Cross References.

Contract to print Supreme Court reports to be let within the state if feasible,§ 1-506.

Penalty for violation of chapter,§ 60-104.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Constitutionality.

This section and§§ 60-103 and 60-104 are constitutional and do not violate public policy since statute has nothing to do with letting contracts to either residents or nonresidents of state but only requires that certain work done for the several counties shall be actually executed within confines of county or state, without any reference to the person who does it. In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911).

Amendments.

The 2015 amendment, by ch. 50, in the section heading, inserted “or county”; and, near the beginning of subsection (b), inserted “or 60-102” and “or a county”.

The 2016 amendment, by ch. 289, in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3), substituted “after a solicitation has been made” for “after requests for proposals or bids have been made” and “67-9208” for “67-5718” twice.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2015, ch. 50 declared an emergency. Approved March 17, 2015.

Statute Constitutional.

An act requiring that all county printing, binding, and stationery work shall be executed within the county is constitutional and not an interference with or regulation of commerce. In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911).

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertions near the middle of the section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

Effective Dates.

Section 4 of S.L. 1965, ch. 304 declared an emergency. Approved March 29, 1965.

Conviction of Officer Upheld.

A conviction of an officer for unlawfully executing county printing outside the county was upheld when practicable facilities existed within the county. In re Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298 (1911).

Amendments.

The 2007 amendment, by ch. 260, added the subsection (1) designation and, in subsection (1), added “On and after October 1, 2007” at the beginning, substituted “seven and one-half cents (7.5¢)” for “seven cents (7¢)”, “six and one-half cents (6.5¢)” for “six cents (6¢)” in two places, and “eight and one-half cents (8.5¢)” for “eight cents (8¢)”; and added subsection (2).

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1999, ch. 281 reads: “Sections 1, 3 and 4 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 2000. Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 2001.”

Section 2 of S.L. 1996, ch. 427 provided that the act shall be in full force and effect on January 1, 1997.

Circulation of Newspaper.

County proceedings should be published, if possible, in a medium that will afford the mass of taxpayers opportunity to become conversant therewith, and contract should not be awarded to paper with a small circulation merely because its bid is lower than that of one with a much larger circulation. Lamphere v. Latah County, 51 Idaho 65, 2 P.2d 317 (1931).

Neither the county which allowed claim, nor claimant, amount of whose claim for publishing annual financial statement was reduced by district court, was entitled to urge as error conclusion of court that there was no statutory authorization for the publication of statement, where, notwithstanding that conclusion, court did not disallow claim or any part thereof on that ground. Breding v. Board of County Comm’rs, 55 Idaho 480, 44 P.2d 290 (1935).

C.J.S.

§ 60-106. Qualifications of newspapers printing legal notices.

No newspaper shall qualify under this section unless the same shall hold a valid second class mailing permit from the United States Post Office. Any violations of the previous requirements of this section concerning printing of newspapers other than in the governmental entity in which a notice or advertisement is required to be printed are hereby excused and any advertisement published in any such newspapers is hereby validated.

History.

1919, ch. 38, § 1, p. 137; C.S., § 2340; I.C.A.,§ 58-106; am. 1935, ch. 86, § 1, p. 151; am. 1939, ch. 38, § 1, p. 79; am. 1943, ch. 16, § 1, p. 44; am. 1947, ch. 140, § 1, p. 337; am. 1969, ch. 132, § 1, p. 414; am. 1994, ch. 192, § 1, p. 621.

Cross References.

Affidavit of proof of publication, Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(g).

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1969, ch. 132 declared an emergency. Approved March 11, 1969.

Compiler’s Notes.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Constitutionality.

This section was judged to be constitutional as it applies to governmental entities, but unconstitutional and void in regard to non-governmental entities because the statute referred only to governmental entities in its title, but referred to non-governmental entities in the statute itself. Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus. Review, Inc., 146 Idaho 207, 192 P.3d 1031 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011).

Exceptions to Continuous Publication.

Interruption of Publication.

By providing no less than twelve individual exceptions to the continuous publication requirement, the Idaho legislature impliedly excluded all other reasons for temporary suspension of publication. Poison Creek Publ’g, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publ’g, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 3 P.3d 1254 (Ct. App. 2000). Interruption of Publication.

The “frequency of publication” exception in this section does not encompass a voluntary decision by a weekly newspaper to interrupt its ordinary course of publication for one week so that employees can take a vacation. Poison Creek Publ’g, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publ’g, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 3 P.3d 1254 (Ct. App. 2000).

Legislative Intent.

Where the clear language of this section mandates that a weekly newspaper publish its weekly edition continuously and uninterruptedly for seventy-eight consecutive weeks, and because enforcement of this provision does not lead to palpably absurd results, it must be assumed that the legislature meant what is plainly written in the statute. Poison Creek Publ’g, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publ’g, Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 3 P.3d 1254 (Ct. App. 2000).

Separate Newspapers.

A weekly and daily newspaper published by the same firm, both of which were qualified under the statute to print county proceedings, are not two separate newspapers as respects validity of award of county printing to weekly newspaper, with the understanding that the proceedings would also be printed in the daily newspaper. Robinson v. Latah County, 56 Idaho 759, 59 P.2d 19 (1936).

Am. Jur. 2d.

C.J.S.

Effective Dates.

Section 5 of S.L. 1999, ch. 281 reads: “Sections 1, 3 and 4 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 2000. Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 2001.”

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed insertion was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 1949, ch. 121 declared an emergency. Approved March 3, 1949.

Am. Jur. 2d.

C.J.S.

Cross References.

Affidavit of proof of publication, Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(g).

Compiler’s Notes.

The bracketed word “as” in the first paragraph was inserted by the compiler to supply the probable intended term.

The second bracketed insertion in the first paragraph was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.

C.J.S.

§ 60-109. Publication of notices — Number of publications required.

Whenever any law of this state requires publication of any notice or proceeding, said requirement shall be satisfied by publishing the same once each calendar week on the same day of each week for the number of times equal to the number of weeks mentioned in the requirement in any regular issue of a newspaper published on one or more days of each week; or when a specified number of days is required, a ten (10) days’ notice shall be satisfied by two (2) such weekly publications, a twenty (20) days’ notice by three (3) such publications, and a thirty (30) days’ notice by five (5) such publications.

History.

1941, ch. 22, § 1, p. 47; am. 1947, ch. 8, § 1, p. 8.

Cross References.

Affidavit of proof of publication, Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(g).

Compiler’s Notes.

The title to S.L. 1947, ch. 8 recites that it amends section 1 of chapter 22 of the 1941 Session Laws but in the introductory paragraph in the text of section 1 of S.L. 1947, ch. 8 recites that it amends § 7 instead of § 1 of S.L. 1941, ch. 22.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Prefatory Note

Introduction.

Changing to an electronic environment also raises new issues in information management. Electronic legal information moves from its originating computer through a series of other computers or servers until it eventually reaches the individual user. The information is susceptible to being altered, whether accidentally or maliciously, at each point where it is stored, transferred, or accessed. Any such alterations can be virtually undetectable by the consumer. A major issue raised by the change to an electronic format, therefore, is whether the information presented to consumers is trustworthy, or authentic.

“An authentic text is one whose content has been verified by a government entity to be complete and unaltered when compared to the version approved or published by the content originator.” (American Association of Law Libraries, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT ON AUTHENTICATION OF ONLINE LEGAL RESOURCES 8 (2007)). In the context of this act, the content originator is the official publisher. When a document is authentic, it means that the version of the legal resource presented to the user is the same as that published by the official publisher. Authentication provides an electronic method to establish the integrity of the document, demonstrating that the information has not been tampered with or altered during the transfer between the official publisher and the end-user. Few state governments have taken the actions necessary to ensure that the electronic legal information they create and distribute remains unaltered and is, therefore, trustworthy or authentic. Authenticity is a much larger concern in the electronic age than in the print age, where legal information typically exists in multiple copies. The content of a print work is “fixed” once printed, making the text easily verifiable and changes readily detectible. Many years of experience allow us to determine when we can trust the integrity of a printed document. It stands to reason, therefore, that before state governments can transition fully into the electronic legal information environment they must develop procedures to ensure the trustworthiness of their electronic legal information.

The ease with which electronic legal information is created and changed raises a second critical consideration: how is legal information with long-term, historical value (including, for example, amended statutes, repealed sections of regulations, and overruled cases) preserved for future use? In a print environment, information is preserved by maintaining paper copies of key legislative documents, administrative materials, and judicial decisions and other resources. It is typical for more than one library, archive, or institution to keep a copy of these historical documents, further assuring their preservation.

Electronic information resides, however, on a computer or other storage device. New versions of computer hardware and software and changing storage media continually result in an inability to read or access older files, thereby making their content unavailable. As hardware, software, and storage media change, old documents are preserved by “migrating” to new formats. Electronic legal information of long-term value must be preserved in a usable format. Unfortunately, few states have addressed this critical need, and fewer still have an infrastructure in place to monitor older data and keep their storage methods up-to-date. The governmental and societal benefits of electronic creation and distribution are limited severely if state government information becomes unusable because of technological changes.

A third issue raised by the electronic creation and distribution of legal material flows from the necessity of preserving all forms of documents with long-term value: the issue is the responsibility of state government to make its legal resources easily, and permanently, accessible. Legal information is consulted by citizens, legislators, government administrators and officials, judges, attorneys, researchers, and scholars, all of whom may require access to both the current law and to older materials, including that which has been amended and superseded. Once properly preserved, electronic legal information of long-term value must also be easily accessible on the same basis as other legal information; that is, electronic legal information should be authenticated and widely available on a permanent basis. State governments must ensure an informed citizenry, which is essential for our democracy to function.

The issues that arise as state governments transition to an electronic legal information environment are common to every state. These issues are also encountered by subdivisions of state government, including municipalities and counties, as well as American Indian tribes. These governments face the same issues as the larger state government, and likewise must manage the entire life cycle of government information, from creation and publication to preservation. This act can be adapted for use by any governmental entity.

About the act.

About the act. — The Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act (UELMA) provides states with an outcomes-based approach to the authentication and preservation of electronic legal material. That is, the goals of the authentication and preservation program outlined in the act are to enable end-users to verify the trustworthiness of the legal material they are using and to provide a framework for states to preserve legal material in perpetuity in a manner that allows for permanent access. The act does not require specific technologies, leaving the choice of technology for authentication and preservation up to the states. Giving states the flexibility to choose any technology that meets the required outcomes allows each state to choose the best and most cost-effective method for that state. In addition, this flexible, outcomes-based approach anticipates that technologies will change over time; the act does not tie a state to any specific technology at any time.

It should be noted that there are some important issues this act does not address, leaving them to other law or policy. First, this act does not mandate that states publish legal material electronically; choice of format is left entirely to a state’s discretion. Second, the act does not require a state to convert older legal material from print format to electronic format. Print remains an accepted medium for preservation of and access to legal material. If, however, a state converts older legal material from print to electronic format, and if the state then designates that electronic format as official, the requirements of the act apply.

Third, this act does not deal with copyright issues, leaving those to federal law and state practice. Fourth, this act does not affect or supersede any rules of evidence; it only provides that electronic legal material that is authenticated is presumed to be a true copy. Fifth, the act does not affect existing state law regarding the certification of printed documents.

Sixth, this act does not interfere with the contractual relationship between a state and a commercial publisher with which the state contracts for the production of its legal material. The act requires that the official publisher be responsible for implementing the terms of the act, regardless of where or by whom the legal material is actually printed or distributed. For the purposes of the act, only a state agency, officer, or employee can be the official publisher, although state policy may allow a commercial entity to produce an official version of the state’s legal material.

The UELMA is intended to be complementary to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC, which covers sales and many commercial transactions), the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act (URPERA, which provides for electronic recording of real property instruments), and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA, which deals with electronic commerce). Each of these acts covers a unique topic, as does the UELMA, which addresses management of the most important state-level legal materials. The UELMA is not intended to conflict with any of these acts.

Conclusion.

A uniform act should set forth provisions that can be efficiently followed and that achieve the stated purposes of the act. The Drafting Committee believes that this proposed uniform act meets these requirements. The act is straightforward in its terms, creates no additional administrative offices, and has no requirement of judicial or administrative oversight. The act was developed through extensive discussion and debate during five meetings of the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee was assisted by numerous advisors and observers, representing a wide range of organizations. In addition to the American Bar Association advisors listed above, important contributions were made by the observers who attended meetings, participated in conference calls, and submitted many comments on and suggestions for the various drafts of the act. The act is better for their contributions.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the introductory paragraph refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Legal material.

Legal material. — (Section 2(2)). The definition of “legal material” is intentionally narrow. As drafted, it includes only the most basic state-level legal documents: the state constitution, session laws, codified laws, and administrative rules with the effect of law. The act suggests as alternatives a range of additional legal material.

Among the additional legal material suggested for inclusion is state administrative agency decisions. An enacting state may choose to include those administrative agency decisions that are treated in that state as having the effect of law, for example, or the state may choose to include or exclude certain agency decisions in the act’s coverage, in which situation the decisions should be listed with specificity. Each enacting state is given discretion to determine which, if any, of its administrative agency decisions should be covered by the act.

In some states, the publication of judicial decisions and court rules is handled by the judicial branch, over which the state legislature may have no authority to mandate specific procedures such as those created by this act. Because of this potential separation of powers issue, judicial decisions and court rules are included in this act as an alternative in the definition of legal material. If an enacting state includes judicial decisions or court rules, some differentiation between legal material issued by the state’s various courts (i.e. trial courts of various types, appellate courts, and supreme court) may be necessary.

Enacting states may decide to expand the definition of legal material beyond that offered as alternatives. For example, in some states, an initiative or referendum process may result in the creation of statutory law outside of, or in addition to, the legislative process. An enacting state may choose to include in the definition of legal material the various documents created in an initiative or referendum process, including especially the final, uncodified form (similar to a session law) as passed by popular vote. States may decide to include enacted, but subsequently vetoed, legislation. Other states may decide to include certain categories of municipal or county legal material in the act. The definition of legal material is left to the discretion of the enacting state, beyond the four categories of basic state-level legal material defined in this section.

Many important sources of law, such as legislative journals and calendars, reports of legislative confirmations and other hearings, versions of bills, gubernatorial orders and proclamations, attorney general opinions, and many agency publications, might be included in the act’s coverage under the discretionary section 2 (2) (H). Whether a state legislature can include in the act the records from certain executive branch officials (executive orders and proclamations, or attorney general opinions, for example) raises a separation of powers issue similar to that regarding judicial decisions.

Official publisher.

If additional legal material is added to Section 2(2), a corresponding addition must be made to Section 2(3) that identifies an official publisher for the legal material. Official publisher. — (Section 2(3)). The state must designate an official publisher for each type of legal material defined in Section 2(2). This can, and most likely will, be an existing state agency, officer, or employee that already has responsibility for the publication of the legal material. The official publisher is the state actor charged with carrying out the provisions of this act.

To complete the definition of official publisher, an appropriate government agency or employee for each type of legal material must be identified, as indicated by bracketed language. Because the legal material may come from different departments, and even different branches, of government, the official publisher may be one employee or agency, or several.

This act only applies to legal material published by the official publisher designated in this section. Many states contract with commercial printers or publishers for the production of their legal material, and under this act states can continue to contract out the production of their legal material as desired. The act does not interfere with the contractual relationship between the state and the commercial publisher. However, a commercial publisher cannot serve as official publisher of legal material for the purposes of this act.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

[From section 12 of the Uniform Act]

[From section 12 of the Uniform Act] This act applies to legal material in an electronic record designated as official and first published after the effective date of the act, as noted in Section 3. Additional time may be needed, beyond the usual date of effectiveness of its statutes, for a state to prepare policies and procedures to meet the requirements of authentication, preservation and public access of electronic legal material.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in subsection (2) refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” in the introductory paragraph and in subsection (5) refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

The term “this act” refers to S.L. 2014, Chapter 278, which is compiled as§§ 60-301 to 60-311.

Effective Dates.

Section 2 of S.L. 2014, ch. 278 makes that act effective on July 1, 2015.