone on a city street, the city is engaged in a governmental function and could not be held liable for any error in judgment in such planning. Beall v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. App. 760 , 34 S.E.2d 918 (1945).

For a discussion of liability for maintenance of safety zone, see Beall v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. App. 760 , 34 S.E.2d 918 (1945).

Power lines. —

When, in a city street about 80 feet wide, the city has authorized the erection and maintenance, longitudinally down the middle of the street, of a series of poles supporting electrical wires, and on either side of the poles there remains a driveway approximately 40 feet in width each, and the poles cause no substantial danger or interference with the lawful use of the road, the maintenance of the poles in the street is not negligence, either as a matter of law or in fact. South Ga. Power Co. v. Smith, 42 Ga. App. 100 , 155 S.E. 80 (1930).

Because material fact questions remained regarding the quality of a utility company’s inspection and whether the company had constructive knowledge of an electrical wiring defect outside of a homeowner’s home, summary judgment was properly denied. Schuessler v. Bennett, 287 Ga. App. 880 , 652 S.E.2d 884 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0398, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 230 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2008).

Tree overhanging sidewalk. —

Even if a tree actually grew in a park so that the tree’s maintenance is a governmental function, if some of the tree’s limbs overhung a sidewalk not part of a park so that the sidewalk was not in a reasonably safe condition, so that persons could pass along the sidewalk in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety, a municipality would be liable for any injuries caused by such unsafe condition, if other requirements of notice and negligence obtained. Mayor of Savannah v. Harvey, 87 Ga. App. 122 , 73 S.E.2d 260 (1952) (decided under former Ga. L. 1895, p. 306).

City park and tree commission liability for negligently maintained trees. —

Act creating a park and tree commission for a city does not relieve the city of the city’s duty to keep the city’s sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition so that persons could pass along the sidewalks in the ordinary methods of travel with reasonable safety, and a petition, alleging injuries due to the negligence of the city in performing such duty, states a cause of action as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Mayor of Savannah v. Harvey, 87 Ga. App. 122 , 73 S.E.2d 260 (1952).

City maintenance of drainage culverts. —

Summary judgment was granted in favor of a city upon a father’s claim of negligence under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) because: (1) there was no showing that the city had a legal duty to expand the culvert pipe in which the child drowned, to widen the shoulder of the street, or to erect a guardrail, as no statute required the city to take these actions, and the city’s construction code did not impose a duty with regard to the culvert; (2) there was no evidence that the city negligently maintained the culvert; and (3) the city had no actual or constructive notice of flooding problems near the culvert or of defects in the culvert. Walden v. City of Hawkinsville, No. 5:03-CV-0398, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21694 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2005).

City could be liable for dock collapse but had no notice of any defect. —

Although a city could be liable under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) for failure to maintain a dock that collapsed, injuring the plaintiffs, because the dock fell within the definition of “public road” in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 , there was no evidence that the city had notice of any defect in the dock, and the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit did not identify any defect. Therefore, the city was properly granted summary judgment on immunity grounds. Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197 , 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019).

Photographs of roadway taken after accident insufficient to show city’s notice of defect. —

In a driver’s action against a city under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-91 , alleging that an accident occurred because an area of broken pavement around a manhole caused the driver’s vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic, photographs of the area taken two weeks after the accident did not constitute evidence of the city’s notice of the defect under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) . City of Macon v. Brown, 343 Ga. App. 262 , 807 S.E.2d 34 (2017).

Duty to maintain dock. —

In an action for injuries suffered when a city-owned dock collapsed, the trial court did not err in finding that the city had a ministerial duty to maintain the dock in reasonably safe conditions because the dock was a “way” intended for public use and the passage of vehicles boarding the ferry. Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197 , 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019).

Trial Procedure

Allegation that walkway is part of municipal streets and sidewalks. —

When it is alleged that the walkway on which the plaintiff was injured is a part of the sidewalk and street system of a municipal corporation there must be some evidence that the walkway was intended and maintained by the city for such use. Kesot v. City of Dalton, 94 Ga. App. 194 , 94 S.E.2d 90 (1956).

Evidence as to presence or character of city safeguard. —

If the question is whether a city has performed the city’s duty in regard to keeping a street in a reasonably safe condition, or whether the city has been negligent in that regard, and in respect to failing to erect proper safeguards or to placing proper lights at a dangerous place where an injury occurs, the character of the light at that point, or the light’s absence, may be shown as a circumstance bearing on the question of negligence. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655 , 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

If a municipality obstructs a street or allows the street to remain obstructed, or out of repair, or in a dangerous condition, the fact of the absence of lights or safeguards of any character at the place or that a street light established at that point has been allowed to remain unlit for a number of nights before an injury occurred to a pedestrian may be considered, along with the other evidence, in determining whether there is negligence in failing to keep the street in a reasonably safe condition. Lundy v. City Council, 51 Ga. App. 655 , 181 S.E. 237 (1935).

Evidence which raises fact question of implied notice to city. —

Evidence that a power pole was maintained in the same location for many years and that the pole bore scrape marks from passing vehicles is sufficient to raise a fact question of implied notice to the city. Kicklighter v. Savannah Transit Auth., 167 Ga. App. 528 , 307 S.E.2d 47 (1983).

Evidence of notice required. —

Because there was a lack of evidence that the city had actual or constructive knowledge of a defect created by a sewer overflow resulting in the absence of the manhole cover, the issue of negligence became a matter of law. Quinn v. City of Cave Spring, 243 Ga. App. 598 , 532 S.E.2d 131 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1385, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 794 (Ga. Oct. 20, 2000).

Evidence needed to defeat summary judgment. —

Once a city put forth evidence showing that the city had installed pipes in a culvert through which a creek ran under a street in compliance with municipal standards for culvert work, it was incumbent upon a resident claiming negligence to come forward with some evidence of negligent installation of the pipes in order to defeat summary judgment; as the resident had not done so, it was proper to grant summary judgment for the city. Gilbert v. City of Jackson, 287 Ga. App. 326 , 651 S.E.2d 461 (2007).

Notice of defect. —

County water and sewer authority was not liable to motorist injured when street pavement collapsed, since the authority had no duty to inspect water lines under the street in the absence of any actual or constructive notice of a defect. Andrews v. City of Macon, 191 Ga. App. 745 , 382 S.E.2d 739 (1989).

Constructive notice. —

While the question of constructive notice is ordinarily one for the jury, in the absence of any evidence as to constructive notice there is no reasonable ground for two opinions, and thus the issue of negligence is a matter of law, not a question of fact for the jury. Andrews v. City of Macon, 191 Ga. App. 745 , 382 S.E.2d 739 (1989).

In an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when plaintiff stepped in a hole on the right-of-way maintained by the city, the plaintiff’s opinion that “the hole appeared to have been there for a significant period of time,” without other evidence of how long the hole had been in existence, was insufficient to raise a factual question as to the city’s constructive notice of the hole. Brumbelow v. City of Rome, 215 Ga. App. 321 , 450 S.E.2d 345 (1994).

Even though the size of the depression in which the plaintiff tripped and the grass growing over the depression presented some evidence of age, the factors did not establish that the depression was so old as to provide a basis for concluding that the city had constructive knowledge of the hazard. Rischack v. City of Perry, 223 Ga. App. 856 , 479 S.E.2d 163 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0543, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 388 (Ga. Apr. 11, 1997).

Summary of means of showing implied or constructive notice of a defect. —

See Crider v. City of Atlanta, 184 Ga. App. 389 , 361 S.E.2d 520 (1987).

When notice presumed. —

If a defect has existed in a sidewalk for such a length of time that by reasonable diligence in the performance of their duties the defect ought to have been known by the proper authorities, notice will be presumed, and proof of actual knowledge will not be necessary in order to render the municipality liable for injuries occasioned thereby. Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254 , 167 S.E. 324 (1933).

Knowledge on the part of a city of a defect in one of the city’s sidewalks will be presumed when the defect has continued for such a length of time that, by reasonable diligence in the performance of the city’s duties, the defect’s existence should have become known to the proper authorities. City of Silvertown v. Harcourt, 51 Ga. App. 160 , 179 S.E. 772 (1935).

Time needed for implied notice depends on defect and location. —

Length of time that must elapse from the creation or placing of an obstruction in the street or sidewalk of a municipality, in order to authorize a finding of negligence against the municipality, will vary according to the location and nature of the defect. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27 , 197 S.E. 342 (1938).

It was error to overrule the city’s motion for judgment n.o.v. in the case of a bus passenger who was injured when a portion of street pavement collapsed, where a crack in the pavement which could have existed for three days prior to the collapse was not itself the defect, when three days was not a sufficient time for surface or rainwater entering the crack to have undermined the pavement, and when there was nothing to indicate that if the city had investigated the crack that the cavity which caused plaintiff’s injuries would have been discovered. City of Atlanta v. Hightower, 177 Ga. App. 140 , 338 S.E.2d 683 (1985).

Jury questions. —

In an action against a municipal corporation for injuries sustained while running along a certain street in the city after dark, which street was alleged to have been in a defective and unsafe condition, questions of whether the city was negligent in failing to keep the street and walkway in question in a reasonably safe condition, whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in running along the street and walkway on the occasion in question, and what negligence constituted the proximate cause of the injury, are questions which should have been submitted to a jury. Harris v. City of Rome, 59 Ga. App. 279 , 200 S.E. 337 (1938).

When an action is brought against a municipality for injuries alleged to have been brought about by the existence of an obstruction in a public street of the municipality which was not shown to have been placed there by the city, when no actual notice of the obstruction is shown, the issue of whether or not the obstruction had existed for a sufficient length of time to charge the city with negligence in failing to discover and remove the obstruction should be generally left to the jury. City of Barnesville v. Sappington, 58 Ga. App. 27 , 197 S.E. 342 (1938); City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453 , 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).

Whether a defect or hole in a city street gave a right of action to a person injured thereby is ordinarily a question for the jury, because it is a complicated question of fact, involving the depth of the hole or defect, the defect’s appearance to travelers on the street, and the danger which might have been anticipated and guarded against by the city in the exercise of reasonable forethought. Mayor of Buford v. Medley, 58 Ga. App. 48 , 197 S.E. 494 (1938).

When it appears that a city has permitted an excavation in a street, it becomes a question for the jury to determine as to the extent and character of the warnings or signals placed which are necessary and sufficient to give notice to members of the public using such street of the presence of such excavation or obstruction. City of Rome v. Alexander, 63 Ga. App. 301 , 11 S.E.2d 52 (1940).

While it is true that a city would not be liable for the existence of a latent defect not discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, whether the defect was such as the municipality should have discovered the defect in the exercise of ordinary care in keeping the streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition is a question for the jury. City of Bainbridge v. Cox, 83 Ga. App. 453 , 64 S.E.2d 192 (1951).

In a wrongful death case, the trial court properly denied a city summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence and nuisance claims based on the obstruction in the line of sight caused by a tree as a jury had to determine whether the tree located on the city’s right of way obstructed the view of oncoming traffic such that the tree was a defect within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. —

Defective Design or Setting of a Traffic Control Signal, 6 POF2d 683.

Municipality’s Failure, in Making Street Repairs, to Avoid Injury to Adjacent Property, 8 POF2d 361.

Highway Defects — Road Shoulder, 16 POF2d 1.

Highway Defects — Barrier on Guardrail, 17 POF2d 413.

Highway Defects — Warning Device, 18 POF2d 487.

Public Authority’s Failure to Remove or Guard Against Ice or Snow on Surface of Highway or Street, 21 POF2d 251.

Highway Defects — Liability for Failure to Install Median Barrier, 50 POF2d 63.

Highway Defects — Negligent Design or Maintenance of Curve, 14 POF3d 527.

Establishing Liability of a State or Local Highway Administration, Where Injury Results from the Failure to Place or Maintain Adequate Highway Signs, 31 POF3d 351.

Governmental Liability for Failure to Maintain Trees Near Public Way, 41 POF3d 109.

Governmental Liability for Injury to Landowner’s Property from Road Construction Activities on Neighboring Land, 65 POF3d 311.

Proof of Roadside Hazard Case, 71 POF3d 1.

Liability of Municipality or Abutting Landowner for Injury Caused by Defective Condition of Sidewalk, 86 POF3d 327.

C.J.S. —

39A C.J.S., Highways, § 237.

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 414 et seq.

ALR. —

Responsibility of county for injury from defect in highway, 2 A.L.R. 721 .

Applicability of statute or ordinance requiring notice of claim for damages from injuries in street as affected by the conditions which caused the injury, 10 A.L.R. 249 .

Liability of a municipal corporation for injuries caused by the unsafe condition of a street resulting from or incidental to work performed under a permit authorizing the construction, alteration, repair, or demolishing of a building or its appurtenances, 11 A.L.R. 1343 .

Liability of municipality for act of employee engaged in sprinkling or cleaning streets or removing garbage or rubbish, 14 A.L.R. 1473 ; 32 A.L.R. 988 ; 52 A.L.R. 187 ; 60 A.L.R. 101 ; 156 A.L.R. 692 ; 156 A.L.R. 714 .

Negligent or unlawful use of road as a defect within statute rendering county, town, or other political division liable for damages, 22 A.L.R. 588 .

Liability of municipality for injury from ice or snow on crosswalk, 32 A.L.R. 1293 .

Liability of municipality for damages by fire because of condition of streets delaying or impeding fire department, 33 A.L.R. 694 .

Duty to make highway safe for children as including duty to prevent their leaving it at a place of danger, 36 A.L.R. 309 .

Personal liability of public official for personal injury on highway, 40 A.L.R. 39 ; 57 A.L.R. 1037 .

Municipal liability for drowning of child in pond created by its failure to provide drainage in constructing highway embankment, 40 A.L.R. 488 .

Liability of municipality for condition of the part of private driveway which is within the street, 42 A.L.R. 1281 .

Liability of municipality for injury to lateral support in grading street, 44 A.L.R. 1494 .

Liability of municipal corporation for injury incident to coasting in street, 46 A.L.R. 1434 .

Liability of municipality for injury to traveler in alley, 48 A.L.R. 434 .

Notice of condition of street due to acts of municipal employees as condition precedent to municipal liability, 50 A.L.R. 1193 .

Liability of municipality for injury or damage due to sprinkling of street, 51 A.L.R. 575 .

Liability of municipality for negligence not affecting the condition of the street itself by its agents or servants while engaged in making street improvements, 52 A.L.R. 524 .

Liability of municipal corporations and their licensees for the torts of independent contractors, 52 A.L.R. 1012 .

Duty and liability of public authorities as to conditions beyond limits of highway which affect safety or comfort of travel, 53 A.L.R. 764 .

Liability for conditions in space between lot lines and sidewalk actually within limits of street, but apparently part of the abutting property, 56 A.L.R. 220 .

Duty of municipality to remedy conditions due to traffic rendering roadway dangerous for automobiles, 63 A.L.R. 208 .

Duty and liability as to construction or maintenance of bridge as respects weight of load, 68 A.L.R. 605 .

Liability for injury by stepping or falling into opening in sidewalk while doors are open or cover off, 70 A.L.R. 1358 .

Liability of municipality for injury due to defective catch-basin covers, and the like, maintained in street in connection with drainage or sewer system, 71 A.L.R. 753 .

Municipal liability for injuries from snow and ice on sidewalk, 80 A.L.R. 1151 ; 39 A.L.R.2d 782.

Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give required notice of claim of injury to municipality, county, or other governmental agency or body, 82 A.L.R. 749 ; 159 A.L.R. 329 ; 65 A.L.R.2d 1278.

Liability of municipality for injury to person or property due to improper plan for or defects in original construction of street or highway, 90 A.L.R. 1502 .

Failure of municipality to adopt, or to enforce, traffic regulations as ground of its liability for damage to property or person, 92 A.L.R. 1495 ; 161 A.L.R. 1404 .

Liability of municipality for injury or damage by automobile colliding with temporary obstruction in connection with alteration or repair of street, 100 A.L.R. 1386 .

Abandonment or discontinuance of use of rails, poles, wires, or other obstructions having previous lawful situs in street as affecting liability of municipality or another for personal or property damage resulting therefrom, 102 A.L.R. 677 .

Liability of public for injury or damage from slides or fall of object from embankment at side of highway, 107 A.L.R. 596 .

Municipal liability for injury due to condition of street, 109 A.L.R. 605 .

Degree of inequality in sidewalk which makes question for jury or for court, as to municipality’s liability, 119 A.L.R. 161 ; 37 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Liability of municipality or other governmental body to pedestrian for injury in street closed or partially closed during construction or repairs, 119 A.L.R. 841 .

Duty and liability of municipality, or other political subdivision, as regards condition of streets as extending to place or structure not strictly part of street but commonly used by public as an extension of or by-pass between streets, 126 A.L.R. 443 .

Liability of municipality for injury or damage due to pole maintained by third person in street or highway, 128 A.L.R. 1269 .

Liability for injury to pedestrian predicated upon slope or contour of sidewalk or crosswalk, or slippery nature of material of which it is constructed, 133 A.L.R. 1026 .

Scope of employment of municipal employee engaged in work in street or highway, or in directing traffic, as regards municipal responsibility for his tort, 136 A.L.R. 1361 .

Liability for injury to pedestrian due to condition of street or highway as affected by his blindness or other physical disability, 141 A.L.R. 721 .

Duty of municipality to children playing in street, 154 A.L.R. 1330 .

Cleaning and sprinkling of streets as governmental or private function as regards municipal immunity from liability for tort, 156 A.L.R. 692 .

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way, 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Liability of municipality for damage caused by fall of tree or limb, 14 A.L.R.2d 186.

Liability of municipal corporation to pedestrian for slippery condition of sidewalk caused by deposits of earth or mud thereon, 16 A.L.R.2d 1290.

Liability of municipal corporation for injury or death occurring from defects in, or negligence in construction, operation, or maintenance of its electric street-lighting equipment, apparatus, and the like, 19 A.L.R.2d 344.

Liability for injury on parking or strip between sidewalk and curb, 19 A.L.R.2d 1053; 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Installation or operation of parking meters as within governmental immunity from tort liability, 33 A.L.R.2d 761.

Liability of municipality for injury resulting from slippery condition of walk concurring with defects therein, 41 A.L.R.2d 739.

Liability for negligence of public body or political subdivision operating toll bridge, 43 A.L.R.2d 550.

Duty and liability of municipality as regards barriers for protection of adult pedestrians who may unintentionally deviate from street or highway into marginal or external hazards, 44 A.L.R.2d 633.

Liability of municipality for failure to erect traffic warnings against entering or using street which is partially barred or obstructed by construction or improvement work, 52 A.L.R.2d 688.

Liability for injury or damage by tree or limb overhanging street or highway, 54 A.L.R.2d 1195.

Liability of state, municipality, or public agency for vehicle accident occurring because of accumulation of water on street or highway, 61 A.L.R.2d 425.

Municipal liability for injury or death from collision with rope or clothesline across sidewalk or street, 75 A.L.R.2d 565.

Liability of municipal corporation to person injured in fall because of slippery substance such as paint or oil deliberately placed upon surface of street or sidewalk, 81 A.L.R.2d 1194.

Liability of municipality for injury or death resulting from temporary condition or obstruction in street in connection with holiday, entertainment, parade or other special event, 84 A.L.R.2d 508.

Liability of municipality for injury or death from defects or obstructions in sidewalk to one riding thereon on bicycle, tricycle, or similar vehicle, 88 A.L.R.2d 1423.

Liability for injury from defective condition or improper operation of lift bridge or drawbridge, 90 A.L.R.2d 105.

Existence of actionable defect in street or highway proper as question for court or for jury, 1 A.L.R.3d 496.

Liability of highway authorities arising out of motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by failure to erect or properly maintain traffic control device at intersection, 34 A.L.R.3d 1008.

Liability of governmental unit for injuries or damage resulting from tree or limb falling onto highway from abutting land, 95 A.L.R.3d 778.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from ice or snow on surface of highway or street, 97 A.L.R.3d 11.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from failure to repair pothole in surface of highway or street, 98 A.L.R.3d 101.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from defect or obstruction on roadside parkway or parking strip, 98 A.L.R.3d 439.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defect or obstruction in shoulder of street or highway, 19 A.L.R.4th 532.

Governmental liability for failure to reduce vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing or at street or highway intersection, 22 A.L.R.4th 624.

Liability of governmental entity for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision between vehicle and domestic animal at large in street or highway, 52 A.L.R.4th 1200.

Duty of public authorities to erect and maintain warning signs or devices for curves in highway, 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Governmental tort liability as to highway median barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th 1249.

State and local government liability for injury or death of bicyclist due to defect or obstruction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L.R.4th 204.

32-4-94. Standards for construction of curb ramps.

  1. The standard for construction of curbs on each side of any municipal street or of any connecting street or road for which curbs have been prescribed by the governing body of the municipal corporation having jurisdiction thereover shall be not less than one ramp per lineal block giving on the crosswalks at intersections. Such ramps shall be at least 40 inches wide and shall be so constructed as to allow reasonable access to the crosswalk for physically disabled persons.
  2. Standards set for curb ramping under subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to any curb existing on July 1, 1974, but shall apply to all new curb construction and to all replacement curbs constructed at any point in a block which gives reasonable access to a crosswalk; provided, however, that the standards set for curb ramping under subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply to curbs on each side of the street circling the state capitol; provided, further, that the standard for construction of curbs on each side of the street circling the state capitol shall be not less than two ramps per lineal block giving on the crosswalks at intersections.

History. — Ga. L. 1974, p. 514, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1302, § 14.

Cross references. —

Access to and use of public facilities by physically disabled persons generally, T. 30, C. 3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 8.

C.J.S. —

64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1141.

ALR. —

Right of municipality to hasten flow of surface water along natural drain ways by improvements of street or highway, 36 A.L.R. 1463 .

Liability of municipality for injury to lateral support in grading street, 44 A.L.R. 1494 .

PART 2 Exercise by Municipalities of Power to Contract Generally

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Construction and effect of “changed conditions” clause in public works or construction contract with state or its subdivision, 56 A.L.R.4th 1042.

32-4-110. “Contract” defined.

As used in this part, the term “contract” means a contract or subcontract entered into by a municipality with any person, the state or federal government or an agency of either, with another municipality or municipalities, with a county or counties, or with any combination of any of the foregoing entities, for the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of all or part of a public road in said municipality, including but not limited to a contract or subcontract for the purchase of materials, for the hiring of labor, for professional services, or for other things or services incident to such work.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-831, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-4-111. Authority of municipality to contract; form of contracts; approval of contracts by resolution.

A municipality shall have the authority to contract as set forth in this part and in Part 1 of this article. Any contract for work on all or part of the municipal road system shall be in writing and be approved by resolution which shall be entered on the minutes of such municipality.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-832, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

32-4-112. Contracts with state agencies and adjoining counties.

  1. A contract with a state agency is subject to those limitations of subparagraph (d)(1)(A) and paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 32-2-61.
    1. A municipality may contract with any county in which part of the municipality lies for the construction and maintenance of a public road within the limits of such municipality. A municipality may contract with any county abutting the corporate limits of such municipality for the construction and maintenance of a bridge within the limits of both such municipality and such county.
    2. In such contract, the county may agree to use any county funds available for the construction and maintenance of roads in such county, including funds derived from general obligation bonds issued after approval in a county-wide election, to pay the costs, in whole or in part, of the construction or maintenance of such public road.
    3. In such contract, the municipality may agree to use any funds available for the construction and maintenance of roads in such municipality, together with any funds the municipality may collect pursuant to its power to assess any part of its share of the cost of such contract against abutting and adjoining property and the owners thereof according to the provisions of Chapter 39 of Title 36, as if the municipality were performing the work alone, unless the terms of such assessment shall be in violation of the municipality’s charter, an ordinance of the municipality, or a general law of the state.
    4. The work under such contract may be performed either by county or municipal forces or by a contractor employed by either or jointly.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-833, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2018, p. 714, § 1/SB 324.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added the second sentence in paragraph (b)(1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Contract for improvement of county road located in municipality. — County may, by contract, obtain the cooperation of a municipality in the right-of-way acquisition for, and construction and maintenance of, a county road located within the municipality, but the county cannot require this of a municipality absent an appropriate contract. 1986 Op. Atty Gen. No. U86-27.

32-4-113. Limitations on power to contract; at least two estimates required for certain expenditures.

  1. A municipality is prohibited from negotiating a contract except a contract:
    1. Involving the expenditure of less than $200,000.00;
    2. With a state agency or political subdivision as authorized by Code Sections 32-4-111 and 32-4-112;
    3. With a railroad or railway company or a publicly or privately owned utility as authorized by Article 6 of Chapter 6 of this title;
    4. For engineering or other kinds of professional or specialized services;
    5. For emergency maintenance requiring immediate repairs to a public road, including but not limited to bridge repairs, snow and ice removal, and repairs due to flood conditions; or
    6. Otherwise expressly authorized by law.
  2. No contract involving an expenditure of more than $20,000.00 but less than $200,000.00 shall be awarded under this Code section without the submission of at least two estimates.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-834, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 356, § 3; Ga. L. 2014, p. 851, § 4/HB 774.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids and condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

32-4-114. Required letting of contracts by public bid.

Except as authorized by Code Section 32-4-113, all contracts shall be let by public bid.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-835, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

32-4-115. Advertising for bids.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of Code Section 36-39-10 to the contrary, on all contracts to be let by public bid a municipality shall advertise for competitive sealed bids for at least two weeks. The public advertisement shall be inserted once a week in such newspapers wherein the county sheriff’s sales are advertised or in such newspapers or other publications, or both, as will ensure adequate publicity, the first insertion to be at least two weeks prior to the opening of the sealed bids, the second to follow one week after the publication of the first insertion.
  2. Such advertisement shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. A description sufficient to enable the public to know the approximate extent and character of the work to be done;
    2. The time allowed for performance;
    3. The terms and time of payment;
    4. Where and under what conditions and costs the detailed plans and specifications and proposal forms may be obtained;
    5. The amount of the proposal guaranty, if one is required;
    6. The time and place for submission and opening of bids;
    7. The right of the municipality to reject any one or all bids; and
    8. Such further notice as the municipality may deem advisable as in the public interest.

History. — Ga. L. 1922, p. 37, § 1a; Code 1933, § 95-1103; Code 1933, § 95A-836, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

32-4-116. Payment by bidder to cover costs.

A municipality may require each bidder to pay a reasonable sum sufficient to cover the cost to the municipality, where applicable, of the bid proposal form, the contract, and its specifications.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-837, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-4-117. Proposal guaranty by bidder.

  1. A municipality may require that each bid on a particular contract, as a prerequisite to the bid being considered, be accompanied by a proposal guaranty in the form of a certified check or other acceptable security payable to the municipality for an amount deemed by the municipality in the public interest necessary to ensure that the successful bidder will execute the contract on which he bid.
  2. Such proposal guaranty will be returned to a bidder upon receipt by the municipality of the bidder’s written withdrawal of his bid if such receipt is before the time scheduled for the opening of bids. Upon the determination by the municipality of the lowest reliable bidder, the municipality will return proposal guaranties to all bidders except the proposal guaranty of the lowest reliable bidder. If no contract award is made within 30 days after the date set for the opening of bids, all bids shall be rejected and all proposal guaranties shall be returned unless the municipality and the successful bidder agree in writing to a longer period of time.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-838, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake of fact or that of his employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991.

32-4-118. Award of contract to lowest reliable bidder; procedure upon rejection of bids.

Notwithstanding any provisions of Code Section 36-39-11 to the contrary, where a contract has been let for bid, the municipality, by resolution entered in its minutes, shall award the contract to the lowest reliable bidder, provided that the municipality shall have the right to reject any and all such bids whether such right is reserved in the public notice or not and, in such case, may readvertise, perform the work itself, or abandon the project.

History. — Ga. L. 1922, p. 37, § 1c; Code 1933, § 95-1005; Code 1933, § 95A-839, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Public contracts: authority of state or its subdivision to reject all bids, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

Public contracts: low bidder’s monetary relief against state or local agency for nonaward of contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93.

Encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, 65 A.L.R.4th 603.

32-4-119. Bonds of successful bidder.

Notwithstanding any provision of Chapter 91 of Title 36 to the contrary, where the contract price is $5,000.00 or more, no construction contract of a municipality, other than a contract solely for engineering or other professional services, shall be valid unless the contractor first gives:

  1. A performance and payment bond which meets the requirements of Parts 1, 3, and 4 of Article 3 of Chapter 91 of Title 36; and
  2. Such other bonds or insurance policies required by the municipality in its proposal forms, including but not limited to public liability and property damage insurance bonds or policies and bonds to maintain in good condition such completed construction for a period of not less than five years.

History. — Ga. L. 1922, p. 37, § 1b; Code 1933, § 95-1104; Code 1933, § 95A-840, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 8; Ga. L. 2007, p. 167, § 5/HB 192.

32-4-120. Failure to take bonds; liability of municipality.

If the payment bond required by Code Section 32-4-119 is not taken, the municipality then shall be liable to subcontractors, laborers, materialmen, and other persons, as provided in Part 4 of Article 3 of Chapter 91 of Title 36, for losses to them resulting from failure to take such bond.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-841, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 15; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 9.

32-4-121. Failure of successful bidder to sign contract or furnish bonds.

If the successful bidder fails to sign the contract or furnish the bonds required under authority of Code Section 32-4-119, his proposal guaranty, if one had been required by the municipality, will become the property of the municipality as liquidated damages. The contract then may be readvertised, or the project may be abandoned.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-842, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake of fact or that of his employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991.

32-4-122. Oath by successful bidder.

A successful bidder, before commencing the work, shall execute a written oath, as required by subsection (e) of Code Section 36-91-22, stating that he has not violated such Code section which makes it unlawful to restrict competitive bidding.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-843, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32.

32-4-123. Other laws applicable to part.

Except as indicated to the contrary in this part, Chapter 91 of Title 36 shall not apply to this part.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-844, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 16; Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 10.

CHAPTER 5 Funds for Public Roads

Editor’s notes. —

By resolution (Ga. L. 2007, p. 352), the General Assembly created the Joint Study Committee on Transportation Funding to undertake a study of the conditions, needs, issues, and problems with the funding of Georgia’s transportation system. The Committee made a report to the General Assembly and was abolished on December 31, 2007.

Article 1 Federal Funds

32-5-1. Receipt of federal-aid funds by state; department authorized to waive chapter provisions inconsistent with or contrary to federal laws, rules, or regulations.

  1. The state treasurer is designated a proper authority to receive any of the federal-aid funds apportioned by the federal government under 23 U.S.C. and to receive any other federal funds apportioned to the State of Georgia for public road and other public transportation purposes, unless designated otherwise by the federal government and except as such funds may be directed by the federal government to the State Road and Tollway Authority.
  2. If any provisions of this chapter are inconsistent with or contrary to any laws, rules, regulations, or other requirements of the United States Department of Transportation or other federal agencies, the Georgia Department of Transportation is authorized and empowered to waive such provisions of this chapter in order to resolve any such inconsistency or conflict, it being the purpose of this chapter to enable the department to comply with any requirement of the federal government in order to procure all possible federal aid and assistance for the construction or maintenance of the public roads of Georgia and other public transportation purposes.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-701, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1402, § 18; Ga. L. 1999, p. 112, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-4; Ga. L. 2010, p. 863, § 3/SB 296.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority,” see 36 Georgia L. Rev. 247 (2001).

For note on 1999 amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233 (1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

No expenditure of money on historic preservation if not for transportation. — Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances when the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) when such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3 (decided prior to 1993 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 ).

32-5-2. Appropriation of funds to department.

All federal funds received by the state treasurer under Code Section 32-5-1 are continually appropriated to the department for the purpose specified in the grants of such funds except as such funds may be directed by the federal government to the State Road and Tollway Authority.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-702, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1402, § 18; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-5; Ga. L. 2010, p. 863, § 3/SB 296; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1072, § 2/SB 169.

Article 2 State Public Transportation Fund

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Grant programs, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-12.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Replacement of public facilities. — Department of Transportation may presently make payments to effectuate the federal purpose of functional replacement of publicly owned facilities; while the department may not pay for the functional replacement of improvements without considering the value of the improvement, the department may, in appropriate cases, make payments which reflect special values approximating the replacement costs of the improvement. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-186.

32-5-20. “State Public Transportation Fund” defined.

As used in this article, the term “State Public Transportation Fund” means that money the expenditures of which are controlled and supervised by the department by virtue of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-2-2.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-703, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Motor fuel and road taxes, T. 48, C. 9.

32-5-21. Priority of expenditures from fund.

Subject to the restrictions on expenditures imposed by Code Section 32-5-23, the State Public Transportation Fund shall be expended by the department in the following order:

  1. To pay the rentals on lease contracts entered into pursuant to the authority of the Constitution of Georgia;
  2. To pay into the State of Georgia Guaranteed Revenue Debt Common Reserve Fund the amount of the highest annual debt service requirements for an issue of guaranteed revenue debt for public road projects initiated pursuant to Code Section 32-10-67, upon its issuance, when the guarantee of the specific issue has been authorized by an appropriation of moneys governed by Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution and the appropriation meets the requirements for such debt as provided by Article VII, Section IV, Paragraph III(b) of the Constitution;
  3. To pay the costs of operating the department and for any emergencies or unusual situations;
  4. To pay the costs necessary to comply with the conditions of federal-aid apportionments to the state for the planning, surveying, constructing, paving, and improving of the public roads in Georgia;
  5. As directed from time to time by appropriations Acts; and
  6. After the requirements set out in the foregoing provisions of this Code section have been met, the remainder of the State Public Transportation Fund to be expended to pay the costs of maintaining, improving, constructing, and reconstructing the public roads of the state highway system, for maintaining roads within and leading to state parks, and for constructing public roads by department forces.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-704, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1355, § 2; Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 11/SB 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highways, 2 A.L.R. 746 ; 123 A.L.R. 1462 .

32-5-22. Other expenditures from fund.

Expenditures from the State Public Transportation Fund may be made, under such conditions as the department may provide, for streets, driveways, and parking areas located upon the property of and serving:

  1. Public schools;
  2. Colleges of the university system;
  3. State agencies and governments of political subdivisions; and
  4. Hospitals constructed with the assistance of financial grants from the federal government, authorized by Title 42, Chapter 6A, Subchapter IV, United States Code, as amended.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-705, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-5-23. Limitations on expenditures from fund.

Notwithstanding Code Section 32-5-22 and except as expressly authorized elsewhere in this title, no funds from the State Public Transportation Fund shall be expended for the construction or maintenance of:

  1. Private driveways, roads, or bridges; or
  2. Public roads that have since been abandoned.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-706, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

Cross references. —

Abandonment of public roads, T. 32, C. 7.

32-5-24. Authorization of expenditure for public roads serving planned communities.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 2-6/HB 252, effective July 1, 2015.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Code 1933, § 95A-706.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 1215, § 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

Ga. L. 2015, p. 385, § 1-1/HB 252, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘J. Calvin Hill, Jr., Act.’ ”

32-5-25. Use of fund in regard to acquisition of rights of way.

Whenever property is acquired under subsection (e) of Code Section 32-3-3, all expenses of the acquisition thereof, including the purchase price and all direct and consequential damages awarded in any proceeding brought to condemn any such right of way, shall be paid by the county in which such right of way or portion thereof is situated. When such right of way or portion thereof lies within the limits of a municipality, acquisition expenses shall be paid by such municipality unless the county concerned agrees to procure such right of way on behalf of the municipality. However, nothing contained in this Code section shall prevent the department from using the State Public Transportation Fund to acquire such right of way, to pay any damage awarded on account of the location of any road that is a part of the state highway system, or to assist a county or municipality in so doing. Furthermore, nothing in this Code section shall be construed to authorize an expenditure from the State Public Transportation Fund for the procurement of a right of way for a road to be constructed on a county road system or municipal street system except as otherwise provided by law or by agreement between the federal government and the department.

History. — Code 1933, § 95-1721, enacted by Ga. L. 1935, p. 160, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-707, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Acquisition of rights of way within municipalities for state highway system, § 32-4-90 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

No conflict of interest was created by a special assistant Attorney General representing the owner of property condemned by a county for road purposes. 1983 Op. Atty Gen. No. U83-64.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

32-5-26. Reimbursement of counties and municipalities in regard to acquisition of rights of way.

The department shall be required to reimburse any county or municipality of this state the sums actually expended by it in accordance with subsection (e) of Code Section 32-3-3 where construction on the right of way so acquired by the county or municipality has not been begun within ten years from the date title to such right of way was acquired in the name of the department.

History. — Ga. L. 1947, p. 1186, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-708, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 18.

32-5-27. Allocation formula development and implementation.

  1. The Planning Division of the department and the director of planning shall develop an allocation formula for:
    1. A state-wide transportation asset management program;
    2. A state-wide transportation asset improvement program; and
    3. A local maintenance and improvement grant program.

      Funds from the State Public Transportation Fund shall be allocated by the department pursuant to such formula as further defined in subsections (b) through (d) of this Code section and as appropriated by the General Assembly. Every four years, concurrent with the renewal of the state-wide strategic transportation plan, the division and the director shall update the data used in the allocation formula and shall review the distributional components of the formula and at such time may amend the formula as necessary to support implementation of the plans provided for in Code Section 32-2-22.

  2. Funds appropriated for the state-wide transportation asset management program shall be allocated pursuant to the long-range state-wide strategic transportation plan and shall be available for administration, maintenance, operations, and rehabilitation of infrastructure.
    1. Funds allocated for the state-wide transportation asset improvement program shall be allocated for capital construction projects, which may include new capacity, expansion of current infrastructure, safety improvements, or completion of, additions to, and capital improvement of state strategic corridors and economic development highways, including but not limited to those identified pursuant to Code Section 32-4-22. Recommendations for appropriation to the state-wide transportation asset improvement program shall include consideration of current and future regional population and regional employment. Local funding matches may be required.
    2. A portion of this allocation shall be a specific itemized and prioritized project list and such portion shall be not less than 10 percent nor more than 20 percent of the aggregate allocation from the State Public Transportation Fund, subject to and consistent with the provisions of the state-wide transportation improvement program, for such fiscal year. In developing such project list the division and the director may accept project recommendations from the Transportation Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Governor, metropolitan planning organizations, and nonmetropolitan areas. Such projects shall be prioritized in accordance with the state-wide strategic transportation plan. The division and the director shall submit such prioritized capital construction projects to the Governor for consideration in advance of the legislative session each year. The Governor shall submit all or a portion of such capital construction project requests as part of the Governor’s budget recommendations to the General Assembly. The General Assembly may appropriate funds to any project on the prioritized project list.
    3. In addition to the portion of the state-wide transportation asset improvement program subject to the 10 percent limitation in paragraph (2) of this subsection, additional funds from the State Public Transportation Fund may be allocated to the state-wide transportation asset improvement program that are not subject to specific project selection.
  3. Funds allocated for the local maintenance and improvement grant program shall replace funds formerly available under the local assistance road program and state-aid program and shall be allocated by the Local Grants Division of the department to local governing authorities as grants or otherwise according to a funding formula developed by the division and the director. Such formula shall include considerations of paved and unpaved lane miles and vehicle miles traveled and may include population, employment, and local funding matches available, as well as other factors as may be determined by the division and the director. Funds allocated each fiscal year for the local maintenance and improvement grant program shall be not less than 10 percent nor more than 20 percent of the money derived from motor fuel taxes received by the state in the immediately preceding fiscal year, less the amount of refunds, rebates, and collection costs authorized by law and shall be used only for the purposes available for the proceeds of such taxes. Grants of such funds shall include provisions requiring adherence to adequate roadway standards, accounting practices, and applicable transportation plans. Additional allocations to this program from other funding sources shall be allocated subject to the requirements for usage attached to such funds.
  4. Funds allocated or appropriated pursuant to the provisions of this Code section shall not be subject to redirection or reservation pursuant to Chapter 12 of Title 45 or to budgetary reduction except as provided by subparagraph (b) of Paragraph VI of Section IX of Article III of the Constitution.
  5. Information pertaining to all funds received and expended by, through, or from the department, including but not limited to project numbers, let dates, estimated costs, actual costs, estimated completion date, status, priority ranking, congressional, House, and Senate districts, vendor names, contract amounts, and other pertinent contract information, shall be published on the website of the department as data in structured format. As used in this subsection, “structured format” means data that is presented in machine readable format.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-5-27 , enacted by Ga. L. 2009, p. 976, § 12/SB 200.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2009, a comma was deleted following “the division” in the last sentence of subsection (a).

32-5-27.1. Ten-Year Strategic Plan.

  1. In addition to the requirements contained in Code Section 32-5-27, the department shall annually prepare and submit to the General Assembly, for approval by the Senate Transportation Committee and the House Committee on Transportation, a ten-year strategic plan that outlines the use of department resources for the upcoming fiscal years.
  2. The Senate Transportation Committee and the House Committee on Transportation shall approve the plan and may make recommendations to the Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Committee on Appropriations for their consideration in developing the budget.
  3. Such plan shall identify at least the following categories and establish a target percentage of resources to be expended and the respective fund sources in each of the following areas:
    1. Construction of new highway projects;
    2. Maintenance of existing infrastructure;
    3. Bridge repairs and replacement;
    4. Safety enhancements; and
    5. Administrative expenses.
  4. Priority shall be given to expenditure of available resources for maintenance, expansion, and improvement of highway infrastructure in the areas of this state most impacted by traffic congestion and to areas of this state in need of highway infrastructure to aid in attracting economic development to the area.
  5. Such plan shall also bring forward all efficiencies found within the bureaucracy of the department and how those funds have been redirected to road construction.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-5-27.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 2-1/HB 170.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 8-1/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Funding Act of 2015.’ ”

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 8-2/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “It is the intention of the General Assembly, subject to appropriations and other constitutional obligations of this state, that year to year revenue increases be prioritized to fund education, transportation, and health care in this state.”

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 9-1(b)/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Tax, penalty, and interest liabilities and refund eligibility for prior taxable years shall not be affected by the passage of this Act and shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated as it existed immediately prior to the effective date of this Act.” This Act became effective July 1, 2015.

Law reviews. —

For article on the 2015 enactment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 261 (2015).

Article 3 Allocation of Funds

32-5-30. Allocation of state and federal funds; items excluded from budgeting; budgeting periods; authorization of reduction of funds allocated.

    1. The total of expenditures from the State Public Transportation Fund under paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of Code Section 32-5-21 plus expenditures of federal funds appropriated to the department shall be budgeted by the department over two successive budgeting periods every decade. However, such budgeting shall not include:
      1. Any federal funds specifically designated for projects that have been earmarked by a member of Congress in excess of appropriated funds;
      2. Any funds for a project undertaken for purposes of providing for the planning, surveying, constructing, paving, and improving of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways within the state; or
      3. Any funds for a project undertaken for purposes of providing for the planning, surveying, constructing, paving, and improving of any part of the state designated freight corridor, when such designation is made by the director of planning with approval from a majority of the board.
    2. The first budgeting period shall commence immediately following redistricting of congressional districts and shall be for a duration of five years. The second budgeting period shall continue until the beginning of the budgeting period following the next redistricting of congressional districts after each decennial census; provided, however, that if the congressional districts have been redrawn prior to a new decennial census, but after the approval of an existing map based on the last decennial census, the budgeting period shall include two successive budgeting periods. The first budgeting period shall end upon approval of the new redistricting and the second budgeting period shall commence from the date such redrawn congressional districts have been approved and shall continue until the next budgeting period following the next redistricting of congressional districts. The department shall budget such expenditures such that at the end of such budgeting period funding obligations equivalent to at least 80 percent of such total for such budgeting period shall have been divided equally among the congressional districts in this state, as those districts existed at the commencement of such budgeting period, for public road and other public transportation purposes in such districts.
    1. The board may upon approval by two-thirds of its membership authorize a reduction in the share of funds allocated pursuant to this Code section to any such congressional district if such supermajority of the board determines that such district does not have sufficient projects available for expenditure of funds within that district to avoid lapsing of appropriated funds.
    2. In the event that funding becomes available to the department which could not otherwise be allocated among congressional districts due to the allocation requirements of this Code section, the board may upon approval by a majority of its membership authorize a waiver of such allocation requirements to the extent necessary to allow the expenditure of such funding, and any project, projects, or portion thereof undertaken with such additional funding shall be in addition to those projects funded in accordance with the allocation requirements of this Code section in the fiscal year in which the additional funds became available or any subsequent year; provided, however, that any such waiver shall be valid only for the fiscal year in which it is granted, and any funds budgeted pursuant to a waiver granted by this paragraph which were not obligated by the end of such fiscal year shall not be obligated in violation of the allocation requirements of this Code section in a subsequent fiscal year unless a majority of the board again authorizes a waiver of the allocation requirements in such subsequent fiscal year.
  1. Provisions of this Code section may be waived pursuant to subsection (b) of Code Section 32-5-1 only upon approval by two-thirds of the membership of the board.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-5-30 , enacted by Ga. L. 1999, p. 112, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1483, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1490, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 724, § 1/SB 4; Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32/SB 465; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46; Ga. L. 2013, p. 67, § 2/HB 202; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 32/HB 323.

The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted “provided, however, that if” for “provided, however, if” near the middle of the second sentence of paragraph (a)(2).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 247 (2001).

For note on 1999 enactment of this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233 (1999).

32-5-31. Duty of board to submit yearly report; requirements of report.

In each calendar year, the board shall provide to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Speaker of the House of Representatives a written report detailing the allocation of funding obligations among congressional districts pursuant to Code Section 32-5-30 for the fiscal year ending June 30 of that same calendar year. Such report shall include without limitation the annual funding obligations and the projected expenditures of funds for the five-year period and any and all documents or information indicating how the department intends to allocate the applicable state and federal funds among congressional districts as required by Code Section 32-5-30 or a detailed explanation of why the department is unable to allocate such funds as required.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-5-31 , enacted by Ga. L. 1999, p. 112, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1483, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 247 (2001).

CHAPTER 6 Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally

Cross references. —

Access to and use of public facilities by physically handicapped persons, T. 30, C. 3.

Penalty for operating unlicensed or unregistered vehicles on public highways, § 40-2-8 .

Uniform rules of the road, T. 40, C. 6.

Procedure for passing stationary authorized emergency vehicles, stationary towing or recovery vehicles, or stationary highway maintenance vehicles, § 40-6-16 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury, death, or property damage resulting from defect or obstruction in shoulder of street or highway, 19 A.L.R.4th 532.

Liability of governmental entity for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision between vehicle and domestic animal at large in street or highway, 52 A.L.R.4th 1200.

Highway contractor’s liability to highway user for highway surface defects, 62 A.L.R.4th 1067.

Governmental tort liability for detour accidents, 1 A.L.R.5th 163.

Article 1 General Provisions

32-6-1. Obstructing, encroaching on, or injuring public roads.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to obstruct, encroach upon, solicit the sale of any merchandise on, or injure materially any part of any public road. For purposes of this Code section, the term “obstruct” shall include without limitation the causing of any buildup of rock, gravel, mud, dirt, chemicals, or other materials by continued ingress or egress of vehicles or of any natural waters dammed or redirected by diversion to an extent which presents a hazard to the traveling public.
  2. Any person who unlawfully obstructs, encroaches upon, or injures said public road shall be responsible for reimbursing the Department of Transportation or the applicable local governing authority in the case of a road which is part of a county road system or municipal street system for the costs of removal of said obstructions or encroachments and the costs of repairs to the public road incurred by such department or local governing authority, including any costs associated with traffic management; provided, however, that such costs shall be limited to those costs which are directly incurred from such damages. Costs incurred for traffic management may include, but not be limited to, costs incurred for flagging, signing, or provision of detours, provided that these activities are directly caused by the obstruction, encroachment, or injury to the public road system. The court may, in addition to any other sentence authorized by law, order a person convicted of violating this Code section to make such restitution for the offense.
  3. Nothing in this Code section shall abridge or limit any authority provided by law for the installation and operation of vending machines at welcome centers, tourist centers, and safety rest areas. Nothing in this Code section shall limit in any way the department’s authority to lease property to state or federal agencies, counties, or municipalities as provided for in Code Section 32-7-5, or limit the Department of Transportation’s ability to grant a license to any utility or railroad corporation as defined in Code Section 46-1-1.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-903, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 132, § 4; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1431, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 315, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1126, § 4.

Cross references. —

Further provisions regarding obstruction of public roads, § 16-11-43 .

Prohibition against interference with public roads and streets by mass picketing near site of labor dispute, § 34-6-5 .

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section’s applicability to structures on private property. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-1 does not apply to structures which are on private property adjacent to public roads. Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70 , 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983), cert. vacated, 252 Ga. 258 , 314 S.E.2d 110 (1984), overruled in part, Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

Applicability to operation of and parking vehicles. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-1 does not in any way regulate vehicles used upon state highways, and therefore does not authorize the conviction of a person for obstructing and encroaching upon a public road resulting from operating and parking vehicles. Cartwright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 868 , 399 S.E.2d 736 (1990).

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-1 does not apply to improperly parked tractor-trailer, which is a parked vehicle rather than a structure. Southern Intermodal Logistics, Inc. v. Coleman, 175 Ga. App. 853 , 334 S.E.2d 888 (1985).

Department can require removal of obstructions. —

Management and control of the right of way of the state’s system of roads is vested in the Department of Transportation, and the department can require the removal of any obstruction placed thereon without express permission. Crider v. Kelley, 232 Ga. 616 , 208 S.E.2d 444 (1974).

Bridge partially blocking traffic lights. —

Railroad’s bridge, which partially blocked traffic lights at a nearby intersection, did not infringe on the public right-of-way, when the space provided by the bridge for the public right-of-way adequately allowed for the safe and unimpeded flow of traffic thereunder and the traffic lights were not part of the bridge’s structure. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority to issue license for rail line. — Department of Transportation has authority to issue a revocable license to a company constructing and operating a rapid rail passenger service line to cross the rights-of-way of several state routes so long as consideration is received which represents a substantial benefit to the public. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-45.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 31.

C.J.S. —

40 C.J.S., Highways, § 335 et seq.

ALR. —

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance imposing upon abutting owners or occupants duty in respect of care or condition of street or highway, 58 A.L.R. 215 .

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Relative rights and liabilities of abutting owners and public authorities in parkways in center of street, 81 A.L.R.2d 1436.

Liability of private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at highway or street intersection, 69 A.L.R.4th 1092.

32-6-2. Authority of department, counties, and municipalities to regulate parking; parking vehicles or leaving vehicles unattended on right of way of public road on state highway system.

Notwithstanding Code Section 40-6-200 and Code Sections 40-6-202 through 40-6-204:

  1. The department may regulate and prohibit the parking of any type of vehicle on any public road on the state highway system, including extensions thereof into or through municipalities. Whenever any state or local law enforcement officer finds a vehicle parked in violation of law or the department’s regulations, such officer or employee is authorized to move such vehicle or require the driver or other person in charge of the vehicle to move the same. If the vehicle is unattended, such officer is authorized to remove or provide for the removal of such vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety at the owner’s expense. State or local law enforcement officers and the department are further authorized, with or without the consent of the owner, to remove or have removed any obstruction, cargo, or personal property which is abandoned, unattended, or damaged as a result of a vehicle accident which the department determines to be a threat to public health or safety or to mitigate traffic congestion, and any person or towing service that is removing an obstruction, cargo, or personal property at the location of such obstruction, cargo, or personal property upon instruction by a law enforcement officer, an official of a fire department acting under the authority of paragraph (1) of Code Section 25-3-1 or paragraph (3) of Code Section 25-3-2, or an official of the department shall be liable only for gross negligence;
  2. A county may regulate and control the parking of vehicles on the county road system and to this end the county may place parking meters on or immediately adjacent to any or all such roads, except extensions into a municipality, for the purpose of authorizing timed parking in designated spaces upon the payment of a charge for such privilege. A county may also place such parking meters on or adjacent to any public road on the state highway system located within the county and outside the corporate limits of a municipality when authorized by the department pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Code section;
  3. A municipality may regulate and control the parking of vehicles on its municipal street system and on extensions of a county  road system within its corporate limits and to this end may place parking meters on or immediately adjacent to any or all of such roads for the purpose of authorizing timed parking in designated spaces upon the payment of a charge for such privilege. A municipality also may place such parking meters on or adjacent to any public road on the state highway system located within the corporate limits of the municipality when authorized by the department pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Code section; and
  4. It shall be unlawful for any person to park or leave unattended any vehicle upon the right of way of any public road on the state highway system for over 48 hours.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-904, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1993, p. 370, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-3; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 12-1/HB 501; Ga. L. 2007, p. 170, § 1/HB 231.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, “county road” was substituted for “count yroad” in the first sentence of paragraph (3).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Removal of unattended vehicles by law enforcement officers. — Any vehicle left unattended for more than 48 hours on the right of way of a public road within the State Highway System may be removed by state or local law enforcement officers. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-165.

Municipal regulation of streets in State Highway System. — Municipality may not, by ordinance, seek to regulate streets which are a part of the State Highway System, unless the municipality is attempting to place parking meters on or adjacent to a road which is a part of the State Highway System, and has been first authorized by the department to place the parking meters; or the municipality is attempting to erect or maintain a traffic-control device on a road which is a part of the State Highway System, and written approval has first been obtained from the department. 1974 Op. Atty Gen. No. U74-94.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity of restrictions as to points at which jitney bus passengers may be taken on and discharged, 6 A.L.R. 110 .

32-6-3. Deposit of driver’s license with arresting officer in lieu of bail or incarceration; driver’s failure to appear before proper judicial officer; applicability of Code section to foreign licenses.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 32, effective April 5, 1999.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Code 1933, § 95A-1101, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 4. For present provisions, see Code Section 17-6-11.

32-6-4. Removal of natural or manmade obstructions, cargo, or personal property during state of emergency.

State or local law enforcement officers, including fire department officials, and the department are authorized, upon the issuance of an executive order by the Governor declaring a state of emergency, with or without the consent of the owner, to remove or have removed any natural or manmade obstruction, cargo, or other personal property which is abandoned, unattended, or damaged and the law enforcement officer or the department determines such object to be a threat to public health or safety or to be contributing to traffic congestion. Any person, contractor, towing service, or other entity that is removing an obstruction, cargo, or other personal property pursuant to the instruction of a law enforcement officer, an official of a fire department acting under the authority of paragraph (1) of Code Section 25-3-1 or paragraph (3) of Code Section 25-3-2, or the department, and under the provisions of this Code section, shall be liable for damage or harm at the location where the obstruction, cargo, or other personal property was left abandoned or unattended, only when the person, contractor, towing service, or other entity was grossly negligent in the performance of his or her assigned duties; provided, however, nothing in this Code section shall limit liability for any damage or harm caused at a location different from the location where the obstruction, cargo, or other personal property was left abandoned or unattended.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-4 , enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 583, § 8/HB 137.

32-6-5. Closure of or limiting access to roads due to declared state of emergency for inclement weather conditions; exception for certain vehicle operators.

  1. The department may close or limit access to any portion of road on the state highway system due to a declared state of emergency for inclement weather conditions that results in dangerous driving conditions. There shall be erected or posted signage of adequate size indicating that a portion of the state highway system has been closed or access has been limited. When the department determines a road shall have limited access due to a declared state of emergency for inclement winter weather conditions, notice shall be given to motorists through posted signage that motor vehicles must be equipped with tire chains, four-wheel drive with adequate tires for existing conditions, or snow tires with a manufacturer’s all weather rating in order to proceed. Such signage shall inform motorists that it shall be unlawful to proceed on such road without such equipment. With the exception of buses, operators of commercial motor vehicles as defined by Code Section 40-1-1 with four or more drive wheels traveling on a road declared as limited access due to a declared state of emergency for inclement winter weather conditions shall affix tire chains to each of the outermost drive wheel tires. Bus and motor coach operators shall affix tire chains to at least two of the drive wheel tires before proceeding on a road with limited access due to a declared state of emergency for inclement winter weather conditions. For purposes of this Code section, the term “tire chains” means metal chains which consist of two circular metal loops, positioned on each side of a tire, connected by not less than nine evenly spaced chains across the tire tread or any other traction devices as provided for by rules and regulations of the commissioner of public safety.
  2. A driver of a motor vehicle who causes an accident or blocks the flow of traffic while failing to comply with the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section when access is limited on the state highway system due to a declared state of emergency for inclement weather conditions shall be fined up to $1,000.00.
  3. This Code section shall not apply to a tow operator towing a motor vehicle or traveling to a site from which a motor vehicle shall be towed or to emergency responders traveling the roadway in order to fulfill their duties.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-5 , enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 6/HB 817; Ga. L. 2014, p. 807, § 1/HB 753.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Tire chains, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety, Chapter 570-37.

32-6-6. Camping on roadways; penalty.

  1. For purposes of this Code section, the term “camping” means temporary habitation outdoors as evidenced by one or more of the following actions: the erection or use of tents or other shelters; the laying down of sleeping bags, blankets, or other materials used for bedding; the placing or storing of personal belongings; the making of a fire; or the act of cooking.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use any portion of road on the state highway system or any property owned by the department for camping.
  3. Nothing in this Code section shall prohibit the normal, customary, and temporary use of safety rest areas, welcome centers, tourist centers, and other property of the department or state highway system specifically designated for purposes of resting, sleeping, eating, or other similar activities by persons traveling by vehicle.
  4. This Code section shall not apply to state or local government officials or employees acting in their official capacity and while performing activities as part of their official duties and shall not apply to any employee of a contractor or subcontractor performing duties under a contract with the department.
  5. Any person convicted of violating this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-6 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 5/SB 445.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective July 1, 2018.

Cross references. —

Information for traveling public, § 32-2-4 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fingerprinting not required. — Offenses arising from a violation of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-6 do not, at this time, appear to be offenses for which fingerprinting is required. 2018 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18-3.

Article 2 Dimensions and Weight of Vehicles and Loads

Cross references. —

Powers and duties of state fire marshal with regard to sale and storage of liquified petroleum gas, § 10-1-260 et seq.

Authority of Commissioner of Agriculture to stop and inspect commercial vehicles pursuant to enforcement of weights and measures law, § 10-2-6 .

Required equipment for motor vehicles generally, T. 40, C. 8.

Georgia Forest Product Trucking Rules, § 46-1-1 .

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Permits for vehicles or loads of excess weight or dimension, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-2.

Public school bus inspection, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety, Chapter 570-31.

32-6-20. General restrictions.

No vehicle or load shall be operated or moved upon the public roads of Georgia if a dimension or the weight of such vehicle or load exceeds the limitations specified in Code Sections 32-6-22 through 32-6-24 or in Code Section 32-6-26 unless exempted in Code Section 32-6-25 or authorized to do so by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 15; Code 1933, § 68-401; Code 1933, § 95A-953, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Observing laws by motor carriers, § 40-1-122 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Twin trailer vehicle subject to general weight and dimension limitations. — While there is no express prohibition against the operation of twin trailers in Georgia, such a vehicle is subject to the weight and dimension limitations placed upon all vehicles by the General Assembly. 1980 Op. Atty Gen. No. 80-9.

When Department of Transportation officers may selectively stop vehicles. — Department of Transportation enforcement officers may not selectively stop vehicles unless the officers have an articulate and reasonable suspicion that the operator is violating, or the vehicle is in violation of, the law. 1987 Op. Atty Gen. No. U87-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity and applicability of statutes relating to use of highway by private motor carriers and contract motor carriers for hire, 175 A.L.R. 1333 .

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways, 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads, 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

32-6-21. Redesignated.

Reserved. Redesignated as Code Section 40-6-248.1 by Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 3-9/HB 1320, effective July 1, 2006.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 3-9/HB 1320, redesignated former Code Section 32-6-21 as present Code Section 40-6-248.1.

Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 4-1/HB 1320 reserved the designation of this Code section.

32-6-22. Height of vehicles and loads.

  1. Except as authorized in subsection (b) of this Code section and except when so authorized by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28, no vehicle unladen or with a load shall exceed a height of 13 feet, six inches.
  2. On highways which constitute a part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways as such term is used in 23 U.S.C. Section 127 and ramps or service streets which provide reasonable access thereto, no vehicle transporting motor vehicles (commonly known as automobile carriers) unladen or with a load shall exceed a height of 14 feet.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 15; Code 1933, § 68-401; Ga. L. 1941, p. 449, § 1; Ga. L. 1956, p. 83, § 2; Ga. L. 1959, p. 27, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 83, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-956, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1010, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Traffic regulation. — This section qualifies as a statute relating to traffic upon the public roads, streets, and highways, violation of which is punishable as a misdemeanor offense. 1979 Op. Atty Gen. No. U79-14.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

32-6-23. Width of vehicles and loads.

Unless otherwise provided in this Code section or exempted in Code Section 32-6-25 or so authorized by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28, no vehicle shall exceed a total outside width, including any load thereon, of 102 inches, exclusive of mirrors and accessories attached thereto, when operated on any street, road, or highway.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 15; Code 1933, § 68-401; Ga. L. 1941, p. 449, § 1; Ga. L. 1951, p. 772, § 1; Ga. L. 1956, p. 83, § 2; Ga. L. 1959, p. 27, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 83, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-957, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 439, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1798, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 32; Ga. L. 1984, p. 621, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 567, § 1.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Promotion of safety and protection of public investment. — O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-10 , 32-6-23 , 32-6-24 , 46-7-61 (now repealed) and 46-7-78 (now repealed) are intended to promote the safety of the traveling public and protect the public’s investment in the public’s roads and highways. 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

Traffic regulation. — This section qualifies as a statute relating to traffic upon the public roads, streets, and highways, violation of which is punishable as a misdemeanor offense. 1979 Op. Atty Gen. No. U79-14.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity and applicability of statutes relating to use of highway by private motor carriers and contract motor carriers for hire, 175 A.L.R. 1333 .

Liability for injury or damage caused by collision with portion of load projecting beyond rear or side of motor vehicle or trailer, 21 A.L.R.3d 371.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

32-6-24. Length of vehicles and loads.

  1. As used in this article, the term:
    1. “Bimodal semitrailer” means a detachable load-carrying unit designed to be attached to a coupling on the rear of a truck tractor by which it is partly supported during movement over the highway and designed either with retractable flanged wheels or to attach to a detachable flanged wheel assembly for movement on the rails.
    2. “Combination of vehicles” means a semitrailer pulled by a truck tractor or a semitrailer and trailer pulled by a truck tractor operating in a truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combination.
    3. “Extendable semitrailer” means a semitrailer that has been manufactured for the purpose of extending the frame to increase the overall length for the purpose of transporting single-piece loads.
    4. “NHS” means the National Highway System.
    5. “Semitrailer” means a detachable load-carrying unit designed to be attached to a coupling on the rear of a truck tractor by which it is partly supported.
    6. “Trailer” means a detachable load-carrying unit designed to be attached to a coupling at the rear of a semitrailer and capable of support in operation without the truck tractor.
    7. “Truck tractor” means the noncargo-carrying power unit that operates in combination with a semitrailer or trailer, except that a truck tractor and semitrailer engaged in the transportation of automobiles may transport motor vehicles on part of the power unit.
  2. Unless exempted in Code Section 32-6-25 or so authorized by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28, the following length limits shall apply:
    1. Trailer and semitrailer lengths:
      1. Truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer combinations shall have trailers and semitrailers that do not exceed 28 feet in length;
      2. Truck tractor-semitrailer combinations shall have semitrailers that do not exceed 53 feet in length, unless signs are posted that indicate semitrailer length restrictions;
      3. On interstate and NHS routes, single-piece loads may be transported on an extendable semitrailer that exceeds 53 feet, provided that no pieces will be loaded end to end and the semitrailer does not exceed 75 feet in length; on roads other than the interstate and NHS routes, the foregoing provisions of this subparagraph shall also apply, except that the overall length shall not exceed 100 feet. Empty extendable semitrailers or extendable semitrailers transporting a single-piece load of 53 feet or less shall be required to maintain a semitrailer length of 53 feet or less. When the semitrailer is extended as described in this subparagraph, the rear extremity of each extendable semitrailer or load shall be marked with a four-inch multidirectional amber strobe light and with 18 inch bright red or orange warning flags on the rearmost of the load or semitrailer;
      4. Maxi-cube combinations shall have a cargo box that does not exceed 34 feet, provided that the pair of cargo boxes together does not exceed 60 feet and the overall length, including the power unit, does not exceed 65 feet; and
      5. Trailer and semitrailer length requirements in this paragraph shall not apply to automobile and boat transporters; however, no unit of the vehicle shall exceed 56 feet in length; and
    2. Overall truck tractor-semitrailer or truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer lengths:
      1. Maxi-cube combinations shall have an overall length that does not exceed 65 feet;
      2. Saddlemount and saddlemount with fullmount combinations shall have an overall length that does not exceed 97 feet; and
      3. All other combinations of truck tractor-semitrailer or truck tractor-semitrailer-trailer operated on roads other than interstate or the NHS shall have an overall length that does not exceed 100 feet, unless signs are posted that indicate length restrictions. This maximum length shall include the federal allowance for automobile and boat transporter loads to overhang up to three feet over the front of the vehicle and overhang up to six feet over the rear of the vehicle.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 15; Code 1933, § 68-401; Ga. L. 1956, p. 83, § 2; Ga. L. 1959, p. 27, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 83, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-958, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 35, 36; Ga. L. 1979, p. 439, § 2; Ga. L. 1980, p. 576, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1981, p. 133, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1798, § 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1002, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 414, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1030, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1569, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 693, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 255, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2467, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 786, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 990, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1010, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 567, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 828, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1654, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32; Ga. L. 2010, p. 442, § 1/HB 1174; Ga. L. 2017, p. 720, § 1/HB 328.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted “six feet” for “four feet” near the end of the last sentence of subparagraph (b)(2)(C).

Cross references. —

Light, flag, or strobe lamp on projecting load, § 40-8-27 .

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, “term” was substituted for “terms” at the end of the introductory language of subsection (a).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Delegation of authority constitutional. —

Delegation of authority to the Department of Transportation to determine which of the thousands of miles of state highways are suitable for the types of truck traffic governed by the statute is not unconstitutional. State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139 , 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989).

Enforcement of different limits violates equal protection clause. —

Enforcement of total length limits — i.e., combination of vehicle and load — for general freight transport that are different from those total length limits enforced as to live poultry transport violates the equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution. State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139 , 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Preemption. — 49 U.S.C. § 2311 , which establishes certain minimum vehicle lengths, without reference to loads, did not preempt O.C.G.A. § 32-6-24 with regard to load lengths of automobile transporters on federally assisted highways. 1985 Op. Atty Gen. No. U85-1.

Promotion of safety and protection of public investment. — O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-10 , 32-6-23 , 32-6-24 , 46-7-61 (now repealed) and 46-7-78 (now repealed) are intended to promote the safety of the traveling public and protect the public’s investment in the public’s roads and highways. 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

Traffic regulation. — This section qualifies as a statute relating to traffic upon the public roads, streets, and highways, violation of which is punishable as a misdemeanor offense. 1979 Op. Atty Gen. No. U79-14.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity, construction, and application of statutes or other regulations affecting the moving of buildings on highways, 83 A.L.R.2d 464.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

32-6-25. Exemptions for farming, agricultural, and forest management equipment.

The limitations of Code Section 32-6-23 as to width and of Code Section 32-6-24 as to length shall not apply to the following loads and vehicles, which may exceed such limitation without a permit: farming or agricultural equipment or forest management equipment, whether self-propelled or being hauled, when such vehicle or equipment is being operated during daylight hours upon a public road not part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways by dealers or by the owner thereof or his agent within a radius of 40 miles of the property of the dealer or owner. The foregoing exemptions do not apply to vehicles hauling or transporting forest products.

History. — Ga. L. 1965, p. 206, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-954, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 532, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32.

32-6-25.1. Exemptions for port vehicles used to transport cargo or containers.

The limitations of Code Section 32-6-23 as to width and of Code Section 32-6-24 as to length shall not apply to the following loads and vehicles, which may exceed such limitation without a permit: Any vehicle or equipment used for transporting cargo or containers between and within wharves, storage areas, or terminals within the facilities of any port under the jurisdiction of the Georgia Ports Authority when such vehicle or equipment is being operated upon any public road not part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways by the owner thereof or his or her agent within a radius of ten miles of the port facility of origin and accompanied by an escort vehicle equipped with one or more operating amber flashing lights that are visible from a distance of 500 feet.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-25.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1999, p. 784, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32.

32-6-26. Weight of vehicle and load.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Federal bridge formula” means:

      Click to view

      Where W = the overall gross weight on any group of two or more consecutive axles to the nearest 500 pounds, L = the distance in feet between the extreme of any group of two or more consecutive axles, and N = the number of axles in the group under consideration.

      LN

      W = 500 _______________ + 12 N + 36

      N-1

      Click to view

    2. “Lift axle” means any axle on any vehicle manufactured after July 1, 1978, which axle may be raised or lowered with respect to the horizontal plane of the vehicle.
    3. “Single axle” means all the wheels whose centers may be included between two parallel transverse vertical planes 40 inches apart.
    4. “State bridge formula” means:

      Click to view

      Where W = the maximum allowable gross weight of the vehicle or combination of vehicles to the nearest 500 pounds, L = the distance in feet between the first and last axles of the vehicle or combination of vehicles, and N = the number of axles on the vehicle or combination of vehicles.

      Click to view

      LN

      W = 500 _______________ + 12 N + 36

      N-1

    5. “Tandem axle” means two or more consecutive axles, excluding the steering axle, which extend across the full width of the vehicle and whose centers may be included between parallel vertical planes spaced more than 40 inches apart but not more than 216 inches apart.
  2. Except when authorized by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28 and except as otherwise provided in this Code section:
    1. No vehicle equipped with high pressure pneumatic, solid rubber, or cushion tires and operated upon any public road of this state shall carry a load on any wheel which exceeds 8,000 pounds by more than 13 percent or a load on any single axle which exceeds 16,000 pounds by more than 13 percent; and
    2. No vehicle equipped with low pressure pneumatic tires and operated upon any public road of this state shall carry a load on any wheel which exceeds 9,000 pounds by more than 13 percent or a load on any single axle which exceeds 18,000 pounds by more than 13 percent.
      1. On all highways within this state which are not interstate highways, the maximum total gross weight authorized for any vehicle and load shall not exceed 80,000 pounds; the maximum load authorized on any single axle shall be as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section; the maximum load on any tandem axle shall be 40,680 pounds; and subject to subparagraph (B) and subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, the maximum total gross weight authorized for any vehicle and load shall be the maximum load authorized on any single axle multiplied by the number of axles with which the vehicle is equipped.
      2. For vehicles and loads with an actual total gross weight between 73,280 pounds and 80,000 pounds, the maximum total gross weight authorized for the vehicle and load shall be determined by applying the state bridge formula.
      3. For any vehicle equipped with four axles, the maximum total gross weight authorized for the vehicle and load shall be 70,000 pounds.
    1. Reserved.
    2. No lift axle may be used in computing the maximum total gross weight authorized for any vehicle or load.
      1. On all highways within this state which are interstate highways, the maximum total gross weight authorized for any vehicle and load shall not exceed 80,000 pounds; the maximum load authorized on any single axle shall be as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section; and, except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, the maximum overall gross weight in pounds on a group of two or more consecutive axles shall be determined by applying the federal bridge formula. In applying the formula, no lift axle shall be counted as an individual or additional axle when determining the maximum overall gross weight.
      2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the maximum load authorized on any tandem axle shall be 34,000 pounds, and any two consecutive sets of tandem axles may carry a gross load of 34,000 pounds each if the overall distance between the first and last axles of such consecutive sets of tandem axles is 36 feet or more; however, except for vehicles and combinations of vehicles exceeding 55 feet in length, the maximum gross weight authorized on a tandem axle for a vehicle or combination of vehicles carrying a gross weight of less than 73,280 pounds shall be 40,680 pounds.
    1. If at any time federal law authorizes any weight greater than that authorized by this subsection, such greater weight under federal law shall be authorized on the interstate highways within this state.
  3. Subject to the provisions of this article, the department shall be authorized, on behalf of the state, to enter into agreements with the United States Secretary of Transportation as provided in Section 127 of Title 23 of the United States Code, relating to the control of vehicle weight and width limitations, which agreements shall exempt certain vehicles from the requirements of subsection (d) of this Code section. The department shall be authorized to take action in the name of the state to comply with the terms of any such agreement and to promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to ensure the department’s compliance with federal laws and to provide for the issuance of the special permits required by this Code section.
  4. On any public road of a county road system, the maximum total gross weight of a vehicle and load shall not exceed 56,000 pounds unless the vehicle is making a pickup or delivery on such road; except that if a county road is constructed to the same standards as those highways of this state which are interstate highways and is authorized as a designated local truck route pursuant to official resolution of the county, the maximum weight limits for such designated local truck route shall be the same as those for highways in this state which are not interstate highways as provided by paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of this Code section. The county shall notify the department of any roads designated by the county as a local truck route within 90 days of such designation.
    1. The weight limitations provided for in this Code section, except the limitation in subsections (f) and (h) of this Code section, may be exceeded on any public road within this state which is not an interstate highway, or when making a pickup or delivery on any public road of a county road system, without a permit only when the load on any single axle does not exceed 23,000 pounds, the load on any tandem axle does not exceed 46,000 pounds, and the maximum total gross weight of the vehicle and load does not exceed 80,000 pounds when:
      1. Hauling forest products from the forest where cut to the first point of marketing or processing;
      2. Hauling live poultry or cotton from a farm to a processing plant;
      3. Hauling feed from a feed mill to a farm;
      4. Hauling granite, either block or sawed, or any other naturally occurring raw ore or mineral for further processing, from the quarry or stockpile area to a processing plant located in the same or an adjoining county and construction aggregates hauled to any point, unless otherwise prohibited;
      5. Hauling solid waste or recovered materials from points of generation to a solid waste handling facility or other processing facility;
      6. Hauling concrete that is in a freshly mixed and unhardened state for delivery to a customer; or
      7. Hauling poultry waste from the point of origin to a farm.

        No lift axle may be used in computing the maximum total gross weight authorized for any vehicle or load under this paragraph.

    2. A vehicle which is hauling the products listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) of this subsection or which is hauling any other agricultural or farm product from a farm to the first point of marketing or processing shall be permitted a 5 percent variance from the weight limitations in paragraph (1) of this subsection within a 100 mile radius of the farm or point of origin. Any person who violates the load limitations provided for in this paragraph by exceeding the 5 percent variance per single axle, tandem axle, or maximum total gross weight shall be fined on the basis of the weight limitations of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including the variance allowed by this paragraph.
    3. A vehicle which is hauling the products listed in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be permitted a 5 percent variance from the weight limitations in paragraph (1) of this subsection within a 250 mile radius of the farm or point of origin. Any person who violates the load limitations provided for in this paragraph by exceeding the 5 percent variance per single axle, tandem axle, or maximum total gross weight shall be fined on the basis of the weight limitations of paragraph (1) of this subsection and not on the basis of the variance allowed by this paragraph.
    4. Any vehicle carrying a load as authorized in this subsection at night shall be equipped with lights clearly visible for a distance of not less than 300 feet from the front and rear of the vehicle.
  5. Notwithstanding any provision of this Code section to the contrary, no vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be operated over any bridge with a posted limit which is less than the total gross weight of the vehicle and its load.
    1. Any vehicle which can be made to comply with the requirements of this Code section by shifting the load and which is then loaded to comply with this Code section shall not be held to be in violation of this Code section.
    2. On all highways within this state which are not interstate highways:
      1. Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, for all vehicles, fines for violations of the total gross weight limitations provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section shall be based on the amount by which the actual weight of the vehicle and load exceeds the allowable maximum weight determined under subsection (c) of this Code section.
      2. For vehicles equipped with four axles, fines for violations of the total gross weight limitations provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section shall be based on the amount by which the actual weight of the vehicle and load exceeds 70,000 pounds.
  6. Except as provided in subsections (f) and (h) of this Code section, weight limits and axle definitions for any bimodal semitrailer, semitrailers, and trailers operated on highways and public roads within this state shall be weight limits and axle definitions authorized by federal law governing interstate highways.

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FORMULA

FORMULA

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History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 16; Ga. L. 1931, Ex. Sess., p. 114, § 2; Code 1933, §§ 68-402, 68-702; Ga. L. 1941, p. 449, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1955, p. 392, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1956, p. 83, § 2; Ga. L. 1964, p. 83, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, § 95A-959, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1111, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 68, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1965, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 576, § 4; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 23; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1798, §§ 3, 4; Ga. L. 1984, p. 621, § 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 414, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 693, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1995, p. 862, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1512, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1206, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1484, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 366, § 22; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 2/SB 160; Ga. L. 2005, p. 822, § 1/HB 279; Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32/SB 465; Ga. L. 2006, p. 292, § 1/HB 1106; Ga. L. 2007, p. 237, § 1/HB 536; Ga. L. 2008, p. 155, § 1/HB 981; Ga. L. 2011, p. 548, § 1/SB 54; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 32/HB 942; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 7/HB 817.

Cross references. —

Posting of bridge weight limit on county road, § 32-4-41 .

Posting of bridge weight limit on municipal street, § 32-4-91 .

Designated local truck route signs, § 32-6-50 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Conclusive presumption of road damage by overweight vehicles is constitutional. —

The conclusive presumption under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-27 of damage to the public roads caused by overweight vehicles does not deprive the person accused of violating O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 of any constitutional right. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

It is constitutionally permissible for the state to enact a statute providing that any person who operates an overweight motor vehicle on the public roads shall be conclusively presumed to have damaged the roads, and requiring such person to recompense the state for such damage in accordance with a schedule pegging the amount of the damages to the poundage of excess weight. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

Section’s failure to differentiate between timber and other freight haulers. —

Failure of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 to differentiate between timber haulers and other freight haulers does not render statute unconstitutional. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982) (decided prior to 1984 amendment).

Limited application exception not unconstitutional. —

When a limited exemption to highway weight requirements was granted for certain industries which could not take advantage of other statutory exceptions, there was no arbitrary decision violative of equal protection of those industries which were not granted the same limited exemptions since overall gross weights and axle load requirements still had to be met and the exemptions applied to short hauls on state roads. DOT v. Georgia Mining Ass'n, 252 Ga. 128 , 311 S.E.2d 443 (1984).

“Tag axle,” which permits the amount of weight borne by the axle to be adjusted by the driver from inside the truck through the manipulation of a switch which causes an air bag located between the axle and the frame of the trailer to inflate or deflate, is not a “lift axle” within the contemplation of paragraph (c)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 . Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 199 Ga. App. 108 , 404 S.E.2d 148 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C0914, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 781 (Ga. June 20, 1991).

Constitutional right to jury trial in administrative proceedings. —

There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in administrative proceedings when a driver is issued with an overweight citation. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

Person assessed can prosecute action for judicial review in superior court. —

Person issued an overweight vehicle assessment does have at least the statutory right to prosecute the action for judicial review of the administrative decision in the superior court of the county of his or her residence. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipalities are authorized to regulate weight of vehicles using municipal streets as long as such regulations are reasonable and do not violate general maximum weight limits contained in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 . 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-20.

Equalization of load must be by physically shifting load. — O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 does not allow equalization by changing the position of the truck’s “sliding tandem” or by changing the fifth wheel setting. Subsection (i) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 requires the truck driver to physically shift the load so as to bring the load into compliance with Georgia’s truck weight laws. 1992 Op. Atty Gen. No. U92-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways, 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads, 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

32-6-27. Enforcement of load limitations.

  1. Any person who violates the load limitation provisions of Code Section 32-6-26 shall be conclusively presumed to have damaged the public roads, including bridges, of this state by reason of such overloading and shall recompense the state for such damage in accordance with the following schedule:
    1. Five cents per pound for all excess weight over the allowed weight limitations, including any applicable variances;
    2. For the following vehicles, damages for excess weight shall be assessed at 125 percent times the rate imposed on offending vehicles operating without a permit:
      1. Where a vehicle is authorized to exceed the weight limitations of Code Section 32-6-26 by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28, the term “excess weight” means that weight which exceeds the weight allowed by such permit; and
      2. Where a vehicle is authorized to exceed the weight limitations of Code Section 32-6-26 by a permit issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-28 as a superload permit or superload plus permit, the term “excess weight” means:
        1. Any single axle weight which exceeds any single axle weight allowed by such permit; and
        2. All weight greater than 150,000 pounds when the gross weight of the vehicle and load exceeds the gross weight allowed by such permit or when any axle spacing is less than that specified by such permit; or
    3. Any vehicle that utilizes idle reduction technology shall have any penalty for violating Code Section 32-6-26, except for subsections (f) and (h), calculated by reducing from the actual gross weight, single axle weight, tandem axle weight, or the allowed weight on any group of two or more axles the manufacturer’s certified weight of the idle reducing technology or 550 pounds, whichever is less. The operator of the vehicle shall present written certification from the manufacturer specifying the weight of the idle reducing technology and demonstrate that the idle reducing technology is fully functional at all times when so requested by any law enforcement officer or employee of the Department of Public Safety.

    (a.1) (1) (A) The Department of Public Safety is authorized to issue a citation to the owner or operator of any vehicle in violation of a maximum weight limit on a county road which is a designated local truck route under subsection (f) of Code Section 32-6-26 and for which signs have been placed and maintained as required under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) of Code Section 32-6-50.

  2. The schedules listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply separately to:
    1. The excess weight of the gross load; and
    2. The sum of the excess weight or weights of any axle or axles;

      provided, however, that where both gross load and axle weight limits are exceeded, the owner or operator shall be required to recompense the state only for the largest of the money damages imposed under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.

    1. Within 30 days after the issuance of the citation, the owner or operator of any offending vehicle shall pay the amount of the assessment to the Department of Public Safety or request an administrative determination of the amount and validity of the assessment.
    2. The right to an administrative determination of the amount and validity of the assessment shall be granted only to the owner or operator of an offending vehicle.
    3. The party requesting an administrative determination of the amount and validity of the assessment shall deposit the amount of the assessment with the Department of Public Safety, within the time permitted to request such determination, before the determination will be granted. In the event the assessment is determined to be erroneous, the Department of Public Safety shall make prompt refund of any overpayment after receipt of a final decision making such determination.
    4. If an administrative hearing is requested, it shall be held in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” and the rules and regulations of the Department of Public Safety. The scope of any such hearing shall be limited to a determination of:
      1. The weight of the offending vehicle;
      2. The maximum weight allowed by law on the roadway upon which the offending vehicle was operated; and
      3. Whether the operator had in his or her actual possession a valid oversize or overweight permit issued by the Department of Transportation allowing the vehicle to operate in excess of the maximum weight otherwise allowed by law on the roadway upon which the offending vehicle was operated.
    5. Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the Department of Public Safety and who is aggrieved by a final order of the Department of Public Safety is entitled to judicial review in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50.
    6. If a party requests an administrative determination of the amount and validity of the assessment and fails to appear without first obtaining permission from the administrative law judge or does not withdraw the request in writing no less than five days in advance of a scheduled hearing, the party shall be deemed in default and the citation shall be affirmed by operation of law. The party shall be deemed to owe the sum of $75.00 in addition to the amount due on the citation, which sum shall represent hearing costs.
  3. All moneys collected in accordance with this Code section shall be disposed of as follows:
    1. All moneys collected for violations of the weight limitations imposed by this article shall be remitted to the general fund of the state treasury;
    2. All moneys collected for violations of the height, width, or length limitations imposed by this article, after the appropriate statutory deductions, shall be retained by the governing authority of the county wherein the violation occurred for deposit in the general treasury of said county;
    3. Hearing costs imposed pursuant to paragraph (6) of subsection (c) of this Code section shall be retained by the Department of Public Safety;
    4. Reissuance fees imposed pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (g) of this Code section shall be retained by the Department of Revenue; and
    5. Restoration fees imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection (i) of this Code section shall be retained by the Department of Revenue.
  4. Any owner or operator of a vehicle which is operated on the public roads of this state in violation of the weight limitations provided in this article shall be required, in addition to paying the moneys provided in subsection (a) of this Code section, to unload all gross weight in excess of 6,000 pounds over the legal weight limit at the closest reasonable location.
  5. Any person authorized by law to enforce this article may seize the offending vehicle of an owner who fails or whose operator fails to pay the moneys prescribed in subsection (a) of this Code section and hold such vehicle until the prescribed moneys are paid. If the offending vehicle is not registered in this state, any person authorized by law to enforce this article may seize any vehicle owned or operated by an owner who fails or whose operator fails to pay the moneys prescribed in subsection (a) of this Code section and hold such vehicle until the prescribed moneys are paid. Any person seizing a vehicle under this subsection or subsection (e) of this Code section may, when necessary, store the vehicle; and the owner thereof shall be responsible for all reasonable storage charges thereon. When any vehicle is seized, held, unloaded, or partially unloaded under these subsections, the load or any part thereof shall be removed or cared for by the owner or operator of the vehicle without any liability on the part of the authorized person or of the state or any political subdivision because of damage to or loss of such load or any part thereof.
    1. Whenever any person, firm, or corporation violates this article and becomes indebted to the Department of Public Safety because of such violations and fails within 30 days of the date of issuance of the overweight assessment citation either to pay the assessment or appeal to the Department of Public Safety for administrative review, as provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section, such assessment shall become a lien upon the overweight motor vehicle so found to be in violation, which lien shall be superior to all liens except liens for taxes or perfected security interests established before the debt to the Department of Public Safety was created.
    2. Whenever any person, firm, or corporation requests an administrative review, it shall be held in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” In the event that the administrative law judge finds in favor of the Department of Public Safety, the person, firm, or corporation shall pay the assessment within 30 days after that decision becomes final or, if judicial review is had in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, then within 30 days after final judicial review is terminated. If the person, firm, or corporation fails to pay the assessment within 30 days, such assessment shall become a lien as provided for under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
    3. The Department of Public Safety shall perfect the lien created under this subsection by sending notice thereof on a notice designated by the commissioner of public safety, by first-class mail or by statutory overnight delivery, to the owner and all holders of liens and security interests shown on the records of the Department of Revenue maintained pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title 40. Upon receipt of notice from the Department of Public Safety, the holder of the certificate of title shall surrender same to the state revenue commissioner for issuance of a replacement certificate of title bearing the lien of the department unless the assessment is paid within 30 days of the receipt of notice. The Department of Revenue may append the lien to its records, notwithstanding the failure of the holder of the certificate of title to surrender said certificate as required by this paragraph.
    4. Upon issuance of a title bearing the lien of the Department of Public Safety, or the appending of the lien to the records of the Department of Revenue, the owner of the vehicle or the holder of any security interest or lien shown in the records of the Department of Revenue may satisfy such lien by payment of the amount of the assessment, including hearing costs, if any, and payment of a reissuance fee of $100.00. Upon receipt of such amount, the Department of Public Safety shall release its lien and the Department of Revenue shall issue a new title without the lien.
    1. The Department of Public Safety, in seeking to foreclose its lien on the motor vehicle arising out of an overweight motor vehicle citation assessed under this article, may seek an immediate writ of possession from the court before whom the petition is filed, if the petition contains a statement of facts, under oath, by the Department of Public Safety, its agents, its officers, or attorney setting forth the basis of the petitioner’s claim and sufficient grounds for issuance of an immediate writ of possession.
    2. The Department of Public Safety shall allege under oath specific facts sufficient to show that it is within the power of the defendant to conceal, encumber, convert, convey, or remove from the jurisdiction of the court the property which is the subject matter of the petition.
    3. The court before whom the petition is pending shall issue a writ for immediate possession, upon finding that the petitioner has complied with paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. If the petitioner is found not to have made sufficient showing to obtain an immediate writ of possession, the court may, nevertheless, treat the petition as one being filed under Code Section 44-14-231 and proceed accordingly.
    4. When an immediate writ of possession has been granted, the Department of Public Safety shall proceed against the defendant in the same manner as provided for in Code Sections 44-14-265 through 44-14-269.
    1. Whenever any person, firm, or corporation violates this article and fails within 30 days of the date of issuance of the overweight assessment citation either to pay the assessment or appeal to the Department of Public Safety for an administrative review as provided for under Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” the Department of Revenue may act to suspend the motor vehicle registration of the vehicle involved. However, if the person, firm, or corporation requests an administrative review, the Department of Revenue shall act to suspend the registration only after the issuance of a final decision favorable to the Department of Public Safety and the requisite failure of the person, firm, or corporation to pay the assessment. Upon such failure to pay the assessment, the Department of Revenue shall send a letter to the owner of such motor vehicle notifying the owner of the suspension of the motor vehicle registration issued to the motor vehicle involved in the overweight assessment citation. Upon complying with this subsection by paying the overdue assessment and upon submitting proof of compliance and paying a $10.00 restoration fee to the Department of Revenue, the state revenue commissioner shall reinstate any motor vehicle registration suspended under this subsection. In cases where the motor vehicle registration has been suspended under this subsection for a second or subsequent time during any two-year period, the Department of Revenue shall suspend the motor vehicle registration for a period of 60 days and thereafter until the owner submits proof of compliance with this subsection and pays the $150.00 restoration fee to the Department of Revenue.
    2. Unless otherwise provided for in this Code section, notice of the effective date of the suspension of a motor vehicle registration occurs when the owner has actual knowledge or legal notice thereof, whichever first occurs. For the purposes of making any determination relating to the restoration of a suspended motor vehicle registration, no period of suspension shall be deemed to have begun until ten days after the mailing of the notice required in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
    3. For the purposes of this subsection, except where otherwise provided, the mailing of a notice to a person at the name and address shown in records of the Department of Revenue maintained under Chapter 3 of Title 40 shall, with respect to the holders of liens and security interests, be presumptive evidence that such person received the required notice.
    4. For the purposes of this subsection, except where otherwise provided, the mailing of a notice to a person or firm at the name and address shown on the overweight assessment citation shall, with respect to owners and operators of vehicles involved in an overweight assessment, be presumptive evidence that such person received the required notice.
    5. The state revenue commissioner may suspend the motor vehicle registration of any offending vehicle for which payment of an overweight assessment is made by a check that is returned for any reason.
    6. For the purposes of this subsection, where any provisions require the Department of Public Safety or the Department of Revenue to give notice to a person, which notice affects such person’s motor vehicle license plate, the mailing of such notice and the name and address shown on the notice of overdue assessment citation supplied by the Department of Public Safety, as required by this subsection, shall be presumptive evidence that such person received the required notice.

(B) The Department of Public Safety is authorized to issue a warning to the owner or operator of any vehicle in violation of a maximum weight limit on a county road which is a designated local truck route under subsection (f) of Code Section 32-6-26 but for which signs have not been placed or maintained as required under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) of Code Section 32-6-50 upon the first such violation and to issue a citation to such owner or operator for a subsequent such violation.

(2) (A) The Department of Public Safety is authorized to issue a citation to the owner or operator of any vehicle in violation of a maximum weight limit on a bridge for which signs have been placed and maintained as required under paragraph (3) of Code Section 32-4-41 or subsection (a.1) of Code Section 32-4-91.

(B) The Department of Public Safety is authorized to issue a warning to the owner or operator of any vehicle in violation of a maximum weight limit on a bridge but for which signs have not been placed or maintained as required under paragraph (3) of Code Section 32-4-41 or subsection (a.1) of Code Section 32-4-91 upon the first such violation and to issue a citation to such owner or operator for a subsequent such violation.

History. — Ga. L. 1956, p. 83, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-960, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 37; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 2; Ga. L. 1981, p. 998, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 23; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1236, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1206, § 4; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, §§ 2-4, 2-5; Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 32; Ga. L. 2003, p. 450, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 12-2/HB 501; Ga. L. 2005, p. 822, § 2/HB 279; Ga. L. 2006, p. 72, § 32/SB 465; Ga. L. 2007, p. 237, § 2/HB 536; Ga. L. 2010, p. 442, § 2/HB 1174; Ga. L. 2011, p. 548, § 2/SB 54; Ga. L. 2017, p. 720, § 2/HB 328.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted “550 pounds” for “400 pounds” near the end of the first sentence of paragraph (a)(3).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Conclusive presumption of road damage by overweight vehicles is constitutional. —

Conclusive presumption of damage to the public roads caused by overweight vehicles pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-6-27 does not deprive the person accused of violating O.C.G.A. § 32-6-26 of any constitutional right. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

It is constitutionally permissible for the state to enact a statute providing that any person who operates an overweight motor vehicle on the public roads shall be conclusively presumed to have damaged the roads, and requiring such person to recompense the state for such damage in accordance with a schedule pegging the amount of the damages to the poundage of excess weight. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

No opportunity to prove damages. There is certainly no constitutional requirement that the person accused of operating an overweight vehicle be given an opportunity to avoid the penalty or fine by proving that no perceptible damage to the roads in fact occurred in the driver’s case. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734 , 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause, 49 A.L.R. 1203 ; 62 A.L.R. 52 ; 85 A.L.R. 1136 ; 109 A.L.R. 1245 ; 135 A.L.R. 1358 .

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways, 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads, 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

32-6-28. Permits for excess weight and dimensions.

  1. Generally.
      1. The commissioner or an official of the department designated by the commissioner may, in his or her discretion, upon application in writing and good cause being shown therefor, issue a permit in writing authorizing the applicant to operate or move upon the state’s public roads a motor vehicle or combination of vehicles and loads whose weight, width, length, or height, or combination thereof, exceeds the maximum limit specified by law, provided that the load transported by such vehicle or vehicles is of such nature that it is a unit which cannot be readily dismantled or separated; and provided, further, that no permit shall be issued to any vehicle whose operation upon the public roads of this state threatens to unduly damage a road or any appurtenance thereto, except that the dismantling limitation specified in this Code section shall not apply to loads which consist of cotton, tobacco, concrete pipe, and plywood that do not exceed a width of nine feet or of round bales of hay that do not exceed a width of 11 feet and which are not moved on part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways. However, vehicles transporting portable buildings and vehicles not exceeding 65 feet in length transporting boats on roads not a part of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways, regardless of whether the nature of such buildings or boats is such that they can be readily dismantled or separated, may exceed the lengths and widths established in this article, provided that a special permit for such purposes has been issued as provided in this Code section, but no such special permit shall be issued for a load exceeding 12 feet in width when such load may be readily dismantled or separated. A truck tractor and low boy type trailer may, after depositing its permitted load, return to its point of origin on the authorization of its original permit.
      2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the commissioner or an official of the department designated by the commissioner may, in his or her discretion, upon application in writing and good cause being shown therefor, issue to a specific tow vehicle a permit in writing authorizing the applicant to operate or move upon the state’s public roads a motor vehicle or combination of vehicles and loads for transporting not more than two modular housing units or sectional housing units if the total weight, width, length, and height of the vehicle or combination of vehicles, including the load, does not exceed the limits specified in Code Sections 32-6-22 and 32-6-26. Permission to transport two modular housing units is only authorized when the modular unit transporter meets the minimum specifications contained in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph. No permit shall be issued to any vehicle or combination of vehicles whose operation upon the public roads of this state threatens the safety of others or threatens to damage unduly a road or any appurtenance thereto.
      3. A modular unit transporter shall meet all requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and all state safety requirements, rules, and regulations. The modular unit transporter shall be properly registered and have a proper, current license plate. At a minimum, the modular unit transporter shall:
        1. Be constructed of 12 inch steel I beams doubled and welded together;
        2. Have all axles equipped with brakes;
        3. Have every floor joist on each modular section securely attached to the beams with lag bolts and washers, or lag bolts, washers, and cable winches; and
        4. Have an overall length not to exceed 80 feet including the hitch.
    1. Permits may be issued, on application to the department, to persons, firms, or corporations without specifying license plate numbers in order that such permits which are issued on an annual basis may be interchanged from vehicle to vehicle. The department is authorized to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations which are necessary or desirable to govern the issuance of such permits, provided that such rules and regulations are not in conflict with this title or other provisions of law.
    2. Every such permit shall be carried in the vehicle or combination of vehicles to which it refers and shall be open to inspection by any police officer, state trooper, or authorized agent of the department.
    3. The application for any such permit shall describe the type of permit applied for, as said types of permits are described in subsection (c) of this Code section. In addition, the application for a single-trip permit shall describe the points of departure and destination.
    4. The commissioner or an official of the department designated by the commissioner is authorized to withhold such permit or, if such permit is issued, to establish seasonal or other time limitations within which the vehicles described may be operated on the public road indicated, or otherwise to limit or prescribe conditions of operation of such vehicles when necessary to ensure against undue damage to the road foundation, surfaces, or bridge structures, and to require such undertaking or other security as may be deemed necessary to compensate the state for any injury to any roadway or bridge structure.
    5. For just cause, including, but not limited to, repeated and consistent past violations, the commissioner or an official of the department designated by the commissioner may refuse to issue or may cancel, suspend, or revoke the permit and any permit privileges of an applicant or permittee. The specific period of time of any suspension shall be determined by the department. In addition, any time the restrictions or conditions within which a permitted vehicle must be operated are violated, the permit may be immediately declared null and void.
    6. The department is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to enforce the suspension of permits authorized in this Code section.
    7. The department shall issue rules to establish a driver training and certification program for drivers of vehicles escorting oversize/overweight loads. Any driver operating a vehicle escorting an oversize/overweight load shall meet the training requirements and obtain certification under the rules issued by the department pursuant to this Code section. The rules may provide for reciprocity with other states having a similar program for escort certification. Certification credentials of the driver of an escort vehicle shall be carried in the escort vehicle and be readily available for inspection by law enforcement personnel or an authorized employee of the department. The department shall implement the vehicle escort driver training and certification program on or before July 1, 2010, and the requirements for training and certification shall be enforced beginning on January 1, 2011.
    8. Permit holders shall be required to meet the following minimum insurance standards:
      1. For loads where the gross vehicle weight is less than or equal to 10,000 pounds:
        1. For bodily injury a limit of $50,000.00 per person for injury or death as a result of any one occurrence; and
        2. For property damage a limit of $50,000.00 for damage to property of others in any one occurrence; or
      2. For commercial motor carriers where the gross vehicle weight is greater than 10,000 pounds:
        1. For bodily injury a minimum of $300,000.00 for each person and $1 million for multiple persons for injury or death as a result of any one occurrence; and
        2. For property damage a minimum of $1 million for damage to property of others in any one occurrence.
  2. Duration and limits of permits.
    1. Annual permit.    The commissioner or an official of the department designated by the commissioner may, pursuant to this Code section, issue an annual permit which shall permit a vehicle to be operated on the public roads of this state for 12 months from the date the permit is issued even though the vehicle or its load exceeds the maximum limits specified in this article. However, except as specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an annual permit shall not authorize the operation of a vehicle:
      1. Whose total gross weight exceeds 100,000 pounds;
      2. Whose single axle weight exceeds 25,000 pounds;
      3. Whose total load length exceeds 100 feet;
      4. Whose total width exceeds 102 inches or whose load width exceeds 144 inches; or
      5. Whose height exceeds 14 feet and six inches.
    2. Annual permit plus.    Vehicles and loads that meet the requirements for an annual permit may apply for a special annual permit to carry wider loads on the NHS. The wider load limits shall be a maximum of 14 feet wide from the base of the load to a point 10 feet above the pavement and 14 feet and eight inches for the upper portion of the load.
    3. Annual commercial wrecker emergency tow permit.    Pursuant to this Code section, the commissioner may issue an annual permit for vehicles towing disabled, damaged, abandoned, or wrecked commercial vehicles, including combination vehicles, even though such wrecker or its load exceeds the maximum limits specified in this article. An annual commercial wrecker emergency tow permit shall not authorize the operation of a vehicle:
      1. Whose single axle weight exceeds 25,000 pounds;
      2. Whose load on one tandem axle exceeds 50,000 pounds and whose load on any secondary tandem axle exceeds 38,000 pounds; or
      3. Whose total load length exceeds 125 feet.
    4. Six-month permit.    Six-month permits may be issued for loads of tobacco or unginned cotton the widths of which do not exceed nine feet, provided that such loads shall not be operated on The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways.
    5. Single trip.    Pursuant to this Code section, the commissioner may issue a single-trip permit to any vehicle or load allowed by federal law.
    6. Multitrip.    Pursuant to this Code section, the commissioner may issue a multitrip permit to any vehicle or load allowed by federal law. A multitrip permit authorizes the permitted load to return to its original destination on the same permit, if done so within ten days, with the same vehicle configuration, and following the same route, unless otherwise specified by the department. A multitrip permit authorizes unlimited permitted loads on the same permit, if done so within the allowable ten days, with the same vehicle configuration, and following the same route.
  3. Fees.    The department may promulgate rules and regulations concerning the issuance of permits and charge a fee for the issuance thereof as follows:
    1. Annual.    Charges for the issuance of annual permits shall be $150.00 per permit.
    2. Annual permit plus.    Charges for the issuance of annual permits plus shall be $500.00 per permit.
    3. Annual commercial wrecker emergency tow permit.    Charges for the issuance of annual commercial wrecker emergency tow permits shall be $500.00 per permit.
    4. Six months.    The charges for the issuance of six-month permits for loads of tobacco or unginned cotton shall be $25.00 per permit.
    5. Single trip.    Charges for the issuance of single-trip permits shall be as follows:
      1. Any load not greater than 16 feet wide, not greater than 16 feet high, and not weighing more than 150,000 pounds or any load greater than 100 feet long which does not exceed the maximum width, height, and weight limits specified by this subparagraph $ 30.00 (B) Any load having a width, height, or weight exceeding the maximum limit therefor specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and not weighing more than 180,000 pounds 125.00 (C) Any load having a weight exceeding the maximum limit therefor specified in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph 500.00

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    6. Multitrip.    Charges for the issuance of multitrip permits shall be $100.00 for any load not greater than 16 feet wide, not greater than 16 feet high, and not weighing more than 150,000 pounds or any load greater than 100 feet long which does not exceed the maximum width, height, and weight limits specified by this paragraph.
  4. Notwithstanding any provision of Code Section 48-2-17 to the contrary, all fees collected in accordance with this Code section shall be paid to the treasurer of the department to help defray the expenses of enforcing the limitations set forth in this article and may also be used for public road maintenance purposes in addition to any sums appropriated therefor to the department.

History. — Ga. L. 1968, p. 30, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 637, § 1; Ga. L. 1971, p. 43, § 1; Ga. L. 1971, p. 462, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1972, p. 356, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, § 95A-961, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 38; Ga. L. 1975, p. 400, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 439, § 4; Ga. L. 1980, p. 576, § 7; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1798, § 5; Ga. L. 1986, p. 471, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1986, p. 655, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 846, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 987, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2467, §§ 2-4; Ga. L. 1993, p. 348, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 10, § 32; Ga. L. 1995, p. 155, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1010, § 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1512, § 3A; Ga. L. 1999, p. 567, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1654, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1126, §§ 5, 6; Ga. L. 2010, p. 442, § 3/HB 1174; Ga. L. 2011, p. 548, §§ 3, 4/SB 54; Ga. L. 2012, p. 732, § 1/HB 835; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 32/HB 942; Ga. L. 2013, p. 738, § 1/SB 218.

Cross references. —

License fees for different weight categories of vehicles, § 40-2-151 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Issuance of permits. — Commissioner or the commissioner’s designee is empowered to issue annual permits which authorize the operation of vehicles which do not exceed a height of 14´6" for hauling automobiles when the conditions specified in this section have been met. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-110.

When considering issuance of permits for vehicles exceeding maximum weight or dimensions allowed by law, discretion of the commissioner of transportation or the commissioner’s designee is limited to consideration of whether good cause for issuance of the permit has been shown by the applicant, whether the loads transported may be readily dismantled or separated, and whether the vehicle and load threatens to unduly damage the roads of the state. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-84.

Permits for moving houses. — Municipal corporation, which has the authority to control the streets and highways within the municipality’s corporate limits, may enact an ordinance requiring that permits be obtained prior to moving houses on streets and highways lying within the corporate limits and charging a fee reasonably related to the expenses incurred by a municipality during the course of moving a house. 1974 Op. Atty Gen. No. U74-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause, 49 A.L.R. 1203 ; 62 A.L.R. 52 ; 85 A.L.R. 1136 ; 109 A.L.R. 1245 ; 135 A.L.R. 1358 .

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways, 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes or other regulations affecting the moving of buildings on highways, 83 A.L.R.2d 464.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property, 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads, 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

32-6-29. Responsibility of the Department of Transportation; responsibility of the Department of Public Safety.

  1. The Department of Transportation shall be responsible for rules and regulations relating to size and weight limits and issuance of permits under this article.
  2. The Department of Transportation shall not, however, employ any law enforcement officers or agents except as may be specifically authorized by other laws. Law enforcement responsibility for enforcement of this article shall be in the Department of Public Safety.

History. — Ga. L. 1960, p. 1122, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 193, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-962, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 40; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1500, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 3; Ga. L. 1979, p. 814, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1993, p. 91, § 32; Ga. L. 1993, p. 366, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-6; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1199, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 12-3/HB 501.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Department of Transportation enforcement officer had authority to enforce travel restrictions in high occupancy vehicle lanes. Edge v. State, 226 Ga. App. 559 , 487 S.E.2d 117 (1997), overruled in part, Zilke v. State, 299 Ga. 232 , 787 S.E.2d 745 (2016), overruled in part as stated in Suggs v. State, 343 Ga. App. 71 , 806 S.E.2d 224 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Arrest powers of Department of Transportation enforcement officers extend only to arrests for commission of crimes specifically enumerated by statute conferring powers. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Authority of public official, whose duties or functions generally do not entail traffic stops, to effectuate traffic stop of vehicle, 18 A.L.R.6th 519.

32-6-30. Stopping vehicles for purposes of weighing, measuring, or inspecting; reports of violations; refusal to stop.

  1. Any law enforcement officer or employee of the Department of Public Safety to whom law enforcement authority has been designated who observes a motor vehicle being operated upon a public road of the state and who has reason to believe that: (1) Any provision of this article is being violated; (2) The vehicle is improperly licensed in violation of Code Sections 40-2-150 through 40-2-162; or (3) A fuel tax registration card is not being carried or that a proper distinguishing identification marker is not affixed to the vehicle in violation of Code Section 48-9-39 is authorized to stop such vehicle and weigh, measure, or inspect the same. Violations of such licensing or fuel tax registration and identification requirements shall be reported to the Department of Revenue.
    1. If the operator of the vehicle shall refuse to stop upon proper order as directed by a person authorized by subsection (a) of this Code section to stop, weigh, measure, or inspect the vehicle or its load, the operator shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $200.00. The operator shall have the right to post an appropriate bond, which shall not exceed $400.00, when any law enforcement officer or employee of the Department of Public Safety authorized to enforce this article apprehends said operator for any violation of this article.
    2. In addition, the operator’s driver’s license or nonresident’s driving privilege may be suspended for a period of not more than 90 days by the Department of Driver Services upon satisfactory proof of said refusal to stop or drive the vehicle upon the scales. Each person who shall apply for a Georgia driver’s license, or for nonresident driving privileges, or for a renewal of same thereby consents to stop such vehicle for inspection or to drive such vehicle upon scales whenever so ordered by a law enforcement official or authorized employee of the Department of Public Safety.

History. — Ga. L. 1960, p. 1122, § 2; Ga. L. 1968, p. 193, §§ 1, 3; Code 1933, § 95A-963, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 2-7; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1074, § 5; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 12-4/HB 501; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 32/SB 103.

Cross references. —

General duty of Georgia State Patrol to check motor vehicles for excess load, § 35-2-33 .

Stopping of motor vehicles for lack of proper equipment or for other safety violations, § 40-8-200 .

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2002, “Code Sections 40-2-150 through 40-2-162; or” was substituted for “Code Section 40-2-150 through Code Section 40-2-162; or” in paragraph (a)(2) (now item (a)(2)).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2002, p. 1074, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall not abate any prosecution, punishment, penalty, administrative proceedings or remedies, or civil action related to any violation of law committed prior to the effective date of this Act.” The effective date of Ga. L. 2002, p. 1074 was July 1, 2002.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-30 is a traffic law since the statute provides for criminal liability for refusing to stop and permit vehicles to be weighed, measured, and inspected. 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

Classification of traffic offenses includes violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-30 and 46-7-61 (now repealed). 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

Cases may be tried upon uniform traffic citation. — Since violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-30 and 46-7-61 (now repealed) constitute misdemeanor traffic offenses, cases arising from these sections may be tried upon a uniform traffic citation, and any cash appearance bonds posted may be forfeited as provided by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-8 . 1981 Op. Atty Gen. No. U81-17.

32-6-31. Construction of Code Sections 32-1-10, 32-6-26, 32-6-27, and 32-6-29.

The provisions of Code Sections 32-1-10, 32-6-26, 32-6-27, and 32-6-29 shall not, and shall not be construed to, modify, change, or diminish any power or duty held by any other law enforcement unit, enforcement officer, or peace officer.

History. — Ga. L. 1978, p. 1989, § 5; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 32.

Article 3 Control of Signs and Signals

Cross references. —

Regulation of advertisements and advertising structures along federal parkway rights of way, § 32-3-38 .

PART 1 Public Roads Generally

32-6-50. Uniform regulations governing erection and maintenance of traffic-control devices; placement, removal, defacement, damaging, or sale of devices.

  1. The department shall promulgate uniform regulations governing the erection and maintenance on the public roads of Georgia of signs, signals, markings, or other traffic-control devices, such uniform regulations to supplement and be consistent with the laws of this state. Insofar as practical, with due regard to the needs of the public roads of Georgia, such uniform regulations shall conform to the recommended regulations as approved by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.
  2. In conformity with its uniform regulations, the department shall place and maintain, or cause to be placed and maintained, such traffic-control devices upon the public roads of the state highway system as it shall deem necessary to regulate, warn, or guide traffic, except that the department shall place and maintain a sign for each railroad crossing at grade on the state highway system, warning motorists of such crossing, provided that each railroad company shall also erect and maintain a railroad crossbuck sign on its right of way at every such crossing. The department may remove or direct removal of all traffic-control devices and signs which are erected on the state highway system by any governing authority without the permission of the department.
  3. In conformity with the uniform regulations of the department:
    1. Counties and municipalities shall place and maintain upon the public roads of their respective public road systems such traffic-control devices as are necessary to regulate, warn, or guide traffic except that counties and municipalities also shall erect and maintain a sign for each railroad crossing at grade on their respective county road or municipal street systems, warning motorists of such crossing. Furthermore, each railroad company shall erect and maintain a railroad crossbuck sign on its right of way at all such crossings; and
    2. Counties, on their respective road systems, shall place and maintain on each county road which is authorized as a designated local truck route, pursuant to official resolution of the county, at each intersection of such road with a state highway signs identifying such county road as a designated local truck route and giving notice of the maximum weight limits for such designated local truck route in accordance with subsection (f) of Code Section 32-6-26.
  4. It shall be unlawful for any person to remove, deface, or damage in any way any official traffic-control device lawfully erected or maintained pursuant to this Code section or any other law.
  5. No person, firm, corporation, or other entity shall offer for sale any sign, signal, marking, or other device intended to regulate, warn, or guide traffic upon the public roads of this state, unless it conforms with the uniform regulations promulgated under subsection (a) of this Code section. Any person, firm, corporation, or other entity who sells any sign, signal, marking, or other device intended to regulate, warn, or guide traffic upon the public roads of this state in violation of this Code section shall make restitution to the purchaser in an amount equal to the entire sum, plus interest, originally paid for the sign, signal, marking, or other device. Any person, firm, corporation, or other entity who knowingly sells any sign, signal, marking, or other device intended to regulate, warn, or guide traffic upon the public roads of this state in violation of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History. — Ga. L. 1931, p. 221, § 3; Code 1933, § 95-2003; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 31-33, 39; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1427, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-901, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1826, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1206, § 5; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 8/HB 817.

Cross references. —

Required observance of traffic signs, signals, and markings, § 40-6-20 et seq.

Erection and maintenance of crossbuck signs at highway grade crossings generally, § 46-8-194 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Department’s duty to design, manage, and improve state highway system. —

When the charge in question does in fact state that the Department of Transportation (DOT) has “general responsibility to design, manage and improve the state highway system,” it seems to capture the essence of the sections the defendant relies upon, which are in fact very broad, general descriptions of the duties of the DOT. The additional material used by the court is drawn from the more specific statutory description of the respective duties of the DOT and municipalities. Thus, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 does indeed mention the general duty of the DOT to “designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain.” Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Trial court erred by denying the railroad’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims based on inadequate signage at the railroad crossing and the decision to reopen the roadway because it was the Georgia Department of Transportation’s responsibility to designate the location for, and the manner of placement of, the traffic control devices and signage. DOT v. Delor, 351 Ga. App. 414 , 830 S.E.2d 519 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0086, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. Mar. 26, 2020).

Proof of department liability insufficient. —

Since the trial court did not have before the court evidence of proof that Department of Transportation regulations designated specific acts or omissions to be negligence per se, that the collision forming the basis of the suit was the harm intended to guard against, and that the plaintiffs fell within the class of persons to be protected by the regulations, the court did not err in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict. Donaldson v. DOT, 236 Ga. App. 411 , 511 S.E.2d 210 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0815, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. May 14, 1999).

Department is responsible for traffic-control devices. —

Once a general contractor completes the work on a public road called for under a contract with the Department of Transportation (DOT), the DOT is responsible for traffic-control devices on the road. Baker v. Reynolds Trucking Co., 181 Ga. App. 242 , 351 S.E.2d 657 (1986).

When the trial court correctly interpreted contract provisions as only requiring the defendant to install traffic control devices, or to take preventative or corrective action when traffic related problems were caused from preexisting hazards or by the defendant’s construction activities, the defendant did not undertake to perform the duties under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41(1) and subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 . Adams v. APAC-Georgia, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 215 , 511 S.E.2d 581 (1999).

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 or O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 prohibits the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) from delegating responsibility to erect and maintain traffic control signs to a private contractor through a construction contract; § 32-6-50 does not saddle DOT with ultimate responsibility for installing and maintaining traffic control devices on all county and municipal road systems. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766 , 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1330, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 600 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Contractors were not liable for negligently controlling traffic as the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) was required to place and maintain, or cause to be placed and maintained, traffic control devices and the DOT was responsible for approving all traffic control plans before implementation by a contractor; the injured party failed to show that the contractor failed to implement the traffic control devices pursuant to the DOT’s directives, even though the injured party’s accident reconstruction expert and drivers involved in the accident found the traffic control measures inadequate or improper. Fraker v. C.W. Matthews Contr. Co., 272 Ga. App. 807 , 614 S.E.2d 94 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1342, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 596 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

State DOT not liable for failing to erect road closure signs on county road. —

Because an accident occurred on a county-owned road and did not occur on a part of the state highway system upon which the DOT owed a duty to motorists, and the couple’s expert’s affidavit could not establish a legal duty to erect signs or to take other steps to inform drivers of the closure of the county-owned road, summary judgment for the DOT was proper. Diamond v. DOT, 326 Ga. App. 189 , 756 S.E.2d 277 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C0999, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 648 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2014).

Common law action against railroad precluded. —

Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., precluded a common-law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623 , 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988), overruled, Evans Timber Co. v. Central of Ga. R.R., 239 Ga. App. 262 , 519 S.E.2d 706 (1999).

Because the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., abrogated any common law duty on the part of defendant railroad to install adequate signal equipment at a railroad crossing where the driver’s car was struck by a train, the common law negligence claim asserted by plaintiffs, the driver’s survivors, was dismissed for failure to state a claim; under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 , the railroad company would have acted in violation of Georgia law if the company erected traffic signals on the public road unless the company was required or authorized to do so by O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and 32-6-51(d) , or some “other law,” and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 delegated responsibility for the installation of protective devices on public roads to the appropriate governmental entity. Bentley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Common law duty to install warnings at grade crossings abrogated. —

O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and 32-6-51 work in conjunction to abrogate a railroad’s common law duty to install devices to warn of approaching trains at grade crossings. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

Even though the defendant railroad determined that a crossing might need additional warning signals, when the Department of Transportation inspected the crossing and determined that active warning signals were not needed, the railroad could not be held liable for not installing signals. Crockett v. Norfolk S. Ry., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 239 F.3d 370 (11th Cir. 2000).

No penalty for non-compliance. —

Non-compliance with O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 by the Department of Transportation (DOT) does not exact a penalty and produces no injury to individual rights. Donaldson v. DOT, 236 Ga. App. 411 , 511 S.E.2d 210 (1999), cert. denied, No. S99C0815, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 455 (Ga. May 14, 1999).

Responsibility of private owner. —

Trial court correctly concluded that an apartment complex owner had no responsibility for installing or maintaining traffic signal device as that duty was officially vested in the city by virtue of subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 . Zumbado v. Lincoln Property Co., 209 Ga. App. 163 , 433 S.E.2d 301 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1523, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 1029 (Ga. Oct. 29, 1993).

County and municipal obligation. —

When an injured party sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) for injuries received in a single-car accident on a county road, the party could not maintain a negligent maintenance claim against DOT for not maintaining adequate warning devices on the road because the road on which the accident occurred was not part of the state highway system, nor did the road lead to a state park, so, under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50(c)(1), the county was obligated to maintain such devices. Ogles v. E.A. Mann & Co., 277 Ga. App. 22 , 625 S.E.2d 425 (2005), cert. denied, No. S06C0792, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. July 14, 2006).

Jury instructions. —

In a wrongful death action, the district court did not err by instructing the jury concerning the railroad’s duty to maintain traffic control devices because taking all of the instructions together, the jury was properly informed that the railroad could not be held liable for the decision about which warning device to put in place or continue in place, but the railroad could be held liable for any failure to repair an existing warning light. Wright v. CSX Transp., Inc., 375 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Transportation’s authority over public highways. — Authority to control, manage, and close public highways is vested in the Department of Transportation, not the Department of Public Safety. 1973 Op. Atty Gen. No. 73-184.

Municipal control of traffic. — Traffic on city streets which is not part of the State Highway System is under municipal control. 1977 Op. Atty Gen. No. U77-45.

Cameras used for enforcement of traffic control devices may be erected by counties at the intersection of roads within the state highway system with the approval of the Department of Transportation. 2000 Op. Atty Gen. No. U2000-12.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of private citizen to complain of rerouting of highway or removal or change of route or directional signs, 97 A.L.R. 192 .

Liability, in motor vehicle-related cases, of governmental entity for injury or death resulting from design, construction, or failure to warn of narrow bridge, 2 A.L.R.4th 635.

Highways: Governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings, 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Governmental liability for failure to post highway deer crossing warning signs, 59 A.L.R.4th 1217.

32-6-51. Unauthorized devices and structures within right of way or visible from public road; bus shelters; commercial advertisements by transit agency.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, place, or maintain within the dedicated right of way of any public road any sign, signal, or other device except as authorized by this subsection or subsection (d) of this Code section or as required or authorized by Code Section 32-6-50 or any other law.
    2. The erection, placement, and maintenance of signs within the dedicated rights of way of county roads or municipal streets may be authorized and governed by ordinances adopted by governing authorities of counties and municipalities having jurisdiction over such roads or streets, which ordinances as to such dedicated rights of way of county roads or municipal streets may be as or less restrictive than the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, place, or maintain in a place or position visible from any public road any unauthorized sign, signal, device, or other structure which:
    1. Imitates, resembles, or purports to be an official traffic-control device;
    2. Hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic-control device;
    3. Obstructs a clear view from any public road to any other portion of such public road, to intersecting or adjoining public roads, or to property abutting such public road in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to traffic on such roads; or
    4. Because of its nature, construction, or operation, constitutes a dangerous distraction to or interferes with the vision of drivers of motor vehicles.
  2. Any sign, signal, device, or other structure erected, placed, or maintained on the dedicated right of way of any public road in violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section or in violation of any ordinance adopted pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section is declared to be a public nuisance, and the officials having jurisdiction of the public road affected may remove or direct the removal of the same. Where any sign, signal, device, or other structure is erected, placed, or maintained in violation of subsection (b) of this Code section, but not on the dedicated right of way of any public road, the officials having jurisdiction of the public road affected may order the removal of such structure by written notice to the owner of the structure or the owner of the land on which the structure is located. If such structure is not removed within 30 days after the giving of such order of removal, such officials are authorized to remove or cause to be removed such structure and to submit a statement of expenses incurred in the removal to the owner of the structure or to the owner of the land on which the structure is located. If payment or arrangement to make payment is not made within 60 days after the receipt of said statement, the department shall certify the amount thereof for collection to the Attorney General.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. “Bus shelter” means a shelter or bench located at bus stops for the convenience of passengers of public transportation systems owned and operated by governmental units or public authorities or located on county or municipality rights of way for the convenience of residents.
      2. “Commercial advertisements” means any printed or painted signs or multiple media displays on a bus shelter for which space has been rented or leased from the owner of such shelter.
      3. “Multiple media display” means a device by which the message, image, or text is capable of electronic alteration by movement or rotation of panels or slats.
    2. Bus shelters, including those on which commercial advertisements are placed, may be erected and maintained on the rights of way of public roads subject to the following conditions and requirements:
      1. Any public transit system wishing to erect and maintain a bus shelter on the right of way of a state road shall apply to the department for a permit, and as a condition of the issuance of the permit, the department must approve the bus shelter building plans and the location of the bus shelter on the right of way; provided, however, that such approval is subject to any and all restrictions imposed by Title 23, U.S.C., and Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations relating to the federal-aid system. This paragraph shall entitle only public transit systems or their designated agents the right to be issued permits under this paragraph;
      2. If the bus shelter is to be located on the right of way of a public road other than a state road within a county or municipality, application for permission to erect and maintain such shelter shall be made to the respective county or municipality. Such application shall conform to the county’s and municipality’s regulations governing the erection and maintenance of such structures. When the county or municipality is served by a public transit agency or authority, the applications for all bus shelters on routes of such agency or authority shall also be forwarded by the applicant to such transit agency or authority and subject to the approval of such agency or authority; and
      3. As a condition of issuing a permit for the erection of a bus shelter on the right of way of a state road, the department shall require that the bus shelter shall be properly maintained and that its location shall meet minimum setback requirements as follows:
        1. Where a curb and gutter are present, there shall be a minimum of four feet clearance from the face of the curb to any portion of the bus shelter or the bus shelter shall be placed at the back of the existing concrete sidewalk; or
        2. Where no curb or gutter is present, the front of the bus shelter shall be at least ten feet from the edge of the main traveled roadway.
    3. Any bus shelter erected and maintained on the right of way of a public road in violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection or in violation of the conditions of the permit issued by the department or in violation of the conditions of the consent of the county or municipality is declared to be a public nuisance and if it is determined to be a hazard to public safety by the department, county, or municipality, it may be removed or its removal may be ordered by the department or the governing authority of the respective county or municipality. In every case of removal of a bus shelter as a hazard to public safety by the department, a county, or a municipality, a good faith attempt shall be made to notify the owner of its removal. In such cases where the department, county, or municipality orders the removal of the bus shelter as a public nuisance, if such a bus shelter is not removed by its owner within 30 days after its owner has been issued a written order of removal by the department or the governing authority of the respective county or municipality, the department or the governing authority of the respective county or municipality may cause the bus shelter to be removed and submit a statement of expenses incurred in the removal to the owner of the bus shelter. In the case of a statement of expenses for removal of a shelter on a state road, if payment or arrangement to make payment is not made within 60 days after the receipt of such statement, the department shall certify the amount thereof to the Attorney General for collection.
    4. The person to whom a permit has been issued for the erection and maintenance of a bus shelter on the right of way of a public road or who places such shelter on a public road other than a state road shall at all times assume all risks for the bus shelter and shall indemnify and hold harmless the State of Georgia, the department, and any county or municipality against all losses or damages resulting solely from the existence of the bus shelter.
    5. Permits for shelters on state roads shall be issued under this subsection only to cities, counties, or public transportation authorities owning or operating public transportation systems or their designated agents.
  3. Each sign erected, placed, or maintained in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall constitute a separate offense.
  4. Any person who violates paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be punished the same as for littering under Code Section 16-7-43. Any person who violates subsection (b) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. “Commercial advertisements” means any printed or painted signs or multiple media displays on or in transit vehicles or facilities for which space has been rented or leased from the owner of such transit vehicles or facilities.
      2. “Multiple media display” means a device by which the message, image, or text is capable of electronic alteration by movement or rotation of panels or slats.
      3. “Transit agency” means any public agency, public corporation, or public authority existing under the laws of this state that is authorized by any general, special, or local law to provide any type of transit services within any area of this state, including, but not limited to, the Department of Transportation, the Atlanta-region Transit Link “ATL” Authority, and the Georgia Rail Passenger Authority.
      4. “Transit vehicles or facilities” means everything necessary and appropriate for the conveyance and convenience of passengers who utilize transit services.
    2. A transit agency may authorize the placement, erection, and maintenance of commercial advertisements on or in transit vehicles or facilities owned or operated by that transit agency and said placement of commercial advertisements shall not be considered conducting commercial enterprises or activities in violation of Code Section 32-6-115.
  5. Multiple media displays authorized pursuant to this Code section shall comply with the operational standards for multiple message signs provided for in Part 2 of this article but shall not be required to comply with any spacing requirements provided for in such part and multiple media displays shall not be considered in regard to the spacing requirements provided for in Code Section 32-6-75 as to the placement of any multiple message sign.

History. — Ga. L. 1931, p. 221, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5; Code 1933, §§ 95-2002, 95-2004, 95-2005, 95-2006; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 38; Code 1933, § 95A-902, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1861, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1504, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1732, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, Ex. Sess., p. 335, § 5; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 3/SB 160; Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 3-10/HB 1320; Ga. L. 2009, p. 302, § 2/HB 101; Ga. L. 2016, p. 148, § 1/SB 307; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 32/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-13/HB 930.

The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, inserted a comma following “area of this state” in subparagraph (g)(1)(C).

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, substituted “Atlanta-region Transit Link ‘ATL’ Authority” for “Georgia Regional Transportation Authority” near the end of subparagraph (g)(1)(C).

Cross references. —

Placement of election campaign posters, signs, and advertisements within right of way of public roads, § 21-1-1 .

Further provisions regarding display of unauthorized traffic signs, signals, or other markings, § 40-6-25 .

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, “federal-aid system” was substituted for “Federal-aid system” at the end of the first sentence in subparagraph (d)(2)(A).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 1-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Comprehensive Litter Prevention and Abatement Act of 2006.’ ”

Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 5-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall become effective April 21, 2006, for purposes of adopting local ordinances to become effective on or after July 1, 2006.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 381 (2005).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Department’s duty to design, manage, and improve state highway system. —

When the charge in question does in fact state that the Department of Transportation (DOT) has “general responsibility to design, manage and improve the state highway system,” it seems to capture the essence of the sections the defendant relies upon, which are in fact very broad, general descriptions of the duties of the DOT. The additional material used by the court is drawn from the more specific statutory description of the respective duties of the DOT and municipalities. Thus, O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2 does indeed mention the general duty of the DOT to “designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain.” Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 or O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 prohibits the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) from delegating responsibility to erect and maintain traffic control signs to a private contractor through a construction contract; § 32-6-50 does not saddle DOT with ultimate responsibility for installing and maintaining traffic control devices on all county and municipal road systems. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766 , 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1330, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 600 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Bridge partially blocking traffic lights. —

Railroad’s bridge, which partially blocked traffic lights at a nearby intersection, did not infringe on the public right-of-way, where the space provided by the bridge for the public right-of-way adequately allowed for the safe and unimpeded flow of traffic thereunder and the traffic lights were not part of the bridge’s structure. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Contractor can design and establish detour route with department approval and inspection. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 did not prohibit a contractor from designing and establishing a detour route under a contract with the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), subject to DOT’s approval and inspection. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766 , 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1330, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 600 (Ga. Sept. 19, 2005).

Party asserting that structure on private property is unauthorized must establish this fact by showing that the structure was erected or maintained in violation of some statute, code, or local ordinance. Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70 , 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983), cert. vacated, 252 Ga. 258 , 314 S.E.2d 110 (1984), overruled in part, Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004); Whidby v. Mr. B's Food Mart, 182 Ga. App. 408 , 356 S.E.2d 78 (1987), overruled in part, Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

Common law duty to install warnings at grade crossings abrogated. —

O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and 32-6-51 work in conjunction to abrogate a railroad’s common law duty to install devices to warn of approaching trains at grade crossings. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

Because the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., abrogated any common law duty on the part of defendant railroad to install adequate signal equipment at a railroad crossing where the driver’s car was struck by a train, the common law negligence claim asserted by plaintiffs, the driver’s survivors, was dismissed for failure to state a claim; under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 , the railroad company would have acted in violation of Georgia law if the company erected traffic signals on the public road unless the company was required or authorized to do so by O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-50 and 32-6-51(d) , or some “other law,” and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 delegated responsibility for the installation of protective devices on public roads to the appropriate governmental entity. Bentley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Private property structures only unlawful when road view obstructed. —

Structures on private property adjoining road rights-of-way only become unlawful if the structures both obstruct a clear view of roads in such a manner as to constitute a traffic hazard and are unauthorized. Smith v. Hiawassee Hdwe. Co., 167 Ga. App. 70 , 305 S.E.2d 805 (1983), cert. vacated, 252 Ga. 258 , 314 S.E.2d 110 (1984), overruled in part, Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

Obstruction was not linked to causation. —

While the greenery may have caused some obstruction of vision, there existed no competent evidence that any possible obstruction in visibility did, in fact, cause or contribute to the collision; whereas, the evidence presented created a strong probability that a jury could find that the negligence of the driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision. Howard v. Gourmet Concepts Int'l, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 521 , 529 S.E.2d 406 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1082, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 553 (Ga. June 30, 2000).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a landowner in a negligence suit brought by a parent, who asserted that overgrowth on the landowner’s property at an intersection obscured the view of the parent’s child and caused the accident that killed the child as the parent failed to establish that the landowner violated O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51(b) with regard to having overgrown foliage on the property at the intersection and, otherwise, failed to show any breach of duty on the landowner’s part. Rachels v. Thompson, 290 Ga. App. 115 , 658 S.E.2d 890 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1188, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 778 (Ga. Sept. 22, 2008).

Applicability to trees on property abutting railroad crossing. —

Cases involving a landowner’s liability for vision-obstructing objects on property abutting a railroad crossing are governed by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 and the statute applies to allegedly unauthorized vision-obstructing trees. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Emmer, 218 Ga. App. 865 , 463 S.E.2d 535 (1995).

Government entity’s liability for vegetation near railroad crossing. —

Town was entitled to summary judgment in a survivor’s action claiming damages from the survivor’s decedent’s fatal collision with a train because the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was located on the railroad’s property, and, further, it was undisputed that the survivor failed to show that the vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance. Furthermore, although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 . Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507 , 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003), rev'd, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004), vacated, 274 Ga. App. 586 , 618 S.E.2d 26 (2005).

Genuine issue of material fact existed about whether there was an absence of governmental authorization for vegetation that allegedly obscured the decedent’s view as the decedent drove a tractor-trailer across the town’s railroad crossing and was struck by the railway’s train and that issue precluded the appellate court’s ruling that reversed the trial court’s summary judgment to the town and the railway. Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

Town was not entitled to summary judgment on a decedent’s nuisance claim as correspondence between the town and the railway indicated that in the months preceding a train-truck accident, the defendants were aware that the overgrown shrubbery needed to be cut back to prevent interference with the line of sight at a railroad crossing; further, photographs were also submitted from which a jury might conclude that the shrubs obscured visibility. Town of Register v. Fortner, 274 Ga. App. 586 , 618 S.E.2d 26 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C2038, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 804 (Ga. Nov. 7, 2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipal control of traffic. — Traffic on city streets which is not part of the State Highway System is under municipal control. 1977 Op. Atty Gen. No. U77-45.

Fingerprinting of offenders not required. — An offense under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 is not one for which those charged with a violation are to be fingerprinted. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-1.

32-6-52. Displays of nudity or sexual conduct on outdoor advertising visible from roadway prohibited; penalty.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Nudity” means the displaying of any portion of the human female breast below the top of the areola or the displaying of any portion of any human’s pubic hair, anus, vulva, or genitals.
    2. “Outdoor advertising” means any commercial advertisement displayed outdoors by means of billboards or signs.
    3. “Sexual conduct” means acts of sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, or fondling of a human’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the human is female, breast.
  2. The General Assembly finds and declares that outdoor advertising containing depictions of nudity or sexual conduct which are visible from the roadways of public roads may be startling or provocative and thereby divert the attention of motor vehicle drivers, thus causing real and substantial hazards to traffic safety. The General Assembly further declares that the purpose of this Code section is to protect the public welfare and safety against such hazards.
  3. No person shall display any outdoor advertising containing any depiction of nudity or sexual conduct when such depiction is visible from the roadway of any public road in the state highway system as defined in Code Section 32-4-1.
    1. Any person who violates subsection (c) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000.00.
    2. Each day during which outdoor advertising is displayed in violation of subsection (c) of this Code section shall constitute a separate offense.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-52 , enacted by Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, § 2/HB 1097.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, § 7/HB 1097, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fingerprinting required for violators. — Those charged with offenses under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-52 are to be fingerprinted. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-1.

PART 2 State Highway System

Cross references. —

Control and regulation of outdoor advertising in relation to federal highways, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II.

Law reviews. —

For comment, “The Federal Highway Beautification Act After Metromedia,” see 35 Emory L.J. 419 (1986).

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Granting, renewal, and revocation of permits for outdoor advertising, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-6.

Granting, renewal, and revocation of vegetation management permits for outdoor advertising, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-14.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

O.C.G.A. Pt. 2, Ch. 6, T. 32 does not violate the right of freedom of expression by restricting outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the rights-of-way of interstate and primary systems of highways in this state. DOT v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873 , 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984).

O.C.G.A. Pt. 2, Ch. 6, T. 32 is a proper exercise of the police powers, as the statute provides for compensation for property rights in signs which were lawfully in existence on the statute’s effective date. DOT v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873 , 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Issuance and renewal of permits for outdoor advertising devices. — Department of Transportation may issue permits for outdoor advertising devices, and renew such permits, within districts zoned “Forest-Agricultural” in Glynn County if the activities permitted in the district without further action of the zoning authority are commonly and generally recognized as commercial by the department in the department’s uniform application of the law. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

32-6-70. Declaration of policy.

  1. The General Assembly declares it to be the policy of this state that the erection or maintenance of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the rights of way of roads of the state highway system, which roads are also a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways within the state, shall be regulated in accordance with the terms of this part and the regulations promulgated by the commissioner pursuant thereto and that all outdoor advertising which does not conform to the requirements of this part is a public nuisance. The General Assembly recognizes that the outdoor advertising industry is a bona fide commercial function. However, in no manner shall any outdoor advertising sign be defined as a commercial or industrial activity or be used for the purposes of administering this part. It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system which also form a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways declared by the Congress in Title 23, Section 103, United States Code.
  2. The General Assembly further declares it to be the policy of this state to avert substantial economic hardship by the retention, in specific areas defined by the board, upon request made by the Department of Transportation and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation, of directional signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected under state law in force at the time of their erection, which were in existence on May 5, 1976, and which do not conform to the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (5) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraphs (1) through (3) of Code Section 32-6-73, where it can be demonstrated that such signs, displays, and devices (1) provide directional information about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public and (2) are such that removal would work a substantial economic hardship in such defined area.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 1; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-913, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

For annual survey on business corporations, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 61 (2012).

For annual survey on administrative law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2018).

For note, “Regulation and Ownership of the Marshlands: The Georgia Marshlands Act,” see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 563 (1971).

For comment on State Hwy. Dep’t v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770 , 152 S.E.2d 372 (1966), discussing regulation of outdoor advertising and billboards as a constitutional “taking,” see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 499 (1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality. —

The 1983 Constitution carried forward power exclusively in the counties and municipalities from former constitutional provisions; the Outdoor Advertising Act, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 , does not conflict with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IV. Patrick v. Head, 262 Ga. 654 , 424 S.E.2d 615 (1993).

Owner had to be in compliance with then-existing ordinance. —

Property owner did not have a vested right to erect a sign because the sign had not been erected in accordance with zoning regulations in force when the owner applied for the permit; accordingly, the owner’s failure to comply with the permit rendered the owner outside of the scope of protection afforded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IV. Although the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 , also afforded protections, such protection was again not applicable to the property owner because the owner had not erected the owner’s sign in compliance with the legal requirements of the existing ordinances; accordingly, the owner had no property rights in the sign. DeKalb County v. DRS Invs., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 225 , 581 S.E.2d 573 (2003).

Outdoor advertising. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 , in no uncertain terms, delegated the regulation of outdoor advertising to the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) as the statute provided in part that it was the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system, under § 32-6-70 (a), and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-90 further authorized the DOT to promulgate regulations governing permits for outdoor advertising. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

Signs inside the building. —

After a company installed three signs inside the windows of a building, the superior court erred in concluding that the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act (OACA), O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 et seq., regulated the company’s signs because the OACA regulated outdoor signs, and it was undisputed that the company’s signs were located inside the building, and the signs could not be characterized as outdoor signs. Monumedia II, LLC v. DOT, 343 Ga. App. 49 , 806 S.E.2d 215 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, §§ 2, 7, 23, 24. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 324.

Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. —

Outdoor Advertising Sign or Billboard as Nuisance, 37 POF2d 141.

ALR. —

Nature and extent of right granted by contract for use of wall or roof for advertising purposes, 10 A.L.R. 1108 ; 119 A.L.R. 1523 .

Advertising rights on leased premises, 22 A.L.R. 800 ; 20 A.L.R.2d 940.

Constitutional power to regulate outdoor and street car advertising, 79 A.L.R. 551 .

Power of highway officer in respect of billboards or other conditions on adjoining property which are deemed dangerous to travel or offensive esthetically to travelers, 81 A.L.R. 1547 .

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance relating to distribution of advertising matter, 114 A.L.R. 1446 .

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

32-6-71. Definitions.

As used in this part, the term:

  1. “Defined area” means any area or areas within the state defined by the board, upon request made by the State Department of Transportation and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation, to be an area where the removal of directional signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected under state law in force at the time of their erection, which were in existence on May 5, 1976, and which do not conform to the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (5) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraphs (1) through (3) of Code Section 32-6-73 would deprive the traveling public of directional information about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public and would work a substantial economic hardship in such defined area or areas.
  2. “Directional and other official signs and notices” means only official signs and notices, public utility signs, service club and religious notices, public service signs, and directional signs.
  3. “Directional signs” means signs containing directional information deemed to be in the interest of the traveling public, including information about public places owned or operated by state, federal, or local governments or their agencies; publicly or privately owned natural phenomena; historic, cultural, scientific, educational, and religious sites; and areas of natural scenic beauty or areas naturally suited for outdoor recreation.
  4. “Directional signs, displays, and devices in the specific interest of the traveling public” means any directional sign, display, or device which was lawfully erected under state law in force at the time of its erection, which was in existence on May 5, 1976, and which provides directional information about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public but does not conform to the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (5) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraphs (1) through (3) of Code Section 32-6-73.
  5. “Erect” means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being or establish, but it shall not include any of the foregoing activities when performed as an incident to the change of advertising message or the normal maintenance or repair of a sign structure.
  6. “Illegal sign” means:
    1. A sign for the maintenance of which a permit is required under this part, or any amendment thereof, which sign is being maintained without a permit;
    2. A sign presently being maintained without a required permit even though it could have been permitted under any outdoor advertising control law in effect at the time of its erection;
    3. A sign presently being maintained without a permit, which sign could not have been permitted under the law in effect at the time of its erection even though the sign may meet the requirements of this part for the issuance of a permit;
    4. A sign on which the permit has been revoked pursuant to this part;
    5. A sign on which a nonconforming application for permit was denied and the denial has become final; and
    6. A nonconforming sign for which no permit was sought as required by Code Section 32-6-79.
  7. “Industrial or commercial activity” means those activities commonly or generally recognized as commercial or industrial except that none of the following activities shall be considered commercial or industrial:
    1. Outdoor advertising structures;
    2. Agricultural, forestry, ranching, grazing, farming, and related activities, including but not limited to wayside fresh produce stands;
    3. Transient or temporary activities;
    4. Activities within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right of way which from the main traveled way are not visible and are not recognizable as being commercial or industrial activities;
    5. Activities more than 660 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way;
    6. Activities conducted in a building principally used as a residence; and
    7. Railroad tracks and minor sidings.
  8. “Information center” means an area or site established and maintained at a safety rest area for the purpose of informing the public of places of interest within the state and providing such other information as the department may consider desirable.
  9. “Interstate system” or “interstate highway” means any road of the state highway system which is a portion of The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways located within this state, as officially designated or as may hereafter be so designated by the department and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of Title 23, Section 103, United States Code, or any limited-access highway as officially designated or as may hereafter be so designated by the department and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of Title 23, Section 103, United States Code.
  10. “Maintain” means to allow to exist.
  11. “Main traveled way” means the traveled way of a highway on which through traffic is carried; and, in the case of a divided highway, it means the traveled way of each of the separated roadways for traffic traveling in opposite directions. It does not include such facilities as frontage roads, turning roadways, or parking areas.

    (11.1) “Multiple message sign” means a sign, display, or device which changes the message or copy on the sign electronically by movement or rotation of panels or slats.

  12. “Nonconforming sign” means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with state law or state regulations due to changes in state law or changes in rules and regulations since the date of erection of the sign.
  13. “Official signs and notices” means signs and notices erected and maintained by public officers or public agencies within their territorial or zoning jurisdiction and pursuant to and in accordance with direction or authorization contained in state, federal, or local law for the purpose of carrying out an official duty or responsibility. Historical markers authorized by state law and erected by state or local government agencies or nonprofit historical societies shall be considered official signs.
  14. “Outdoor advertising” or “sign” means any outdoor sign, light, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, placard, poster, billboard, or other thing which is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising or information contents of which are visible from any place on the main traveled way of the interstate or primary highway systems.
  15. “Parkland” means any publicly owned land which is designated or used as a public park, recreation area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or historic site.
  16. “Primary system” or “primary highway” means the federal-aid primary system in existence on June 1, 1991, and any highway which is not on such system, but which is on the National Highway System, as officially designated or as may hereafter be so designated by the department and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of Title 23, Section 103, United States Code.
  17. “Private” shall not mean, through the effect of this part, publicly owned property leased to others.
  18. “Public service signs” means signs located on school bus stop shelters, which signs identify the donor, sponsor, or contributor of said shelters and which contain safety slogans or messages which occupy not less than 60 percent of the sign area.
  19. “Public utility signs” means warning signs, informational signs, notices, or markers which are customarily erected and maintained by publicly or privately owned public utilities as essential to their operations.
  20. “Safety rest area” or “rest area” means an area or site established and maintained within or adjacent to the highway right of way, by or under public supervision or control, for the convenience of the traveling public.
  21. “Scenic area” means any area of particular scenic beauty or historical significance, as determined by the state, federal, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, and includes interests in land which have been acquired for the restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty.
  22. “Service club and religious notices” means signs or notices, whose erection is authorized by law, relating to religious services or to meetings of nonprofit service clubs or charitable associations, which signs do not exceed eight square feet in area.
  23. “Specific interest of the traveling public” means information regarding places offering lodging, food, motor vehicle fuels and lubricants, motor vehicle service and repair facilities, or any other service or product available to the general public, including, but not limited to, publicly or privately owned natural phenomena; historic, cultural, scientific, educational, or religious sites; and areas of natural scenic beauty or areas naturally suited for outdoor recreation.
  24. “Traveled way” means the portion of a roadway used for the movement of vehicles, exclusive of shoulders.
  25. “Unzoned commercial or industrial areas” means those areas which are not zoned by state law or local ordinance and on which there is located one or more permanent structures devoted to an industrial or commercial activity or on which an industrial or commercial activity is actually conducted, whether or not a permanent structure is located thereon, and the area along the highway extending outward 600 feet from and beyond the edge of the activity in each direction and a corresponding zone directly across a primary highway which is not also a limited-access highway, when the same is not a public park, public playground, public recreational area, public forest, parkland, scenic area, cemetery, primarily residential, or locally zoned. All measurements shall be from the outer edges of the regularly used buildings, parking lots, or storage, processing, or landscaped areas of the commercial or industrial activity and not from the property lines of the activity and shall be along or parallel to the edge of the pavement of the highway.
  26. “Urban area” means an area included within the boundaries of an incorporated municipality having a population of 5,000 or more as determined by the latest available federal census and any area adjacent to such municipality, provided that such adjacent area is included within boundaries presently designated and fixed by the outdoor advertising urban area boundary maps and written records attached thereto on file in the office of the treasurer of the Department of Transportation.
  27. “Visible” means capable of being seen (whether or not legible) without visual aid by a person of normal visual acuity.
  28. “Would work a substantial economic hardship” means having the potential to cause a substantial negative economic effect in a defined area or areas, as may be demonstrated by a projected reduction in gross business sales, state and local sales taxes, and employment opportunities within the defined area or areas.
  29. “Zoned commercial or industrial areas” means those areas which are zoned for industrial or commercial activities pursuant to state or local zoning laws or ordinances as part of a comprehensive zoning plan. Strip zoning shall not be considered as a bona fide comprehensive zoning plan. Comprehensive zoning plans for the purposes of outdoor advertising only shall be approved by the board when an application for a permit has been made.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 2; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-914, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 22, 23; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 2; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 4/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of administrative law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 17 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Sign restriction at freeway entrance ramps. —

Freeway has one “main traveled way” and signs may not be permitted within 500 feet of an entrance ramp even though such ramp is on the other side of a divided four-lane highway. Department of Transp. v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350 , 233 S.E.2d 435 (1977).

Rest areas. —

Recreational Property Act (RPA), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applies to rest areas maintained by the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), and the DOT was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with regard to a visitor’s premises liability and negligence suit against the DOT resulting from the visitor’s trip and fall while attempting to place garbage in a trash can at a rest area because the DOT was immune from liability as a result of the application of the RPA and the visitor failed to show that the DOT was wilful or wanton in DOT’s placement of DOT’s trash can or that DOT charged money for the use of DOT rest areas. Ga. DOT v. Thompson, 270 Ga. App. 265 , 606 S.E.2d 323 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0511, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2005).

Welcome center where a traveler was injured was recreational and was a rest area, and thus the department which owned the welcome center was immune from liability. Matheson v. Ga. DOT, 280 Ga. App. 192 , 633 S.E.2d 569 (2006).

Strip zoning. —

Denial of the request of landowners and a sign company for permits to erect outdoor advertising did not violate statutory authority, under O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-71(29) and 32-6-72(4) , which allowed such advertising on commercially zoned property but provided that strip zoned property was not properly considered commercially zoned, or Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 672-6-.01(q) (1988), defining strip zoning, because: (1) the land on which the advertising would be erected was small in comparison to the owners’ total property; (2) was rezoned to commercial use, a use less restrictive than surrounding property; (3) rezoning did not regard the neighborhood’s character, as there was no commercial activity in the immediate vicinity; and (4) rezoning a small parcel to a less restrictive use out of character with surrounding land benefitted only the parcel’s owners. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

Signs in windows are not outdoor signs. —

After a company installed three signs inside the windows of a building, the superior court erred in concluding that the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act (OACA), O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 et seq., regulated the company’s signs because the OACA regulated outdoor signs, and it was undisputed that the company’s signs were located inside the building, and the signs could not be characterized as outdoor signs. Monumedia II, LLC v. DOT, 343 Ga. App. 49 , 806 S.E.2d 215 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Issuance of permits for outdoor advertising devices. — Outdoor advertising devices located in areas zoned by local governments and subject to regulation by the department can be lawfully erected and maintained only in areas zoned, without further action of the local governing body, for commercial or industrial activities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

Renewal of permits. — If there are activities permitted in the district which are commonly and generally recognized as commercial, then the permits for outdoor advertising devices may be renewed provided the criteria for renewal established elsewhere are met. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Validity and construction of zoning regulations relating to illuminated signs, 30 A.L.R.5th 549.

32-6-72. Designation of outdoor advertising which may be erected or maintained within 660 feet of nearest edge of right of way.

No outdoor advertising shall be erected or maintained within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right of way and visible from the main traveled way of the interstate or primary highways in this state, except the following:

  1. Directional and other official signs and notices;
  2. Signs advertising the sale or lease of the property upon which they are located;
  3. Signs advertising activities conducted or maintained within 100 feet of the nearest part of the activity as the dimensions of said activity are determined by department regulations, which regulations need not take into consideration the property lines of said activity;
  4. Signs located in areas zoned commercial or industrial, which signs provide information in the specific interest of the traveling public;
  5. Signs located in unzoned commercial or industrial areas, which signs provide information in the specific interest of the traveling public; and
  6. Directional signs, displays, and devices about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public located in a defined area or areas approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 3; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-915, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 3.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, a comma was deleted between “public” and “located” in paragraph (6).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Signs prohibited near interstate even if primary roads intervene. —

This clear legislative proscription cannot be thwarted by the mere fact that other roads, even “primary roads,” intervene between the sign and the interstate highway. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

State’s police power to zone against future use without compensation. —

Police power of the state to zone property to prevent the property’s use for certain purposes in the future, as distinguished from the taking or damaging in respect to a use already in existence, is not open to question, and does not require the payment of any compensation. National Adv. Co. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 230 Ga. 119 , 195 S.E.2d 895 (1973).

Strip zoning. —

Denial of the request of landowners and a sign company for permits to erect outdoor advertising did not violate statutory authority, under O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-71(29) and 32-6-72(4) , which allowed such advertising on commercially zoned property but provided that strip zoned property was not properly considered commercially zoned, or Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 672-6-.01(q) (1988), defining strip zoning, because: (1) the land on which the advertising would be erected was small in comparison to the owners’ total property; (2) was rezoned to commercial use, a use less restrictive than surrounding property; (3) rezoning did not regard the neighborhood’s character, as there was no commercial activity in the immediate vicinity; and (4) rezoning a small parcel to a less restrictive use out of character with surrounding land benefitted only the parcel’s owners. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Issuance of permits for outdoor advertising devices. — Outdoor advertising devices located in areas zoned by local governments and subject to regulation by the department can be lawfully erected and maintained only in areas zoned, without further action of the local governing body, for commercial or industrial activities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk, 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

32-6-73. Designation of outdoor advertising which may be erected or maintained beyond 660 feet of nearest edge of right of way.

No outdoor advertising shall be erected or maintained beyond 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right of way of the interstate or primary highways in this state outside of urban areas so as to be visible and intended to be read from the main traveled way, except the following:

  1. Directional and other official signs and notices;
  2. Signs advertising the sale or lease of the property upon which they are located;
  3. Signs advertising activities conducted or maintained within 100 feet from the nearest part of the activity as the dimensions of said activity are determined by department regulations, which regulations need not take into consideration the property lines of said activity; and
  4. Directional signs, displays, and devices about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public located in a defined area or areas approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-915.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 4.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, a comma was deleted between “public” and “located” in paragraph (4).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

32-6-74. Applications for outdoor advertising sign permits generally; fees; renewals; transfer of permits.

  1. Applications for permits authorized by subsections (a) through (d) of Code Section 32-6-79 shall be made to the department upon forms prescribed by the department. The applications shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department and shall be verified under oath by the person, firm, or corporation making the application. Permits and renewals thereof shall be issued for and shall be valid only if the sign is erected and maintained in accordance with this part during the 12 month period next following the date of issuance. As to permits for the initial erection of an outdoor advertising sign, one 12 month extension may be granted so long as a written request is submitted to the department at least 30 days prior to expiration along with a fee of $35.00. Any denial of an extension request shall be sent to the applicant before the expiration date and shall state the basis for denial. Multiple extensions shall not be granted as to the same permit, and the applicant shall not be allowed to reapply for the same site until the extension has expired; however, modifications to the application which do not extend the term of the permit shall be allowed. There shall be an initial outdoor advertising permit fee and an annual renewal fee. On and after July 1, 2011, the outdoor advertising application fee shall be $300.00, and the renewal fee for each sign shall be $85.00. The department may adjust future application and renewal fees through the formal rule making process so long as notice of any proposed increase is sent to the House and Senate Transportation Committees at least 30 days prior to final adoption by the department. Such fees shall be limited to amounts sufficient to offset the administrative costs to the department. An annual report on the expenditures and revenues of the department related to the outdoor advertising program shall be sent to the House and Senate Transportation Committees no later than October 31 of each year. Upon receipt of a properly executed application and the appropriate fee for the erection or maintenance of a sign which may be lawfully erected or maintained pursuant to this part, the department shall, within 60 days, issue a permit authorizing the erection or maintenance, or both, of the sign for which application was made except when a person, firm, or corporation is maintaining or allowing the maintenance of an illegal sign as provided for in subsection (f) of Code Section 32-6-79. All outdoor advertising permits and renewals shall expire on the first day of April in the year following issuance. Renewal of such permits shall be made to the department between January 1 and April 1 of each calendar year. Notice of such renewal period shall be mailed to each outdoor advertising permit holder along with an itemized list of all permits maintained by such person or entity in the month of December. In response, each permit holder should clearly indicate any permits not being renewed and return a copy to the department along with payment for all permits being renewed. If a permit holder believes the itemized list is incomplete or inaccurate, such permit holder shall clearly note such discrepancies on the list and return a copy to the department with supporting documentation. The permit holder shall submit the renewal and any suggested corrections within 60 days of the date of the department notice or by April 1, whichever occurs last. If the department fails to receive the renewal before the expiration date, the department shall notify the permit holder by certified mail that the renewal is overdue and shall give the permit holder 45 days from the date of the postmark on such notice to send the department the renewal. If the applicant does not send the permit renewal and fee within 45 days after the postmark date on such notice, the permit shall expire and the sign shall then become an illegal sign. Signs shall become illegal by operation of law after the expiration of the permit followed by notice to the permit holder and a failure to submit for the renewal within 45 days. Any illegal sign may be removed without any administrative proceeding before the department. Vegetation permits or renewals issued pursuant to Code Section 32-6-75.3 shall expire on the first day of September in the year following issuance. If a vegetation permit renewal application and fee is not timely submitted and such deficiency is not cured within 45 days of the postmark date of notice via certified mail from the department, the vegetation permit shall be canceled, but the sign shall not be deemed illegal. No permit shall be renewed if the renewal thereof has not been made in accordance with this Code section.
  2. Permits shall be transferable. An application to have the permit specified in subsection (a) of this Code section transferred shall be made within 30 days of the change in ownership of the sign; shall be made to the department upon forms prescribed by the department; shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department; and shall be verified under oath by the person, firm, or corporation making application for transfer. Failure to comply in a timely and proper manner with this subsection shall be grounds for revocation of the permit.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 10; Code 1933, § 95A-922, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 32; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1508, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 6; Ga. L. 2011, p. 601, § 1/HB 179.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2011, p. 601, § 4/HB 179, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The Department of Transportation shall have 120 days from the effective date to promulgate any forms or policies necessary to implement this Act. Those applications submitted before any necessary forms and policies are in place shall be processed in accordance with the regulations in place prior to the effective date. Those holding vegetation maintenance permits or renewals issued at any time prior to the promulgation of the necessary forms and policies shall, upon written request to the department, be able to trim or remove vegetation in accordance with the terms of this Act.” This Act became effective July 1, 2011.

Law reviews. —

For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2011).

For article, “Highways, Bridges, and Ferries: Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally,” see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2011).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Denial of sign permits. —

Although ground had not been broken on a proposed interchange as of the date an applicant submitted applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs, the Georgia Department of Transportation’s denial of the applications comported with O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-2 , 32-6-74(a) , and 32-6-75(a)(18) because the interchange project had progressed to a point such that it constituted an interchange for purposes of § 32-6-75(a)(18) and the proposed sign locations were within the 500-foot blocked out zone established by § 32-6-75(a)(18). Eagle West, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 312 Ga. App. 882 , 720 S.E.2d 317 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0593, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 731 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Issuance of permits for outdoor advertising devices. — Outdoor advertising devices located in areas zoned by local governments and subject to regulation by the department can be lawfully erected and maintained only in areas zoned, without further action of the local governing body, for commercial or industrial activities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

When issuing permits for outdoor advertising devices, the Department of Transportation must be guided by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 et seq., notwithstanding the local zoning ordinances. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

Department of Transportation may issue permits for outdoor advertising devices, and renew such permits, within “Forest-Agricultural” Districts of Glynn County if the department commonly and generally recognizes the activities permitted therein as commercial or industrial. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

32-6-75. Restrictions on outdoor advertising authorized by Code Sections 32-6-72 and 32-6-73; multiple message signs on interstate system, primary highways, and other highways.

  1. No sign authorized by paragraphs (4) through (6) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraph (4) of Code Section 32-6-73 shall be erected or maintained which:
    1. Advertises an activity that is illegal under Georgia or federal laws or regulations in effect at the location of such sign or at the location of such activity;
    2. Is obsolete;
    3. Is not structurally safe, clean, and in good repair;
    4. Is not securely affixed to a substantial structure which is permanently attached to the ground;
    5. Is attached to, drawn, or painted upon trees, rocks, or other natural features;
    6. Moves or has any moving or animated parts, except as expressly allowed under subsection (c) of this Code section;
    7. Emits or utilizes in any manner any sound capable of being detected on the main traveled way by a person with normal hearing;
    8. If illuminated, contains, includes, or is illuminated by any flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights except those giving public service information such as time, date, temperature, weather, or other similar information except as expressly permitted under subsection (c) of this Code section. The illumination of multiple message signs is not illumination by flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights, except that no multiple message sign may include any illumination which is flashing, intermittent, or moving when the sign is in a fixed position;
    9. If illuminated, is not effectively shielded so as to prevent beams or rays of light from being directed at any portion of the traveled way, which beams or rays are of such intensity or brilliance as to cause glare or to impair the vision of the driver of any motor vehicle or which otherwise interfere with the operation of a motor vehicle;
    10. If illuminated, is illuminated so that it obscures or interferes with the effectiveness of an official traffic sign, device, or signal;
    11. Contains an area, to be measured by the smallest square, rectangle, triangle, circle, or combination thereof, which encompasses the entire sign, in excess of 1,200 square feet or exceeding 30 feet in height or 60 feet in length, inclusive of any border and trim but excluding the base, apron, supports, and other structural members; provided, however, that, in counties having a population greater than 500,000 according to the United States decennial census for 1970 or any such future census, the maximum size of 1,200 square feet, the maximum height of 30 feet, and the maximum length of 60 feet may be exceeded, but in no event shall any such sign exceed 3,000 square feet; provided, further, that no such oversize signs shall be erected after July 1, 1973;
    12. Contains more than two faces visible from the same direction on the main traveled way; provided, however, that after July 1, 2006, no sign shall be erected that contains more than one face vertically stacked visible from the same direction on the main traveled way. Double-faced, back-to-back, and V-type constructed signs shall, for the purpose of determining compliance with size and spacing limitations, be considered as one sign;
    13. Is in an area not zoned for commercial or industrial activity and within 300 feet of a residence without the written consent of the owner;
    14. Is within 500 feet in any direction of a public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 500 feet of a public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery when the sign is separated by buildings or other obstructions so that the sign located within the 500 foot zone is not visible from the public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery;
    15. Is located so as to obscure or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness of an official traffic sign, signal, or device;
    16. Is located so as to obscure or otherwise interfere with a motor vehicle operator’s view of approaching, merging, or intersecting traffic;
    17. Is located adjacent to an interstate highway and which is within 500 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 500 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 500 foot zone is visible from the interstate highway at any time;
    18. Is located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to an interstate highway within 500 feet of an interchange, intersection at grade, or safety rest area. The foregoing 500 foot zone shall be measured along the interstate highway from the point at which the pavement commences or ceases to widen at exits from or entrances to the main traveled way. In circumstances where both the exit and entrance ramps on one side of an interchange constitute continuous lanes of travel to the exit and entrance ramps of the adjacent interchange, this side of the interchange shall be treated as if no ramps exist and the foregoing 500 foot zone on this side of the interchange shall be measured from the survey centerline of the main traveled way and crossroad forming the interchange or intersecting road. In all circumstances where this definition conflicts with any agreement with the United States secretary of transportation pursuant to Code Section 32-6-87, said agreement shall be deemed to control for purposes of this Code section;
    19. Is located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to a highway on the primary system and which is within 300 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 300 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 300 foot zone is visible from the primary system highway at any one time;
    20. Is located within the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to a highway on the primary system and which is within 100 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 100 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 100 foot zone is visible from the primary system highway at any one time; or
    21. Depicts any material which is obscene as such term is defined in Code Section 16-12-80.
  2. Reserved.
    1. Multiple message signs shall be permitted on the interstate system, primary highways, and other highways under the following conditions:
      1. Each multiple message sign shall remain fixed for at least ten seconds;
      2. When a message is changed mechanically, it shall be accomplished in three seconds or less;
      3. No such multiple message sign shall be placed within 5,000 feet of another multiple message sign on the same side of the highway;
      4. Any such sign shall contain a default design that will freeze the sign in one position if a malfunction occurs;
      5. Any maximum size limitations shall apply independently to each side of a multiple message sign; and
      6. Nonmechanical electronic multiple message signs that are otherwise in compliance with this subsection and are illuminated entirely by the use of light emitting diodes, back lighting, or any other light source shall be permitted under the following circumstances:
        1. Each transitional change occurs within two seconds;
        2. If the department finds an electronic sign or any display or effect thereon to cause glare or to impair the vision of the driver of any motor vehicle or to otherwise interfere with the safe operation of a motor vehicle, then, upon the department’s request, the owner of the sign shall promptly and within not more than 48 hours reduce the intensity of the sign to a level acceptable to the department; and
        3. The owner of any existing or nonconforming electronic sign shall have until October 31, 2006, to bring the electronic sign in compliance with this subparagraph and to request a permit from the department.
    2. If a multiple message sign on a primary highway or other highway is in violation of any of the above conditions, its permit shall be revoked and the sign shall be removed. During the appeal of any violations of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the sign shall remain fixed until the matter is resolved. The commissioner may allow the continued operation of a multiple message sign during part or all of the appeals process.
    3. After April 15, 1996, all persons, firms, or corporations who have signs that were illegal signs under previous law, but which are legal signs under the provisions of this subsection, shall have a one-year period during which time they shall be required to file an application for a permit issued by the department. Applications for such permits shall be made upon forms prescribed and provided by the department and shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department rules and regulations. The department shall have a period of 60 days from the date such an application is received to process it. If, at the end of this 60 day period, the department has failed to approve or deny an application in proper form, it shall be conclusively presumed for all purposes that the sign can be permitted and the department must issue the permit within a reasonable time. Should the department deny the application, the applicant may seek relief in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” In cases where the applicant fails to exhaust the procedures prescribed by Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” the department’s denial of the permit request will be final and the sign shall then become an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 and shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part. If the owner of the sign fails to apply properly for a permit and it is conclusively presumed that the sign has been abandoned, the sign shall remain an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 and the sign shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, §§ 3, 4, 6; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-916, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 25, 26, 27, 28, 30; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 4; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 831, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, § 3; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1132, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, §§ 3-6/HB 1097; Ga. L. 2019, p. 260, § 1/SB 79.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, deleted “mechanical” preceding “multiple message” in the second sentence of paragraph (a)(8) and in the middle of subparagraph (c)(1)(C).

Cross references. —

False advertising, § 10-1-420 et seq.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, a comma was inserted following “flashing” in paragraph (a)(8).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, subsection (b), which was added by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, § 3, was redesignated as subsection (c) in view of the fact that Ga. L. 1996, p. 831 also enacted a subsection (b). As a result, the reference in paragraph (a)(6) to “subsection (b)” was changed to be a reference to “subsection (c)”.

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, “April 15, 1996” was substituted for “the effective date of this subsection” in the first sentence of paragraph (c)(3).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, “until October 31, 2006,” was substituted for “180 days from the effective date of this subparagraph” in division (c)(1)(F)(iii).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, § 7/HB 1097, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of law on administrative law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2010).

For annual survey on administrative law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 39 (2012).

For review of 1996 highways, bridges, and ferries legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 180 (1996).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality. —

Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75 is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech as the statute’s absolute proscription against any form of off-site advertising impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the state’s legitimate interest in preventing hazards to the traveling public. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97 , 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

Proscription in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75 of “any outdoor advertising of a commercial establishment where nudity is exhibited” is not narrowly tailored to achieve the statute’s purpose of preventing hazards to the safety of the traveling public since the statute is not directed solely at provocative images, but prohibits even a worded sign advertising the location of a business. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97 , 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

Purpose. —

Purpose of this section is to regulate the impact of the signs on the driver along the interstate. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Intent of the General Assembly is to protect the public traveling along the highway from distractions, aesthetic desecration, and nuisances, all associated with the proliferation of signs in a concentrated area along the highway. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Minimization of distractions by signs in the area of an interchange is precisely the intent and purpose behind the blocked-out zone contemplated in paragraph (a)(18) of this section. Department of Transp. v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350 , 233 S.E.2d 435 (1977); National Adv. Co. v. Department of Transp., 149 Ga. App. 334 , 254 S.E.2d 571 .

Measurement of distances under paragraph (a)(18). —

In requiring that all signs be located at least 500 feet apart, the legislative intent would require that the measurement be made along the highway. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

“Crow flies” method of measurement is not intended to apply to every statute omitting the method of measuring. Rather, each statute is to be construed individually in order to ascertain the method of measurement which best fulfills the legislative intent. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Impact on motorist more important than exact interval between signs. —

Distance requirement in this section for separation of signs is aimed at the impact on the traveling motorist, not at the literal distance between each sign. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436 , 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Paragraph (a)(18) applicable to “Y” and “half-diamond” interchanges. —

Prohibition on signs within 500 feet of intersecting highways also applies in cases where the interchange is a “Y” or “half-diamond” type and the sign is to be located on the “no ramp” side of the interchange. National Adv. Co. v. Department of Transp., 149 Ga. App. 334 , 254 S.E.2d 571 .

Proposed interchange project constituted an interchange. —

Although ground had not been broken on a proposed interchange as of the date an applicant submitted applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs, the Georgia Department of Transportation’s denial of the applications comported with O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-2 , 32-6-74(a) , and 32-6-75(a)(18) because the interchange project had progressed to a point such that it constituted an interchange for purposes of § 32-6-75(a)(18) and the proposed sign locations were within the 500-foot blocked out zone established by § 32-6-75(a)(18). Eagle West, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 312 Ga. App. 882 , 720 S.E.2d 317 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0593, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 731 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012).

Superior court failed to address basis for conclusions of the Georgia Department of Transportation. —

Judgment reversing a decision of the Georgia Department of Transportation overruling an administrative law judge’s finding that one owner had a valid multiple message permit for its sign and that a second owner’s application for a permit was properly denied was remanded because the superior court ignored the basis for the GDOT’s conclusion and reviewed the ALJ’s decision instead, and the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Commissioner of the GDOT pertaining to governmental restrictions on commercial speech did not properly address and resolve the issues; in its final agency decision, the Deputy Commissioner essentially sidestepped the issues the ALJ addressed and resolved and did not directly address the issue of whether, applying the applicable provisions and regulations, the first owner failed to make the necessary revisions to its sign, and the GDOT’s conclusion that allowing the first owner to keep its permit would be unduly restrictive was arbitrary and capricious. Lamar Co., LLC v. Whiteway Neon-Ad, 303 Ga. App. 495 , 693 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Abandonment of outdoor advertising device. — No outdoor advertising device in this state may be considered abandoned until there is an expression, either by judicial determination or some affirmative act on the part of the owner, that the owner of the device has relinquished all intent of ever again using the device. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-134.

Compensation for prohibited outdoor advertising device. — Lawfully erected outdoor advertising device which could not be permitted on March 28, 1974, or a device which cannot now be permitted because of changed conditions beyond the control of the owner, is due compensation. However, this rule applies only in the situation wherein there was a lawfully erected outdoor advertising device and a second device was later erected and permitted in such proximity to the first that the first cannot now receive a permit because of the spacing requirements of this section. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-134.

Outdoor advertising sign facings. — Four outdoor advertising sign facings can be permitted at a given location. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-124.

Consent required for erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising sign. — Owners of all residences within 300 feet of outdoor advertising sign must first consent to the sign’s erection and maintenance. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-124.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, §§ 24, 25.

C.J.S. —

66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 38.

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Constitutional power to regulate outdoor and street car advertising, 79 A.L.R. 551 .

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk, 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

32-6-75.1. Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council; membership; purpose; compensation.

    1. The Governor shall appoint a Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council composed of 12 members. The council shall include the chairperson of the Senate Transportation Committee; the chairperson of the House Transportation Committee; a member from the Georgia Conservancy; a member from the Garden Clubs of Georgia, Inc.; a member of the faculty of the School of Environmental Design at the University of Georgia; a member from the Sierra Club; a member from the Georgia Wildlife Federation; four members of the Outdoor Advertising Association of Georgia, Inc.; and the deputy commissioner of the Georgia Department of Transportation or the designee thereof. The commissioner shall submit recommendations to the Governor for purposes of selecting members to the council.
      1. Terms of those members representing the Georgia Conservancy, the Garden Clubs of Georgia, and the School of Environmental Design and of two of those members representing the Outdoor Advertising Association shall expire on January 1, 2001, and quadrennially thereafter. Such members may be appointed to successive terms.
      2. Terms of those members representing the Sierra Club and the Georgia Wildlife Federation and of two of those members representing the Outdoor Advertising Association shall expire on January 1, 2003, and quadrennially thereafter. Such members may be appointed to successive terms.
    2. A landscape architect employed by the department and designated by the commissioner shall serve as an adviser to the council.
  1. The council shall aid the commissioner in formulating policies and discussing problems related to the administration of this article. In addition, the council shall:
    1. Review, comment upon, and make recommendations to the commissioner on the standards and policies to be used in the trimming and removal of vegetation on state rights of way in front of legally erected and maintained outdoor advertising signs;
    2. Make recommendations to the department regarding standards for vegetation removal and landscape and maintenance plans submitted by permittees including without limitation the use of viewing zones under Code Section 32-6-75.3;
    3. Review the performance of permittees holding current tree and vegetation trimming permits issued under Code Section 32-6-75.3 for compliance with the requirements of such permits including without limitation the implementation of landscaping plans;
    4. Encourage the contribution of funds from appropriate sources to support roadside enhancement and beautification;
    5. Submit to the commissioner annually not later than 30 days after the date of its fourth quarter meeting a written report of findings based upon its reviews of permittees’ performances and recommendations including without limitation any recommendations for expenditures for roadside enhancement and beautification; and
    6. Perform such other functions as may be specified for the council by the department.

      The council shall have full and complete access to all department records necessary for the performance of its duties.

  2. The council shall meet to elect a chairperson and vice chairperson and to establish the rules governing its operation. The advisory council shall meet at the call of the chairperson and shall meet not less than quarterly.
  3. Each councilmember shall be compensated at a rate per day the same as that rate per day provided by law for members of the General Assembly serving on interim committees and shall be reimbursed for any necessary expenses; provided, however, that any full-time state employee on the council shall draw no compensation but shall receive necessary expenses. The commissioner is authorized to pay such compensation and expenses from department funds.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-934.3, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 955, § 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1313, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32.

Cross references. —

Roadside enhancement and beautification fund, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IX, Para. VI.

Forest resources and other plant life generally, T. 12, C. 6.

Law reviews. —

For review of 1998 legislation relating to highways, bridges, and ferries, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 136 (1998).

For article, “Highways, Bridges, and Ferries: Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally,” see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2011).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Regulations invalid. —

Regulations adopted by the Department of Transportation to implement the program allowing the owners of private outdoor advertising to trim vegetation on public property blocking the owners’ advertising did not comply with the statutory mandate that the Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council was to review and recommend such standards so the regulations were invalid. Garden Club of Ga. v. Shackelford, 274 Ga. 653 , 560 S.E.2d 522 (2002).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Commissioner is authorized to initiate issuance of permits. — Commissioner is authorized, but not required, to initiate a program under which permits may be issued for trimming trees and vegetation in connection with administration of laws regulating billboards. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

32-6-75.2. Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Fund; dedication of certain revenues.

There is established a special fund to be known as the “Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Fund.” This fund shall consist of all moneys collected under Code Section 32-6-75.3, any appropriations by the General Assembly to the fund, revenues derived from the sale of any special and distinctive wildflower motor vehicle license plates issued pursuant to paragraph (5) of subsection (l) of Code Section 40-2-86, any contributions to the fund from any other source, and all interest thereon. All moneys collected under Code Section 32-6-75.3 and fees for any special and distinctive wildflower motor vehicle license plates shall be paid into the fund. All balances in the fund shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account identifying the fund and shall be carried forward each year so that no part thereof may be deposited in the general treasury. The department shall administer the fund and expend moneys held in the fund in furtherance of roadside enhancement and beautification projects along public roads in this state and administration of the tree and vegetation trimming permit program under Code Section 32-6-75.3. In addition to the foregoing, the department may, without limitation, promote and solicit voluntary contributions, promote the sale of motor vehicle license tags authorized under paragraph (5) of subsection (l) of Code Section 40-2-86, and develop any fund raising or other promotional techniques deemed appropriate by the department. Contributions to the fund shall be deemed supplemental to and shall in no way supplant funding that would otherwise be appropriated for these purposes. The department shall prepare, by February 1 of each year, an accounting of the funds received and expended from the fund. The report shall be made available to the members of the State Transportation Board, the Senate Transportation Committee, the Transportation Committee of the House of Representatives, and to members of the public on request.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-934.4, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 955, § 3; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1313, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1021, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 9, § 1-60/HB 1055.

Cross references. —

Roadside enhancement and beautification fund, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IX, Para. VI.

Editor’s notes. —

The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1998, p. 1688) which authorized provisions of this Code section was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the 1998 November general election.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Commissioner is authorized to initiate issuance of permits. — Commissioner is authorized, but not required, to initiate a program under which permits may be issued for trimming trees and vegetation in connection with administration of laws regulating billboards. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

Direct economic benefit from material severed from rights-of-way. — Neither O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.2 nor O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3 authorizes any private person to derive any economic benefit directly from disposition of material severed from rights-of-way. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

No donation of constitutionally forbidden gratuity. — Cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way, without cost or expense to taxpayers and to the extent no more than minimally necessary to facilitate reasonably adequate public viewing of privately owned billboards, does not itself amount to donation of constitutionally forbidden gratuity. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Governmental liability for compensation or damages to advertiser arising from obstruction of public view of sign or billboard on account of growth of vegetation in public way, 21 A.L.R.4th 1309.

32-6-75.3. Permits for trimming or removal of trees or vegetation in state right of way which obstruct view of outdoor advertising; removal of signs with lapsed permits.

    1. For purposes of this Code section, the term:
      1. “Removal” or “removed” means the elimination of trees or other vegetation from a viewing zone.
      2. “Target view zone” means an area of the viewing zone extending from the sign to the roadway to which the sign is permitted which shall be angled as requested by the applicant to maximize the visibility of the sign to passing motorists but not to exceed:
        1. Two-hundred and fifty feet along the right of way fence or boundary; and
        2. Three-hundred and fifty feet along the pavement edge, to include any emergency lane or paved shoulder.
      3. “Trimming” or “trimmed” means the pruning of excess limbs or branches from trees or other vegetation which are not removed from a viewing zone.
      4. “Viewing zone” means a continuous 500 foot horizontal distance parallel to a state right of way and adjacent to or otherwise within the line of sight of an outdoor advertising sign.
    2. The General Assembly finds and declares that outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia’s citizens as well as the traveling public. Therefore, the General Assembly declares it to be in the public interest that provisions be made for the visibility of outdoor advertising signs legally erected and maintained along the highways in this state to provide information regarding places offering lodging, food, motor vehicle fuels and lubricants, motor service and repairs, or any other services or products available to the general public. Recognizing, however, that the beautification of this state and the health of its environment are absolutely essential and equally as important to the traveling public, the General Assembly finds and declares that these needs must be balanced.
    1. So as to promote these objectives and in accordance with the provisions of this Code section, the commissioner shall provide by rule or regulation for the issuance and annual renewal of permits for the trimming and removal of trees and other vegetation on the state rights of way within viewing zones with respect to outdoor advertising signs legally erected and legally maintained adjacent to said rights of way. Such rules and regulations shall include, without limitation, standards for survival of vegetation trimmed or planted.
    2. So as to ensure that no vegetation maintenance permits are issued for the purpose of creating new outdoor advertising signs, no owner of outdoor advertising signs permitted or assigned a working number by the department after December 31, 2010, or such owner’s agent, shall be eligible to make application for vegetation maintenance for a period of five years from the date a new sign is permitted.
  1. Application for a tree or vegetation trimming or removal permit and the annual renewal thereof shall be made upon the forms prescribed and provided by the department and shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department’s rules and regulations.
  2. An application fee shall accompany the application for each vegetation maintenance permit, and both the application and fee shall be submitted to the department. There shall be an annual renewal of the permit for activities in the original scope of the permit. The department shall promulgate rules and regulations setting forth the application fees and renewal fees. Such application and renewal fees shall be established by the department in reasonable amounts in order to fully recover the costs of administering the vegetation maintenance program.
    1. The department shall evaluate each application for a permit under this Code section and require as a condition of granting any permit under this Code section that the value of the landscaping to be either provided or paid for by the applicant is not less than the department’s appraised value of the benefit to be conferred by the state upon the applicant by allowing the trimming or removing of trees or other vegetation as requested, which shall be the value of the trees or vegetation to be trimmed or removed; provided, however, that a permit may be granted to an otherwise qualified applicant in a case where the value of the landscaping to be either provided or paid for by the applicant is less than the department’s appraised value of the trees or other vegetation to be trimmed or removed if, in addition, the applicant pays to the department an amount equal to the amount of the difference between the value of the landscaping to be either provided or paid for by the applicant and the department’s appraised value of the trees or other vegetation to be trimmed or removed.
    2. Any measurement of vegetation to be removed for valuation purposes shall be made at diameter breast height as shown in the section entitled “Height of Measurement” in the Guide for Plant Appraisal (9th Edition) as published by the International Society of Arboriculture. Based on the substantial benefit to the state where dead or diseased trees are removed from the right of way, and the negligible value of dead or diseased trees, such vegetation shall not be measured or valued in determining the appraised value. Trees shall be only deemed dead or diseased if listed as such in the report of a certified forester or arborist, subject to review and approval by the department. Upon receipt of a properly completed application, the department shall, within 60 days, issue the permit for vegetation maintenance.
      1. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “historic tree” means a tree or group of trees that are reasonably determined by the department to be:
        1. Identified by a unit of government to recognize an individual or group;
        2. Located at the site of a historic event and significantly impact an individual’s perception of the event;
        3. Dated to the time of a historic event at the location of the tree, as identified by a unit of government; or
        4. Confirmed as the progeny of a tree that meets any of the criteria contained in this division.
      2. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “landmark tree” means a tree or group of trees that:
        1. Have been planted and maintained for educational purposes for more than 75 years;
        2. Were planted as a memorial to an individual, group, event, or cause and are more than 75 years old; or
        3. Symbolize a historically significant individual, place, event, or contribution, as recognized by a unit of government prior to July 1, 2010.
      3. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “specimen tree” means a hardwood tree or group of hardwood trees that is determined to be in excess of 75 years of age as determined by a registered forester or arborist.
      4. The applicant shall be allowed to remove all trees and vegetation from the target view zone so long as the sign was permitted or assigned a working number by the department on or before December 31, 2010. Vegetation removal shall be prohibited in all areas of the viewing zone outside of the target view zone except that portions of vegetation, such as tree limbs, which extend into the target view zone from outside the target view zone may be trimmed as necessary to preserve the clear target view zone. The only vegetation which cannot be removed from the target view zone pursuant to this paragraph shall be landmark trees, historic trees, and specimen trees, as defined in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph, and any tree planted as part of a permitted local, state, or federal government beautification project. After July 1, 2011, however, no beautification project in this state shall include the planting of trees in the right of way within 500 feet of an outdoor advertising sign such that the visibility of a permitted outdoor advertising sign is obscured or could later be obscured by the growth of such vegetation.
      5. Pruning or trimming of trees under a permit shall conform to industry standards as defined by the National Arborist Association, International Society of Arboriculture or ANSI A300 pruning standards as of January 1, 2011, or such later edition as may be adopted by rule or regulation of the department.
    3. An applicant’s record of conduct regarding disturbance of trees or other vegetation on state rights of way shall be considered by the department as part of the evaluation process for any permit or permit renewal application.
    4. Prior to approving any permit application to remove allegedly diseased trees, the department shall verify that such trees are in fact diseased. Such determination shall be made by the department’s landscape architect.
    5. A performance bond in an amount adequate for the requirements of the permit as determined by the department shall be required of each permittee.
    1. No trees or other vegetation on state rights of way shall be trimmed, killed, or removed by any person other than in accordance with a permit issued under this Code section by any person other than the department or an authorized agent or contractor thereof.
    2. No outdoor advertising sign to which a permit under this Code section is applicable shall be unused for advertising for a period of six consecutive months or more.
    3. On and after July 1, 1999, no outdoor advertising sign to which a permit under this Code section is applicable shall be maintained in such a condition of disrepair as to be unusable for advertising.
      1. In cases where the department has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this subsection has been committed by any person, the procedures provided under Code Section 32-6-95 shall apply the same as in cases wherein the department believes that a sign is being maintained in violation of this part.
      2. Following notice, hearing, and a finding that a person has committed a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a civil fine of not less than $10,000.00 nor more than $20,000.00, and restitution in an amount equal to the appraised value of the trees or vegetation, or both, which were unlawfully trimmed or removed, shall be imposed on such person.
      3. Following notice, hearing, and a finding that a permittee under this Code section has committed a violation of paragraph (2) of this subsection, an order directing the removal of such unused sign, at the expense of the permittee, shall be issued.
      4. Following notice, hearing, and a finding that a permittee under this Code section has committed a violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, an order directing the removal of such unusable sign shall be issued.
      5. The department or its authorized agents shall be authorized to enter upon private lands and disassemble and remove signs without civil or criminal liability therefor pursuant to an order issued in accordance with this paragraph and as provided by Code Section 32-6-96 for disassembly and removal of illegal outdoor advertising signs.
  3. In order to obtain a vegetation maintenance permit for signs which exceed 75 feet in height, as measured from the base of the sign or crown of the adjacent roadway to which the sign is permitted, whichever is higher, the owner of the sign shall agree to reduce the sign to 75 feet in height or less, as measured from the base of the sign or crown of the adjacent roadway to which the sign is permitted, whichever is higher, unless lowering is precluded by local government code or regulation. Work to lower the sign shall be concluded within 60 days of completion of the vegetation removal. If the terms of the work plan are not complied with and all work satisfactorily completed within the allowed time, the performance bond shall be forfeited, and the department shall be authorized to collect the bond and lower the sign. Upon completion of any project which reduces sign height by use of a new support mechanism, such as a new pole, the sign owner shall provide the department with a written footer inspection from the applicable local government or a professional engineer prior to the release of the bond.
  4. The department shall have the right to refuse to issue any vegetation permits to any person, firm, or entity which the department determines is maintaining or is allowing to be maintained any abandoned sign or signs, until all such abandoned signs are removed or brought into compliance with the provisions of this Code section. For purposes of this subsection, the term “abandoned sign” means any sign adjacent to a state-controlled route that has not contained a message for six consecutive months and which has not had a message displayed within 30 days after receipt of notice by certified mail from the department. The addition of a “for rent” panel or a phone number shall not qualify as a message for purposes of this subsection, but self-promotional copy covering at least one entire sign face or advertising copy benefiting charitable, nonprofit, religious, or other noncommercial groups shall qualify as a message.
  5. The department shall have the right to refuse to issue any vegetation permits to any person, firm, or entity which the department determines is maintaining or is allowing to be maintained in their inventory of signs in this state any sign which depicts any material which is obscene as such term is defined in Code Section 16-12-80, or material that is in conflict with the applicable local government’s obscenity ordinance. Upon conviction of depiction of any material as obscene the person, firm, or entity shall be punishable by a fine of not less than $5,000.00 for the first conviction and $10,000.00 for any subsequent conviction and shall also be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.
  6. The removal of signs with lapsed outdoor advertising permits is of benefit to this state but is often too costly for the department to undertake. In order to encourage the removal of such signs and permitted signs that do not conform to the state’s current requirements for outdoor advertising signs without the expenditure of state funds, a credit which may be used as an offset toward the total appraised value of the vegetation to be removed in accordance with a vegetation maintenance permit shall be awarded for each qualifying sign removal as follows:
    1. On or before March 1, 2012, the department shall prepare a list of signs which once held a valid outdoor advertising permit but for which the permit has been allowed to lapse. Notification of a sign’s inclusion on such list shall be sent to the last known address for the sign’s owner as listed on department records and to any other person or entity which the department reasonably finds to have an interest in such sign. Within 30 days of receipt of such notice or 60 days of publication of the list, whichever comes later, any person or entity claiming to be the owner of a sign that they do not believe has been properly included on the list shall be allowed to submit written notice to the department of their objection. Such objection may include a statement of the relevant facts and any supporting documents. On or before July 1, 2012, the department shall publish the final list. Signs which are the subject of any current objections, administrative appeals, or legal disputes shall not be included on such list. This list shall be updated annually and provided to the chairpersons of the House and Senate Transportation Committees on or before the first day of March;
    2. The department shall, on or before January 1, 2012, prepare a schedule or formula to determine the credit to be received for the removal of lapsed-permit signs and permitted nonconforming outdoor advertising signs. Such schedule shall provide a valuation of the credit based on four factors: material used in sign structure, height of sign, size of sign, and terrain and topography. The department shall also prepare a form to be submitted by any person or entity seeking a credit under this subsection. Such form shall require a description of the material used in the sign structure, the height of the sign, the size of the sign, and the terrain and topography where the sign is situated and a calculation of the anticipated credit in accordance with the department’s schedule or formula;
    3. At such time as any lapsed-permit sign from the department’s updated list or a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign is removed, the person or entity responsible for such removal shall submit to the department the completed removal form and photographic evidence of the removal. For purposes of this subsection, the term “removal” means removal of all structural elements above ground level; removal of footers or foundation elements shall not be required. Within 60 days of such submission, the department shall certify and return the form. No credit shall be allowed for the removal of a lapsed-permit sign by the owner of such sign. The certified form shall serve as a credit voucher. Credit vouchers may be transferred to another party via notarized statement signed by both parties;
    4. Where a lapsed-permit sign from the department’s updated list or a nonconforming sign is to be removed in conjunction with a specific application for a vegetation maintenance permit, the sign to be removed shall be designated by department permit number. If the vegetation permit is approved, then the sign designated for removal shall be removed at least 15 days prior to initiation of work pursuant to the vegetation permit. Removal shall be deemed complete when the removal form and photographic evidence of the removal are submitted to the department. The sign designated for removal need not be owned by the vegetation permit applicant. As such, nothing herein shall be interpreted to require that the removed sign be owned or controlled by the vegetation permit applicant. All work hereunder shall be performed by licensed and bonded entities or individuals, where required by law, and the department shall not be liable for the actions of any nondepartment personnel; and
    5. A credit voucher may be used by an applicant for a vegetation maintenance permit as an offset against the total appraised value of the vegetation to be removed on a dollar-for-dollar basis, except that the total payment shall not be reduced below $4,000.00. Any unused portion of a credit voucher may be used in conjunction with a subsequent vegetation maintenance application.
  7. Nothing contained in this Code section shall render any sign existing on July 1, 2011, nonconforming. Nothing in this Code section shall supersede any applicable local rules or ordinances. The department shall not deny an applicant a vegetation maintenance permit for complying with applicable local rules or ordinances.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-934.3, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 955, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1313, § 3; Ga. L. 2011, p. 601, § 2/HB 179; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 32/HB 942.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2011, p. 601, § 4/HB 179, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “The Department of Transportation shall have 120 days from the effective date to promulgate any forms or policies necessary to implement this Act. Those applications submitted before any necessary forms and policies are in place shall be processed in accordance with the regulations in place prior to the effective date. Those holding vegetation maintenance permits or renewals issued at any time prior to the promulgation of the necessary forms and policies shall, upon written request to the department, be able to trim or remove vegetation in accordance with the terms of this Act.” This Act became effective July 1, 2011.

Law reviews. —

For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2011).

For article, “Highways, Bridges, and Ferries: Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally,” see 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2011).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality. —

In a city’s suit challenging vegetation removal around billboard advertising, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the constitutionality of the billboard advertising statute, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3 , because the Georgia legislature has found that outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to the traveling public. City of Columbus v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., No., 292 Ga. 878 , 742 S.E.2d 728 (2013).

No donation of constitutionality forbidden gratuity. —

Legislative scheme allowing the owners of private outdoor advertising to trim vegetation on public property blocking the view of the owners’ advertising was not an unconstitutional donation, prohibited by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI, because the legislature declared that outdoor advertising benefits the state, and the private individuals were required to pay the state for the privilege of allowing the public to have an unimpeded view of the owners’ signs. Garden Club of Ga. v. Shackelford, 274 Ga. 653 , 560 S.E.2d 522 (2002).

Billboard advertising statute constitutional. —

Trial court properly determined that the billboard advertising statute, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3(j) , did not violate the trustees clause because the trustees clause did not apply because the city’s challenges to the statute did not involve a public officer reaping personal financial gain at the expense of the public. City of Columbus v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., No., 292 Ga. 878 , 742 S.E.2d 728 (2013).

Take down credits for removal of billboards. —

Trial court erred in holding that the take-down credits under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3(j) violated the gratuities clause because, to the contrary, the Supreme Court of Georgia has found that the Georgia legislature has explicitly determined that removal of outdated signs provides a benefit to the State of Georgia and that there would be a financial benefit in allowing take-down credits. City of Columbus v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., No., 292 Ga. 878 , 742 S.E.2d 728 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Direct economic benefit from material severed from rights-of-way. — Neither O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.2 nor O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3 authorizes any private person to derive any economic benefit directly from disposition of material severed from rights-of-way. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

No donation of constitutionally forbidden gratuity. — Cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way, without cost or expense to taxpayers and to extent no more than minimally necessary to facilitate reasonably adequate public viewing of privately owned billboards, does not itself amount to donation of constitutionally forbidden gratuity. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Governmental liability for compensation or damages to advertiser arising from obstruction of public view of sign or billboard on account of growth of vegetation in public way, 21 A.L.R.4th 1309.

32-6-76. Restrictions on directional signs generally.

Paragraphs (1) through (7), (9), (10), (13) through (17), (19), and (20) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-6-75 are applicable to directional signs authorized by paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-73; and, in addition thereto, no directional sign shall be erected or maintained which:

  1. Is located in a rest area, parkland, or scenic area;
  2. Contains an area, to be measured by the smallest square, rectangle, triangle, circle, or combination thereof, which encompasses the entire sign, in excess of 150 square feet or exceeding 20 feet in height or 20 feet in length, inclusive of any border and trim but excluding the base, apron, supports, and other structural members;
  3. Contains, includes, or is illuminated by any flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights;
  4. Is located adjacent to an interstate highway and which is within 2,000 feet of an interchange or intersection at grade. The foregoing 2,000 foot zone shall be measured along the interstate highway from the point at which the pavement commences or ceases to widen at exits from or entrances to the main traveled way;
  5. Is located within 2,000 feet of a rest area, parkland, or scenic area;
  6. Is located within one mile of another directional sign facing the same direction of travel;
  7. Creates the existence of more than three directional signs pertaining to the same activity facing the same direction of travel along a single route approaching the activity;
  8. Is located along the interstate system at a point more than 75 air miles from the advertised activity;
  9. Is located along the primary system at a point more than 50 air miles from the advertised activity;
  10. Contains information other than the identification of the attraction or activity and directional information useful to the traveler in locating the attraction, such as mileage, route numbers, or exit numbers. The sign shall not contain descriptive words, phrases, or pictorial or photographic representations of the activity or its environs; or
  11. Advertises privately owned activities or attractions other than natural phenomena, scenic attractions, historic, educational, cultural, scientific, and religious sites, agricultural tourist attractions designated by the Department of Agriculture, and outdoor recreational areas and which are nationally or regionally known and are of outstanding interest to the traveling public, as determined by the State Transportation Board.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-917, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 28A, 29; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 3; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, § 4; Ga. L. 2008, p. 314, § 2/HB 1088.

Cross references. —

Directional road signs to direct passing traffic to agricultural tourist attractions, § 50-7-70 .

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

General statutes controls over local ordinances. — When issuing permits for outdoor advertising devices, the Department of Transportation must be guided by the law of the State of Georgia, notwithstanding the local zoning ordinances. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

32-6-77. Exceptions to spacing limitations contained in Code Sections 32-6-75 and 32-6-76.

Signs which are authorized by and erected or maintained pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of Code Section 32-6-72 or paragraph (2) or (3) of Code Section 32-6-73 or which are official signs or notices, as defined in paragraph (13) of Code Section 32-6-71, and signs which are not lawfully erected or maintained shall not be counted nor shall measurements be made therefrom for the purpose of determining the spacing limitations prescribed in Code Sections 32-6-75 and 32-6-76.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-918, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

32-6-78. Restrictions on public service signs.

No public service sign authorized by paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-72 or paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-73 shall be erected or maintained which:

  1. Is attached to a school bus shelter, the construction of which is not authorized by state law or local ordinance;
  2. Is attached to a school bus shelter located at a place not approved by the governmental agency having jurisdiction of the highway along which said shelter is located;
  3. Contains an area, to be measured by the smallest square, rectangle, triangle, circle, or combination thereof, which encompasses the entire sign, in excess of 32 square feet; or
  4. Creates a situation in which there is more than one sign facing in any one direction on each shelter.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 7; Code 1933, § 95A-919, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

32-6-79. Permits for nonconforming signs; right of department to refuse to issue additional permits to persons maintaining illegal sign; appeal from department’s decision.

  1. On and after October 6, 1971, no person, firm, or corporation shall erect or maintain a sign authorized by paragraph (1), (4), or (5) of Code Section 32-6-72 without a permit issued by the department.
  2. On and after January 1, 1972, no person, firm, or corporation shall maintain a sign lawfully in existence on October 6, 1971, and which is authorized by this part without a permit issued by the department.
  3. On and after March 4, 1977, no person, firm, or corporation shall erect or maintain a sign authorized by paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-73 without a permit issued by the department.
  4. On and after July 1, 1977, no person, firm, or corporation shall maintain a sign lawfully in existence on March 4, 1977, and which sign is authorized by paragraph (1) of Code Section 32-6-73 without a permit issued by the department.
    1. It is the intent of this Code section to provide for a system of cataloguing and registering nonconforming signs in order to administer this part more adequately. The department is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations consistent with this Code section requiring the registration of nonconforming signs; and such rules and regulations shall inform the applicants of the procedures to make application for nonconforming sign permits.
    2. From March 24, 1980, all persons, firms, or corporations who own nonconforming signs as defined in paragraph (12) of Code Section 32-6-71 shall have a period of one year during which time they shall be required to file application for nonconforming sign permits. Applications for nonconforming sign permits shall be made upon forms prescribed and provided by the department and shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department’s rules and regulations. If the applicant files the application for a nonconforming sign permit upon the forms and according to the procedures provided by the department and within the specified time period of one year, the application shall be considered to have been filed timely and properly. An application fee of $50.00 shall accompany the application for each nonconforming sign and both the application and the fee shall be submitted to the department. The money received from permit fees shall be used to help defray the expenses of administering this part, Code Section 48-2-17 to the contrary notwithstanding. The department shall have a period of two years from March 24, 1980, to process applications for nonconforming sign permits. If at the end of this two-year period the department has failed to approve or deny a proper and completed application, it shall be conclusively presumed for all purposes that the sign can be permitted as a nonconforming sign and the department must issue the permit within a reasonable time. Should the department deny the application for a nonconforming sign permit, the applicant may seek relief in accordance with Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18. In cases where the applicant fails to exhaust the procedures prescribed by Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18, the department’s denial of the permit request will be final and the sign shall then become an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 and shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part.
    3. If the owner of the nonconforming sign fails to apply properly for a permit, it is conclusively presumed that the sign has been abandoned, and the sign shall then become an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71, and the sign shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part.
  5. On or after March 24, 1980, the department shall have the right to refuse to issue any additional permits to any person, firm, or corporation who the department determines is maintaining or is allowing to be maintained an illegal sign or signs as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 on the interstate or primary highways in this state until such illegal sign or signs are removed. The refusal by the department to issue any additional permits shall not be considered a final denial. If the applicant does not believe the sign or signs designated by the department are illegal, the applicant may seek relief in accordance with Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18. Unless, within 120 days after the applicant has requested an administrative hearing, the department has issued a final agency decision that the sign or signs are illegal, the department may no longer refuse to issue permits because of a contention that an illegal sign or signs are being maintained.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 9; Code 1933, § 95A-921, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 7; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 5; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, “cataloguing” was substituted for “cataloging” in the first sentence of paragraph (e)(1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Zoned commercial or industrial areas. — Department of Transportation may issue permits for outdoor advertising devices, and renew such permits, within “forest-agricultural” districts of Glynn County if the department commonly and generally recognizes the activities permitted therein as commercial or industrial. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

32-6-80. Renewal of permits for nonconforming signs; transfer of permits for nonconforming signs.

  1. After March 24, 1980, renewal of permits for nonconforming signs as defined in paragraph (12) of Code Section 32-6-71 and as authorized in subsection (e) of Code Section 32-6-79 shall be made to the department upon forms prescribed by the department; shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department’s rules and regulations; and shall be verified under oath by the person, firm, or corporation making the application. Permit renewals shall be issued and shall be valid only if the sign is maintained in accordance with this part during the 12 month period next following the date of issuance. The fee for the renewal of a permit shall be $25.00. The money received from permit fees shall be used to help defray the expenses of administering this part. Upon receipt of a properly executed application and the appropriate fee for the maintenance of a sign which may be lawfully maintained pursuant to this part, the department shall, within 60 days, issue a permit renewal authorizing the maintenance of the sign for which application is made. Application for the renewal of a permit shall be made to the department not more than 90 days nor less than 60 days before the expiration date of the permit for which renewal is sought. If the department fails to receive the renewal application before the expiration date of the permit, the department will notify the applicant that the renewal application is overdue when the applicant’s address is known or reasonably available to the department and shall give the applicant 30 days after the expiration date to send the department the renewal application. If the applicant does not send the properly executed application and the appropriate fee within the specified 30 day period, the sign shall then become an illegal sign. No permit shall be renewed if the application for the renewal thereof has not been made in accordance with this Code section.
  2. Permits shall be transferable. An application to have the permit transferred shall be made within 30 days of the change in ownership of the sign; shall be made to the department upon forms prescribed by the department; shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department; and shall be verified under oath by the person, firm, or corporation making application for transfer. Failure to comply in a timely and proper manner with this subsection shall be grounds for revocation of the permit.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-922, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 6; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Zoned commercial or industrial areas. — Department of Transportation may issue permits for outdoor advertising devices, and renew such permits, within “forest-agricultural” districts of Glynn County if the department commonly and generally recognizes the activities permitted therein as commercial or industrial. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

If there are activities permitted in the district which are commonly and generally recognized as commercial, then the permits for outdoor advertising devices may be renewed, provided criteria for renewal established elsewhere in the law are met. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

32-6-81. Revocation or withholding of permits for illegal or unauthorized actions against the department’s property.

  1. It shall be cause for the department to revoke a sign permit or refuse to issue a sign permit if any of the department’s property on the rights of way, including but not limited to trees, vegetation, or fences, is destroyed, damaged, converted, or altered by or on behalf of a person, firm, or corporation who owns, erects, maintains, leases, or uses any sign which is controlled by this part. When the department believes that any of the aforesaid property has been destroyed, damaged, converted, or altered, the department shall make a preliminary investigation and based on its findings may:
    1. Revoke the permit or permits of any owner of a sign or signs if the department determines that the person, firm, or corporation who owns the land or who owns, erects, maintains, leases, or uses the sign or signs caused, hired, procured, or consciously or by design consented to any of the illegal acts described in this paragraph at or near the sign site, thereby depriving the sign owner of the permit to use that site; or
    2. Refuse to issue a permit or permits for a sign site or sites for a period not to exceed five years if the department determines that the applicant has caused, hired, procured, or consciously or by design consented to any of the illegal acts described in this subsection on the department’s rights of way within 500 feet on either side of that sign site or sites.
  2. Before the actions listed in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section may be taken, the department shall give 30 days’ written notice via certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the permit holder; and this notice shall apprise the permit holder of a hearing that will be held in accordance with Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18. If the action described in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section is taken, the department shall state this in its refusal to issue a permit, and the applicant shall have the right to an administrative review of this action as provided by Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-930.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 8; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2000 amendment was applicable to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

32-6-82. Acquisition by department of property rights in outdoor advertising which does not comply with requirements of part.

The department is authorized to acquire by purchase, gift, or condemnation and to pay just compensation for any property rights in outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected in compliance with the applicable laws in effect at the time of erection but which do not conform to this part or which fail to comply with this part due to changed conditions beyond the control of the sign owner. The department shall be limited to an expenditure of $5 million for the state’s portion of just compensation. The department shall be prohibited from paying more than 25 percent of any award for just compensation.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 11; Code 1933, § 95A-923, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 33.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Eminent domain: determination of just compensation for condemnation of billboards or other advertising signs, 73 A.L.R.3d 1122.

32-6-83. Acquisition by municipal corporation or county of outdoor advertising which does not comply with requirements of applicable ordinances, regulations, or resolutions.

Any municipal corporation or county is authorized to acquire by purchase, gift, or condemnation and to pay just compensation for any property rights in outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected but which do not conform with the provisions of any lawful ordinance, regulation, or resolution or which at a later date fail to comply with the provisions of any lawful ordinance, regulation, or resolution due to changed conditions beyond the control of the sign owner. No municipal corporation or county shall remove or cause to be removed any such nonconforming outdoor advertising sign, display, or device without paying just compensation. Such compensation shall be paid in accordance with the conditions stated in Code Section 32-6-84. For the purposes of this Code section, the term “devices” means light, lighting fixtures, or other fixtures which are permanently attached to an advertising sign or display.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 8; Code 1933, § 95A-923.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 803, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

County ordinance violated O.C.G.A. § 32-6-83 since the ordinance provided that a nonconforming sign damaged by weather or an act of God could not be repaired or reerected. State v. Hartrampf, 273 Ga. 522 , 544 S.E.2d 130 (2001).

Just compensation. —

County sign ordinance was unconstitutional since the ordinance conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 32-6-83 requiring the payment of just compensation after the county acquired an owner’s property rights when an advertiser attempted to repair a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign damaged by a tornado and the ordinance contained no provision for paying compensation. Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the county was erroneous when the county failed to pay the advertiser just compensation for taking of the advertiser’s sign. Outdoor Sys. v. Cobb County, 274 Ga. 611 , 555 S.E.2d 435 (2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

32-6-84. Interests and losses which may be compensable under Code Sections 32-6-82 and 32-6-83.

The compensation provided for in Code Sections 32-6-82 and 32-6-83 is authorized to be paid only for the following:

  1. The taking from the owner of such sign, display, or device of all right, title, leasehold, and interest in such sign, display, or device;
  2. The taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign, display, or device is located of the right to erect and maintain such signs, displays, and devices thereon;
  3. The actual financial loss suffered by the lessee under a written lease expressly and solely permitting the erection and maintenance of a sign, display, or device (which was lawful on the date such lease was executed) because of the refusal by the department to issue a permit for the erection of such sign, display, or device, provided that the amount of compensation paid may not exceed the pro rata part of the entire rental paid and to be paid under such lease for the unelapsed portion thereof remaining on July 1, 1973; or
  4. The actual financial loss suffered by the lessor under a written lease expressly and solely permitting the erection and maintenance of a sign, display, or device (which was lawful on the date such lease was executed) because of the refusal by the department to issue a permit for the erection of such sign, display, or device, provided that the amount of compensation paid may not exceed the pro rata part of the entire rental paid and to be paid under such lease for the unelapsed portion thereof remaining on July 1, 1973.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 8; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 12; Code 1933, § 95A-924, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 32.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Eminent domain: determination of just compensation for condemnation of billboards or other advertising signs, 73 A.L.R.3d 1122.

32-6-85. Department’s exercise of eminent domain power to acquire interests specified in Code Section 32-6-84.

Whenever it is necessary, in the judgment of the commissioner, to acquire those interests specified in Code Section 32-6-84, the department may exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title for the acquisition of real property needed for the construction of highways.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 9; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 13; Code 1933, § 95A-925, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-86. Compensation contingent upon federal matching funds.

The department shall not acquire any sign by purchase or condemnation, any portion of the cost of which is eligible for federal participation, until such time as federal matching funds have been apportioned to and made available to the department for such acquisition. No sign shall be acquired by condemnation, except after three months’ written notice has been given to the owner thereof of the intention to so acquire the same, during which time the penalties provided by this part shall not apply.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 14; Code 1933, § 95A-926, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

U.S. Code. —

For provisions regarding authorization of federal matching funds, referred to in this Code section, see 23 U.S.C. § 131(m) .

32-6-87. Agreements with United States Secretary of Transportation.

Subject to the provisions of this part, the department is authorized, on behalf of the state, to enter into agreements with the United States Secretary of Transportation (as provided in Section 131 of Title 23 of the United States Code) relating to the control of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems, including the establishment of information centers at safety rest areas. The department is also authorized to take action in the name of the state to comply with the terms of such agreements.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 22; Code 1933, § 95A-934, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-87.1. “RV friendly” markers.

  1. Subject to the prior approval of the Federal Highway Administration, the department is directed to incorporate the use of “RV friendly” markers on specific service signs for business establishments that cater to the needs of persons driving recreational vehicles. A business establishment that qualifies for participation in the specific service sign program and that also qualifies as “RV friendly” may request that an “RV friendly” marker be displayed immediately adjacent to such establishment’s business logo sign on the appropriate background sign panel. For purposes of this Code section, the “RV friendly” marker to be displayed shall be such marker as may be approved by the Federal Highway Administration in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
  2. In accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” and subject to the approval of the Federal Highway Administration, the department shall promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to implement the provisions of this Code section, including the promulgation of rules and regulations setting forth the minimum requirements that business establishments must meet in order to qualify as “RV friendly.” Such requirements shall include, but shall not be limited to, the availability at each qualifying business establishment of parking spaces, entrances and exits in sufficient number and of sufficient size and dimensions to easily accommodate recreational vehicles, and the presence of appropriate overhang clearances at all facilities, if applicable.
  3. For the purposes of assisting the Federal Highway Administration in considering the approval of an “RV friendly” marker for incorporation into the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the department is directed to submit a request to the Federal Highway Administration for permission to experiment with the use of an “RV friendly” marker on specific service signs in accordance with this Code section.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-87.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2007, p. 45, § 1/SB 87; Ga. L. 2008, p. 324, § 32/SB 455.

32-6-88. Designation of defined areas where directional information is provided by previously conforming signs or devices.

Upon written request made by any county, city, corporation, partnership, association, person, or persons, the board is authorized to consider and to designate a specific area or areas as a defined area or areas, upon a showing having been made that the area in question contains directional signs, displays, or devices which were lawfully erected under state law in force at the time of erection and in existence on May 5, 1976, and which do not conform to the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (6) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraphs (1) through (4) of Code Section 32-6-73, and upon a further showing that such directional signs, displays, and devices provide directional information about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public and that their removal would work a substantial economic hardship in such defined area or areas.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-934.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 5.

32-6-89. Retention of directional signs, displays, and devices in defined areas.

Upon designation made by the board of an area or areas as a defined area or areas for purposes of requesting the approval of the United States Secretary of Transportation for the retention of directional signs, displays, and devices in the specific interest of the traveling public, the Georgia Department of Transportation is authorized to request the approval of the United States Secretary of Transportation.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-934.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

32-6-90. Promulgation of rules and regulations by department.

The department is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations governing the issuance and revocation of permits for the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising which is authorized by Code Sections 32-6-72 and 32-6-73 and which is not prohibited by this part. The department is further authorized to promulgate rules and regulations governing the issuance, revocation, and renewal of permits for the trimming of trees and vegetation on the state’s rights of way authorized by and in accordance with Code Section 32-6-75.3. Such rules and regulations shall be consistent with the safety and welfare of the traveling public, and as may be necessary to carry out the policy of the state declared in this part, and consistent with the purposes of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Public Law 89-285, as amended, and contained in Title 23, United States Code. The department is further authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out this part.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 5; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 8; Code 1933, § 95A-920, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 31; Ga. L. 1977, p. 263, § 6; Ga. L. 1981, p. 955, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1313, § 4.

Law reviews. —

For review of 1998 legislation relating to highways, bridges, and ferries, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 136 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Outdoor advertising. —

Since former paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 32-2-41 expressly forbade the commissioner from exercising the board’s power concerning the approval of “long-range plans and programs of the department,” and the adoption, amendment, or repeal of departmental rules and regulations concerning outdoor advertising in Georgia was a long-range program, the commissioner was not empowered to adopt proposed amendments to such rules and regulations sua sponte. Outdoor Adv. Ass'n v. DOT, 186 Ga. App. 550 , 367 S.E.2d 827 (1988).

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 , in no uncertain terms, delegated the regulation of outdoor advertising to the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), as the statute provided in part that it was the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system, under § 32-6-70 (a), and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-90 further authorized the DOT to promulgate regulations governing permits for outdoor advertising. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department must maintain control over contemplated tree cutting operations. — Given the Department of Transportation’s authority and obligation to control the state highway system, it seems imperative that the department maintain rigid and absolute control over any contemplated tree cutting operations, particularly if those operations are undertaken by private individuals on rights-of-way. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

Authorization to regulate cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way. — Authorization to formulate rules related to, and issuance of permits for, cutting of trees and vegetation on rights-of-way does not impinge upon the Department of Transportation’s authority and legal obligation to control the state highway system. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-75.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158 .

Power of highway officer in respect of billboards or other conditions on adjoining property which are deemed dangerous to travel or offensive esthetically to travelers, 81 A.L.R. 1547 .

32-6-91. Erection or maintenance of sign without permit as constituting misdemeanor.

Any person who erects or maintains any sign for which a permit is required by this part without a valid permit or renewal of such permit issued by the department shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day or fraction thereof during which a sign is unlawfully maintained shall constitute a separate offense. The commissioner and officials or employees of said department designated by the commissioner are authorized to take such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to procure the prosecution and conviction of any person, firm, or corporation violating this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 15; Code 1933, § 95A-927, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-92. Maintenance of unauthorized sign as constituting misdemeanor.

Any person who maintains any sign not authorized by this part and which was not lawfully in existence on October 6, 1971, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day or fraction thereof during which a sign is unlawfully maintained shall constitute a separate offense. The commissioner and officials or employees of the department designated by the commissioner are authorized to take such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to procure the prosecution and conviction of any person, firm, or corporation violating this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 16; Code 1933, § 95A-928, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

32-6-93. Erection or maintenance of sign without a permit as constituting a public nuisance; enjoining erection or maintenance of such sign.

The erection or maintenance by any person, firm, or corporation of any sign for which a permit is required by this part without a valid permit or renewal thereof issued by the department is declared to be a public nuisance. In addition to the remedies provided for in this part or which may otherwise exist under the laws of Georgia, the department is authorized to bring an equitable proceeding to enjoin any person, firm, or corporation from erecting or maintaining, without a valid permit or renewal thereof, any sign for which a permit or renewal thereof is required by this part. It shall not be necessary for the department to allege and prove that there is no adequate remedy at law in order to obtain the equitable relief provided for in this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 17; Code 1933, § 95A-929, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Billboards and other outdoor advertising signs as civil nuisance, 38 A.L.R.3d 647.

32-6-94. Maintenance of unauthorized sign as constituting a public nuisance; enjoining maintenance of such sign.

The maintenance by any person, firm, or corporation of any sign which is not authorized by this part and which was not lawfully in existence on October 6, 1971, is declared to be a public nuisance. In addition to the remedies provided for in this part or which may otherwise exist under the laws of Georgia, the department is authorized to bring an equitable proceeding to enjoin any person, firm, or corporation from maintaining any sign which is not in compliance with this Code section. It shall not be necessary for the department to allege and prove that there is no adequate remedy at law in order to obtain the equitable relief provided for in this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 18; Code 1933, § 95A-930, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Billboards and other outdoor advertising signs as civil nuisance, 38 A.L.R.3d 647.

32-6-95. Applicability of Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” to part generally; affirmance of agency decision by operation of law.

  1. In addition to the procedures and remedies afforded by this part, any person, firm, or corporation who owns, uses, leases, or subleases any outdoor advertising sign which is controlled by this part or who owns property on which a sign is located shall be subject to Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” with respect to the erection, maintenance, or use of outdoor advertising signs.
  2. It is specifically declared that the procedures provided in Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-22 may be employed in cases wherein the department believes that a sign has been erected or is being maintained or used in violation of this part. After conducting the hearing required by Code Section 50-13-13, the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee, hearing officer, or others are authorized to issue an order requiring the disassembly and removal of any sign which has been administratively determined to be illegal as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71. In the event that the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee, hearing officer, or others find that a sign is illegal and order its disassembly and removal, the party or parties against whom the order is directed shall be given 120 days from the date of the order in which to disassemble and remove the sign.  In the event the party or parties against whom the order is directed fail to comply with the order, the department may disassemble and remove the sign in accordance with Code Section 32-6-96.
  3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, when a petition for judicial review of a final decision of the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee, hearing officer, or others in any matter arising under this title is filed pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act,” if the superior court in which the petition for review is filed does not hear the case within 120 days from the date the petition for review is filed with the court, the final agency decision shall be considered affirmed by operation of law unless a hearing originally scheduled to be heard within 120 days has been continued to a date certain by order of the court.  In the event a hearing is held later than 120 days after the date the petition for review is filed with the superior court because a hearing originally scheduled to be heard within the 120 days has been continued to a date certain by order of the court, the final agency decision shall be considered affirmed by operation of law if no order of the court disposing of the issues presented for review has been entered within 60 days after the date of the continued hearing. If a case is heard within 120 days from the date the petition for review is filed, the final agency decision shall be considered affirmed by operation of law if no order of the court dispositive of the issues presented for review has been entered within 60 days of the date of the hearing.
  4. A decision of the agency affirmed by operation of law under subsection (c) of this Code section shall be subject to appellate review in the same manner as a decision of the superior court.  The date of entry of judgment for purposes of appeal pursuant to Code Section 5-6-35 of a decision affirmed by operation of law without action of the superior court shall be the last date on which the superior court could have taken action under subsection (c) of this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-930.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 7; Ga. L. 1993, p. 969, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Affirmed by operation of law. —

When landowners and a sign company sought judicial review of the Georgia Department of Transportation’s denial of their request for permits to erect outdoor advertising on the owners’ property, an affirmance of the denial was affirmed by operation of law, under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-95(c) , because the owners and the company did not schedule a hearing on their petition for judicial review to occur within 120 days of the petition being filed. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

Construction with § 34-9-105 . —

In light of the fact that O.C.G.A. § 32-6-95(c) is worded nearly identically to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) and that both statutes concern trial court review of agency decisions, there is no reason to interpret the “affirmed by operation of law” provision in § 32-6-95(c) differently from the interpretation of the similar provision in § 34-9-105(b) . Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287 , 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).

32-6-96. Authority of department to enter upon private lands to implement administrative decisions; reimbursement of department for expenses; return or disposition of stored sign remnants.

  1. After notifying the landowner by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, in cases where an administrative order has been issued by the commissioner or his designee, hearing officer, or others requiring the removal of an illegal outdoor advertising sign and the order has become a final decision, the department shall be authorized to enter upon privately owned lands for the purposes of effectuating the administrative order requiring disassembly and removal of illegal signs, provided the order issued authorizes this action by the department.
  2. The disassembly and removal of any illegal sign by the department shall begin only after an inspection of the sign site has been made by an employee of the department and it is found that the sign has not been removed and an affidavit of the employee reflecting this finding has been filed by the department in the closed administrative record in the case. When the department disassembles and removes a sign, it shall be done as expeditiously as reasonably possible during daylight hours of regular working days, and it shall be done in a manner so as to cause as little inconvenience to the property owner as is possible under the circumstances. The outdoor advertising sign shall be removed to the nearest convenient field or district office of the department which is suitable for storage of the sign.
  3. An itemization of the expenses incurred by the department for the disassembly, removal, transportation, and storage may be kept and a statement for the expenses incurred may be sent via certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the party or parties against whom the order requiring the disassembly and removal is directed. It shall be the duty of the party or parties to reimburse the department for the expenses incurred by the department for the disassembly, removal, transportation, and storage of the sign. In the event the expenses are not paid in full within 30 days of receipt of the itemized statement, the department in its discretion may:
    1. Institute a civil action to recover these unpaid expenses;
    2. Utilize any other collection procedures authorized by law; or
    3. Refuse to issue a permit or permits to the party or parties from whom the expenses are due for any outdoor advertising site until such expenses are paid.

      However, if the party or parties dispute the itemized amount or dispute that the expenses are due, the party or parties may deposit the sum claimed due with the department or post a bond with good security in an amount equal to the sum claimed due, such bond to be approved by the department, and the party or parties shall then request a hearing and the controversy shall be decided in accordance with Code Sections 50-13-13 through 50-13-18. Until such a final determination is made, the department shall not refuse to issue a permit or permits.

  4. If the party or parties against whom the order is directed pay   the itemized expenses within 30 days from the receipt of the statement and requests the right to retrieve the stored remains of the sign at the time of payment, the department shall allow the party or parties to retrieve the sign remains within a reasonable period of time. If the party or parties against whom the order is directed fail to pay the itemized expenses within 30 days of the receipt of the statement, or if they timely pay the expenses but fail to request the right to retrieve the sign remains within a timely period or, if after making a timely request they fail to retrieve the sign remains within a timely period, then the department is authorized to dispose of the stored signs, or remnants thereof, in any lawful manner the department deems appropriate. Any other provisions of this or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, any party or parties against whom any order is issued shall have the right to seek relief directly in the superior court.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 19; Code 1933, § 95A-931, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 9; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2000 amendment was applicable to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 95-2006 and former Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Procedures for disposal of confiscated signs. — When advertising signs are removed from state highway property, the Department of Transportation must first send a 30 day notice to the owner of the signs, and then store the signs for a reasonable length of time, during which time the owner may claim the signs; if the signs are unclaimed after a reasonable length of time such signs may be treated as abandoned property and disposed of in any manner, within the law, the department deems appropriate. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-24 (decided under former Ga. L. 1967, p. 423).

32-6-97. Construction of part.

Nothing in this part shall be construed to abrogate or affect any lawful ordinance, regulation, or resolution which is more restrictive than this part.

History. — Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 20; Code 1933, § 95A-932, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

State law has not preempted police power authority of municipalities to regulate the location and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs within the municipalities’ territorial jurisdictions. City of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp., 236 Ga. 385 , 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

General statutes control over local ordinances. — When issuing permits for outdoor advertising devices, the Department of Transportation must be guided by the law, notwithstanding the local zoning ordinances. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

When permit may issue for advertising in forest-agricultural district. — If, in the Department of Transportation’s uniform application of the law, one or more of the following activities, that is, animal hospitals, golf courses, dredging, land fill, or the excavation of natural materials, boat marinas, bait houses, swimming beaches, and radio and television stations, are commonly or generally recognized as commercial, the department may issue permits for outdoor advertising devices in the forest-agricultural district. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

Article 4 Limited-access Roads

32-6-110. “Local service road” defined.

As used in this article, the term “local service road” means any public road, whether existing at the time of the designation of a limited-access road or established thereafter, which serves the owner or occupant of any land or improvements abutting a limited-access road and which gives a means of ingress to and egress from any such lands or improvements.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-935, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Abutting owner’s right to damages for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42 A.L.R.3d 13.

Measure and elements of damage for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42 A.L.R.3d 148.

32-6-111. Establishment and maintenance of limited-access roads.

  1. The department or a county or a municipality in this state, acting alone or in cooperation with each other or with any federal, state, or local agency, is authorized and empowered to plan, designate, establish, regulate, abandon, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited-access public roads wherever the department or such authorities consider that traffic conditions, present or future, justify such special facilities, provided that the term “traffic conditions, present or future, justifying such special facilities” shall be construed to mean a road having present traffic volumes requiring a minimum of four lanes of road or traffic volumes estimated to be accommodated by the road within a period not to exceed 20 years from the date of such consideration that will require a minimum of four lanes of road; provided, further, that within municipalities such authorization for limited-access public roads shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law, except that such municipal consent is not necessary for any limited-access road if the limited-access road includes space or other provisions for the construction of a heavy rail line as a part of a public transportation system or a rapid busway operating on a designated lane as a part of a public transportation system and such public transportation system is a part of a regional transportation plan developed by the metropolitan planning organization or other such similar body.
  2. The department or a county or a municipality, in addition to the specific powers granted in this article, also shall have and may exercise, relative to limited-access facilities, any and all additional authority vested in them relative to other public roads in their jurisdiction.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-936, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 163, § 1.

Cross references. —

Manner of operation of motor vehicles on divided highways and controlled-access roadways, § 40-6-50 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Resolution and ordinance authorizing land transfer constituted “municipal consent” as well as “cooperation” between city and the Department of Transportation and thus estopped city from revoking the department’s consent to construction of parkway. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

No need to condemn “right of access” not existing previously. —

Condemnor creating a limited access highway does not have to condemn a purported “right of access” where none has previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973).

Political subdivisions not liable for each others’ torts in joint project. —

While the law authorizes the cooperation of counties and municipal corporations with the Department of Transportation for the purpose of establishing limited access highways, there is nothing in the statute or in the law generally which expressly or by implication makes one of the cooperating governmental entities liable for the unilateral tortious acts of another cooperating governmental entity in a project of this type. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App. 19 , 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).

Courts may, and the Court of Appeals does, take judicial cognizance that municipalities and counties are separately created and possess divergent powers; accordingly, the unilateral action of one may not be construed as imposing liability upon the other even though the action taken by the one may be under a statute authorizing a cooperative effort. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App. 19 , 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity of restrictions as to points at which jitney bus passengers may be taken on and discharged, 6 A.L.R. 110 .

Effect of expiration of charter of turnpike or tollroad company on title to road, 30 A.L.R. 206 .

Abutting owner’s right to damages or other relief for loss of access because of limited-access highway or street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072; 42 A.L.R.3d 13; 42 A.L.R.3d 148.

32-6-112. Acquisition of property and property rights.

The department, a county, or a municipality may acquire private property and property rights for limited-access facilities and service roads, including rights of access, of view, of air, and of light through gift, devise, purchase, or condemnation in the same manner as such governmental units are authorized by law to acquire such property or property rights in connection with public roads within their respective jurisdictions. Public property or an interest therein may be acquired for such purposes by the department or by a county or municipality by any method authorized by law for such acquisition other than condemnation. The acquisition of public property or an interest therein for such purposes by condemnation may be accomplished by the department pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of Code Section 32-3-4 when such acquisition is approved by the State Commission on the Condemnation of Public Property as provided in Code Section 50-16-183. As used in this Code section, the term “public property” has the meaning provided for in Code Section 50-16-180. In the process of acquiring property or property rights for any limited-access facility, the department or the county or municipality, in its discretion, may acquire an entire lot, block, or tract of land if, by so doing, the interest of the public will best be served.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-938, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1187, § 5.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of local government law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Department lacks power to condemn public property. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-112 does not confer on the Department of Transportation the power to condemn public property as the law only authorizes the department to acquire property “in the same manner” as the department is otherwise authorized by law to acquire property. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124 , 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Abutting owner’s right to damages or limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42 A.L.R.3d 13.

Measure and elements of damage for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 52 A.L.R.3d 148.

32-6-113. Design of limited-access roads.

Limited-access roads may be so designed as to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access thereto so as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended. The authority designating and establishing any limited-access road is authorized to divide and separate such highway into separate roadways by the construction of raised curbings, central dividing sections, or other physical separations or by designating such separate roadways by signs, markers, or stripes; to designate the proper lanes for traffic moving in opposite directions; and to prohibit the making of turns at specified points. The designating authority may recommend to the commissioner of public safety or, if the roads in question are in a municipality, to the municipality that there be fixed on such roads and on the separate lanes thereof such rates of speed as are deemed in the public interest. No person shall have any right of ingress to or egress from or passage across any limited-access road to or from abutting lands except at the designated points to which access may be permitted and under such arrangements and conditions as may be specified from time to time.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-937, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Property condemned for limited access highway. —

In view of this section and the ruling in Department of Transp. v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973), no right of access to the limited-access highway exists in one whose property is condemned for a highway. State Hwy. Dep't v. Kinsey, 131 Ga. App. 770 , 206 S.E.2d 835 (1974).

Contiguous landowners have no right of access to limited access highways. —

This provision has effect of preventing a property right of access from arising for benefit of contiguous landowners in newly created limited access highway. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973).

No condemnation necessary when no prior right of access. —

Condemnor creating limited access highway does not have to condemn a purported “right of access” when none has previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right of fee owner to use highway for agricultural or grazing purposes, 145 A.L.R. 1356 .

Laws of road or traffic regulation as affected by closing of street or highway to general public or restriction of its use to special class of persons, 157 A.L.R. 1164 .

32-6-114. Designation of limited-access roads; elimination of intersections at grade.

The department, a county, or a municipality may designate and establish limited-access roads as new or additional facilities or may designate or establish existing public roads to be limited-access roads. The department or the counties or municipalities shall have authority to provide for the elimination of intersections at grade of limited-access highways with existing state, county, or municipal public roads or railroad rights of way by grade separation or local service roads or by closing off such roads or streets at the right of way boundary line of such limited-access road. After the establishment of any limited-access road, no public road which is not a part of such facility shall intersect the same at grade. No public road shall be opened into or connected with any established limited-access road without the consent of the governmental authority having jurisdiction of such limited-access road, in the same manner as such governmental units are authorized by law.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-939, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Elimination of railroad grade crossings, § 32-6-193 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

No condemnation necessary when no prior right of access. —

Condemnor creating limited access highway need not condemn purported “right of access” when none previously existed. DOT v. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359 , 201 S.E.2d 441 (1973).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Laws of road or traffic regulation as affected by closing of street or highway to general public or restriction of its use to special class of persons, 157 A.L.R. 1164 .

32-6-115. Conducting commercial enterprises or activities on property on which limited-access roads have been constructed.

Except as otherwise provided in this Code section and Code Section 32-6-116, no commercial enterprise or activities shall be authorized or conducted by the department or any other agency or by a county or municipality of the state, within or on the property on which have been constructed limited-access roads as defined in this article, provided that the term “commercial enterprise or activities” shall not be so construed as to prevent the installation of public utility facilities, to the extent that it is authorized by law, or as to prevent the proper management of property acquired for future construction of public roads, including limited-access roads, as such acquisition is authorized in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-936, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 1401, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Cooperating governmental entities not liable for each other’s torts. —

While the law authorizes cooperation of counties and municipal corporations with the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) for the purpose of establishing limited access highways, there is nothing in statute or in the law generally which expressly or by implication makes one of the cooperating governmental entities liable for unilateral tortious acts of another cooperating governmental entity in a project of this type. Madden v. Fulton County, 102 Ga. App. 19 , 115 S.E.2d 406 (1960).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority to issue license for rail line. — Department of Transportation has authority to issue a revocable license to a company constructing and operating a rapid rail passenger service line to cross the rights-of-way of several state routes so long as consideration is received which represents a substantial benefit to the public. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-45.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Effect of expiration of charter of turnpike or tollroad company on title to road, 30 A.L.R. 206 .

Abutting owner’s right to damages or other relief for loss of access because of limited-access highway or street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072; 42 A.L.R.3d 13; 42 A.L.R.3d 148.

32-6-116. Installation and operation of vending machines in safety rest areas on rights of way of state highway system.

The department is authorized to install or provide for the installation of and to operate or provide for the operation of vending machines in safety rest areas constructed on or located on the rights of way of the state highway system. The vending machines may dispense nonalcoholic beverages, snacks, candy, cigarettes, and other articles as determined by the department to be necessary or desirable for the traveling public at reasonable prices. The prices charged for these products shall approximate the prevailing rate within the area for similar items so as not to compete unfairly with private enterprise, such prices to be set by the department.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-936.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 132, § 3.

Cross references. —

Authority of department to provide information to traveling public at safety rest areas, § 32-2-4 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Effect of expiration of charter of turnpike or tollroad company on title to road, 30 A.L.R. 206 .

32-6-117. Lease of air rights.

The department is authorized to lease by negotiation air rights over existing or proposed limited-access highways for development as commercial enterprises or activities. Prior to entering into any negotiations for the lease of such air rights, the department shall advertise its intent to negotiate the lease of such air rights at least once a week for four consecutive weeks in one or more newspapers of general circulation in the county or counties where the air rights to be leased are situated and in one or more legal organs in Fulton County. Any person, firm, or corporation leasing such air rights shall reimburse the department for all costs, including administrative costs, incurred by the department in connection with the negotiation of said lease. Furthermore, when two or more offers are received by the department for a lease of air rights, the highest responsible offer shall be accepted by the department. The department shall establish a minimum negotiated price, based upon competent appraisal; and the final negotiated amount shall not be less than this appraisal.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-936, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 1401, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Effect of expiration of charter of turnpike or tollroad company on title to road, 30 A.L.R. 206 .

Abutting owner’s right to damages or other relief for loss of access because of limited-access highway or street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072; 42 A.L.R.3d 13; 42 A.L.R.3d 148.

Municipal power as to billboards and outdoor advertising, 58 A.L.R.2d 1314.

Municipality’s power to permit private owner to construct building or structure overhanging or crossing the air space above public street or sidewalk, 76 A.L.R.2d 896.

32-6-118. Establishment, maintenance, and disposal of local service roads.

In connection with the development of any limited-access facility, the department, a county, or a municipality is authorized to plan, designate, establish, use, regulate, alter, improve, maintain, abandon, and dispose of local service roads or streets or to designate as local service roads any existing public road and to exercise jurisdiction over service roads in the same manner as authorized over any other public roads on their public road systems if such local service roads are deemed necessary or desirable. Such local service roads shall be of appropriate design and shall be separated from the limited-access facility property by means of any or all devices designated as necessary or desirable by the proper authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 7; Code 1933, § 95A-940, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-119. Effect of article on Coastal Highway District and Coastal Scenic Highway Authority.

This article shall in no way take away from, impair, or infringe upon the authority, duty, power, or obligations of the Coastal Highway District or the Coastal Scenic Highway Authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 559, § 9; Code 1933, § 95A-941, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Article 5 Commercial Property and Subdivisions

PART 1 Commercial Property

32-6-130. “Commercial driveway” defined.

As used in this part, the term “commercial driveway” means any private entrance, exit, ramp, tunnel, bridge, side road, or other vehicular passageway to any property used for commercial purposes, except a farm or a dwelling house not exceeding a four-family capacity, and leading to or from any public road on the state highway system.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-942, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-131. Permit requirement as to construction or improvement of commercial driveways; authority of department to close driveways for violations.

It shall be unlawful for any person to construct a new commercial driveway or to reconstruct, alter, or improve any existing commercial driveway without first obtaining a permit from the department therefor and complying with the department regulations authorized by Code Section 32-6-133. A violation of this Code section, in addition to being unlawful, shall entitle the department to barricade, displace, or otherwise close such driveway and to collect the costs therefor from the violator as provided in Code Section 32-6-134.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-943, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Purpose of section. —

By requiring permits for commercial access to state roads, the legislative intent was to promote public safety by mandating Department of Transportation oversight as to whether, among other things, every new or changed commercial driveway is, in fact, safe to the public. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190 , 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995).

Construction of unpermitted driveway negligence per se. —

Motorcyclist who was injured in a collision with a vehicle that pulled out from an unpermitted commercial driveway into the motorcyclist’s path was within the category of persons protected by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 and, from the evidence, the jury could determine that the construction or maintenance of the driveway in violation of that section would be negligence per se. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190 , 464 S.E.2d 633 (1995).

Exclusion of evidence proper. —

In a wrongful death action, the trial court did not err by granting the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence related to an alleged violation of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-131 with regard to the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants violated § 32-6-131 or were negligent per se in failing to get a permit for a speed bump in which the decedent collided as the trial court properly reasoned that the relationship between the permitting process, the speed-bump, and the accident involving the decedent was too tenuous, making the evidence irrelevant; the plaintiff failed to include the theory of the alleged statutory and regulatory violation in the pretrial order; and the plaintiff failed to provide the defendants’ counsel with notice of the regulations until the day before trial. Land v. Ricks, 288 Ga. App. 497 , 654 S.E.2d 643 (2007).

32-6-132. Change or substitution of existing commercial driveways.

Any commercial driveway constructed prior to July 1, 1973, and adjudged by the department to be unsafe for the traveling public or in violation of department regulations promulgated pursuant to Code Section 32-6-133 may be changed or caused to be changed by the department so as to eliminate any unsafe features; or it may be closed or displaced by substitution therefor of another driveway at such place or of such design as may be deemed safe. Liability for the expense of such change or substitution will be determined in accordance with Code Section 32-6-134.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-944, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-133. Promulgation of regulations; charges for permits for commercial driveways.

  1. The department is granted the authority to promulgate uniform and reasonable regulations to carry out the provisions of this part. In making such regulations the department shall specify among other things the circumstances under which commercial driveway permits may be issued or revoked, provided that such regulations shall not deprive the landowner of reasonable access to the public road on the state highway system.
    1. Where a person seeks a permit to construct, reconstruct, alter, or improve a commercial driveway and the commercial driveway will lie in whole or in part upon a parcel of land acquired for the state highway system from such person or the immediately preceding owner of such property from whom such person acquired title to such property, the total amount of money charged to such person as a condition of obtaining the permit shall not exceed the compensation received by such person or the immediately preceding owner of such property from whom such person acquired title to such property for such parcel of land upon its acquisition for the state highway system. This limitation shall apply to the total of all amounts of money of whatever character charged to such person as a condition of obtaining the permit, including without limitation any and all amounts charged for title to or use of land and any and all fees or other costs of any nature whatsoever. This subsection shall constitute only a maximum limitation upon the total amount of money charged under such circumstances and shall not in any manner be construed to establish a minimum amount of money to be charged under such circumstances.
    2. Except in the case of heirs and assigns, the limitation of the department to require a payment of more than the maximum amount received for such property as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall last for only a ten-year period from the date of the initial acquisition of property by the department.
    3. This subsection shall apply with respect to land acquired for the state highway system prior to April 15, 1996, as well as land so acquired on or after April 15, 1996.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-946, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1010, § 4.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, in subsection (b), “ten-year” was substituted for “ten year” in paragraph (b)(2) and, in paragraph (b)(3), “April 15, 1996,” was substituted for “its effective date” and “April 15, 1996” was substituted for “the effective date of this subsection” at the end.

32-6-134. Procedure by department upon discovery of violation of Code Section 32-6-131; liability for expenses incurred in connection with changes made in commercial driveways.

  1. Upon discovery of a violation of Code Section 32-6-131, the department shall give written notice by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the offender to commence removing any offending condition within ten days of receipt of such notice. Upon failure to comply with such notice or to complete such work within a reasonable time after such notice, the department may remove, prevent, or rectify any offending condition by barricading or closing the commercial driveway or a portion thereof, or by other methods, and certify the expenses thereof for collection to the Attorney General.
  2. Where, in accordance with Code Section 32-6-132, a change is made in a commercial driveway in existence on July 1, 1973, the department shall be liable for the expenses thereof, provided that the commercial driveway so changed did not, before such change, provide an unsafe and unreasonable access from the abutting property, considering that there exists in the owner of the abutting property a private property right to have a reasonable access from such property to the public road as the same was and would have continued to be according to the mode of its original use. Before making any change or substitution in a commercial driveway in existence on July 1, 1973, when the department has determined that it shall not bear the expenses thereof, the department first shall give written notice to the abutting property owner to begin within 90 days the necessary change in or substitution of the driveway, provided that in the case of a nuisance such notice need be given only ten days in advance. Upon failure of the abutting property owner to complete the necessary change or substitution, the department may perform the necessary work and certify the expenses thereof to the Attorney General for collection.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-945, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2000 amendment was applicable to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

32-6-135. Effect of part on authority of counties and municipalities to regulate highways, roads, and streets.

Nothing in this part is intended to limit the authority of a county or a municipality to regulate highways, roads, or streets under their exclusive jurisdiction.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-947, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

PART 2 Subdivisions

Cross references. —

Regulation of sale of subdivided lands generally, § 44-3-1 et seq.

32-6-150. “Subdivision” defined.

As used in this part, the term “subdivision” means all divisions of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, buildings, sites, or other divisions for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale, legacy, or building development; includes all division of land involving a new public road or a change in existing public roads or new drives, driveways, access ways, or changes that require access to the state right of way; includes resubdivision; and, where appropriate to the context, relates to the process of subdividing or to the land or area subdivided; provided, however, that the following are not included within this definition:

  1. The combination or recombination of portions of previously platted lots where the total number of lots is not increased and the resultant lots are equal to the standards of the municipality; and
  2. The division of land into parcels of five acres or more where no new street is involved.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-948, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 613, § 1.

32-6-151. Department recommendation as to approval or rejection of a proposed subdivision plat abutting any part of or requiring access to the state highway system.

A planning commission shall submit two copies of the proposed subdivision plat to the department if such proposed subdivision includes or abuts on any part of the state highway system or where the proposed subdivision requires access to the state highway system. The department, within 30 days of receipt of the plat, shall recommend approval and note its recommendation on the copy to be returned to the planning commission or recommend rejection. Failure of the department to act within this 30 day period shall constitute approval. If the plat is recommended for rejection, the reasons for rejection and requirements for approval shall be given the commission in writing; such rejection shall be binding on the planning commission unless the planning commission, by official action recorded in its minutes, overrules such department action.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-949, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 613, § 2.

Cross references. —

Regulation of sale of subdivided lands generally, § 44-3-1 et seq.

32-6-152. Department approval or rejection of plat submitted by proprietor of subdivision abutting any part of or requiring access to the state highway system.

The proprietor of a subdivision to be developed within a county or municipality which has not created a planning commission shall submit three copies of the plat to the department if such a proposed subdivision includes or abuts on any part of the state highway system or where the proposed subdivision requires access to the state highway system. The department, within 30 days of receipt of the plan, shall approve or reject it, with written reasons for such rejection and requirements for approval, and note such action on the copy to be returned to the proprietor as well as on the copy to be returned to the county or municipal governing authority concerned. Such rejection shall be binding on the county or municipality concerned unless the county or municipal governing authority concerned, by official action recorded in its minutes, overrules such department action. Failure of the department to act within the 30 day period provided in this Code section shall constitute approval.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-950, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 613, § 3.

Cross references. —

Regulation of sale of subdivided lands generally, § 44-3-1 et seq.

32-6-153. Factors to be considered by department in making recommendations to planning commissions and in approving or rejecting plats.

Where the department is required to make recommendations to a planning commission under Code Section 32-6-151 or to approve a proposed plat under Code Section 32-6-152, the department, in addition to considering other factors, shall base its recommendation or approval on the following being provided for in the plat:

  1. Dedication to the department in fee simple of any portion of the subdivision which includes any part of the state highway system, such dedication to include land necessary for future widening of the state highway system; and
  2. An adequate provision for traffic safety in laying out public roads, drives, driveways, or access ways which enter the state highway system.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-951, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 613, § 4.

32-6-154. Effect of part on requirement as to commercial driveway permit.

Nothing in this part shall dispense with the requirement of obtaining a commercial driveway permit as set forth in Part 1 of this article.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-952, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Article 6 Public Utilities

PART 1 In General

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Maintenance, relocation, etc., of facilities of public utilities, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-11.

32-6-170. Payment by department of costs of removal, relocation, and adjustment of utility facilities necessitated by construction of public roads.

  1. The department is authorized to pay or participate in the payment of the costs of removing, relocating, or adjusting any of the following facilities or any component part thereof if they are owned by a municipal corporation, county, state agency, or by an authority created under the laws of Georgia pertaining to public utilities, without regard to whether such facilities were originally installed upon rights of way of the state highway system, a county road system, or a municipal street system, where such removal, relocation, or adjustment is made necessary by the construction or maintenance of any public road by the department: water distribution and sanitary sewer facilities and systems for producing, transmitting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, steam, waste, and storm water not connected with highway drainage, including fire and police signals, traffic-control devices, and street lighting systems.
  2. The department is authorized to pay or participate in the payment of the costs of removing, relocating, or making necessary adjustments to any of the following facilities or any component part thereof if they are owned by a public utility that is publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned, without regard to whether such facilities were originally installed upon rights of way of the state highway system, a county road system, or a municipal street system, where the department has made the determination that (i) such payments are in the best interest of the public and necessary in order to expedite the staging of the project; and (ii) the costs of the removal, relocation, or adjustment of such facilities are included as part of the contract between the department and the department’s roadway contractor for the project, provided that such removal, relocation, or adjustment is made necessary by the construction or maintenance of a public road by the department: water distribution and sanitary sewer facilities and systems for producing, transmitting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, steam, waste, and storm water not connected with highway drainage, including fire and police signals, traffic-control devices, and street lighting systems.
  3. As to municipal corporations, counties, state agencies, authorities controlled by such municipal corporations, counties, or other state agencies, and public utilities that are publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned, the department is authorized to waive provisions in existing permits and agreements in conflict with this article.
  4. The costs of removing, relocating, or adjusting the facilities listed in subsection (a) of this Code section, which costs the department is authorized to pay or participate in by this Code section, shall be limited to the costs of removing, relocating, or adjusting those facilities which are physically in place and in conflict with proposed construction and, where replacement is necessary, to the costs of replacement in kind. That proportion of the costs representing improvement or betterment in a facility shall be excluded from the costs eligible for payment or participation by the department under this Code section, except to the extent that such improvement or betterment is made necessary by the public road construction or maintenance.
  5. All costs incurred by the department under this Code section shall be deemed to be a part of the costs of the project requiring removal, relocation, or adjustment of any of the facilities listed in subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1961, p. 453, §§ 1-4; Ga. L. 1968, p. 345, §§ 1-3; Code 1933, § 95A-1001, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2007, p. 30, § 1/SB 19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1715, and 95-1724, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Department’s authority to take property for relocation of gas line. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) is authorized to take property for relocation of gas company’s interstate gas line when it is in the interest of safety, and prevents inconvenience to the public using gas line and where acquisition is in furtherance of and reasonable for public state highway use. Benton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 111 Ga. App. 861 , 143 S.E.2d 396 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 95-1701, 95-1715, and 95-1724).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

32-6-171. Authority of department to order removal, relocation, or adjustment of utility facilities.

  1. Any utility using, occupying, or adjacent to any part of a public road which the department has undertaken to improve or intends to improve shall remove, relocate, or make the necessary adjustments to its facility when, in the reasonable opinion of the department, the facility constitutes an obstruction or interference with the use or safe operation of such road by the traveling public or when, in the reasonable opinion of the department, the facility will interfere with such contemplated construction or maintenance. In undertaking such removal, relocation, or adjustment, if the department has notified the utility in writing that the facility constitutes an obstruction or interference with the construction, use, or safe operation of the roadway, then the utility shall be exempt from the requirements of Code Sections 22-1-10 and 22-1-10.1. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to deprive any utility relocated from a location in which it owned a property interest of compensation for such interest.
  2. Whenever the department reasonably determines it necessary to have a utility facility removed, relocated, or adjusted, the department shall give to the utility at least 60 days’ written notice directing it to begin the physical removal, or relocation, or adjustment of such utility obstruction or interference. If such notice is part of a highway improvement project, it is normally provided at the date of advertisement or award. However, prior to the notice directing the physical removal, relocation, or adjustment of a utility facility, the utility and the department shall adhere to the department’s utility relocation procedures for public road improvements which shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. The submission by the department to the utility of a letter and set of preliminary plans for the proposed highway improvement project and the utility’s submission to the department of written confirmation acknowledging receipt of the plans;
    2. The utility’s submission to the department of plans showing existing and proposed locations of facilities within a reasonable time as specified by the department in the letter required under paragraph (1) of this subsection; provided, however, that the time specified by the department shall not be sooner than 30 days and shall not be greater than 120 days. If the utility fails to submit to the department the plans within the allotted 120 days, the department may no longer be required to pay the costs of removal, relocation, or adjustment as prescribed in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-170 even if those costs had previously been included in the contract between the department and the department’s contractor; instead, such costs shall be borne by the utility; and
    3. The utility’s submission shall include with the plans a work plan in a manner and time frame established by the department’s written procedures and instructions.

      If the utility does not thereafter begin removal, relocation, or adjustment within the time specified in the work plan, the department may give the utility a final notice directing that such removal, relocation, or adjustment shall commence not later than ten days from the receipt of such final notice. If such utility does not, within ten days from receipt of such final notice, begin to remove, relocate, or adjust the facility or, having so begun removal, relocation, or adjustment, thereafter fails to complete the removal, relocation, or adjustment within the time specified in the work plan, the department may exercise its right to obtain injunctive relief as provided in Code Section 32-6-175. If utility removal, relocation, or adjustment work is found necessary after the letting date of the highway improvement project, the utility shall provide a revised work plan within 30 calendar days after becoming aware of such additional work or upon receipt of the department’s written notification advising of such additional work. The utility’s revised work plan shall be reviewed by the department to ensure compliance with additional work.

  3. In addition to the foregoing, the owner of the utility may be responsible for and liable to the department or its contractors for documented damages resulting solely from failure on the part of the utility to comply with requirements of the submitted and approved work plan under the control of the utility. If the utility owner fails to provide a work plan or fails to complete the removal, relocation, or adjustment of its facilities in accordance with the work plan approved by the department, then the utility owner may be liable to the contractor for delay costs incurred by the contractor and approved by the department which are caused by or which grow out of the failure of the utility owner to carry out and complete its work in accordance with the approved work plan or in a timely and reasonable manner if a work plan or revised work plan was not submitted. Upon notification in writing by the department or its contractors that the utility is liable for damages or delay costs, the utility company shall have 45 days from receipt of such letter to either pay the amount of the damages or delay costs to the department or its contractors or to request mediation as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section.
  4. The department’s utility relocation procedures shall include, in addition to the provisions set forth in subsection (b) of this Code section, provisions for the establishment of mediation boards to hear and decide disputes that may arise between the department and the utility concerning (i) a work plan or revised work plan that has been submitted by the utility but not approved by the department; (ii) a contractor’s claim for delay costs or other damages related to the utility’s removal, relocation, or adjustment of its facilities; and (iii) any other matter related to the removal, relocation, or adjustment of the utility’s facilities pursuant to this Code section. Such procedures shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. Each mediation board shall consist of one mediator who shall be designated by the department, one mediator who shall be designated by the utility, and an independent mediator who shall be mutually selected by the department’s designee and the utility’s designee and shall serve as the presiding officer of the mediation board;
    2. The mediators shall hold a hearing with regard to each dispute that is submitted to the mediation board for resolution, shall provide notice of the hearing to each party involved in the dispute, and shall afford each party an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing; provided, however, that unless the parties otherwise agree, the provisions of Code Sections 50-13-13, 50-13-14, and 50-13-15, relating to proceedings in a contested case under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, shall not apply to the hearing before the mediation board;
    3. The mediators shall decide each issue presented to the mediation board by a majority vote of the mediators;
    4. The mediators shall issue a final decision in writing with regard to each dispute that is submitted to the mediation board for resolution and shall serve a copy of the final decision on each party involved in the dispute; and
    5. All final decisions of the mediation board shall be subject to de novo review in the Superior Court of Fulton County by way of a petition for judicial review filed by the department or the utility within 30 days after service of the final decision.
  5. The department shall promulgate reasonable regulations governing the mediation board, including the procedural rules governing the mediation of a contested case and the creation of a list of qualified mediators. The department shall consult with the Georgia Utilities Coordinating Council in the development of these regulations, and these regulations shall be adopted by the department on or before January 1, 2008.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1002, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2007, p. 30, § 2/SB 19; Ga. L. 2008, p. 922, § 1/HB 1026.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey article on real property law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (2000).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

County liable to power company for movement of power lines from private property easement. —

Trial court properly found that a power company was entitled to compensation from a county for the taking of the company’s private property easements, including the costs of relocating the electrical power and distribution poles, when the county widened a road because a 1929 franchise agreement did not apply to situations where the power company was forced by the county to relocate power transmission lines and poles that the company originally erected on private property easements. Clayton County v. Ga. Power Co., 340 Ga. App. 60 , 796 S.E.2d 16 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

32-6-172. Authority of department to obtain replacement right of way for relocated utility.

  1. Whenever a public road improvement necessitates the acquisition by the department of a utility’s privately owned rights of way and the relocation of such utility’s facilities, the department may, with the written consent of the utility, provide a replacement right of way.
  2. Whenever a public road improvement requires the relocation of a utility occupying public road rights of way, the department may, at the written request of such utility, provide to the utility a right of way which is not on a public road right of way. In this event, the utility shall reimburse the department for the acquisition costs.
  3. Title to property acquired for utility relocations under subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section and as authorized by Code Section 32-3-1 may be transferred to such utility as authorized in Code Section 32-7-3. However, the procedures for sale of property as set forth in Code Section 32-7-4 shall not be applicable to the transfer of property acquired for utility relocation. Any such property transfer to the utility shall be conveyed by the execution of a quitclaim deed by the commissioner.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1003, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1961, p. 517, as amended, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Property appropriation for location of gas company’s interstate gas line. —

State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may take property for relocation of gas company’s interstate gas line when it was in interest of safety and prevents inconvenience to public using gas line and when acquisition is in furtherance of and reasonably for a public state highway use. Benton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 111 Ga. App. 861 , 143 S.E.2d 396 (1965) (decided under Ga. L. 1961, p. 517).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

32-6-173. Payment of expenses of removal and relocation of utility facilities.

The expenses incurred by the department as a result of utility removal and relocation pursuant to subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-171, including the cost of acquiring new land or interests therein pursuant to subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-172, shall be paid out of the available appropriations of the department for the construction or maintenance of public roads. A statement of such expenses shall be submitted to the utility, which shall make payment to the department. In the event the utility does not make payment or arrange to make payment to the department within 60 days after the receipt of said statement, the department shall certify the amount for collection to the Attorney General. However, nothing in this Code section shall restrict the authority of the department pursuant to Code Section 32-6-170 to pay any or all of the expenses of removal and relocation of government owned utilities; and, furthermore, nothing in this article shall be construed so as to deprive any utility, relocated from a location in which it owned a property interest, of compensation for such property interest.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1004, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Utility’s right to compensation for loss of easement. —

County may require a utility, at the utility’s expense, to relocate the utility’s equipment, even if the county’s right-of-way was obtained after the utility had obtained an easement for the equipment. But in turn the utility may seek just and adequate compensation for the loss of the use of the utility’s old easement, which loss would include the costs necessary to relocate to the new easement. Bibb County v. Georgia Power Co., 241 Ga. App. 131 , 525 S.E.2d 136 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0607, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 369 (Ga. May 1, 2000).

County liable to power company for movement of power lines from private property easement. —

Trial court properly found that a power company was entitled to compensation from a county for the taking of the company’s private property easements, including the costs of relocating the electrical power and distribution poles, when the county widened a road because a 1929 franchise agreement did not apply to situations where the power company was forced by the county to relocate power transmission lines and poles that the company originally erected on private property easements. Clayton County v. Ga. Power Co., 340 Ga. App. 60 , 796 S.E.2d 16 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

32-6-174. Promulgation of regulations by department.

The department may promulgate reasonable regulations governing the installation, construction, maintenance, renewal, removal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables, wires, poles, towers, tracks, traffic and other such signals, and other equipment and appliances of any utility in, on, along, over, or under any part of the state highway system or any public road project which the department has undertaken or agreed to undertake or which has been completed by the department pursuant to its authority. In addition to the requirements of such department regulations, it shall be the responsibility of the utility to obtain whatever franchise is required by law.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1005, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004).

For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

State regulation of rates to consumers of gas or electricity transported across state lines for light or power purposes, 7 A.L.R. 1094 .

Constitutionality of state legislation to reimburse public utilities for cost of relocating their facilities because of highway construction, conditioned upon federal reimbursement of the state under the terms of Federal-Aid Highway Act ( 23 U.S.C. § 123 ), 75 A.L.R.2d 419.

Placement, maintenance, or design of standing utility pole as affecting private utility’s liability for personal injury resulting from vehicle’s collision with pole within or beside highway, 51 A.L.R.4th 602.

32-6-175. Right to injunctive relief.

The department, the county or municipality, or the railroad or utility concerned may petition for an injunction to enforce the performance of any duty or act imposed by this article or for an order to restrain the breach of any duty or the commission of any act imposed or prohibited or unauthorized by this article.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1019, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Liability of highway district for damages for improper condition of highway, 49 A.L.R. 1075 .

PART 2 Railroads

32-6-190. Duty to maintain grade crossings.

Any railroad whose track or tracks cross a public road at grade shall have a duty to maintain such grade crossings in such condition as to permit the safe and reasonable passage of public traffic. Such duty of maintenance shall include that portion of the public road lying between the track or tracks and for two feet beyond the ends of the crossties on each side and extending four feet beyond the traveled way or flush with the edge of a paved shoulder, whichever is greater, of such crossing.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1006, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 1.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Criteria for elimination of highway-rail grade crossings, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-16.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

For comment, “Commercial Transportation,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1087 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1895, § 2220, former Code 1910, § 2673, and former Code 1933, § 94-503, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Section applies to road crossings, not to roads running parallel to railroads. Collier v. Georgia R.R., 76 Ga. 611 (1886) (decided under former Code 1895, § 2220).

Section’s applicability to excavation made for purpose of laying track. —

Provisions of section apply to railroad company where public road is crossed only by an excavation made for purpose of laying therein, across such public road, a railroad track of the company, and before any railroad track has been laid and before work of constructing railroad is completed across such public road. Mixon v. Savannah & A. Ry., 152 Ga. 670 , 111 S.E. 197 (1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2673).

Duty may extend beyond two feet. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-190 strongly implies that the railroad’s duty may extend beyond the two feet mentioned in the statute. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732 , 123 L. Ed. 2 d 387 (1993).

Effect of federal highway aid provisions. —

In the absence of a decision by a federally designated policymaker, state common law liabilities relating to the adequacy of railroad grade crossings are not affected by the federal highway aid provisions of the United States Code. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732 , 123 L. Ed. 2 d 387 (1993).

No compensation to railroad for mere enlargement of crossing. —

When crossing of railroad track and public road is partially shifted in one direction and is more in nature of an enlargement than an entire change, railroad company is not entitled to compensation for cost of making structural change of the company’s right of way at the crossing. State Hwy. Bd. v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 47 Ga. App. 652 , 171 S.E. 176 (1933) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2673).

Common law action against railroad precluded. —

Georgia Code of Public Transportation precluded a common law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623 , 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988), overruled, Evans Timber Co. v. Central of Ga. R.R., 239 Ga. App. 262 , 519 S.E.2d 706 (1999).

Railroad must maintain prescriptive public crossings. —

When a crossing becomes a public crossing, by implication through being used by public and worked or treated by public authorities as part of a system of public highways in place where passageway is claimed and continuously used for a period of over 20 years, the crossing or passageway is considered the same as other public streets and highways intersecting railroads within a city’s limits, and provisions of this section prevail. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Layne, 88 Ga. App. 674 , 77 S.E.2d 565 (decided under former Code 1933, § 94-503).

Liability where tracks of two railroad companies cross on same street. —

When there is a crossing of tracks of two railroad companies in a city street, it is ordinarily, as between the companies, the duty of the crossing company, at whose instance and for whose benefit the crossing was made, to keep the crossing in repair. Macon Ry. & Light Co. v. Southern Ry., 28 Ga. App. 339 , 110 S.E. 912 (1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2673).

When track of a railroad company crosses track of another railroad company in a city street, the duty of keeping the crossing in repair rests upon both companies, and either may and should make all necessary repairs, but the company making the repairs may recover the expense of such repairs from other company, if, as between the companies, the duty of making repairs was upon the latter. Macon Ry. & Light Co. v. Southern Ry., 28 Ga. App. 339 , 110 S.E. 912 (1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2673).

Railroad company’s failure to comply with the company’s duties under the law is negligence as a matter of law. Southern Ry. v. Brooks, 112 Ga. App. 324 , 145 S.E.2d 76 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 94-503).

Railroad liability for employee’s or independent contractor’s negligence. —

Wrongful act or negligence of employee or independent contractor in failing to keep public road in good order where crossed by an excavation made for purpose of constructing a railroad therein, being an act in violation of this section, the railroad is not absolved from liability upon ground that alleged tort was committed by employee or independent contractor. Mixon v. Savannah & A. Ry., 28 Ga. App. 390 , 111 S.E. 690 (1922) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2673).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Customary or statutory signal from train as measure of railroad’s duty as to warning at highway crossing, 5 A.L.R.2d 112.

Duty of railroad company to maintain flagman at crossing, 24 A.L.R.2d 1161.

32-6-191. Responsibility for construction of new grade crossings and relocation of existing grade crossings.

  1. Where a new grade crossing results from the construction of a new or relocated railroad line, the railroad shall be responsible for and bear all expenses of the construction of such grade crossing. The department, when such a grade crossing is on the state highway system, a county, when such a grade crossing is on its county road system, or a municipality, when such a grade crossing is on its municipal street system, may impose such terms and conditions on the nature and manner of construction of such a grade crossing, including the installation of protective devices, as may be necessary for the safe and reasonable passage of public traffic.
  2. Where a new grade crossing results from the construction of a new or relocated public road, the department, when such road is on the state highway system, a county, when such road is on its county road system, or a municipality, when such road is on its municipal street system, shall be responsible for and bear all expenses of the construction of such grade crossing. The railroad may impose such terms and conditions on the nature and manner of construction of such a grade crossing, including the installation of protective devices, as may be reasonably necessary for the safety and convenience of the traveling public. While on the right of way of any railroad during the construction of any such grade crossing, employees or contractors of the department or any county or municipality shall be subject to such rules and regulations of the railroad as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of its traffic, passengers, property, and its safe operation.
  3. Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this Code section, the department, in respect to a grade crossing on the state highway system, a county, in respect to a grade crossing on its county road system, or a municipality, in respect to a grade crossing on its municipal street system, may close and relocate an existing grade crossing by relocation of a part of the public road involved, whenever such closing and relocation is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety; and the procedure for such closing and relocation and the division of the costs of construction shall be the same as provided in Code Sections 32-6-194 and 32-6-195 for elimination of a grade crossing by construction of an underpass or overpass.
  4. Where there is disagreement as to the terms and conditions imposed on the nature and manner of construction by the department, county, or municipality pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section or by the railroad pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section, the department shall make such determination after reasonable opportunity for a hearing is given to all parties concerned.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1007, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 3.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section applicable to new grade crossings only. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-191 by the statute’s plain language applies only to a new grade crossing and is inapplicable if there is neither a new nor relocated railroad line. Chatham County Comm'rs v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 169 Ga. App. 607 , 314 S.E.2d 449 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Customary or statutory signal from train as measure of railroad’s duty as to warning at highway crossing, 5 A.L.R.2d 112.

32-6-192. Construction of underpass or overpass in lieu of grade crossing.

When the department, the county, or the municipality having jurisdiction of a public road determines that it is reasonably necessary and in the public interest to use an underpass or overpass instead of a grade crossing at a new or relocated railroad track or tracks or at a new or relocated public road, the procedure to be followed, the division of costs, and the maintenance responsibilities shall be the same as are provided in Code Sections 32-6-194 through 32-6-198.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 3; Code 1933, § 95-1903; Code 1933, § 95A-1015, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-193. Authority of department, counties, and municipalities to eliminate grade crossings.

When it is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, the department, in respect to the state highway system, a county, in respect to its county road system, or a municipality, in respect to its municipal street system, may authorize and direct the elimination of a grade crossing by construction of an underpass or overpass or by physical removal of the grade crossing and barricading or removing the approaches thereto without construction of an underpass or overpass, provided that any grade crossing elimination shall be in accordance with this part and that no grade crossing on a county road system or municipal street system shall be eliminated by construction of an underpass or overpass upon order of the county or municipality until and unless the department shall approve the plans and specifications of the proposed construction. No grade crossing on a public road shall be permanently closed except by elimination in accordance with this part.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 1; Code 1933, § 95-1902; Code 1933, § 95A-1008, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 2.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

32-6-193.1. Elimination of grade crossings by physical removal; procedures.

  1. The department shall by rule or regulation prescribe uniform criteria for its own use and that of local governing authorities in assessing whether elimination of a grade crossing on a public road by physical removal of the grade crossing and barricading or removing the approaches thereto without construction of an underpass or overpass is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety. For purposes of this Code section, “reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety” means that the enhancement of public safety resulting from such elimination of the grade crossing will outweigh any inconvenience to the reasonable passage of public traffic, specifically including without limitation emergency vehicle traffic, caused by such rerouting of traffic. Such criteria shall include consideration of each of the following factors:
    1. Number and timetable speeds of passenger trains operated through the crossing;
    2. Number and timetable speeds of freight trains operated through the crossing;
    3. Distance to alternate crossings;
    4. Accident history of the crossing for the immediately preceding five-year period;
    5. Type of warning device present at the crossing, if any;
    6. The alignments, horizontal and vertical, of the roadway and the railroad and the angle of the intersection of those alignments;
    7. The average daily traffic volume in proportion to the population of the municipality if the crossing is located within a municipality or the population of the county if the crossing is located within an unincorporated area of a county;
    8. The posted speed limit over the crossing;
    9. The effect of closing the crossing upon access by persons utilizing:
      1. Hospital or medical facilities and public health departments, specifically including without limitation utilization by medical personnel;
      2. Facilities of federal, state, or local government, specifically including without limitation court, postal, library, sanitation, and park facilities; and
      3. Commercial, industrial, and other areas of public commerce;
    10. Any use of the crossing by:
      1. Trucks carrying hazardous material;
      2. Vehicles carrying passengers for hire;
      3. School buses;
      4. Emergency vehicles; or
      5. Public or private utility vehicles, specifically including without limitation water, sewer, natural gas, and electric utility maintenance and repair vehicles; and
    11. Any other relevant factors as prescribed by the department.
    1. Any railroad may file a written petition requesting an order to eliminate a grade crossing on a public road by physical removal of the grade crossing and barricading or removing the approaches thereto without construction of an underpass or overpass. Any such petition shall be filed by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, with the department in respect to the state highway system, a county governing authority in respect to its county road system, or a municipal governing authority in respect to its municipal street system.
    2. Any petition by a railroad under this subsection shall include without limitation information as to each of the factors set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a) of this Code section.
    3. The department or the local governing authority, whichever is applicable, shall conduct a public hearing on the matter prior to deciding whether to grant or deny such a petition.
      1. No railroad shall have a duty to file a petition for elimination of a grade crossing as authorized by this subsection.
      2. Neither the failure of a railroad to file such a petition nor any decision by the department or any local governing authority regarding such a petition shall give rise to a cause of action against the railroad, the department, or a local governing authority by a person for injuries or damages arising from the existence or use of such crossing.
    1. If the department in respect to the state highway system, a county governing authority in respect to its county road system, or a municipal governing authority in respect to its municipal street system determines that elimination of a grade crossing in accordance with this Code section is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, the department or the local governing authority may issue an order to eliminate the crossing. Such order shall be in writing, and a copy shall be served upon the railroad. If a local governing authority issues such an order, it shall make a record of its findings and transmit a copy of the same along with the order to the department.
    2. If the department in respect to the state highway system, a county governing authority in respect to its county road system, or a municipal governing authority in respect to its municipal street system determines that elimination of a grade crossing in accordance with this Code section is not reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, the department or the local governing authority may issue an order denying a petition to eliminate the crossing. Such order shall be in writing, and a copy shall be served upon the railroad. If a local governing authority denies a petition, it shall make a written record of its findings and transmit a copy of the same along with the order and petition to the department.
      1. Any railroad aggrieved by an order of a local governing authority under this subsection may make a written request to the department for review of such order. Such request shall be accompanied by a $500.00 filing fee. The department shall within 60 days after the filing of such request review the matter.
      2. Upon review of the order and findings of the local governing authority and any filings by the railroad, if the department determines that elimination of a grade crossing in accordance with this Code section is not reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, the department shall order that the crossing shall remain open.
      3. Upon review of the order and findings of the local governing authority and any filings by the railroad, if the department determines that elimination of a grade crossing in accordance with this Code section is reasonably necessary in the interest of public safety, the department shall issue an order to eliminate the crossing.
      4. Any such order of the department shall be in writing, and a copy of the order shall be served upon the railroad and the local governing authority. As part of such order, the department shall assess all its costs of investigating and reviewing the matter against the railroad if an order for the crossing to remain open is issued or against the county or municipality if an order to eliminate the crossing is issued, and the party so assessed shall be liable therefor to the department; provided, however, that any filing fee paid to the department by a railroad shall be applied to any such amount assessed against the railroad, and the balance of such filing fee, if any, shall be refunded to the railroad. The department shall keep detailed records of its costs of investigation and review for purposes of this subparagraph, and such records shall be subject to public inspection as provided by Article 4 of Chapter 18 of Title 50.
  2. If an order to close a grade crossing is issued, the railroad shall at its expense physically remove the crossing from the tracks and for two feet beyond the ends of the crossties on each side and extending four feet beyond the traveled way or flush with the edge of a paved shoulder, whichever is greater, of such crossing and erect a department approved barricade; and the department in respect to the state highway system, the county in respect to its county road system, or the municipality in respect to its municipal street system may at its expense remove approaches to the crossing. The provisions of Code Section 32-6-195 for division of costs of elimination of a grade crossing by construction of an underpass or overpass shall not apply to elimination of any grade crossing under this Code section.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-6-193.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 4; Ga. L. 2004, p. 376, § 1.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Criteria for elimination of highway-rail grade crossings, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-16.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 enactment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

32-6-194. Procedure for grade crossing elimination.

  1. Whenever the department, a county, or a municipality shall decide to eliminate any grade crossing on its respective public road system by means of an underpass or overpass, prompt notice of such decision shall be given to the railroad or railroads involved; and within 30 days thereafter the representatives of the department, the county, or the municipality and of the railroads involved shall meet and, within 90 days, agree to a plan and specifications for the construction of a grade separation structure. Any such agreement between a county or municipality and a railroad shall be submitted to the department for its approval; and work leading to the elimination of the grade crossing pursuant to the agreement shall not commence until and unless the department approves the same. The department, county, or municipality, by agreement with the railroad or railroads involved, may apportion the work to be done in the construction of such grade separation structure between the railroad or railroads and the department or the county or the municipality.
  2. If agreement is not reached within 90 days, the department, county, or municipality may proceed with construction of a grade separation structure or may by written order direct the railroad or railroads involved to proceed with the construction of a grade separation structure according to the plan and specifications accompanying such order, provided that no work shall be begun on any grade separation structure on a county or municipal public road system until and unless the department approves the plan and specifications of such structure. It shall be the duty of said railroad to begin work on any such grade separation structure within four months after receipt of an order to that effect and to complete that structure within a reasonable time, provided that the railroad shall not be required to do the actual physical work of providing approaches by fill to an overpass or the excavating beneath an underpass or the approaches thereto, although the cost of such work shall be considered as part of the costs of the grade crossing elimination, whether actually performed by the railroad, the department, the county, or the municipality; and such costs shall be apportioned as provided in Code Section 32-6-195. If the railroad does not begin work within four months after receipt of an order to that effect, the department, county, or municipality may proceed with the construction of the proposed grade separation structure. If the railroad begins work within four months after receipt of an order to that effect but thereafter fails to complete such work within a reasonable time, the department, county, or municipality may proceed to complete the unfinished work.
  3. In any case where the construction of all or part of a grade separation structure is done by the department, a county, or a municipality, a statement of any railroad’s share of the costs of the project, as determined pursuant to Code Section 32-6-195, plus 8 percent per annum interest on each expenditure of the cost of such project shall be submitted to the railroad upon completion of the project. In the event that the railroad does not make payment or arrange to make payment to the department, county, or municipality within 60 days of receipt of the statement, the department shall certify the amount for collection to the Attorney General; or, in the case of a project on a county or municipal public road system, the county or municipality shall take appropriate action for the collection of the amount thereof. In the event said share is not paid within the time specified in this Code section, said share or any unpaid portion thereof shall bear interest at a rate of 8 percent per annum from the date due.
  4. The department, a county, or a municipality shall not construct or require any railroad to construct an underpass of a plan, specification, or design, the strength of which, in the judgment of the railroad, shall not be sufficient to meet the requirements of its traffic thereover. In a plan providing for an overpass or underpass, the department, a county, or a municipality shall not interfere with or change the grade or alignment of the track or tracks of any railroad or relocate the line of the railroad without its consent.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, §§ 3, 4, 10; Code 1933, §§ 95-1903, 95-1906, 95-1910; Code 1933, § 95A-1009, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

32-6-195. Division of costs of grade crossing elimination projects.

  1. The costs of the grade crossing elimination project in which the railroad or railroads shall be required to share shall include the costs of surveys, preparation of plans and specifications, the securing of estimates or bids, if any, and the total cost of construction of the grade separation structures involved, including the establishment of drainage and any excavation and other expenses involved in constructing public roadways or railroad lines under any grade separation structure. However, the railroad or railroads shall not be required to participate in the cost of any construction outside the limits of grade or alignment change required for the public road to go over or under the track or tracks of the railroad or railroads nor in any costs apportionable to purposes other than the elimination of the grade crossing. Where additional lanes are added to the public road, the railroad’s share of the cost, if any, shall be based on the cost of a grade elimination project having the same number of lanes as the public road prior to the construction of said grade elimination project.
    1. The costs of the project shall be shared by the parties involved in such manner as may be agreed upon by the railroad or railroads involved and the department, county, or municipality. Such agreement shall have precedence over any existing agreement on the same subject matter and shall give consideration to the following factors: the benefits accruing to the railroad or railroads and to the public, respectively, from the elimination of the grade crossing; the circumstances under which the grade crossing was created; any preexisting rights of the railroad or railroads as result of being first in position; comparison of the degree of danger caused by the railroad or railroads and by quantity and character of traffic upon the public road; and what is generally, under comparable circumstances, considered to be reasonable, provided that in no event shall the railroad be required to pay more than 50 percent of the cost of a grade crossing elimination project on a county road system or on a municipal street system. In the event agreement cannot be reached, the determination of what portion of the costs shall be the fair and reasonable share of the railroads involved shall be made by the department after reasonable opportunity for hearing to all parties concerned. In making such determination, the department shall give due regard to the considerations heretofore enumerated. The agreed value or, in the absence of agreement, the independently appraised value of the fee or any lesser interest in the right of way of the railroad used for such project shall be determined and such value credited to the railroad as a part of its participation in the cost of the project, provided that nothing in this Code section shall prevent the department, county, or municipality from exercising its rights of eminent domain as now or hereafter provided by law.
    2. As used in this subsection, the term “costs of the project” means:
      1. In the case of a project for part of a county road or municipal street system, the total costs of such project less the sum of any funds for such project furnished by the federal and state governments; and
      2. In the case of a project for part of the state highway system, the total costs of such project less any funds furnished by the federal government.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 6; Code 1933, § 95-1905; Code 1933, § 95A-1010, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 95-1912, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Railroad may be required to contribute 50 percent of cost of eliminating grade crossing when provisions of section are followed. 1945-47 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 616 (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1905).

Railroads may agree with department to pay less than half of costs. — Railroad and the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may agree for joint participation in cost of elimination of grade crossing on a basis of less than 50 percent to railroad. 1945-47 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 616.

32-6-196. Temporary use of railroad rights of way during construction or maintenance of grade separation structures or grade crossing or protective devices.

All railroads shall permit the temporary use, free of cost, of so much of their rights of way as may be necessary during the construction or maintenance of any grade separation structures or any grade crossing or protective devices, provided that, whenever any employees or contractors of the department or of any county or municipality shall enter the right of way of any railroad, they shall be subject to any reasonable rules and regulations such railroad may make for the protection of its traffic, employees, passengers, and operations.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, §§ 4, 13; Code 1933, §§ 95-1906, 95-1913; Code 1933, § 95A-1010, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-197. Responsibility for maintenance of overpasses and underpasses.

  1. It shall be the duty of the department to maintain all overpasses involving railroads on the state highway system.
  2. It shall be the duty of the county or the municipality to maintain at its own expense the drainage, surface, pavement, approaches, and guardrails of all overpasses involving railroads on its respective public road system. It shall be the duty of the railroad involved to maintain at its own expense any floors constructed of wood and the foundations, piers, abutments, and superstructures of all overpasses on the county or municipal public road system.
  3. It shall be the duty of the railroad or railroads involved to maintain all underpasses except the lighting, drainage, and pavement of the public roads thereunder, which shall be maintained by the department, counties, or municipalities on their respective public road systems.
  4. All maintenance required by this Code section of the department shall be at the expense of the department, and all maintenance required by this Code section of the railroad shall be at the expense of such railroad, provided that the duty of maintenance imposed upon the department by this Code section shall not operate to subject the department to liability for damages resulting from any failure to maintain properly.
  5. Except as provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-195, nothing in this article shall be construed as voiding agreements executed prior to July 1, 1973.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 9; Code 1933, § 95-1909; Ga. L. 1950, p. 419, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-1011, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Traffic control devices. —

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-197 places any duty on a railroad regarding the installation or maintenance of traffic control devices in the area around a railroad overpass. City of Fairburn v. Cook, 188 Ga. App. 58 , 372 S.E.2d 245 (1988).

Exclusive duty of county to maintain road and warning devices. —

Statutory duty to maintain a public road and warning devices thereon leading to the former site of a timber bridge spanning a railroad track was exclusively that of the county, both at the time the bridge was removed and at the time of the accident giving rise to a negligence action against the railroad. Kitchen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 265 Ga. 206 , 453 S.E.2d 712 (1995).

32-6-198. Agreements as to grade crossing elimination.

Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent the department, a county, or a municipality from reaching special agreements with a railroad company providing for grade crossing elimination by means of relocation of either the railroad or public road involved or by other means not expressly provided for in this part and from arranging joint participation in the cost of such elimination in accordance with the procedures in Code Section 32-6-195.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 12; Code 1933, § 95-1912; Code 1933, § 95A-1012, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Railroad may enter agreement to pay less than half of costs. — Railroad and the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) may agree for joint participation in the cost of elimination of a grade crossing on the basis of less than 50 percent to the railroad. 1945-47 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 616.

32-6-199. Improvement of existing underpass or overpass.

Whenever an existing underpass or overpass involving railroads is unsafe or inadequate to serve reasonably the traffic for which it was constructed, the department, the county, or the municipality may proceed to bring about improvement of said existing structure. In such event the procedure, division of the costs of construction, and maintenance responsibilities in regard to such improvement shall be as provided in Code Sections 32-6-194 through 32-6-198.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 8; Code 1933, § 95-1908; Code 1933, § 95A-1013, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Restriction on authority of Public Service Commission to require railroad to reconstruct underpass, trestle, or grade crossing to accommodate motor vehicle exceeding 12 feet, six inches in height, § 46-8-133 .

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Specific defects within county’s responsibility. —

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the builder of a one-lane railroad overpass since the builder indisputably established that the specific defects alleged by the injured driver’s expert were within the county’s statutory responsibility. Crouch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 203 Ga. App. 618 , 417 S.E.2d 216 (1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When department may expend funds for new overpasses. — Department of Transportation may expend the department’s funds for reconstruction of overpasses which the department has determined to be obsolete, inadequate, and unsafe to accommodate current highway traffic, or which have become so costly to maintain as to warrant replacement or reconstruction. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-125.

Department expenditure of funds to construct new overpasses. — Department can expend the department’s funds to construct new overpasses on same or new locations for purpose of replacing existing inadequate overpasses. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-125.

32-6-200. Installation of protective devices at grade crossings; school bus routes that cross rail crossings.

  1. Whenever, in the judgment of the department in respect to the state highway system, a county in respect to its county road system, or a municipality in respect to its municipal street system, such protection is reasonably necessary for the safety of the traveling public, the department or the county or the municipality may order the protection of a grade crossing by the installation of protective devices. Prompt notice of such order shall be given to the railroad or railroads involved; and within 30 days thereafter the representatives of the department, the county, or the municipality and of the railroad or railroads involved shall meet and, within 90 days, agree to a plan and specifications for the acquisition and installation of protective devices. If an agreement is not reached within 90 days, the department, the county, or the municipality may order the railroad company or companies involved to proceed with the acquisition and installation of protective devices, as indicated in the plan and specifications accompanying its order. However, no work leading to the installation of protective devices at a grade crossing on a county or municipal public road system shall commence until and unless the plan and specifications for such device are approved by the department. It shall be the duty of the railroad or railroads to proceed with acquisition and installation of protective devices within 60 days after receipt of an order to that effect and to complete such acquisition and installation within six months thereafter.
    1. The expense of acquiring and installing a protective device shall be shared between:
      1. The department and the railroad involved, in such portions as may be determined by the negotiation procedures set forth in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-6-195, including consideration of all pertinent factors included in said subsection to be weighed in determining a reasonable division of costs and including the right of the department after a hearing to make the determination of the fair and reasonable costs to be shared by the railroad in the event that agreement as to such division of costs cannot be reached; and
      2. The county or municipality and the railroad involved, equally.

        However, if such device shall be required as a result of a new road being constructed over an existing railroad, 100 percent of such cost shall be the responsibility of the department, county, or municipality involved; and, if such device shall be required as the result of a new railroad, 100 percent of such cost shall be the responsibility of the railroad.

    2. As used in this subsection, the term “expense of acquiring and installing a protective device” means:
      1. In the case of a protective device for part of a county road or municipal street system, the total cost of such project less the sum of any funds for such project furnished by the federal and state governments; and
      2. In the case of a protective device for part of the state highway system, the total cost of such project less any funds furnished by the federal government.
    3. The railroad or railroads shall maintain all protective devices at its or their own expense; and nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impose any public liability on the department or any county or municipality in any manner regarding such devices. However, nothing in this subsection shall prevent an agreement between the railroad or railroads and an industry or industries, which agreement assesses the cost of construction or maintenance of such devices against the industry or industries to be served by such track.
  2. In any case where the protective devices are acquired and installed by agreement or by order of the department, a county, or a municipality, a statement of such public agency’s share of the costs of the project, as determined by such agreement or pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section, shall be submitted by the railroad involved to the public agency involved upon completion of the project and upon nonpayment may be collected as provided by law.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term “active warning devices” means automated control gates, lights, and warning bells, used singly or in any combination.
    2. Each local school district in this state shall survey its established school bus routes annually and submit to the Department of Transportation a list identifying each rail crossing that does not have active warning devices on an established bus route. Each local school district shall be required to submit this information to the department each year by no later than September 1.
    3. Each local school district shall exercise best efforts to minimize the number of established school bus routes that cross rail crossings that do not have active warning devices.
    4. The department shall use the information about school bus routes as an important factor in selecting rail crossings to upgrade with active warning devices.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, §§ 3, 7; Code 1933, §§ 95-1903, 95-1907; Code 1933, § 95-1907.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1967, p. 458, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-1014, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 497, § 2/HB 426.

Cross references. —

Further provisions regarding installation of protective devices at grade crossings, § 46-8-194 et seq.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2008, p. 497, § 1/HB 426, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The General Assembly is interested in increasing safety at railroad crossings, especially crossings used by school buses, and therefore finds that certain legislation may enhance such safety.”

Law reviews. —

For comment, “Commercial Transportation,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1087 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Common law action against railroad precluded. —

Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., precluded a common law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623 , 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988), overruled, Evans Timber Co. v. Central of Ga. R.R., 239 Ga. App. 262 , 519 S.E.2d 706 (1999).

Because the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., abrogated any common law duty on the part of defendant railroad to install adequate signal equipment at a railroad crossing where the driver’s car was struck by a train, the common law negligence claim asserted by plaintiffs, the driver’s survivors, was dismissed for failure to state a claim; under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 , the railroad company would have acted in violation of Georgia law if the company erected traffic signals on the public road unless the company was required or authorized to do so by § 32-6-51(d) , O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50 , or some “other law,” and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 delegated responsibility for the installation of protective devices on public roads to the appropriate governmental entity. Bentley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2006).

Applicability to private crossings. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 relates to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings on the state highway system, the county road systems, and the municipal street systems, but, by the statute’s terms, not to the installation of protective devices at private crossings. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851 , 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1546, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 839 (Ga. Oct. 18, 1991), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

Absence of private crossings from the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 merely shows that there is no statutory duty as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings, and that railroads may not be held negligent per se as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings. It does not establish that there is no common law duty as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings so that railroads may not be held liable for common law negligence with regard to the installation of protective devices at such crossings. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851 , 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1546, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 839 (Ga. Oct. 18, 1991), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

Municipal traffic protection requirements. —

Section provides sole and exclusive method whereby a municipality may require traffic protection at a grade crossing. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 242 Ga. 169 , 249 S.E.2d 545 (1978).

Constitutionality of municipal ordinance. —

Municipal ordinance requiring flag person to be placed at grade crossing violates the Georgia Constitution. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 242 Ga. 169 , 249 S.E.2d 545 (1978).

Unsafe conditions. —

Authority of a railroad to initiate certain curative action for a potentially unsafe condition was affirmatively redelegated in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 , and, thus, the common-law duties the railroad owed to motorists regarding unsafe conditions was not contradicted or placed exclusively on governmental entities. Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625 , 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).

City has no duty of care with regard to automatic signals at railroad crossings except, in the city’s judgment, to require installation of the signals. Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178 , 205 S.E.2d 470 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433).

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 creates no affirmative duty on behalf of a municipality to install protective devices, and when the city had provided a cross buck and stop sign in the exercise of the city’s discretionary judgment, the city was not liable for the city’s failure to install additional signs. Biggers ex rel. Key v. Southern Ry., 820 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1993), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).

City’s failure to enforce ordinance does not constitute nuisance. —

Failure of city to enforce the city’s ordinance requiring signals at all railroad crossings or terms of contract to pay for installation of signals does not involve maintenance of a nuisance. Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178 , 205 S.E.2d 470 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433).

Condition of zoning ordinance upheld. —

Condition of a zoning ordinance requiring an auction company to pay for traffic signals at a railroad crossing on a road leading to the company’s property did not violate O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 ; the statute does not prevent a county from requiring, as a condition of zoning, that a landowner reimburse the county for the county’s share of the costs associated with the acquisition and installation of protective devices. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9 , 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. Feb. 11, 2008).

Trial court erred by denying the railroad’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims based on inadequate signage at the railroad crossing and the decision to reopen the roadway because it was the Georgia Department of Transportation’s responsibility to designate the location for, and the manner of placement of, the traffic control devices and signage. DOT v. Delor, 351 Ga. App. 414 , 830 S.E.2d 519 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0086, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. Mar. 26, 2020).

Jury instructions. —

In a wrongful death action, the district court did not err by instructing the jury concerning the railroad’s duty to maintain traffic control devices because taking all of the instructions together, the jury was properly informed that the railroad could not be held liable for the decision about which warning device to put in place or continue in place, but the railroad could be held liable for any failure to repair an existing warning light. Wright v. CSX Transp., Inc., 375 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Customary or statutory signal from train as measure of railroad’s duty as to warning at highway crossing, 5 A.L.R.2d 112.

32-6-201. Regulation of traffic when necessary to perform maintenance.

  1. Whenever it is necessary for the department, a county, or a municipality to perform any maintenance in regard to a grade separation structure, protective devices, or grade crossing, responsibility for which is imposed on such department, county, or municipality by this part, and the regulation and control of railroad traffic is necessary for the performance of such maintenance, it shall be the duty of the railroad or railroads involved, after receiving notice, to assist the department, county, or municipality by providing reasonable regulation and control of railroad traffic, having due regard to the needs of such traffic and to the public welfare.
  2. Whenever it is necessary for a railroad to perform any maintenance in regard to a grade separation structure, protective devices, or grade crossing, responsibility for which is imposed on such railroad by this part, and the regulation and control of pedestrian and vehicular traffic is necessary for the performance of such maintenance, it shall be the duty of the department, the county, or the municipality, after having received notice, to assist the railroad by providing reasonable regulation and control of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, having due regard to the needs of such traffic and to the public welfare.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1016, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-6-202. Procedure to obtain maintenance of grade separation structures, protective devices, and grade crossings.

    1. Whenever any maintenance of a grade separation structure, protective devices, or a grade crossing is necessary for the safe and reasonable passage of public traffic and such maintenance is the responsibility of a railroad under this part, the department in respect to the state highway system, the governing authority of the county in respect to its county road system, or the governing authority of the municipality in respect to its municipal street system may give written notice to the railroad of the necessity of such maintenance and order the railroad to comply with the maintenance requirements of this part. Such order shall be in writing and, as applicable, shall include the United States Department of Transportation inventory number and railroad milepost number, as well as the highway, street, or roadway name and number as identified on a general highway map prepared by the department. Such order shall be served upon the railroad by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested.
      1. If any railroad fails to comply with such an order of a county or municipality within 30 days after receipt of such notice and order, the county or municipal governing authority may file with the department a written request for review of the matter. Any such request for review shall be accompanied by a filing fee of $500.00 per grade crossing and shall include a copy of the order of the county or municipality. A copy of such request for review shall be served on the railroad by the county or municipality by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested. The department shall within 30 days after the filing of such request investigate the matter, including undertaking consideration of any statement of position filed by the railroad within ten days after the filing of the request for review, and issue an order either requiring the railroad to take such action as is necessary for purposes of compliance with the maintenance requirements of this part or nullifying the order of the local governing authority. As part of such order, the department shall assess all its costs of investigating and reviewing the matter against the railroad if a compliance order is issued or against the county or municipality if the order of the local governing authority is nullified, and the party so assessed shall be liable therefor to the department; provided, however, that any filing fee paid to the department by a county or municipality shall be applied to any such amount assessed against the county or municipality, and the balance of such filing fee, if any, shall be refunded to the county or municipality. Copies of any such order of the department shall be served upon the railroad and the local governing authority by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested. The department shall keep detailed records of its costs of investigation and review for purposes of this subparagraph, and such records shall be subject to public inspection as provided by Article 4 of Chapter 18 of Title 50.
      2. If any railroad fails to comply with any order of the department under paragraph (1) of this subsection or subparagraph (A) of this paragraph within 30 days after receipt of such order, then after notice and opportunity for a hearing, the railroad shall be subject to a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00 per day from 30 days after the date of receipt of the order of the department until the railroad has complied with the order of the department; provided, however, that the department may grant an extension of time for compliance without penalty upon a showing that the railroad’s failure to timely comply was due to force majeure. The provisions of this subparagraph are in addition to the provisions of Code Sections 32-1-10 and 32-6-1, if applicable. Any fine under this subparagraph shall be tolled for the period from the filing of a petition for a judicial review under Code Section 32-6-203 until the rendering of a final decision.
    2. Each railroad whose track or tracks cross a public road in this state shall identify in writing to the department, by job title and with contact information, the appropriate office responsible for the maintenance of grade separation structures, protective devices, and grade crossings and upon which the notices and orders provided for in this subsection shall be served. Such information shall be kept current by the railroad and shall be made publicly available and accessible by the department.
    3. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to prevent the department, a county, or a municipality from performing any emergency maintenance which is necessary for the safe and reasonable passage of public traffic, provided reasonable notice is given to the railroad involved, and from collecting the expenses of such maintenance.
  1. Whenever any maintenance of a grade separation structure, protective devices, or a grade crossing is reasonably necessary for the safe passage of railroad traffic and such maintenance is the responsibility of the department, a county, or a municipality, the railroad concerned may give written notice to the department, county, or municipality of the necessity of such maintenance. If the department, county, or municipality does not proceed with the performance of such maintenance within 30 days after receipt of such notice, the railroad may proceed to enforce performance of such maintenance as provided in Code Section 32-6-175. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to prevent a railroad from performing any emergency maintenance which is necessary for the safe passage of railroad traffic, provided reasonable notice is given to the department, county, or municipality involved, and from collecting the expenses of such maintenance.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1017, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 5.

Cross references. —

Restriction on authority of Public Service Commission to require railroad to reconstruct underpass, trestle, or grade crossing to accommodate motor vehicle exceeding 12 feet, six inches in height, § 46-8-133 .

Further provisions regarding installation of protective devices at grade crossings, § 46-8-194 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

32-6-203. Judicial review.

Any judgment, decision, or order of the department upon any question involving the advisability or necessity of eliminating any grade crossing, of installing any protective device, of improving any grade crossing structure, or involving any other question concerning the public roads arising under this part shall be subject to judicial review in such manner as is provided by law for judicial review of contested cases under Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” Pending the final determination of any judicial proceedings so instituted, the department, without prejudice to it or the railroad involved and at its own risk, may proceed with the work involved in such litigation, subject to final judgment of the court as to all questions involved in such litigation.

History. — Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, § 11; Code 1933, § 95-1911; Code 1933, § 95A-1018, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1050, § 6.

Law reviews. —

For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 213 (2002).

Article 7 Transportation of Hazardous Materials

32-6-220 through 32-6-225.

Repealed by Ga. L. 1985, p. 469, § 1, effective July 1, 1985, and by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1499, § 1, effective July 1, 1985.

Editor’s notes. —

The provisions of this article were transferred to new Chapter 11 of Title 46 by Ga. L. 1985, p. 469 and by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1499.

Article 8 Control of Junkyards

Cross references. —

Waste management generally, T. 12, C. 8.

Junk dealers, T. 43, C. 22.

Scrap metal processors, T. 43, C. 43.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Rules and regulations governing the control of junkyards, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-8.

32-6-240. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. “Automobile graveyard” means any establishment which is maintained or used for storing, buying, or selling wrecked, scrapped, ruined, or dismantled motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts.
  2. “Junk” means old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, paper, trash, rubber, debris, or waste; junked, dismantled, or wrecked automobiles, or parts thereof; or iron, steel, and other old scrap ferrous or nonferrous material.
  3. “Junkyard” means any establishment which is maintained or used for storing, buying, or selling junk or for an automobile graveyard; and the term shall include garbage dumps, sanitary fills, and scrap processor establishments.
  4. “Primary system” or “primary highway” means the federal-aid primary system in existence on June 1, 1991, and any highway which is not on such system, but which is on the National Highway System, as officially designated or as may hereafter be so designated by the department and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of Title 23, Section 103, United States Code.
  5. “Scrap processor” means any person, firm, or corporation engaged only in the business of buying scrap iron and metals, including but not limited to old automobiles, for the specific purpose of processing into raw material for remelting purposes only, and whose principal product is ferrous and nonferrous scrap for shipment to steel mills, foundries, smelters, and refineries, and who maintains an established place of business in this state and has facilities and machinery designed for such processing.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-905, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 5/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

32-6-241. Restrictions on location of junkyards in relation to location of rights of way of interstate or federal-aid primary highways.

The department is responsible for the control of junkyards only on those primary highways that are state roads. For all primary highways it shall be unlawful for any person to establish, operate, or maintain any junkyard, any portion of which is within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right of way of any interstate or federal-aid primary highway, except:

  1. Those which are screened by natural objects, plantings, fences, or other appropriate means or which are otherwise removed from sight so as not to be visible from the main traveled way of such highway systems;
  2. Those located within areas which are zoned for industrial use under authority of law;
  3. Those located within unzoned industrial areas, which areas shall be determined from actual land uses and defined by regulations promulgated by the commissioner; and
  4. Those which are not visible from the main traveled way of the systems.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-906, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 6/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Section has effect of zoning and authorizes actions for violations. —

Provisions declaring that junkyards established in contravention of law are subject to being removed and destroyed has effect of zoning such areas adjacent to designated highways, and confers upon the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) sufficient authority to bring an action. Burnham v. State Hwy. Dep't, 224 Ga. 543 , 163 S.E.2d 698 (1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity, construction, and application of zoning ordinance relating to operation of junkyard or scrap metal processing plant, 50 A.L.R.3d 837.

32-6-242. Screening junkyards in existence on April 6, 1967.

Any junkyard lawfully in existence on April 6, 1967, which is within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right of way and visible from the main traveled way of any public road on the interstate or primary system, shall, whenever feasible, be screened by the department if such road is on the state highway system, otherwise by the county or municipal government having jurisdiction, so as not to be visible from such public road. Such junkyards may be screened at locations either on the right of way of such public road or on property acquired by the department for that purpose outside such right of way. Whenever the commissioner determines that it is in the best interest of the state, the department may acquire, pursuant to any of the procedures for property acquisition set forth in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title, such property or interests therein outside existing public road rights of way as may be necessary to provide adequate screening of such junkyards.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-907, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 7/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

32-6-243. Promulgation by department of regulations governing the screening and fencing of junkyards.

For any interstate or primary highway on the state highway system, the department may promulgate uniform and reasonable regulations governing the screening or fencing of junkyards, including the materials used in such screening or fencing and the location, construction, and maintenance thereof.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 7; Code 1933, § 95A-908, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 8/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S. —

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1759, 1760, 1767, 1889.

ALR. —

Regulation of junk dealers, 45 A.L.R.2d 1391.

32-6-244. Authority of commissioner or local officials to acquire land and remove junkyards.

  1. For state roads on the primary system, when the commissioner or, with regard to nonstate roads on the primary system, the principal elected officials of the county or municipality having jurisdiction determines that the topography of the land adjoining such a road will not permit adequate screening of any junkyard lawfully in existence on April 6, 1967, or that such screening would not be economically feasible, the department or the local officials shall have the authority to acquire, pursuant to any of the procedures for property acquisition authorized in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title, such interests in lands as may be necessary to secure the relocation, removal, or disposal of such junkyard. The commissioner or the local officials shall determine whether it would be more feasible to relocate, remove, or dispose of the junkyards which cannot be screened, and such determination shall be final and conclusive.
  2. All junkyards lawfully in existence on April 6, 1967, which do not conform to the requirements of Code Section 32-6-241 and which, in the determination of the commissioner or the principal elected officials of the county or municipality having jurisdiction, cannot be made to conform by screening, shall be required to be removed under this Code section as soon as funds are available for that purpose, provided that the department or the county or municipality having jurisdiction shall not be required to expend any funds for screening or removal under this article unless and until federal-aid matching funds are made available for this purpose.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, §§ 8, 10, 14; Code 1933, § 95A-909, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 9/SB 160.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

32-6-245. Agreements with United States Secretary of Transportation.

The Georgia Department of Transportation is authorized to enter into agreements with the United States Secretary of Transportation, as provided by Title 23 of the United States Code, relating to the control of junkyards in areas adjacent to the interstate system and state routes on the primary systems; and the department may take action in the name of the state to comply with the terms of such agreements.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 13; Code 1933, § 95A-911, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 10/SB 160.

U.S. Code. —

Provision in Title 23 of the United States Code, relating to the control of junkyards in areas adjacent to interstate and federal-aid primary systems, referred to in this Code section, are found in 23 U.S.C. § 136 .

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

32-6-246. Abatement of nuisances.

Any junkyard which comes into existence after April 6, 1967, the establishment, operation, or maintenance of which is made unlawful by Code Section 32-6-241, is declared to be a public and private nuisance and may be forthwith removed, obliterated, or abated at the order of the commissioner. The department may then submit by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery a statement of the expenses of such removal, obliteration, or abatement to the person owning or operating such junkyard; and, if payment is not made to the department within 60 days of receipt thereof, the department shall certify the amount for collection to the Attorney General.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 11; Code 1933, § 95A-910, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that the 2000 amendment was applicable to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

58 Am. Jur. 2d, Occupations, Trades, and Professions, § 79.

C.J.S. —

66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 42 et seq., 50 et seq., 62.

32-6-247. Penalty.

  1. Any person who violates any provision of this article or any lawful regulation promulgated pursuant to this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day’s presence of the offending junkyard shall be a separate offense.
  2. State and local law enforcement officers shall assist department employees in enforcing this article or any lawful regulation promulgated pursuant thereto.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 15; Code 1933, § 95A-912, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

32-6-248. Construction of article.

Nothing in this article shall be construed as to abrogate or affect the provisions of any lawful ordinance, regulation, resolution, or other law which are more restrictive than the provisions of this article.

History. — Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, § 12; Code 1933, § 95A-912, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For article, “Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,” see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963).

CHAPTER 7 Abandonment, Disposal, or Leasing of Property Not Needed for Public Road Purposes

Cross references. —

Condemnation of public and private roads for purposes of constructing electric power plants, § 22-3-20 et seq.

32-7-1. Authority of department, counties, and municipalities to substitute for, relocate, or abandon public roads.

Whenever deemed in the public interest, the department or a county or a municipality may substitute for, relocate, or abandon any public road that is under its respective jurisdiction, provided that a county or municipality shall first obtain the approval of the department if any expenditure of federal or state funds is required.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-618, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on local government law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2014).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Authority of department and political subdivisions to vacate roads. —

General Assembly has delegated to the Department of Transportation, and to counties and municipalities throughout the state, authority to relocate or abandon public roads within their respective jurisdictions. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Vacating of street must benefit public in general. —

Neither General Assembly nor subordinate public corporation acting under its authority can lawfully vacate a public street or highway for benefit of a private individual. The street or highway cannot be vacated unless it is for the benefit of the public that such action should be taken. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Public benefits justifying vacating of public street or highway. —

General Assembly or a subordinate public corporation acting under its authority may lawfully vacate a public street or highway in order to relieve the public from the charge of maintaining a street or highway that is no longer useful or convenient to the public, or to lay out a new street or road in its place which will be more useful and convenient to the public in general. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Abandonment only to benefit private individual constitutes abuse of power. —

If public interest is not the motive which prompts vacating of a street, whether partial or entire, the act of vacating is an abuse of power, and a gross abuse of power if it is authorized without reference to the rights of the public and merely for the convenience of a private individual. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Public nonuse of road’s full width is not abandonment. —

If highway is legally laid out and established, the mere fact that the public does not use the highway to the highway’s entire width will not of itself constitute an abandonment of any portion thereof. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467 , 105 S.E.2d 299 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Encroachments on highway continually used cannot be legalized by mere lapse of time. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467 , 105 S.E.2d 299 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Counties and citizens may establish easements over abandoned roads. —

Power and authority conferred upon State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) to change or relocate state-aid roads, and thus to abandon portions of those roads, does not specifically or by necessary implication include power to foreclose rights of counties or general public to establish easements over abandoned portions of such roads. Southern Ry. v. Wages, 203 Ga. 502 , 47 S.E.2d 501 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Questions of fact remained as to abandonment. —

In a dispute over access to a roadway, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff summary judgment enjoining the defendant from obstructing the road because questions of fact remained as to abandonment of the roadway leading to the plaintiff’s property, which were not properly resolved by the trial court. Pass v. Forestar GA Real Estate Group, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 244 , 787 S.E.2d 250 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1689, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 830 (Ga. Dec. 8, 2016).

Judicial review of abandonment decision. —

In a mandamus action, a trial court erred by reversing a decision of a county board of commissioners to abandon a road as the trial court failed to give proper deference to the board’s decision to abandon the road and substituted the court’s own judgment for that of the board. Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431 , 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Reversion of title upon abandonment or vacation of public street or highway, 70 A.L.R. 564 .

Right of private citizen to complain of rerouting of highway or removal or change of route or directional signs, 97 A.L.R. 192 .

Necessity for adhering to statutory procedure prescribed for vacation, discontinuance, or change of route of street or highway, 175 A.L.R. 760 .

32-7-2. Procedure for abandonment.

    1. Before abandoning any public road on the state highway system, the department shall confer with the governing authority of the counties or municipalities concerned and give due consideration to their wishes in such abandonment; but in case of disagreement the judgment of the department shall prevail.
    2. When it is determined that a section of the state highway system has for any reason ceased to be used by the public to the extent that no substantial public purpose is served by it and after having conferred with the counties and municipalities, the department, by certification signed by the commissioner and accompanied by a plat or sketch, may declare that section of the state highway system abandoned. Thereafter, that section of road shall no longer be a part of the state highway system and the rights of the public in and to the section of road as a public road shall cease.
    3. Prior to certifying the abandonment of a road or section thereof, the department shall give notice of its intentions to the counties or municipalities through which such road passes.
    4. If such county or municipality, by proper resolution, indicates its willingness and desire to take over the road that is proposed to be abandoned and to maintain such road, the certificate of abandonment shall so state; and thereafter the abandoned road shall form part of the county road or municipal street system of the particular county or municipality. Whenever the department abandons a road and a county or a municipality takes over the road, the department shall convey, by quitclaim deed executed by the commissioner, such road to the county or municipality. If the appropriate county or municipality is unwilling to take over the road and maintain it, the property may be disposed of by the department as provided in Code Section 32-7-4, provided that, if the county or municipality has not indicated its desire to take over the road within 30 days after receiving notice, it shall be conclusively presumed that the county or municipality is unwilling to take over the road; and provided, further, that before the department disposes of the abandoned road it shall give 15 days’ notice to the county or municipality, during which time such county or municipality may reconsider its decision and take over the road.
    1. When it is determined that a section of the county road system has for any reason ceased to be used by the public to the extent that no substantial public purpose is served by it or that its removal from the county road system is otherwise in the best public interest, the county, by certification recorded in its minutes, accompanied by a plat or sketch, and, after notice to property owners located thereon, after notice of such determination is published in the newspaper in which the sheriff’s advertisements for the county are published once a week for a period of two weeks, and after a public hearing on such issue, may declare that section of the county road system abandoned. Thereafter, that section of road shall no longer be part of the county road system and the rights of the public in and to the section of road as a public road shall cease.
    2. Prior to certifying the abandonment of a road or section thereof, the county shall give notice of its intention to the municipality into which or through which any part of such road passes.
    3. If such municipality, by proper resolution, indicates its willingness and desire to take over the road that is proposed to be abandoned and to maintain such road, the certification of abandonment shall so state; and thereafter that part of the abandoned road within the municipality shall form part of the municipal street system of the particular municipality. Whenever a county abandons a road and a municipality takes over the road, the county, by quitclaim deed executed by the chairman or presiding officer, shall convey such road to the municipality. If such municipality is unwilling to take over the road and maintain it, the property may be disposed of by the county as provided for in Code Section 32-7-4, provided that, if the municipality has not indicated its desire to take over the road within 30 days after receiving notice, it shall be conclusively presumed the municipality is unwilling to take over the road; and provided, further, that before the county disposes of the abandoned road it shall give 15 days’ notice to the municipality during which time such municipality may reconsider its decision and take over the road.
  1. When it is determined that a section of the municipal street system has for any reason ceased to be used by the public to the extent that no substantial public purpose is served by it or that its removal from the municipal street system is otherwise in the best public interest, the municipality, by certification recorded in its minutes, accompanied by a plat or sketch, and after notice to property owners located thereon, may declare that section of the municipal street system abandoned. Thereafter, that section of road shall no longer be a part of the municipal street system and the rights of the public in and to that section of street as a public road shall cease. The property may be disposed of by the municipality as provided in Code Section 32-7-4.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-619, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 16; Ga. L. 1994, p. 294, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 399, § 1/SB 354.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979).

For annual survey on law of real property, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 353 (1991).

For annual survey article on local government law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (2000).

For survey article on local government law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 353 (2003).

For article, “Administrative Law,” see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 47 (2011).

For annual survey on local government law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2014).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor’s notes. —

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 608, former Code 1910, § 644, and former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

The 1994 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2 demonstrates that notice by publication does not satisfy the requirement of notice to adjoining landowners. The 1994 amendment added a provision requiring a county to publish notice of the determination to abandon a road in the legal organ of the county, but also retained the language requiring “notice to property owners located thereon.” By adding a notice by publication requirement, the legislature must have intended to add a requirement different from the requirement of notice to adjoining property owners. Talbot County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Woodall, 275 Ga. 281 , 565 S.E.2d 465 (2002).

Duty of county to repair and maintain road. —

When the public has ceased to use a road for reasons other than the road’s state of disrepair, a county is not required to undertake to repair and maintain the road as a prerequisite to abandoning the road in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2 . Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 264 Ga. 316 , 444 S.E.2d 775 (1994).

Group of landowners were properly granted a writ of mandamus requiring a county to maintain an adjacent road, as the county acquired title to the road by prescriptive acquisition, abandonment was not an issue, and compliance with O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3(c) did not need to be shown when a roadway was otherwise acquired by prescription; moreover, urging that a county’s failure to meet the county’s obligation to maintain public roads was an acceptable method of abandoning a roadway would encourage counties to disregard their public duty. Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 281 Ga. 385 , 637 S.E.2d 679 (2006).

Distinction between abandonment and failure to maintain. —

Standard of review on appeal with respect to a mandamus order involving the superior court’s review of a county’s decision to abandon a public road pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) is whether there is any evidence supporting the decision of the local governing body, not whether there is any evidence supporting the decision of the superior court. This standard is not applicable if the issue on appeal involves the county’s failure to properly build, repair, and maintain county roads. Burke County v. Askin, 294 Ga. 634 , 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

Source of authority to abandon roads. —

Through enactment of Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-7-1 ), the General Assembly delegated to the Department of Transportation, and to counties and municipalities throughout the state, authority to relocate or abandon public roads within their respective jurisdictions. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

When abandonment of road is justified. —

When there is evidence that an abandoned road has ceased to be used by the public to the extent that the road serves no substantial public purpose, as specified by subsection (b) of this section, the action of a governmental authority in abandoning a road cannot be declared an abuse of discretion, at least on the ground that the governmental authority was erroneous in the government’s determination that abandoning the road would be in the public interest. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Abandonment not justified. —

Fact that no substantial public purpose was served by a road due to the county’s failure to comply with the county’s duty to repair and maintain the road did not authorize the county to abandon the road pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2 . Cherokee County v. McBride, 262 Ga. 460 , 421 S.E.2d 530 (1992), overruled in part, Scarborough v. Hunter, 288 Ga. 687 , 706 S.E.2d 650 (2011), overruled in part as stated in Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431 , 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).

Subsection (b) not applicable to relocation of county road. —

Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to the relocation of a portion of the county road still in use by the public to such an extent that a substantial public purpose is served by the road, but only when the county abandons all or part of a county road which has for any reason ceased to be used by the public to the extent that no substantial public purpose is served by the road. Miller v. Lanier County, 243 Ga. 58 , 252 S.E.2d 909 (1979).

County commission’s consideration of economic factors involved in the decision whether to abandon a road was proper and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Torbett v. Butts County, 271 Ga. 521 , 520 S.E.2d 684 (1999).

Abandonment must be for benefit of public in general. —

Neither the General Assembly nor a subordinate public corporation acting under its authority can lawfully vacate a public street or highway for the benefit of a private individual, but only for the benefit of the public; the benefit may be either in relieving the public from the charge of maintaining a street or highway that is no longer useful or convenient to the public or by laying out a new street or road in its place which will be more useful and convenient to the public in general. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Abandonment for individual’s benefit constitutes abuse of power. —

If public interest is not partial or entire motive which prompts vacating of street, the act of vacating is an abuse of power, a gross abuse if it is authorized without reference to the rights of the public and merely to serve the convenience of a private individual. McIntosh County v. Fisher, 242 Ga. 66 , 247 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Judicial review of abandonment decision. —

In a mandamus action, a trial court erred by reversing a decision of a county board of commissioners to abandon a road as the trial court failed to give proper deference to the board’s decision to abandon the road and substituted the court’s own judgment for that of the board. Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431 , 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).

Abandonment not found. —

Public road was not abandoned when the board of county commissioners had not taken official action, but had simply had several discussions concerning the road, and had received, but not finally acted on, requests to close the road. McDilda v. Board of Comm'rs, 230 Ga. App. 530 , 497 S.E.2d 25 (1998).

Trial court’s denial of a property owner’s motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-50 was proper because the county failed to follow all of the statutory steps needed to properly close a road that bordered on an adjoining landowner’s properties, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1), and the evidence did not demand a verdict that the road was still public. Lovell v. Rea, 278 Ga. App. 740 , 629 S.E.2d 459 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1467, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 557 (Ga. July 14, 2006).

Notice. —

Paragraph (b)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2 requires merely that notice be given before a road is declared abandoned. Lack of proper notice is not a ground for granting a petitioner in mandamus the ultimate relief of ordering a road reopened. Carnes v. Charlock Invs. (USA), Inc., 258 Ga. 771 , 373 S.E.2d 742 (1988).

When the county sought to abandon two roads, notice by publication was insufficient to meet the requirement of notice to adjoining property owners; thus, the showing of such notice by the owners who claimed title to the roads did not entitle them to summary judgment. Talbot County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Woodall, 275 Ga. 281 , 565 S.E.2d 465 (2002).

Board may not foreclose public or county acquisition of easements. —

Authority conferred upon the State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) to change or relocate state-aid roads, and thus to abandon portions of those roads, does not specifically or by necessary implication include the power to foreclose rights of counties or general public to establish easements over abandoned portions of such roads. Southern Ry. v. Wages, 203 Ga. 502 , 47 S.E.2d 501 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Alteration of old road involves discontinuance of that part which is altered, and it is lawful to provide for both alteration and discontinuance in the same proceedings, and under citation which refers merely to alteration. Ponder v. Shannon, 54 Ga. 187 (1875); Barnard v. Durrence, 22 Ga. App. 8 , 95 S.E. 372 (1918) (decided under former Code 1910, § 644).

Nonuse of full width of roads does not constitute abandonment. —

If a highway is legally laid out and established, the mere fact that the public does not use the highway to the highway’s entire width will not of itself constitute an abandonment of any portion thereof. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467 , 105 S.E.2d 299 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Encroachments on a highway continually used cannot be legalized by mere lapse of time; limited use will not lessen the right of the public to use the entire width of the road whenever increased travel and exigencies of the public render this desirable. State Hwy. Dep't v. Strickland, 214 Ga. 467 , 105 S.E.2d 299 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 95-17).

Questions of fact remained as to abandonment. —

In a dispute over access to a roadway, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff summary judgment enjoining the defendant from obstructing the road because questions of fact remained as to abandonment of the roadway leading to the plaintiff’s property, which were not properly resolved by the trial court. Pass v. Forestar GA Real Estate Group, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 244 , 787 S.E.2d 250 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1689, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 830 (Ga. Dec. 8, 2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

County must maintain roads on county road system located within municipality. — Because the county must maintain roads on the county road system and because public roads are not removed from the system by mere annexation into a municipality where the road lies, the county must continue to maintain the roads on the county road system which are in areas annexed into a municipality until the governing authority of the county removes the roads from the county road system by appropriate action. 1976 Op. Atty Gen. No. U76-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, §§ 148, 149, 174 et seq., 218 et seq.

C.J.S. —

39A C.J.S., Highways, § 192 et seq.

ALR. —

Reversion of title upon abandonment or vacation of public street or highway, 70 A.L.R. 564 .

Precautions to be taken for safety of travelers where highway or part of highway is abandoned, 71 A.L.R. 1206 .

Alteration or relocation of street or highway as abandonment or vacation of parts not included, 158 A.L.R. 543 .

Necessity for adhering to statutory procedure prescribed for vacation, discontinuance, or change of route of street or highway, 175 A.L.R. 760 .

Relative rights and liabilities of abutting owners and public authorities in parkways in center of street, 81 A.L.R.2d 1436.

32-7-3. Authority of department, counties, and municipalities to dispose of property no longer needed for public road purposes.

Whenever any property has been acquired in any manner by the department, a county, or a municipality for public road purposes and thereafter the department, county, or municipality determines that all or any part of the property or any interest therein is no longer needed for such purposes because of changed conditions, the department or the county or municipality is authorized to dispose of such property or such interest therein in accordance with Code Section 32-7-4. Any disposition of property acquired for utility relocation, as provided for in Code Section 32-6-172, or on which utilities are located shall not be subject to Code Section 32-7-4; and no provision of this title shall be construed to prevent the department from conveying to the federal government land or interests in land acquired for federal parkways in Georgia, as provided in Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-620, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Offer to original owner of property acquired, then rezoned. —

If a county or municipality acquires land for public road purposes, rezones the land in a manner increasing the land’s value, and then decides to sell the property, the county or municipality has decided that the property was no longer needed for public road purposes at the time of the rezoning and, thus, the property must be offered to the original owner based on the land’s value under the land’s pre-rezoning classification. DeWolff v. Fulton County, 253 Ga. 744 , 325 S.E.2d 140 (1985).

Application. —

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county and purchaser because the prior owner of the property condemned by the county never had a binding contract with the county to re-purchase a remnant, unused portion and there was no conflict between O.C.G.A. §§ 32-7-3 , 32-7-4 , and 36-9-3(h) and the county’s code amendment. Hubert Props., LLP v. Cobb County, 318 Ga. App. 321 , 733 S.E.2d 373 (2012), cert. denied, No. S13C0423, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 176 (Ga. Feb. 18, 2013).

32-7-4. Procedure for disposition of property.

    1. In disposing of property, as authorized under Code Section 32-7-3, the department, a county, or a municipality, provided that such department, county, or municipality has held title to the property for no more than 30 years, shall notify the owner of such property at the time of its acquisition or, if the tract from which the department, a county, or a municipality acquired its property has been subsequently sold, shall notify the owner of abutting land holding title through the owner from whom the department, a county, or a municipality acquired its property. In the event that all or a portion of the property subject to disposition is a roadway located in a subdivision with a duly formed property owner’s association, the notice for that roadway portion of the property within such subdivision may be provided to the association in lieu of the individual owners of abutting land. The notice shall be in writing delivered to the appropriate owner or association or by publication if the owner’s or association’s address is unknown; and the owner or the association, as applicable, shall have the right to acquire, as provided in this subsection, the property with respect to which the notice is given. Publication, if necessary, shall be in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the property is located. If, after a search of the available public records, the address of any interested party cannot be found, a record of the facts and reciting the steps taken to establish the address of any such person shall be placed in the department, county, or municipal records and shall be accepted in lieu of service of notice by mailing the same to the last known address of such person. After properly completing and documenting the search, the department, county, or municipality may dispose of the property in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section.
      1. When an entire parcel acquired by the department, a county, or a municipality, or any interest therein, is being disposed of, it may be acquired under the right created in paragraph (1) of this subsection at such price as may be agreed upon, but in no event less than the price paid for its acquisition. When only remnants or portions of the original acquisition are being disposed of, they may be acquired for a price no less than 15 percent under the market value thereof at the time the department, county, or municipality decides the property is no longer needed. The department shall use a real estate appraiser with knowledge of the local real estate market who is licensed in Georgia to establish the fair market value of the property prior to listing such property.
      2. The provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph notwithstanding, if the value of the property is $75,000.00 or less as determined by department estimate, the department, county, or municipality may negotiate the sale.
    2. If the right of acquisition is not exercised within 30 days after due notice, the department, county, or municipality may proceed to sell such property as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.
    3. When the department, county, or municipality in good faith and with reasonable diligence attempted to ascertain the identity of persons entitled to notice under this Code section and mailed such notice to the last known address of record of those persons or otherwise complied with the notification requirements of this Code section, the failure to in fact notify those persons entitled thereto shall not invalidate any subsequent disposition of property pursuant to this Code section.
      1. Unless a sale of the property is made pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection, such sale shall be made to the bidder submitting the highest of the sealed bids received after public advertisement for such bids for two weeks. If the highest of the sealed bids received is less than but within 15 percent of the established market value, the department may accept that bid and convey the property in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this Code section. The department or the county or municipality shall have the right to reject any and all bids, in its discretion, to readvertise, or to abandon the sale.
      2. Such public advertisement shall be inserted once a week in such newspapers or other publication, or both, as will ensure adequate publicity, the first insertion to be at least two weeks prior to the opening of bids, the second to follow one week after the first publication. Such advertisement shall include but not be limited to the following items:
        1. A description sufficient to enable the public to identify the property;
        2. The time and place for submission and opening of sealed bids;
        3. The right of the department or the county or municipality to reject any one or all of the bids;
        4. All the conditions of sale; and
        5. Such further information as the department or the county or municipality may deem advisable as in the public interest.
      1. Such sale of property may be made by the department or a county or municipality by listing the property through a real estate broker licensed under Chapter 40 of Title 43 who has a place of business located in the state. Property shall be listed for a period of at least 30 days. The department shall use a real estate appraiser with knowledge of the local real estate market who is licensed in Georgia to establish the fair market value of the property prior to listing such property. If the highest offer received to purchase is less than the appraised value but within 15 percent of such value, the department, county, or municipality may accept such offer and convey the property in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this Code section. All sales shall be approved by the commissioner on behalf of the department or shall be approved by the governing authority of the county or municipality at a regular meeting that shall be open to the public, and public comments shall be allowed at such meeting regarding such sale.
      2. Commencing at the time of the listing of the property as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the department, county, or municipality shall provide for a notice to be inserted once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county indicating the names of real estate brokers listing the property for the political subdivision. The department, county, or municipality may advertise in newspapers, on the Internet, or in magazines relating to the sale of real estate or similar publications.
      3. The department, county, or municipality shall have the right to reject any and all offers, in its discretion, and to sell such property pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
      1. Such sale of property may be made by the department, a county, or a municipality to the highest bidder at a public auction conducted by an auctioneer licensed under Chapter 6 of Title 43. If the highest offer received to purchase is less than the appraised value but within 15 percent of such value, the department, county, or municipality may accept such offer and convey the property in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this Code section.
      2. The department, county, or municipality shall provide for a notice to be inserted once a week for the two weeks immediately preceding the auction in the legal organ of the county including, at a minimum, the following items:
        1. A description sufficient to enable the public to identify the property;
        2. The time and place of the public auction;
        3. The right of the department or the county or municipality to reject any one or all of the bids;
        4. All the conditions of sale; and
        5. Such further information as the department or the county or municipality may deem advisable as in the public interest.

          The department, county, or municipality may advertise in magazines relating to the sale of real estate or similar publications.

      3. The department, county, or municipality shall have the right to reject any and all offers, in its discretion, and to sell such property pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection.
  1. Any conveyance of property shall require the approval of the department, county, or municipality, by approval of the commissioner on behalf of the department and, in the case of a county or municipality, by resolution, to be recorded in the minutes of its meeting. If the department or the county or municipality approves a sale of property, the commissioner, chairperson, or presiding officer may execute a quitclaim deed conveying such property to the purchaser. All proceeds arising from such sales shall be paid into and constitute a part of the funds of the seller.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-621, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 16A; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1195, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 726, § 1/SB 444; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1072, § 3/SB 169; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1358, § 1/HB 477; Ga. L. 2018, p. 372, § 6/SB 445.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted “a price no less than 15 percent under” in the middle of the second sentence of subparagraph (a)(2)(A); substituted the present provisions of subparagraph (b)(2)(A) for the former provisions, which read: “Such sale of property may be made by the department or a county or municipality by listing the property through a real estate broker licensed under Chapter 40 of Title 43 who has a place of business located in the county where the property is located or outside the county if no such business is located in the county where the property is located. Property shall be listed for a period of at least three months. Such property shall not be sold at less than its fair market value. The department shall use a real estate appraiser with knowledge of the local real estate market who is licensed in Georgia to establish the fair market value of the property prior to listing such property. All sales shall be approved by the commissioner on behalf of the department or shall be approved by the governing authority of the county or municipality at a regular meeting that shall be open to the public, and public comments shall be allowed at such meeting regarding such sale.”; inserted “newspapers, on the Internet, or in” in the middle of subparagraph (b)(2)(B); and substituted “If the highest offer received to purchase is less than the appraised value but within 15 percent of such value, the department, county, or municipality may accept such offer and convey the property in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this Code section” for “Such property shall not be sold at less than its fair market value” in subparagraph (b)(3)(A).

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1995, “paragraph” was substituted for “paragraphs” in subparagraph (b)(1)(A).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, “paragraph (1) of this subsection” was substituted for “the preceding paragraph” in the first sentence of paragraph (a)(2).

Law reviews. —

For survey article on real property law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 193 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Intergovernmental exchanges not governed by disposal provisions. —

Exchange of condemned property between the Department of Transportation and a county did not require application of the notice requirements and repurchase rights of O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4 . Swims v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 94 , 475 S.E.2d 597 (1996).

Offer to original owner of property acquired, then rezoned. —

If a county or municipality acquires land for public road purposes, rezones the land in a manner increasing the land’s value, and then decides to sell the property, the county or municipality has decided that the property was no longer needed for public road purposes at the time of the rezoning and, thus, the property must be offered to the original owner based on the land’s value under the land’s pre-rezoning classification. DeWolff v. Fulton County, 253 Ga. 744 , 325 S.E.2d 140 (1985).

Landowner’s dismissal of claim against county barred claim that county failed to comply with § 32-7-4 . —

Because a landowner dismissed all the claims alleged against a county, a claim that the county improperly abandoned a public road due to the county’s failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4 had also been relinquished. McRae v. SSI Dev., LLC, 283 Ga. 92 , 656 S.E.2d 138 (2008).

Application. —

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county and purchaser because the prior owner of the property condemned by the county never had a binding contract with the county to re-purchase a remnant, unused portion and there was no conflict between O.C.G.A. §§ 32-7-3 , 32-7-4 , and 36-9-3(h) and the county’s code amendment. Hubert Props., LLP v. Cobb County, 318 Ga. App. 321 , 733 S.E.2d 373 (2012), cert. denied, No. S13C0423, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 176 (Ga. Feb. 18, 2013).

32-7-5. Leasing property not needed for public road purposes.

  1. In order that any interest in real property acquired for public road or other transportation purposes may be used most economically, the department, counties, or municipalities, in addition to the authority granted in Code Section 32-7-3 to dispose of property no longer needed and in subsection (b) of Code Section 32-3-3 to exchange property, may, notwithstanding Article 2 of Chapter 16 of Title 50, the “State Properties Code,” improve, use, maintain, or lease any interest in property acquired for public road or other transportation purposes that is not presently needed for such purposes.
  2. If the department, a county, or municipality decides to lease any such property or interest therein, the owner of such property at the time of its acquisition or his successor in interest shall have the right to lease such property at an appraised fair market value to be determined by the department, county, or municipality for such period of time until the property is needed for public road or other transportation purposes. However, if at the time of acquisition such property was leased to a tenant, the tenant, instead of the owner or his successor in interest, shall have the first right to lease such property at the appraised fair market value. If the owner, his successor in interest, or the tenant of the property does not lease such property, the department, county, or municipality shall have the right to lease such property at a price equal to the highest sealed public bid, if the bid is acceptable to the department, county, or municipality, for such period of time until the property is needed for public road or other transportation purposes. If no bids or bids which are insufficient are received, the department, county, or municipality may readvertise for new public bids. The department, county, or municipality may negotiate a lease with any state or federal agency, county, or municipality without the aforesaid requirement of sealed bids or leasing to the former owner. The department, county, or municipality shall have the right to impose reasonable restrictions, terms, or conditions on the use of such leased property.
  3. Separate and distinct from the department’s authority to lease property in subsection (b) of this Code section, the department has the authority to negotiate a lease of any property contained within the rights of way of any nonlimited-access public road and not presently needed for public road purposes or rights of way under bridges or viaducts on limited-access public roads and not presently needed for public road purposes. If the department decides to lease any such property, the property shall be leased, at an appraised fair market value to be determined by the department, to the owner or the lessee of the property adjacent to the department’s rights of way for the purposes of parking. Such property shall only be used for the purposes of providing parking and shall not be subleased without the department’s prior approval. Plans for the use of said property must be submitted to and approved by the department prior to any construction. Regardless of any financial expenditures by the lessee, no lease granted under this subsection shall merge into and become a property interest of the lessee or a sublessee. The department shall reserve the right to terminate any lease without cause upon 30 days’ written notice to the lessee. Notwithstanding any provisions of Code Section 48-2-17, all net revenues derived from the lease of any of the department’s property used for the purposes of providing parking shall be utilized by the department to offset the cost of maintaining the public roads of the state.
  4. Unless said property or interest therein is leased to a tax-exempt person or body, it shall be subject to all applicable taxes, both real and personal.
  5. The department or any county or municipality may negotiate a lease with any state or federal agency, county, or municipality for the use of the property for any purpose for which the agency, county, or municipality may put property it owns in fee and without complying with the requirement for sealed bids or leasing to the former owner contained in this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-622, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1431, § 2.

CHAPTER 8 Relocation Assistance

Cross references. —

Relocation assistance for persons, businesses, and others displaced by federal-aid public works projects, T. 22, C. 4.

Duties of counties regarding relocation assistance, § 32-4-41 .

Duties of municipalities regarding relocation assistance, § 32-4-92 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity, construction, and application of state relocation assistance laws, 49 A.L.R.4th 491.

32-8-1. Relocation assistance in accordance with Uniform Act; real property acquisition.

  1. As used in this chapter, the term “Uniform Act” means the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV of Public Law 100-17. The department, as required by the Uniform Act:
    1. Shall make or approve payments, in accordance with Section 210 of the Uniform Act, for relocation expenses and replacement housing expenses and shall provide relocation assistance advisory services outlined in Section 205 of the Uniform Act; and
    2. Shall make or approve payments, in accordance with Section 305(2) of the Uniform Act, to any person, family, business, farm operation, or nonprofit organization whose real property has been acquired by the department or is subject to a condemnation proceeding brought by the department for any federal-aid project in the state, the costs of which are now or hereafter financed in whole or in part from federal funds allocated to the department:
      1. For expenses incident to the transfer of real property acquired by the department, prepayment of mortgage penalties, and a pro rata portion of real property taxes on real property acquired by the department;
      2. For litigation expenses actually incurred by the condemnee in any condemnation proceeding brought by the department if the final judgment is that the department cannot acquire the real property by condemnation or the condemnation proceeding is formally abandoned by the department; or
      3. For litigation expenses incurred by the plaintiff in any inverse condemnation proceeding brought against the department in which judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
  2. In acquiring real property for any federal-aid project, the costs of which are financed in whole or in part from federal funds allocated to the department, the department shall be guided to the greatest extent practicable under state law by the land acquisition policies in Section 301 of the Uniform Act and the provisions of Section 302 of the Uniform Act.
  3. Nothing contained in this Code section shall be construed as creating in any condemnation proceeding brought under the power of eminent domain any element of value or of damage.

History. — Ga. L. 1966, p. 588, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 495, §§ 3, 6; Ga. L. 1972, p. 931, §§ 3-10; Code 1933, § 95A-623, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3.

U.S. Code. —

The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, referred to in this Code section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Department need not abide by federal prohibition of compensation for enhancement. —

By requiring the Department of Transportation to be guided by federal law “to the greatest extent practicable” in the department’s condemnation procedures, subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 does not thereby require the department to abide by the federal law’s prohibition of compensation for enhancement by reason of taking and does not affect the judiciary’s power to determine what constitutes just and adequate compensation. DOT v. White, 173 Ga. App. 68 , 325 S.E.2d 397 (1984).

Relocation expenses part of “just and adequate compensation.” —

Enactment of O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 does not alter the fact that relocation expenses, whether awarded judicially or administratively, are still a part of the “just and adequate compensation” guaranteed to condemnees under the Constitution. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Relocation expenses may be recovered by administrative proceeding. —

Under O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 , a condemnee whose property is being acquired for federally assisted highway projects may, but is not required to, seek payment of relocation expenses directly from the Department of Transportation in an administrative action. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Relocation expenses may be recovered in condemnation proceeding. —

When the case does not involve payments under O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 , the condemnee would be able to litigate the question of the condemnee’s business relocation expenses as an element of “just and adequate compensation” in the condemnation proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Seeking administrative payment of relocation expenses precludes a separate judicial determination of the same relocation expenses in the statutorily authorized condemnation proceedings. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Appeal of relocation expenses award under the Administrative Procedure Act. —

If a condemnee is dissatisfied with an award of relocation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 , the award may be appealed under the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50. DOT v. Gibson, 251 Ga. 66 , 303 S.E.2d 19 (1983).

Attorney fees. —

O.C.G.A. § 32-8-1 provides a remedy to recover attorney fees separate and apart from a condemnation proceeding where just and adequate compensation is at issue. DOT v. B & G Realty, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 613 , 398 S.E.2d 762 (1990).

32-8-2. Last resort replacement housing for persons displaced by federal-aid projects.

The department shall have the authority, as a last resort, to provide replacement housing when a federal-aid project financed in whole or in part with federal aid cannot proceed to actual construction because no comparable replacement sale or rental housing is available. In carrying out the relocation assistance activities, the department, with prior concurrence of the board, shall be authorized to make payments, construct or reconstruct with its own forces, cause to be constructed or reconstructed, and purchase by deed or condemnation any real property for the purposes of providing replacement housing. The department may exchange, lease, or sell to the displaced person such replacement housing. Whenever any real property has been acquired under this Code section and thereafter the department determines that all or any part of such property or any interest therein is no longer needed for such purposes because of changed conditions, the department is authorized to dispose of such property or interest therein in accordance with subsection (b) of Code Section 32-7-4.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-623.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3.

32-8-3. Relocation assistance to persons displaced by federal-aid river and harbor improvement projects; real property acquisition.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3, effective April 12, 1988.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Code 1933, § 95A-623.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 7; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 31.

32-8-4. Persons displaced by state-aid projects on the state highway system.

The department is authorized to make or approve payments for all necessary relocation expenses, replacement housing expenses, relocation advisory services, expenses incident to the transfer of real property, and litigation expenses as provided for in subparagraphs (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), and (a)(2)(C) of Code Section 32-8-1 of any individual, family, business, farm operation, or nonprofit organization displaced by a state-aid highway project on the state highway system, the cost of which is now or hereafter financed in whole or in part from state funds. The department shall be guided by the policies, provisions, and limitations of the Uniform Act. The department shall not implement any relocation assistance on any state-aid projects on the state highway system without the prior concurrence of the board.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-623.3, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 3; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3.

U.S. Code. —

The Uniform Act, referred to in this Code section, is known as the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 and is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

32-8-5. Last resort replacement housing for persons displaced by state-aid projects on the state highway system.

The department shall have the authority, as a last resort, to provide replacement housing when a state-aid project on the state highway system cannot proceed to actual construction because no comparable replacement sale or rental housing is available. In carrying out the relocation assistance activities, the department, with prior concurrence of the board, shall be authorized to make payments, construct or reconstruct with its own forces, cause to be constructed or reconstructed, and purchase by deed or condemnation any real property for the purposes of relocating or constructing replacement housing. The department may exchange, lease, or sell to the displaced person such replacement housing. Whenever any real property has been acquired under this Code section and thereafter the department determines that all or any part of said property or any interest therein is no longer needed for such purposes because of changed conditions, the department is authorized to dispose of such property or interest therein in accordance with subsection (b) of Code Section 32-7-4.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-623.4, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 775, § 4; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3.

32-8-6. Construction of chapter; power of department to take action necessary to secure benefit of federal-aid programs.

  1. Nothing in this chapter is intended to conflict with any federal law, and in case of such conflict such portion as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict.
  2. The department is authorized to take the necessary steps to secure the full benefit of any federal-aid program and to meet any contingencies not provided for in this chapter, abiding at all times by a fundamental purpose to plan, construct, reconstruct, and maintain, as economically as possible, the public roads and other major transportation facilities of Georgia which will best promote the interest, welfare, and progress of the citizens of Georgia.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-624, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 973, § 8; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1737, § 3.

CHAPTER 9 Mass Transportation

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2004, p. 898, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The department will form a pilot program that will provide a state level flow through point for any available federal funding or other forms of financial and development sources and assistance for local, regional, and public-private streetcar projects. Any funding through bonds for such pilot and grant program shall be administered by the State Road and Tollway Authority.” Ga. L. 2006, p. 498, § 5/SB 150, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for the repeal of Ga. L. 2004, p. 898, § 2, effective April 27, 2006.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Grant programs, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-12.

Article 1 General Provisions

Editor’s notes. —

Code Sections 32-9-1 through 32-9-12 were designated as Article 1 by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB930, effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-1. Financial support and project grants for research, programs, and purchases.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Mass transportation” means all modes of transportation serving the general public which are appropriate, in the judgment of the department, to transport people, commodities, or freight by highways, rail, air, water, or other conveyance, exclusive of wires and pipelines.
    2. “Mass transportation facilities” means everything necessary for the conveyance and convenience of passengers and the safe and prompt transportation of freight on those modes of transportation serving the general public which are appropriate, in the judgment of the department, to transport people, commodities, or freight by highways, rail, air, water, or other conveyance, exclusive of wires and pipelines.
    3. “Project grant” means the state’s share of the cost of carrying out a particular project authorized by this Code section. This share may be provided in direct financial support, goods or products, personnel services, or any combination thereof.
  2. Subject to general fund appropriations for such purposes and any provisions of Chapter 5 of this title to the contrary notwithstanding, the department is authorized, within the limitations provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, to provide to municipalities, counties, regional commissions, authorities, state agencies, and public and private mass transportation operators:
    1. Financial support for research concerning mass transportation, by contract or otherwise; and
    2. Project grants to supplement federal, local, or federal and local funds for use:
      1. In providing for studies, analyses, and planning and development of programs for mass transportation service and facilities;
      2. In providing for research, development, and demonstration projects in all phases of mass transportation;
      3. In providing for programs designed solely to advertise, promote, and stimulate the development and use of mass transportation facilities; and
      4. In providing for the purchase of facilities and equipment, including rolling stock, used or to be used for the purpose of mass transportation.
    1. The governing bodies of municipalities, counties, regional commissions, authorities, state agencies, and public and private mass transportation operators may, by formal resolution, apply to the department for financial support and project grants provided by this Code section.
    2. The use of funds or grants shall be for the purposes set forth in this Code section and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may be used for local contributions required by the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, or any other federal law concerning mass transportation.
    3. The department shall review the proposal and, if satisfied that the proposal is in accordance with the purposes of this Code section, may, with the approval of the commissioner, enter into a financial support or project grant agreement subject to the condition that the financial support or project grant be used in accordance with the terms of the proposal.
    4. The time of payment of the financial support or project grant and any conditions concerning such payment shall be set forth in the financial support or project grant agreement.
  3. In order to effectuate and enforce this Code section, the department is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations and to prescribe conditions and procedures in order to assure compliance in carrying out the purposes for which financial support and project grants may be made in accordance with this Code section.
  4. The department is directed to administer this program with such flexibility as to permit full cooperation between federal, state, and local governments, agencies, and instrumentalities so as to result in an effective and economical program.
  5. Funds appropriated to the department pursuant to Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia may not be utilized for any of the purposes set out in this Code section.
  6. No financial support or project grant provided for in this Code section may be made to any private mass transportation operator without prior concurrence of the State Transportation Board.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1301, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 817, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1317, § 6.17; Ga. L. 2008, p. 181, § 20/HB 1216.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1989, “transportation” was substituted for “transportaion” in subsection (g).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2008, “commissions” was substituted for “commission” in subsection (b) and paragraph (c)(1), as the original language was “development centers”.

U.S. Code. —

The federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, referred to in paragraph (c)(2) of this Code section, is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments in zoning, planning and environmental law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1979).

32-9-2. Operation by department of facilities or systems; financial assistance to systems; prohibition relating to certain Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Services.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Capital project” has the same meaning as in 49 U.S.C.A. Section 5302(a)(1).
    2. “Construction” means the supervising, inspecting, actual building, and all expenses incidental to the acquisition, actual building, or reconstruction of facilities and equipment for use in mass transportation, including designing, engineering, locating, surveying, mapping, and acquisition of rights of way.
    3. “Mass transportation” means all modes of transportation serving the general public which are appropriate, in the judgment of the department, to transport people, commodities, or freight by highways, rail, air, water, or other conveyance, exclusive of wires and pipelines.
  2. Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department may, alone or in cooperation with counties, municipalities, authorities, state agencies, or private or public transit companies, plan, develop, supervise, support, own, lease, maintain, and operate mass transportation facilities or systems.
    1. The department may, when funds are available from the United States government for such purposes, provide assistance to the operators of mass transportation systems or to the owners of facilities used in connection therewith for the payment of operating expenses to improve or to continue such mass transportation service by operation, lease, contract, or otherwise.
    2. The department may, when funds are available from the United States government for such purposes, participate in the acquisition, construction, and improvement of facilities and equipment, including capital projects, for use, by operation or lease or otherwise, in mass transportation service.
    3. The department’s participation with state funds in those programs specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection may be in either cash, products, or in-kind services. The department’s participation with state funds shall be limited to the minimum nonfederal share of the program. The remainder shall be provided from sources other than department funds or from revenues from the operation of public mass transportation systems.
  3. The department shall not enter into any contract with any private entity for the purposes set out in subsections (b) and (c) of this Code section without the prior concurrence of the State Transportation Board.
  4. Funds appropriated to the department pursuant to Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia may not be utilized for any of the purposes set out in this Code section.
  5. In order to effectuate and enforce this Code section, the department is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations and to prescribe conditions and procedures in order to assure compliance in carrying out the purposes of this Code section.
  6. The department shall not be authorized, without the concurrence of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, to receive federal financial assistance to provide mass transportation services or facilities that will duplicate those mass transportation services or facilities provided or to be provided by the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, within the City of Atlanta and Fulton and DeKalb counties, as a part of its rapid transit system, including the use of buses as well as a rail system, as that system is described in an engineering report, dated September 1971, prepared for the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority by Parsons-Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel, general engineering consultants, and adopted as part of the Rapid Transit Contract and Assistance Agreement, dated September 1, 1971, between the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, and DeKalb County, Georgia.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1302, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 817, § 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56; Ga. L. 1999, p. 112, § 3; Ga. L. 2003, p. 905, § 4; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1343, § 9/HB 817.

Cross references. —

Powers and duties of department relating to Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, § 32-2-2(a)(14).

Law reviews. —

For article, “Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 247 (2001).

For note on 1999 amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233 (1999).

For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 170 (2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

State funds may be used to match federal funds for transportation services. — State funds, provided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IV, Sec. VIII, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II) may be used to match federal funds to provide operating subsidies for intercity bus service and Amtrak passenger rail service. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-143.

Administration of railroad safety program. — Georgia Department of Transportation lacks statutory authority necessary to engage in the administration of railroad safety program. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-64.

32-9-3. Financial assistance for transportation services for elderly and handicapped persons.

Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1990, p. 915, § 1, effective July 1, 1990.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Ga. L. 1990, p. 915, § 1. For present similar provisions relating to financial assistance for transportation services for elderly and disabled persons, see Code Section 49-2-13.1.

32-9-4. Designation of special or exclusive use travel lanes; use of such lanes.

  1. The department is authorized to designate travel lanes in each direction of travel on any road in the state highway system for the exclusive or preferential use of:
    1. Buses;
    2. Motorcycles;
    3. Passenger vehicles occupied by two persons or more;
    4. Vehicles bearing alternative fueled vehicle license plates issued under paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-2-38 or paragraph (7) of subsection (l) of Code Section 40-2-86.1; or
    5. Other vehicles as designated by the department.

      Where such designation has been made, the road shall be appropriately marked with such signs or other roadway markers and markings to inform the traveling public of the lane restrictions imposed.

    (a.1) Upon approval through either legislative action in the United States Congress or regulatory action by the United States Department of Transportation to permit hybrid vehicles with fewer than two occupants to operate in a high occupancy vehicle lane, the department shall authorize hybrid vehicles, as defined in Code Section 40-2-76, to use the travel lanes designated for such vehicles as provided in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section.

  2. No driver of any vehicle not authorized to be operated in a lane designated and signed for exclusive use shall operate such vehicle in such lane except to execute turning movements or in an emergency situation. Any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable as provided for in Code Section 40-6-54.
  3. No traffic lane shall be designated and signed for exclusive use pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section without the approval of the State Transportation Board.
  4. The department is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations in order to carry out the purposes of this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1304, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 817, § 2; Ga. L. 1993, p. 363, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1589, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 450, § 2; Ga. L. 2010, p. 9, § 1-61/HB 1055; Ga. L. 2019, p. 486, § 1/SB 227.

The 2019 amendment, effective May 2, 2019, inserted “paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-2-38 or” in the middle of paragraph (a)(4).

Cross references. —

Further provisions regarding designation of travel lanes and operation of vehicles within lanes, §§ 40-6-24 , 40-6-48 .

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Validity of restrictions as to points at which jitney bus passengers may be taken on and discharged, 6 A.L.R. 110 .

Validity and applicability of statutes relating to use of highway by private motor carriers and contract motor carriers for hire, 175 A.L.R. 1333 .

32-9-4.1. FlexAuto lanes.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “FlexAuto lane” means an area designated as a special lane of travel created by converting emergency lane and hard shoulder areas on the left or right side of an interstate highway or other road into a rush hour traffic lane for use by automobiles during certain hours.
  2. The department, with the approval of the board, is authorized to designate FlexAuto lanes on the state highway system for the purpose of improving traffic flow in and around areas with a history of traffic congestion.
  3. Any FlexAuto lane shall be appropriately striped and marked and shall have signage appropriate to indicate its nature, as determined by the department. The department may incorporate emergency havens, emergency ramps, or emergency parking pads into the design and creation of FlexAuto lanes, as determined appropriate by the department.
  4. The hours of usage of a FlexAuto lane shall be determined by the department.
  5. It shall be unlawful for any person operating any motor vehicle to use a FlexAuto lane for purposes of travel other than emergency use outside the permitted hours of travel use, as determined and posted by the department. It shall be unlawful for any person operating any motor vehicle other than an automobile, motorcycle, or light truck to use a FlexAuto lane for purposes of travel other than emergency use at any time.
  6. Prior to implementing this Code section, the department shall, if necessary, seek to secure and implement any federal approvals, waivers, or other actions necessary or appropriate in order to implement this Code section without any loss or impairment of federal funding.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-4.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2005, p. 684, § 2/HB 273; Ga. L. 2017, p. 720, § 3/HB 328.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted “, not to exceed eight hours per day” following “department” at the end of subsection (d); and deleted former subsection (g), which read: “FlexAuto lanes shall not be implemented at more than 80 separate locations in the state until such time as the department has completed a one year test use of such lanes.”.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2005, p. 684, § 1/HB 273, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The General Assembly finds and determines and recommends as follows:

“(1) The Georgia Department of Transportation has a job of overwhelming proportions and addresses the ever-increasing transportation needs of the state through the hard work and dedication of outstanding leaders and staff;

“(2) There is a need in this state to reduce emissions and improve air quality by increasing traffic flow and reducing traffic congestion and decreasing drive times;

“(3) The Department of Transportation is urged to use creative and innovative methods to deal with gridlock and traffic congestion in Georgia and especially in the metropolitan areas;

“(4) Upon passage of this enabling legislation, the department is urged to implement FlexAuto lanes where applicable and to commence the implementation of such lanes in as timely a manner as is practicable;

“(5) The Department of Transportation is requested specifically to identify 20 major areas with a history of traffic congestion in and around our state that will derive the most benefit from the use of FlexAuto lanes and, after identifying these areas, to create and rapidly implement a plan for use of such lanes in such areas;

“(6) Studies and construction models used successfully in other areas within this country and others should be used as models where traffic flow was improved and emissions reduced by using creative and innovative methods to deal with gridlock and traffic congestion; and

“(7) The model used in Virginia is being studied by Israel, France, Japan, Germany, and England.”

32-9-5. Ride-sharing programs.

Subject to general appropriations for such purposes, the department, pursuant to its rules and regulations, is authorized, alone or in cooperation with counties, municipalities, authorities, state agencies, or private or public entities, to participate in the establishment and operation of ride-sharing programs. A ride-sharing program is an undertaking designed to encourage safe and adequate transportation by increasing the number of person-trips per vehicle, regardless of the type of vehicle.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1307, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1473, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 373, § 1.

32-9-6. Financial assistance for rail service.

  1. The department is designated as the state agency to offer financial assistance, in the form of a rail service continuation payment, to enable rail service, for which the Interstate Commerce Commission has determined a certificate of abandonment should be issued, to be continued.
  2. The department is authorized to receive and administer federal financial assistance and to distribute, by contract or otherwise, such federal financial assistance, alone or together with state, local, or private funds available for such purposes, for the implementation of railroad assistance programs that are designed to provide for:
    1. The cost of rail service continuation payments;
    2. The cost of purchasing a line of railroad or other rail properties to maintain existing rail services or to provide for future rail services;
    3. The cost of rehabilitating and improving rail properties on a line of railroad to the extent necessary to permit adequate and efficient rail service on such line; or
    4. The cost of reducing the cost of the lost rail service in a manner less expensive than continuing rail service.

      Subject to general fund appropriations for these purposes, the department is authorized to expend state funds to the extent necessary to pay the state’s share of such payments.

  3. The department shall provide to the Georgia Public Service Commission the pertinent information it may possess regarding a proposed abandonment of a railroad line and shall assist the Public Service Commission, as required, in developing the state’s position on the abandonment. The Public Service Commission shall provide to the department the pertinent information it may possess concerning any railroad line for which abandonment has been requested in order to assist the department in preparing an economic and operational analysis of the line.
  4. Should the department decide to implement a railroad assistance program in accordance with paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of this Code section, the Public Service Commission will use its best efforts, within the scope of its powers and responsibilities, to assist the department in implementing such a program.
  5. The department is authorized to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations for the implementation and administration of this Code section.
  6. The department shall not implement or propose to implement any railroad assistance program without the prior concurrence of the State Transportation Board.
  7. Funds appropriated to the department pursuant to Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia may not be utilized for any of the purposes set out in this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1305, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 870, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56.

Cross references. —

Railroads and rail service generally, T. 46, C. 8 and T. 46, C. 9.

32-9-7. Financial assistance for airport development.

  1. So that the State of Georgia may effectively and responsibly implement its state airport system plan, after September 30, 1977, all applications to an agency of the United States for funds to improve or develop an airport not regularly served by an air carrier operating under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or any successor agency of the United States government or owned and operated by the United States government shall be submitted to the department for review and comment prior to being submitted to the federal agency. No such application shall be submitted to the federal agency without first having been reviewed and commented on by the department. The department shall act on each application within 90 days after the receipt of the application. Applications submitted to the Federal Aviation Agency prior to September 30, 1977, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Code section.
  2. The department is authorized, when requested by the owner or operator of any airport for which federal funds are or will be sought for the improvement or development of the airport, to provide such assistance to the owner or operator of the airport as may be necessary to prepare the application for such funds and to complete the project for which such funds are requested.
  3. In order to effectuate and enforce this Code section, the department is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations and to prescribe conditions and procedures in order to assure compliance in carrying out the purposes of this Code section.
  4. Funds appropriated to the department pursuant to Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia may not be utilized for any of the purposes set out in this Code section.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1306, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 868, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56.

Cross references. —

Powers of local governments as to air facilities, T. 6, C. 3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power to establish or maintain public airport, or to create separate public airport authority, 161 A.L.R. 733 .

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

32-9-8. Licensing airports.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Aircraft” means any machine, whether heavier or lighter than air, used or designed for navigation of or flight in the air.
    2. “Airport” means any area of land, water, or mechanical structure which is used for the landing and takeoff of aircraft and is open to the general public, as evidenced by the existence of a current and approved Federal Aviation Administration Form 7480-I or any successor application, for such use without prior permission or restrictions and includes any appurtenant structures and areas which are used or intended to be used for airport buildings, other airport facilities, rights of way, or easements; provided, however, that the term “airport” shall not include the following facilities used as airports:
      1. Facilities owned or operated by the United States government or an agency thereof;
      2. Privately owned facilities not open to the general public when such airports do not interfere with the safe and efficient use of air space of an airport for which a license or an airport operating certificate issued under 14 C.F.R. Part 139 of the regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration or any successor regulation has been granted; and
      3. Facilities being operated pursuant to 14 C.F.R. Part 139 relating to certification requirements for airports serving scheduled air carrier operations or any successor agency of the United States government.
    3. “Person” means an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, company, association, joint-stock association, municipality, county, or state agency, authority, or political subdivision and includes any director, employee, agent, trustee, receiver, assignee, or other similar representative thereof.
  2. It is declared that the operation of airports used by the public for general aviation purposes but which are operated without regulation as to minimum and uniform safety requirements endangers the lives and property of persons operating aircraft at these facilities, the passengers of aircraft operated by such persons, and the occupants of lands in the vicinity of such facilities. For the purpose of establishing and improving a system of safer airports and to foster safer operating conditions at these airports, the department is authorized and directed to provide for the licensing of airports. The department may charge a license fee of $100.00 per runway, up to a maximum of $400.00, for each original license and each renewal thereof. All licenses shall be renewed biennially.
  3. The department shall issue a license or renewal thereof to any owner of an airport that applies for a license or renewal thereof, if, upon investigation, the department determines that the airport meets minimum standards, prescribed by the department in its rules and regulations, in the areas of geometric layout, navigational aids, lighting, approach surfaces, landing surfaces, runway markings, and separation between airport sites, provided that no license shall be denied the owner or operator of an airport in existence on July 1, 1978, because of the failure to meet minimum standards prescribed with regard to geometric layout and separation between airport sites.
  4. The department shall promulgate and publish reasonable rules and regulations establishing the minimum standards provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section, the procedure for obtaining, renewing, and revoking a license, and such other procedures and conditions as are reasonable and necessary to carry out this Code section.
  5. Within 60 days after the receipt of a properly filled out application for a license, with appropriate fee, the department shall act upon the application.
  6. All applications for renewal of a license shall be made to the department no later than 60 days prior to the expiration of the existing license.
  7. Applications for a license or renewal thereof may be denied, or a license may be revoked, by the department, after notice and opportunity for hearing to the licensee, when the department shall reasonably determine:
    1. That the licensee has failed to comply with the conditions of the license or renewal thereof;
    2. That the licensee has failed to comply with the minimum standards prescribed by the department pursuant to this Code section; or
    3. That because of changed physical or legal conditions or circumstances the airport has become either unsafe or unusable for the purposes for which the license or renewal was issued.
  8. The decision of the department to deny or revoke any license or renewal thereof shall be subject to review in the manner prescribed for the review of contested cases as prescribed by Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.”
    1. It shall be unlawful for any person to own or operate an airport without first obtaining and thereafter maintaining a valid license as required by this Code section.
    2. Whenever it appears or is made known to the department that any person is operating an airport without a valid license, the department may issue an initial written cease and desist order requiring such person to cease and desist immediately from such unauthorized activity. Such cease and desist order shall become final 20 calendar days from the date of issuance as noted on the order. If the proper license or evidence of exemption from licensure requirements during the time of the alleged unlicensed activity is provided to the department’s satisfaction within the 20 day period, the order shall not become final and shall be rescinded in writing by the department. Review of an administrative decision of the department entered pursuant to this paragraph shall be available solely in the superior court of the county of domicile of the department and shall be filed no later than 30 days after the department’s cease and desist order becomes final.
    3. When a person fails to comply with the terms of a final cease and desist order of the department, the department may, through the Attorney General and upon three days’ written notice to such person, petition the superior court in the county where the unlicensed airport is located for an order directing such person to obey the final cease and desist order of the department. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall allow a motion to show cause as to why a final cease and desist order of the department should be affirmed. After a hearing upon the merits or after failure of such person to appear when ordered, the court may grant the petition of the department.
      1. Any person that violates the terms of an order issued pursuant to this subsection shall be liable to the department for a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000.00 per violation per day.
      2. In determining the amount of penalty, the department shall consider the appropriateness of the penalty relative to the gravity of the violation, the history of any previous violation by such person, and any other such contributing factors or circumstances. The department may, in its discretion, compromise or modify any penalty that is subject to imposition or has been imposed pursuant to this paragraph. Any violator that is assessed a civil penalty may also be assessed the cost of collection, including, but not limited to, interest, court costs, and attorney’s fees.
      3. Any person assessed a civil penalty as provided in this paragraph shall have the right to request a hearing into the matter as provided for in Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act” within ten days after notification of the assessment has been served upon the person involved; otherwise, such penalty shall be final.
    4. All penalties and fines recovered by the department pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection shall be paid to the general fund of the state; provided, however, that the department in its discretion may remit such amounts net of the cost of recovery if the department makes an accounting of all such costs and expenses of recovery.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1307, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1932, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 9, § 1-62/HB 1055; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 6/HB 577.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in paragraph (a)(2), inserted “, as evidenced by the existence of a current and approved Federal Aviation Administration Form 7480-I or any successor application,” in the middle, and substituted “, provided, however,” for “, provided” near the end; in subparagraph (a)(2)(B), inserted “14 C.F.R.” in the middle, and added “and” at the end; substituted the present provisions of subparagraph (a)(2)(C) for the former provisions, which read: “Facilities being operated pursuant to a current airport operating certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration or any successor agency of the United States government; and”; deleted subparagraph (a)(2)(D), which read: “Any facility served by a scheduled air carrier operating under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or any successor agency of the United States government.”; inserted “director, employee, agent,” near the end of paragraph (a)(3); deleted the former last sentence of subsection (b), which read: “In promulgating the rules and regulations establishing minimum standards, the department shall consult with the Georgia Aviation Trades Association.”; in subsection (c), substituted “license” for “permit” three times and substituted “that applies” for “who applies” near the middle; substituted “The” for “Within nine months after July 1, 1978, the” at the beginning of subsection (d); deleted the former first sentence of subsection (e), which read: “Within six months after the effective date of the rules and regulations adopted by the department, the owner of each airport in this state shall apply, on forms prescribed by the department, for a license to operate the airport.”; and substituted the present provisions of subsection (i) for the former provisions, which read: “After September 30, 1979, it shall be unlawful for any person to own or operate an airport without a valid license as required by this Code section. Any person owning or operating an airport without a valid license as prescribed by this Code section shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100.00, to be imposed by the commissioner.”

Cross references. —

Powers of local governments as to air facilities, T. 6, C. 3.

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Rules and regulations for licensing of certain open-to-the-public airports, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, State Department of Transportation, Chapter 672-9.

32-9-8.1. Redesignated.

Redesignated as Code Section 6-1-3 by Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32(1)/HB 737, effective May 3, 2016.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32(1)/HB 737, effective May 3, 2016, redesignated former Code Section 32-9-8.1 as Code Section 6-1-3.

32-9-9. Creation of transit authority by special legislation; authority’s attributes and powers.

  1. This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the “Transit Authority Act.”
  2. It is declared to be the policy of the state to foster and to assure the development of mass rapid transit systems within the metropolitan areas of this state.
  3. As used in this Code section, the term “metropolitan area” means (1) the area of any city within the state whose population, as determined by the federal census of 1950 or any later federal census, shall have exceeded 43,617 persons (such a city being hereinafter referred to as a central city), together with (2) the area suburban to such a central city as each such suburban area shall be more specifically delimited by special Act of the General Assembly.
  4. The General Assembly may, by special Act, create a transit authority charged with the duty of acquiring, constructing, owning, operating, and maintaining a mass rapid transit system within a metropolitan area as defined in this Code section. The General Assembly, in the special Act creating such an authority, shall delimit the territory to be served by such authority; and the General Assembly may, in such special Act, provide that the property of and the securities issued by such authority shall be exempt from taxation and that such authority may, in addition to the rights, powers, privileges, exemptions, and immunities which are customarily possessed by public corporations, have such other and further rights, powers, privileges, exemptions, and immunities as the General Assembly shall deem appropriate to the accomplishment of its purposes, provided that such authority shall not be empowered to obligate the State of Georgia or any county, municipality, political subdivision, or public body of the state to pay any of its debts; provided, further, that the central city served by such mass rapid transit system and any county or counties whose territory or any part thereof lies within the territorial limits of such authority, as the same may be delimited in the special Act creating such authority, shall have the right to appoint the members of such authority, or a majority thereof, subject to such qualifications for membership and such apportionment of the right of appointment as the special Act creating such authority may provide.

History. — Ga. L. 1960, p. 1025; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Savannah Transit Authority is not a political subdivision. 1983 Op. Atty Gen. No. U83-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Powers of federal and state governments respectively as regards railroad stations, 37 A.L.R. 1372 .

Validity of statute or ordinance relating to taxicab or bus service as against objection based upon monopolistic tendency or effect, 159 A.L.R. 821 .

32-9-10. Implementation of federal Transportation Safety Program.

  1. The purpose of this Code section is to implement the federal Public Transportation Safety Program, 49 U.S.C. Section 5329, referred to in this Code section as the act.
  2. For purposes of this Code section, the term “system” means a public transportation system having vehicles operated on a fixed guideway on steel rails, the steel of the wheels of such vehicles coming directly into contact with such rails, but excluding such systems that are subject to regulation by the Federal Railroad Administration.  In addition, a “system” shall include all other public transportation systems that, under regulations issued pursuant to subsection (e) of the act, are subject to the act.
  3. The department is designated as the agency of this state responsible for implementation of the act.
  4. Each system operating in this state shall adopt and carry out a safety program plan that provides for the following:
    1. The plan shall establish safety requirements with respect to the design, manufacture, and construction of the equipment, structures, and fixtures of the system; the maintenance of equipment, structures, and fixtures; operating methods and procedures and the training of personnel; compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations applicable to the safety of persons and property; protection from fire and other casualties; and the security of passengers and employees and of property;
    2. The plan shall provide for measures reasonably adequate to implement the requirements established pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection; and
    3. The plan shall establish lines of authority, levels of responsibility and accountability, and methods of documentation adequate to ensure that it is implemented.
  5. The department shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. It shall review the safety program plan of each system and all revisions and amendments thereof and if it finds that the plan conforms to subsection (d) of this Code section shall approve it;
    2. It shall monitor the implementation of each system’s plan;
    3. It shall have the power to require any system to revise or amend its safety program plan as may be necessary in order to comply with any regulations issued pursuant to subsection (e) of the act and any amendments or revisions thereof; and
    4. It shall investigate hazardous conditions and accidents on each system and, as appropriate, require that hazardous conditions be corrected or eliminated.
  6. If any system fails to comply with an order of the department to correct or to eliminate a hazardous condition, the department may apply for an order requiring such system to show cause why it should not do so.  Such application shall be made to the superior court of the most populous county in which such system operates, as such population is determined according to the United States decennial census of 1990 or any future such census.  If at the hearing upon such an order to show cause the court finds that the condition that is the subject of the order in fact creates an unreasonable risk to the safety of persons, property, or both, the court may order the system to comply with the department’s order or to take such other corrective action as the court finds appropriate.
  7. Nothing in this Code section is intended to conflict with any provision of federal law; and, in case of such conflict, such portion of this Code section as may be in conflict with such federal law is declared of no effect to the extent of the conflict.
  8. The department is authorized to take the necessary steps to secure the full benefit of the federal-aid program and meet any contingencies not provided for in this Code section, abiding at all times by a fundamental purpose to perform all acts which are necessary, proper, or incidental to the efficient and safe operation and development of the department and the state highway system and of other modes and systems of transportation.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-10 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1362, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1072, § 4/SB 169.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, a comma was deleted following “Code section” near the end of paragraph (e)(1).

32-9-11. Transit services with local governments.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. “Local government” means any county, municipality, or political subdivision of this state, or any combination thereof.
    2. “Nonattainment area” means those counties currently having or previously deemed to have excess levels of ozone, carbon monoxide, or particulate matter in violation of the standards in the federal Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990 and codified at 42 U.S.C.A. Sections 7401 to 7671q and which fall under the jurisdiction exercised by the Atlanta-region Transit Link “ATL” Authority or any predecessor authority as described in Article 2 of Chapter 39 of Title 50.
    3. “Transit agency” means any public agency, public corporation, or public authority existing under the laws of this state that is authorized by any general, special, or local law to provide any type of transit services within any area of this state but shall not include the Department of Transportation, the Atlanta-region Transit Link “ATL” Authority, or the Georgia Rail Passenger Authority.
    4. “Transit facilities” means everything necessary and appropriate for the conveyance and convenience of passengers who utilize transit services.
    5. “Transit services” means all modes of transportation serving the general public which are appropriate to transport people and their personal effects by highway or other ground conveyance but does not include rail conveyance.
    1. Any transit agency may, by contract with any local government for any period not exceeding 50 years, provide transit services or transit facilities for, to, or within that local government or between that local government and any area in which such transit agency provides transit services or transit facilities, except that if such services or facilities are to be funded wholly or partially by fees, assessments, or taxes levied and collected within a special district created pursuant to Article IX, Section II, Paragraph VI of the Constitution, such contract may only become effective if a majority of the qualified voters residing within the special district to be taxed authorize such contract or tax by referendum in a special election which shall be called and conducted for that purpose by the election superintendent of such local government.
      1. Any services provided in a county outside a nonattainment area by a transit agency pursuant to a contract authorized by this subsection shall be conditioned upon such services being included in a plan for transit services adopted or approved by the governing authority of the county and by the governing authorities of any municipalities within which transit services are to be provided as provided in the plan.
      2. Any services provided by a transit agency in a county within a nonattainment area pursuant to a contract authorized by this subsection and entered into on or after January 1, 2019, shall be for services:
        1. Approved by a local governing authority;
        2. Included in the regional transit plan adopted pursuant to Code Section 50-39-12; and
        3. Through agreement with the Atlanta-region Transit Link “ATL” Authority.
  2. The purpose of this Code section is to facilitate the exercise of the power to provide public transportation services conferred by Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III of the Constitution. This Code section does not repeal any other law conferring the power to provide public transportation services or prescribing the manner in which such power is to be exercised. This Code section does not restrict the power of the Department of Transportation, the Atlanta-region Transit Link “ATL” Authority, or the Georgia Rail Passenger Authority to contract with any local government to provide transit services or transit facilities, including but not limited to rail transit services and facilities, pursuant to Article IX, Section III, Paragraph I of the Constitution.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-11 , enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 888, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 112, § 4; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-1/HB 930.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, added paragraph (a)(2); redesignated former paragraph (a)(2) as present paragraph (a)(3); substituted “Atlanta-region Transit Link ‘ATL’ ” for “Georgia Regional Transportation” near the end of present paragraph (a)(3) and in the last sentence of subsection (c); redesignated former paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) as present paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5), respectively; and substituted the present provisions of subsection (b) for the former provisions, which read: “Any transit agency may, by contract with any local government for any period not exceeding 50 years, provide transit services or transit facilities for, to, or within that local government or between that local government and any area in which such transit agency provides transit services or transit facilities, except that if such services or facilities are to be funded wholly or partially by fees, assessments, or taxes levied and collected within a special district created pursuant to Article IX, Section II, Paragraph VI of the Constitution, such contract may only become effective if it is approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting in such local government in a special election which shall be called and conducted for that purpose by the election superintendent of such local government. Any services provided by a transit agency pursuant to a contract authorized by this subsection shall be conditioned upon such services being included in a plan for transit services adopted or approved by the governing authority of the county and by the governing authorities of any municipalities within which transit services are to be provided as provided in the plan.”

Law reviews. —

For article, “Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority,” see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 247 (2001).

For note on 1999 amendment to this Code section, see 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 233 (1999).

32-9-12. Pilot program for funding streetcar projects.

The department will form a pilot program that will provide a state level flow through point for any available federal funding or other forms of financial and development sources and assistance for local, regional, and public-private streetcar projects. Any funding through bonds for such pilot and grant program shall be administered by the State Road and Tollway Authority.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-12 , enacted by Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 32/HB 95.

Article 2 Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)

Editor’s notes. —

Code Sections 32-9-13 and 32-9-14 were designated as Article 2 by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930, effective May 3, 2018.

Ga. L. 2021, p. 431, § 3/HB 714, not codified by the General Assembly, amended the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243) in Section 10 by revising subsection (t) to read: “Any action to protect or enforce any rights under the provisions of this Act or any suit or action against such Authority, except as provided in Section 9(c), shall be brought in either State or Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, and any action pertaining to validation of any bonds issued under the provisions of this Act shall likewise be brought in said court, which shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction of such actions.”

Administrative rules and regulations. —

Rapid Transit Tax, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Sales and Use Tax Division, Rapid Transit Tax, Subject 560-12-4.

32-9-13. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. “Authority” means the authority created by the MARTA Act and pursuant to a local constitutional amendment for purposes of establishing a metropolitan area system of public transportation set out at Ga. L. 1964, p. 1008.
  2. “Board” means the board of directors of the authority.
  3. “City” means the City of Atlanta.
  4. “MARTA Act” means an Act known as the “Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965,” approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended.
  5. “Metropolitan area” means the Counties of Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett and the city.
  6. “Qualified municipality” shall have the same meaning as provided in paragraph (4) of Code Section 48-8-110.
  7. “Regional transit plan” means the official multiyear plan for transit services and facilities adopted pursuant to Code Section 50-39-12.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-13 , enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 105, § 1-1/SB 369; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930; Ga. L. 2019, p. 1056, § 32/SB 52.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, deleted the subsection (a) designation; substituted “article” for “Code section” in the introductory paragraph; added “and pursuant to a local constitutional amendment for purposes of establishing a metropolitan area system of public transportation set out at Ga. L. 1964, p. 1008” at the end of paragraph (1); added present paragraph (2); redesignated former paragraphs (2) and (3) as present paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; added paragraphs (5) through (7); and redesignated former subsections (b) through (g) as present Code Section 32-9-14.

The 2019 amendment, effective May 12, 2019, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, in paragraph (5), substituted “Counties” for “counties” and substituted “city” for “City”.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, Code Section 32-9-13, as enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32/HB 737, was redesignated as Code Section 32-9-14.

Editor’s notes. —

Former Code Section 32-9-13, pertaining to suspension of restrictions on use of annual proceeds from local sales and use taxes by public transit authorities, was repealed by Ga. L. 2014, p. 649, § 1/HB 265, effective June 1, 2014. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 3/HB 277.

32-9-14. Procedures, conditions, and limitations for levy of additional retail sales and use tax by City of Atlanta for MARTA services.

  1. Any provisions to the contrary in the MARTA Act notwithstanding and pursuant to the authority granted under a provision of the Constitution enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 1008, the city shall be authorized to levy a retail sales and use tax up to 0.50 percent under the provisions set forth in this Code section. Such tax shall be in addition to any tax which is currently authorized and collected under the MARTA Act. The city may elect to hold a referendum in 2016 as provided for by this Code section by the adoption of a resolution or ordinance by its governing body on or prior to June 30, 2016; provided, however, that if the city does not adopt a resolution or ordinance on or prior to June 30, 2016, it may elect to hold a referendum at the November, 2017, municipal general election by the adoption of a resolution or ordinance by its governing body to that effect on or prior to June 30, 2017. Such additional tax shall not count toward any local sales tax limitation provided for by Code Section 48-8-6. Any tax imposed under this Code section at a rate of less than 0.50 percent shall be in an increment of 0.05 percent. Any tax imposed under this Code section shall run concurrently as to duration of the levy with the 1 percent tax currently levied pursuant to the MARTA Act.
    1. No later than May 31 of the year a referendum is to be called for as provided in this Code section, the authority shall submit to the city a preliminary list of new rapid transit projects within or serving the geographical area of the city which may be funded in whole or in part by the proceeds of the additional tax authorized by this Code section.
    2. No later than July 31 of the year a referendum is to be called for as provided in this Code section, the authority shall submit to the city a final list of new rapid transit projects within or serving the city to be funded in whole or in part by the proceeds of the tax authorized by this Code section. Such final list of new rapid transit projects shall be incorporated into the rapid transit contract established under Section 24 of the MARTA Act between the authority and the city upon approval by the qualified voters of the city of the referendum to levy the additional tax authorized by this Code section.
  2. Before the additional tax authorized under this Code section shall become valid, the tax shall be approved by a majority of qualified voters of the city in a referendum thereon. The procedure for holding the referendum called for in this Code section shall be as follows: There shall be published in a newspaper having general circulation throughout the city, once each week for four weeks immediately preceding the week during which the referendum is to be held, a notice to the electors thereof that on the day named therein an election will be held to determine the question of whether or not the tax authorized by this Code section should be collected in the city for the purpose of expanding and enhancing the rapid transit system. Such election shall be held in all the election districts within the territorial limits of the city. The question to be presented to the electorate in any such referendum shall be stated on the ballots or ballot labels as follows:

    “( ) YES Shall an additional sales tax of ( insert

    percentage ) percent be collected in the City of

    ( ) NO Atlanta for the purpose of significantly expanding and enhancing MARTA transit service in Atlanta?”

    The question shall be published as a part of the aforesaid notice of election. Each such election shall be governed, held, and conducted in accordance with the provisions of law from time to time governing the holding of special elections. After the returns of such an election have been received, and the same have been canvassed and computed, the result shall be certified to the governing body of the city, in addition to any other person designated by law to receive the same, and such governing body shall officially declare the result thereof. Each election called by the governing body of the city under the provisions of this Code section shall be governed by and conducted in accordance with the provisions of law governing the holding of elections by the city. The expense of any such election shall be paid by the city.

  3. If a majority of those voting in such an election vote in favor of the proposition submitted, then the rapid transit contract between the authority and the city shall authorize the levy and collection of the tax provided for by this Code section, and the final list provided for in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section shall be incorporated therein. All of the proceeds derived from the additional tax provided for by this Code section shall be first allocated for payment of the cost of the rapid transit projects incorporated in such contract, except as otherwise provided by the terms of such rapid transit contract, and thereafter, upon completion and payment of such rapid transit projects, as provided for in such contract and this Code section. It shall be the policy of the authority to provide that the tax collected under this Code section in an amount exceeding the cost of the rapid transit projects incorporated in the contract shall be expended solely within and for the benefit of the city. When a tax is imposed under this Code section, the rate of any tax approved as provided for by Article 5A of Chapter 8 of Title 48 shall and the tax provided for by this Code section, in aggregate, shall not exceed a rate of 1 percent.
  4. If a majority of those voting in an election provided for by this Code section in 2016 vote against the proposition submitted, the city may elect to resubmit such proposition on the date of the November, 2017, municipal general election by the adoption of a resolution or ordinance to that effect on or prior to June 30, 2017, subject to the provisions of this Code section.
    1. Except as provided for to the contrary in this Code section, the additional tax provided for by this Code section shall be collected in the same manner and under the same conditions as set forth in Section 25 of the MARTA Act.
    2. The tax provided for by this Code section shall not be subject to any restrictions as to rate provided for by the MARTA Act and shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (b) or subsection (k) of Section 25 of the MARTA Act.
    3. A tax levied under this paragraph shall be added to the state sales and use tax imposed by Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 48 and the state revenue commissioner is authorized and directed to establish a bracket system by appropriate rules and regulations to collect the tax imposed under this paragraph in the city.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-13 , enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 105, § 1-1/SB 369; Code 1981, § 32-9-14 , as redesignated by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930; Ga. L. 2019, p. 1056, § 32/SB 52.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, redesignated former subsections (b) through (g) of former Code Section 32-9-13 as subsections (a) through (f) of present Code Section 32-9-14, respectively; in subsection (a), substituted “0.50” for “.50” twice, substituted “Code section” for “part” twice, substituted “0.05” for “.05” in the fifth sentence, and substituted “MARTA Act” for “ ‘Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965,’ approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended” at the end of the last sentence; and substituted “subsection (b)” for “subsection (c)” near the end of the first sentence of present subsection (d). See Editor’s notes for applicability.

The 2019 amendment, effective May 12, 2019, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted “(insert percentage)” for “( insert percentage )” in the ballot question in subsection (c).

Editor’s notes. —

Former Code Section 32-9-13, pertaining to suspension of restrictions on use of annual proceeds from local sales and use taxes by public transit authorities, was repealed by Ga. L. 2014, p. 649, § 1/HB 265, effective June 1, 2014. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 3/HB 277.

32-9-15. Procedures, conditions, and limitations for levy of additional retail sales and use tax by Fulton County for MARTA services; transit oriented development.

  1. Any provisions to the contrary in the MARTA Act notwithstanding and pursuant to the authority granted under a provision of the Constitution enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 1008, the governing authority of Fulton County shall be authorized to levy a retail sales and use tax up to 0.20 percent in the portion of such county located outside the jurisdictional limits of the city upon satisfaction of the provisions set forth in this Code section. Such tax shall be in addition to any tax which is currently authorized and collected under the MARTA Act. Such additional tax shall not count toward any local sales tax limitation provided for by Code Section 48-8-6. Such additional tax shall not be utilized to fund heavy rail. Any tax imposed under this Code section at a rate of less than 0.20 percent shall be in an increment of 0.05 percent. The minimum period of time for the imposition of the tax imposed under this Code section shall be ten years and the maximum period of time for the imposition shall not exceed 30 years.
  2. Prior to the call for a referendum authorized by this Code section, the governing authority of Fulton County shall deliver or mail a written notice to the authority and to the mayor or chief elected official in each qualified municipality located within such county and outside the jurisdictional limits of the city. Such notice shall contain the date, time, place, and purpose of a meeting at which the authority and the governing authority of such county and of each qualified municipality are to meet to discuss possible projects within or serving the geographical area of the county which may be funded in whole or in part by the proceeds of the additional tax authorized by this Code section and the rate of such tax. The notice shall be delivered or mailed at least ten days prior to the date of the meeting. The meeting shall be held at least 60 days prior to the issuance of the call for the referendum.
  3. Following the meeting required by subsection (b) of this Code section and prior to any tax being imposed under this Code section, the qualified municipalities and governing authority representing at least 70 percent of the population of Fulton County outside the boundaries of the city may execute an intergovernmental agreement memorializing their agreement to the levy of a tax and the rate of such tax; provided, however, that no tax shall be authorized to be imposed under this Code section if no such intergovernmental agreement is entered into. An intergovernmental agreement authorized by this subsection shall, at a minimum, include:
    1. If such tax is to be levied after January 1, 2019, a list of the projects proposed to be funded from the tax which shall be from the regional transit plan and approved by the Atlanta-regional Transit Link “ATL” Authority;
    2. The rate of tax to be imposed upon approval of a referendum; and
    3. The duration of the tax to be imposed upon approval of a referendum.
  4. Upon execution of an intergovernmental agreement as provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section, the governing authority of Fulton County shall be authorized to enter into a rapid transit service contract based upon the conditions agreed to in such intergovernmental agreement. Such rapid transit service contract shall incorporate the list of projects included in the intergovernmental agreement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of this Code section. Such rapid transit contract shall become effective and binding only upon passage of a referendum approving the imposition of an additional tax held in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) of this Code section.
  5. Before the additional tax authorized under this Code section shall become valid or the rapid transit contract shall become binding, the tax shall be approved by a majority of qualified voters in Fulton County residing outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the city in a referendum thereon. The procedure for holding the referendum called for in this Code section shall be as follows: There shall be published in a newspaper having general circulation throughout Fulton County, once each week for four weeks immediately preceding the week during which the referendum is to be held, a notice to the electors thereof that on the day named therein an election will be held to determine the question of whether or not the tax authorized by this Code section should be collected in Fulton County for the purpose of expanding and enhancing the rapid transit system. Such election shall be held in all the election districts within the territorial limits of Fulton County located outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the city. The question to be presented to the electorate in any such referendum shall be stated on the ballots or ballot labels as follows:

    “( ) YES Shall an additional sales tax of ( insert

    rate ) be collected for a period of ( insert number )

    ( ) NO years in the portion of Fulton County outside of the City of Atlanta for the purpose of ( description of project or projects )?”

    The question shall be published as a part of the aforesaid notice of election. Each such election shall be governed, held, and conducted in accordance with the provisions of law from time to time governing the holding of special elections. After the returns of such an election have been received, and the same have been canvassed and computed, the result shall be certified to the board of commissioners of Fulton County, in addition to any other person designated by law to receive the same, and such board of commissioners shall officially declare the result thereof. Each election called by the board of commissioners of Fulton County under the provisions of this Code section shall be governed by and conducted in accordance with the provisions of law governing the holding of elections by such county. The expense of any such election shall be paid by the county.

  6. If a majority of those voting in such an election vote in favor of the proposition submitted, then the rapid transit contract between the authority and Fulton County shall be binding and the levy and collection of the tax provided for by this Code section shall be authorized. All of the proceeds derived from the additional tax provided for by this Code section shall be first allocated for payment of the cost of the rapid transit projects incorporated in such contract, except as otherwise provided by the terms of such rapid transit contract, and thereafter, upon completion and payment of such rapid transit projects, as provided for in such contract and this Code section. It shall be the policy of the authority to provide that the tax collected under this Code section in an amount exceeding the cost of the rapid transit projects incorporated in the contract shall be expended solely within and for the benefit of Fulton County.
  7. If a majority of those voting in an election provided for by this Code section vote against the proposition submitted, Fulton County may elect to resubmit such proposition provided that the requirements of this Code section are satisfied.
    1. Except as provided for to the contrary in this Code section, the additional tax provided for by this Code section shall be collected in the same manner and under the same conditions as set forth in Section 25 of the MARTA Act.
    2. The tax provided for by this Code section shall not be subject to any restrictions as to rate provided for by the MARTA Act and shall not be subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (b) or subsection (k) of Section 25 of the MARTA Act.
    3. A tax levied under this Code section shall be added to the state sales and use tax imposed by Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 48, and the state revenue commissioner is authorized and directed to establish a bracket system by appropriate rules and regulations to collect the tax imposed under this Code section in the area of Fulton County outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the city.
    1. For purposes of this subsection, the term “transit oriented development” means any commercial, residential, retail, or office building or development located on authority property or connected physically or functionally to a transit station, including, without limitation, joint development projects on authority property which provide for lease of authority property to private parties, convenient access to a transit station, and construction of a development for any such use. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the location of retail concessions within a transit station shall not alone constitute a transit oriented development.
    2. With respect to any local jurisdiction levying a tax as provided for by this Code section, the power of zoning and planning provided for by Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IV of the Constitution of Georgia shall extend to transit oriented development and to authority property which is not part of the transportation system, transportation projects, or rapid transit system or projects of the authority as provided for by the MARTA Act.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-15 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-16. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Overview Committee.

  1. There is created the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Overview Committee to be composed of the following 14 members: the chairperson of the State Planning and Community Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives; the chairperson of the State and Local Governmental Operations Committee of the Senate; the chairperson of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives; a member of the Banking and Financial Institutions Committee of the Senate to be selected by the President of the Senate; two members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, at least one of whom shall be from the area served by the authority; two members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President thereof, at least one of whom shall be from the area served by the authority; and three members of the House of Representatives and three members of the Senate appointed by the Governor, at least two of whom shall be from the area served by the authority. The appointed members of the committee shall serve two-year terms concurrent with their terms as members of the General Assembly. The chairperson of the committee shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House from the membership of the committee, and the vice chairperson of the committee shall be appointed by the President of the Senate from the membership of the committee. The chairperson and vice chairperson shall serve terms of two years concurrent with their terms as members of the General Assembly. Vacancies in an appointed member’s position or in the offices of chairperson or vice chairperson of the committee shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment. The committee shall periodically inquire into and review the operations, contracts, safety, financing, organization, and structure of the authority, as well as periodically review and evaluate the success with which said authority is accomplishing its legislatively created purposes.
  2. The state auditor, the Georgia Department of Transportation, and the Attorney General shall make available to the committee the services of their staffs’ facilities and powers in order to assist the committee in its discharge of its duties herein set forth. The committee may employ staff and secure the services of independent accountants, engineers, and consultants. Upon authorization by joint resolution of the General Assembly, the committee shall have the power while the General Assembly is in session or during the interim between sessions to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents in aid of its duties. In addition, when the General Assembly is not in session, the committee shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents in aid of its duties, upon application of the chairperson of the committee with the concurrence of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.
  3. The authority shall cooperate with the committee, its authorized personnel, the Attorney General, the state auditor, and the Georgia Department of Transportation in order that the charges of the committee, set forth in this Code section, may be timely and efficiently discharged. The authority shall submit to the committee such reports and data as the committee shall reasonably require of the authority in order that the committee may adequately inform itself of the activities of the authority required by this Code section. The Attorney General is authorized to bring appropriate legal actions to enforce any laws specifically or generally relating to the authority or as to any subpoenas issued by the committee. The committee shall, on or before the first day of January of each year, and at such other times as it deems to be in the public interest, submit to the General Assembly a report of its findings and recommendations based upon the review of the operations of the authority, as set forth in this Code section.
  4. In the discharge of its duties, the committee shall evaluate the performance of the authority in providing public transportation consistent with the following criteria:
    1. Public safety;
    2. Prudent, legal, and accountable expenditure of public funds;
    3. Responsiveness to community needs and community desires;
    4. Economic vitality of the transportation system and economic benefits to the community;
    5. Efficient operation; and
    6. Impact on the environment.

      To assist in evaluating the performance of the authority, the committee may appoint a citizens’ advisory committee or committees. Such citizens’ advisory committee or committees shall act in an advisory capacity only.

    1. The committee is authorized to expend state funds available to the committee for the discharge of its duties. Said funds may be used for the purposes of compensating staff personnel; paying the expenses of advertising notices of intention to amend the MARTA Act; paying for services of independent accountants, engineers, and consultants; paying necessary expenses of the citizens’ advisory committee or committees; and paying all other necessary expenses incurred by the committee in performing its duties.
    2. The members of the committee shall receive the same compensation, per diem, expenses, and allowances for their service on the committee as is authorized by law for members of interim legislative study committees.
    3. The funds necessary for the purposes of this Code section shall come from the funds appropriated to and available to the legislative branch of government.
  5. Nothing contained within this Code section shall relieve the authority of the responsibilities imposed upon it under the MARTA Act for planning, designing, purchasing, acquiring, constructing, improving, equipping, financing, maintaining, administering, and operating a system of rapid transit for the metropolitan area of Atlanta.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-14 , enacted by Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32/HB 737; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 32/HB 323; Code 1981, § 32-9-16 , as redesignated by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted “for planning” for “for the planning” in the middle of subsection (f).

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, redesignated former Code Section 32-9-14 as present Code Section 32-9-16; substituted “authority” for “Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority” throughout this Code section; substituted “MARTA Act” for “‘Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965,’ as amended” in the second sentence of paragraph (e)(1); and substituted “MARTA Act” for “‘Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965,’ as amended,” in the middle of subsection (f).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32(2)/HB 737, codified Ga. L. 1999, p. 965, §§ 1-5, as this Code section.

32-9-17. Logo and branding.

  1. On and after January 1, 2019, the board shall utilize a logo and brand upon any newly acquired capital asset worth more than $250,000.00 that is regularly visible to the public which shall include the acronym “ATL” as a prominent feature.
  2. On and after January 1, 2023, the board shall utilize a logo and brand upon any property of the authority which shall include the acronym “ATL” as a prominent feature.
  3. Such branding and logo will in no manner change the official name, business, contracts, or other obligations of the authority.
  4. The powers and duties conferred under this Code section shall be in addition to any powers and duties authorized in the MARTA Act and shall in no way be interpreted to repeal any portion of such Act.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-17 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-18. Repeal of funding limitations.

Any provision of the MARTA Act which limits the amount the state may contribute to the system of the rapid transit system of the authority shall stand repealed.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-18 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-19. Transportation services contracts.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of the MARTA Act, any county, municipality, special tax or community improvement district, political subdivision of this state within the metropolitan area, or any combination thereof may execute a transportation services contract with the authority to provide public transportation services, facilities, or both, for, to, or within such county, municipality, district, subdivision, or combination thereof. A transportation services contract executed pursuant to this subsection:
    1. Shall not be a rapid transit contract subject to the conditions established therefor in Code Sections 32-9-20 and 32-9-22 or Section 24 of the MARTA Act;
    2. May not utilize a method of financing those public transportation services or facilities provided under the contract which involves:
      1. The issuance of bonds under subsection (c) of Section 24 of the MARTA Act;
      2. The levy of the special retail sales and use tax described and authorized in Section 25 of the MARTA Act; or
      3. Both methods described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph;
    3. Shall require that the costs of any transportation services and facilities contracted for, as determined by the board on the basis of reasonable estimates, allocations of costs and capital, and projections, shall be borne by one or more of the following:
      1. Fares;
      2. Other revenues generated by such services or facilities;
      3. Any subsidy provided, directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of the public entity with which the authority contracted for the services and facilities; or
      4. A special retail sales and use tax described and authorized in Article 5B of Chapter 8 of Title 48; and
    4. Shall be for services on the regional transit plan and approved by the Atlanta-regional Transit Link “ATL” Authority.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the MARTA Act, any county, municipality, special tax or community improvement district, political subdivision of this state outside the metropolitan area, or any combination thereof may execute a transportation services contract with the authority to provide public transportation services, facilities, or both, for, to, or within such county, municipality, district, subdivision, or combination thereof. Under a transportation services contract executed pursuant to this subsection:
    1. The services and facilities shall be provided pursuant to a transportation services contract meeting the requirements therefor under subsection (a) of this Code section; and
    2. The contract shall not authorize the construction of any extension of or addition to the authority’s existing rapid rail system.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-19 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-20. Rapid transit contract with Gwinnett County.

    1. Any provisions to the contrary in the MARTA Act notwithstanding and pursuant to the authority granted under a provision of the Constitution enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 1008, and subject to such limitations set forth in this Code section, the authority and the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County may negotiate and determine the extent of financial participation and the time or times such financial participation may be required with respect to Gwinnett County in order to finance the provision of a rapid transit system through the joint instrumentality of the authority. Except as provided in Code Section 32-9-19 if such county is entering into a transportation services contract, such determination shall take the form of a rapid transit contract to be entered into between the authority and the local government. The final execution of a rapid transit contract shall be completed in every instance in the manner hereinafter set forth in this Code section.
    2. As one method of providing the financial participation determined by the board of commissioners and the authority to be Gwinnett County’s proper share of the cost of financing a rapid transit project or projects, Gwinnett County may, in the manner prescribed by law and subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law, issue its general obligation bonds, pay over the proceeds thereof to the authority, and thereby complete and make final the execution of the proposed rapid transit contract anticipated by such bond authorization and issuance and the authority shall agree in such contract to perform for such local government the aforesaid governmental function and to provide specified public transportation services and facilities.
    3. As an alternative method of providing the financial participation determined by the board of commissioners and the authority to be Gwinnett County’s proper share of the cost of financing a rapid transit project or projects, Gwinnett County may enter into a rapid transit contract or contracts calling for the authority to perform for it the aforesaid governmental function and calling for it to make periodic payments to the authority for the public transportation services and facilities contracted for, which payments may include amounts required to defray the periodic principal and interest payments on any obligations issued by the authority for the purpose of financing the cost of any rapid transit project or projects, amounts necessary to establish and maintain reasonable reserves to insure the payment of said debt service and to provide for renewals, extensions, repairs and improvements and additions to any project or projects, and amounts required to defray any operational deficit which the system or any part thereof may incur from time to time.
  1. The board of commissioners of Gwinnett County, subject to the conditions provided in this Code section, shall be authorized to enter into a rapid transit contract for and on behalf of the county with the authority for the provision of the aforesaid services and extension of the existing system to and from and within said county subject to approval by a majority of the qualified voters within said county voting in a referendum as provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section. As a condition precedent to the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County holding such referendum, if a rapid transit contract is entered into after January 1, 2019, the rapid transit service to be provided through the execution of a rapid transit contract shall be from the regional transit plan and approved by the Atlanta-regional Transit Link “ATL” Authority.
  2. The procedure for holding the referendum called for in subsection (b) of this Code section shall be as follows: There shall be published in a newspaper having general circulation throughout the territory of Gwinnett County, once each week for four weeks immediately preceding the week during which the referendum is to be held, a notice to the electors thereof that on the day named therein an election will be held to determine the question of whether or not the local government shall enter into the proposed rapid transit contract and said notices shall contain the full text of said proposed contract, which contract shall set forth the obligations of the parties thereto. It is expressly provided, however, that none of the documents or exhibits which are incorporated in such contract by reference or are attached to such contract and made a part thereof shall be published. Such special election shall be held at all the election districts within the territorial limits of Gwinnett County. The question to be presented to the electorate in any such referendum shall be and shall be stated on the ballots or ballot label as follows:

    “Gwinnett County has executed a contract for the provision of transit services, dated as of ( insert date ).

    Shall this contract be approved?

    YES _______________ NO _______________ ”

    The question shall be published as a part of the aforesaid notice of election. Such election shall be governed by and held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of law from time to time governing the holding of special elections as provided in Chapter 2 of Title 21, the “Georgia Election Code.” After the returns of such an election have been received, and the same have been canvassed and computed, the result shall be certified to the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County, in addition to any other person designated by law to receive the same, and such board of commissioners shall officially declare the result thereof.

  3. If a majority of those voting in such an election vote in favor of the proposition submitted, then the rapid transit contract as approved shall become valid and binding in accordance with its terms.
  4. The board of commissioners of Gwinnett County may elect any method provided in subsection (a) of this Code section to finance the participation required of it in whole or in part, and the election of one method shall not preclude the election of another method with respect thereto or with respect to any additional or supplementary participation determined to be necessary.
  5. When the authority and the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County have completed and fully executed a rapid transit contract in compliance with the requirements of this Code section, and the voters shall have approved such contract as herein provided, such contract shall constitute an obligation on the part of the local government for the payment of which its good faith and credit are pledged, but in no other way can the good faith and credit of any local government be pledged with respect to a rapid transit contract.
  6. The board of commissioners of Gwinnett County may use public funds to provide for a rapid transit system within the metropolitan area and may levy and collect any taxes authorized to it by law to the extent necessary to fulfill the obligations incurred in a rapid transit contract or contracts with the authority.
  7. Gwinnett County may transfer to the authority any property or facilities, or render any services, with or without consideration, which may be useful to the establishment, operation, or administration of the rapid transit system contemplated hereunder, and may contract with the authority for any other purpose incidental to the establishment, operation, or administration of such system, or any part or project thereof or the usual facilities related thereto.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-20 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

32-9-21. Creation of Cobb County Special District for Transit Committee; meetings; contracting; abolishment.

Reserved. Repealed pursuant to its own terms effective December 1, 2019.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Ga. L. 2021, p. 922, § 32(2)/HB 497, effective May 10, 2021, part of Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, reserved the designation of this Code section.

32-9-22. Rapid transit contract with Cobb County on behalf of the Cobb County Special District for Transit.

Reserved. Repealed pursuant to its own terms effective December 1, 2019.

Editor’s notes. —

This Code section was based on Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Ga. L. 2021, p. 922, § 32(3)/HB 497, effective May 10, 2021, part of Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, reserved the designation of this Code section.

32-9-23. Retail sales and use tax in Gwinnett and Cobb counties; rate; proceeds; utilization.

  1. In the event Gwinnett County and the authority enter into a rapid transit contract which is approved by a majority of voters, a retail sales and use tax shall be authorized to be levied pursuant to the conditions and limitations set forth in Section 25 of the MARTA Act, except as provided to the contrary in subsection (c) of this Code section. Such additional tax shall not count toward any local sales tax limitation provided for by Code Section 48-8-6.
  2. Reserved.
    1. The retail sales and use tax authorized to be levied pursuant to this Code section shall be at a rate of up to 1 percent. Any tax imposed under this Code section shall be in increments of 0.05 percent.
    2. The proceeds of the tax authorized to be levied pursuant to this Code section shall be used solely by each local government to fulfill the obligations incurred in the contracts entered into with the authority and as contemplated by this article.
    3. The effective date of the tax authorized to be levied pursuant to this Code section shall be the first day of the first calendar month following approval of the tax in the referendum required by Code Sections 32-9-20 and 32-9-22 unless a later effective date shall have been specified in the resolution or ordinance providing for the levy of the tax; provided that, with respect to services which are regularly billed on a monthly basis, the tax shall become effective with the first regular billing period coinciding with or following the effective date of the tax.
    4. The tax authorized to be levied pursuant to this Code section shall not be subject to any restrictions as to rate provided for by the MARTA Act and shall not be subject to the provisions of subsection (k) of Section 25 of the MARTA Act.
    5. A tax levied pursuant to this Code section shall be added to the state sales and use tax imposed by Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 48 and the state revenue commissioner is authorized and directed to establish a bracket system by appropriate rules and regulations to collect the tax imposed under this Code section.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-23 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930; Ga. L. 2021, p. 922, § 32(4)/HB 497.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

The 2021 amendment, effective May 10, 2021, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, reserved subsection (b).

Editor’s notes. —

Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section provides for the repeal of the subsection in the event a rapid transit contract has not been entered into on behalf of the Cobb County Special District for Transit or the referendum required by the Code Section 32-9-22 fails to receive the requisite majority vote for approval prior to December 1, 2019. The contingency was not met and, therefore, subsection (b) has been set out as repealed.

32-9-24. Appointment of Gwinnett County residents to board.

Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of Section 6 of the MARTA Act to the contrary, upon approval of a rapid transit contract pursuant to Code Section 32-9-20, the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County may appoint three residents of the county to the board. The board of commissioners shall designate one such resident to serve an initial term ending on December 31 in the second full year after the year in which the referendum approving said rapid transit contract was held and one such resident to serve an initial term ending on December 31 in the fourth full year after the year in which the referendum approving said rapid transit contract was held, in which event the board shall, subsections (a) and (b) of Section 6 of the MARTA Act to the contrary notwithstanding, be composed of such additional members. Upon the conclusion of the initial terms provided for in this Code section, the board of commissioners of Gwinnett County shall appoint a successor thereto for a term of office of four years.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-9-24 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 3-1/HB 930.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective May 3, 2018.

CHAPTER 10 Public Authorities

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

State or local governmental unit’s liability for injury to private highway construction worker based on its own negligence, 29 A.L.R.4th 1188.

Article 1 Georgia Highway Authority

PART 1 General Provisions

32-10-1. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. “Approach” means not more than three miles of the traffic artery on either end of the bridge and within that limit shall mean so much of the traffic arteries on either end of the bridge as shall be required to develop the maximum traffic capacity of the bridge, including necessary grading, paving, drainage structures or facilities, and other construction necessary to the approach.
  2. “Authority” means the public corporation created by the “Georgia Highway Authority Act,” Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, as amended by Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, and by Ga. L. 1972, p. 826, which 1967 Act merged the public corporation known as the Georgia Rural Roads Authority created by the “Georgia Rural Roads Authority Act,” Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, as amended, with the Georgia State Highway Authority, created by the “Georgia State Highway Authority Act,” Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, as amended particularly by Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, and which 1967 Act provided that all property, assets, choses in action, or other things of value of both of the constituent public corporations shall be vested in and be the property of the Georgia Highway Authority (the continuing and surviving public corporation); all the rights, powers, and duties, including their perpetual existence, previously legally granted to both constituent public corporations, shall be vested in the Georgia Highway Authority, subject, however, to all debts, obligations, liabilities, and duties incurred by the two constituent public corporations; the purpose and intention of such merger was that the Georgia Highway Authority as the successor and continuing corporation would be for the continuation of all the purposes of both constituent public corporations and would be vested with the rights, powers, duties, and obligations of both constituent public corporations, together with the additional powers and rights granted by the aforesaid “Georgia Highway Authority Act” of 1967.
  3. “Board” means the State Transportation Board or the commissioner of transportation acting as the chief executive officer of the Department of Transportation; and, whenever any action is required to be taken, any power is permitted to be exercised, any approval is to be granted, or any contract is to be executed by the State Transportation Board, pursuant to any provision of this article, the same may be taken, exercised, granted, or executed by the commissioner to the extent permitted by law.
  4. “Bonds and revenue bonds” means any bonds issued by the authority or either of the constituent public corporations, whether issued under this article or otherwise, including refunding bonds.
  5. “Bridge” means a structure, including the approaches thereto, erected in order:
    1. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage over obstructions in any public road, including but not limited to rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, bays, ravines, gullies, railroads, public highways, and canals; or
    2. To afford unrestricted vehicular passage under or over existing railroads and public roads.
  6. “Cost of project or projects” means the cost of construction; the cost of all lands, properties, franchises, and rights in property; the cost of all machinery and equipment necessary for the operation of a project; financing charges; interest prior to and during construction; cost of engineering, plans and specifications, surveys, and supervision; legal expenses; expenses necessary or incident to determining the feasibility or practicability of the project; administrative expenses; fiscal expense; such other expense as may be necessary or incident to the financing authorized by this article; the expense of construction or any action permitted by this article with respect to a particular project and the placing of the same in operation; and any other expense authorized by this article to be incurred by the authority with respect to any action with regard to a particular project or projects. Any obligation or expense incurred for any of the foregoing purposes shall be regarded as a cost of the project and may be paid or reimbursed as such out of the proceeds of bonds issued under this article for such project or group of projects.
  7. “County road” means any public road or portion thereof, not located wholly within the boundaries of an incorporated municipality and not now, or as of the particular time of inquiry in the future, part of a state road or urban road as defined in paragraphs (12) and (15), respectively, of this Code section. The term shall include not only such roads as come within this definition on July 1, 1973, but also such roads, as defined in this Code section, which may from time to time be planned, laid out, and constructed by the authority pursuant to this article. The fact that a road owned by the authority and leased to the state may, as provided by this article, be declared part of the state highway system shall not destroy its identity as a county road for the purposes of this article, provided that nothing in the definition of “county road” shall in any manner alter the legal effect of said term which is intended to be synonymous with “rural road” as used in the “Georgia Highway Authority Act,” Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, as amended.
  8. “Governing authority of a county” means the commissioner, board of commissioners, commission, or other person or body of persons at the time entrusted by law with the administration of the fiscal affairs of any county.
  9. “Governing authority of any incorporated municipality” means the mayor, board of aldermen, city council, board, council, commission, or other person or body of persons at the time entrusted by law with the administration of the fiscal affairs of any incorporated municipality.
  10. “Project” means:
    1. A continuous length or stretch of state road, including bridges thereon, as to which the authority has undertaken or agreed to undertake any action permitted by the terms of this article or as to which any such action has been completed by the authority;
    2. A continuous length or stretch of county road, including bridges thereon, as to which the authority has undertaken or agreed to undertake any action permitted by the terms of this article or as to which any such action has been completed by the authority;
    3. A continuous length or stretch of urban road, including bridges thereon, as to which the authority has undertaken or agreed to undertake any action permitted by the terms of this article or as to which any such action has been completed by the authority;
    4. One or more bridges, as defined in paragraph (5) of this Code section, together with the approaches thereto, as defined in paragraph (1) of this Code section; and
    5. A project undertaken pursuant to a public-private initiative as authorized pursuant to Code Section 32-2-78.
  11. “Self-liquidating” means a project or group of projects whose revenues, rents, and earnings derived by the authority therefrom will be sufficient to pay, in the judgment of the authority, the principal of and interest on bonds which may be issued for the cost of such project or group of projects and to pay the cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the projects or combination of projects and other lawful expenses of the authority.
  12. “State road” means any public road or portion thereof which is part of the state highway system or The Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways.
  13. “Urban county” means any county with a population of more than 50,000 according to the most recent official United States census.
  14. “Urban incorporated municipality” means a municipal corporation incorporated and chartered pursuant to an Act of the General Assembly and which has a population of 5,000 or more according to the most recent official United States census.
  15. “Urban road” means any public road or portion thereof located:
    1. Anywhere wholly within the boundaries of an urban county; or
    2. Wholly or partly within an urban incorporated municipality within the boundaries of a county with a population under 50,000 according to the most recent official United States census and extending no more than two miles outside of such urban incorporated municipality.

      The term shall include not only such roads as come within this definition on or after July 1, 1973, but also such roads as defined in this Code section which may from time to time be planned, laid out, and constructed by the authority pursuant to this article. The fact that a road owned by the authority and leased to the state may be declared part of the state highway system, as provided by this article, shall not destroy its identity as an urban road for the purposes of this article.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 3; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 2; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 3; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 3; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 826, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-1201, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 32; Ga. L. 2005, p. 601, § 11/SB 160; Ga. L. 2005, p. 902, § 4/SB 270.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, commas were inserted following “(15)” and “respectively” in the first sentence of paragraph (7).

32-10-2. Continuation of Georgia Highway Authority; preservation of authority’s powers; protection of rights of bondholders generally.

  1. The Georgia Highway Authority shall continue to be a body corporate and politic and an instrumentality and public corporation of this state known as the “Georgia Highway Authority.” It shall continue to have perpetual existence. In this name it may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded, and complain and defend in all courts subject to the limitations of Code Section 32-10-50.
  2. Except as provided in this article, the powers granted by law prior to July 1, 1973, to the Georgia Highway Authority to carry out the purpose for which it was originally created shall not be impaired or diminished. Furthermore, no provision of this article is intended to diminish or impair, nor shall any provision be construed as diminishing or impairing, the rights of the holders of any bonds issued by the Georgia Rural Roads Authority or the Georgia Highway Authority or of the holders of any bonds issued by the Georgia Highway Authority outstanding before July 1, 1973; and should it be determined that any provision of this article does diminish or impair any such right in any manner, such provision is declared to be ineffective to that extent but shall be effective for all other purposes.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 2; Ga. L. 1959, p. 11, § 2; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 2; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-1202, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-3. Members; compensation; officers; quorum; record of proceedings.

  1. The members of the Georgia Highway Authority shall be ex officio the Governor, the commissioner of transportation, and the director of the Office of Planning and Budget; and membership on the authority shall be a separate and distinct duty for which they shall receive no additional compensation. All members of the authority shall be entitled to all actual expenses necessarily incurred while in the performance of their duties on behalf of the authority.
  2. The authority shall elect one of its members as chairman. It shall also elect a secretary and a treasurer, who need not necessarily be members of the authority. The authority may make such bylaws for its government as is deemed necessary but it is under no duty to do so. A majority of the members of the authority shall constitute a quorum necessary for the transaction of business, and a majority vote of those present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be sufficient to do and perform any action permitted to the authority by this article.
  3. No vacancy on the authority shall impair the right of the quorum to transact any and all business as stated in this Code section. Members of the authority shall be accountable as trustees. They shall cause to be kept adequate books and records of all transactions of the authority, including books of income and disbursements of every nature. The books and records shall be inspected and audited by the state auditor at least once a year.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 2; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 4; Ga. L. 1959, p. 13, § 2; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 2; Ga. L. 1963, p. 284, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-1203, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

32-10-4. Powers of authority generally.

The authority shall have, in addition to any other powers conferred in this article, the following powers:

  1. To have a seal and alter the same at its pleasure;
  2. To acquire by purchase, exchange, lease, or otherwise and to hold, lease, and dispose of, in any manner, real and personal property of every kind and character for its corporate purposes;
  3. To appoint such additional officers, who need not be members of the authority, as the authority deems advisable; to employ such experts, agents, and employees as may be in its judgment necessary to carry on properly the business of the authority; to fix the compensation for such officers, experts, agents, and employees and to promote and discharge same; provided, however, that the total compensation paid such persons shall not exceed the sum of $100,000.00 per year;
  4. To make such contracts and agreements as the legitimate and necessary purposes of this article shall require, to execute and perform lease contracts for projects as permitted by this article, and to make all other contracts and agreements as may be necessary to the proper performance of any action permitted by this article;
  5. To build, rebuild, relocate, construct, reconstruct, surface, resurface, lay out, grade, repair, improve, widen, straighten, operate, own, maintain, lease, and manage projects located on property conveyed to the authority as authorized in Code Section 32-10-5, and to pay the cost in whole or in part of any such action or actions from the proceeds of bonds;
  6. To borrow money for any of its corporate purposes and to issue bonds for such purposes as provided in Code Section 32-10-30;
  7. To exercise any power granted to private corporations not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of Georgia nor with other provisions of this article;
  8. By or through its agents or employees, to enter upon any lands, waters, and premises in the state for the purpose of making surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations as the authority may deem necessary or convenient for the purposes of this article; and such entry shall not be deemed a trespass. The authority shall, however, make reimbursement for any actual damage resulting from such activities;
  9. To make reasonable regulations for the installation, construction, maintenance, repair, renewal, removal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables, wires, poles, towers, tracts, and other equipment and appliances of any public utility in, on, along, over, and under any project;
  10. To do and perform all things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers conferred upon the authority by this article;
  11. To prescribe rules and regulations as approved by the department for the operation of each project constructed under this article, including rules and regulations to ensure maximum use of each such project; and
  12. To incorporate one or more nonprofit corporations as subsidiary corporations of the authority for the purpose of carrying out any of the powers of the authority and to accomplish any of the purposes of the authority. Any such subsidiary corporation shall be a nonprofit corporation, a body corporate and politic, and an instrumentality and public corporation of the state and shall exercise essential governmental functions. Any subsidiary corporations created pursuant to this power shall be created pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title 14, the “Georgia Nonprofit Corporation Code,” and shall be filed with the Secretary of State, who shall be authorized to accept such filings. The commissioner and two individuals appointed by the members of the authority shall constitute the members of and shall serve as directors of any subsidiary corporation, and such appointment shall not constitute a conflict of interest, provided that the provisions of subsection (a) of Code Section 45-10-23 or any other law shall not prevent full-time employees of the authority or the Department of Transportation from serving as members of the governing board of such subsidiary corporation. Upon dissolution of any subsidiary corporation of the authority, any assets shall revert to the authority or to any successor to the authority or, failing such succession, to the state, provided that any toll collection or other tollway operations remain under the authority of the State Road and Tollway Authority. The authority shall not be liable for the debts, obligations, or bonds of any subsidiary corporation or for the actions or omissions to act of any subsidiary corporation unless the authority in writing expressly so consents.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 4; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 5; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 4; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 4; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-1204, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1215, § 4; Ga. L. 2005, p. 902, § 5/SB 270.

Cross references. —

Prohibition against authorizing construction or maintenance of private road, § 32-1-8 .

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 1974, p. 1215, which enacted Code Sections 12-5-41, 32-5-24, and 45-12-170, and amended Code Sections 20-2-553 and 32-10-4, provided that it shall be known and may be cited as the “Planned Growth and Development Act of 1974.”

32-10-5. Conveyance of property to authority.

  1. The Governor is authorized and empowered to convey to the authority, on behalf of the state, any real property or interest therein or any rights of way owned by the state, including property or rights of way acquired in the name of the department or board, which is used at the time, or may be used upon completion of any action committed to the authority by this article, as a state road, a county road, or an urban road. The consideration for such conveyance shall be determined by the Governor and expressed in the deed of conveyance; however, such consideration shall be nominal, the benefits flowing to the state and its citizens constituting full and adequate actual consideration.
  2. The governing authority of any political subdivision of this state, which for the purpose of this title is a county or an incorporated municipality of this state, is authorized and empowered on behalf of such political subdivision to convey to the authority any real property or interest therein for any rights of way owned by such political subdivision, which is used at the time or may, upon completion of any action committed to the authority by this article, be used as a county road or an urban road if conveyed by a county or as an urban road if conveyed by an incorporated municipality. The consideration for such conveyance shall be determined by the governing authority of such political subdivision and expressed in the deed of conveyance. Such consideration, however, shall be nominal, the benefits flowing to the political subdivision and its citizens constituting full and adequate actual consideration. However, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the authority from reimbursing a political subdivision, as authorized in Code Section 32-10-6.
  3. The board or its successors and the department are empowered to acquire, in any manner now permitted to them by law, and to expend funds available to them for such acquisition, real property, interests therein, or rights of way which upon acquisition may be conveyed by the Governor as above-provided to the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 6; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-1206, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, in subsection (b) “subdivision” was substituted for “subdivisions” in the next-to-last sentence and a comma was inserted following “However” in the last sentence; and, in subsection (c), “above-provided” was substituted for “above provided”.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves, 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

32-10-6. Reimbursement of counties and municipalities for property, interests, and rights of way conveyed to authority.

Notwithstanding any provisions of this article to the contrary, the authority is authorized to reimburse counties or incorporated municipalities, as a part of the construction cost of a project, for any real property or interest therein or any rights of way conveyed to the authority pursuant to this article, when such real property or interest therein or any rights of way are used as an urban road.

History. — Ga. L. 1972, p. 826, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-1207, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-7. Letting of construction contracts by competitive bids.

All contracts of the authority for the construction of any project authorized by this article shall be let to the reliable bidder submitting the lowest sealed bid upon plans and specifications approved by the department, as set forth in Code Sections 32-2-64 through 32-2-72. However, subject to the restriction on the subletting of negotiated contracts as contained in Code Section 32-2-61, the authority may contract with any county or other political subdivision of the state for the construction of any project situated wholly or partly within such subdivision, upon agreed terms; but the work provided for by such contract shall be at unit prices which shall not exceed the average of the unit prices submitted in the immediately preceding 60 days by competitive bidders for similar work to the department or the authority, whichever may be lower, as determined and averaged by the chief engineer or his or her designated subordinate.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 9; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 5; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-1205, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 9.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right in submitting proposal for bids on public work to require bid on unit basis, with reservation to public authorities of right to determine amount or extent of work, 79 A.L.R. 225 .

Right or duty of public authorities to require single bid or to let single contract for entire improvement or for two or more separate improvements, 123 A.L.R. 577 .

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility, 81 A.L.R.3d 979.

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake or that of his employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991.

Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract, 52 A.L.R.4th 186.

32-10-8. Initiation of projects; preliminary expenses; selection of projects.

  1. Action by the authority with respect to any project or combination of projects shall be initiated as follows: The board, after investigation, shall by resolution recommend the undertaking to the authority with respect to a specific project or a group of projects of any action permitted by this article and deemed by the board to be desirable, in the public interest, and consistent with the purposes provided in subsection (b) of this Code section. The authority shall consider such request and may by resolution provide for undertaking and financing of all or any part of such recommended actions but it shall be under no duty to undertake or finance any of them.
  2. The board is authorized to make and to expend any funds available to it for the purpose of making surveys, studies, and estimates in connection with formulating its recommendations to the authority; and it is further authorized to prepare, furnish, and expend its funds for the purpose of preparing all necessary plans and specifications and furnishing all engineering skill and supervision for any project or projects with respect to which the authority has undertaken or contemplates undertaking any action permitted by this article. The department shall keep an accurate record of such expenses which, if not reimbursed or paid for by the authority as permitted in subsection (d) of this Code section, shall be deemed proper and legitimate expenses of the board and department.
  3. The surveys, plans, and specifications for any action taken by the authority with respect to any project shall be prepared by the department, and the engineering and construction supervision shall be performed by the department unless the board specifically authorizes the authority to do so with its own employees and agents. In any event, all such plans and specifications shall be approved by the chief engineer before work is entered upon pursuant to this subsection.
  4. The authority may contract to reimburse the department for surveys, studies, estimates, plans, specifications, furnishing engineering skill and supervision, and for any other services permitted by this article from the proceeds of any issue of revenue bonds secured by the rentals of the project or group of projects with respect to which the services were rendered; and the same shall be considered as part of the cost of the project.
  5. In selecting projects pursuant to this Code section, the board shall locate urban road projects according to a formula which will allocate to each urban incorporated municipality or urban county, as the case may be, a project or projects estimated to cost an amount approximately equal to the percentage of $100 million which 110 percent of the population of such urban incorporated municipality or which 100 percent of the population of such urban county, as the case may be, bears to the sum of the total population of all urban counties plus 110 percent of the total population of all urban incorporated municipalities except those in urban counties. As used in this subsection, the term “population” means the population figures according to the most recent official United States census. If any urban incorporated municipality or urban county fails to qualify for one or more of its projects, the board shall have full authority to substitute other projects; but such substituted project shall count in the formula allocation and the urban incorporated municipality or urban county which failed to qualify shall have a cumulative credit for the amount of such forfeited project.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 7; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 7; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 6; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 7; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 8; Code 1933, § 95A-1208, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 10.

32-10-9. Leasing of projects.

The authority, as lessor, is authorized to lease any project or group of projects to the state and the department as lessees; and the Governor on behalf of the state and the commissioner on behalf of the department are authorized to execute and enter upon such leases for the use of a project or group of projects by the state, the department, and the general public; and such leases may contain such of the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth in this Code section as may be applicable to the undertaking:

  1. Said leases shall be for a term not in excess of 50 years;
  2. The rental to be paid for the use of the project or projects shall be fixed by the authority and shall be calculated so as to enable the authority:
    1. To pay the principal of and interest on the bonds, the proceeds of which have been or will be spent on the cost of the project or projects thus leased, including premiums, if any;
    2. To comply with any sinking fund requirement contained in the indenture of trust securing such bonds;
    3. To pay the cost of constructing, reconstructing, maintaining, repairing, and operating such project or projects;
    4. To perform fully all of the provisions of the trust indenture securing the bonds to the payment of which such rental is pledged;
    5. To pay the pro rata share of the reasonable and necessary administrative and operating expense of the authority, including any sum or sums that may be owed to the department as a result of expenditure made by the department under this article;
    6. To accumulate any excess income which may be required by the bond purchasers or dictated by the requirements of achieving ready marketability and low interest rates of the bonds;
    7. To pay any expenses in connection with the bond issue or project or group of projects, such as trustees’ fees, counsel fees, fiscal fees, and the like;
  3. The rental shall be payable at such intervals as may be agreed upon and set forth in such lease, and any lease may provide for the commencement of rental payments to the authority prior to the completion of the undertaking of the authority with respect to any project or projects; and it may also provide for payment of rental during such times as the leased project or group of projects may be partially or wholly untenantable;
  4. The lease may obligate the lessees to maintain and keep in good repair (including complete reconstruction, if necessary) the leased projects, regardless of the cause of the necessity for such maintenance, repair, or reconstruction. If such provision is included in any lease, the maintenance, repair, upkeep, and reconstruction, if necessary, shall be performed by the department, which is authorized to expend any sums legally available to it in carrying out such obligations. However, as to any project which is a county road, urban road, or state road, as defined in Code Section 32-10-1, which is not part of the state highway system, the duty of maintenance and repair shall rest upon the incorporated municipality within the limits of which lie any part of the project and upon the county for the remaining part of such project lying outside such limits, as in the case of other public roads of the county or of the municipality. Furthermore, if the entire project lies within the limits of the incorporated municipality, such municipality then shall have the duty of maintenance and repair of the entire project; and furthermore, if no part of said project lies within the limits of an incorporated municipality, the county shall have the duty of maintenance and repair of the entire project; and
  5. The lease may obligate the lessees to indemnify and save harmless the authority from any and all injury and damage to persons or property occurring on or by reason of the leased premises and improvements thereon and to undertake at state expense the defense of any actions brought against the authority by reason of injury or damages to persons or property occurring on or by reason of the leased premises; and a lease may contain a similar obligation on the part of the county through which runs a project covered by the lease.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 8; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 10; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 7; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 8; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-1209, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-10. Payment of rentals by lessees; enforcement of covenants and obligations; assignment of rentals by authority.

  1. The rentals contracted to be paid by lessees to the authority under leases entered upon pursuant to this article shall constitute obligations of the state for the payment of which the good faith of the state is pledged. Such rentals shall be paid as provided in the lease contracts from funds appropriated for such purposes by the terms of the Constitution of Georgia. It shall be the duty of the Governor and the board to see to the punctual payment of all such rentals. In the event of any failure or refusal on the part of lessees punctually to perform any covenant or obligation contained in any lease entered upon pursuant to this article, the authority may enforce performance by any legal or equitable process against lessees; and consent is given for the institution of any such action.
  2. The authority shall be permitted to assign to a trustee or paying agent any rental due it by the lessees, as may be required by the terms of any trust indenture entered into by the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 13; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 9; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 11; Code 1933, § 95A-1212, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-11. Cessation of rentals; transfer of projects.

When each and all of the bonds, interest coupons, and obligations of every nature whatsoever, for the payment of which the revenues of any given project or projects have been pledged, in whole or in part, either originally or subsequently, either primarily or secondarily, directly or indirectly, or otherwise, have been paid in full, or a sufficient amount for the payment of all such bonds and other obligations and the interest thereon to the maturity thereof shall have been set aside in trust for the benefit of such bondholders or other obligees, such project or projects shall henceforth be maintained, free from any and all rental consideration, by the department, if part of the state highway system; and, if a county road or an urban road, then by the political subdivision which under paragraph (4) of Code Section 32-10-9 had the duty to maintain the project prior to the cessation of rentals, provided that, upon the cessation of rentals upon any given project, the authority may convey by deed all right, title, and interest in and to such project to the department as part of the state highway system; and, if not part of the state highway system, then to the political subdivision having maintenance responsibility for the project under this Code section; and provided, further, that the department shall maintain and keep in repair such free project or projects as are a part of the state highway system.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 10; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 11; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 10; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 5; Code 1933, § 95A-1211, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority may reconvey right of way to governmental body. — Once bonds issued by an authority on a project or projects have been liquidated in accordance with this section, the authority is authorized to reconvey by quitclaim deed the rights of way on the particular project to the governmental body which has maintenance responsibility for the project. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-119.

32-10-12. Designation of projects as part of county and municipal public road systems and as part of state highway system.

Each county or urban road project leased by the authority to the state and the department, upon completion of the action with respect thereto undertaken by the authority, shall be a part of the system of public roads of the state and of the county or counties or incorporated municipality or municipalities wherein the project is located; but no such project shall become a part of the state highway system until designated as such as provided by law.

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 12; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 9; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 9; Code 1933, § 95A-1210, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-13. Composition of authority’s fund; purposes for which fund may be pledged or utilized.

All revenues in excess of all obligations of the authority, of every nature, which are not otherwise pledged or restricted as to disposition and use by the terms of any trust indenture entered into by the authority for the security of bonds issued under this article, together with all receipts and gifts of every kind and nature whatsoever, shall be and become the authority fund. The authority, in its discretion, shall pledge or utilize the authority fund for any one or more of the following purposes:

  1. Pledges to the payment of any bond issue requirements, sinking or reserve funds, as may be provided for under the terms of this article;
  2. Payment of any outstanding unpaid bond obligations or administrative expenses;
  3. The construction of any project requested by the board, the cost of which may amount to a sum less than the accumulated balance of such fund;
  4. The most advantageous obtainable purchase redemption and retirement of the authority’s bonds pursuant to privileges accorded to the authority in the various issues of bonds outstanding;
  5. The most advantageous open market purchase of the authority’s bonds that it may accomplish; or
  6. Investment in obligations of the United States government or obligations of agencies of the United States government, the payment of which is guaranteed by the United States government, of guaranteed convertibility or maturity not in excess of two years, provided that funds so invested and income from such investments shall always be available to and ultimately expended for other purposes set forth in this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 12; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 14; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 10; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 12; Code 1933, § 95A-1213, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

32-10-14. Designation of moneys received pursuant to article as trust funds.

All moneys received pursuant to this article, whether as proceeds from the sale of bonds or as revenues, tolls, and earnings, shall be deemed trust funds to be held and applied solely as provided in this article; and the bondholders paying or entitled to receive the benefit of such funds shall have a lien on all such funds until applied as provided for in any resolution or trust indentures of the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 35; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 36; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 35; Code 1933, § 95A-1235, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-15. Effect of article.

This article shall be deemed to provide an additional and alternative method for the doing of the things authorized in this article, shall be regarded as supplemental and additional to powers conferred by other laws, and shall not be regarded as in derogation of any powers now existing.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 36; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 37; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 36; Code 1933, § 95A-1236, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-16. Construction of article.

This article, being for the welfare of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes of this article.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 37; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 38; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 37; Code 1933, § 95A-1237, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

PART 2 Revenue Bonds

32-10-30. Power of authority to issue bonds generally; attributes of bonds generally.

The authority shall have the power and is authorized, at one time or from time to time, to provide by resolution for the issuance of negotiable bonds in a sum not to exceed $484 million in principal amount outstanding at any one time for the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost of any one or a combination of projects; provided, however, that of such authorized amount not more than $150 million of bonds may be issued to finance county road projects, not more than $234 million of bonds may be issued to finance state road projects, and not more than $100 million of bonds may be issued to finance urban road projects. The bonds of each issue shall be dated, shall bear interest as provided for in Code Section 32-10-31, shall be payable in such manner of payment as to both principal and interest as may be determined by the authority from the special funds provided in this article for such payment, shall mature not later than 30 years from the date of issuance, and may be made redeemable before maturity, at the option of the authority, at such price or prices and under such terms and conditions as may be fixed by the authority in the resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds. For the purpose of this Code section, bonds shall not be considered to be outstanding if there shall have been deposited into the sinking fund created for the payment of such bonds amounts sufficient to pay the same, together with the interest thereon as the bonds mature.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 14; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 15; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 11; Ga. L. 1962, p. 91, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 14; Ga. L. 1971, p. 385, § 7; Ga. L. 1972, p. 826, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-1214, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Cross references. —

Revenue bonds generally, § 36-82-60 et seq.

32-10-31. Sale of bonds by public competitive bidding; determination of sale price and interest rate.

All bonds of the authority shall be sold by public competitive bidding at not less than par plus accrued interest to the date of delivery. However, the authority may obligate itself to deliver any given issue of bonds to the purchasers thereof within any reasonable period of time after the date of sale and may pay as a penalty for delay in such delivery such reasonable sums as may be agreed upon in advance in writing with the purchaser or purchasers of such bonds. All bonds of the authority shall be advertised and offered prior to the fixing of the interest rates thereon, and bids thereon shall be competitive as to the interest rate offered by each bidder, provided that on any issue the authority may make rules limiting the number of divisions into which the bonds of various maturity dates may be divided and limiting the number and percentage spreads of the different interest rates which may be bid to apply to such divisions of the bonds; and provided, further, that the authority may require reasonable security for the performance of the contract of purchase of any successful bidder at any public bidding held.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 15; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 16; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 5; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 15; Code 1933, § 95A-1215, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-32. Form and issuance of bonds.

The authority shall determine the form of the bonds, including any interest coupons to be attached thereto, and shall fix the denomination or denominations of the bonds and the place or places of payment of principal and interest thereof, which may be at any bank or trust company inside or outside of the state. The bonds may be issued in coupon or registered form, or both, as the authority may determine; and provision may be made for the registration of any coupon bond as to principal alone and also as to both principal and interest.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 16; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 17; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 16; Code 1933, § 95A-1216, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

32-10-33. Signing bonds; affixing authority’s seal to bonds.

In case any officer whose signature shall appear on any bonds or whose facsimile signature shall appear on any coupon shall cease to be such officer before the delivery of such bonds, such signature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until such delivery. All such bonds shall be signed by the chairman of the authority and the official seal of the authority shall be affixed thereto and attested by the secretary of the authority, and any coupons attached thereto shall bear the signature or facsimile signature of the chairman of the authority. Any coupon may bear the facsimile signature of such person and any bond may be signed, sealed, and attested on behalf of the authority by such persons as at the actual time of the execution of such bonds shall be duly authorized to hold the proper office although at the date of such bonds such persons may not have been so authorized or shall not have held such office.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 17; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 18; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 17; Code 1933, § 95A-1217, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-34. Bonds as negotiable instruments; tax exemption.

All bonds issued under this article shall have and are declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the laws of this state. Such bonds, their transfer, and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within this state.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 18; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 19; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 18; Code 1933, § 95A-1218, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Bond or warrant of governmental subdivision as subject of taxation or exemption, 44 A.L.R. 510 .

32-10-35. Utilization of bond proceeds; procedure in cases where proceeds are less than or greater than cost of project or combined projects.

The proceeds of the bonds shall be used solely for the payment of the cost of the project or combined projects and shall be disbursed upon requisition or order of the chairman of the authority or its duly bonded agents under such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or the trust indenture may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation, or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the project or combined projects, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the trust indenture, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit which, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the trust indenture, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which such bonds were issued, all surplus shall be paid into the sinking fund provided for the payment of principal and interest of such bonds or shall be used for construction of additional projects as the resolution creating such bonds and the trust indenture securing them may provide.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 19; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 20; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 12; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 19; Code 1933, § 95A-1219, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-36. Issuance of interim receipts, interim certificates, and temporary bonds.

Prior to the preparation of definitive bonds, the authority, under like restrictions, may issue interim receipts, interim certificates, or temporary bonds with or without coupons exchangeable for definitive bonds upon the issuance of the latter.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 20; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 21; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 20; Code 1933, § 95A-1220, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-37. Replacement of lost or mutilated bonds.

The authority may also provide for the replacement of any bond which becomes mutilated or which is destroyed or lost.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 21; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 22; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 21; Code 1933, § 95A-1221, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-38. Resolutions for bond issuance; issuance of bonds of a single issue.

Resolutions for the issuance of bonds may be adopted without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this article. In the discretion of the authority, bonds of a single issue may be issued for the purpose of paying the cost of any one or more, including a combination of, projects at any one location or any number of locations. Any resolution providing for the issuance of bonds under this article shall become effective immediately upon its passage and need not be published or posted, and any such resolution may be passed at any regular or special or adjourned meeting of the authority by a majority of its members.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 22; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 23; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 22; Code 1933, § 95A-1222, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-39. Effect of bond issuance on state debt; recitals on face of bonds regarding such effect.

Bonds issued under this article shall not be deemed to constitute a debt of the State of Georgia or a pledge of the credit of the state, but such bonds shall be payable solely from the fund provided for in Code Section 32-10-42; and the issuance of such bonds shall not directly, indirectly, or contingently obligate the state to levy or to pledge any form of taxation whatsoever therefor or to make any appropriation for the payment; and all such bonds shall contain recitals on their face covering substantially the foregoing provisions of this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 23; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 24; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 23; Code 1933, § 95A-1223, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-40. Trust indentures as security for bonds.

  1. In the discretion of the authority, any issue of such bonds may be secured by a trust indenture by and between the authority and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company inside or outside of the state.
  2. Resolutions providing for the issuance of bonds and trust indentures may contain such provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholders, including the right to the appointment of a receiver for any project or projects upon the default of any principal or interest payment upon the bonds thereof, and the right of any receiver or indenture trustee to enforce collections of rents, revenues, or other charges for the use of the project or projects necessary to pay all costs of operation, the principal and interest on the issue, and cost of collection, and all things reasonably necessary to accomplish the collection of such sums in the event of any default of the authority.
  3. Such resolutions or trust indentures may include covenants setting forth the duties of the authority in relation to the acquisition of the property; the construction of the project; the maintenance, operation, repair, and insurance of the project; and the custody, safeguarding, and application of all moneys; may also provide that any project shall be constructed and paid for under the supervision of department engineers or others satisfactory to the original purchasers of the bonds issued for such project or projects. Such resolution or trust indenture may also require that the security given by contractors and by any depository of the proceeds of the bonds or revenues or other moneys be satisfactory to such purchasers and may also contain provisions concerning the conditions, if any, upon which additional revenue bonds may be issued.
  4. It shall be lawful for any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of this state to act as such depository and to furnish such indemnifying bonds or pledge such securities as may be required by the authority. The trust indenture may set forth the rights and remedies of the bondholders and of the trustee and may restrict the individual right of action of bondholders as is customary in trust indentures securing bonds and debentures of corporations.
  5. In addition to the foregoing, such trust indenture may contain such other provisions as the authority may deem advisable, reasonable, and proper for the security of the bondholders. All expenses incurred in carrying out such trust indenture may be treated as a part of the cost of maintenance, operation, and repair of the project affected by such indenture or as an administrative expense of the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 24; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 25; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 24; Code 1933, § 95A-1224, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, “rights” was substituted for “right” in the second sentence of subsection (d).

32-10-41. Payment of bond proceeds to trustee.

The authority shall, in the resolution providing for issuance of bonds or in the trust indenture, provide for the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds to any officer or person who or any agency, bank, or trust company which shall act as trustee of such funds and shall hold and apply such funds as provided in this article, subject to such regulations as this article and such resolution or trust indenture may provide.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 25; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 26; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 25; Code 1933, § 95A-1225, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-42. Pledges of revenues, rents, and earnings; creation and disposition of sinking funds.

  1. The revenues, rents, and earnings derived from any particular project or combined projects or any and all funds from any source received by the department and pledged and allocated by it to the authority as security for the performance of any lease or leases or any and all revenues, rents, and earnings received by the authority, regardless of whether or not such rents, earnings, and revenues were produced by a particular project for which bonds have been issued, unless otherwise pledged and allocated, may be pledged by the authority to payment of principal and interest on bonds of the authority as any resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or trust instrument may provide; and such funds so pledged, from whatever source received, may include funds received from one or more or all sources and may be set aside into sinking funds at regular intervals which may be provided in any resolution or trust indenture. All such sinking funds shall be pledged to and charged with the payment of (1) the interest upon such bonds as such interest shall fall due, (2) the principal of the bonds as the same shall fall due, (3) the necessary charges of paying agents for paying principal and interest, and (4) any premium upon bonds retired by call or purchase as provided in this Code section.
  2. The use and disposition of such sinking funds shall be subject to such regulations as may be provided for in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the trust indenture, but, except as may otherwise be provided in such resolutions or trust indentures, such sinking funds individually shall be funds for the benefit of all bonds without distinction or priority of one over another. Subject to the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or the trust indenture of any given bond issue, any moneys in all sinking funds, after all bonds and the interest thereon for which such sinking funds were pledged have been paid, may be paid into the authority fund provided for in Code Section 32-10-13.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 26; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 27; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 26; Code 1933, § 95A-1226, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 43; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

32-10-43. Rights and remedies of holders of bonds or interest coupons, of receivers for such holders, and of indenture trustees.

Any holder of bonds or interest coupons issued under this article, any receiver for such holders, or indenture trustee, if any there be, except to the extent the rights given in this Code section may be restricted by resolution passed before the issuance of the bonds or by the trust indenture, may either at law or in equity, by action, mandamus, or other proceedings protect and enforce any and all rights under the laws of Georgia or granted in this Code section or under such resolution or trust indenture. Also, any holder of bonds or interest coupons issued under this article, any receiver for such holders, or any indentured trustee may enforce and compel performance of all duties required by this article or by resolution or trust indenture to be performed by the authority or any officer thereof, including the fixing, charging, and collecting of revenues, rents, and other charges for the use of the project or projects; and, in the event of default of the authority upon the principal and interest obligations of any bond issue, the individual, receiver, or trustee specified in this Code section shall be subrogated to each and every right, specifically including the contract rights of collecting rentals, which the authority may possess against the board and the department or either of them or their respective successors; and, in the pursuit of their remedies as subrogee, such individual, receiver, or trustee may proceed, either at law or in equity, by action, mandamus, or other proceedings to collect any sums by such proceedings due and owing to the authority and pledged or partially pledged directly or indirectly to the benefit of the bond issue of which said individual, receiver, or trustee is representative. No holder of any such bond or receiver or indenture trustee thereof shall have the right to compel any exercise of the taxing power of the state to pay any such bond or the interest thereon or to enforce the payment thereof against any property of the state; nor shall any such bond constitute a charge, lien, or encumbrance, legal or equitable, upon the property of the state. However, any provision of this article or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, any such bondholder or receiver or indenture trustee shall have the right by appropriate legal or equitable proceedings, including without being limited to mandamus, to enforce compliance by the appropriate public officials with Article VII, Section IV and Article III, Section IX, Paragraph VI(b) of the Constitution of Georgia; and permission is given for the institution of any such proceedings to compel the payment of lease obligations.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 27; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 28; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 13; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 27; Code 1933, § 95A-1227, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 56.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, in the second sentence “rentals” was substituted for “rental”.

32-10-44. Refunding bonds.

The authority is authorized, subject to any prior resolution or trust indenture, to provide by resolution for the issuance of refunding bonds of the authority for the purpose of refunding any bonds issued under this article and then outstanding, together with accrued interest thereon. The issuance of such refunding bonds, the maturities and all other details thereof, the rights of the holders thereof, and the duties of the authority in respect to the same shall be governed by this article insofar as it may be applicable.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 28; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 29; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 28; Code 1933, § 95A-1228, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, in the second sentence “holders” was substituted for “holder”.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power of municipal corporation to refund special assessment bonds, 102 A.L.R. 202 .

Power of municipality or other governmental body to issue refunding bonds to retire obligation in respect of which the creation and maintenance of a sinking fund by taxation is required by constitutional or statutory provision, 157 A.L.R. 794 .

Power of governmental unit to issue bonds as implying power to refund them, 1 A.L.R.2d 134.

32-10-45. Investment of funds in bonds; deposit of bonds as securities.

The bonds authorized in Code Section 32-10-30 are deemed securities in which (1) all public officers and bodies of the state and all municipalities and all municipal subdivisions, (2) all insurance companies and associations and other persons carrying on an insurance business, (3) all banks, bankers, trust companies, savings banks and savings associations, including savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, investment companies, and other persons carrying on a banking business, (4) all administrators, guardians, executors, trustees, and other fiduciaries, and (5) all other persons whatsoever who are now or hereafter may be authorized to invest in bonds or other obligations of the state may properly and legally invest funds, including capital in their control or belonging to them. The bonds are also deemed securities which may be deposited with and shall be received by all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and municipal subdivisions for any purpose for which the deposit of the bonds or other obligations of this state is now or hereafter may be authorized.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 29; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 30; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 29; Code 1933, § 95A-1229, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-46. Protection of interests and rights of bondholders.

While any of the bonds issued by the authority remain outstanding, the powers, duties, or existence of the authority or of its officers, employees, or agents shall not be diminished or impaired in any manner that will affect adversely the interests and rights of the holders of such bonds; nor will the state itself in any way obstruct, prevent, impair, or render impossible the due and faithful performance by its board and department, or either of them, or their successors, of all project rental and lease contracts and all the covenants thereof entered into under this article. This article shall be for the benefit of the state, the authority, and each and every holder of the authority’s bonds and upon and after the issuance of bonds under this article shall constitute an irrevocable contract with the holders of such bonds.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 34; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 35; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 15; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 34; Code 1933, § 95A-1234, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-47. Confirmation and validation of bonds.

Bonds of the authority shall be confirmed and validated in accordance with the procedure of Article 3 of Chapter 82 of Title 36, the “Revenue Bond Law.”

History. — Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 33; Ga. L. 1961, p. 3, § 14; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 32; Code 1933, § 95A-1232, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-48. Adjudication regarding lease contracts and rental income.

In and as an integral but independent part of the bond validation proceedings under this article, or separately, the authority is given the right to and privilege of a simultaneous or separate right of action or equitable bill against the state, the board, and the department for a declaratory adjudication of the validity and binding effect of all lease contracts whose rental income may be pledged or partially pledged to the benefit of any bonds being validated. In each instance of the exercise of this right the actual controversy shall be whether or not the purported contracts contested are in all respects good and sufficient, valid, and binding obligations of the board and department. Any citizens of the state may intervene in such actions and assert any ground of objection. It shall be incumbent upon the board and department to defend against an adjudication of such validity or be forever bound unto the authority and all succeeding to the rights of the authority thereafter. Such adjudications may be rendered as an integral but independent part of the judgment upon the validation issue with which they are contested or may be rendered separately.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 33; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 34; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 33; Code 1933, § 95A-1233, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-49. Covenant with holders of bonds as to tax-exempt status of authority property and bonds.

It is found, determined, and declared that the creation of the authority and the carrying out of its corporate purposes are in all respects for the benefit of the people of this state and that the authority is an institution of purely public charity and will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by this article; and this state covenants with the holders of the bonds that the authority shall be required to pay no taxes or assessments upon any of the property acquired or leased by it under its jurisdiction, control, possession, or supervision or upon its activities in the operation or maintenance of the projects erected by it or upon any fees, rental, or other charges for the use of such projects or upon other income received by the authority and that the bonds of the authority, their transfer, and the income therefrom shall at all times be exempt from taxation from within the state.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 30; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 31; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 30; Code 1933, § 95A-1230, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, “are” was substituted for “is” following “corporate purposes” near the beginning.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Bond or warrant of governmental subdivision as subject of taxation or exemption, 44 A.L.R. 510 .

32-10-50. Venue and jurisdiction of actions.

Any action to protect or enforce any rights under this article and any action pertaining to validation of any bonds issued under this article brought in the courts of this state shall be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County, which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of such actions.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 626, § 31; Ga. L. 1955, p. 124, § 32; Ga. L. 1967, p. 385, § 31; Code 1933, § 95A-1231, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Article 2 State Road and Tollway Authority

PART 1 General Provisions

32-10-60. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. “Approach” means that distance on either end of a bridge as shall be required to develop the maximum traffic capacity of a bridge, including but not limited to necessary rights of way, grading, paving, minor drainage structures, and such other construction necessary to the approach.
  2. “Authority” means the State Tollway Authority created by the “State Tollway Authority Act,” Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, as amended particularly by Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, and on and after April 30, 2001, also means the State Road and Tollway Authority.
  3. “Bridge” means a structure, including the approaches thereto, erected in order to afford unrestricted vehicular passage over any obstruction in any public road, including but not limited to rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, bays, ravines, gullies, railroads, public highways, and canals.
  4. “Cost of project” means the cost of construction, including relocation or adjustments of utilities; the cost of all lands, properties, rights, easements, and franchises acquired; relocation expenses; the cost of all machinery and equipment necessary for the operation of the project; financing charges; interest prior to and during construction and for such a period of time after completion of construction as shall be deemed necessary to allow the earnings of the project to become sufficient to meet the requirements of the bond issue; the cost of engineering, legal expenses, plans and specifications, and other expenses necessary or incident to determining the feasibility or practicability of the project; administrative expenses; and such other expenses as may be necessary or incident to the financing authorized in this article, the construction of any project, and the placing of the same in operation. Any obligation or expense incurred for any of the foregoing purposes shall be regarded as a part of the cost of the project and may be paid or reimbursed as such out of the proceeds of revenue bonds issued for such project under this article.
  5. “Project” means transportation related undertakings which provide a public benefit, including:
    1. One or more roads or bridges or a system of roads, bridges, and tunnels or improvements thereto included on an approved state-wide transportation improvement program on the Developmental Highway System as set forth in Code Section 32-4-22, as now or hereafter amended, or a comprehensive transportation plan pursuant to Code Section 32-2-3 or which are toll access roads, bridges, or tunnels, with access limited or unlimited as determined by the authority, and such buildings, structures, parking areas, appurtenances, and facilities related thereto, including but not limited to approaches, cross streets, roads, bridges, tunnels, and avenues of access for such system;
    2. Any program for mass transportation or mass transportation facilities as approved by the authority and the department and such buildings, structures, parking areas, appurtenances, and facilities related thereto, including, but not limited to, approaches, cross streets, roads, bridges, tunnels, and avenues of access for such facilities; and
    3. Any project undertaken pursuant to Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 2 of this title.
  6. “Relocation expenses” means all necessary relocation expenses, replacement housing expenses, relocation advisory services, expenses incident to the transfer of real property, and litigation expenses of any individual, family, business, farm operation, or nonprofit organization displaced by authority projects to the extent authorized by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV of Public Law 100-17.

    (6.1) “Revenue” or “revenues” shall mean any and all moneys received from:

    1. The collection of tolls authorized by Code Sections 32-10-64 and 32-10-65, any federal highway funds and reimbursements, any other federal highway assistance received from time to time by the authority, any other moneys of the authority pledged for such purpose, any other moneys received by the authority pursuant to the Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank, and any moneys received pursuant to a public-private initiative as authorized pursuant to Code Section 32-2-78.
    2. Repealed.
  7. “Revenue bonds,” “revenue bond,” “bonds,” or “bond” means any bonds, notes, interim certificates, reimbursement anticipation notes, or other evidences of indebtedness of the authority authorized by Part 2 of this article, including without limitation obligations issued to refund any of the foregoing.
  8. “Self-liquidating” means that, in the judgment of the authority, the revenues and earnings to be derived by the authority from any project or combination of projects or from any other revenues available to the authority, together with any maintenance, repair, operational services, funds, rights of way, engineering services, and any other in-kind services to be received by the authority from appropriations of the General Assembly, the department, other state agencies or authorities, the United States government, or any county or municipality or from disbursements from any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of entity shall be sufficient to provide for the maintenance, repair, and operation and to pay the principal and interest of revenue bonds which may be issued for the cost of such project, projects, or combination of projects.
  9. “Utility” means any publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned line, facility, or system for producing, transmitting, transporting, or distributing communications, power, electricity, light, heat, gas, oil products, passengers, water, steam, clay, waste, storm water not connected with highway drainage, and other similar services and commodities, including publicly owned fire and police, and traffic signals and street lighting systems, which directly or indirectly serve the public. This term also means a person, municipal corporation, county, state agency, or public authority which owns or manages a utility as defined in this paragraph.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 3; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 3; Code 1933, § 95A-1238, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 44; Ga. L. 1976, p. 775, § 3; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1285, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1241, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-6; Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 1/HB 1019; Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 1/SB 183; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-2/HB 930; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 4/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 7/HB 577.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in paragraph (5), deleted “and” at the end of subparagraph (A), added “; and” at the end of subparagraph (B), and added subparagraph (C); in paragraph (6.1), deleted “and” preceding “any other moneys” in the middle, and added “, and any moneys received pursuant to a public-private initiative as authorized pursuant to Code Section 32-2-78” at the end; and in paragraph (8), substituted “municipality or from disbursements from any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of entity” for “municipality,” near the end.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, in paragraph (6.1), substituted “moneys received from: (A) The collection” for “moneys received from the collection” near the beginning; in subparagraph (6.1)(A), deleted “or transit” following “federal highway” twice and substituted “; and” for a period at the end; and added subparagraph (6.1)(B).

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, substituted “transportation related undertakings which provide a public benefit,” for “land public transportation systems” in paragraph (5); substituted “One” for “one” at the beginning of subparagraph (5)(A); substituted “Any” for “any” at the beginning of subparagraph (5)(B); and substituted the present provisions of subparagraph (5)(C) for the former provisions which read: “any project undertaken pursuant to a public-private initiative as authorized pursuant to Code Section 32-2-78.” The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, “April 30, 2001,” was substituted for “the date of the year 2001 change of the authority’s name” in paragraph (2).

U.S. Code. —

The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, referred to in this Code section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Tollway Authority may include part of State Highway System. — It is lawful, under certain circumstances, for portions of the State Highway System to be included in a State Tollway Authority project and for such portions of highways to be improved with funds of the State Tollway Authority; further, such portions of tollway projects need not necessarily be included in that portion of a project which can be used by the public only upon payment of a toll. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-5.

“Feeder route” may be avenue of access. — Existing highway facility which would be a “feeder route” into a tollway can be considered as an avenue of access to a tollway system within the meaning of the definition of the term “project”; provided, of course, that the “feeder route” bears an actual and legitimate relationship to the tollway as an avenue of access to the tollway. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 685.

32-10-61. Continuation of State Tollway Authority as State Road and Tollway Authority.

The State Tollway Authority shall continue to be a body corporate and politic and an instrumentality and public corporation of the state known as the “State Road and Tollway Authority.” It shall have perpetual existence. In said name it may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded, and complain and defend in all courts of this state, subject to the limitations of Code Section 32-10-110.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 2; Ga. L. 1962, Sept.-Oct. Ex. Sess., p. 31, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-1239, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-7.

32-10-62. Membership; compensation; officers; bylaws; quorum; record of proceedings.

  1. The members of the authority shall be ex officio the Governor, the commissioner of transportation, the director of the Office of Planning and Budget, one member to be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor and to serve during the term of office of the Lieutenant Governor and until a successor is duly appointed and qualified, and one member to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to serve during the term of office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and until a successor is duly appointed and qualified; and membership shall be a separate and distinct duty for which they shall receive no additional compensation. All members of the authority shall be entitled to all actual expenses necessarily incurred while in the performance of duties on behalf of the authority. The authority shall elect one of its members as chairman. It shall also elect a secretary and a treasurer, who need not necessarily be members of the authority. The authority may make such bylaws for its government as is deemed necessary but it is under no duty to do so. A majority of the members of the authority shall constitute a quorum necessary for the transaction of business, and a majority vote of those present at any meeting at which there is a quorum shall be sufficient to do and perform any action permitted to the authority by this article.
  2. No vacancy on the authority shall impair the right of the quorum to transact any and all business as stated in this Code section. Members of the authority shall be accountable as trustees. They shall cause to be kept adequate books and records of all transactions of the authority, including books of income and disbursements of every nature. The books and records shall be inspected and audited by the state auditor at least once a year.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 2; Ga. L. 1962, Ex. Sess., p. 31, § 1; Ga. L. 1963, p. 283, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 2; Code 1933, § 95A-1240, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-8.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, “term of office” was substituted for “term in office” in the first sentence of subsection (a).

32-10-63. Powers of authority generally.

The authority shall have, in addition to any other powers conferred in this article, the following powers:

  1. To have a seal and alter the same at its pleasure;
  2. To acquire by purchase, lease, exchange, or otherwise and to hold, lease, and dispose of real and personal property of every kind and character for its corporate purposes;
  3. To appoint such additional officers, who need not be members of the authority, as the authority deems advisable and to employ such experts, employees, and agents as may be necessary, in its judgment, to carry on properly the business of the authority; to fix their compensation; and to promote and discharge same;
  4. To acquire in its own name by purchase, on such terms and conditions and in such manner as it may deem proper, or by condemnation in accordance with any and all existing laws applicable to the condemnation of property for public use, including but not limited to those procedures in Article 1 of Chapter 3 of this title, real property or rights or easements therein or franchises necessary or convenient for its corporate purposes; and to use the same so long as its corporate existence shall continue and to lease or make contracts with respect to the use of or to dispose of the same in any manner it deems to the best advantage of the authority, the authority being under no obligation to accept and pay for any property condemned under this article except from the funds provided under the authority of this article; and, in any proceedings to condemn, such order may be made by the court having jurisdiction of the action or proceedings as may be just to the authority and to the owners of the property to be condemned; and no property shall be acquired under this article upon which any lien or other encumbrance exists unless at the time such property is so acquired a sufficient sum of money be deposited in trust to pay and redeem such lien or encumbrance in full;
  5. To make such contracts, leases, or conveyances as the legitimate and necessary purposes of this article shall require, including but not limited to contracts for construction or maintenance of projects, provided that the authority shall consider the possible economic, social, and environmental effects of each project, and the authority shall assure that possible adverse economic, social, and environmental effects relating to any proposed project have been fully considered in developing such project and that the final decision on the project is made in the best overall public interest, taking into consideration the need for fast, safe, and efficient transportation, public services, and the cost of eliminating or minimizing adverse economic, social, and environmental effects. Furthermore, in order to assure that adequate consideration is given to economic, social, and environmental effects of any project under consideration, the authority shall:
    1. Follow the processes required for federal-aid highway projects, as determined by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, except that final approval of the adequacy of such consideration shall rest with the Governor, as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, acting as the chief executive of the state, upon recommendation of the commissioner, acting as chief administrative officer of the Department of Transportation;
    2. In the location and design of any project, avoid the taking of or disruption of existing public parkland or public recreation areas unless there are no prudent or feasible project location alternates. The determination of prudency and feasibility shall be the responsibility of the authority as part of the consideration of the overall public interest;
    3. Not approve and proceed with acquisition of rights of way and construction of a project until: (i) there has been held, or there has been offered an opportunity to hold, a public hearing or public hearings on such project in compliance with requirements of the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1970, as amended, except that neither acquisition of right of way nor construction shall be required to cease on any federal-aid project which has received federal approval pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and is subsequently determined to be eligible for construction as an authority project utilizing, in whole or in part, a mix of federal funds and authority funds; and (ii) the adequacy of environmental considerations has been approved by the Governor, for which said approval of the environmental considerations may come in the form of the Governor’s acceptance of a federally approved environmental document; and
    4. Let by public competitive bid upon plans and specifications approved by the chief engineer or his or her successors all contracts for the construction of projects, except as otherwise provided for projects authorized under any provisions of Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 2 of this title;
  6. To construct, erect, acquire, own, repair, maintain, add to, extend, improve, operate, and manage projects, as defined in paragraph (5) of Code Section 32-10-60, the cost of any such project to be paid in whole or in part from the proceeds of revenue bonds of the authority, from other funds available to the authority, or from any combination of such sources;
    1. To accept and administer any federal highway funds and any other federal highway assistance received from time to time for the State of Georgia and to accept, with the approval of the Governor, loans and grants, either or both, of money or materials or property of any kind from the United States government or the State of Georgia or any political subdivision, authority, agency, or instrumentality of either of them, upon such terms and conditions as the United States government or the State of Georgia or such political subdivision, authority, agency, or instrumentality of either of them shall impose;
    2. Repealed;
    1. To borrow money for any of its corporate purposes, to issue negotiable revenue bonds payable from revenues of such projects, and to provide for the payment of the same and for the rights of the holders thereof; and
    2. To enter into credit enhancement or liquidity agreements with any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of entity for the planning, design, construction, acquisition of land for, financing, refinancing, operating, maintaining, or carrying out of any project. Such credit enhancement or liquidity agreements may be secured by the authority’s loan agreements, deeds to secure debt, security agreements, contracts, or other instruments or funds derived from tolls, fees, or other charges, upon such terms and conditions as the authority shall determine reasonable, including provision for the establishment and maintenance of reserves and insurance funds, provided that the obligation of the authority under any such agreements shall not be general obligation of the authority, but shall be a limited obligation of the authority payable from a specific source of funds identified for such purpose. Any such agreements may further include provisions for guaranty, insurance, construction, use, operation, maintenance, and financing of a project as the authority may deem necessary or desirable;
  7. To exercise any power usually possessed by private corporations performing similar functions, which power is not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of Georgia;
  8. To covenant with bondholders for the preparation of annual budgets for each project and for approval thereof by engineers or other representatives designated by the bondholders of each project, as may be provided for in any bond issue resolutions or trust indentures, and to covenant for the employment of experts or traffic engineers;
  9. To lease its property to the United States government, the State of Georgia, or its political subdivisions, including any agency, authority, or instrumentality of the foregoing governments or political subdivisions, as well as to persons, public or private, for the construction or operation of facilities of benefit to the general public;
  10. By or through its authorized agents or employees, to enter upon any lands, waters, and premises in the state for the purpose of making surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations as the authority may deem necessary or convenient for the purposes of this article; and such entry shall not be deemed a trespass. The authority shall, however, make reimbursement for any actual damages resulting from such activities;
  11. To make reasonable regulations for the installation, construction, maintenance, repairs, renewal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables, wires, towers, poles, and other equipment and appliances of any public utility in, on, along, over, or under any project;
    1. To pledge, mortgage, convey, assign, hypothecate, or otherwise encumber any property of the authority, including but not limited to real property, fixtures, personal property, intangible property, revenues, income, charges, fees, or other funds and to execute any lease, trust indenture, trust agreement, resolution, agreement for the sale of the authority’s bonds, loan agreement, mortgage, deed to secure debt, trust deed, security agreement, assignment, or other agreement or instrument as may be necessary or desirable, in the judgment of the authority, to secure such bonds; and
    2. To acquire, accept, or retain equitable interests, security interests, or other interests in any property, real or personal, by deed to secure debt, assignment, security agreement, pledge, conveyance, contract, lien, loan agreement, or other consensual transfer, with any such instrument terminating when the bonds for the project are retired, in order to secure repayment under a credit enhancement or liquidity agreement and taking into consideration the public benefit to be derived from such transfer; and
  12. To do all things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly given in this article.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 4; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, §§ 9-13; Code 1933, § 95A-1241, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, § 45; Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, §§ 2-4; Ga. L. 1994, p. 591, § 11; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-9; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46; Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 2/SB 183; Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-3/HB 930; Ga. L. 2021, p. 480, § 5/HB 588; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 8/HB 577.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added “, except as otherwise provided for projects authorized under any provisions of Code Sections 32-2-78 through 32-2-81” at the end of subparagraph (5)(D); designated the existing provisions of paragraph (8) as subparagraph (8)(A); in subparagraph (8)(A), added “and” at the end; added subparagraph (8)(B); designated the existing provisions of paragraph (14) as subparagraph (14)(A); and added subparagraph (14)(B).

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, designated the existing provisions of paragraph (7) as subparagraph (7)(A), and, in subparagraph (7)(A), deleted “or federal transit” following “federal highway” near the beginning and deleted “or transit” following “federal highway” near the middle; and added subparagraph (7)(B).

The 2021 amendments. —

The first 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, deleted “tollway” preceding “project” near the end of paragraph (5); and substituted “Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 2 of this title” for “Code Sections 32-2-78 through 32-2-81” at the end of subparagraph (5)(D). The second 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, made identical changes.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, a comma was inserted following “agency” in two places in paragraph (7).

U.S. Code. —

The Federal-aid Highway Act of 1970, referred to in this Code section, is codified as various sections throughout 23 U.S.C. Ch. 1.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, referred to in this Code section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.

Cross references. —

Prohibition against authorizing construction or maintenance of private road, § 32-1-8 .

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Assembly’s power to direct federal funds to state authority. —

Under the Georgia Constitution, the General Assembly had the power to enact O.C.G.A. § 32-10-63(7) and related statutes that authorized the State Road and Tollway Authority (SRTA) to receive federal-aid highway funds; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the challenge of the taxpayers to the trial court’s validation and approval of the bonds the SRTA was empowered to issue for highway construction projects which were to be retired using future federal-aid highway funds the state would receive. Campbell v. State Rd. & Tollway Auth., 276 Ga. 714 , 583 S.E.2d 32 (2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with financial backing from State Road and Tollway Authority. — Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with all or a portion of the financial backing for the contracts coming from a contractual promise from the State Road and Tollway Authority to borrow and provide money to DOT as and when needed to expend on projects that are the subjects of the construction contracts. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-10.

32-10-63.1. Exemption for transit service buses, motor vehicles, and rapid rail systems from requirements relating to identification and regulation of motor vehicles.

No provision of Chapter 1 of Title 40 shall apply to any bus, other motor vehicle, or rapid rail system of the authority which provides transit services.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-63.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2018, p. 254, § 1/SB 391.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective July 1, 2018.

32-10-64. General toll powers; police powers; operation of vehicles through toll collection facilities; penalties; video surveillance authorized.

    1. For the purpose of earning sufficient revenue to make possible, in conjunction with other funds available to the authority, the financing of the construction or acquisition of projects of the authority with revenue bonds, the authority is authorized and empowered to collect tolls on each and every project which it, the department, or local governing authority shall cause to be constructed. It is found, determined, and declared that the necessities of revenue bond financing are such that the authority’s toll earnings on each project or projects, in conjunction with other funds available to the authority, must exceed the actual maintenance, repair, and normal reserve requirements of such projects, together with monthly or yearly sums needed for the sinking fund payments upon the principal and interest obligations of financing such project or projects; however, within the framework of these legitimate necessities of the authority and subject to all bond resolutions, trust indentures, and all other contractual obligations of the authority, the authority is charged with the duty of the operation of all projects in the aggregate at the most reasonable possible level of toll charges; and, furthermore, the authority is charged with the responsibility of a reasonable and equitable adjustment of such toll charges as between the various classes of users of any given project in which the repayment of financing is the primary or exclusive purpose for the exercise of the toll power of the authority.
    2. For the purpose of managing the flow of traffic, the authority is authorized and empowered to collect tolls on each and every project which it, the department, or local governing authority shall cause to be constructed in which managing the flow of traffic is the primary or exclusive purpose. It is found, determined, and declared that the necessities of managing the flow of traffic are such that the authority is charged with the responsibility of taking into consideration value pricing and lane management as those terms are described in subsection (d) of Code Section 40-6-54 in determining toll charges on such projects.
  1. In the exercise of the authority’s toll powers, the authority is authorized to exercise so much of the police powers of the state as shall be necessary to maintain the peace and accomplish the orderly handling of the traffic and the collection of tolls on all projects operated by the authority; and the authority shall prescribe such rules and regulations for the method of taking tolls and the employment and conduct of toll takers and other operating employees as the authority, in its discretion, may deem necessary.
    1. No motor vehicle shall be driven or towed through a toll collection facility, where appropriate signs have been erected to notify traffic that it is subject to the payment of tolls beyond such sign, without payment of the proper toll. In the event of nonpayment of the proper toll, as evidenced by video or electronic recording, the registered owner of such vehicle shall be liable to make prompt payment to the authority of the proper toll and an administrative fee of up to $25.00 per violation to recover the cost of collecting the toll. The authority or its authorized agent shall provide notice to the registered owner of a vehicle, and a reasonable time to respond to such notice, of the authority’s finding of a violation of this subsection. The authority or its authorized agent may provide subsequent notices to the registered owner of a vehicle if such owner fails to respond to the initial notice. The administrative fee may increase with each notice, provided that such fee shall not exceed a cumulative total of $25.00 per violation. Upon failure of the registered owner of a vehicle to pay the proper toll and administrative fee to the authority after notice thereof and within the time designated in such notice, the authority may proceed to seek collection of the proper toll and the administrative fee as debts owing to the authority, in such manner as the authority deems appropriate and as permitted under law. If the authority finds multiple failures by a registered owner of a vehicle to pay the proper toll and administrative fee after notice thereof and within the time designated in such notices, the authority may refer the matter to the Office of State Administrative Hearings. The scope of any hearing held by the Office of State Administrative Hearings shall be limited to consideration of evidence relevant to a determination of whether the registered owner has failed to pay, after notice thereof and within the time designated in such notice, the proper toll and administrative fee. The only affirmative defense that may be presented by the registered owner of a vehicle at such a hearing is theft of the vehicle, as evidenced by presentation at the hearing of a copy of a police report showing that the vehicle has been reported to the police as stolen prior to the time of the alleged violation. A determination by the Office of State Administrative Hearings of multiple failures to pay by a registered owner of a vehicle shall subject such registered owner to imposition of, in addition to any unpaid tolls and administrative fees, a civil monetary penalty payable to the authority of not more than $70.00 per violation. Upon failure by a registered owner to pay to the authority, within 30 days of the date of notice thereof, the amount determined by the Office of State Administrative Hearings as due and payable for multiple violations of this subsection, the motor vehicle registration of such registered owner shall be immediately suspended by operation of law. The authority shall give notice to the Department of Revenue of such suspension. Such suspension shall continue until the proper toll, administrative fee, and civil monetary penalty as have been determined by the Office of State Administrative Hearings are paid to the authority. The authority may seek to collect the debt owed through setoff by the Department of Revenue under procedures set forth in Article 7 of Chapter 7 of Title 48. Actions taken by the authority under this subsection shall be made in accordance with policies and procedures approved by the members of the authority.
    2. The registered owner of a vehicle which is observed being driven or towed through a toll collection facility without payment of the proper toll may avoid liability under this subsection by presenting to the authority a copy of a police report showing that the vehicle had been reported to the police as stolen prior to the time of the alleged violation.
    3. For purposes of this subsection, for any vehicle which is registered to an entity other than a natural person, the term “registered owner” shall be deemed to refer to the natural person who is the operator of such motor vehicle at the time of the violation of this subsection, but only if the entity to which the vehicle is registered has supplied to the authority, within 60 days following notice from the authority or its authorized agent, information in the possession of such entity which is sufficient to identify and give notice to the natural person who was the operator of the motor vehicle at the time of the violation of this subsection.
  2. Any person who shall use or attempt to use any currency or coins other than legal tender of the United States of America or tokens issued by the authority or who shall use or attempt to use any electronic device or equipment not authorized by the authority in lieu of or to avoid payment of a toll shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
  3. Any person, except an authorized agent or employee of the authority, who removes any coin from the pavement or ground surface within 15 feet of a toll collection booth or toll collection machine, except to retrieve coins the person dropped while attempting payment of that person’s toll, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
  4. Any person who enters without authorization or who willfully, maliciously, and forcibly breaks into any mechanical or electronic toll collection device of the authority or appurtenance thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
  5. Any law enforcement officer shall have the authority to issue citations for toll evasions if such officer is a witness to any of the following violations:
    1. A person forcibly or fraudulently passes a toll collection device without payment or refuses to pay, evades, or attempts to evade the payment of such tolls;
    2. A person turns, or attempts to turn, a vehicle around on a bridge, approach, or toll plaza where signs have been erected forbidding such turning; or
    3. A person refuses to pass through the toll collection facility after having come within the area where signs have been erected notifying traffic that it is entering the area where a toll is collectable or where vehicles may not turn around and where vehicles are required to pass through the toll gates for the purposes of collecting tolls.
  6. The authority may in its discretion use such technology, including but not limited to automatic vehicle license tag identification photography and video surveillance, either by electronic imaging or photographic copy, that it deems necessary to aid in the collection of tolls and enforcement of toll violations. Such technology shall not be used to produce any photograph, microphotograph, electronic image, or videotape showing the identity of any person in a motor vehicle except that such technology may be utilized for general surveillance of a toll collection facility for the security of toll collection facility employees.
  7. State and local law enforcement entities are authorized to enter into traffic and toll enforcement agreements with the authority.  Any funds received by a state law enforcement entity pursuant to such toll enforcement agreement shall be subject to annual appropriations by the General Assembly to such law enforcement entity for the purpose of performing its duties pursuant to such agreement.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 8; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 15; Code 1933, § 95A-1245, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1091, § 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, § 5; Ga. L. 1993, p. 366, § 2; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-10; Ga. L. 2004, p. 498, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 308, § 1/HB 1190; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1058, § 1/SB 125; Ga. L. 2018, p. 152, § 1/HB 150.

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added the next-to-last sentence of paragraph (c)(1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Inclusion of portions of State Highway System in tollway projects. — It is lawful, under certain circumstances, for portions of State Highway System to be included in a State Tollway Authority project and for such portions of highways to be improved with funds of State Tollway Authority; further, such portions of tollway projects need not necessarily be included in that portion of project which can be used by public only upon payment of a toll. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-5.

Phrase “is authorized and empowered” means that act may or may not be done within the discretion of the State Tollway Authority, which is the body authorized to make the decision. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Tolls as taxes within constitutional provisions respecting taxes, 167 A.L.R. 1356 .

32-10-65. Fixing, revising, charging, and collecting tolls; use and disposition of tolls generally.

The authority is authorized to fix, revise, charge, and collect tolls for the use of each project. Such tolls shall be so fixed and adjusted as to carry out and perform the terms and provisions of any resolution, trust indenture, or contract with or for the benefit of bondholders; and such tolls shall not be subject to supervision or regulation by any other commission, board, bureau, or agency of the state. Notwithstanding any provision of this article to the contrary, if the repayment of financing is not the primary or exclusive purpose for the exercise of the authority’s toll power, the authority shall not be required to issue or have outstanding bonds or other indebtedness with respect to a project in order to fix, revise, charge, enforce, or collect tolls for such project. The use and disposition of tolls and revenues shall be subject to the provisions of the resolution authorizing the issuance of such bonds or of the trust indenture securing the same, if there are any.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 33; Code 1933, § 95A-1270, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1058, § 2/SB 125; Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 32/HB 737.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. —

40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 692 et seq.

32-10-65.1. Expiration of tolls.

Every toll established under this article must expire after a specified period of time and may be extended beyond said time by approval of the State Road and Tollway Authority.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-65.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 2-1.

32-10-65.2. Annual reporting.

The authority shall submit an annual report to the House Committee on Transportation and the Senate Transportation Committee detailing the amount of funds collected pursuant to the exercise of the authority’s toll powers and how such funds have been used or disposed of by the authority.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-65.2 , enacted by Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 3/SB 183.

Effective date. —

This Code section became effective July 1, 2017.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

32-10-66. Duty of authority to prescribe rules and regulations for projects generally.

It shall be the duty of the authority to prescribe rules and regulations as approved by the department for the operation of each project constructed under this article, including rules and regulations to ensure maximum use of such project. The authority is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations for the use and occupancy of the project as may be necessary and proper for the public’s safety and convenience, for the preservation of its property, and for the collection of tolls.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 11; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 18; Code 1933, § 95A-1248, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-67. Study, financing, construction, and operation of new projects; cooperation and assistance of Department of Transportation.

  1. The Governor, in his discretion or upon the recommendation of the State Transportation Board, is authorized and empowered to call a joint meeting of the authority and the board for the purpose of initiating all projects which may be considered under the authority of this article. Upon the concurrence of the Governor, a majority of the board, and the authority, the board or the authority is authorized and empowered to commence the study of any given project or projects and to provide for their construction. An appropriate resolution of such joint meeting shall provide for divisions of duties and responsibilities between the authority and the board in connection with such studies. In keeping with such resolution or resolutions, the authority and the board are authorized, in the performance of their assigned duties, to expend from any sums available such sums as may be necessary for the survey and study and completion of any project or projects; and such expenditures may include those necessary for all traffic surveys, expert studies, and all other expense reasonably necessary in establishing the feasibility of any given project and in the execution of all plans, specifications, and all other things necessary for revenue bond financing and construction, including all supervision of every kind required in its completion. If such expenditures, or any part of them, shall be undertaken by the board, the board shall keep proper records which shall reflect the amounts spent on each and every project study. Upon completion of any given project or projects financed by any given revenue bond issued, so long as there shall be funds available in the hands of the authority from the issue of revenue bonds to finance such project or projects, the board may demand the reimbursement of such expenditures; however, if not reimbursed, said expenditures shall be legitimate expenses of operation of the board. The authority, upon the completion or receipt of such studies or plans and specifications or other aids, shall proceed, if such project or projects are possible, to finance, acquire rights of way, construct, and operate such projects pursuant to its purposes, powers, and duties.
  2. Upon the concurrence of the board, the Department of Transportation shall have the right to provide maintenance and operational assistance to the authority as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this article, including but not limited to authorizing employees of the department to assist the authority in the collection of tolls on authority projects. The authority shall reimburse the department for such assistance.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 6; Code 1933, § 95A-1243, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 635, § 1.

32-10-68. Letting of contracts by competitive bids.

All contracts of the authority for the construction of any project authorized by this article shall be let to the reliable bidder submitting the lowest sealed bid upon plans and specifications approved by the department, except as otherwise provided for projects authorized under any provisions of Code Sections 32-2-78 through 32-2-81. The procedures for letting such bids shall conform to those prescribed for the department in Code Sections 32-2-64 through 32-2-72 and 32-2-78 through 32-2-81.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 13; Code 1933, § 95A-1242, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 4/SB 183.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added “, except as otherwise provided for projects authorized under any provisions of Code Sections 32-2-78 through 32-2-81” at the end of the first sentence, and added “and 32-2-78 through 32-2-81” at the end of the second sentence.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Right or duty of public authorities to require single bid or to let single contract for entire improvement or for two or more separate improvements, 123 A.L.R. 577 .

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract, 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility, 80 A.L.R.3d 979.

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake or that of his employee, 2 A.L.R.4th 991.

Encroachment of trees, shrubbery, or other vegetation across boundary line, 65 A.L.R.4th 603.

32-10-69. Conveyance of real property to authority; power to acquire and expend funds for property interests.

  1. The Governor is authorized and empowered to convey to the authority, on behalf of the state, any real property or interest therein or any rights of way owned by the state, including property or rights of way acquired in the name of the department or board, which is used at the time or may, upon completion of any action committed to the authority by this article, be used as a project. The consideration for such conveyance shall be determined by the Governor and expressed in the deed of conveyance; however, such consideration shall be nominal, the benefits flowing to the state and its citizens constituting full and adequate actual consideration, provided that in the event of the inability of the authority to issue or sell the revenue bonds required for financing the completion of any given project or projects, then, subject to the intervening rights of any innocent party, all rights, titles, and interests so conveyed shall forever revert to the department or agency from which it came.
  2. The governing authority of any county or incorporated municipality of this state is authorized and empowered on behalf of such political subdivision to convey to the authority any real property or interest therein or any rights of way owned by such political subdivision, which is used at the time or may, upon completion of any action committed to the authority by this article, be used as a project if conveyed by a county or incorporated municipality. The consideration for such conveyance shall be determined by the governing authority of such political subdivision and expressed in the deed of conveyance. Such consideration, however, shall be nominal, the benefits flowing to the political subdivisions and its citizens constituting full and adequate actual consideration. However, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the authority from reimbursing a political subdivision, as authorized in Code Section 32-10-70.
  3. The board or its successors and the department are empowered to acquire, in any manner now permitted to them by law, and to expend funds available to them for such acquisition, real property, interests therein, or rights of way which upon acquisition may be conveyed by the Governor as provided in this Code section to the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 7; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 14; Code 1933, § 95A-1244, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, § 6; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-10.1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, a comma was substituted for a semicolon following “actual consideration” in subsection (a).

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Every toll established under this Act must expire at a specified period of time, and may be extended beyond said time by approval of the State Tollway Authority.”

Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 55, part of an Act to correct errors and omissions in the Code, repealed Ga. L. 1988, p. 227, § 8, which provided for the expiration and extension of tolls, and enacted those provisions as Code Section 32-10-65.1.

32-10-70. Transfer of real and personal property to authority by public bodies and officers.

All counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions of the state and all public agencies and officers of the state, notwithstanding any contrary provisions of the law, are authorized and empowered to lease, lend, grant, or convey to the authority, upon its request and upon such terms and conditions as the authority and the proper officials of such counties, cities, other political subdivisions, or public agencies or officials may agree upon as reasonable and fair, and without necessity for any advertisement, order of court, or other action or formality other than the regular execution of the proper instrument, any real or personal property which may be necessary or convenient to the effectuation of the purpose of this article, including real or personal property devoted to public use.

History. — Code 1933, § 95A-1244.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1091, § 1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, a comma was inserted following “municipalities” near the beginning of this Code section.

32-10-71. Acquisition, maintenance, and operation of tollway projects; collection of parking fees for public beaches.

  1. The authority is authorized and empowered to acquire, maintain, repair, improve, and operate a tollway project whose status at the time of acquisition is a toll facility or which was operated as a toll facility at some point in its existence. For the purpose of earning sufficient revenue to make possible the maintenance, repair, and improvement of the acquired project, the authority is authorized to collect tolls on each and every project it acquires.
  2. When an existing state tollway facility has been acquired from a local government by the authority or the department, and the state tollway facility provides access to an island with public beaches that are  in need of maintenance, repair, or restoration, the State Road and Tollway Authority may assist the local government in the collection of a parking fee for each vehicle entering the island. The local government is authorized to set a fee on roads, streets, and parking facilities owned by the local government for such purposes and may contract with the authority to collect the fee.  The department is authorized to assist the authority in the collection of the fee.  The local government shall reimburse the department and the authority for any costs associated with executing the terms of the contract.
  3. When a state highway provides access to an island with public beaches that are in need of maintenance, repair, or restoration, the Department of Transportation may, if consistent with federal law and regulations, authorize the local government to set and collect a parking fee for the purpose of providing funding for such maintenance, repair, or restoration.  The department is authorized to allow the authority to collect such parking fee on the state highway system, provided that the collection point shall lie within the corporate limits of the local government setting the parking fee.  The authority is authorized to contract with the local government for the collection of the fee.  The local government shall reimburse the authority for any costs associated with executing the terms of the contract.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 8; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 8; Code 1933, § 95A-1245.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1091, § 3; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1409, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 2-1.

32-10-72. Authority fund for excess toll and other revenue.

All revenue in excess of all obligations of the authority of any nature, together with all unused receipts and gifts of every kind and nature whatsoever, shall be and become the authority fund. The authority, in its discretion, is charged with the duty of pledging, utilizing, or expending the authority fund for the following purposes:

  1. Pledges to the payment of any revenue bond issue requirements, sinking or reserve funds, as may be provided for under Code Section 32-10-102;
  2. The payment of any outstanding unpaid revenue bond obligations or administrative expenses;
  3. The construction of all or any part of projects, the need for which is concurred in by the Governor and the board;
  4. The most advantageous obtainable redemptions and retirements of the authority’s bonds pursuant to the prepayment redemption privileges accorded to the authority upon the various issues of bonds outstanding;
  5. The most advantageous open market purchase of the authority’s bonds that the authority may accomplish;
  6. Investment in such securities and in such manner as it determines to be in its best interest; and
  7. Subject to the terms of any resolution or trust indenture authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds, the transfer of funds to the department to be used by the department for department purposes.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 10; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 17; Code 1933, § 95A-1247, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-11.

32-10-73. Designation of moneys received pursuant to article as trust funds.

All moneys received pursuant to the authority of this article, whether as proceeds from the sale of revenue bonds or as revenues, tolls, and earnings, shall be deemed to be trust funds to be held and applied solely as provided in this article. The bondholders paying or entitled to receive the benefits of such bonds shall have a lien on all such funds until applied as provided for in any resolution or trust indenture of the authority, provided that revenue bonds issued for the use and benefit of a person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of private entity shall be a limited obligation of the authority and in the event of default, the remedies of the bondholders shall be limited to the funds identified in the resolution or trust indenture and not the funds held by the authority as trust funds or otherwise.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 32; Code 1933, § 95A-1269, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 5/SB 183.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added the proviso at the end of the second sentence.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

32-10-74. Effect of article.

This article shall be deemed to provide an additional and alternative method for the doing of the things authorized thereby and shall be regarded as supplemental and additional to powers conferred by other laws and shall not be regarded as in derogation of any powers now existing.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 34; Code 1933, § 95A-1271, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-75. Construction of article.

This article, being for the welfare of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes of this article.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 35; Code 1933, § 95A-1272, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32.

32-10-76. Grant programs; street car transportation pilot program formation; requirements.

Reserved. Redesignated as Code Section 50-39-53 pursuant to Ga. L. 2018, p. 377, § 4-4/HB 930, effective July 1, 2021.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 3, 2018, substituted “Atlanta-region Transit Link ‘ATL’ Authority” for “Georgia Regional Transportation Authority” in the middle of subsection (e); and, effective July 1, 2021, redesignates this Code section as Code Section 50-39-53.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 498, § 1/SB 150, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Georgia Community Streetcar Development and Revitalization Act.”’

Ga. L. 2021, p. 922, § 32(5)/HB 497, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, reserved the designation of this Code section, effective July 1, 2021.

32-10-77. General Assembly approval of funding for street car projects.

No funding by issuing bonds, any other state funds, or federal funds administered by the Department of Transportation shall be allowed for streetcar projects by any state entity or authority, including, but not limited to, the Department of Transportation or the State Road and Tollway Authority, or any other subsidiary of the state, without specific prior approval by passage of a general Act by the General Assembly.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-77 , enacted by Ga. L. 2006, p. 498, § 3/SB 150.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2006, p. 498, § 1/SB 150, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Georgia Community Streetcar Development and Revitalization Act.”’

PART 2 Revenue Bonds

32-10-90. Form and issuance of bonds; pledging of tolls and other project revenues.

The authority shall have the power and is authorized, at one time or from time to time, to provide by resolution for the issuance of negotiable revenue bonds of the authority for the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost, as defined in paragraph (4) of Code Section 32-10-60, of any one or a combination of projects. The principal and interest of such revenue bonds shall be payable from and may be secured by a pledge of tolls and other revenues of all or any part of the project financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of such issue or with the proceeds of bonds refunded or to be refunded by such issue or by a pledge of any other revenues of the authority that are legally available for such purpose. The bonds of each issue shall be dated, shall bear interest as provided for in Code Section 32-10-91, shall mature not later than 40 years from the date of issue, shall be payable in such media of payments as to both principal and interest as may be determined by the authority, and may be made redeemable before maturity, at the option of the authority, at such price or prices and under such terms and conditions as may be fixed by the authority in the resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 12; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 19; Code 1933, § 95A-1249, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-12.

Cross references. —

Revenue bonds generally, § 36-82-60 et seq.

32-10-90.1. Garvee bond provisions.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term “grant anticipation revenue vehicle” or “garvee bond” means any bond issued by the authority which is an eligible debt financing instrument within the scope of 23 U.S.C. Section 122 or which is otherwise to be repaid or reimbursed in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from federal funds.
  2. With respect to garvee bonds and projects financed by garvee bonds, the provisions and limitations of this Code section shall control over any other conflicting provisions of this article, it being the intention of the General Assembly that grant anticipation revenue vehicles and projects funded thereby be fully subject to the terms expressed in this Code section.
  3. For the purpose of issuance and use of the proceeds of garvee bonds, the authority and the department shall give priority, as far as reasonably practicable in the judgment of the department, to the completion of those portions of the Developmental Highway System as set out in paragraphs (1) through (13) and paragraphs (15) and (16) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-4-22 and such further paragraphs as may be added to such subsection from time to time, with due regard to the timely and economical completion of the portion set out in paragraph (14) thereof.
  4. Any project the cost of which is paid from the proceeds of garvee bonds shall be, pursuant to a contract or agreement between the authority and the department, planned, designed, and constructed by the Department of Transportation or a contractor contracting with the Department of Transportation.
  5. If during any state fiscal year the amount of federal reimbursement available to the State of Georgia under 23 U.S.C. Section 122 is or will be reduced below 90 percent of the amount available during Fiscal Year 2000-2001, the authority shall not thereafter issue any garvee bond.
  6. If cost effective as determined by the authority, garvee bonds shall be insured.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-90.1 , enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-12.1.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, a comma was inserted following “garvee bonds” in subsection (c).

U.S. Code. —

Payments to states for bond and other debt instrument financing, 23 U.S.C. § 122 .

32-10-91. Obtaining of loans and issuance and sale of notes and bonds; sale of obligations.

The authority may authorize by resolution the following: the obtaining of loans; the issuance and sale of notes; and the issuance and sale of bonds. The foregoing obligations may be offered at public or private sale in such manner and for such interest rate and at such price as the authority may determine to be in the best interests of the authority and the state, provided that any offering is subject to the review and approval of the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission pursuant to the provisions of Article 2 of Chapter 17 of Title 50.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 13; Code 1933, § 95A-1250, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 489, § 1.

32-10-92. Bonds authorized by resolution; specification of terms; public or private sale.

Bonds issued by the authority shall be authorized by resolution of the authority, be in such denominations, bear such date or dates, and mature at such time or times within 40 years from the issuance thereof as the authority determines to be appropriate. Such bonds shall be subject to such terms of redemption, bear interest at such rate or rates payable at such times, be in registered form or book-entry form through a securities depository, or both, as to principal or interest or both principal and interest, carry such registration privileges, be executed in such manner, be payable in such medium of payment at such place or places, and be subject to such terms and conditions as such resolution of the authority may provide; provided, however, in lieu of specifying the rate or rates of interest which the bonds to be issued by an authority are to bear, the resolution of the authority may provide that the bonds when issued will bear interest at a rate not exceeding a maximum per annum rate of interest which may be fixed or may fluctuate or otherwise change from time to time as specified in the resolution or may state that, in the event the bonds are to bear different rates of interest for different maturity dates, none of such rates will exceed the maximum rate, which rate may be fixed or may fluctuate or otherwise change from time to time, as specified. Bonds may be sold at public or private sale for such price or prices as the authority shall determine.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 14; Code 1933, § 95A-1251, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-13.

32-10-93. Execution, seal, and signing of bonds.

All bonds issued by the authority shall be executed in the name of the authority by the chairperson and secretary of the authority and shall be sealed with the official seal of the authority or a facsimile thereof. The facsimile signatures of the chairperson and secretary of the authority may be imprinted thereon in lieu of the manual signatures of such officers if the authority so directs in the resolution authorizing such bonds or otherwise. In case any officer whose manual or facsimile signature shall appear on any bonds shall cease to be such officer before the delivery of such bonds, such signature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he or she had remained in office until such delivery.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 15; Code 1933, § 95A-1252, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-13.1.

32-10-94. Bonds as negotiable instruments; tax exemption.

All revenue bonds issued under this article shall have and are declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the negotiable instruments law of the state. Such bonds, their transfer, and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation in this state.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 16; Code 1933, § 95A-1253, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-95. Utilization of bond proceeds; procedure in cases where proceeds are less than or greater than cost of project or combined projects.

The proceeds of the bonds shall be used solely for the payment of the cost of the project or combined projects and shall be disbursed upon requisition or order of the chairman of the authority or its duly bonded agents under such restrictions, if any, as the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or the trust indenture may provide. If the proceeds of such bonds, by error of calculation or otherwise, shall be less than the cost of the project or combined projects, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the trust indenture, additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit, which bonds, unless otherwise provided in the resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds or in the trust indenture, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued for the same purpose. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed the amount required for the purpose for which such bonds are issued, all surplus shall be paid into the sinking fund provided for the payment of principal and interest of such bonds.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 17; Code 1933, § 95A-1254, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-96. Issuance of interim receipts, interim certificates, and temporary bonds.

Prior to the preparation of definitive bonds, the authority may, under like restrictions, issue interim receipts, interim certificates, or temporary bonds, with or without coupons exchangeable for definitive bonds upon the issuance of the latter.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 18; Code 1933, § 95A-1255, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-97. Replacement of lost or mutilated bonds.

The authority may also provide for the replacement of any bond which becomes mutilated or which is destroyed or lost.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 19; Code 1933, § 95A-1256, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Construction and effect of statutes in relation to duplication of lost or destroyed securities issued by state or other public body, 63 A.L.R. 388 .

32-10-98. Resolutions for bond issuance; issuance of bonds of a single issue.

Resolutions for the issuance of revenue bonds may be adopted without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified or required by this article. In the discretion of the authority, revenue bonds of a single issue may be issued for the purpose of paying the cost of any one or more, including a combination of, projects at any one location or any number of locations. Any resolution providing for the issuance of revenue bonds under this article shall become effective immediately upon its passage and need not be published or posted; and any such resolution may be passed at any regular or special or adjourned meeting of the authority by a majority of its members.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 20; Code 1933, § 95A-1257, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-99. Credit of state not pledged.

Revenue bonds issued under this article shall not be deemed to constitute a debt of the State of Georgia or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state, but such bonds shall be payable from the revenues and funds of the authority as provided for in the resolutions or trust indentures authorizing or securing such bond issues; and the issuance of such revenue bonds shall not directly, indirectly, or contingently obligate the state to levy or to pledge any form of taxation whatsoever therefor or to make any appropriation for the payment thereof; and all such bonds shall contain recitals on their face covering substantially the foregoing provisions of this Code section.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 21; Code 1933, § 95A-1258, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 32; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-13.2.

32-10-100. Trust indenture as security for bonds.

  1. In the discretion of the authority, any issue of such revenue bonds may be secured by a trust indenture by and between the authority and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company, inside or outside of the state. Such trust indenture may pledge or assign tolls, revenues, and earnings to be received by the authority.
  2. Either the resolution providing for the issuance of revenue bonds or such trust indenture may contain provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholder, including the right of the appointment of a receiver upon default in the payment of any principal or interest obligation and the right of any receiver or indenture trustee to enforce collection of tolls, revenues, or other charges for the use of the project or projects, necessary to pay all costs of operation, all reserves provided for, the principal and interest on all bonds in the given issue, all cost of collection, and all other costs reasonably necessary to accomplish the collection of such sums, in the event of any default by the authority.
  3. Such resolution or trust indenture may include covenants setting forth the duties of the authority in relation to the acquisition of property; the construction of the project; the custody, safeguarding, and application of all moneys; and the operation and maintenance of the project or projects; and may also provide that any project shall be constructed and paid for under the supervision of department engineers or others satisfactory to the original purchasers of the bonds issued for such project or projects. Such resolution or trust indenture may also require that the security given by contractors and by any depository of the proceeds of the bonds or revenues or other moneys be satisfactory to such purchasers and may also contain provisions concerning the conditions, if any, upon which additional revenue bonds may be issued.
  4. It shall be lawful for any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of this state to act as such depository and to furnish such indemnifying bonds or pledge such securities as may be required by the authority. Such indenture may set forth the rights and remedies of the bondholders and of the trustee and may restrict the individual right of action of bondholders as is customary in trust indentures securing bonds and debentures of corporations.
  5. In addition to the foregoing, such trust indenture may contain such other provisions as the authority may deem reasonable and proper for the security of the bondholders. All expenses incurred in carrying out such trust indenture may be treated as a part of the cost of maintenance, operation, and repair of the project affected by such indenture.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 22; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 20; Code 1933, § 95A-1259, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 32.

32-10-101. Payment of bond proceeds to trustee.

The authority shall, in the resolution providing for issuance of revenue bonds or in the trust indenture, provide for the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds to any officer or person who or any agency, bank, or trust company which shall act as trustee of such funds and shall hold and apply such funds as provided in this article, subject to such regulations as this article and such resolution or trust indenture may provide.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 23; Code 1933, § 95A-1260, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-102. Pledges of revenues, tolls, and earnings; creation and disposition of sinking funds.

  1. The revenues, tolls, and earnings derived from any particular project or projects and all or any part of the revenues, tolls, and earnings received by the authority, regardless of whether or not such tolls, earnings, and revenues were produced by a particular project for which bonds have been issued, unless otherwise pledged or allocated, may be pledged by the authority to the payment of the principal and interest obligations of any revenue bond issues of the authority. All funds so pledged, from whatever source received, which may include funds received from one or more of all sources of the authority’s income, shall be set aside at regular intervals, as may be provided in the resolutions or trust indentures, into sinking funds which shall be pledged to and charged with the payment of (1) the interest upon such revenue bonds as such interest shall fall due, (2) the principal of the bonds as the same shall mature, (3) the necessary charges of paying agents for paying principal and interest, and (4) any premium required upon bonds retired by call or purchase as may be provided in the resolutions or trust indentures.
  2. The use and disposition of such sinking funds shall be subject to such regulations as may be provided in the resolutions authorizing the issuance of the revenue bonds or in the trust indentures; but, except as may otherwise be provided in such resolutions or trust indentures, such sinking funds, individually, shall be funds for the benefit of all revenue bonds of the given issue for which they are created without distinction or priority of one over another. Subject to the resolution or trust indenture of any given bond issue, any moneys in such sinking funds, after all bonds and the interest thereon for which such sinking funds were pledged have been paid, may be paid into the authority fund provided for in Code Section 32-10-72.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 24; Code 1933, § 95A-1261, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-103. Rights and remedies of holders of bonds or interest coupons and of indenture trustees.

Any holders of revenue bonds issued under this article or any of the coupons appertaining thereto, any duly appointed receiver of such bonds or coupons, and any indenture trustee for bondholders, except to the extent the rights given in this Code section may be restricted by resolution passed before the issuance of the bonds or by the trust indenture, may, either at law or in equity, by action, mandamus, or other proceedings, protect and enforce any and all rights under the laws of Georgia or granted in this Code section or under such resolution or trust indentures and may enforce and compel performance of all duties required by this article or by such resolution or trust indenture to be performed by the authority or any officer thereof, including the fixing, charging, and collection of revenues, tolls, and other charges for the use of the project or projects. No holder of any such bond or receiver or indenture trustee thereof shall have the right to compel any exercise of the taxing power of the state to pay any such bond or the interest thereon or to enforce the payment thereof against any property of the state; nor shall any such bond constitute a charge, lien, or encumbrance, legal or equitable, upon any property of the state.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 25; Code 1933, § 95A-1262, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 32.

32-10-104. Refunding bonds.

The authority is authorized, subject to any prior resolution or trust indenture, to provide by resolution for the issuance of revenue refunding bonds of the authority for the purpose of refunding any revenue bonds issued under this article and then outstanding, together with accrued interest thereon. The issuance of such revenue refunding bonds, the maturities and all other details thereof, the rights of the holders thereof, and the duties of the authority in respect to the same shall be governed by this article insofar as the same may be applicable.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 26; Code 1933, § 95A-1263, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. —

Power of municipal corporation to refund special assessment bonds, 102 A.L.R. 202 .

Power of municipality or other governmental body to issue refunding bonds to retire obligation in respect of which the creation and maintenance of a sinking fund by taxation is required by constitutional or statutory provision, 157 A.L.R. 794 .

Power of governmental unit to issue bonds as implying power to refund them, 1 A.L.R.2d 134.

32-10-105. Investment of funds in bonds; deposit of bonds as securities.

The bonds authorized in paragraph (8) of Code Section 32-10-63 and in Code Section 32-10-90 are deemed securities in which (1) all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and all municipal subdivisions, (2) all insurance companies and associations and other persons carrying on an insurance business, (3) all banks, bankers, trust companies, savings banks and savings associations, including savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, investment companies, and other persons carrying on a banking business, (4) all administrators, guardians, executors, trustees, and other fiduciaries, and (5) all other persons whatsoever who are now or may hereafter be authorized to invest in bonds or other obligations of the state may properly and legally invest funds, including capital in their control or belonging to them. The bonds are also deemed securities which may be deposited with and shall be received by all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and municipal subdivisions for any purpose for which the deposit of the bonds or other obligations of this state is now or may hereafter be authorized.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 27; Code 1933, § 95A-1264, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-106. Protection of interests and rights of bondholders.

While any of the bonds issued by the authority remain outstanding, the powers, duties, or existence of the authority or of its officers, employees, or agents shall not be diminished or impaired in any manner that will affect adversely the interests and rights of the holders of such bonds.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 31; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 21; Code 1933, § 95A-1268, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

32-10-107. Confirmation and validation of bonds.

Bonds of the authority shall be confirmed and validated in accordance with Article 3 of Chapter 82 of Title 36, the “Revenue Bond Law.” The petition for validation for conduit bonds issued pursuant to paragraph (8) of Code Section 32-10-63 shall also make any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of private entity a party defendant to such action, if such person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or other type of private entity has contracted or will contract with the authority to provide funds for the repayment of revenue bonds which are to be issued and are sought to be validated. The bonds, when validated, and the judgment of validation shall be final and conclusive with respect to the validity of such bonds and against the authority and against all other persons or entities, regardless of whether such persons or entities were parties to such validation proceedings.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 30; Code 1933, § 95A-1267, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 760, § 6/SB 183; Ga. L. 2021, p. 526, § 9/HB 577.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted the present provisions of this Code section for the former provisions, which read: “Bonds of the authority shall be confirmed and validated in accordance with Article 3 of Chapter 82 of Title 36, the ‘Revenue Bond Law.’ The bonds, when validated, and the judgment of validation shall be final and conclusive with respect to such bonds and against the authority issuing the same.”.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 1, 2021, in the second sentence, inserted “for conduit bonds issued pursuant to paragraph (8) of Code Section 32-10-63” near the beginning, inserted “contracted” near the middle, substituted “to provide funds for the repayment of” for “with respect to the project for which” in the middle, and inserted “which” near the end.

Law reviews. —

For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017).

32-10-108. Transfer of projects to state highway system free from tolls.

Upon payment in full of all bonds and the interest thereon and obligations of every nature whatsoever for the payment of which the revenues of any given project or projects have been pledged, in whole or in part, either originally or subsequently, either primarily or secondarily, directly or indirectly or otherwise, or upon the setting aside in trust, for the benefit of bondholders or other obligees, of a sufficient amount for the payment of all such bonds and other obligations and the interest thereon to the maturity thereof, such project or projects, if deemed by the department to be in a safe and satisfactory condition of repair and traffic capacity, may become part of the state highway system and thereafter shall be maintained by the department free of tolls. In the event such project or projects to be transferred are not in good condition, in the judgment of the department, the department shall be charged with the duty of immediately advising the authority in writing what will be necessary to accomplish such safe and satisfactory condition of repair and traffic capacity; and the authority thereafter shall apply sufficient revenue from such project or projects to the accomplishment of such safe condition of repair and traffic capacity; and, upon its accomplishment, such project or projects shall become toll free as provided in this Code section. Upon the fulfillment of all conditions necessary to the cessation of tolls upon any such project, the authority shall convey by deed all right, title, and interest in and to such project to the department for and in consideration of $1.00, which the treasurer of the department is authorized to pay from any department funds available to him for any department expenditure.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 9; Ga. L. 1972, p. 179, § 16; Code 1933, § 95A-1246, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1251, § 1-14.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, “Upon payment in full” was substituted for “Upon payment if full” at the beginning of the Code section.

32-10-109. Covenant with holders as to tax-exempt status of authority property and bonds.

It is found, determined, and declared that the creation of the authority and the carrying out of its corporate purpose are in all respects for the benefit of the people of this state and that the authority is an institution of purely public charity and will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by this article; and this state covenants with the holders of the bonds that the authority shall not be required to pay any taxes or assessments upon any of the property acquired or leased by it or under its jurisdiction, control, possession, or supervision or upon its activities in the operation or maintenance of the projects erected by it or upon any fees, tolls, or other charges for the use of such projects or upon other income received by the authority. The bonds of the authority, their transfer, and the income therefrom shall at all times be exempt from taxation within this state. The tax exemption provided for in this chapter shall include an exemption from sales and use tax on property purchased by the authority or for use by the authority.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 28; Code 1933, § 95A-1265, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1058, § 3/SB 125.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, “are” was substituted for “is” near the beginning of this Code section.

32-10-110. Venue and jurisdiction of actions.

Any action to protect or enforce any rights under this article and any action pertaining to validation of any bonds issued under this article brought in the courts of this state shall be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County, which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of such actions.

History. — Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 302, § 29; Code 1933, § 95A-1266, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

PART 3 Transportation Infrastructure Bank

32-10-120. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank Act.”

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-120 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-121. Creation; governance; corporate purpose; types of accounts.

  1. There shall be created within the State Road and Tollway Authority an instrumentality of the state to be known as the Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank.
  2. The bank shall be governed by the board of the State Road and Tollway Authority as provided in this chapter.
  3. The corporate purpose of the bank is to assist in financing qualified projects by providing loans and other financial assistance to government units for constructing and improving highway and transportation facilities necessary for public purposes, including economic development. The exercise by the bank of a power conferred in this part is an essential public function.
  4. The bank shall establish and maintain at least the four following accounts in the authority fund:
    1. State and local roadway account;
    2. State and local nonroadway account;
    3. Federal roadway account; and
    4. Federal nonroadway account.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-121 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-122. Definitions.

As used in this part, the term:

  1. “Bank” means the Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank.
  2. “Board” means the board of the State Road and Tollway Authority.
  3. “Department of Transportation” means the Georgia Department of Transportation and its successors.
  4. “Eligible costs” means, as applied to a qualified project to be financed from the federal roadway account, the costs that are permitted under applicable federal laws, requirements, procedures, and guidelines in regard to establishing, operating, and providing assistance from the bank. As applied to a qualified project to be financed from the state and local roadway account, these costs include the costs of preliminary engineering, traffic and revenue studies, environmental studies, right of way acquisition, legal and financial services associated with the development of the qualified project, construction, construction management, facilities, and other costs necessary for the qualified project. As applied to any qualified project to be financed from the federal nonroadway account, these costs include the costs of preliminary engineering, traffic and revenue studies, environmental studies, right of way acquisition, legal and financial services associated with the development of the qualified project, construction, construction management, equipment, facilities, and other nonoperating costs necessary for the qualified project. As applied to any qualified project to be financed from the state and local nonroadway account, these costs include the costs of preliminary engineering, traffic and revenue studies, environmental studies, right of way acquisition, legal and financial services associated with the development of the qualified project, construction, construction management, equipment, facilities, and other nonoperating costs necessary for the qualified project.
  5. “Eligible project” means a highway, including bridges, air transport and airport facilities, and rail, or transit or bicycle facility project which provides public benefits by either enhancing mobility and safety, promoting economic development, or increasing the quality of life and general welfare of the public. The term “eligible project” also includes mass transit systems including, but not limited to, monorail and monobeam mass transit systems. There may be included as part of any such project all improvements necessary to the full utilization thereof, including site preparation, roads and streets, sidewalks, water supply, outdoor lighting, belt line railroad sidings and lead tracks, bridges, causeways, terminals for railroad, automotive, and air transportation, transportation facilities incidental to the project, and the dredging and improving of harbors and waterways, none of which foregoing descriptive words shall be construed to constitute a limitation.
  6. “Federal accounts” means, collectively, the separate accounts for federal roadway funds and federal nonroadway funds.
  7. “Financing agreement” means any agreement entered into between the bank and a qualified borrower pertaining to a loan or other financial assistance. This agreement may contain, in addition to financial terms, provisions relating to the regulation and supervision of a qualified project, or other provisions as the board may determine. The term “financing agreement” includes, without limitation, a loan agreement, trust indenture, security agreement, reimbursement agreement, guarantee agreement, bond or note, ordinance or resolution, or similar instrument.
  8. “Government unit” means a municipal corporation, county, community improvement district, or any public operator of transit, including combinations of two or more of these entities, acting jointly to construct, own, or operate a qualified project, or any other state authority, board, commission, agency, or department which may construct, own, or operate a qualified project.
  9. “Loan” means an obligation subject to repayment which is provided by the bank to a qualified borrower for all or a part of the eligible costs of a qualified project. A loan may be disbursed in anticipation of reimbursement for or direct payment of the eligible costs of a qualified project.
  10. “Loan obligation” means a bond, note, or other evidence of an obligation issued by a qualified borrower.
  11. “Other financial assistance” includes, but shall not be limited to, grants, contributions, credit enhancement, capital or debt reserves for bonds or debt instrument financing, interest rate subsidies, provision of letters of credit and credit instruments, provision of bond or other debt financing instrument security, and other lawful forms of financing and methods of leveraging funds that are approved by the board, and, in the case of federal funds, as allowed by federal law.
  12. “Project revenues” or “revenues” means all rates, rents, fees, assessments, charges, and other receipts derived or to be derived by a qualified borrower from a qualified project or made available from a special source, and, as provided in the applicable financing agreement, derived from any system of which the qualified project is a part or from any other revenue producing facility under the ownership or control of the qualified borrower including, without limitation, proceeds of grants, gifts, appropriations and loans, including the proceeds of loans made by the bank, investment earnings, reserves for capital and current expenses, proceeds of insurance or condemnation and proceeds from the sale or other disposition of property and from any other special source as may be provided by the qualified borrower.
  13. “Qualified borrower” means any government unit authorized to construct, operate, or own a qualified project.
  14. “Qualified project” means an eligible project which has been selected by the bank to receive a loan or other financial assistance from the bank to defray an eligible cost.
  15. “State and local accounts” means, collectively, the separate accounts for state and local roadway funds and state and local nonroadway funds.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-122 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

Code Commission notes. —

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2008, in paragraphs (6) and (15), “accounts” was substituted for “account”, and, in paragraph (11), a comma was inserted following “the board, and” near the end.

32-10-123. Authority of the board.

In administering the affairs of the bank, the board may exercise any or all of the powers granted to the authority under Parts 1 and 2 of this article, as well as the powers granted in this part. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the board is specifically authorized to issue bonds for the purposes of the bank, in the same general manner provided in Part 2 of this article.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-123 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-124. Power of board; meaning of use of word “bank” for purposes of this article.

  1. In addition to the powers contained elsewhere in this article, the board has all power necessary, useful, or appropriate to fund, operate, and administer the bank, and to perform its other functions including, but not limited to, the power to:
    1. Have perpetual succession;
    2. Adopt, promulgate, amend, and repeal bylaws, not inconsistent with provisions in this part for the administration of the bank’s affairs and the implementation of its functions, including the right of the board to select qualifying projects and to provide loans and other financial assistance;
    3. Sue and be sued in the name of the bank;
    4. Have a seal and alter it at its pleasure, although the failure to affix the seal does not affect the validity of an instrument executed on behalf of the bank;
    5. Make loans to qualified borrowers to finance the eligible costs of qualified projects and to acquire, hold, and sell loan obligations at prices and in a manner as the board determines advisable;
    6. Provide qualified borrowers with other financial assistance necessary to defray eligible costs of a qualified project;
    7. Enter into contracts, arrangements, and agreements with qualified borrowers and other persons and execute and deliver all financing agreements and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers granted in this part;
    8. Enter into agreements with a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States or of this state or another state for the purpose of providing for the financing of qualified projects;
    9. Establish:
      1. Policies and procedures for the making and administering of loans and other financial assistance; and
      2. Fiscal controls and accounting procedures to ensure proper accounting and reporting by the bank and government units;
    10. Acquire by purchase, lease, donation, or other lawful means and sell, convey, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer, and dispose of all or any part of its properties and assets of every kind and character or any interest in it to further the public purpose of the bank;
    11. Procure insurance, guarantees, letters of credit, and other forms of collateral or security or credit support from any public or private entity or instrumentality of the United States for the payment of any bonds issued by it, including the power to pay premiums or fees on any insurance, guarantees, letters of credit, and other forms of collateral or security or credit support;
    12. Collect or authorize the trustee under any trust indenture securing any bonds to collect amounts due under any loan obligations owned by it, including taking the action required to obtain payment of any sums in default;
    13. Unless restricted under any agreement with holders of bonds, consent to any modification with respect to the rate of interest, time, and payment of any installment of principal or interest, or any other term of any loan obligations owned by it;
    14. Borrow money through the issuance of bonds and other forms of indebtedness as provided in this article;
    15. Expend funds to obtain accounting, management, legal, financial consulting, and other professional services necessary to the operations of the bank;
    16. Expend funds credited to the bank as the board determines necessary for the costs of administering the operations of the bank;
    17. Establish advisory committees as the board determines appropriate, which may include individuals from the private sector with banking and financial expertise, including the requirement that the bank shall consult with the Department of Transportation for the purpose of implementing the project accounting procedures required by subparagraph (B) of paragraph (9) of this subsection;
    18. Procure insurance against losses in connection with its property, assets, or activities including insurance against liability for its acts or the acts of its employees or agents or to establish cash reserves to enable it to act as a self-insurer against any and all such losses;
    19. Collect fees and charges in connection with its loans or other financial assistance;
    20. Apply for, receive, and accept from any source, aid, grants, or contributions of money, property, labor, or other things of value to be used to carry out the purposes of this part subject to the conditions upon which the aid, grants, or contributions are made;
    21. Enter into contracts or agreements for the servicing and processing of financial agreements;
    22. Accept and hold, with or without payment of interest, funds deposited with the bank by government units and private entities; and
    23. Do all other things necessary or convenient to exercise powers granted or reasonably implied by this part.
  2. The bank shall not be authorized or empowered to be or to constitute a bank or trust company within the jurisdiction or under the control of this state or an agency of it or the Comptroller of the Currency or the Treasury Department of the United States, or a bank, banker, or dealer in securities within the meaning of, or subject to the provisions of, any securities, securities exchange, or securities dealers’ law of the United States or of this state. The use of the word “bank” in the “Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank” is required by federal law. For the express purposes of this part, the use of the word “bank” in the “Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank Act” does not violate Code Section 7-1-243. In addition, all deposits taken by the Georgia Transportation Infrastructure Bank shall contain a notice stating that the deposits are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-124 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019; Ga. L. 2009, p. 8, § 32/SB 46.

32-10-125. Revenue sources.

  1. The following sources may be used to capitalize the bank and for the bank to carry out its purposes:
    1. Appropriations by the General Assembly;
    2. Federal funds available to the state, as approved by the Department of Transportation;
    3. Contributions, donations, and deposits from government units, private entities, and any other source as may become available to the bank;
    4. All moneys paid or credited to the bank, by contract or otherwise, payments of principal and interest on loans or other financial assistance made from the bank, and interest earnings which may accrue from the investment or reinvestment of the bank’s moneys;
    5. Proceeds from the issuance of bonds as provided in this part; and
    6. Other lawful sources not already dedicated for another purpose as determined appropriate by the board.
  2. Without limiting the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section, it shall be specifically provided that any local government may use the proceeds of any local funds which may be hereafter made available by law for the purposes of this part, including without limitation the funding of eligible projects and contributions, donations, and deposits to the bank.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-125 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-126. Earnings; establishment of accounts and subaccounts; commingling of funds.

  1. Earnings on balances in the federal accounts must be credited and invested according to federal law. Earnings on state and local accounts must be credited to the state and local roadway account or state and local nonroadway account that generates the earnings. The bank may establish accounts and subaccounts within the state and local accounts and federal accounts as considered desirable to effectuate the purposes of this part, or to meet the requirements of any state or federal programs.
  2. For necessary and convenient administration of the bank, the board shall establish federal and state and local accounts and subaccounts within the bank necessary to meet any applicable federal law requirements or as the bank shall determine necessary or desirable in order to implement the provisions of this part.
  3. The bank shall comply with all applicable federal laws and regulations prohibiting the commingling of certain federal funds deposited in the bank.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-126 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-127. Loans and other financial assistance; determination of eligible projects.

  1. The bank may provide loans and other financial assistance to a government unit to pay for all or part of the eligible costs of a qualified project. The term of the loan or other financial assistance shall not exceed the useful life of the project. The bank may require the government unit to enter into a financing agreement in connection with its loan obligation or other financial assistance. The board shall determine the form and content of loan applications, financing agreements, and loan obligations including the term and rate or rates of interest on a financing agreement. The terms and conditions of a loan or other financial assistance from federal accounts shall comply with applicable federal requirements.
    1. The board shall determine which projects are eligible projects and then select from among the eligible projects qualified projects. When determining eligibility, the board shall make every effort to balance any loans or other financial assistance among all regions of this state.
    2. Preference for loans may be given to eligible projects in tier 1 and tier 2 counties, as defined in Code Section 48-7-40 and by the Department of Community Affairs.
    3. Preference for grants and other financial assistance may be given to eligible projects which have local financial support.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-127 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019; Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 6-1/HB 170.

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 8-1/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Funding Act of 2015.’ ”

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 8-2/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “It is the intention of the General Assembly, subject to appropriations and other constitutional obligations of this state, that year to year revenue increases be prioritized to fund education, transportation, and health care in this state.”

Ga. L. 2015, p. 236, § 9-1(b)/HB 170, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Tax, penalty, and interest liabilities and refund eligibility for prior taxable years shall not be affected by the passage of this Act and shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated as it existed immediately prior to the effective date of this Act.” This Act became effective July 1, 2015.

Law reviews. —

For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 261 (2015).

32-10-128. Authority of qualified borrowers.

  1. Qualified borrowers are authorized to obtain loans or other financial assistance from the bank through financing agreements. Qualified borrowers entering into financing agreements and issuing loan obligations to the bank may perform any acts, take any action, adopt any proceedings, and make and carry out any contracts or agreements with the bank as may be agreed to by the bank and any qualified borrower for the carrying out of the purposes contemplated by this part.
  2. In addition to the authorizations contained in this part, all other statutes or provisions permitting government units to borrow money and issue obligations, including, but not limited to Article 3 of Chapter 82 of Title 36, the “Revenue Bond Law,” may be utilized by any government unit in obtaining a loan or other financial assistance from the bank to the extent determined necessary or useful by the government unit in connection with any financing agreement and the issuance, securing, or sale of loan obligations to the bank.
  3. A qualified borrower may receive, apply, pledge, assign, and grant security interests in project revenues to secure its obligations as provided in this part. A qualified borrower may fix, revise, charge, and collect fees, rates, rents, assessments, and other charges of general or special application for the operation or services of a qualified project, the system of which it is a part, and any other revenue producing facilities from which the qualified borrower derives project revenues to meet its obligations under a financing agreement or to provide for the construction and improving of a qualified project.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-128 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-129. Bank exempted from taxes and assessments.

The bank is performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it and shall not be required to pay taxes or assessments upon property or upon its operations or the income therefrom, or taxes or assessments upon property or loan obligations acquired or used by the bank or upon the income therefrom.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-129 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-130. Withholding of funds.

  1. If a government unit fails to collect and remit in full all amounts due to the bank on the date these amounts are due under the terms of any note or other obligation of the government unit, the bank shall notify the appropriate state officials who shall withhold all or a portion of the funds of the state and all funds administered by the state and its agencies, boards, and instrumentalities allotted or appropriated to the government unit and apply an amount necessary to the payment of the amount due.
  2. Nothing contained in this Code section mandates the withholding of funds allocated to a government unit which would violate contracts to which the state is a party, the requirements of federal law imposed on the state, or judgments of a court binding on the state.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-130 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-131. Liability of officer, employee, or committee of bank.

Neither the board nor any officer, employee, or committee of the bank acting on behalf of it, while acting within the scope of this authority, is subject to any liability resulting from carrying out any of the powers given in this part.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-131 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-132. Notice prior to action or referendum not required.

Notice, proceeding, or publication, except those required in this part, shall not be necessary to the performance of any act authorized in this part nor shall any act of the bank be subject to any referendum.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-132 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

32-10-133. Annual report.

Following the close of each state fiscal year, the bank shall submit an annual report of its activities for the preceding year to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and make such report available to the General Assembly. The bank also shall submit an annual report to the appropriate federal agency in accordance with requirements of any federal program.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-10-133 , enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 73, § 2/HB 1019.

CHAPTER 11 Interstate Rail Passenger Network Compact

32-11-1. Ratification, enactment, and entry of compact.

The interstate rail passenger network compact is ratified, enacted, and entered into by the State of Georgia with all other states joining the compact in the form substantially as this chapter.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-1 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-2. Policy.

It is the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and share the administrative and financial responsibilities concerning the planning of an interstate rail passenger network system connecting major cities in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida. The participating states agree that a rail passenger system would provide a beneficial service and would be enhanced if operated across state lines.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-2 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-3. Economic impact study.

  1. The states of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida (referred to in this chapter as “participating states”) agree, upon adoption of this compact by the respective states, to jointly conduct and participate in a rail passenger network financial and economic impact study. The study must do the following:
    1. Carry forward research previously performed by the national railroad passenger corporation (Amtrak) (report issued December 1990) for purposes of evaluating a representative service schedule, train running times, and associated costs.
    2. Include consideration of the following:
      1. The purchase of railroad equipment by a participating state and the lease of the railroad equipment to Amtrak.
      2. The recommendation that a member of the council serve on the Amtrak board of directors.
      3. The periodic review of projected passenger traffic estimates.
      4. Any other matter related to the financial and economic impact of a rail passenger network between the cities of Chicago, Illinois, and Jacksonville, Florida.
  2. Information and data collected during the study under subsection (a) of this Code section that is requested by a participating state or a consulting firm representing a participating state or the compact may be made available to the state or firm. However, the information may not include matters not of public record or of a nature considered to be privileged and confidential unless the state providing the information agrees to waive the confidentiality.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-3 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-4. Assistance by participating states.

The participating states agree to do the following:

  1. Make available to each other and to a consulting firm representing a participating state or the compact assistance that is available, including personnel, equipment, office space, machinery, computers, engineering, and technical advice and services.
  2. Provide financial assistance for the implementation of the feasibility study that is available.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-4 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-5. Creation of advisory council; membership.

The interstate rail passenger advisory council (referred to in this compact as the “council”) is created. The membership of the council consists of three individuals from each participating state. The Governor, President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each appoint one member of the council.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-5 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-6. Duties of council.

The council shall do the following:

  1. Meet within 30 days after ratification of this agreement by at least two participating states.
  2. Establish rules for the conduct of the council’s business, including the payment of the reasonable and necessary travel expenses of council members.
  3. Coordinate all aspects of the rail passenger financial and economic impact study under Code Section 32-11-3.
  4. Contract with persons, including institutions of higher education, for performance of any part of the study under Code Section 32-11-3.
  5. Upon approval of the study, negotiate the proportionate share that each state will contribute toward the implementation and management of the proposed restoration of the interstate rail passenger system.
  6. Make recommendations to each participating state legislature concerning the results of the study required by this chapter.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-6 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-7. Effective date.

This compact becomes effective upon the adoption of the compact into law by at least two of the participating states. Thereafter, the compact becomes effective for another participating state upon the enactment of the compact by the state.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-7 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-8. Repeal.

This compact continues in force with respect to a participating state and remains binding upon the state until six months after the state has given notice to each other participating state of the repeal of this chapter. The withdrawal may not be construed to relieve a participating state from an obligation incurred before the end of the state’s participation in the compact.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-8 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

32-11-9. Construction of compact.

  1. This compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the compact’s purposes.
  2. The provisions of this compact are severable.  If:
    1. A phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of a participating state or of the United States; or
    2. The applicability of this compact to a government, an agency, a person, or a circumstance is held invalid,

      the validity of the remainder of this compact and the compact’s applicability to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is not affected.

  3. If this compact is held contrary to the Constitution of a participating state, the compact remains in effect for the remaining participating states and in effect for the state affected for all severable matters.

History. — Code 1981, § 32-11-9 , enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 419, § 1.

CHAPTER 12 Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation

Cross references. —

Transit Governance Study Commission; creation; members; report; funds, § 50-32-5 .

Editor’s notes. —

Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 1/HB 277, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Transportation Investment Act of 2010.’ ”

32-12-1 through 32-12-6.

Repealed by Ga. L. 2015, p. 950, § 1/HB 386, effective July 1, 2015.

Editor’s notes. —

This chapter consisted of Code Sections 32-12-1 through 32-12-6, relating to Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation, and was based on Ga. L. 2010, p. 778, § 4/HB 277; Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 5-19/HB 214.